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MEMPHIS NATURAL GAS CO. v. STONE, CHAIRMAN, STATE TAX COMMISSION. No. 94. Argued December 8, 1947. Decided June 21, 1948. Edward P. Russell argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was B. L. Tighe, Jr. J. H. Sumrall argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Reed announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Murphy join. The Memphis Natural Gas Company is a Delaware corporation which owns and operates a pipe line for the transportation of natural gas. The line runs from the Monroe Gas Field in the State of Louisiana through the states of Arkansas and Mississippi to Memphis and other points in the State of Tennessee. Approximately 135 miles of the pipe line lie within Mississippi; at two points within that state there are compressing stations. It is stipulated that the Gas Company has never engaged in any intrastate commerce in Mississippi; that it has only one customer within the state, the Mississippi Power and Light Company, to which it sells gas from its interstate line at wholesale from several delivery points; that the Gas Company has never qualified under the laws of Mississippi to do intrastate business within that state; that it has no agent for the service of process and that it has no office within the state; and that its only employees and representatives in Mississippi are those necessary to maintain the pipe line and its auxiliary appurtenances. The Gas Company has paid all ad valorem taxes assessed against its property in Mississippi pursuant to the state law. In addition to the ad valorem taxes, Mississippi imposes a “franchise, or excise tax” upon all corporations “doing business” within the state. For the purpose of the Act, “doing business” is defined “[to] mean and [to] include each and every act, power or privilege exercised or enjoyed in this State, as an incident to, or by virtue of the powers and privileges acquired by the nature of such organization.” The tax is “equal to $1.50 of each $1,000.00 or fraction thereof of the value of capital used, invested or employed” within the state. The Gas Company filed a petition for review by the State Tax Commission of Mississippi of the franchise tax assessed against it for the years 1942, 1943 and 1944 by the State Tax Commissioner. In this petition the Gas Company argued that the imposition of the tax by the state was an act prohibited by the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. From an order of the Tax Commission approving the action of the Commissioner, the Gas Company appealed to the Circuit Court of Hinds County, Mississippi. That court reversed the Tax Commission, but was itself reversed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi. The Supreme Court said that Mississippi had made “no attempt to tax interstate commerce as such, but the levy is an exaction which the State requires as a recompense for its protection of lawful activities carried on in this State by the corporation, foreign or domestic, activities which are incidental to the powers and privileges possessed by it by the nature of its organization — here the local activities in maintaining, keeping in repair, and otherwise in manning the facilities of the system throughout the 135 miles of its line in this State.” 201 Miss. 670, 674, 29 So. 2d 268, 270. It argued that the state tax did not bear directly upon interstate commerce and that any burden imposed upon that commerce was remote and unsubstantial. It concluded that the local tax was not unconstitutional and ordered that the taxes in question, plus penalties, be paid by the Gas Company. A petition for certiorari, under § 237 (b), Judicial Code, was filed in this Court by the Gas Company on May 17, 1947. It presented the question as to whether the judgment violated the Commerce Clause by requiring a foreign undomesticated corporation, engaged in interstate commerce, to pay the tax. That petition was granted June 16, 1947. 331 U. S. 802. The suggestion is made that by the stipulation of facts in the trial court, Mississippi concedes the truth of an allegation of the challenged petition before the State Tax Commission reading as follows: “To carry on interstate commerce is not a franchise or a privilege granted by the state; it is a right which every citizen of the United States is entitled to exercise under the constitution and laws of the United States; and the accession and possession of mere corporate facilities, as a matter of convenience in carrying on their business, cannot have the effect of depriving it of such right, unless congress should see fit to interpose some contrary regulation. Your Petitioner obtains no protection from the State of Mississippi and acquires no powers or privileges in its interstate activity other than the protection afforded your Petitioner by virtue of the payment of an ad valorem tax on the property used by the Company wholly in interstate commerce.” It is said that because of this concession Mississippi cannot exact a tax from petitioner as the state “affords nothing to this petitioner for which it could ask recompense by way of a tax.” The pertinent part of the stipulation reads: “That all of the facts stated in said petition are true and no proof of the same shall be required in this cause.” No contention as to the concession is presented to us by the petition for certiorari, assignment of errors or brief. Petitioner’s contention is that the tax levied against it is invalid under the Commerce Clause. Petitioner’s failure to raise the question alone would justify a refusal here to consider the contention. See Connecticut R. Co. v. Palmer, 305 U. S. 493, 496; Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U. S. 22, 34. The answer to the suggestion, however, seems to us clear. The argument is that the Supreme Court of Mississippi must be reversed because the tax before us “is a tax on the privilege of engaging in the doing of interstate business within the State, and such a tax is . . . invalid under the Commerce Clause.” This conclusion seems to be reached by the following analysis. The stipulation between the Company and the State Tax Commission is read as if the phrase “in its interstate activity” modified only the words “powers” and “privileges” and not the word “protection.” If that is a proper construction of this stipulation, then the parties have agreed that the Company has obtained by the tax “no protection from the State . . . other than the protection afforded ... by virtue of the payment of an ad valorem tax . . . .” The dissent then concludes that the imposition of the ad valorem taxes “exhausted” the state’s taxing power and, consequently, that the tax “is a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate business” and, as such, “invalid under the Commerce Clause.” The state Supreme Court construed the tax as “an exaction ... as a recompense for . . . protection of . . . the local activities in maintaining, keeping in repair, and otherwise in manning the facilities of the system throughout the 135 miles of its line in this State.” As we are bound by the construction of the state statute by the state court, it is idle to suggest that the tax is on “the privilege of engaging in interstate business.” Nor can this result be changed by the suggestion that the tax cannot be on any local incidents “because they have already been fully taxed.” The local incidents, spoken of by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, were not the taxable events selected for the imposition of the ad valorem tax. These local incidents were the basis for the franchise or excise tax now in controversy. No reason is perceived why Mississippi cannot exact this different tax for the same protection. It is as though the ad valorem rate had been increased. The power to levy such a new tax is not and could not be questioned except as an interference with commerce. The legal question remains as to whether a state can exact a tax on those activities under the Commerce Clause. The facts of this case present again the perennial problem of the validity of a state tax for the privilege of carrying on, within a state, certain activities admittedly necessary to maintain or operate the interstate business of the taxpayer. This transportation by pipe line with deliveries within the state at wholesale only is interstate business. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Comm’n, 332 U. S. 507, 513, and cases cited. Notwithstanding the power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause to regulate the taxation of interstate commerce, if it so desires, that body generally has left the determination to the courts of what state taxes on or affecting commerce were permissible and what impermissible under the Commerce Clause. The states have sought by taxation to collect from the instrumentalities of commerce compensation for the protection and advantages rendered to commerce by state governments. The federal courts have sought over the years to determine the scope of a state’s power to tax in the light of the competing interests of interstate commerce, and of the states, with their power to impose reasonable taxes upon incidents connected with that commerce. See Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 441. We continue at that task, characterized long ago as an area of “nice distinctions.” Galveston, Harrisburg & S. A. R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 225. There is no question here of Due Process. The Gas Company’s property is in the taxing state where the taxable incidents occurred. McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327, 329. See Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 423. Nor is the measure used to calculate the amount of the tax challenged. That measure is $1.50 on each thousand dollars of capital employed within Mississippi. Southern Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U. S. 148, 156, Third. The attack on the Mississippi statute is that it violates the Commerce Clause by putting a tax on the commerce itself. The local incidents covered by the definition of doing business hereinbefore set out, § 9312, Mississippi Code, supra, were said by the Supreme Court in this case to be “the local activities in maintaining, keeping in repair, and otherwise in manning the facilities of the system” in Mississippi. 201 Miss. 670, 674, 29 So. 2d 268, 270. The cases just cited in the note show that, from the viewpoint of the Commerce Clause, where the corporations carry on a local activity sufficiently separate from the interstate commerce, state taxes may be validly laid, even though the exaction from the business of the taxpayer is precisely the same as though the tax had been levied upon the interstate business itself. But the choice of a local incident for the tax, without more, is not enough. There are always convenient local incidents in every interstate operation. Nippert v. City of Richmond, supra, at 423. The incident selected should be one that does not lend itself to repeated exactions in other states. Otherwise intrastate commerce may be preferred over interstate commerce. Again, where there is a state exaction for some intrastate privilege that discriminates against interstate commerce, it is invalid even though it is sufficiently disconnected from the commerce to be taxable otherwise. The Mississippi tax under consideration is not discriminatory. It is levied, in addition to ad valorem taxes, on corporations created under Mississippi laws, those admitted to do business in Mississippi and those operating in the state without any authority from the state. See note 1, supra. Petitioner operated local compressor stations. We have heretofore held that the generation of electric energy for the operation of such stations was subject to state taxation without violation of the Commerce Clause. Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U. S. 604. A glance at the activities, named above, listed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, shows that there is no possibility of multiple taxation through the same exac-tions by other states. The amount of the tax is reasonable. It is properly apportioned to the investment in Mississippi. However, a state tax upon a corporation doing only an interstate business may be invalid under our decisions because levied (1) upon the privilege of doing interstate business within the state, or (2) upon some local event so much a part of interstate business as to be in effect a tax upon the interstate business itself. Petitioner asserts that the Mississippi statute so offends. First. This Court has drawn the distinction in the field of pipe line taxation between state statutes on the privilege of doing business where only interstate business was done and those upon appropriate local incidents. In Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, the Ozark Pipe Line Corporation operated an oil pipe line from Oklahoma, through Missouri to a point in Illinois. Oil was neither received nor delivered in Missouri. This was interstate transportation. Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Power Comm’n, 331 U. S. 682, 689, and cases cited at note 12. It had its principal office in Missouri. It had a license from Missouri authorizing it to engage “ ‘exclusively in the business of transporting crude petroleum by pipe line.’ ” Page 561. The state tax was an apportioned franchise tax. It was construed by this Court as a tax “upon the privilege or right to do business.” Page 562. Virginia v. Imperial Coal Co., 293 U. S. 15, 20. As such a tax upon a corporation doing only an interstate business, it was held invalid under the Commerce Clause. In State Tax Commission v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U. S. 41, a pipe line ran from Louisiana, through Mississippi and back to Louisiana. Two local Mississippi distributors took gas in that state from the respondent. Mississippi sought to tax the respondent under a privilege tax law that required the pipe line company to get a license to exercise the privilege desired, that is, to operate an interstate pipe line. This Court held that the entire business of the respondent was interstate despite a claimed local activity by the reduction of pressure to deliver gas to the Mississippi distributors. It followed that the state license for the privilege of engaging in the business of operating a pipe line was an invalid burden under the Commerce Clause. On the other hand, in Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 308 U. S. 522, we affirmed per curiam a judgment of the Fifth Circuit in Stone v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 103 F. 2d 544, on the authority of Southern Gas Corporation v. Alabama, supra at 153, 156-57. The tax in question in the 308 U. S. case was exacted by the same Mississippi statute employed here. This differs from the Mississippi statute in the Interstate case in 284 U. S. The Interstate case in 308 U. S. differed from this present case, so far as is material, only in the fact that the foreign corporation filed a copy of its charter as a prerequisite to doing business in Mississippi and appointed an agent for the service of process. The page references in the Stone citation of the Southern Gas case show that this Court considered the Mississippi tax in the Stone case as one not on business but “ ‘on the privilege of exercising corporate functions within the State and its employment of its capital in [Mississippi].' ” Southern Gas Corp. v. Alabama, supra, 153. In the Southern Gas case, page 155, the company did intrastate business, but in the Stone case no intrastate business was done. Thus the local event of qualifying for intrastate business, which occurred in both Southern Gas and Stone, brought a different result from that in the Ozark case and in Interstate, 284 U. S., where the privilege or right to do interstate business was protected. Mississippi, through its Supreme Court, has declared that there is no attempt to tax the privilege of doing an interstate business or to secure anything from the corporation by this statute except compensation for the protection of the enumerated local activities of “maintaining, keeping in repair, and otherwise in manning the facilities.” 201 Miss. 674, 29 So. 2d 270. Under § 9314, quoted in note 1, in the light of that statute’s definition of “doing business” set out on pp. 81-82, supra, this is a reasonable meaning to give the taxing statute. We must accept the state court’s interpretation. We therefore conclude that the Mississippi tax here involved is not upon the privilege of doing an interstate business. Second. We come now to the second question. That is whether the challenged excise for carrying on within the state the aforementioned activities of maintenance, repair and manning by a corporation engaged solely in interstate commerce may be taxed. The answer on this point depends upon whether these activities are so much a part of the interstate business as to be under the protection of the Commerce Clause as this Court has construed it. In this case the local activities are those involved in the maintenance of the pipe line. This tax is not an unap-portioned tax on gross receipts from the commerce itself. It is measured by a proportion of the capital employed within the state. It cannot be duplicated in other states. Compare Western Live Stock v. Bureau, 303 U. S. 250, 255. In Ozark Pipe Line v. Monier, supra, this Court, at p. 565, spoke of such activities as set out below. If it was intended to say that such in-the-state activities as there described could not be taxed, we disagree with that conclusion. We are inclined to the view that the fact that the tax there under consideration was considered a tax “upon the privilege or right to do business,” led the Court to point out that as the local activities were essential to that business, they were not taxable activities. The pipe line itself and all appurtenances are essential, yet an ad valorem tax can be laid. In taxation, we do not have the problems raised by many decisions on state regulations alleged to impede the free flow of commerce when not nationally uniform. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761. Regulations may be imposed by the state on commerce. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, supra; Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28. When state taxation of activities or property within a state is involved, different considerations control. It is no longer a question of actual interruption of the operation of commerce. Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1, 14. Rather a prohibited tax exaction is one beyond the power of the state because the taxable event is outside its boundaries, McLeod v. Dilworth Co., supra, or for a privilege the state cannot grant. See note 10, supra. Is it bad because a tax on the commerce itself? We have sustained a fee for the privilege of using state courts, exacted by the state from a business licensed by the United States to handle customs charges. Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U. S. 202. Likewise a special privilege tax upon an interstate automobile transportation company for the use of the state roads has been approved. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Comm’rs, 332 U. S. 495. The Mississippi excise has no more effect upon the commerce than any of the instances just recited. The events giving rise to this tax were no more essential to the interstate commerce than those just mentioned or ad valorem taxes. We think that the state is within its constitutional rights in exacting compensation under this statute for the protection it affords the activities within its borders. Of course, the interstate commerce could not be conducted without these local activities. But that fact is not conclusive. These are events apart from the flow of commerce. This is a tax on activities for which the state, not the United States, gives protection and the state is entitled to compensation when its tax cannot be said to be an unreasonable burden or a toll on the interstate business. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Black concurs in the judgment. Miss. Code § 9313 (1942): “There is hereby imposed ... a franchise or excise tax upon every corporation . . . now existing in this state, or hereafter organized, created or established, under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Mississippi, equal to $1.50 for each $1,000.00 or fraction thereof, of the value of the capital used, invested or employed in the exercise of any power, privilege or right enjoyed by such organization within this state, except as hereinafter provided. It being the purpose of this section to require the payment to the state of Mississippi, this tax for the right granted by the laws of this state to exist as such organization, and enjoy, under the protection of the laws of this state, the powers, rights, privileges and immunities derived from the state by the form of such existence.” §9314: “For the year 1940 and annually thereafter, there shall be and is hereby imposed, levied and assessed upon every corporation, association or joint stock company, as hereinbefore defined, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of some other state, territory or country, or organized and existing without any specific statutory authority, now, or hereafter doing business within this state, as hereinbefore defined, a franchise or excise tax equal to $1.50 of each $1,000.00 br fraction thereof of the value of capital used, invested or employed within this state, except as hereinafter provided. It being the purpose of this section to require the payment of a tax by all organizations not organized under the laws of this state, measured by the amount of capital or its equivalent, for which such organization receives the benefit and protection of the government and laws of the state.” Miss. Code §9312 (1942). Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 429. Such local incidents form a sound basis for taxation by a state of foreign corporations doing interstate business. For example, we have upheld state taxes on sales after completion of the interstate transit, McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33; on production of electricity for interstate commerce, Utah Power & L. Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165, compare Fisher’s Blend Station, Inc. v. Tax Comm’n, 297 U. S. 650, 655; a privilege tax on the operation of machines for the production of electricity to drive gas in interstate commerce, Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U. S. 604; a use tax on rails shipped interstate for immediate incorporation into an interstate transportation system, Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167. We have upheld a franchise tax on a foreign corporation authorized to do business and making sales in a state other than its actual or business domicile, Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U. S. 331; a privilege tax on a foreign corporation doing business in the state upon a proportion of property in the taxing state that was computed by using interstate commerce as an element, Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U. S. 290; Western Cartridge Co. v. Emmerson, 281 U. S. 511; an excise on intrastate manufacturing, added to an ad valorem tax and measured by sales, including out of state, American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459, and see Powell, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 501, 508 and 727, Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 255; a license for storing goods at rest in the state under a transit privilege, Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U. S. 70. See Western Live Stock v. Bureau, 303 U. S. 250, 254. See Western Live Stock v. Bureau, 303 U. S. 250, 255. See Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454; Nippert v. City of Richmond, supra, at 431-32. Cf. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Comm’rs, 332 U. S. 495, 501-502. See Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U. S. 290, 295, and Western Cartridge Co. v. Emmerson, 281 U. S. 511, 514. See Southern Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U. S. 148, 156, Third, and cases cited; International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U. S. 416, 422-23; Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Comm’rs, 332 U. S. 495, 501-502. This Court has held many times that a state has no power to refuse or tax the privilege of doing interstate business. A foreign corporation, seeking or requiring no privilege from a state such as the power of eminent domain, the right to use public ways or beds of streams, and without federal charter or other federal statutory privilege, cannot be denied the right to enter a state, remain there and operate a purely interstate business without a state franchise. Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 56; International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 107 (3); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282. See also California v. Pacific R. Co., 127 U. S. 1; Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525; Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153, 164; State ex rel. Board v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 216 Iowa 436, 445, 249 N. W. 366, 371. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, “because it taxes the very process of interstate commerce” (p. 253), it is “a direct imposition on that very freedom of commercial flow which for more than a hundred and fifty years has been the ward of the Commerce Clause” (p. 256); Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Co., 330 U. S. 422, “Steve-doring, we conclude, is essentially a part of the commerce itself and therefore a tax . . . upon the privilege of conducting the business of stevedoring for interstate and foreign commerce, measured by those gross receipts, is invalid” (p. 433); this follows “a line of precedents outlawing taxes on the commerce itself” (p. 433). Galveston, Harrisburg & S. A. R. Co. v. Texas, supra at 224. See Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 312, n. 11; see comments on American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, n. 4, supra. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 9836 (1919): “. . . Every corporation, not organized under the laws of this state, and engaged in business in this state, shall pay an annual franchise tax to the state of Missouri equal to one-tenth of one per cent, of the par value of its capital stock and surplus employed in business in this state . . . .” The opinion evoked a dissent by Justice Brandéis which pointed out that: “The tax assailed is not laid upon the occupation . . .”; nor “upon the privilege of doing business.” Pp. 567-68. The Justice concluded that “a tax is not a direct burden merely because it is laid upon an indispensable instrumentality of such commerce,” but that the contrary is true “where it is upon property moving in interstate commerce.” P. 569. Compare Ozark with Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Comm’r, 298 U. S. 553. The Ozark case has had a long history in this Court. Since 288 U. S., it has not been cited in a manner pertinent to our present issue, except to be distinguished, sometimes narrowly. In Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245, 249, and State Tax Commission v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U. S. 41, 43, it was cited with approval for the proposition that a state cannot lay a tax on the occupation or the business of carrying on interstate commerce. In Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U. S. 218, Ozark was relied upon to hold unconstitutional a state tax upon a corporation which was qualified to do intrastate business within the state but which in fact did only an interstate business. Cardozo, J., joined by Brandéis, J., and Stone, J., dissented on the ground that the tax could be supported as a tax laid upon the privilege to do intrastate business. Ozark was next before the Court in Virginia v. Imperial Coal Co., supra, a case involving a tax on tangible and intangible property situated and used within the state to carry on an exclusively interstate business. In that case it was distinguished on the ground that an-ad valorem property tax, and not a privilege tax, was before the Court. In Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Comm’r, 298 U. S. 553, involving an excise tax on corporations doing business within Massachusetts, Ozark was again distinguished, this time on the ground that the Lumber Co. was engaged in local activities within the state and, therefore, that the burden imposed upon its interstate commerce was remote and incidental. Again, in Southern Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U. S. 148, Ozark was found to be inapposite because of factual differences. Southern Gas ruled upon the constitutionality of a tax assessed on the basis of the same tax that was before this Court in Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, supra. The state tax was held constitutional by the Southern Gas case as a tax exacted for the privilege of doing an intrastate business by a company in fact engaging in intrastate business in Alabama. Miss. Gen. Laws (1930), c. 88, §3: “Every person desiring to engage in any business, or exercise any privilege hereinafter specified, shall first, before commencing same, apply for, pay for, and procure from the proper officer a privilege license authorizing him to engage in the business, or exercise the privilege specified therein; and the amount of tax shown in the following schedules is hereby imposed for the privilege of engaging and/or continuing in the businesses set out therein.” Id., § 163: “Upon each person engaging and/or continuing in this state in the business of operating a pipe line or transporting in or through this state oil, or natural, or artificial gas, through pipes, and/or conduits, a tax, as follows: [On each mile a varying tax that depended upon the diameter of the pipe].” The same rationale has led this Court at times to declare invalid similar taxes on foreign corporations, admitted to do business in a state and doing only an interstate business through activities within the state. The leading decisions supporting this view (Cheney Brothers Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. 8. 147, and Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203) have been strictly limited. Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 298 U. S. 553; cf. Southern Gas Corporation v. Alabama, supra, at p. 156, and dissent in Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U. S. 218, 229, at 237. In the Cheney case an excise tax for the privilege of doing business in Massachusetts of an unapportioned percentage of its authorized capital stock (Mass. Acts, 1909, c. 490, Part III, § 56) was invalidated as being wholly on interstate commerce although it maintained "in Boston a selling office with one office salesman and four other salesmen who travel through New England. The salesmen solicit and take orders, subject to approval by the home office in Connecticut, and it ships directly to the purchasers. No stock of goods is kept in the Boston office, but only samples used in soliciting and taking orders. Copies and records of orders are retained, but no bookkeeping is done, and the office makes no collections. The salesmen and the office rent are paid directly from Connecticut and the other expenses of the office are paid from a small deposit kept in Boston for the purpose. No other business is done in the State.” P. 153. In the Alpha Portland case where, on the assumption that the taxpayer had obtained a right to do business in the state, under similar circumstances an unapportioned excise on the privilege to do business in Massachusetts was invalidated because a burden on commerce. St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 362; Southern Gas Corp. v. Alabama, supra at 153, First; Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U. S. 69, 79; Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U. S. 155, 158. See note 11, supra. This Court said, 266 U. S. at 565: “The business actually carried on by appellant was exclusively in interstate commerce. The maintenance of an office, the purchase of supplies, employment of labor, maintenance and operation of telephone and telegraph lines and automobiles, and appellant’s other acts within the State, were all exclusively in furtherance of its interstate business; and the property itself, however extensive or of whatever character, was likewise devoted only to that end. They were the means and instrumentalities by which that business was done and in no proper sense constituted, or contributed to, the doing of a local business.” See also Heyman v. Hays, 236 U. S. 178, 185. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 439, 445: “The rule of property taxation is that the value of the property is the basis of taxation. It does not mean a tax upon the earnings which the property makes, nor for the privilege of using the property, but rests solely upon the value. But the value of property results from the use to which it is put and varies with the profitableness of that use, present and prospective, actual and anticipated. There is no pecuniary value outside of that which results from such use. The amount and profitable character of such use determines the value, and if property is taxed at its actual cash value it is taxed upon something which is created by the uses to which it is put.” See also Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530. In the Union Brokerage case we dealt not with an annual tax on franchises or licenses but with a state’s single exaction from a foreign corporation for the right to use the courts of the state. The company was a customhouse broker engaged wholly in thus earning fees by “ ‘charges upon the commerce itself,’ ” p. 209. There were incidental activities in the state in furtherance of this main purpose, p. 208: “Union’s business is localized in Minnesota, it buys materials and services from people in that State, it enters into business relationships, as this case, a suit against its former president, illustrates, wholly outside of the arrangements it makes with importers or exporters.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SOCIETY FOR SAVINGS IN THE CITY OF CLEVELAND v. BOWERS, TAX COMMISSIONER OF OHIO. NO. 204. Argued March 28, 1955. Decided May 16, 1955. Robert F. Maskey argued the cause for appellant in No. 204. With him on the brief were David A. Gaskill and Edgar P. Stocker. Robert G. Day argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant in No. 220. Joseph S. Gill, First Assistant Attorney General of Ohio, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was C. William O’Neill, Attorney General. Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Holland, Ellis N. Slack and Hilbert P. Zarky filed briefs for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1829 this Court decided in Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, that obligations of the Federal Government are immune from state taxation. This rule, aimed at protecting the borrowing power of the United States from state encroachment, was derived from the “Borrowing” and “Supremacy” Clauses of the Constitution, and the constitutional doctrines announced in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). It was subsequently embodied in a succession of federal statutes, the existing statute being R. S. § 3701, 31 U. S. C. § 742. The rule has been carried forward to embrace indirect taxation of such obligations through their inclusion in a tax imposed on all the property of a taxpayer. It is quite immaterial that the state tax does not discriminate against the federal obligations. New York ex rel. Bank of Commerce v. Commissioners of Taxes, 2 Black 620 (1863); Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200 (1865); Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516 (1914); New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 338 U. S. 665 (1950). The two cases now before us involve the application of that rule, in a somewhat novel situation. Society for Savings in the City of Cleveland and First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Warren, two mutual savings banks having no capital stock or shareholders, and located in Ohio, attack the validity of an Ohio property tax, as assessed against them, on the ground that they were required to include in the property values upon which the tax was computed United States bonds held in their security portfolios. Had these bonds been excluded, the entire tax would have been wiped out in both instances. The Ohio Tax Commissioner thought these government bonds were not excludible. The Ohio Board of Tax Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court of Ohio sustained the Commissioner in each instance. The two banks are here by appeal from the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court in each case. The cases were argued together, and are so treated in this opinion. The tax in question was assessed in the names of these banks under §§ 5408, 5412 and 5638-1 of the Ohio General Code, upon the book value of their “capital employed, or the property representing it” (§ 5408) “at the aggregate amount of the capital, the surplus or reserve fund and the undivided profits” (§ 5412). The tax was at the rate of two mills on the dollar (§ 5638-1). No claim is made that the taxes constituted a franchise tax or some other kind of privilege tax. Cf. Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379 (1931). The Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that this tax, based as it was upon the inclusion of federal obligations, would have to fall if directed against the banks. New York ex rel. Bank of Commerce v. Commissioners of Taxes, supra; Bank Tax Case, supra. This tax, though, was not considered to be against the banks. Holding that the depositors of a mutual savings bank have an interest similar to that of shareholders of other banks, the Ohio court found instead that the tax was imposed upon the “intangible property interests” of the depositors as the owners of each bank. The banks’ capital, surplus fund and undivided profits, which we will refer to as their surplus, were regarded as not themselves the subject matter of the tax, but as simply the measure of the tax against the depositors, and the banks were treated as tax-collecting agents rather than as taxpayers. In so deciding the Ohio court relied upon a gloss on the rule of immunity stated above. It has been held that a state may impose a tax upon the stockholders’ interests in a corporation, measured by corporate asset values, without making any deduction on account of United States securities held by the corporation. This doctrine had its origin in cases involving national bank stock. There, congressional consent to state taxation of the stock of national banks, upon certain conditions, was held, over strong dissent, to permit such taxes to be assessed without the exclusion of federal obligations owned by the banks. Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573 (1866); National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353 (1870); Des Moines National Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U. S. 103 (1923). This result was reached in part on the theory that the stockholders’ interests in a corporation represent a separate property interest from the corporation’s ownership of its assets, so that a tax on the stockholders’ interests is not a tax on the federal obligations which are included in the corporate property. This rationale has been carried over to cases involving stock of state-created banks, and thus a tax on their shareholders, though measured by corporate assets which include federal obligations, is held not to offend the rule immunizing such obligations from state taxation. Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander, 184 U. S. 111 (1902). Further, in levying a tax on shareholders, a state may require its payment by the corporation, as a collecting agent. Corry v. Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466 (1905). The result is that when, as is usually the case, the shareholder tax is measured solely by corporate asset values, such a tax is difficult to distinguish from a tax imposed upon the corporation itself, so far as the practical impact of the two types of taxes upon corporate-owned federal obligations is concerned. Nevertheless, this exception to the general rule of immunity is firmly embedded in the law. The focal point of these appeals is thus whether we are to regard this tax as imposed on the banks or, as the Ohio court held the legislature intended, on their depositors. Were we free to construe Ohio’s statute de novo we might have difficulty in reaching the conclusion which the Ohio court did. Suffice it to say at this point: The statute is barren of any language expressly imposing this tax on the depositors, and contains no provision giving the bank any right to recover the tax from the depositors, as might be expected if the bank had been regarded as a mere tax-collecting agent. By contrast, the taxes laid by the Ohio General Code on (a) the shares of incorporated financial institutions whose capital is divided into shares, (b) the shares of unincorporated institutions whose capital is divided into shares, and (c) deposits, are imposed on the shares “of the stockholders” (§ 5408) and on the deposits “as taxable property of its depositors” (§5673-2) In the case of those taxes, not here involved, the bank is given full rights of reimbursement from the stockholders or depositors, as the case may be, and it is clear that the institution in paying such taxes is acting only as a collection agent. Ohio Gen. Code §§ 5672, 5673, 5673-1, 5673-2. And beyond these considerations, one might not have expected the legislature to tax the ownership interests of the depositors of these banks on the same basis as stockholders are taxed. The asserted interest of the depositors is in the surplus of the bank, which is primarily a reserve against losses and secondarily a repository of undivided earnings. So long as the bank remains solvent, depositors receive a return on this fund only as an element of the interest paid on their deposits. To maintain their intangible ownership interest, they must maintain their deposits. If a depositor withdraws from the bank, he receives only his deposits and interest. If he continues, his only chance of getting anything more would be in the unlikely event of a solvent liquidation, a possibility that hardly rises to the level of an expectancy. It stretches the imagination very far to attribute any real value to such a remote contingency, and when coupled with the fact that it represents nothing which the depositor can readily transfer, any theoretical value reduces almost to the vanishing point. Cf. Collett v. Springfield Savings Society, 13 Ohio Cir. Ct. Repts. 131, aff’d 56 Ohio St. 776, 49 N. E. 1109 (1897). The Ohio court, however, has held that this tax is imposed on the depositors. But that does not end the matter for us. We must judge the true nature of this tax in terms of the rights and liabilities which the statute, as construed, creates. In assessing the validity of the tax under federal law, we are not bound by the state’s conclusion that the tax is imposed on the depositors, even though we would be bound by the state court’s decision as to what rights and liabilities this statute establishes under state law. The court’s mere conclusion that the tax is imposed on the depositors is no more than a characterization of the tax. “Where a-federal right is concerned we are not bound by the characterization given to a state tax by state courts or legislatures, or relieved by it from the duty of considering the real nature of the tax and its effect upon the federal right asserted.” Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 367 (1930). See also New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, supra, at 674; Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, supra, at 387. “Neither ingenuity in calculation nor form of words in state enactments can deprive the owner of the tax exemption established for the benefit of the United States.” Missouri ex rel. Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U. S. 313, 321 (1930). Therefore, we proceed -to examine what rights and liabilities the statute-creates. We note, first, that should the bank be unable to pay the tax, after it has been assessed, there is no provision entitling the State of Ohio to collect it from the depositors. A tax against the depositors which is recoverable only from the bank looks like a tax against the bank. And if the tax is in fact against the bank, it does not matter whether the ultimate economic impact is passed on to the depositors. Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U. S. 503, 519 (1907). Next, it appears that the statute does not relieve the bank from having to pay the tax on the “intangible property interest” of a depositor who had an account with the bank on the assessment date of the tax, but has withdrawn his account before the collection date. And if the bank is required to pay on the former depositor’s account, there is no provision entitling the bank to reimbursement from him. It should be observed that in the case of the deposit tax the statute does contain provisions protecting the bank in such a situation. §§ 5412, 5673-1, 5673-2. Finally, and perhaps most important, if this tax is on the depositors, we must find somewhere a right in the bank to make itself whole from the depositors for the taxes paid on their account. In all the cases upholding state taxes against shareholders, without the exclusion of federal obligations owned by the corporation, an express or implied right of reimbursement was presupposed. See Van Allen and other cases at p. 147, supra. As already observed, in the case of the Ohio taxes on shares and deposits the statute contains such a right (§§ 5673, 5673-2) , In the present cases we can find no such right. It may be true that where the tax paid by the bank is less than the interest which the bank contemplates paying the depositors, no such right of reimbursement is necessary. If, for example, a bank has $100,000 of undivided profits, intends to pay its depositors $75,000 interest on their deposits, and has an obligation for this tax of $10,000, it perhaps makes no difference whether the bank pays $65,000 to its depositors, without recovering anything back from them, or pays them $75,000, but later recovers back the $10,000 tax paid for their account. Under either method the bank comes out whole, and the depositors receive the same net interest payment. But if the bank has declared the $75,000 interest payment before the tax is due, we can find nothing in the statute which would give the bank the right either to deduct the $10,000 tax from the interest payment, or to recover it back from the depositors. And conceivably the tax might exceed the interest payable to the depositors, in which event the bank would be left short, absent a right to recover the excess from the depositors. The Ohio court thought that in charging the tax to surplus, the bank in reality would be reducing the depositors’ interest in the surplus, which it described as being “owned” by them, and that therefore in no circumstance was a right of reimbursement necessary. But there are difficulties with this proposition. If this means that the corporate fiction should be disregarded, the result would be that the government bonds would have to be excluded, since on this hypothesis such securities should then be treated as the property of the depositors. On the other hand, if the Ohio court was referring to the depositors' equitable interest in the surplus, as seems more likely, then without a right of recoupment the bank as well as the depositors bears the impact of the tax. Without provisions protecting the bank against the burdens of the tax, we cannot assume that the statute’s operation will not infringe on the immunity of the federal obligations held by the banks. It is not adequate merely to suggest that a bank may be entitled to make itself whole from the depositors under Ohio common law. For no such common-law right has been called to our attention. Rather, the Ohio court’s opinion indicates that the bank may be left without any right of reimbursement. We conclude that this tax is on the depositors in name only, and that for federal purposes it must be held to be on the banks themselves. Accordingly, the judgments in both cases are Reversed. Mr. Justice Burton took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Art.I, § 8, cl. 2; Art. VI, cl. 2. “Except as otherwise provided by law, all stocks, bonds, Treasury notes, and other obligations of the United States, shall be exempt from taxation by or under State or municipal or local authority.” Society for Savings was incorporated under Ohio law, and First Federal under the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, as amended, 48 Stat. 128, 12 U. S. C. § 1461 et seq. Nothing turns here on the difference in their origins. In the view we take of this case, it is unnecessary to consider the taxable status of certain Federal Home Loan Bank stock owned by First Federal, which is also claimed to be exempt. 161 Ohio St. 122, 118 N. E. 2d 651 (1954); 161 Ohio St. 149, 118 N. E. 2d 667. We noted probable jurisdiction, 348 U. S. 807. “Sec. 5408. ... All the shares of the stockholders in a financial institution, located in this state, incorporated or organized under the laws of the state or of the United States, the capital stock of which is divided into shares, excepting such as are defined as ‘deposits’ in section 5324 of the General Code, and all the shares of the stockholders in an unincorporated financial institution, located • in this state, the capital stock of which is divided into shares held by the owners of such financial institution, and the capital employed, or the property representing it, in a financial institution the capital of which is not divided into shares, or which has no capital stock, located in this state, shall be listed and assessed at the book value thereof, and taxed in the manner provided in this chapter.” “Sec. 5412. . . . Upon receiving such report the tax commissioner shall ascertain and assess all the taxable shares of such financial institution, or the value of the property representing the capital employed by such financial institution, not divided into shares, at the aggregate amount of the capital, the surplus or reserve fund and the undivided profits as shown in such report, and the amount of taxable deposits of such institution in each county in which the institution maintained an office or offices for the receipt of deposits. Such amounts shall be assessed in the name of such financial institution excepting that the amounts of the taxable deposits wholly withdrawn from each such institution within the times mentioned in section 5411-2 of the General Code and separately set forth.in such report shall be subtracted from the amount of taxable deposits so assessed and separately assessed in the names of such respective depositors. In the case of an incorporated financial institution all of whose shares constitute deposits as defined in section 5324 of the General Code such assessment of shares shall exclude the capital stock thereof as so shown but shall include the surplus or reserve and undivided profits so shown.” “Sec. 5638-1. . . . Annual taxes are hereby levied on the kinds and classes of intangible property, hereinafter enumerated, on the intangible property tax list in the office of the auditor of state and duplicate thereof in the office of treasurer of state at the following rates, to wit: . . . deposits, two mills on the dollar; shares in and capital employed by financial institutions, two mills on the dollar; . . . .” See note 8, pp. 149-150, infra. “Sec. 5672. . . . Taxes assessed on non-withdrawable shares of stock, of a financial institution, shall be a lien on such shares from the first day of January in each year until they are paid. “It shall be the duty of every financial institution to collect the taxes due upon its shares of stock from the several owners of such shares, and to pay the same to the treasurer of state and any financial institution failing to pay the said taxes as herein provided, shall be liable by way of penalty for the gross amount of the taxes due from all the owners of the shares of stock, and for an additional amount of one hundred dollars for every day of delay in the payment of said taxes. “Sec. 5673. . . . Such financial institution paying to the treasurer of state the taxes assessed upon its shares, in the hands of its shareholders respectively, as provided in the next preceding section, may deduct the amount thereof from dividends that are due or thereafter become due on such shares, and shall have a lien upon the shares of stock and on all funds in its possession belonging to such shareholders, or which may at any time come into its possession, for reimbursement of the taxes so paid on account of the several shareholders, with legal interest; and such lien may be enforced in any appropriate manner. “Sec. 5673-1. . . . Taxes assessed on deposits in a financial institution in this state shall be a lien on the deposit of each person as of the day fixed by the tax commission of Ohio for the listing of such deposits. Taxes assessed on the shares of stock of such an institution, all of whose shares are withdrawable and defined as deposits in chapter four of this title, shall be a lien on such shares so defined as deposits as of the day so fixed. It shall be the duty of every financial institution to pay the taxes on the amount of such deposits and/or with-drawable shares assessed in its name to the treasurer of state and any such institution failing to pay such taxes as herein provided shall be liable by way of penalty for the gross amount of the taxes due on and with respect to all its deposits and withdrawable shares assessed in its name and for an additional amount of one hundred dollars for every day of delay in the payment of such taxes. “Sec. 5673-2. ... A financial institution so required to pay to the treasurer of state the taxes assessed upon its deposit accounts, as taxable property of its depositors, and/or upon its withdrawable shares as taxable property of its shareholders respectively, as provided in the next preceding section, may, upon receipt of notice of the day fixed for the listing of such deposits, charge the amount thereof to and deduct the same from the deposit of each depositor, or from the interest that is due or thereafter becomes due thereon, or from the dividends that are due or thereafter become due thereon, as the case may be, and shall have a lien upon such deposit, interest and/or dividends and on all funds in its possession belonging to such depositor or shareholder, or which may at any time come into its possession, for reimbursement of the taxes so payable, with legal interest. Such lien may be enforced in any appropriate manner at any time within six months after the payment of the taxes to the treasurer.” As construed by the state court, the “intangible property tax” on depositors applied to different property than did the “deposit” tax also imposed on them, involving, as we see it, no question of duplication or overlapping between the two taxes. Section 5412 provides in part: “Upon receiving such report the tax commissioner shall ascertain and assess . . . the amount of taxable deposits of such institution in each county in which the institution maintained an office or offices for the receipt of deposits. Such amounts shall be assessed in the name of such financial institution excepting that the amounts of the taxable deposits wholly withdrawn from each such institution within the times mentioned in section 5411-2 of the General Code [that is, between the date of assessment and the bank’s receipt of the notice of such date, or if no notice is received, the next January 1] and separately set forth in such report shall be subtracted from the amount of taxable deposits so assessed and separately assessed in the names of such respective depositors.” For §§ 5673-1 and 5673-2, see note 8, pp. 149-150, supra. See note 8, pp. 149-150, supra. Even so, if a comparable situation arose in connection with the tax on shareholders, the bank would have a right of reimbursement under the provisions of the Ohio statute. See note 8, pp. 149-150, supra. The Ohio court stated: “In our opinion, such a provision [an express right of reimbursement] is not necessary to enable such a financial institution to secure such reimbursement.” 161 Ohio St., at 136, 118 N. E. 2d, at 659. It is clear that by this statement the court did not mean that an implied right of reimbursement existed under Ohio law, for it then went on to hold that “the financial institution, which pays the tax on [the depositors’] property interests in the corporation, will always be able to reimburse itself by reducing the ultimate value of the property interests of those who are the only ones who can have any claim to benefit from the ownership interests taxed.” 161 Ohio St., at 137, 118 N. E. 2d, at 659-660. This is of course not reimbursement in any proper sense of the term.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS et al. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 06-9130. Argued October 29, 2007 Decided January 22, 2008 Jean-Claude André, by appointment of the Court, 551 U. S. 1186, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Michael G. Smith, Peter K. Stris, Shaun P. Martin, and Brendan Maher. Kannon K. Shanmugam argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, and Mark B. Stern. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. This ease concerns the scope of 28 U. S. C. § 2680, which carves out certain exceptions to the United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity for torts committed by federal employees. Section 2680(c) provides that the waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to claims arising from the detention of property by “any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer.” Petitioner contends that this clause applies only to law enforcement officers enforcing customs or excise laws, and thus does not affect the waiver of sovereign immunity for his property claim against officers of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). We conclude that the broad phrase “any other law enforcement officer” covers all law enforcement officers. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding the dismissal of petitioner’s claim. I Petitioner Abdus-Shahid M. S. Ali was a federal prisoner at the United States Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia, from 2001 to 2003. In December 2003, petitioner was scheduled to be transferred to the United States Penitentiary Big Sandy (USP Big Sandy) in Inez, Kentucky. Before being transferred, he left two duffle bags containing his personal property in the Atlanta prison’s Receiving and Discharge Unit to be inventoried, packaged, and shipped to USP Big Sandy. Petitioner was transferred, and his bags arrived some days later. Upon inspecting his property, he noticed that several items were missing. The staff at USP Big Sandy’s Receiving and Discharge Unit told him that he had been given everything that was sent, and that if things were missing he could file a claim. Many of the purportedly missing items were of religious and nostalgic significance, including two copies of the Qur’an, a prayer rug, and religious magazines. Petitioner estimated that the items were worth $177. Petitioner filed an administrative tort claim. In denying relief, the agency noted that, by his signature on the receipt form, petitioner had certified the accuracy of the inventory listed thereon and had thereby relinquished any future claims relating to missing or damaged property. Petitioner then filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, violations of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346, 2671 et seq. The BOP maintained that petitioner’s claim was barred by the exception in § 2680(c) for property claims against law enforcement officers. The District Court agreed and dismissed petitioner’s FTCA claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Petitioner appealed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the District Court’s interpretation of § 2680(c). 204 Fed. Appx. 778, 779-780 (2006) (per curiam). In rejecting petitioner’s arguments, the Court of Appeals relied on this Court’s broad interpretation of §2680(c)’s “detention” clause in Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S. 848, 854-859 (1984), on decisions by other Courts of Appeals, and on its own decision in Schlaebitz v. United States Dept. of Justice, 924 F. 2d 193, 195 (1991) (per curiam) (holding that United States Marshals, who were allegedly negligent in releasing a parolee’s luggage to a third party, were “law enforcement officers” under § 2680(c)). See 204 Fed. Appx., at 779-780. We granted certiorari, 550 U. S. 968 (2007), to resolve the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals as to the scope of § 2680(c). II In the FTCA, Congress waived the United States’ sovereign immunity for claims arising out of torts committed by federal employees. See 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b)(1). As relevant here, the FTCA authorizes “claims against the United States, for money damages ... for injury or loss of property . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” Ibid. The FTCA exempts from this waiver certain categories of claims. See §§ 2680(a)-(n). Relevant here is the exception in subsection (c), which provides that § 1346(b) shall not apply to “[a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer.” § 2680(c). This case turns on whether the BOP officers who allegedly lost petitioner’s property qualify as “other law enforcement officer[s]” within the meaning of § 2680(c). Petitioner argues that they do not because “any other law enforcement officer” includes only law enforcement officers acting in a customs or excise capacity. Noting that Congress referenced customs and excise activities in both the language at issue and the preceding clause in § 2680(c), petitioner argues that the entire subsection is focused on preserving the United States’ sovereign immunity only as to officers enforcing those laws. Petitioner's argument is inconsistent with the statute’s language. The phrase “any other law enforcement officer” suggests a broad meaning. Ibid, (emphasis added). We have previously noted that “[r]ead naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976)). In Gonzales, we considered a provision that imposed an additional sentence for firearms used in federal drug trafficking crimes and provided that such additional sentence shall not be concurrent with “ ‘any other term of imprisonment.’” 520 U. S., at 4 (quoting 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1) (1994 ed.); emphasis deleted). Notwithstanding the subsection’s initial reference to federal drug trafficking crimes, we held that the expansive word “any” and the absence of restrictive language left “no basis in the text for limiting” the phrase “any other term of imprisonment” to federal sentences. 520 U. S., at 5. Similarly, in Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578 (1980), the Court considered the phrase “any other final action” in amendments to the Clean Air Act. The Court explained that the amendments expanded a list of Environmental Protection Agency Administrator actions by adding two categories of actions: actions under a specifically enumerated statutory provision, and “any other final action” under the Clean Air Act. Id., at 584 (emphasis deleted). Focusing on Congress’ choice of the word “any,” the Court “discern[ed] no uncertainty in the meaning of the phrase, ‘any other final action,’ ” and emphasized that the statute’s “expansive language offer[ed] no indication whatever that Congress intended” to limit the phrase to final actions similar to those in the specifically enumerated sections. Id., at 588-589. We think the reasoning of Gonzales and Harrison applies equally to the expansive language Congress employed in 28 U. S. C. § 2680(c). Congress’ use of “any” to modify “other law enforcement officer” is most naturally read to mean law enforcement officers of whatever kind. The word “any” is repeated four times in the relevant portion of § 2680(c), and two of those instances appear in the particular phrase at issue: “any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer.” (Emphasis added.) Congress inserted the word “any” immediately before “other law enforcement officer,” leaving no doubt that it modifies that phrase. To be sure, the text’s references to “tax or customs duty” and “officer[s] of customs or excise” indicate that Congress intended to preserve immunity for claims arising from an officer’s enforcement of tax and customs laws. The text also indicates, however, that Congress intended to preserve immunity for claims arising from the detention of property, and there is no indication that Congress intended immunity for those claims to turn on the type of law being enforced. Petitioner would require Congress to clarify its intent to cover all law enforcement officers by. adding phrases such as “performing any official law enforcement function,” or “without limitation.” But Congress could not have chosen a more all-encompassing phrase than “any other law enforcement officer” to express that intent. We have no reason to demand that Congress write less economically and more repetitiously. Recent amendments to § 2680(c) support the conclusion that “any other law enforcement officer” is not limited to officers acting in a customs or excise capacity. In the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Congress added subsections (c)(l)-(c)(4) to 28 U.S.C. § 2680. §3(a), 114 Stat. 211. As amended, § 2680(c) provides that the § 1346(b) waiver of sovereign immunity, notwithstanding the exception at issue in this case, applies to: “[A]ny claim based on injury or loss of goods, merchandise, or other property, while in the possession of any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer, if— “(1) the property was seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any provision of Federal law providing for the forfeiture of property other than as a sentence imposed upon conviction of a criminal offense; “(2) the interest of the claimant was not forfeited; “(3) the interest of the claimant was not remitted or mitigated (if the property was subject to forfeiture); and “(4) the claimant was not convicted of a crime for which the interest of the claimant in the property was subject to forfeiture under a Federal criminal forfeiture law.” The amendment does not govern petitioner’s claim because his property was not “seized for the purpose of forfeiture,” as required by paragraph (1). Nonetheless, the amendment is relevant because our construction of “any other law enforcement officer” must, to the extent possible, ensure that the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 340 (1997) (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 240 (1989)). The amendment canceled the exception - and thus restored the waiver of sovereign immunity - for certain seizures of property based on any federal forfeiture law. See 28 U. S. C. § 2680(c)(1) (excepting property claims if “the property was seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any provision of Federal law providing for the forfeiture of property” (emphasis added)). Under petitioner’s interpretation, only law enforcement officers enforcing customs or excise laws were immune under the prior version of § 2680(c). Thus, on petitioner’s reading, the amendment’s only effect was to restore the waiver for cases in which customs or excise officers, or officers acting in such a capacity, enforce forfeiture laws. This strikes us as an implausible interpretation of the statute. If that were Congress’ intent, it is not apparent why Congress would have restored the waiver with respect to the enforcement of all civil forfeiture laws instead of simply those related to customs or excise. Petitioner’s interpretation makes sense only if we assume that Congress went out of its way to restore the waiver for cases in which customs or excise officers, or officers acting in such a capacity, enforce forfeiture laws unrelated to customs or excise. But petitioner fails to demonstrate that customs or excise officers, or officers acting in such a capacity, ever enforce civil forfeiture laws unrelated to customs or excise, much less that they do so with such frequency that Congress is likely to have singled them out in the amendment. It seems far more likely that Congress restored the waiver for officers enforcing any civil forfeiture law because, in its view, all such officers were covered by the exception to the waiver prior to the amendment. Against this textual and structural evidence that “any other law enforcement officer” does in fact mean any other law enforcement officer, petitioner invokes numerous canons of statutory construction. He relies primarily on ejusdem generis, or the principle that “when a general term follows a specific one, the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration.” Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 U. S. 117, 129 (1991). In petitioner’s view, “any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer” should be read as a three-item list, and the final, catchall phrase “any other law enforcement officer” should be limited to officers of the same nature as the preceding specific phrases. Petitioner likens his case to two recent cases in which we found the canon useful. In Washington State Dept. of Social and Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U. S. 371, 375 (2003), we considered the clause “execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process” in 42 U. S. C. § 407(a). Applying ejusdem generis, we concluded that “other legal process” was limited to legal processes of the same nature as the specific items listed. 537 U. S., at 384-385. The department’s scheme for serving as a representative payee of the benefits due to children under its care, while a “legal process,” did not share the common attribute of the listed items, viz., “utilization of some judicial or quasi-judicial mechanism ... by which control over property passes from one person to another in order to discharge” a debt.. Id., at 385. Similarly, in Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U. S. 481 (2006), the Court considered whether an exception to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity for claims arising out of the “ ‘loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter’ ” barred a claim that mail negligently left on the petitioner’s porch caused her to slip and fall. Id., at 485 (quoting 28 U. S. C. § 2680(b)). Noting that “loss” and “miscarriage” both addressed “failings in the postal obligation to deliver mail in a timely manner to the right address,” 546 U. S., at 487, the Court concluded that “negligent transmission” must be similarly limited, id., at 486-489, and rejected the Government’s argument that the exception applied to “all torts committed in the course of mail delivery,” id., at 490. Petitioner asserts that § 2680(c), like the clauses at issue in Keffeler and Dolan, “‘presents a textbook ejusdem generis scenario.’” Brief for Petitioner 15 (quoting Andrews v. United States, 441 F. 3d 220, 224 (CA4 2006)). We disagree. The structure of the phrase “any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer” does not lend itself to application of the canon. The phrase is disjunctive, with one specific and one general category, not — like the clauses at issue in Keffeler and Dolan — a list of specific items separated by commas and followed by a general or collective term. The absence of a list of specific items undercuts the inference embodied in ejusdem generis that Congress remained focused on the common attribute when it used the catchall phrase. Cf. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, 615 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the canon’s applicability to an omnibus clause that was “one of... several distinct and independent prohibitions” rather than “a general or collective term following a list of specific items to which a particular statutory command is applicable”). Moreover, it is not apparent what common attribute connects the specific items in § 2680(c). Were we to use the canon to limit the meaning of “any other law enforcement officer,” we would be required to determine the relevant limiting characteristic of “officer of customs or excise.” In Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303 (1961), for example, the Court invoked noscitur a sociis in limiting the scope of the term “'discovery’” to the common characteristic it shared with '"exploration”’ and '"prospecting.”’ Id., at 307. The Court noted that all three words in conjunction “describe[d] income-producing activity in the oil and gas and mining industries.” Ibid. Here, by contrast, no relevant common attribute immediately appears from the phrase “officer of customs or excise.” Petitioner suggests that the common attribute is that both types of officers are charged with enforcing the customs and excise laws. But we see no reason why that should be the relevant characteristic as opposed to, for example, that officers of that type are commonly involved in the activities enumerated in the statute: the assessment and collection of taxes and customs duties and the detention of property. Petitioner’s appeals to other interpretive principles are also unconvincing. Petitioner contends that his reading is supported by the canon noscitur a sociis, according to which “ ‘a word is known by the company it keeps.’ ” S. D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Environmental Protection, 547 U. S. 370, 378 (2006). But the cases petitioner cites in support of applying noscitur a sociis involved statutes with stronger contextual cues. See Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U. S. 250, 254-258 (2000) (applying the canon to narrow the relevant phrase, “any election,” where it was closely surrounded by six specific references to gubernatorial elections); Jarecki, supra, at 306-309 (applying the canon to narrow the term “discoveries” to discoveries of mineral resources where it was contained in a list of three words, all of which applied to the oil, gas, and mining industries and could not conceivably all apply to any other industry). Here, although customs and excise áre mentioned twice in § 2680(c), nothing in the overall statutory context suggests that customs and excise officers were the exclusive focus of the provision. The emphasis in subsection (c) on customs and excise is not inconsistent with the conclusion that “any other law enforcement officer” sweeps as broadly as its language suggests. Similarly, the rule against superfluities lends petitioner sparse support. The construction we adopt today does not necessarily render “any officer of customs or excise” superfluous; Congress may have simply intended to remove any doubt that officers of customs or excise were included in “law enforcement officer[s].” See Fort Stewart Schools v. FLRA, 495 U. S. 641, 646 (1990) (noting that “technically unnecessary” examples may have been “inserted out of an abundance of caution”). Moreover, petitioner’s construction threatens to render “any other law enforcement officer” superfluous because it is not clear when, if ever, “other law enforcement officer[s]” act in a customs or excise capacity. In any event, we do not woodenly apply limiting principles every time Congress includes a specific example along with a general phrase. See Harrison, 446 U. S., at 589, n. 6 (rejecting an argument that ejusdem generis must apply when a broad interpretation of the clause could render the specific enumerations unnecessary). In the end, we are unpersuaded by petitioner’s attempt to create ambiguity where the statute’s text and structure suggest none. Had Congress intended to limit §2680(c)’s reach as petitioner contends, it easily could have written “any other law enforcement officer acting in a customs or excise capacity.” Instead, it used the unmodified, all-encompassing phrase “any other law enforcement officer.” Nothing in the statutory context requires a narrowing construction — indeed, as we have explained, the statute is most consistent and coherent when “any other law enforcement officer” is read to mean what it literally says. See Norfolk & Western R. Co., 499 U. S., at 129 (noting that interpretive canons must yield “when the whole context dictates a different conclusion”). It bears emphasis, moreover, that § 2680(c), far from maintaining sovereign immunity for the entire universe of claims against law enforcement officers, does so only for claims “arising in respect of” the “detention” of property. We are not at liberty to rewrite the statute to reflect a meaning we deem more desirable. Instead, we must give effect to the text Congress enacted: Section 2680(c) forecloses lawsuits against the United States for the unlawful detention of property by “any,” not just “some,” law enforcement officers. III For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is Affirmed. The Eleventh Circuit joined five other Courts of Appeals in construing § 2680(c) to encompass all law enforcement officers. See Bramwell v. Bureau of Prisons, 348 F. 3d 804, 806-807 (CA9 2003); Chapa v. United States Dept. of Justice, 339 F. 3d 388, 390 (CA5 2003) (per curiam); Hatten v. White, 275 F. 3d 1208, 1210 (CA10 2002); Cheney v. United States, 972 F. 2d 247, 248 (CA8 1992) (per curiam); Ysasi v. Rivkind, 856 F. 2d 1520, 1525 (CA Fed. 1988). Five other Courts of Appeals reached the contrary conclusion, interpreting the clause as limited to officers performing customs or excise functions. See ABC v. DEF, 500 F. 3d 103, 107 (CA2 2007); Dahler v. United States, 473 F. 3d 769, 771-772 (CA7 2007) (per curiam); Andrews v. United States, 441 F. 3d 220, 227 (CA4 2006); Bazuaye v. United States, 83 F. 3d 482, 486 (CADC 1996); Kurinsky v. United States, 33 F. 3d 594, 598 (CA6 1994). We assume, without deciding, that the BOP officers “detained” Ali’s property and thus satisfy § 2680(c)’s “arising in respect of. . . detention” requirement. The Court of Appeals held that the “detention” clause was satisfied, and petitioner expressly declined to raise the issue on certiorari. See 204 Fed. Appx. 778, 779-780 (CA11 2006) (per curiam); Brief for Petitioner 10-11, n. 9. We consider this question for the first time in this ease. Petitioner argues that this Court concluded in Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S. 848 (1984), that the phrase “any other law enforcement officer” is ambiguous. Reply Brief for Petitioner 4. In that case, the Court construed a portion of the same clause at issue here, but the decision had no bearing on the meaning of “any other law enforcement officer.” 465 U. S., at 853-862 (holding that “detention” encompasses claims resulting from negligent handling or storage). Indeed, the Court expressly declined to reach the issue. Id., at 852, n. 6 (“We have no occasion in this ease to decide what kinds of ‘law-enforcement officer[s],’ other than customs officials, are covered by the exception” (alteration in original)). Petitioner’s reliance on the footnote as concluding that the phrase is ambiguous reads too much into the Court’s reservation of a question that was not then before it. Of course, other circumstances may counteract the effect of expansive modifiers. For example, we have construed an “any” phrase narrowly when it included a term of art that compelled that result. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 115-116 (2001) (construing “any other class of workers engaged in . .. commerce,” 9 U. S. C. § 1, narrowly based on the Court’s previous interpretation of “in commerce” as a term of art with a narrower meaning). We also have construed such phrases narrowly when another term in the provision made sense only under a narrow reading, see United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 357-358 (1994) (limiting “any law-enforcement officer” to federal officers because the statute’s reference to “delay” made sense only with respect to federal officers), and when a broad reading would have implicated sovereignty concerns, see Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U. S. 533, 541-542 (2002) (applying the “clear statement rule” applicable to waivers of sovereign immunity to construe the phrase “all civil actions” to exclude a category of claims, “even though nothing in the statute expressly exclude[d]” them). None of the circumstances that motivated our decisions in these cases is present here. Justice Kennedy’s dissent (hereinafter the dissent) argues that, during border searches, customs and excise officers “routinely” enforce civil forfeiture laws unrelated to customs or excise. Post, at 239-240. But the examples the dissent provides do not support that assertion. The dissent maintains that a customs officer who seizes material defined as contraband under 49 U. S. C. § 80302 et seq. is one such example. Post, at 240. But a customs officer’s authority to effect a forfeiture of such contraband derives from a specific customs law. See 19 U. S. C. § 1595a(c)(l)(C). Similarly, the dissent suggests that a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent “assisting a customs official” in a border search who seizes drug-related contraband under 21 U. S. C. § 881 is acting in a “traditional revenue capacity.” Post, at 240. But that argument is based on the assumption that an officer who assists in conducting a border search acts in a customs capacity even if he is not a customs officer and is not enforcing a customs law. That assumption, far from self-evident, only underscores the difficulty that would attend any attempt to define the contours of the implied limitation on § 2680(c)’s reach proposed by petitioner and embraced by the dissent. “Acting in a customs or excise capacity” is not a self-defining concept, and not having included such a limitation in the statute’s language, Congress of course did not provide a definition. Finally, the dissent points out that a customs or excise officer might effect a forfeiture of currency or monetary instruments under 31 U. S. C. § 5317(c). Post, at 240. But § 5317(e) is hardly a civil forfeiture law unrelated to customs or excise. See § 5317(c)(2) (2000 ed., Supp. V) (authorizing forfeiture of property involved in a violation of, inter alia, § 5316 (2000 ed.), which sets forth reporting requirements for exporting and importing monetary instruments). As an example of “other law enforcement officer[s]” acting in an excise or customs capacity, petitioner cites Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. United States, 777 F. 2d 822, 823-824 (CA2 1985) (holding that the seizure of a vehicle still in transit from overseas by DEA agents who searched it for drugs was “sufficiently akin to the functions carried out by Customs officials to place the agents’ conduct within the scope of section 2680(c)”). But it is not clear that the agents in that case were acting in an excise or customs capacity rather than in their ordinary capacity as law enforcement agents. It seems to us that DEA agents searching a car for drugs are acting in their capacity as officers charged with enforcing the Nation’s drug laws, not the customs or excise laws. Similarly, the dissent notes that 14 U. S. C. § 89(a) authorizes Coast Guard officers to enforce customs laws. Post, at 233. But the very next subsection of §89 provides that Coast Guard officers effectively are customs officers when they enforce customs laws. See § 89(b)(1) (providing that Coast Guard officers “insofar as they are engaged, pursuant to the authority contained in this section, in enforcing any law of the United States shall... be deemed to be acting as agents of the particular executive department . . . charged with the administration of the particular law”). As a result, a Coast Guard officer enforcing a customs law is a customs officer, not some “other law enforcement officer.” Congress, we note, did provide an administrative remedy for lost property claimants like petitioner. Federal agencies have authority under 31 U. S. C. § 3723(a)(1) to settle certain “claim[s] for not more than $1,000 for damage to, or loss of, privately owned property that... is caused by the negligence of an officer or employee of the United States Government acting within the scope of employment.” The BOP has settled more than 1,100 such claims in the last three years. Brief for Respondents 41, n. 17.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF CALIFORNIA et al. NO. 205. Argued January 14, 1953. Decided April 6, 1953. Solicitor General Cummings argued the cause for the United States in No. 205. With him on the brief Were Assistant Attorney General Baldridge, Robert L. Stern, Paul A. Sweeney and Melvin Richter. L. E. Blaisdell argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 206. Boris H. Lakusta argued the cause for respondents in No. 205. With him on the briefs were Everett C. McKeage and IVilson E. Cline for the Public Utilities Commission of California, respondent in Nos. 205 and 206. Henry W. Coil argued the cause for respondents in No. 206. With him on the briefs was Donald J. Carman for the California Electric Power Co., respondent in Nos. 205 and 206. Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent California Electric Power Company produces electricity in California, partially by hydroelectric projects licensed under Part I of the Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1063, as amended by Title II of the Public Utility Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 838, 16 U. S. C. § 791a et seq., and markets the greater portion of it, subject to respondent Public Utilities Commission’s authority, in that State. The jurisdictional dispute which is our present concern relates only to certain power sales by the Company to the Navy Department and to Mineral County, Nevada, for consumption there. This power, following production, is transmitted at 55,000 volts to the Company’s Mill Creek substation in California, about 25 miles from the border, on its own lines. There it is figuratively taken over by the Navy and by the County, and delivered on their lines at the same high voltage to Hawthorne, Nevada, where it is stepped down for local distribution and consumption. The Navy’s power is used at its ammunition depot, largely in official industrial operations; between 15% and 29%, however, is distributed for consumption in the private households and enterprises of tenants at the Navy’s low-cost housing project nearby. These sales are metered individually and each purchaser is billed according to his own use. The power purchased by the County is all resold to local consumers, with the exception of minor line losses and official use. The Navy’s contract for purchase of the power was negotiated in 1943, and provided for termination on 60-day notice; the County’s was entered into in 1945 for a stated period of three years. In 1947 the Power Company applied to the State Commission for a general rate increase which, after hearings at which the Navy was represented, was granted. Thereafter, the Company terminated its Navy contract and failed to renew that with the County, giving notice of its intention to apply the new schedule to these sales. Both purchasers demurred, and the Company reapplied to the State Commission for a ruling as to the applicability of the general schedule to these particular operations. After some early state exploratory hearings, the Federal Power Commission, on February 15, 1950, issued an order to the Company to show cause as to why the rates were not subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. Thus joined, the issues were heard by both agencies at a joint proceeding on March 20 and 21, 1950. Both eventually decided in favor of their own asserted authority. The State Commission’s supporting opinion was denied review by the California Supreme Court on January 21, 1952, thus affirming its holding, while that of the Federal Power Commission was likewise approved by the Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, California Electric Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 199 F. 2d 206. As a federal question concerning the applicability of Part II of the Act was raised, certiorari was granted, 344 U. S. 810, to bring the record here from the state proceedings under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3). I. Federal authority, which we think obtains, is asserted under Part II of the Federal Power Act. This applies “to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.” § 201(b). Regulation of the rates of such sales — other types of authority in connection with such interstate transmission operations are granted in other sections — -rests on §§ 205 (a) and 206 (a). The preliminary issue as to whether the operations in question fall within the concept of interstate commerce, on which the federal power initially depends, can be shortly disposed of, for Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U. S. 497, 509-515, firmly established that commerce includes the transportation of public property, while the irrelevance of the fact that this electricity is transmitted across the state boundary over lines owned by the Navy and by the County, as purchasers, may be seen from Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 319 U. S. 61, 69, 71, and Illinois Gas Co. v. Public Service Co., 314 U. S. 498. The most serious contentions pressed in opposition to application of Part II, arise from the self-limiting statement therein that the Act is “to extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.” So respondents contend that Power Commission jurisdiction only begins where the local regulatory power ends, and point to Part I, § 20, as supporting their contention that the limitation applies to the facts of this case. Section 20 provides that when power from projects licensed under Part I, which that energy sold to the Navy and the County includes, “shall enter into interstate or foreign commerce the rates . . . and the service ... by any . . . licensee .. . or by any person, corporation, or association purchasing power from such licensee for sale and distribution or use in public service shall be reasonable ... to the customer . . . and whenever any of the States directly concerned has not provided a commission or other authority to enforce the requirements of this section within such State ... or such States are unable to agree through their properly constituted authorities on the services ... or on the rates . . . jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the commission ... to regulate ... so much of the services . . . and . . . rates . . . therefor as constitute interstate or foreign commerce . . . .” 41 Stat. 1073, 16 U. S. C. § 813. Both Nevada and California have regulatory agencies with certain rate powers. And we may assume, though the Government asserts otherwise, that both agencies can enforce reasonable rate orders and have not disagreed. Respondents point to this as satisfying § 20, and thus ousting any Part II regulation. In short, they contend — what at first blush may appear anomalous— that federal rate jurisdiction under Part II may be prohibited by the fact that some portion of the power sold originated in hydroelectric projects federally licensed under Part I. We do not agree. Admittedly, § 20 contemplated state regulation. And it may well be, as indicated by the congressional hearings, that Congress quite frankly chose the local authorities to regulate the bulk of interstate sales of electricity from licensed projects. In fact, a contrary view would have been almost astonishing as an historical proposition, for neither the large interstate operations of electric utilities that have developed during the last thirty years, nor the concomitant desirability of federal regulation, could have been foreseen in 1920. Long-range transmission was not then adequately developed, nor had the various local utilities by then undergone the integration into large centralized systems which later came about. So we may assume that Congress, as a policy judgment, accepted and adapted the substantial tradition of local utility regulation to power production licensed under the federal Act. But there is no evidence that this was done with any firm intent to settle with the states a power essentially national. For whatever views of the draftsmen of § 20 as to the efficacy of state regulation, the jurisdictional lines between local and national authority were not finally determined until this Court’s opinion in Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U. S. 83. This decision followed the Federal Water Power Act by some seven years. In short, that case established what has unquestionably become a fixed premise of our constitutional law but what was not at all clear in 1920, that the Commerce Clause forbade state regulation of some utility rates. State power was held not to extend to an interstate sale “in wholesale quantities, not to consumers, but to distributing companies for resale to consumers.” 273 U. S., at 89. Attleboro reiterated and accepted the holding of Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 252 U. S. 23, that sales across the state line direct to consumers is a local matter within the authority of the agency of the importing state. But it prohibited regulation of wholesale sales for resale by either interested commission. Respondents seek to escape that doctrine, however, by pointing to the fact that there was not there involved sales of electricity produced at a project licensed under Part I. They admit that absent § 20 of that Part, the later Part II authority would apply exclusively and determine the result. But, they say, § 20 creates an exception, which the language of Attleboro did not reach, for hydroelectric energy transmitted across state lines under the aegis of coordinated state regulation. In short, it is alleged that § 20 “conferred jurisdiction” on the states. We do not agree. Attleboro declared state regulation of interstate transmission of power for resale forbidden as a direct burden on commerce. The states may act as to such a subject only when Congress has specifically granted permission for the exercise of this state power over articles moving interstate which would otherwise be immune. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 560-562. Section 20 cannot bear this interpretation; it did not establish the source of the energy as a significant factor determining whether state or -federal authority applied. It is quite different from those few unique federal statutes this Court has heretofore considered, "subjecting interstate commerce ... to present and future state prohibitions,” or regulation, Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311, 326, in the exercise of the constitutional commerce power. Its language indicates no consideration or desire to alter the limits of state power otherwise imposed by the Commerce Clause; it merely states that the federal power shall not be invoked unless certain conditions of state inability to regulate obtain. Section 20 quite obviously is not based on any recognition of the constitutional barrier, but rather assumes what Attleboro held did not exist — state authority to reach interstate sales of energy for resale; its sole concern is the application of federal regulation on the possible failure of the states to empower their regulatory agencies or their inability to agree. Nor can it soundly be said that Congress in § 20 of Part I charged the states with responsibility of regulating rates of interstate sales of electricity through the use of the federal power over government property. U. S. Const.. Art. 4, § 3, cl. 2. As indicated in our discussion of the commerce power, there was in 1920 when § 20 was enacted no full appreciation of the limits of state power over sales of electricity for export or import for resale. So the language of § 20 required reasonable rates to consumers of electricity moving interstate and then added the provision that when no state commission was provided to enforce reasonable rates, or the states interested could not agree, the Federal Power Commission could act. We do not think such an arrangement for water power electricity as Part I, § 20, provides can be held to block the general authority of Part II. See note 13, infra. The actions of the Congress following the Attleboro decision do not reflect any different interpretation of § 20. We note some interest in the application of that section in the light of the opinion, but nothing that is decisive of respondents’ contentions. In 1929, Senator Couzens introduced an amendment to his then pending bill, S. 6, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., to establish federal regulation of communications. The amendment, § 47 et seq., would have established a federal rate authority over all interstate power sales. “Power” was defined, § 47 (a) (4), to include electric energy, “whether or not produced by a licensee under the Federal Water Power Act.” The bill was referred to Committee, but Congress took no final action. In the next year, the same Committee held hearings on S. Res. 80, concerning a purported breakdown in the investigative powers of the Federal Power Commission as it then was constituted. The decision of the Commission of February 28, 1929, reported F. P. C. Ninth Ann. Rep. 119, was introduced. This argued that, as a result of Attleboro, the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over rates of interstate wholesale-for-resale sales of licensed hydroelectric power, until displaced by a § 20 agreement of the interested states which received congressional approval as a compact. The first positive congressional action in the field, of course, was the Federal Power Act of 1935. The sweep of the statute is wholly inconsistent with any asserted state power as fixed by § 20 of the 1920 Act. We have examined the legislative history; its purport is quite clear. Part II was intended to “fill the gap”- — the phrase is repeated many times in the hearings, congressional debates and contemporary literature — left by Attleboro in utility regulation. Congress interpreted that case as prohibiting state control of wholesale rates in interstate commerce for resale, and so armed the Federal Power Commission with precisely that power. There is nothing to indicate that Congress’ conception of the states’ disability in 1935, or of the power it gave the Commission by Part II, did not include Part I electricity. In fact, the unqualified statements concerning Part II favor the opposite construction, for we find the Act explained time and again as empowering the agency with rate authority over interstate wholesale sales for resale; not once is this authority spoken of as one conditioned on the electricity concerned having been produced by steam generators or at nonlicensed dams. This would largely determine our interpretation of the ambiguous reference to “matters . . . subject to regulation by the States,” § 201 (a), if nothing more were available to work with. However, there is other proof that Congress did not have in mind § 20-type state regulation. The limiting clause is spoken of only as protecting state regulation of local affairs, including rates of intrastate and interstate-for-consumption sales: “Facilities for local distribution and for the production and transmission of energy solely for one’s own use and not for resale are excluded.” Hearings, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 385. The phrase is not once mentioned as the distinct affirmation of state power over interstate sales for resale under § 20 that respondents apparently would recognize it to be. There are indeed further reasons for rejecting respondents’ construction of § 201 (a). The nature of the generating facilities, in the first place, has no functional significance for rate regulation; the same considerations that lead Congress to enact federal authority over interstate electricity in general would have been similarly applicable to power generated at licensed projects. Secondly, contemporary literature was frankly divided over whether any power over interstate sales for resale remained with the states after Attleboro. We cannot assume that Congress enacted Part II with the purpose of permitting the states to regulate hydroelectric energy through § 20. This is especially so in view of the dearth of legislative discussion of the matter. So we conclude that the limitations of § 201 (a) on federal regulation cannot, and were not intended to, preserve an exclusive state regulation of wholesale hydroelectric sales across state borders. Even if we conceived of the matter as one peculiarly limited to the statutory wording of § 201 (a), our statement that “[exceptions to the primary grant of jurisdiction in the section are to be strictly construed,” Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 331 U. S. 682, 690-691, would be as applicable here as to § 1 (b) of the Natural Gas Act. “Production” and “distribution” are elsewhere specifically excluded from Commission jurisdiction, § 201 (b); the phrase relied on in § 201 (a) was originally drafted as a declaration of “policy,” and the rewording which gave it its present more succinct form was unaccompanied by any “mention [of] this change as one of substance.” Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 319 U. S. 61, 76, referring to H. R. Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 26. “It cannot nullify a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction, even if the particular grant seems inconsistent with the broadly expressed purpose.” Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 324 U. S. 515, 527. To conceive of it now as a bench mark of the Commission’s power, or an affirmation of state authority over any interstate sales for resale, would be to speculate about a congressional purpose for which there is no support. Part II is a direct result of Attleboro. They are to be read together. The latter left no power in the states to regulate licensees’ sales for resale in interstate commerce, while the former established federal jurisdiction over such sales. Discussion of the constitutional problem as reflected in that statute and the Natural Gas Act in recent cases supports this conclusion. Especially in the litigation arising under the Gas Act has this Court expressed the view that the limitations established on Commission jurisdiction therein were designed to coordinate precisely with those constitutionally imposed on the states. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 609-610; Panhandle Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission, 332 U. S. 507, 514-515; Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 331 U. S. 682, 690-691; Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Co., 314 U. S. 498, 506. II. We turn next to a definitional problem raised by respondents, relating to the sales to Mineral County. In short, it is this: §201 extends Commission jurisdiction to “sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.” Subsection (d) of that section states: “The term 'sale of electric energy at wholesale’ when used in this Part means a sale of electric energy to any person for resale.” And § 3 (4) equates “person” with “individual or a corporation,” while § 3 (3) excludes municipalities defined in § 3 (7) from the scope of the latter term. So respondents argue that the sales to Mineral County are neatly and decisively excluded from Part II rate regulation. The use of these sections in support of an indirect exception to Part II has no support in the statutory scheme as a whole. Sections 306 and 313 (a), in fact, look quite the other way. They provide for complaints and petitions for rehearing by municipalities. And § 3 (7) contemplates municipalities as users and distributors of power. To accept respondents’ contention as to Mineral County would thwart the premise of these provisions: that such political subdivisions of the states can be aggrieved by the failure of a public utility selling power to them to satisfy the requirements of Part II. Nor do we find any evidence of conscious coordination of §§ 3 (3), (4) and 201 (d) from the legislative history. True, they were simultaneously enacted, and, in fact, the interpolation of the word “person” into § 201 (d) occurred after the §§ 3 (3) and 3 (4) definitions were in existence in S. 2796, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., as passed by the Senate and reported to the House, June 13, 1935. But this alteration came at the insistence of the House. The Senate had provided for jurisdiction over sales occurring before or after interstate transmission,'ibid., §201 (f), and the House amendment, from which § 201 (d) in its present form stemmed, covered sales during the transmission across state lines for the first time. So the House Report is, we think, significant in its redefinition of the section: “A ‘wholesale’ transaction is defined to mean the sale of electric energy for resale.” H. R. Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 8. We conclude, therefore, that the Congress attached no significance of substance to the addition of the word “person,” and in fact did not intend it as a limitation on Commission jurisdiction. Indeed quite the contrary was sought by the House amendment of §201 (d). A third factor, in addition to the statutory scheme and legislative history of § 201 (d), is the rejection of respondents’ contention by the Commission and courts. Three circuits have just recently done so, and the Federal Power Commission’s long assertion that it has authority over rates of sales to municipalities has probably risen to tLe dignity of an agency “policy.” We have often stated our sympathy with established administrative interpretations such as this. Cf. United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U. S. 534, 549. Where the language and purpose of the questioned statute is clear, courts, of course, follow the legislative direction in interpretation. Where the words are ambiguous, the judiciary may properly use the legislative history to reach a conclusion. And that method of determining congressional purpose is likewise applicable when the literal words would bring about an end completely at variance with the purpose of the statute. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426; Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135; International Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U. S. 237, 243; Johansen v. United States, 343 U. S. 427, 432. So here, since it is our judgment that neither the legislative aim nor the realities of coordinated rate regulation compel it, we reject respondents’ plea that the Federal Power Commission can exercise no authority over sales to Mineral County, and, for similar reasons, the Company’s contention in No. 205 that the sales to the Navy are not sales to a “person.” III. The claim that the sales here occurred over “local distribution” facilities, § 201 (b), and were not “for resale” because the contracts did not state as much, are insubstantial. The sales were made in California but the facilities supplied “local distribution” only after the current was subdivided for individual consumers. But a final question- — whether the Federal Power Commission may exercise rate authority over the entire amount of power sold or merely that which is resold by the Navy and the County- — requires rather more extended discussion. Certainly the concrete fact of resale of some portion of the electricity transmitted from a state to a point outside thereof invokes federal jurisdiction at the outset, despite the fact that the power thus used traveled along its interstate route “commingled” with other power sold by the same seller and eventually directly consumed by the same purchaser-distributor. But the Government argues from this that all the power exchanged between the same parties over the same facilities is subject to Commission order, irrespective of whether resold or not. For this proposition it relies on an alleged similarity between the problem as thus stated and that decided in Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 343 U. S. 414, 419. We held there that the federal rate authority must apply to all electricity sold, despite the fact that it was made up of power transmitted across state lines as well, as that produced locally. The impossibility of separating interstate from intrastate electricity consumed by each purchaser is patent. In such a case, federal rate jurisdiction must attach-to each distributor’s negotiated agreement with the seller irrespective of occasional and unpredictable use of non-jurisdictional intrastate power. There, however, the problem was whether the sales of electricity were in “interstate commerce.” Here, it is a different one whether the entire sale is a “sale for resale.” For purposes of this case, we need not decide the question of whether a somewhat similar “commingling” — of power resold with that consumed directly by the purchaser — requires entire federal jurisdiction. For, even assuming arguendo respondents’ proposition that it may be proportionally limited, we hold that the record before us in this case does not present a set of facts or findings justifying that result. By the statute, Commission jurisdiction extends to “sales for resale,” “but not to any other sale.” § 201 (b). The problem, then, in applying respondents’ suggested interpretation, is to decide just what power transaction falls within this category of “sale for resale”— whether one involving the entire volume of electricity transmitted to the Navy or merely that which the buyer resells to others; the determinant is the delineation of “sale for resale.” See Panhandle Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission, 332 U. S. 507, 516-517. Assuming respondents’ theory, this would turn, of course, on whether an essentially separate transaction covering the power directly consumed by the purchaser is identifiable. The present record will not permit such a finding. It may be that as an engineering proposition, accurate measurement of the volume resold and the volume directly consumed by the two parties is possible for each billing period. But there is no record evidence of separate rates, separate negotiations, separate contracts or separate rate regulation by official bodies, in short that the “sales” themselves were separate, and it is in these terms that the Act would require us to fix the limits of the jurisdictional grant. The attention of the Commission was not directed towards this matter. The question will not be ripe for our consideration until the California Commission has had an opportunity to perfect the record and to consider the problem. Reversed. California Electric Power Co., 50 Cal. P. U. C. 749, and California Electric Power Co., 89 P. U. R. (N. S.) 359, respectively. There was some doubt as to the effect of the apparently conflicting orders, reflecting on the wisdom of our exercise of the power to review. The respondents contend that the state order merely permitted, but did not require, application of the higher rates to the Navy and County sales. The distinction, whatever its abstract attraction, misses the point that we are here considering whether or not the state agency had jurisdiction at the outset to consider these rates at all. That the order would have no concrete effect on the prices petitioners must pay is irrelevant and unlikely as well. The Federal Power Commission merely ordered the Company to cease charging other than filed rates and so, while constituting a determinative assertion of its jurisdiction, apparently does not foreclose the submission of a new schedule, with usual rate-making procedures before the federal body. 18 CFR §§ 35.3, 35.5, 35.20. § 205 (a): “A11 rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility for or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges shall be just and reasonable . . . § 206 (a): “Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification, demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any public utility for any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order.” § 201 (a): “It is hereby declared that the business of transmitting and selling electric energy ... is affected with a public interest, and that Federal regulation of matters relating to . . . the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce is necessary in the public interest, such Federal regulation, however, to extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.” Section 201 (b) states, in apparently similar vein, that the Act is not to “deprive a State or State commission of its lawful authority now exercised over the exportation of hydroelectric energy which is transmitted across a State line.” The provision certainly does not go beyond that of § 201 (a), noted in the opinion, in limiting federal authority. This is true, not only because of the substantial similarity of the language, but also because it appears not to have been drafted with state rate regulation in mind. Rather, 79 Cong. Rec. 10527 indicates that the provision was intended to preserve the validity of certain state statutes prohibiting or regulating the volume of state power exported. Compare S. 2796, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., as introduced, § 201 (b), and idem as reported in the House, Union Calendar No. 451, § 201 (b). It has been so construed. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp., 5 F. P. C. 221, 235. Section 20’s reference to state agreement has never been wholly clear. See footnotes 13, 16 and 19, infra. Our opinion, Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 343 U. S. 414, did not settle the issue, and it has been judicially discussed only rarely. Hearings, House Committee on Water Power, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 65. It was, of course, more than historical accident that caused the simultaneous passage of the Holding Company Act and the Federal Power Act; in fact, their mutual consideration by the 79th Congress, 1st Sess., see 79 Cong. Rec. passim, strikingly indicates Congress’ realization that state regulation had failed, both because of the giantism of the holding company and because of inability to reach interstate sales. See Davis, Influence of Federal Trade Commission’s Investigations, 14 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 21. See Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U. S. 190; Rosenberger v. Pacific Express Co., 241 U. S. 48; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311; Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431; Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U. S. 334, 350. Compare the Wilson Act, 26 Stat. 313 (alcoholic beverages), the Webb-Kenyon Act, 37 Stat. 699, 27 U. S. C. § 122 (same); 32 Stat. 193 (oleomargarine); the Reed Amendment to the National Appropriation Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 1069 (alcoholic beverages); the Hawes-Cooper Act, 45 Stat. 1084, 49 U. S. C. § 60; and the Ashurst-Sumners Act, 49 Stat. 494, 18 U. S. C. §§ 1761, 1762 (convict-made goods). Hearings, House Committee on Water Power, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 62-66, 95-97, is most illuminating in this regard. O. C. Merrill presented the views of the Secretaries of Agriculture, Interior and War. He discussed at some length the problem of sales across state lines and suggested that the proposed § 20 solution was desirable. It left regulation to the interested states “if they do it; and they are doing it now.” Ibid., at 97. “The intention of the draft was this: That in so far as the local authorities have the power, and exercise it, over rates and service, the Federal commission should leave it alone.” Ibid., at 62. There is no suggestion that § 20 was conceived as an act of federal permission; indeed Merrill explicitly states his ignorance as to whether any permission was needed: “I do not know whether the question has even come before the courts as to whether such business is or is not interstate commerce, within the meaning of the commerce clause of the Constitution, so that exclusive jurisdiction would be vested in the Federal Government, if it wished to exercise it.” Mr. Doremus: “It might be a power which Congress could exercise, or, if it failed to exercise it, could be left in the jurisdiction of the State.” Mr. Merrill: “It is my judgment that so long as it is satisfactorily handled by the several States it had better be left with them.” Ibid., at 97. See Hearings, Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 6, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. Section 47 (h) stated that the purpose of the amendments was not to "abridge the jurisdiction or authority of any State to regulate, to the same extent as if this Act had not been passed, the rates and charges for the sale to consumers within the State of any power transmitted in interstate commerce,” unless a “substantial number” of those consumers sought federal regulation. Hearings, Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. Res. 80, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 265. “In cases of interstate and foreign commerce of the character illustrated in the Pennssdvania Gas Co. case [direct sales to consumers], supra, I [the Chief Counsel of the Commission; the Commission approved the statement as its own Decision February 28, 1929] am of the opinion that the Federal Power Commission has no jurisdiction over any matter for the regulation of which the State has already provided a commission with the requisite authority. This appears to be the very situation which Congress had in mind when it conferred a conditional jurisdiction upon the commission. If such a State commission does not exist, the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission applies in full. If the State has a commission with authority over a part only of the matters specified in section 20, the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission extends to the remainder of such matters. “In cases of interstate and foreign commerce of the character illustrated in the Attleboro case, supra, it seems clear that the States individually have no jurisdiction at all; that having no individual jurisdiction they can not acquire it jointly by agreements between themselves, except by specific authorization of Congress in the manner hereinafter discussed; and that, in absence of such authorization, the only 'agency with authority to regulate, in cases of this kind, the specific matters set forth in section 20 is the Federal Power Commission.” F. P. C. Ninth Ann. Rep. 123-124. The Report went on to state that § 20 could not be interpreted as a “permissive” statute. Ibid., 127-129. The “compact” interpretation of § 20 was adopted in Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 124 F. 2d 800. See footnote 16, infra. The conception of the Federal Commission’s new function was perhaps more revolutionary than could be gathered by merely comparing the new Act with § 20. For it appears that despite the latter provision for limited rate regulation, in fact substantially nothing in that direction had been attempted, at least by 1930. Hearings, Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. Res. 80, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 79, 262. The Commission had only three accountants, all of whom were concerned with evaluation of proposed licensed hydroelectric projects. Ibid., 38. In fact, Colonel Tyler, Chief Engineer, Federal Power Commission, expressly alluded to the fact that, for federal authority to be effective, it would have to reach all interstate electricity, and not just that which is produced at licensed dams. Ibid., at 195. Here, of course, respondents theorize that a small admixture of hydroelectric power will defeat federal jurisdiction. In fact, the House Report on the bill, commenting on § 305 of the Act, stated that specific reference to officials of licensees had been deleted because “such licensees when interstate operating public-utility companies will be subject to the provisions of the section in any event.” H. R. Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 31. For general discussion of the scope of Part II, see Hearings, Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1725, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 250-251; H. R. Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27; Hearings, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 436, 521-530, 549, 1639, 1677-1680, 2143, 2169; H. R. Rep. No. 1903, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 74; 79 Cong. Rec-. 8431, 8442, 8444, 10377-10378. “[T]his language [the § 201 (a) proviso clause] is not pertinent in the instant controversy for it is designed to be applicable only to electric energy transmitted and sold in intrastate commerce. The control of rates referred to in the section is control by a single State and the language has no relation to possible joint control by two or more States under the compact clause of the Constitution.” Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 179 F. 2d 179, 187. See also Hartford Electric Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 131 F. 2d 953; Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 129 F. 2d 183. Scott, Control of Power Transmission, 14 Proc. of Acad, of Pol. Sci. 135, followed by Note, 32 Col. L. Rev. 1171, admit the force of Attleboro, but cite § 20 as a permissive regulation statute. On the other hand, Arneson, Federal Regulation of Electric Utilities, 66 U. S. L. Rev. 133, and Updegraff, Extension of Federal Regulation of Public Utilities, 13 Iowa L. Rev. 369, hold that the states’ power to regulate rates of sales for resale in interstate commerce was completely wiped out. Actually, an exception to federal commission authority for power generated at licensed hydroelectric projects would have had little real significance in 1935, in terms of limiting resort to that authority. Forty percent of the Nation’s electric energy was produced at hydroelectric projects. F. P. C. Electric Power Statistics, 1920-1940, pp. VIII-IX. But only 12.3% of the total production came from licensed sources, which had merely 7.8% of the total national capacity. (Letter from Leon Fuquay, Secretary, Federal Power Commission, to Edward G. Hudon, Assistant Librarian, United States Supreme Court, March 16, 1953.) It would have been curious for Congress to have approved a very special type of regulatory scheme for such a minimal fraction of the country’s total power. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp., 5 F. P. C. 221, 239-243. See also 18 CFR §§ 35.3, 35.20. In view of our holding that § 20 does not, of itself, confer jurisdiction on the state commission or commissions in this case, we need not discuss the much-briefed contention that its conditions have been met. See, however, Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 124 F. 2d 800, 179 F. 2d. 179; Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 343 U. S. 414; and notes 13 and 16, supra. “ 'Person’ means an individual or a corporation.” § 3 (4). “ ‘Corporation’ means any corporation, joint-stock company, partnership, association, business trust, organized group of persons, whether incorporated or not, or a receiver or receivers, trustee or trustees of any of the foregoing. It shall not include ‘municipalities’ as hereinafter defined.” §3(3). “ ‘Municipality’ means a city, county, irrigation district, drainage district, or other political subdivision or agency of a State competent under the laws thereof to carry on the business of developing, transmitting, utilizing, or distributing power.” §3 (7). There is evidence, on the other hand, that the exclusion of producing municipalities from Commission jurisdiction was intended. For instance, DeVane, Solicitor of the Federal Power Commission at the time, testified as follows before the Senate Committee: “Mr. DeVane. [The Act] does not apply to a publicly owned power plant. “Senator Hastings. Why was it drawn that way? “Mr. DeVane. We did not feel that it was within our province to prepare a bill that would undertake to regulate municipal, State, or Government utilities.” Hearings, Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1725, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 256. And before the House Committee, Commissioner Seavey recorded a similar interpretation: “Mr. Pettengill. Mr. Commissioner, you just said a moment ago that as you construed the bill, a private power line could not be required to carry electric energy generated by the Tennessee Valley Authority or a municipal plant owned by a city, or a State; is that correct ? “Commissioner Seavey. Yes; that is my understanding of the bill. “Mr. Pettengill. Because, as you said, the word 'person’ does not include a municipality or a governmental body? “Commissioner Seavey. I think that municipalities are particularly excluded, and it is my belief that any other Federal agency, any other governmental agency, would be excluded under the terms of the bill. “Mr. Pettengill. Now then, suppose that a municipality acquires, by purchase, all of the common stock of a corporation, privately organized, so that the municipality is actually the owner of the power plant, although it was organized privately, as a private corporation. After that was done, could the private power plant competing in the same locality be required to carry the electric energy generated by a plant owned by the municipality, or State, or the nation ? “Commissioner Seavey. If it was controlled by the municipality and was subject wholly to municipal operation, I would say no, there it not be [sic].” Hearings, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 397-398. See §201 (f). California Electric Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 199 F. 2d 206; Wisconsin v. Federal Power Commission, 91 U. S. App. D. C. 307, 201 F. 2d 183, and Wisconsin-Michigan Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 197 F. 2d 472. Kansas Gas & Electric Co., 1 F. P. C. 536; Otter Tail Power Co., 2 F. P. C. 134; Los Angeles v. Nevada-California Electric Corp., 2 F. P. C. 104; Connecticut Light & Power Co., 3 F. P. C. 132; Baum, The Federal Power Commission, 61-62. See the criticism of the § 201 (a) phrase as meaninglessly ambiguous, Hartford Electric Light Co., 2 F. P. C. 359, and Northwestern Elec. Co., 2 F. P. C. 327. The Company has cited a brief by the Commission in another case with some force, as indicating that heretofore it has claimed that the United States is excluded from the Act by virtue of not being a “person.” Respondent’s brief, U. S. ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Commission (C. A. 4th Cir.), 191 F. 2d 796. We note, though, that the contention there was made m regard to the application of §313 (a), that “no proceeding to review any order of the Commission shall be brought by any person unless such person” has applied to the Commission for a rehearing. The Court, however, chose to ignore the point, and rather held that the Secretary of the Interior could not petition for review in that case since he was not a “party aggrieved,” §313 (b). 191 F. 2d, at 799-800. On cer-tiorari here, the Commission failed to press the “person” argument again, relying solely on the argument that petitioner, as a representative of federal interests, was not “aggrieved” by the Commission’s order in support of its contention of lack of standing. Br. F. P. C. Nos. 28 and 29, 1952 Term, pp. 95-128. We did not consider the matter in our opinion. United States v. Federal Power Commission, 345 U. S. 153, 156. See East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission of Ohio, 283 U. S. 465; Federal Power Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U. S. 464, 469. See California Electric Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 199 F. 2d 206, 209. The Ninth Circuit, in California Electric Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, No. 495, now pending before us on a petition for certiorari, 199 F. 2d 206, with the more complete record before it from the Power Commission, held that Penn Water controlled. We do not decide the question but rather note that the Commission’s own view of the matter may still be in the formative stage. See Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 185 F. 2d 357; City of Hastings v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 12 F. P. C. 3, 98 P. U. R. (N. S.) 1.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MULCAHEY, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, v. CATALANOTTE. No. 435. Argued March 27, 1957. Decided June 3, 1957. Roger D. Fisher argued the cause for petitioner. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Olney, Beatrice Rosenberg and J. F. Bishop. Louis M. Hopping argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Whittaker delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a companion case to Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson, ante, p. 685, and presents similar questions. Respondent, an alien who entered the United States in 1920 for permanent residence, was convicted in 1925 of .a federal offense relating to illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. At that time there was no statute making that offense a ground for deportation. He was taken into custody in May, 1953, and, after administrative proceedings, was ordered deported under §241 (a) (11) and (d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which provides, inter alia, for the deportation of any alien “. . . who at any time has been convicted of a violation of any law or regulation relating to the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs . Respondent petitioned the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for a writ of habeas corpus. The District Court, after hearing, denied the petition. The Court of Appeals reversed, 236 F. 2d 955, holding — principally on the basis of its earlier decision in United States v. Kershner, 228 F. 2d 142, this day reversed by us, sub nom. Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson, ante, p. 685 — that inasmuch as respondent’s conviction in 1925 of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs was not a ground for deportation prior to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, respondent had a “status” of nondeportability which was preserved to him by the savings clause in § 405 (a) of that Act. We granted certiorari, 352 U. S. 915. [For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, see ante, p. 690.] As we have said in Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson, ante, p. 685, § 405 (a) by its own terms does not apply to situations “otherwise specifically provided” for in the Act. Section 241 (a) (11) and §241 (d) specifically provide for the deportation of an alien notwithstanding that the offense for which he is being deported occurred prior to the 1952 Act. Section 241 (a) (11) makes an alien deportable if he has “at any time” been convicted of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. And §241 (d) makes §241 (a) (11) applicable to all aliens covered thereby “notwithstanding . . . that the facts . . . occurred prior to the date of enactment of this Act.” It seems to us indisputable, therefore, that Congress was legislating retrospectively, as it may do, to cover offenses of the kind here involved. The case is, therefore, “otherwise specifically provided” for within the meaning of § 405 (a). The Court of Appeals was in error in holding to the contrary, and its judgment is Reversed. The sale of a quantity of cocaine hydrochloride and possession and purchase of 385 grains thereof. 66 Stat. 204, 8 U. S. C. § 1251. Section 241 (a) (11) and (d) of the Immigration and Nationality-Act of 1952 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “(a) Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman) shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be deported who— “(11) is, or hereafter at any time after entry has been, a narcotic drug addict, or who at any time has been convicted of a violation of any law or regulation relating to the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs .... “(d) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this section, the provisions of this section shall be applicable to all aliens belonging to any of the classes enumerated in subsection (a), notwithstanding . . . (2) that the facts, by reason of which any such alien belongs to any of the classes enumerated in subsection (a), occurred prior to the date of enactment of this Act.” 66 Stat. 280, 8 U. S. C. § 1101, Note. Section 405, so far as here material, provides “Nothing contained in this Act, unless otherwise specifically provided therein, shall be construed to affect . . . any status . . . existing, at the time this Act shall take effect ...” Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32; United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 521; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580; Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522; Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U. S. 302.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION v. McCLELLAN, TRUSTEE. No. 42. Argued November 9-10, 1960. Decided December 5, 1960. Morton Hollander argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin and Assistant Attorney General Doub. John Q. Rayce argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The Small Business Act of 1953 created the Small Business Administration to “aid, counsel, assist, and protect insofar as is possible the interests of small-business concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise . . . and to maintain and strengthen the overall economy of the Nation.” The Administration was given extraordinarily broad powers to accomplish these important objectives, including that of lending money to small businesses whenever they could not get necessary loans on reasonable terms from private tenders. When a part, but not all, of a necessary loan can be obtained from a bank or other private lender, the Administration is. empowered to join that private lender in making the loan. The basic question this case presents is whether, when the Administration has joined a private bank in a loan and the borrower becomes a bankrupt, the Administration’s interest in the unpaid balance of the loan is entitled to the priority provided for “debts due to the United States” in R. S. § 3466 and § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act, even though the Administration has agreed to share any money collected on the loan with the private bank. That question arises out of a joint bank-Administration loan of $20,000 to a small business, $5,000 of the loan having come from the funds of the bank and $15,000 from the Government Treasury. Nine months later, an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against the borrower by other creditors. The Administration appeared in the proceedings upon that petition, filed a claim for $16,355.69, the amount then due on the loan, including interest, and asserted priority for its claim to the extent of $12,266.75, its 75 per cent interest in the debt. After a hearing, the referee in bankruptcy denied priority on the ground that the Administration is a “legal entity” and therefore not entitled to the “privileges and immunities of the United States.” The District Court, on review, rejected the ground upon which the referee had relied but concluded that since the bankrupt's note evidencing the loan was not assigned by the bank to the Administration until after the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, the debt is not entitled to priority. The Court of Appeals affirmed on a third ground — that the Administration, having contracted to pay the participating private bank one-fourth of any distribution received, could not assert its priority and thus permit a private party to benefit from a priority which, under R. S. § 3466 and the Bankruptcy Act, belongs to the Government alone. We granted certio-rari to consider the Government’s contention that the denial of priority to the Small Business Administration handicaps that agency in the effective performance of the duties imposed upon it by Congress. First. It is contended that the referee was correct in holding that the Small Business Administration is a separate legal entity and therefore not entitled to governmental priority in a bankruptcy proceeding. The contention rests upon a supposed analogy between this case and Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Fleet Corporation and Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Menihan Corp., in which cases this Court refused to treat the corporate governmental agencies involved as the United States. Neither of those cases, however, is controlling here. The agency involved in Sloan Shipyards, the Fleet Corporation, was organized under the laws of the District of Columbia pursuant to authority of an Act of Congress which “contemplated a corporation in which private persons might be stockholders.” This fact alone is enough to distinguish the Fleet Corporation from the Small Business Administration, which, as was contemplated from the beginning, gets all of its money from the Government Treasury. Our decision in the Reconstruction Finance Corp. case is equally inapplicable for that case involved only the question of whether the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, having been endowed by Congress with the capacity to sue and be sued, could be assessed costs in connection with a suit it brought. The holding that such costs could be assessed would not support a holding that the Small Business Administration is not the United States for the purpose of bankruptcy priority. Thus neither of these cases requires us to hold that the Small Business Administration, an agency created to lend the money of the United States, is not entitled to all the priority that must be accorded to the United States when the time comes to collect that money. Under like circumstances we refused to deny priority for debts due to the Farm Credit Administration in United States v. Remund. As was said there of the Farm Credit Administration, the Small Business Administration is “an integral part of the governmental mechanism” created to accomplish what Congress deemed to be of national importance. And it, like the Farm Credit Administration, is entitled to the priority of the United States in collecting loans made by it out of government funds. Second. Respondent contends, as the District Court held, that the Small Business Administration’s assertion of priority is precluded by our holding in United States v. Marxen that priority attaches only to those debts owing to the United States on the date of the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings and not to debts that come into existence after that date. But this requirement of the Marxen case is fully met here by virtue of the fact that the debt due the Administration arises out of the loan made jointly by- the bank and the United States nine months prior to the petition in bankruptcy. Since beneficial ownership of the three-fourths of the debt for which priority is asserted belonged to the Administration from the date of the loan, it is immaterial that formal assignment of the note evidencing the debt was not made by the bank until after the filing of the petition. Third. The Court of Appeals held, and the contention is reiterated here, that the Administration forfeited any right it might otherwise have had to priority by agreeing to turn over to the bank one-fourth of any distribution obtained because of its priority. By this arrangement, it is urged, the Administration is attempting “to give priority to a claim which the United States is collecting for the benefit of a private party,” contrary to the principles announced by this Court in Nathanson v. Labor Board. But the Nathanson case involved a significantly different situation. There the National Labor Relations Board sought to obtain governmental priority for back-pay claims belonging to employees based upon their loss of pay as a result of allegedly discriminatory discharges by the bankrupt. This Court’s denial of priority in that case, involving claims in which the United States had no financial interest, would not justify a denial here where the money was loaned by, and the debt sought to be collected is due to, the United States. The fact that the Administration has contracted to pay the participating private bank one-fourth of any money it later collects on its loan does not mean the Government must lose its priority. Respondent’s argument to the contrary seems to rest upon the assumption that the Government is deprived of its priority by making a contract to pay a part of its funds to another creditor of the bankrupt who has no priority. This argument finds no support whatever in § 3466, in § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act, or in the Small Business Act. Section 3466 declares in unequivocal language that the United Statesfis entitled to priority “[w]henever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent,” and § 64 recognizes that priority in bankruptcy proceedings. The purpose of these sections is simply to protect the interest of the Government in collecting money due to it. Once that money is collected and placed in the Government Treasury, the end sought to be achieved by § 3466 and § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act is completely satisfied. At that point, there is no difference between the money so received and money received from any other source and, like other money, it may be disbursed in any way the Government sees fit, including the satisfaction of obligations already incurred, so long as the purpose is lawful. The Small Business Administration is authorized to enter into contracts calculated to induce private banks to make loans to small businesses. The contract involved in this case, by providing additional security to the private bank at the Government’s expense, is well adapted to that end. Indeed, in many cases such a contract may be the only way the Administration could induce private bank participation in a necessary loan. In those cases, acceptance of respondent’s argument would make it more difficult for the Administration to perform its statutory duties. Clearly Congress did not intend, by the very act of imposing duties upon the Administration, to take away a privilege necessary to the effective performance of those duties. Respondent’s argument from the policy of equality of distribution for similar creditors expressed in the Bankruptcy Act is no more convincing. It is true that the allowance of the priority asserted here will place the bank, a private unsecured creditor, in a better position than other private unsecured creditors. But this position is a result, not of any inequality of distribution on the part of the bankruptcy court, but of the bank’s valid contract with the Small Business Administration. Fourth. Respondent’s last contention, urged throughout these proceedings, is that governmental priority is inconsistent with the basic purposes and provisions of the Small Business Act. The contention rests upon the fact that having a creditor with governmental priority tends to make it more difficult for a small businessman to borrow money from other persons, and, in this respect, handicaps rather than aids borrowers, thus conflicting with the Act’s basic policy. In United States v. Emory, we rejected this same argument, with reference to priority for Federal Housing Administration debts, stating that “[o]nly the plainest inconsistency would warrant our finding an implied exception to ... so clear a command as that of § 3466.” The same conclusion must be reached here. It was error for the courts below to refuse the Government’s claim for priority. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents. 67 Stat. 232, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 631-651. 67 Stat. 232. 67 Stat. 235-236. Ibid. R. S. § 3466, 31 U. S. C. § 191, establishes a general priority for debts due to the United States. Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 104, provides that in bankruptcy cases the priority so established should come fifth in the order of preferred creditors. 168 F. Supp. 483. 272 F. 2d 143. 362 U. S. 947. 258 U. S. 549. 312 U. S. 81. 258 U. S., at 565. The proper scope of that holding was recognized by Congress itself when, several years later, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act was amended expressly to deny the Corporation a right of priority except with respect to debts arising out of its wartime activities. Act of May 25,1948,62 Stat. 261. That the assumption underlying this amendment was that the Corporation would otherwise have had priority for all debts due to it is clear from the discussion of the purpose of the amendment in the Senate. Senator Buck stated that purpose as follows: “The committee believes that RFC should not have such priority with respect to debts arising from its normal lending activities. A provision has been included in this section which will eliminate that priority except with respect to debts arising under the specific war powers which are designated therein.” (Emphasis supplied.) Cong. Rec., 80th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 94, Part 3, p. 4108. See also In re Temple, 174 F. 2d 145. 330 U. S. 539. Id., at 542. 307 U. S. 200. 344 U. S. 25, at 28. For a discussion of the history and purposes of R.. S. § 3466, see United States v. State Bank, 6 Pet. 29, 35-37. Compare Nathanson v. Labor Board, supra, at 27-28. 67 Stat. 236. 11 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. 314 U. S. 423, 433. See also United States v. Remund, supra, at 544-645; Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. United States, 328 U. S. 8, 11-12.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

A. L. MECHLING BARGE LINES, INC., et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 58. Argued February 18, 1964. Decided March 23, 1964. Edward B. Hayes argued the cause and filed briefs for appellants in No. 58. Harold E. Spencer argued the cause for appellant in No. 59. With him on the briefs was Richard M. Freeman. Frank J. Goodman argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, and Robert B. Hummel. H. Neil Garson argued the cause for the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellee in both cases. With him on the brief was Robert W. Ginnane. Richard J. Murphy argued the cause and filed a brief for New York Central Railroad Co., appellee in No. 59. Leo P. Day filed a brief for McNabb Grain Co. et al., appellees in No. 59. Together with No. 59, Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States et al., also on appeal to the same court. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. This direct appeal from a final judgment of a three-judge District Court is but another episode in the long and continued struggle between the railroads and competing barge lines. In 1960 the Interstate Commerce Commission issued an order permitting a departure from the long- and short-haul provision of § 4 of the Interstate Commerce Act. 310 I. C. C. 437. This order permitted the New York Central and connecting carriers to inaugurate a rate structure on its Belt Line west of Kankakee, Illinois, to eastern destinations under which lower rates were charged for some long hauls than for shorter ones on the same route. The District Court approved this action by dismissing a complaint to set aside the order. 209 F. Supp. 744. We noted probable jurisdiction, 374 U. S. 823, and now reverse the judgment with directions that the District Court vacate the order of the Commission and remand for further consideration in light of this opinion. I. The New York Central operates the Kankakee Belt Line, which extends from South Bend, Indiana, through Kankakee, Illinois, and westward to Zearing, Illinois. That portion of the line west of Kankakee to Moronts, Illinois, roughly parallels the Illinois River in Northern Illinois and is used, in large part, to transport corn toward eastern markets. In the mid-1930’s, the Illinois River was developed for barge movement and almost all of the corn traffic was drawn away from the rails to the river, corn being moved to Chicago by barge and then shipped to the East by rail. Prior to 1957, barge rates from ports along the Illinois River to Chicago averaged 4.625(4 per hundred pounds of corn. From Chicago to eastern destinations, rail rates were 49(4 per hundred pounds of corn and 49.5(4 for corn products, so that the total shipping cost from ports on the Illinois River to the East was 53.625(4 for corn and 54.125(4 for corn products. At the same time, rates for shipping corn via all-rail routes from origins on the Belt Line to eastern markets averaged 72(4 for corn and 72.5(5 for corn products, computed either as through rates or as a combination of a 23(4 rail rate to Chicago and the 490 or 49.5(5 rate from Chicago to the East. The railroads chose to meet the barge competition by establishing a new rate structure on December 15, 1956, with a proportional rate for rail shipments of corn to Kankakee which was competitive with the barge rate to Chicago. The railroads continued the regular rates for transportation of corn to Kankakee from points on the Belt Line but allowed credit on reshipment from Kan-kakee to eastern points which resulted in a net rate of 60 for transportation from Belt Line points to Kankakee. The 60 proportional rate applies only if the corn is milled in transit and only if it is reshipped to the East. Because of the credit, the resulting rate system favors eastbound shipments of corn from Belt Line points west of Kanka-kee over similar shipments via the same route starting at Kankakee. For this reason the rate structure violates the long- and short-haul prohibition of § 4 of the Act and the railroads had to apply for authority for fourth-section departures. In 1957 a temporary fourth-section order was entered authorizing the filing and immediate application of the rates but not approving them, “all such rates being subject to complaint, investigation and correction if in conflict with any provision of the Interstate Commerce Act.” The application was set down for hearing, but the Commission did not exercise its power to enter into a general investigation of the lawfulness of the rates under §15(1) or §15(7) of the Act, 41 Stat. 484-487, as amended, 49 U. S. C. §§ 15 (1), 15 (7). Nor did the appellants file a formal complaint under § 13 of the Act, 24 Stat. 383-384, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 13, assailing the lawfulness of the rates. Subsequently the Examiner denied § 4 relief because Belt Line rates to Kankakee were less than the out-of-pocket cost and were “lower than necessary to meet the barge competition.” The Commission reversed, holding that the proportional rate from origins along the Kankakee Belt Line to Kankakee “has no independent existence, but is an integral part of the rate which applies on the through transportation from Belt origin” to the East. The Commission found that the through combination rate was compensatory and that since the barges attracted the corn grown adjacent to the river and the rails attracted that along the Belt Line, the rates were not lower than necessary to meet the barge rates and did not constitute destructive competition. The Chicago Board of Trade, which had intervened in the proceeding, charged that the rates violated § 3 (1) of the Act (as well as § 4) because they discriminated against Chicago grain merchants and processors. The Commission refused to pass upon the question as not being relevant to a § 4 proceeding. Nor did the Commission consider Mechling’s contention that the rates violated § 3 (4) of the Act because they discriminated between connecting carriers. Other objections that the rates violated § 1 (5) of the Act as not being just and reasonable were likewise refused consideration. While the Commission found that the railroad’s action was not a competitively destructive practice, it made no direct finding that the action did not violate the National Transportation Policy, despite the appellants’ insistence that it did. The District Court approved the Commission’s action in all respects and dismissed the complaint, holding “that the order in question was within the statutory power of the Commission, that it is supported by findings and conclusions based on substantial evidence, and that no prejudicial error occurred in the hearings before the Examiner and Commission.” 209 F. Supp., at 749. We have concluded that there is error in the holding in two respects: (1) The Commission should have passed upon the questions raised and evidence offered that the rates violated other sections of the Act; (2) the Commission erred in failing to specifically consider and pass upon the question of whether the rates violated the National Transportation Policy. II. Contentions were made and proof was offered by the Chicago Board of Trade of discriminatory violations of § 3 (1) of the Act, especially discrimination against whole corn by the milling-in-transit limitation. Under the conclusion of the Examiner that the fourth-section application should be denied, it was not necessary to pass upon the § 3 (1) contention. However, when the Commission took the opposite view on the § 4 application, the claim under § 3 (1) was ripe for decision. The Commission found that “[although the New York Central intends to remove the milling-in-transit limitation, these issues do not directly deal with the fourth-section principles here involved, but are properly matters which may be raised in investigation or complaint proceedings.” 310 I. C. C. 437, 451. Likewise, appellant Mechling claims discrimination against the barge lines at Chicago in violation of § 3 (4) of the Act, which prohibits carriers from practicing rate discrimination between connecting lines, including common carriers by water. The gist of the grievance is the assertion that the New York Central rate structure results in lower reshipping rates for ex-rail corn eastbound from Chicago than for ex-barge corn. Mechling urges that the Commission should have allowed full inquiry into this contention and should have determined whether § 3 (4) is being violated. In defense of its position the Commission says that it does not grant relief under § 4 when the rates proposed result in violations of other sections of the Act. However, the Commission does not believe that this policy requires it to consider and decide, in a fourth-section proceeding, every allegation of rate unlawfulness, no matter how remote. Continuing, the Commission argues that since the attack on the rates was on a proportional factor, the 60, and not on the through charge, these other claims of unlawfulness were beyond the immediate § 4 issues. We cannot agree that the mechanism of the rate under attack permits of such easy dismemberment. Indeed, there is a definite tie-in that prevents the compartmentalization of the elements going into the combination. The 60 is not a separate charge but is the result of the railroad’s combination rate. The shipper is charged 230 for the transportation of corn from points west to Kan-kakee, with milling-in-transit, and is allowed a 170 credit on the rate from Kankakee to the East, either direct or via Chicago, on the transportation of the resulting corn products. This combination rate has a real impact on the freight originating along the Belt Line. Further, the rate is not “remote,” as is shown by the undisputed statement of counsel at argument that the barges have lost 53% of their carriage since it was made effective in 1957. If the proceeding is splintered, contestants will be obliged to await the conclusion of § 4 proceedings before raising claims of violations under other sections of the Act. Not only would this be poor administration but it would result in manifest inequities and allow potential windfalls to some carriers. Moreover, such splintering appears to be contrary to the consistent policy of the Commission in fourth-section proceedings. Over 50 years ago the Commission said: “[T]he proviso authorizing this Commission to permit exceptions to the general prohibition of . . . [Section 4] is not a grant of arbitrary or absolute power, but its exercise must be limited and conditioned upon the presence in special cases of conditions and circumstances which would make such exceptions legal and proper and in no wise antagonistic to other provisions of the act.” Railroad Comm’n of Nevada v. Southern Pac. Co., 21 I. C. C. 329, 341 (1911). In at least 10 subsequent cases, as well as in its annual reports, the Commission has re-emphasized the same principle. See 34 I. C. C. Ann. Rep. 47. Furthermore, the application of all of the Act’s prohibitions against discrimination “as a whole” furthers the purpose of the Congress in its enactment. The Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce once stated it this way: “The provisions of the . . . [Interstate Commerce Act] are based upon the theory that the paramount evil chargeable against the operation of the transportation system of the United States as now conducted is unjust discrimination between persons, places, commodities, or particular descriptions of traffic. The underlying purpose and aim of the measure is the prevention of these discriminations, both by declaring them unlawful and adding to the remedies now available for securing redress and enforcing punishment . . . .” S. Rep. No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., 215-216 (1886). In accordance with this policy, this Court declared in New York v. United States, 331 U. S. 284, 296 (1947), that “[t]he principal evil at which the Interstate Commerce Act was aimed was discrimination in its various manifestations.” In the Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476, 485-486 (1914), the Court held that the Commission's power to relieve carriers from the requirements of § 4 depends upon “the facts established and the judgment of that body in the exercise of a sound legal discretion as to whether the request should be granted compatibly with a due consideration of the private and public interests concerned and in view of the preference and discrimination clauses of the second and third sections.” (Emphasis added.) The fact that the long- and short-haul prohibition of § 4 is particularized does not require any different interpretation. The Congress might well have concluded that such a practice was so pernicious that it required specific condemnation. Finally, by hearing and determining, in a single proceeding, all charges of discrimination bearing upon the formal § 4 application, the Commission would further the legislative purpose as declared by the National Transportation Policy. It directed that the Interstate Commerce Act “shall be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out” its purpose “to encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable charges for transportation services, without unjust discrimina-tions, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices . . . .” 54 Stat. 899, 49 U. S. C., note preceding § 1. We do not say that such a rule of consolidation is an absolute. Many of these applications are filed each year and the Commission summarily disposes of the majority of them. Certainly where issues are not raised or brought to adversary position there is no need to consolidate. Likewise, where consolidation would inordinately delay the § 4 proceeding, good administration would require its denial. However, in the instant case, we see no practical reason why the merits of the several contentions should not have been reached. To require the parties to begin anew and thus spawn several cases, all of which might have been easily disposed of in the § 4 proceeding, needlessly subjects appellants' claims to the rigors of circumlocution so deadly to effective administrative and judicial processes. This proceeding is now in its seventh year— during all of which period the rate under attack has been in force — and, still, basic questions as to the validity of the rate have not been considered by the Commission. III. The Examiner entered a finding, which is uncontested, that the proportional rate here under attack did not cover the out-of-pocket costs of the railroad. In spite of this finding, the Commission gave little, if any, consideration to any resulting violation of the National Transportation Policy. There is no economic analysis, no expert testimony, no supporting data. Instead, the Commission found that the through rate, which it thought compensatory, rather than the Belt Line proportional rate, was controlling. Viewed in this manner, the Commission determined that the rate was not a destructively competitive practice. However, it supported this conclusion only with passing references to the first-year experience under the rate of two Illinois elevators and 10 Illinois River ports. One of the elevators had experienced no adverse effects from the rate while the other had lost some grain grown closer to the Belt Line. The 10 ports experienced about a 23% larger corn shipment to Chicago but the proportion of this increase to the whole grain movement is not shown. Nevertheless, the Commission concluded from this “that while corn grown adjacent to the Belt was attracted to the rails, that grown adjacent to the river remained with the barges. Thus, it is evident that the proposed rates are not lower than necessary to meet the barge competition.” 310 I. C. C. 437, 452. In contradiction to this we have the undenied statement of counsel at argument, quoting statistics of the Chicago Board of Trade, that much corn traffic has been diverted from barge to rail since the rate went into effect, so that the barge lines carried 53% less corn to Chicago in 1963 than they did in 1957. The finding that the through rate was compensatory does not answer the question of whether the direct effect of the below-cost proportional rate on the Belt Line traffic is wholly at odds with the National Transportation Policy. Prior to the establishment of the rate, the barge lines enjoyed practically all of the traffic. However, the combination rate appears to have diverted appreciable traffic from the barge lines without any apparent profit to the railroad. Indeed, the Commission has not indicated whether any additional trafile resulted on the rail haul between Chicago or Kankakee and New York. We, therefore, do not believe it sufficient for the Commission to approve such a rate simply on a finding that the through rate is reasonably compensatory and no lower than necessary to meet competition. In light of the facts present here, the claim of violation of the National Transportation Policy, raised and insisted upon by the appellants at all stages of the proceedings, must be specifically considered. The judgment is, therefore, reversed and the cases are remanded to the District Court with directions to vacate the order of the Commission and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 24 Stat. 380, as amended, 71 Stat. 292, 49 U. S. C. § 4 (1): “(1) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to this part or part III to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers, or of like kind of property, for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line or route in the same direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance, or to charge any greater compensation as a through rate than the aggregate of the intermediate rates subject to the provisions of this part or part III, but this shall not be construed as authorizing any common carrier within the terms of this part or part III to charge or receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer distance: Provided, That upon application to the Commission and after investigation, such carrier, in special cases, may be authorized by the Commission to charge less for longer than for shorter distances for the transportation of passengers or property, and the Commission may from time to time prescribe the extent to which such designated carriers may be relieved from the operation of the foregoing provisions of this section, but in exercising the authority conferred upon it in this proviso, the Commission shall not permit the establishment of any charge to or from the more distant point that is not reasonably compensatory for the service performed; and no such authorization shall be granted on account of merely potential water competition not actually in existence: Provided further, That any such carrier or carriers operating over a circuitous line or route may, subject only to the standards of lawfulness set forth in other provisions of this part or part III and without further authorization, meet the charges of such carrier or carriers of the same type operating over a more direct line or route, to or from the competitive points, provided that rates so established over circuitous routes shall not be evidence on the issue of the compensatory character of rates involved in other proceedings: And provided further, That tariffs proposing rates subject to the provisions of this paragraph requiring Commission authorization may be filed when application is made to the Commission under the provisions hereof, and in the event such application is approved, the Commission shall permit such tariffs to become effective upon one day’s notice.” Reshipment of a commodity which has previously been shipped by barge is termed “ex-barge.” When prior transportation is by rail, reshipment is termed “ex-rail.” Raised to 4.8250 in December 1957. A rate which covers only a portion of the total transportation and is therefore only a portion of the total transportation charge. The net rate was 50 when the plan was established, later 5%0, and now 60. Proposed report, sheet 26. 310 I. C. C. 437, 450. 24 Stat. 380, as amended, 54 Stat. 902, 49 U. S. C. § 3 (1): “It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this part to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, association, locality, port, port district, gateway, transit point, region, district, territory, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever; or to subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation, association, locality, port, port district, gateway, transit point, region, district, territory, or any particular description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever: Provided, however, That this paragraph shall not be construed to apply to discrimination, prejudice, or disadvantage to the traffic of any other carrier of whatever description.” 24 Stat. 380, as amended, 54 Stat. 903-904, 49 U. S. C. § 3 (4): “All carriers subject to the provisions of this part shall, according to their respective powers, afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines and connecting lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of passengers or property to and from connecting lines; and shall not discriminate in their rates, fares, and charges between connecting lines, or unduly prejudice any connecting line in the distribution of traffic that is not specifically routed by the shipper. As used in this paragraph the term ‘connecting line’ means the connecting line of any carrier subject to the provisions of this part or any common carrier by water subject to part III.” 24 Stat. 379, as amended, 41 Stat. 475, 49 U. S. C. § 1 (5): “All charges made for any service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of passengers or property ... as aforesaid, or in connection therewith, shall be just and reasonable, and every unjust and unreasonable charge for such service or any part thereof is prohibited and declared to be unlawful.” National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899, 49 U. S. C., note preceding § 1: “It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of the Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this act (chapters 1, 8, 12, 13 and 19 of this title), so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers; to encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable charges for transportation services, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices; to cooperate with the several States and the duly authorized officials thereof; and to encourage fair wages and equitable working conditions — all to the end of developing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail, as well as other means, adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense. All of the provisions of this act (chapters 1, 8, 12, 13 and 19 of this title), shall be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the above declaration of policy.” Transcontinental Cases of 1922, 74 I. C. C. 48, 71; Commodity Rates on Lumber and Other Forest Products, In Carloads, From South Pacific Coast Territory To Points In Central Freight Association Territory, 165 I. C. C. 561, 569; Differential Routes To Central Territory, 211 I. C. C. 403, 421; Bituminous Coal to Buffalo, N. Y., 219 I. C. C. 554, 560; Pig Iron To Butler, Pa., 222 I. C. C. 1, 2; Iron and Steel to Minnesota, 231 I. C. C. 425, 428; Iron and Steel from Minnequa to Kansas, Nebraska, and South Dakota, 278 I. C. C. 163, 168-169; Coal and Coal Briquets in the South, 289 I. C. C. 341, 376-377; Passenger Fares, Hell Gate Bridge Route, New York, N. Y., 296 I. C. C. 147, 153; Nepheline Syenite from Ontario. Canada, to the East, 308 I. C. C. 561, 564-565. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 884. On Mechling’s claimed violation of § 3 (4), proof on cross-examination was offered before the Examiner and refused as being relevant only in a “division case.” The report of the Commission is silent on the point. It was stated before the Examiner that the record “made fairly plain” the contention which, if true, should permit the Commission to proceed on remand to pass upon it; if not, then the record should be supplemented by stipulation or by additional evidence before the Examiner, if necessary.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CARDILLO, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, UNITED STATES EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION, v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. ET AL. No. 265. Argued January 10, 1947. Decided March 10, 1947. Philip Elman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Washington, Assistant Attorney General Sonnett, Paul A. Sweeney and Joseph B. Goldman. Arthur J. Phelan argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Nelson T. Hartson and Edward B. Williams. Mr. Justice Murphy delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner, Deputy Commissioner of the United States Employees' Compensation Commission, issued an order under the District of Columbia Workmen’s Compensation Act awarding compensation to the widow of one Clarence H. Ticer. It was specifically found that the injury which led to Ticer’s death “arose out of and in the course of the employment.” The propriety and effect of that finding are the main focal points of our inquiry in this case. Section 1 of the District of Columbia Workmen’s Compensation Act provides in part that “the provisions of the Act entitled 'Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act,’ . . . shall apply in respect to the injury or death of an employee of an employer carrying on any employment in the District of Columbia, irrespective of the place where the injury or death occurs.” The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, § 2 (2), in turn defines the term “injury” to include “accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment, ...” A finding that the injury or death was one “arising out of and in the course of employment” is therefore essential to an award of compensation under the District of Columbia Workmen’s Compensation Act. In support of his order in this case the Deputy Commissioner made various findings of fact. These may be summarized as follows: Ticer and his wife were residents of the District of Columbia. He had been regularly employed since about 1934 as an electrician by E. C. Ernst, Inc., a contractor engaged in electrical construction work in the District of Columbia and surrounding areas. In November, 1940, Ticer was transferred by his employer from a project in the District of Columbia to a project at the Quantico Marine Base at Quantico, Virginia. His work at the Marine Base continued for over three years until the time of his injury in December, 1943. There was in effect at all times an agreement between the electrical workers’ union and the employer. Section 15 (b) of this agreement provided that “Transportation and any necessary expense such as board and lodging shall be furnished [by the employer] for all work outside the District of Columbia.” The sum of $2 a day was fixed by the parties to this agreement as transportation expense and represented the approximate cost of travel from the District of Columbia to the Quantico Marine Base and return. This sum was paid to Ticer and others in addition to the regular hourly rate of pay. And it was paid in lieu of the employer’s furnishing transportation. Because the job site at the Marine Base was several miles away from the Quantico bus or train terminal, it was necessary for Ticer and his co-workers to drive their own automobiles to and from work. The employees formed a car pool. Each morning they started from their respective homes in their own automobiles and drove to a designated meeting place at Roaches Run, Virginia. From that point they would proceed in one car to the job site at the Marine Base. This procedure was repeated in reverse in the evening. The workers alternated in the use of the cars between Roaches Run and the job site. Non-members of the car pool each paid the car owner $1 for the round trip. The employer was aware of the means of transportation being used and acquiesced therein. On December 13, 1943, Ticer was driving his car on a direct route from his place of employment to his home, following the close of the day’s work. Four co-workers were riding with him, two of them being non-members of the car pool. As the car approached Fort Belvoir, Virginia, a large stone, which came from under the rear wheel of a passing truck, crashed through the windshield of the car. It struck Ticer’s head, crushing his skull. Death resulted four days later. Ticer’s widow presented a claim for compensation. At the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner, the employer and the insurance carrier contended that the Virginia Compensation Commission had sole jurisdiction over the claim and that Ticer’s injury did not arise out of or in the course of his employment. The Deputy Commissioner ruled against these contentions. After making the foregoing findings, he entered an order awarding death benefits and funeral expenses to the claimant. The employer and the insurance carrier then brought this action in the District Court to set aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner. They renewed their jurisdictional objection and alleged a lack of substantial evidence to support the finding that Ticer’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the Deputy Commissioner’s findings were supported by evidence in the record and that the compensation order was in all respects in accordance with law. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, one justice dissenting. 81 U. S. App. D. C. 72, 154 F. 2d 529. Without passing upon the jurisdictional issue, the court held that Ticer’s injury had not arisen out of and in the course of his employment. It felt that Ticer had become entirely free of his employer’s control at the close of the day’s work at the Marine Base and that he had thereafter assumed his own risk in subjecting himself to the hazards of the highway. We granted certiorari on a petition alleging a conflict with the decision of this Court in Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 288 U. S. 162. As noted, the Court of Appeals deemed it unnecessary to dispose of the question whether the Deputy Commissioner had jurisdiction over the instant claim. But in reviewing an administrative order, it is ordinarily preferable, where the issue is raised and where the record permits an adjudication, for a federal court first to satisfy itself that the administrative agency or officer had jurisdiction over the matter in dispute. At the same time, however, it is needless to remand this case to the Court of Appeals for a determination of the jurisdictional issue. That issue was considered and determined by the Deputy Commissioner, who was in turn sustained by the District Court. The facts pertinent to that issue are not seriously disputed and the matter has been fully briefed and argued before us. A remand under such circumstances is not warranted. We accordingly turn to a consideration of the jurisdictional issue. We are aided here, of course, by the provision of § 20 of the Longshoremen’s Act that, in proceedings under that Act, jurisdiction is to be “presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary”—a provision which applies with equal force to proceedings under the District of Columbia Act. And the Deputy Commissioner’s findings as to jurisdiction are entitled to great weight and will be rejected only where there is apparent error. Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U. S. 249, 256-257. His conclusion that jurisdiction exists in this case is supported both by the statutory provisions and by the evidence in the record. The jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner to consider the claim in this case rests upon the statement in the District of Columbia Act that it “shall apply in respect to the injury or death of an employee of an employer carrying on any employment in the District of Columbia, irrespective of the place where the injury or death occurs; except that in applying such provisions the term 'employer’ shall be held to mean every person carrying on any employment in the District of Columbia, and the term 'employee’ shall be held to mean every employee of any such person.” There is no question here but that Ticer was employed by a District of Columbia employer; the latter had its place of business in the District and engaged in construction work in the District, as well as in surrounding areas. But the contention is made that, despite the broad sweep of the statutory language, the Act applies only where the employee, during the whole of his employment, spent more time working within the District than he spent working outside the District. Using that criterion, it is said that the Act is inapplicable to this case since Ticer was employed on a construction job in Virginia continuously for over three years prior to the accident and did nothing within the District for his employer during that period. The implication is that only the Virginia workmen’s compensation law is applicable. But the record indicates that both Ticer and his wife were residents of the District. He had been hired in the District by his employer in 1934 and had worked on various projects in and around the District from that time until 1940, when he was assigned to the Quantico Marine Base project. While at the Marine Base, he was under orders from the District and was subject to being transferred at anytime to a project in the District. His pay was either carried to him from the District or was given to him directly in the District. And he commuted daily between his home in the District and the Marine Base project. We hold that the jurisdictional objection is without merit in light of these facts. Nothing in the history, the purpose or the language of the Act warrants any limitation which would preclude its application to this case. The Act in so many words applies to every employee of an employer carrying on any employment in the District of Columbia, “irrespective of the place where the injury or death occurs.” Those words leave no possible room for reading in an implied exception excluding those employees like Ticer who have substantial business and personal connections in the District and who are injured outside the District. Whether this language covers employees who are more remotely related to the District is a matter which we need not now discuss and any arguments based upon such hypothetical situations are without weight in this case. Nor does any statutory policy suggest itself to justify the proposed exception. A prime purpose of the Act is to provide residents of the District of Columbia with a practical and expeditious remedy for their industrial accidents and to place on District of Columbia employers a limited and determinate liability. See Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 159. The District is relatively quite small in area; many employers carrying on business in the District assign some employees to do work outside the geographical boundaries, especially in nearby Virginia and Maryland areas. When such employees reside in the District and are injured while performing those outside assignments, they come within the intent and design of the statute to the same extent as those whose work and injuries occur solely within the District. In other words, the District’s legitimate interest in providing adequate workmen’s compensation measures for its residents does not turn on the fortuitous circumstance of the place of their work or injury. Nor does it vary with the amount or percentage of work performed within the District. Rather it depends upon some substantial connection between the District and the particular employee-employer relationship, a connection which is present in this case. Such has been the essence of prior holdings of the Court of Appeals. B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Britton, 78 U. S. App. D. C. 221, 139 F. 2d 362; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 78 U. S. App. D. C. 392, 141 F. 2d 362; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 78 U. S. App. D. C. 394, 141 F. 2d 364. And as so applied, the statute fully satisfies any constitutional questions of due process or full faith and credit. Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U. S. 532. Cf. Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, supra. Hence we conclude that the Deputy Commissioner had jurisdiction under the District of Columbia Act to entertain a claim by the widow of an employee who had been a resident of the District, who had been employed by a District employer and who had been subject to work assignments in the District. We accordingly turn to a consideration of the propriety and effect of the Deputy Commissioner’s finding that Ticer’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. Our approach to that problem grows out of the provisions of the Longshoremen’s Act, as made applicable by the District of Columbia Act. Section 19 (a) of the Longshoremen’s Act provides for the filing of a “claim for compensation” and specifies that “the deputy commissioner shall have full power and authority to hear and determine all questions in respect of such claim.” Thus questions as to whether an injury arose out of and in the course of employment necessarily fall within the scope of the Deputy Commissioner’s authority. Section 21 (b) then provides that compensation orders may be suspended or set aside through injunction proceedings instituted in the federal district courts “if not in accordance with law.” In determining whether a particular injury arose out of and in the course of employment, the Deputy Commissioner must necessarily draw an inference from what he has found to be the basic facts. The propriety of that inference, of course, is vital to the validity of the order subsequently entered. But the scope of judicial review of that inference is sharply limited by the foregoing statutory provisions. If supported by evidence and not inconsistent with the law, the Deputy Commissioner’s inference that an injury did or did not arise out of and in the course of employment is conclusive. No reviewing court can then set aside that inference because the opposite one is thought to be more reasonable; nor can the opposite inference be substituted by the court because of a belief that the one chosen by the Deputy Commissioner is factually questionable. Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., supra, 166; Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U. S. 280, 287; South Chicago Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251, 257-258; Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U. S. 244, 246; Davis v. Department of Labor, supra, 256; Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U. S. 565, 568-569. It matters not that the basic facts from which the Deputy Commissioner draws this inference are undisputed rather than controverted. See Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U. S. 287, 293. It is likewise immaterial that the facts permit the drawing of diverse inferences. The Deputy Commissioner alone is charged with the duty of initially selecting the inference which seems most reasonable and his choice, if otherwise sustainable, may not be disturbed by a reviewing court. Del Vecchio v. Bowers, supra, 287. Moreover, the fact that the inference of the type here made by the Deputy Commissioner involves an application of a broad statutory term or phrase to a specific set of facts gives rise to no greater scope of judicial review. Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 131; Commissioner v. Scottish American Co., 323 U. S. 119, 124; Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143, 153-154. Even if such an inference be considered more legal than factual in nature, the reviewing court’s function is exhausted when it becomes evident that the Deputy Commissioner’s choice has substantial roots in the evidence and is not forbidden by the law. Such is the result of the statutory provision permitting the suspension or setting aside of compensation orders only “if not in accordance with law.” Our attention must therefore be cast upon the inference drawn by the Deputy Commissioner in this case that Ticer’s injury and death did arise out of and in the course of his employment. If there is factual and legal support for that conclusion, our task is at an end. A reasonable legal basis for the Deputy Commissioner’s action in this respect is clear. The statutory phrase “arising out of and in the course of employment,” which appears in most workmen’s compensation laws, is deceptively simple and litigiously prolific. As applied to injuries received by employees while traveling between their homes and their regular places of work, however, this phrase has generally been construed to preclude compensation. Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., supra, 169. Such injuries are said not to arise out of and in the course of employment; rather they arise out of the ordinary hazards of the journey, hazards which are faced by all travelers and which are unrelated to the employer’s business. But certain exceptions to this general rule have come to be recognized. These exceptions relate to situations where the hazards of the journey may fairly be regarded as the hazards of the service. They are thus dependent upon the nature and circumstances of the particular employment and necessitate a careful evaluation of the employment terms. Under the District of Columbia Workmen’s Compensation Act, at least four exceptions have been recognized by the Court of Appeals: (1) where the employment requires the employee to travel on the highways; (2) where the employer contracts to and does furnish transportation to and from work; (3) where the employee is subject to emergency calls, as in the case of firemen; (4) where the employee uses the highway to do something incidental to his employment, with the knowledge and approval of the employer. Ward v. Cardillo, 77 U. S. App. D. C. 343, 345, 135 F. 2d 260, 262. See also Lake v. Bridgeport, 102 Conn. 337, 128 A. 782. In performing his function of deciding whether an injury, incurred while traveling, arose out of and in the course of employment, the Deputy Commissioner must determine the applicability of these exceptions to the general rule. Here he decided that the second exception was applicable, that Ticer’s employer had contracted to furnish transportation to and from work and had paid the expense of transportation in lieu of actually supplying the transportation itself. We cannot say that he was wrong as a matter of law. There are no rigid legal principles to guide the Deputy Commissioner in determining whether the employer contracted to and did furnish transportation to and from work. “No exact formula can be laid down which will automatically solve every case.” Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418, 424; Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., supra, 169. Each employment relationship must be perused to discover whether the employer, by express agreement or by a course of dealing, contracted to and did furnish this type of transportation. For that reason it was error for the Court of Appeals in this case to emphasize that the employer must have control over the acts and movements of the employee during the transportation before it can be said that an injury arose out of and in the course of employment. The presence or absence of control is certainly a factor to be considered. But it is not decisive. An employer may in fact furnish transportation for his employees without actually controlling them during the course of the journey or at the time and place where the injury occurs. Ward v. Cardillo, supra. And in situations where the journey is in other respects incidental to the employment, the absence of control by the employer has not been held to preclude a finding that an injury arose out of and in the course of employment. See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, supra; Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., supra. Indeed, to import all the common law concepts of control and to erect them as the sole or prime guide for the Deputy Commissioner in cases of this nature would be to encumber his duties with all the technicalities and unrealities which have marked the use of those concepts in other fields. See Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, supra, 120-121, 125; Hust v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 328 U. S. 707, 723-725. That we refuse to do. “The modern development and growth of industry, with the consequent changes in the relations of employer and employee, have been so profound in character and degree as to take away, in large measure, the applicability of the doctrines upon which rest the common law liability of the master for personal injuries to a servant, leaving of necessity a field of debatable ground where a good deal must be conceded in favor of forms of legislation, calculated to establish new bases of liability more in harmony with these changed conditions.” Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, supra, 423. Nor is there any other formal principle of law which would invalidate the choice made by the Deputy Commissioner in this instance. The fact that Ticer was not being paid wages at the time of the accident is clearly immaterial. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, supra. And it is without statutory consequence that the employer here carried out his contract obligation to furnish actual transportation by paying the travel costs and allowing the employees like Ticer to make the journey by whatever means they saw fit. To be sure, there are many holdings to the effect that, where the employer merely pays the costs of transportation, an injury occurring during the journey does not arise out of and in the course of employment ; there must be something more than mere payment of transportation costs. But assuming those holdings to be correct and assuming the Deputy Commissioner's findings in this case to be justified, there is more here than mere payment of transportation costs. It was found that Ticer’s employer paid the costs as a means of carrying out its contract obligation to furnish the transportation itself. Where there is that obligation, it becomes, irrelevant in this setting whether the employer performs the obligation by supplying its own vehicle, hiring the vehicle of an independent contractor, making arrangements with a common carrier, reimbursing employees for the use of their own vehicles, or reimbursing employees for the costs of transportation by any means they desire to use. In other words, where the employer has promised to provide transportation to and from work, the compensability of the injury is in no way dependent upon the method of travel which is employed. From the statutory standpoint, the employer is free to carry out its transportation obligation in any way the parties desire; and the rights of the employees to compensation are unaffected by the choice made. Turning to the factual support for the Deputy Commissioner’s inference that Ticer’s injury arose out of and in the course of employment, we find ample sustaining evidence. Ticer’s employment was governed by the terms of a long-standing agreement between Local Union No. 26, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (of which Ticer was a member) and the Institute of Electrical Contractors of the District of Columbia, Inc. (of which the employer was a member). Rule 15 (b) of the agreement provided that “Transportation and any necessary expense such as board and lodging shall be furnished for all work outside the District of Columbia.” The employer carried out in different ways this obligation to furnish transportation. On certain construction jobs in the past, it actually furnished a station wagon or a passenger car of its own to transport the employees. At other times, however, it paid the employees an allowance to cover the cost of transportation in lieu of furnishing an automobile. Where the latter course was followed, the written contract was not amended or changed in any way, the employer simply communicating with the union to ascertain the amount necessary to defray the cost of transportation. The amount agreed upon affected all contractors in the Institute; and the cost of transportation was determined before the contractors made their respective bids. On the Quantico Marine Base project, the sum of $2 per day was agreed upon as the transportation allowance in lieu of furnishing an automobile. This amount was fixed after investigation into the cost of transportation by railroad and was paid to each employee, irrespective of his rate of pay, to cover the cost of transportation to and from the Marine Base. No change was made in the written contract. There was also evidence that the distant location of the Marine Base project, the hours of work and the inadequacy of public transportation facilities all combined to make it essential, as a practical matter, that the employer furnish transportation in some manner if employees were to be obtained for the job. This was not a case of employees traveling in the same city between home and work. Extended cross-country transportation was necessary. And it was transportation of a type that an employer might fairly be expected to furnish. Such evidence illustrates the setting in wffiich the contract was drawn. The Court of Appeals felt, however, that the original contract to furnish transportation was not followed and that a new oral contract to pay transportation expenses was substituted in its place. We need not decide whether that view is justified by the record. It is enough that there is sufficient evidence to support the Deputy Commissioner’s view that the payment of transportation costs was merely one way of carrying out the original contract obligation to furnish the transportation itself. We therefore hold that, under the particular circumstances of this ease, the Deputy Commissioner was justified in concluding that Ticer’s injury and death arose out of and in the course of his employment. And since the Deputy Commissioner had jurisdiction over this case, the resulting award of compensation should have been sustained. Reversed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurs in the result. Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice Burton dissent. Act of May 17, 1928, 45 Stat. 600, D. C. Code, 1940, § 36-501. Act of March 4, 1927, c. 509, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. There was one exception. For a period of about 6 months in 1938 or 1939 he worked for the United States Government. “The few and seemingly simple words ‘arising out of and in the course of the employment’ have been the fruitful (or fruitless) source of a mass of decisions turning upon nice distinctions and supported by refinements so subtle as to leave the mind of the reader in a maze of confusion. From their number counsel can, in most cases, cite what seems to be an authority for resolving in his favour, on whichever side he may be, the question in dispute.” Lord Wrenbury in Herbert v. Fox & Co. [1916] 1 A. C. 405, 419. See also Dodd, Administration of Workmen’s Compensation (1936), pp. 680-687; Horovitz, “Modern Trends in Workmen’s Compensation,” 21 Ind. L. J. 473, 497-564; Horovitz, Injury and Death Under Workmen’s Compensation Laws (1944), pp. 93-173; Brown, “ ‘Arising Out Of And In The Course Of The Employment’ In Workmen’s Compensation Laws,” 7 Wis. L. Rev. 15, 67, 8 Wis. L. Rev. 134, 217. See also Gagnebin v. Industrial Comm’n, 140 Cal. App. 80, 34 P. 2d 1052; Keely v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 157 Pa. Super. 63, 41 A. 2d 420; McKinney v. Dorlac, 48 N. M. 149, 146 P. 2d 867; Exelbert v. Klein & Kavanagh, 243 App. Div. 839, 278 N. Y. S. 377. “Nor is it ['in the course of employment’] limited to the time for which wages are paid. Indeed the fact that the workman is paid wages for the time when the accident occurs is of little, if any, importance.” Bohlen, “A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen’s Compensation Acts,” 25 Harv. L. Rev. 328, 401, 402. Turner Day & Woolworth Handle Co. v. Pennington, 250 Ky. 433, 63 S. W. 2d 490. Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois v. Industrial Commission, 370 Ill. 334, 18 N. E. 2d 914; Guenesa v. Ralph V. Rulon, Inc., 124 Pa. Super. 569, 189 A. 524; Republic Underwriters v. Terrell, (Tex. Civil App.) 126 S. W. 2d 752; Orsinie v. Torrance, 96 Conn. 352, 113 A. 924; Kowalek v. New York Consolidated R. Co., 229 N. Y. 489, 128 N. E. 888; Tallon v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 232 N. Y. 410, 134 N. E. 327; Keller v. Reis & Donovan, Inc., 195 App. Div. 45, 185 N. Y. S. 741; Levchuk v. Krug Cement Products Co., 246 Mich. 589, 225 N. W. 559. See annotations in 20 A. L. R. 319, 49 A. L. R. 454, 63 A. L. R. 469, 87 A. L. R. 250, 100 A. L. R. 1053. Cf. Netherton v. Coles, [1945] 1 All E. R. 227. See Donovan’s Case, 217 Mass. 76, 104 N. E. 431; Breland v. Traylor Engineering & Mfg. Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d 415, 126 P. 2d 455; Lehigh Nav. Coal Co. v. McGonnell, 120 N. J. L. 428, 199 A. 906; Burchfield v. Department of Labor and Industries, 165 Wash. 106, 4 P. 2d 858; Swanson v. Latham, 92 Conn. 87, 101 A. 492; Cary v. State Industrial Commission, 147 Okla. 162, 296 P. 385; Williams v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., (La. App.) 19 So. 2d 586; Turner Day & Woolworth Handle Co. v. Pennington, 250 Ky. 433, 63 S. W. 2d 490.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SEBELIUS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. AUBURN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER et al. No. 11-1231. Argued December 4, 2012 Decided January 22, 2013 Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for .a unanimous Court. Soto-mayor, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 161. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Verrilli, Acting Assistant Attorney General Delery, Melissa Arbus Sherry, Mark B. Stern, Stephanie R. Marcus, William, B. Schultz, Kenneth Y Choe, Janice L. Hoffman, Lawrence J Harder, and Gerard Keating. John F. Manning, by invitation of the Court, 567 U. S. 955, argued the cause as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the briefs was Kevin B. Huff. Robert L. Roth argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were John R. Hellow, Patricia A. Millett, Ruthanne M. Deutsch, and Hyland Hunt. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Hospital Association by Catherine E. Stetson and Dominic F. Perella-, for Quality Reimbursement Services, Inc., by Jeffrey A. Lovitky; and for Southwest Consulting Associates, LP, by John M. Faust. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Tax Clinic by Carlton M. Smith-, and for Scott Dodson by Mr. Dodson, pro se. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the time within which health care providers may file an administrative appeal from the initial determination of the reimbursement due them for inpatient services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries. Government contractors, called fiscal intermediaries, receive cost reports annually from care providers and notify them of the reimbursement amount for which they qualify. A provider dissatisfied with the fiscal intermediary’s determination may appeal to an administrative body named the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB or Board). The governing statute, § 602(h)(1)(D), 97 Stat. 165, 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo(a)(3), sets a 180-day limit for filing appeals from the fiscal intermediary to the PRRB. By a regulation promulgated in 1974, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) authorized the Board to extend the 180-day limitation, for good cause, up to three years. The providers in this case are hospitals who appealed to the PRRB more than ten years after expiration of the 180-day statutory deadline. They assert that the Secretary’s failure to disclose information that made the fiscal intermediary’s reimbursement calculation incorrect prevented them from earlier appealing to the Board. Three positions have been briefed and argued regarding the time for providers’ appeals to the PRRB. First, a Court-appointed amicus curiae has urged that the 180-day limitation is “jurisdictional,” and therefore cannot be enlarged at all by agency or court. Second, the Government maintains that the Secretary has the prerogative to set an outer limit of three years for appeals to the Board. And third, the hospitals argue that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies, stopping the 180-day clock during the time the Secretary concealed the information that made the fiscal intermediary’s reimbursement determinations incorrect. We hold that the statutory 180-day limitation is not “jurisdictional,” and that the Secretary reasonably construed the statute to permit a regulation extending the time for a provider’s appeal to the PRRB to three years. We further hold that the presumption in favor of equitable tolling does not apply to administrative appeals of the kind here at issue. HH The Medicare program covers certain inpatient services that hospitals provide to Medicare beneficiaries. Providers are reimbursed at a fixed amount per patient, regardless of the actual operating costs they incur in rendering these services. But the total reimbursement amount is adjusted upward for hospitals that serve a disproportionate share of low-income patients. This adjustment is made because hospitals with an unusually high percentage of low-income patients generally have higher per-patient costs; such hospitals, Congress therefore found, should receive higher reimbursement rates. See H. R. Rep. No. 99-241, pt. 1, p. 16 (1985). The amount of the disproportionate share adjustment is determined in part by the percentage of the patients served by the hospital who are eligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments, a percentage commonly called the SSI fraction. 42 U. S. C. § 1395ww(d) (2006 ed. and Supp. V). At the end of each year, providers participating in Medicare submit cost reports to contractors acting on behalf of HHS known as fiscal intermediaries. Also at year end, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) calculates the SSI fraction for each eligible hospital and submits that number to the intermediary for that hospital. Using these numbers to determine the total payment due, the intermediary issues a Notice of Program Reimbursement (NPR) informing the provider how much it will be paid for the year. If a provider is dissatisfied with the intermediary’s reimbursement determination, the statute gives it the right to file a request for a hearing before the PRRB within 180 days of receiving the NPR. § 1395oo(a)(3) (2006 ed.) In 1974, the Secretary promulgated a regulation, after notice and comment rulemaking, permitting the Board to extend the 180-day time limit upon a showing of good cause; the regulation further provides that “no such extension shall be granted by the Board if such request is filed more than 3 years after the date the notice of the intermediary’s determination is mailed to the provider.” 39 Fed. Reg. 34517 (1974) (codified in 42 CFR § 405.1841(b) (2007)). For many years, CMS released only the results of its SSI fraction calculations and not the underlying data. The Baystate Medical Center—a hospital not party to this case— timely appealed the calculation of its SSI fraction for each year from 1993 through 1996. Eventually, the PRRB determined that CMS had omitted several categories of SSI data from its calculations and was using a flawed process to determine the number of low-income beneficiaries treated by hospitals. These errors caused a systematic undercalculation of the disproportionate share adjustment, resulting in underpayments to the providers. Baystate Medical Center v. Leavitt, 545 F. Supp. 2d 20, 26-30 (DC 2008); see id., at 57-58 (concluding that CMS failed to use the “best available data”). The methodological errors revealed by the Board’s Bay-state decision would have yielded similarly reduced payments to all providers for which CMS had calculated an SSI fraction. In March 2006, the Board’s decision in the Bay-state case was made public. Within 180 days, the hospitals in this case filed a complaint with the Board seeking to challenge their disproportionate share adjustments for the years 1987 through 1994. The hospitals acknowledged that their challenges, unlike Baystate’s timely contest, were more than a decade out of time. But equitable tolling of the limitations period was in order, they urged, due to CMS’s failure to inform the hospitals that their SSI fractions had been based on faulty data. The PRRB held that it lacked jurisdiction over the hospitals’ complaint, reasoning that it had no equitable powers save those legislation or regulation might confer, and that the Secretary’s regulation permitted it to excuse late appeals only for good cause, with three years as the outer limit. On judicial review, the District Court dismissed the hospitals’ claims for relief, holding that nothing in the statute suggests that “Congress intended to authorize equitable tolling.” 686 F. Supp. 2d 56, 70 (DC 2010). The Court of Appeals reversed. 642 F. 3d 1145 (CADC 2011). It relied on the presumption that statutory limitations periods are generally subject to equitable tolling and reasoned that “ ‘the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States.’ ” Id., at 1148 (quoting Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95-96 (1990)). The presumption applies to the 180-day time limit for provider appeals from reimbursement determinations, the Court of Appeals held, finding nothing in the statutory provision for PRRB review indicating that Congress intended to disallow equitable tolling. 642 F. 3d, at 1149-1151. We granted the Secretary’s petition for certiorari, 567 U. S. 933 (2012), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals over whether the 180-day time limit in 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo(a)(3) constricts the Board’s jurisdiction. Compare 642 F. 3d 1145 (case below); Western Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Heckler, 783 F. 2d 1376, 1379-1380 (CA9 1986) (180-day limit is not jurisdictional and the Secretary may extend it for good cause), with Alacare Home Health Servs., Inc. v. Sullivan, 891 F. 2d 850, 855-856 (CA11 1990) (statute of limitations is jurisdictional and the Secretary lacked authority to promulgate good-cause exception); St. Joseph’s Hospital of Kansas City v. Heckler, 786 F. 2d 848, 852-853 (CA8 1986) (same). Beyond the jurisdictional inquiry, the Secretary asked us to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that equitable tolling applies to providers’ Medicare reimbursement appeals to the PRRB, notwithstanding the Secretary’s regulation barring such appeals after three years. II A Characterizing a rule as jurisdictional renders it unique in our adversarial system. Objections to a tribunal’s jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even by a party that once conceded the tribunal’s subject-matter jurisdiction over the controversy. Tardy jurisdictional objections can therefore result in a waste of adjudicatory resources and can disturbingly disarm litigants. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 434 (2011); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 514 (2006). With these untoward consequences in mind, “we have tried in recent cases to bring some discipline to the use” of the term “jurisdiction.” Henderson, 562 U. S., at 435; see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 90 (1998) (jurisdiction has been a “word of many, too many, meanings” (internal quotation marks omitted)). To ward off profligate use of the term “jurisdiction,” we have adopted a “readily administrable bright line” for determining whether to classify a statutory limitation as jurisdictional. Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 516. We inquire whether Congress has “clearly state[d]” that the rule is jurisdictional; absent such a clear statement, we have cautioned, “courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” Id., at 515-516; see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U. S. 134, 137 (2012); Henderson, 562 U. S., at 435-436. This is not to say that Congress must incant magic words in order to speak clearly. We consider “context, including this Court’s interpretations of similar provisions in many years past,” as probative of whether Congress intended a particular provision to rank as jurisdictional. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 168 (2010); see also John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 133-134 (2008). We reiterate what it would mean were we to type the governing statute, 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo(a)(3), “jurisdictional.” Under no circumstance could providers engage PRRB review more than 180 days after notice of the fiscal intermediary’s final determination. Not only could there be no equitable tolling. The Secretary’s regulation providing for a good-cause extension, see swpra, at 150, would fall as well. The language Congress used hardly reveals a design to preclude any regulatory extension. Section 1395oo(a)(3) instructs that a provider of services “may obtain a hearing” by the Board regarding its reimbursement amount if “such provider files a request for a hearing within 180 days after notice of the intermediary’s final determination.” This provision “does not speak in jurisdictional terms.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 394 (1982). Indeed, it is less “jurisdictional” in tone than the provision we held to be nonjurisdictional in Henderson. There, the statute provided that a veteran seeking Veterans Court review of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ determination of disability benefits “shall file a notice of appeal . . . within 120 days.” 562 U. S., at 438 (quoting 38 U. S. C. § 7266(a); emphasis added). Section 1395oo(a)(3), by contrast, contains neither the mandatory word “shall” nor the appellation “notice of appeal,” words with jurisdictional import in the context of 28 U. S. C. § 2107’s limitations on the time for appeal from a district court to a court of appeals. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 214 (2007). Key to our decision, we have repeatedly held that filing deadlines ordinarily are not jurisdictional; indeed, we have described them as “quintessential claim-processing rules.” Henderson, 562 U. S., at 435; see also Scarborough v. Princ ipi, 541 U. S. 401, 414 (2004) (filing deadline for fee applications under Equal Access to Justice Act); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 454 (2004) (filing deadlines for objecting to debtor’s discharge in bankruptcy); Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484, 498 (1967) (filing deadline for claims under the Trading with the Enemy Act). This case is scarcely the exceptional one in which a “century’s worth of precedent and practice in American courts” rank a time limit as jurisdictional. Bowles, 551 U. S., at 209, n. 2; cf. Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 454 (a time limitation may be emphatic, yet not jurisdictional). B Amicus urges that the three requirements in § 1395oo(a) are specifications that together define the limits of the PRRB’s jurisdiction. Subsection (a)(1) specifies the claims providers may bring to the Board, and subsection (a)(2) sets forth an amount-in-controversy requirement. These are jurisdictional requirements, amicus asserts, so we should read the third specification, subsection (a)(3)’s 180-day limitation, as also setting a jurisdictional requirement. Last Term, we rejected a similar proximity-based argument. A requirement we would otherwise classify as non-jurisdictional, we held, does not become jurisdictional simply because it is placed in a section of a statute that also contains jurisdictional provisions. Gonzalez, 565 U. S., at 146-147; see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 763-764 (1975) (statutory provision at issue contained three requirements for judicial review, only one of which was jurisdictional). Amicus also argues that the 180-day time limit for provider appeals to the PRRB should be viewed as jurisdictional because Congress could have expressly made the provision nonjurisdictional, and indeed did so for other time limits in the Medicare Act. Amicus notes particularly that when Medicare beneficiaries request the Secretary to reconsider a benefits determination, the statute gives them a time limit of 180 days or “such additional time as the Secretary may allow.” 42 U. S. C. § 1395ff(b)(1)(D)(i); see also § 1395ff(b)(1)(D)(ii) (permitting Medicare beneficiary to request a hearing by the Secretary within “time limits” the Secretary “shall establish in regulations”). We have recognized, as a general rule, that Congress’ use of “certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another” can indicate that “different meanings were intended.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692, 711, n. 9 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Amicus notes this general rule in urging that an express grant of authority for the Secretary to extend the time for beneficiary appeals implies the absence of such leeway for provider appeals. But the interpretive guide just identified, like other canons of construction, is “no more than [a] rul[e] of thumb” that can tip the scales when a statute could be read in multiple ways. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992). For the reasons earlier stated, see supra, at 153-155, we are persuaded that the time limitation in § 1395oo(a) is most sensibly characterized as a nonjurisdictional prescription. The limitation therefore does not bar the modest extension contained in the Secretary’s regulation. Ill We turn now to the question whether § 1395oo(a)(3)’s 180-day time limit for a provider to appeal to the PRRB is subject to equitable tolling. A Congress vested in the Secretary large rulemaking authority to administer the Medicare program. The PRRB may adopt rules and procedures only if “not inconsistent” with the Medicare Act or “regulations of the Secretary.” 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo(e). Concerning the 18Q-day period for an appeal to the Board from an intermediary’s reimbursement determination, the Secretary’s regulation implementing § 1395oo, adopted after notice and comment, speaks in no uncertain terms: “A request for a Board hearing filed after [the 180-day time limit] shall be dismissed by the Board, except that for good cause shown, the time limit may be extended. However, no such extension shall be granted by the Board if such request is filed more than 3 years after the date the notice of the intermediary’s determination is mailed to the provider.” 42 CFR § 405.1841(b) (2007). The Secretary allowed only a distinctly limited extension of time to appeal to the PRRB, cognizant that “the Board is burdened by an immense caseload,” and that “procedural rules requiring timely filings are indispensable devices for keeping the machinery of the reimbursement appeals process running smoothly.” High Country Home Health, Inc. v. Thompson, 359 F. 3d 1307, 1310 (CA10 2004). Imposing equitable tolling to permit appeals barred by the Secretary’s regulation would essentially gut the Secretary’s requirement that an appeal to the Board “shall be dismissed” if filed more than 180 days after the NPR, unless the provider shows “good cause” and requests an extension no later than three years after the NPR. A court lacks authority to undermine the regime established by the Secretary unless her regulation is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844 (1984). The Secretary’s regulation, we are satisfied, survives inspection under that deferential standard. As HHS has explained, “[i]t is in the interest of providers and the program that, at some point, intermediary determinations and the resulting amount of program payment due the provider or the program become no longer open to correction.” CMS, Medicare: Provider Reimbursement Manual, pt. 1, ch. 29, §2930, p. 29-73 (rev. no. 372, 2011); cf. Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U. S. 638, 644 (1992) (“Deadlines may lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt parties to act and produce finality.”). The Secretary brought to bear practical experience in superintending the huge program generally, and the PRRB in particular, in maintaining three years as the outer limit. A court must uphold the Secretary’s judgment as long as it is a permissible construction of the statute, even if it differs from how the court would have interpreted the statute in the absence of an agency regulation. National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967, 980 (2005); see also Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843, n. 11. B Rejecting the Secretary’s position, the Court of Appeals relied principally on this Court’s decision in Irwin, 498 U. S., at 95-96. Irwin concerned the then 30-day time period for filing suit against a federal agency under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-16(c) (1988 ed.). We held in Irwin that “the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States.” 498 U. S., at 95-96. Irwin itself, and equitable-tolling cases we have considered both pre- and post-Irwin, have generally involved time limits for filing suit in federal court. See, e. g., Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631 (2010) (one-year limitation for filing application for writ of habeas corpus); Rotella v. Wood, 528 U. S. 549 (2000) (four-year period for filing civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act suit); United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38 (1998) (12-year period to bring suit under Quiet Title Act); Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U. S. 350 (1991) (one- and three-year periods for commencing civil action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484 (1967) (60-day period for filing suit under Trading with the Enemy Act); Kendall v. United States, 107 U. S. 123 (1883) (six-year period for filing suit in Court of Claims). Courts in those cases rendered in the first instance the decision whether equity required tolling. This case is of a different order. We have never applied the Irwin presumption to an agency’s internal appeal deadline, here the time a provider has to appeal an intermediary’s reimbursement determination to the PRRB. Cf. United States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 350 (1997) (assuming, ar-guendo, that Irwin presumption applied to time limit for filing an administrative claim for a tax refund, but concluding based on statutory text, structure, and purpose that there was “good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply”). The presumption of equitable tolling was adopted in part on the premise that “[s]uch a principle is likely to be a realistic assessment of legislative intent.” Irwin, 498 U. S., at 95. But that premise is inapt in the context of providers’ administrative appeals under the Medicare Act. The Act, until 1972, provided no avenue for providers to obtain administrative or judicial review. When Congress first directed the Secretary to establish the PRRB, Congress simultaneously imposed the 180-day deadline, with no statutory exceptions. For nearly 40 years the Secretary has prohibited the Board from extending that deadline, except as provided by regulation. And until the D. C. Circuit’s decision in this case, no court had ever read equitable tolling into § 1395oo(a)(3) or the Secretary’s implementation of that provision. Congress amended § 1395oo six times since 1974, each time leaving untouched the 180-day administrative appeal provision and the Secretary’s rulemaking authority. At no time did Congress express disapproval of the three-year outer time limit set by the Secretary for an extension upon a showing of good cause. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U. S. 833, 846 (1986) (“[W]hen Congress revisits a statute giving rise to a longstanding administrative interpretation without pertinent change, the congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency’s interpretation is persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We note, furthermore, that unlike the remedial statutes at issue in many of this Court’s equitable-tolling decisions, see Irwin, 498 U. S., at 91; Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467, 480 (1986); Zipes, 455 U. S., at 398, the statutory scheme before us is not designed to be “‘unusually protective’ of claimants,” Bowen, 476 U. S., at 480. Nor is it one “in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process.” Zipes, 455 U. S., at 397 (internal quotation marks omitted); The Medicare payment system in question applies to “sophisticated” institutional providers assisted by legal counsel, and “generally capable of identifying an underpayment in [their] own NPR within the 180-day time period specified in 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo(a)(3).” Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U. S. 449, 456 (1999). As repeat players who elect to participate in the Medicare system, providers can hardly claim lack of notice of the Secretary’s regulations. The hospitals ultimately argue that the Secretary’s regulations fail to adhere to the “fundamentals of fair play.” FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 143 (1940). They point, particularly, to 42 CFR § 405.1885(b)(3) (2012), which permits reopening of an intermediary’s reimbursement determination “at any time if it is established that such determination . . . was procured by fraud or similar fault of any party to the determination.” We considered a similar alleged inequity in Your Home and explained that it was justified by the “administrative realities” of the provider reimbursement appeal system. 525 U. S., at 455. There are only a few dozen fiscal intermediaries and they are charged with issuing tens of thousands of NPRs, while each provider can concentrate on a single NPR, its own. Id., at 456. The Secretary, Your Home concluded, could reasonably believe that this asymmetry justifies giving the intermediaries more time to discover overpayments than the providers have to discover underpay-merits. Moreover, the fraud exception allowing indefinite reopening does apply to an intermediary if it “procured” a Board decision by “fraud or similar fault.” Although an intermediary is not a party to its own determination, it does rank as a party in proceedings before the Board. 42 CFR § 405.1843(a). * * * We hold, in sum, that the 180-day statutory deadline for administrative appeals to the PRRB, contained in 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo(a)(3), is not “jurisdictional.” Therefore the Secretary lawfully exercised her rulemaking authority in providing for a three-year “good cause” extension. We further hold that the equitable-tolling presumption our Irwin decision approved for suits brought in court does not similarly apply to administrative appeals of the kind here considered, and that the Secretary’s regulation, 42 CFR § 405.1841(b), is a permissible interpretation of the statute. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The agency was called the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare until 1979, but for simplicity’s sake we refer to it as HHS throughout this opinion. In 2008, after this case commenced, the Secretary replaced the 1974 regulation with a new prescription limiting “good cause” to “extraordinary circumstances beyond [the provider’s] control (such as a natural or other catastrophe, fire, or strike).” 73 Fed. Reg. 30250 (2008) (codified in 42 CFR § 405.1836(b) (2012)). The new regulation retains the strict three-year cutoff for all claims. § 405.1836(c)(2). The parties agree that this case is governed by the 1974 regulation, and our opinion today addresses only that regulation. In § 951 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 117 Stat. 2427, Congress required the Secretary to furnish hospitals with the data necessary to compute their own disproportionate share adjustment. Pursuant to this congressional mandate, the Secretary has adopted procedures for turning over the SSI data to hospitals upon request. 70 Fed. Reg. 47438 (2005). Because no party takes the view that the statutory 180-day time limit is jurisdictional, we appointed John F. Manning to brief and argue this position as amicus curiae. 567 U. S. 955 (2012). Amicus Manning has ably discharged his assigned responsibilities and the Court thanks him for his well-stated arguments. Because neither the Secretary nor the intermediary counts as a party to the intermediary’s determination, 42 CFR §405.1806, providers alone are subject to this exception to the time limitation. The fraud exception apart, reopening time is limited to three years. § 405.1885(a). Within that time, reopening may be sought by the intermediary, the Board, the Secretary, or the provider. Thus an intermediary determination or Board decision could not be reopened if, outside the three-year window, the Secretary discovered errors in calculating the SSI fraction that resulted in overpayments to providers.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WESTERN & SOUTHERN LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF CALIFORNIA No. 79-1423. Argued January 12, 1981 Decided May 26, 1981 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 674. Alan R. Vogeler argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant. Timothy G. Laddish, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was George Deukmejian, Attorney General. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Ferguson, Stuart A. Smith, Michael L. Paup, and Ernest J. Brown for the United States; by Robert Abrams, Attorney General, Shirley AdelsonJSiegel, Solicitor General, and Jeremiah Jochnowitz, Assistant Solicitor General, for the State of New York; and by Jerome R. Hellerstein and William B. Randolph for the Life Insurance Council of New York. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, Edwin P. Lee, and Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, for the State of Arizona et al.; by William M. Leech, Jr., Attorney General, Jimmy G. Creecy, Deputy Attorney General, and Kate Eyler, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Tennessee; and by Matthew J. Zinn for the American Insurance Association et al. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. California imposes two insurance taxes on insurance companies doing business in the State. A premiums tax, set at a fixed percentage of premiums paid on insurance policies issued in the State, is imposed on both foreign and domestic insurance companies and a “retaliatory” tax, set in response to the insurance tax laws of the insurer’s home State, is imposed on some foreign insurance companies. This case presents the question of the constitutionality of retaliatory taxes assessed by the State of California against appellant Western & Southern Life Insurance Co., an Ohio corporation, and paid under protest for the years 1965 through 1971. I Section 685 of the California Insurance Code imposes a retaliatory tax on out-of-state insurers doing business in California, when the insurer’s State of incorporation imposes higher taxes on California insurers doing business in that State than California would otherwise impose on that State’s insurers doing business in California. In computing the retaliatory tax owed by a given out-of-state insurer, California subtracts the California taxes otherwise due from the total taxes that would be imposed on a hypothetical similar California company doing business in the out-of-state insurer’s State of incorporation. If the other State’s taxes on the hypothetical California insurer would be greater than California’s taxes on the other State’s insurer, a retaliatory tax in the amount of the difference is imposed. If the other State’s taxes on the hypothetical California insurer would be less than or equal to California’s taxes, however, California exacts no retaliatory tax from the other State’s insurer. Western & Southern, an Ohio corporation headquartered in Ohio, has engaged in the business of insurance in California since 1955. During the years in question, the company paid a total of $977,853.57 to the State in retaliatory taxes. After unsuccessfully filing claims for refunds with appellee Board of Equalization, Western & Southern initiated this refund suit in Superior Court, arguing that California’s retaliatory tax violates the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. The Superior Court tried the case on stipulated facts without a jury, and ruled that the retaliatory tax is unconstitutional. It ordered a full refund of retaliatory taxes paid, plus interest and costs. App. 78-79. The California Court of Appeal reversed, upholding the retaliatory tax. 99 Cal. App. 3d 410, 159 Cal. Rptr. 539. The California Supreme Court denied Western & Southern’s petition for hearing. App. 89. Western & Southern filed a notice of appeal in this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 449 U. S. 817 (1980). We affirm. II The Commerce Clause provides that “The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In terms, the Clause is a grant of authority to Congress, not an explicit limitation on the power of the States. In a long line of cases stretching back to the early days of the Republic, however, this Court has recognized that the Commerce Clause contains an implied limitation on the power of the States to interfere with or impose burdens on' interstate commerce. Even in the absence of congressional action, the courts may decide whether state regulations challenged under the Commerce Clause impermissibly burden interstate commerce. See, e. g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456 (1981); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617 (1978). Our decisions do not, however, limit the authority of Congress to regulate commerce among the several States as it sees fit. In the exercise of this plenary authority, Congress may “confe [r] upon the States an ability to restrict the flow .of interstate commerce that they would not otherwise enjoy.” Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U. S. 27, 44 (1980); see H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 542-543 (1949). If Congress ordains that the States may freely regulate an aspect of interstate commerce, any action taken by a State within the scope of the congressional authorization is rendered invulnerable to Commerce Clause challenge. Congress removed all Commerce Clause limitations on the authority of the States to regulate and tax the business of insurance when it passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq., as this Court acknowledged in State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U. S. 451, 452 (1962). See also Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U. S. 205, 219, n. 18 (1979); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 310, 319 (1955). Nevertheless, Western & Southern, joined by the Solicitor General as amicus curiae, argues that the McCarran-Fergu-son Act does not permit “anti-competitive state taxation that discriminates against out-of-state insurers.” Brief for Appellant 28; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16. We find no such limitation in the language or history of the Act. Section 1 of the Act, 59 Stat. 33, 15 U. S. C. § 1011, contains a declaration of policy: “Congress declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.” Section 2 (a), 59 Stat. 33, 15 U. S. C. § 1012 (a), declares: “The business of insurance . . . shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.” The unequivocal language of the Act suggests no exceptions. The McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed in the wake of United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944), which held that insurance is “commerce” within the meaning of the Commerce Clause. Prior to South-East ern Underwriters, insurance was not considered to be commerce within the meaning of the Commerce Clause, New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U. S. 495 (1913); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1869), and thus “negative implication from the commerce clause was held not to place any limitation upon state power over the [insurance] business.” Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 414 (1946) (emphasis added). Believing that the business of insurance is “a local matter, to be subject to and regulated by the laws of the several States,” H. R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1945), Congress explicitly intended the McCarran-Ferguson Act to restore state taxing and regulatory powers over the insurance business to their pre-South-Eastern Underwriters scope. H. R. Rep. No. 143, supra, at 3; see SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U. S. 453, 459 (1969); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U. S. 409, 412-413 (1954). The Court has squarely rejected the argument that discriminatory state insurance taxes may be challenged under the Commerce Clause despite the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, supra; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hobbs, 328 U. S. 822 (1946) (per curiam). In Benjamin, the Court considered a South Carolina insurance premiums tax imposed solely on foreign insurance companies. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the tax “would be valid in the dormancy of Congress’ power,” 328 U. S., at 427, or whether the tax “would be discriminatory in the sense of an exaction forbidden by the commerce clause,” id., at 428. Expressly assuming that the tax would be discriminatory, id., at 429, the Court held that enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act “put the full weight of [Congress’] power behind existing and future state legislation to sustain it from any attack under the commerce clause to whatever extent this may be done with the force of that power behind it, subject only to the exceptions expressly provided for.” Id., at 431. In Hobbs, this Court sustained against a Commerce Clause challenge a Kansas retaliatory insurance tax indistinguishable from California’s. The Kansas Supreme Court, upholding the retaliatory tax, had held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act “left the matter of regulation and taxation of insurance companies to the states.” In re Insurance Tax Cases, 160 Kan. 300, 313, 161 P. 2d 726, 735 (1945). This Court summarily affirmed, citing Benjamin and its companion case, Robertson v. California, 328 U. S. 440 (1946). Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hobbs, supra, at 822. We must therefore reject Western & Southern’s Commerce Clause challenge to the California retaliatory tax: the Mc-Carran-Ferguson Act removes entirely any Commerce Clause restriction upon California’s power to tax the insurance business. Ill Ordinarily, there are three provisions of the Constitution under which a taxpayer may challenge an allegedly discriminatory state tax: the Commerce Clause, see, e. g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977); the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, see, e. g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385 (1948); and the Equal Protection Clause, see, e. g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. dander, 337 U. S. 562 (1949). This case assumes an unusual posture, however, because the Commerce Clause is inapplicable to the business of insurance, see Part II, supra, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause is inapplicable to corporations, see Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 537, 548-550 (1928). Only the Equal Protection Clause remains as a possible ground for invalidation of the California tax. The Fourteenth Amendment forbids the States to “deny to any person within [their] jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws/’ but does not prevent the States from making reasonable classifications among such persons. See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356, 359-360 (1973); Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 526-527 (1959). Thus, California’s retaliatory insurance tax should be sustained if we find that its classification is rationally related to achievement of a legitimate state purpose. But as appellee points out, state tax provisions directed against out-of-state parties have not always been subjected to such scrutiny. Rather, a line of Supreme Court cases most recently exemplified by Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945), holds that a State may impose a tax on out-of-state corporations for the “privilege” of doing business in the State, without any requirement of a rational basis. Since the California courts have defined the retaliatory tax as a “privilege” tax, Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 4 Cal. App. 3d 21, 35, 84 Cal. Rptr. 88, 97-98 (1970), application of the reasoning of these cases would require us to sustain the tax without further inquiry into its rational basis. We must therefore decide first whether California’s retaliatory tax is subject to such further inquiry. Some past decisions of this Court have held that a State may exclude a foreign corporation from doing business or acquiring or holding property within its borders. E. g., Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U. S. 207, 211 (1945); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 588-589, 592 (1839). From this principle has arisen the theory that a State may attach such conditions as it chooses upon the grant of the privilege to do business within the State. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall., at 181. While this theory would suggest that a State may exact any condition, no matter how onerous or otherwise unconstitutional, from a foreign corporation desiring to do business within it, this Court has also held that a State may not impose unconstitutional conditions on the grant of a privilege. E. g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 404 (1963); Wiernan v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 192 (1962); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 271 U. S. 583, 592-593 (1926). These two principles are in obvious tension. If a State cannot impose unconstitutional conditions on the grant of a privilege, then its right to withhold the privilege is less than absolute. But if the State’s right to withhold the privilege is absolute, then no one has the right to challenge the terms under which the State chooses to exercise that right. In view of this tension, it is not surprising that the Court’s attempt to accommodate both principles has produced results that seem inconsistent or illogical. Compare Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535 (1877), with Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445 (1874); and compare Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, supra, with Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494 (1926). The doctrine that a State may impose taxes and conditions at its unfettered discretion on foreign corporations, in return for granting the “privilege” of doing business within the State, originated in Paul v. Virginia, supra, a case decided only 15 months after the effective date of the Fourteenth Amendment. A Virginia statute required foreign insurance companies to purchase and file a specified amount of bonds as security for the protection of persons insured. No such requirement was imposed on domestic insurers. Several New York insurance companies refused to comply, and their agent was accordingly denied a license to engage in the insurance business in Virginia. The agent was prosecuted for selling insurance without a license; he defended on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, and the Commerce Clause. This Court sustained the Virginia statute. Viewing corporations as recipients of “special privileges,” 8 Wall., at 181, and believing that “it might be of the highest public interest that the number of corporations in the State should be limited,” id., at 182, the Court held that a State’s assent to the creation of a domestic corporation or the entry of a foreign corporation “may be granted upon such terms and conditions as those States may think proper to impose.” Id., at 181. Under this view, there was no need for the Court to consider whether the statute was arbitrary, irrational, or discriminatory. “[The States] may exclude the foreign corporation entirely; they may restrict its business to particular localities, or they may exact such security for the performance of its contracts with their citizens as in their judgment will best promote the public interest. The whole matter rests in their discretion.” Ibid. In two important respects, the legal underpinnings of Paul v. Virginia were soon eroded. First, the advent of laws of general incorporation, which swept the country in the late 19th century, see Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 557-564 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), altered the very nature of the corporation. Such laws, stimulated largely by “the desire for equality and the dread of special privilege [s],” id., at 549, n. 4, permitted persons to form corporations freely, subject only to generally applicable requirements and limitations. Incorporation lost its status as a special privilege. See Henderson 68. Second, the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, introduced the constitutional requirement of equal protection, prohibiting the States from acting arbitrarily or treating similarly situated persons differently, even with respect to privileges formerly dispensed at the State’s discretion. The combination of general incorporation laws and equal protection necessarily undermined the doctrine of Paul v. Virginia. If the right to incorporate or to do business within a State ceases to be a privilege to be dispensed by the State as it sees fit, and becomes a right generally available to all on equal terms, then the argument for special ex-actions as “privilege taxes” is destroyed. The Court was slow to recognize the consequences of these developments. In Philadelphia Fire Assn. v. New York, 119 U. S. 110 (1886), the first relevant decision governed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court unhesitatingly applied the doctrine of Paul v. Virginia to sustain a New York retaliatory insurance tax against an equal protection challenge. The Court held that a corporation is not a “person within [the State’s] jurisdiction,” 119 U. S., at 116, for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause unless it is in compliance with the conditions placed upon its entry into the State, and that a corporation assents to all state laws in effect at the time of its entry. Id., at 119. “The State, having the power to exclude entirely, has the power to change the conditions of admission at anytime, for the future, and to impose as a condition the payment of a new tax, or a further tax, as a license fee. If it imposes such license fee as a prerequisite for the future, the foreign corporation, until it pays such license fee, is not admitted within the State or within its jurisdiction. It is outside, at the threshold, seeking admission, with consent not yet given. ... By going into the State of New York in 1872, [the Philadelphia Fire Association] assented to such prerequisite as a condition of its admission within the jurisdiction of New York.” Id., at 119-120. Justice Harlan dissented. Acknowledging that a State may prescribe certain conditions upon the entry of a foreign corporation, he insisted “that it is the settled doctrine of this court, that the terms and conditions so prescribed must not be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, or inconsistent with any right granted or secured by that instrument.” Id., at 125. “Can it be,” he asked, “that a corporation is estopped to claim the benefit of the constitutional provision securing to it the equal protection of the laws simply because it voluntarily entered and remained in a State which has enacted a statute denying such protection to it and to like corporations from the same State?” Id., at 127. Although dicta in several cases supported Justice Harlan’s view that a State may not impose conditions repugnant to the Constitution upon the grant of a privilege, see, e. g., Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410, 415 (1871); Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S., at 540, the Court continued to reject constitutional claims by corporations challenging conditions to entry. E. g., New York v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658, 665-666 (1898); Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305, 312-315 (1892); Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 184-185 (1888). Nonetheless, the first quarter of this century saw “an almost complete disintegration” of the doctrine of Paul v. Virginia. Henderson 111. The change became evident in the October Term 1909, when the Court decided four cases in conflict with the principle that the States possess unlimited power to condition the entry of foreign corporations. The most significant of these decisions for our purposes is Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400 (1910), which expressly rejected the contention “that the imposition of special taxes upon foreign corporations for the privilege of doing business within the State is sufficient to justify such different taxation.” Id., at 417. The plaintiff, Southern Railway, had been admitted to do business in Alabama and had invested in permanent facilities in the State. At that time, franchise taxes imposed on domestic corporations were equal to privilege taxes imposed on foreign corporations. Later, Alabama imposed an additional privilege tax on foreign corporations, which Southern Railway challenged on equal protection grounds. The Court held that classifications among corporations for purposes of taxation are constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if they bear a “reasonable and just relation” to the purpose for which they are imposed. Ibid. Noting that there were domestic corporations in Alabama whose business was indistinguishable from that of Southern Railway, the Court stated that “[i]t would be a fanciful distinction to say that there is any real difference in the burden imposed because the one is taxed for the privilege of a foreign corporation to do business in the State and [the] other for the right to be a corporation.” Id., at 417-418. The Court held that “to tax the foreign corporation for carrying on business under the circumstances shown, by a different and much more onerous rule than is used in taxing domestic corporations for the same privilege, is a denial of the equal protection of the laws.” Id., at 418. In Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494 (1926), the Court extended the protections of Southern Railway against discriminatory taxation to corporations holding short-term licenses, and to those without substantial permanent property in the State. 272 U. S., at 508, 509, 514-515. With respect to the general tax burden on business, “the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be classified with domestic corporations of the same kind.” Id., at 511. After Hanover Fire Ins. Co., little was left of the doctrine of Paul v. Virginia and Philadelphia Fire Assn. v. New York, 119 U. S. 110 (1886). It was replaced by a new doctrine: “It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited; and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the “United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.” Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 271 U. S., at 593-594. See also Power Manufacturing Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 497 (1927). The decision in Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945), thus stands as a surprising throwback to the doctrine of Paul v. Virginia and Philadelphia Fire Assn. v. New York. There, the Court seemed to adopt precisely the argument that was rejected in Hanover Fire Ins. Co.: “that a State may discriminate against foreign corporations by admitting them under more onerous conditions than it exacts from domestic companies . . . 325 U. S., at 677; cf. 272 U. S., at 507. The Court stated that the argument that a State may not impose unconstitutional conditions to entry “proves too much.” 325 U. S., at 677. “If it were adopted,” the Court said, “then the long-established rule that a State may discriminate against foreign corporations by admitting them under more onerous conditions than it exacts from dome,stic companies would go into the discard.” Ibid. So long as a tax is “levied upon the privilege of entering the State and engaging in business there,” it may not be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, even though it may impose a burden greater and more discriminatory than was imposed at the date of the corporation’s entry into the State. Id., at 678. The holding in Lincoln National has been implicitly rejected in at least three subsequent cases. In Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562 (1949), the Court struck down a provision of Ohio’s ad valorem tax law that subjected certain intangible property of non-Ohio corporations to a tax not applied to identical property of Ohio corporations. The Court concluded that the provision violated the Equal Protection Clause on the ground that the inequality of treatment was “not because of the slightest difference in Ohio’s relation to the decisive transaction, but solely because of the different residence of the owner.” Id., at 572. The decision in Wheeling Steel was not directly in conflict with that in Lincoln National, because the Ohio courts had held the tax in Wheeling Steel an “ad valorem property tax, . . . and in no sense a franchise, privilege, occupation, or income tax.” 337 U. S., at 572. However, the Wheeling Steel decision rejected the principle of Lincoln National: the opinion declared that a State’s power to exclude out-of-state corporations is limited by the Constitution; the State may not “exac[t] surrender of rights derived from the Constitution of the United States.” 337 U. S., at 571 (citing Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, supra, at 507). In Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959), this Court sustained an Ohio statute exempting nonresidents from an ad valorem tax on certain property held in a storage warehouse, but not exempting Ohio residents from the tax. Without alluding to any possibility that legislative classifications based on State of incorporation should be subject to a different standard from other classifications, the Court held that state tax laws “must proceed upon a rational basis and may not resort to a classification that is palpably arbitrary.” Id., at 527. Finally, in WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117 (1968), this Court struck down a New Jersey statute exempting nonprofit corporations incorporated in New Jersey from tax, but denying a similar exemption to nonprofit corporations incorporated in other States. Disregarding Lincoln National, the Court stated the applicable principle of law as follows: “This Court has consistently held that while a State may impose conditions on the entry of foreign corporations to do business in the State, once it has permitted them to enter, 'the adopted corporations are entitled to equal protection with the state’s own corporate progeny, at least to the extent that their property is entitled to an equally favorable ad valorem tax basis.’ Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 662, 571-572. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380 U. S. 258; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400.” 393 U. S., at 119-120. In view of the decisions of this Court both before and after Lincoln National, it is difficult to view that decision as other than an anachronism. We consider it now established that, whatever the extent of a State’s authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its boundaries, that authority does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose. As we held in Power Manufacturing Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S., at 493-494: “No doubt there are . . . subjects as to which foreign corporations may be classified separately from both individuals and domestic corporations and dealt with differently. But there are other subjects as to which such a course is not admissible, the distinguishing principle being that classification must rest on differences pertinent to the subject in respect of which the classification is made.” IV In determining whether a challenged classification is rationally related to achievement of a legitimate state purpose, we must answer two questions: (1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose? See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S., at 461-463; Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97-98 (1979). The legislative purpose of California’s retaliatory tax is not difficult to discern, for such taxes have been a common feature of insurance taxation for over a century. Although variously expressed, the principal purpose of retaliatory tax laws is to promote the interstate business of domestic insurers by deterring other States from enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes. A survey of state retaliatory tax laws summarized: “[WJhatever their character, it is obvious . . . that their ultimate object is not to punish foreign corporations doing business in the state, or retort the action of the foreign state in placing upon corporations of the enacting state doing business therein burdens heavier than those imposed upon corporations of such foreign state doing business in the enacting state, but to induce such foreign state to show the same consideration to corporations of the enacting state doing business therein as is shown to corporations of such foreign state doing business in the enacting state.” Annot., 91 A. L. R. 795 (1934). Accord, Bankers Life Co. v. Richardson, 192 Cal. 113, 124-125, 218 P. 586, 591 (1923); State ex rel. Crittenberger v. Continental Ins. Co., 67 Ind. App. 536, 542, 116 N. E. 929, 936 (1917); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Welch, 29 Kan. 672, 674-675 (1883); Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 233 Ky. 350, 351-352, 25 S. W. 2d 748, 749-750 (1930); State v. Ins. Co. of North America, 71 Neb. 320, 324, 99 N. W. 36, 38 (1904); Massachusetts Mut. Ins. Co. v. Knowlton, 94 N. H. 409, 412, 54 A. 2d 163, 165 (1947); Commonwealth v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 369 Pa. 560, 565-566, 87 A. 2d 255, 258 (1952); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. State, 161 Wash. 135, 137-138, 296 P. 813, 814-815 (1931). California’s retaliatory tax is based upon a model statute drafted by the insurance industry, and is virtually identical to that enacted by many other States. 4 California Assembly Interim Committee on Revenue and Taxation, The Insurance Tax, No. 15, pp. 64, 66 (1964) (hereafter Insurance Tax). Since the amount of revenue raised by the retaliatory tax is relatively modest, id., at 65, and the impetus for passage of the tax comes from the nationwide insurance industry, it is clear that the purpose is not to generate revenue at the expense of out-of-state insurers, but to apply pressure on other States to maintain low taxes on California insurers. As a committee of the California Assembly has said: “The actual rationale for the provision is that the application of the retaliatory laws acts as a deterrent to state taxation on the insurance industry.” Id., at 66. Decisions by the California courts lend weight to this analysis. The Court of Appeal in the instant case held that the purpose of the retaliatory tax “is to put pressure on the several states to impose the same tax burden on all insurance companies, foreign or domestic, and thereby encourage the doing of interstate business.” 99 Cal. App. 3d, at 413, 159 Cal. Rptr., at 541. Accord, Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 4 Cal. App. 3d, at 34, 84 Cal. Rptr., at 96; Atlantic Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 255 Cal. App. 2d 1, 4, 62 Cal. Rptr. 784, 786 (1967), cert. denied and appeal dism’d, 390 U. S. 529 (1968). Many may doubt the wisdom of California’s retaliatory tax; indeed, the retaliatory tax has often been criticized as a distortion of the tax system and an impediment to the raising of revenue from the taxation of insurance. See, e. g., Council of State Governments, State Retaliatory Taxation of the Insurance Industry 12-13 (1977); Task Force Renort, Statement of Policy on Insurance Premium Taxation, 1 Proc. Nat. Assn, of Ins. Comm’rs 71 (1971); Report of New Jersey Tax Policy Comm., Pt. Y, pp. 47-48 (1972); Strickler, The Mess in State Premium Taxation of Insurance Companies, 69 Best’s Rev. 34, 38 (1969). But the courts are not empowered to second-guess the wisdom of state policies. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 729 (1963). Our review is confined to the legitimacy of the purpose. There can be no doubt that promotion of domestic industry by deterring barriers to interstate business is a legitimate state purpose. This Court has recognized the legitimacy of state efforts to maintain the profit level of a domestic industry, Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 363-367 (1943), and of efforts to “protect and enhance the reputation” of a domestic industry so that it might compete more effectively in the interstate market, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 143 (1970). California’s effort on behalf of its domestic insurance industry is no less legitimate. The mere fact that California seeks to promote its insurance industry by influencing the policies of other States does not render the purpose illegitimate. As we said in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U. S. 452, 478 (1978): “Any time a State adopts a fiscal or administrative policy that affects the programs of a sister State, pressure to modify those programs may result. Unless that pressure transgresses the bounds of the Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IY, § 2, see, e. g., Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U. S. 656 (1975), it is not clear how our federal structure is implicated.” Having established that the purpose of California’s lawmakers in enacting the retaliatory tax was legitimate, we turn to the second element in our analysis: whether it was reasonable for California’s lawmakers to believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose. We acknowledge at the outset that many persons believe that retaliatory taxes are not an effective means for accomplishment of the goal of deterring discriminatory and excessive taxation of insurance companies by the various States. See, e. g., Bodily, The Effects of Retaliation on the State Taxation of Life Insurers, 44 J. of Risk & Ins. 21 (1977); Pelletier, Insurance Retaliatory Laws, 39 Notre Dame Law. 243, 268-269 (1964); Task Force Report, supra, at 71. But whether in fact the provision will accomplish its objectives is not the question: the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied if we conclude that the California Legislature rationally could have believed that the retaliatory tax would promote its objective. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S., at 466; Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S., at 111; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 154 (1938). The Interim Committee on Revenue and Taxation of the California Assembly conducted a major study of the State’s tax system before recommending passage of a constitutional amendment permitting enforcement of the present retaliatory tax. That study found: “It is true that insurers are disadvantaged by retaliatory taxation provisions in the short run, for they usually result in some insurers paying more in taxes in retaliating states. But, in the long run, insurers as a group pay less in taxes because of these provisions, since legislators, when considering measures affecting insurers, do consider retaliatory effects in instance after instance.” Insurance Tax, at 66. The study concluded that retaliatory taxes “have kept premiums lower and insurers’ profits higher than would otherwise have been the case.” Id., at 67. It therefore recommended passage of the proposed constitutional amendment. See ibid. We cannot say that the California Legislature’s conclusions were irrational, or even unreasonable. Assuming that the lawmakers of each State are motivated in part by a desire to promote the interests of their domestic insurance industry, it is reasonable to suppose that California’s retaliatory tax will induce other States to lower the burdens on California insurers in order to spare their domestic insurers the cost of the retaliatory tax in California. In any event, we do not find the evidence against the retaliatory tax overwhelming. The California Department of Finance evaluated the effect of the retaliatory laws: “Whether the insurance companies have sponsored this legislation or not, in their resistance to tax change they have benefitted by it. The home-owned companies in all but a half dozen states are able to say, ‘Don’t raise our taxes. If you do, we will have to pay more in other states.’ The effectiveness of this barrier is demonstrated by the fact that of the 48 states, only 9 increased their insurance tax rates in the last twelve years. . . . None of these is an outstanding insurance state.” State Department of Finance, Budget Div., Highlights of Proposal for Quarterly Insurance Tax Payments 3 (1963). The California courts examined the issue, and found: “The common purpose of [retaliatory tax] legislation in the several states has been to discourage any state from imposing discriminatory taxes or other burdens upon out-of-state companies. The effort seems to have been very largely successful; in any event taxes on insurance premiums have stayed close to 2 percent in most states, for both domestic and out-of-state insurers.” Atlantic Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 255 Cal. App. 2d, at 4, 62 Cal. Rptr., at 786. Authorities in the field have found the evidence mixed. The leading empirical study of the effect of retaliatory tax laws examined tax rates on life insurance premiums from 1936 through 1972, and found: (1) that tax rates have not increased significantly in absolute terms over the period; (2) that life insurance premiums taxes have declined as a percentage of total state tax revenues; and (3) that discrimination against foreign insurance companies has declined over the period. Bodily, 44 J. of Risk & Ins., at 27-32. These results are precisely those that advocates of the retaliatory tax would predict, and thus provide some support for that theory. Statistical analysis of the available data, however, failed to verify this conclusion: the correlation between retaliatory tax laws and the observed results was not found to be statistically significant. Id., at 30-31. The author therefore concluded that retaliatory taxes have been “of questionable value.” Id., at 34. Cf. Pelletier, 39 Notre Dame Law., at 267-269; Felton, Retaliatory Insurance Company Taxation: An Evaluation, 28 J. of Ins. 71, 77-78 (1961). Parties challenging legislation under the Equal Protection Clause cannot prevail so long as “it is evident from all the considerations presented to [the legislature], and those of which we may take judicial notice, that the question is at least debatable.” United States v. Carotene Products Co., supra, at 154. On this standard, we cannot but conclude that the California retaliatory insurance tax withstands the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment. Affirmed. “When by or pursuant to the laws of any other state or foreign country any taxes, licenses and other fees, in the aggregate, and any fines, penalties, deposit requirements' or other material obligations, prohibitions or restrictions are or would be imposed upon California insurers, or upon the agents or representatives of such insurers, which are in excess of such taxes, licenses and other fees, in the aggregate, or which are in excess of the fines, penalties, deposit requirements or other obligations, prohibitions, or restrictions directly imposed upon similar insurers, or upon the agents or representatives of such insurers, of such other state or country under the statutes of this State, so long as such laws of such other state or country continue in force or are so applied, the same taxes, licenses and other fees, in the aggregate, or fines, penalties or deposit requirements or other material obligations, prohibitions, or restrictions, of whatever kind shall be imposed upon the insurers, or upon the agents or representatives of such insurers, of such other state or country doing business or seeking to do business in California. Any tax, license or other fee or other obligation imposed by any city, county, or other political subdivision or agency of such other state or country on California insurers or their agents or representatives shall be deemed to be imposed by such state or country within the meaning of this article.” Cal. Ins. Code Ann. § 685 (West 1972). This provision was enacted in present form in 1959, pursuant to the California Constitution, Art. XIII, § 14-4/5 (f) (3). At that time, the California Constitution permitted imposition of the retaliatory tax only when the other State taxed California insurers at a higher rate than it taxed its own insurers. See Cal. Const., Art. XIII, § 14-4/5 (f) (3) (West Supp. 1964). In 1964, however, the California Constitution was amended to permit the imposition of the retaliatory tax whenever the other State’s taxes on California insurers are higher than California taxes on similar insurers. Cal. Const., Art. XIII, § 14-4/5 (f) (3) (West. Supp. 1966). See Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 63 Cal. 2d 222, 225-227, 404 P. 2d 477, 480-481 (1965). Western & Southern also challenges a provision of California’s property tax law, since repealed, which permitted certain domestic insurance companies to credit a greater portion of property tax paid on their principal offices against their premiums tax liability than foreign insurers could credit. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. §§ 12241 (a) and (b) (West 1970). We need not consider this challenge, because any increase in the property tax deduction would merely trigger an offsetting increase in the retaliatory tax. See App. 86-87. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1852); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 209 (1824). The California courts have described the Kansas retaliatory insurance tax as “substantially identical” to § 685. Atlantic Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 255 Cal. App. 2d 1, 10, 62 Cal. Rptr. 784, 790 (1967), cert. denied and appeal dism’d, 390 U. S. 529 (1968). Western & Southern argues that the instant ease is not controlled by Hobbs because the Kansas Supreme Court said in Hobbs: “We are unable to find in the record evidence to support the view that the tax in question upon foreign insurance companies is greater than that levied on the home insurance companies.” 160 Kan., at 311, 161 P. 2d, at 734. But the principle of Benjamin, applied in Hobbs, was that it was unnecessary for the Court to decide whether the challenged tax was discriminatory, since the McCarran-Ferguson Act simply made the Commerce Clause inapplicable. Thus, Western & Southern’s reliance on this purported distinction carries no weight. We reject appellee’s argument that the McCarran-Ferguson Act altered constitutional standards other than those derived from the Commerce Clause. The House Report states: “It is not the intention of Congress in the enactment of this legislation to clothe the States with any power to regulate or tax the business of insurance beyond that which they had been held to possess prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Southeastern Under writers Association case. Briefly, your committee is of the opinion that we should provide for the continued regulation and taxation of insurance by the States, subject always, however, to the limitations set out in the controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court . . . .” H. R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1945). In State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U. S. 451 (1962), we said: “Congress, of course, does not have the final say as to what constitutes due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. And while Congress has authority by § 5 of that Amendment to enforce its provisions [citing cases], the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not purport to do so.” Id., at 457. Although Western & Southern raises a due process claim in its statement of questions presented, it does not separately address that claim in its brief. We therefore assume that any due process argument is subsumed in the equal protection issue. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456, 470, n. 12 (1981). Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 (1946), did not resolve the equal protection issue. The Court stated in reference to the South Carolina tax challenged in that case: “No conceivable violation of the commerce clause, in letter or spirit, is presented. Nor is contravention of any other limitation.” Id., at 436. The appellant in that case, however, challenged the South Carolina tax under the Commerce Clause, id., at 411, and nothing in the opinion of the Court suggests that the Court considered or decided any equal protection issue. The Court disposed of plaintiff in error’s Commerce Clause argument on the ground that the business of insurance is not commerce. 8 Wall., at 183. See supra, at 653-654. This view of the corporation reflected the common understanding through the first three-quarters of the 19th century. As Justice Brandéis has noted, “at first, the corporate privilege was granted sparingly; and only when the grant seemed necessary in order to procure for the community some specific benefit otherwise unavailable.” Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 549 (1933) (dissenting opinion). See also 1 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations 5-6 (1974); G. Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law 64-68 (1918) (hereafter Henderson). In 1869, the year Paul v. Virginia was decided, the Commonwealth of Virginia did not permit general incorporation of insurance companies. Va. Code of 1860, ch. 65, § 4. Thus, the Court’s conception of the corporate franchise in that case as a “grant of special privileges to the corporators,” Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall., at 181, was an accurate portrayal of the corporation as it existed at that time. This was not to last for long. See Act of Mar. 30, 1871, 1870 Va. Acts, ch. 277 (general incorporation law made applicable to insurance companies). As appellee concedes, the theory espoused in Philadelphia Fire Assn. that a foreign corporation is not “a person within [the State’s] jurisdiction” within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause unless it is in compliance with all conditions imposed on its entry is now discarded. See Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp., 262 U. S. 544, 549-551 (1923) (holding that a foreign corporation is “within” the State if it files a lawsuit therein); Bethlehem Motors Corp. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, 424 (1921) (holding that “corporations doing business in a State and having an agent there are within the jurisdiction of the State”). Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400 (1910); Ludwig v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 216 U. S. 146 (1910); Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56 (1910); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1 (1910) (Western Union I). Southern R. Co. relied on two Commerce Clause cases decided earlier in the same Term, in both of which Justice Harlan wrote the plurality opinion. Western Union I, supra, and Pullman Co. v. Kansas, supra, struck down Kansas taxes imposed on the total authorized capital of out-of-state corporations, representing the corporations’ property both within and without Kansas. The State defended the taxes on the strength of Paul v. Virginia and like cases, as conditions imposed on the privilege of doing business within the State. The plurality held that a State may not impose unconstitutional conditions on the privilege of doing business within the State. See 216 U. S., at 33-38, 46-48; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, supra, at 62-63. Accord, Ludwig v. Western Union Telegraph Co., supra. Since a tax imposed on the out-of-state operations of an interstate company violates the Commerce Clause, see 216 U. S., at 38-45, such a tax may not be imposed as a prerequisite to doing business in the State. The plurality opinion distinguished Paul v. Virginia as involving the business of insurance, which was not considered interstate commerce. 216 U. S., at 33-34. Although modified in detail, the principle established in these cases still governs Commerce Clause challenges to state privilege taxes. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977). Justice Holmes, in dissent in both cases, pointed out that if a State has an “absolute arbitrary power” to exclude foreign corporations, then no conditions imposed on corporations in the exercise of that power could be unconstitutional. 216 U. S., at 54. Southern R. Co. did not, however, overrule Philadelphia Fire Assn. v. New York and like cases. Although acknowledging the difference in principle between its decision and that in Philadelphia Fire Assn., 216 U. S., at 416, Southern R. Co. distinguished the earlier case on the ground that the Philadelphia Fire Association, unlike the Southern Railway, held only a one-year license renewable at the State’s discretion. This effectively overruled those portions of Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 68, 88 (1913), overruled on other grounds, Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 218 (1925), and Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 147, 156-158 (1918), that appeared to limit Southern B. Co. to cases in which the foreign corporation held substantial permanent property within the State. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. also held that, with respect to an admission fee charged to the corporation prior to its entry into the State, “the measure of the burden is in the discretion of the State, and any inequality as between the foreign corporation and the domestic corporation in that regard does not come within the inhibition of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 272 U. S., at 511. The opinion makes clear, however, that a tax on the business of the corporation after its admission may not be imposed in the guise of an admission fee. Ibid. The Court in Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Bead erroneously distinguished Hanover Fire Ins. Co. as involving an out-of-state insurance company holding an “unequivocal” license rather than an annual license, renewable only upon satisfaction of the condition precedent of paying the discriminatory tax. 325 U. S., at 676. In fact, the Hanover Fire Insurance Co. held only an annual license. 272 U. S., at 509. The Court in Hanover Fire Ins. Co. explicitly stated that the “principle is the same,” no matter whether the license is annual or indefinite. Ibid. The reasoning in Lincoln National Life was virtually identical to that offered by Justice Holmes in his Western Union dissent. See n. 14, supra. The State argued that other States could enact similar provisions, and thereby eliminate any inequality. This Court concluded, however, that “[i]t is hard to see that this offer of reciprocity restores to appellants any of the equality which the application of the Ohio tax, considered alone, so obviously denies.” 337 U. S., at 573. Justice Harlan and I, concurring, went still further. Arguing that the Equal Protection Clause must be used as “an instrument of federalism,” 358 U. S., at 532, we rejected the Court’s analysis as insufficiently protective of out-of-state interests. We stated that the Equal Protection Clause denies a State “the power constitutionally to discriminate in favor of its own residents against the residents of other state members of our federation.” Id,., at 533. Our position has not been adopted by the Court, which has subsequently required no more than a rational basis for discrimination by States against out-of-state interests in the context of equal protection litigation. E. g., Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm’n, 436 U. S. 371, 388-391 (1978); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794, 810-814 (1976). Although the retaliatory tax is an imposition on interstate insurance companies, it is supported by the industry as a means of fostering uniform and moderate levels of taxation nationwide. See Brief for the American Insurance Association et al. as Amici Curiae; Council of State Governments, State Retaliatory Taxation of the Insurance Industry 12 (1977). The nature of the classification supports this conclusion as well. The retaliatory tax is not imposed on foreign corporations qua foreign corporations, as would be expected were the purpose of the tax to raise revenue from noncitizens; rather, it is imposed only on corporations whose home States impose more onerous burdens on California insurers than California otherwise would impose on those corporations. See n. 1, supra. A large part of this decline may be accounted for by the general decline in the States’ reliance on business taxes. From 1957 to 1972, the proportion of total state tax revenues attributable to general business taxes fell by 17.7%, while the proportion attributable to life insurance premiums taxes fell by 20.0%. Bodily, The Effects of Retaliation on the State Taxation of Life Insurers, 44 J. of Risk & Ins. 21, 31-32 (1977). But see State Department of Finance, Budget Div., Highlights of Proposal for Quarterly Insurance Tax Payments 3-4 (1963) (showing that since 1950, the proportion of California tax revenues attributable to insurance taxes has decreased substantially relative to that attributable to bank and corporate taxes).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN v. BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD CO. et al. No. 970. Argued May 6,1947. — Decided June 9, 1947. Burke Williamson argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Jack A. Williamson. E. Douglas Schwantes and Robert McCormick Adams were also of counsel. Ernest 8. Ballard argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. Mr. Justice Murphy delivered the opinion of the Court. Our concern here is with the intervention rights of representatives of railroad employees in a suit brought against the railroad under §16 (12) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 16 (12). The origin of this suit is to be found in an order issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission on May 16,1922. Chicago Junction Case, 71 I. C. C. 631. See also Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258. The Commission there approved the purchase by the New York Central Railroad Co. (Central) of all the capital stock of the Chicago River & Indiana Railroad Co. (River Road); it also authorized the leasing to River Road of all the properties of the Chicago Junction Railway Co. (Junction) for 99 years and thereafter, at the lessee’s option, in perpetuity. Among the properties in question were trackage and switching facilities at the Union Stock Yards, Chicago, Illinois, connecting with various trunk lines. Prior to the Commission order, the practice had been for the trunk line railroads to use their own power and crews to move their empty and loaded livestock cars over these tracks to and from the loading places in the Union Stock Yards. For the privilege of so moving their cars, the railroads were charged $1.00 per car, loaded or empty. The Commission made various conditions to its approval of the proposed transactions. The third condition provided: “The present traffic and operating relationships existing between the Junction and River Road and all carriers operating in Chicago shall be continued, in so far as such matters are within the control of the Central.” 71 I. C. C. at 639. This condition is still in effect, the Commission’s decision and order having been found to be valid and binding on all parties in a proceeding in the District Court in 1929. The trunk line railroads have continued to use their own power and crews in moving their livestock cars over the trackage operated by River Road and have paid River Road the amount of $1.00 per car. But on January 25, 1946, Central and River Road notified the railroads that on and after February 1, 1946, the cars would be moved over this trackage by means of the power and crews of River Road and that the handling charge would be $12.96 per outbound loaded car. Soon after this new practice went into effect, the trunk line railroads (appellees herein) brought this suit for preliminary and permanent injunctions under §16 (12) of the Interstate Commerce Act against Central, River Road and Junction. They claimed that the new practice was in violation of the third condition of the 1922 Commission order. They accordingly sought to enjoin the defendants and “their respective officers, agents, representatives, servants, employees and successors,” from disobeying the order, especially the third condition thereof, and to force the defendants to permit them to move their cars with their own power and crews. The Commission was allowed to intervene as a party plaintiff; its intervening complaint also prayed for an injunction against the alleged violation of the third condition by the defendants and their employees. A stipulation of facts was then filed. After describing the change in handling the cars, it pointed out that this change resulted from a settlement between the River Road and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen of a labor dispute over the work involved in these livestock car movements. The Brotherhood was the bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act for the River Road trainmen. It made a demand, based upon its contract with River Road, that these trainmen be given the work of moving and switching the livestock cars over the River Road trackage. The Brotherhood threatened to call a strike unless this demand was met before 10:30 p. m., January 23, 1946, a threat that was backed by an almost unanimous strike vote of the trainmen. Under this threat, River Road made an agreement with the Brotherhood shortly before the scheduled strike hour, as a result of which the River Road trainmen were to be permitted to move and switch the cars. The notice to the trunk line railroads of this change in practice subsequently followed. The District Court thereupon issued a preliminary injunction as requested. Central, River Road and Junction, and “their respective officers, agents, representatives, employees and successors,” were restrained from disobeying the 1922 Commission order and from violating the third condition of that order and were commanded to permit the trunk line railroads to move their cars over the River Road line with their own power and crews. The court concluded, as a matter of law, that the facts relative to the labor dispute between the Brotherhood and River Road were “irrelevant and immaterial.” Three days after the preliminary injunction became effective, the Brotherhood asked leave to file its special appearance for the purpose of moving to vacate the injunction and to dismiss the proceedings for failure to join the Brotherhood and its members as indispensable parties. This motion was denied. River Road then filed its answer to the original complaint, pointing out that the changed arrangement resulted from the labor dispute with the Brotherhood and contending that this new practice did not violate the 1922 Commission order. The Brotherhood thereafter filed its motion to intervene generally as a party defendant, alleging that the primary purpose of the suit was to nullify its agreement with River Road and to deprive the Brotherhood members of the work they were performing under that agreement and that the Brotherhood members were therefore indispensable parties. The contention was made that the Brotherhood had an unconditional right to intervene by virtue of §17 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act and Rule 24 (a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and 28 U. S. C. § 45a was later added in support of this contention. But the motion to intervene was denied by order, without opinion. The District Court then allowed an appeal to this Court from its order denying intervention. The appellee railroads moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that such an order was not final and hence was not appealable, the Brotherhood not being entitled to intervene as a matter of right. We postponed further consideration of the question of our jurisdiction to review the order to the hearing of the appeal upon the merits. Ordinarily, in the absence of an abuse of discretion, no appeal lies from an order denying leave to intervene where intervention is a permissive matter within the discretion of the court. United States v. California Canneries, 279 U. S. 553, 556. The permissive nature of such intervention necessarily implies that, if intervention is denied, the applicant is not legally bound or prejudiced by any judgment that might be entered in the case. He is at liberty to assert and protect his interests in some more appropriate proceeding. Having no adverse effect upon the applicant, the order denying intervention accordingly falls below the level of appealability. But where a statute or the practical necessities grant the applicant an absolute right to intervene, the order denying intervention becomes appealable. Then it may fairly be said that the applicant is adversely affected by the denial, there being no other way in which he can better assert the particular interest which warrants intervention in this instance. And since he cannot appeal from any subsequent order or judgment in the proceeding unless he does intervene, the order denying intervention has the degree of definitiveness which supports an appeal therefrom. See Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U. S. 502, 508. Our jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an order denying intervention thus depends upon the nature of the applicant’s right to intervene. If the right is absolute, the order is appealable and we may judge it on its merits. But if the matter is one within the discretion of the trial court and if there is no abuse of discretion, the order is not appealable and we lack power to review it. In other words, our jurisdiction is identified by the necessary incidents of the right to intervene in each particular instance. We must therefore determine the question of our jurisdiction in this case by examining the character of the Brotherhood’s right to intervene in the proceeding brought under § 16 (12) of the Interstate Commerce Act. We start with Rule 24 (a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, applicable to a civil proceeding of this type. Rule 24 (a) deals with intervention of right and provides in pertinent part: “Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the representation of the applicant’s interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action; . . . .” In contrast, Rule 24 (b) is concerned with permissive intervention and reads as follows: “Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.” The Brotherhood claims that as a consequence of either of two federal statutes — § 17 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act or 28 U. S. C. § 45a — it has an absolute right to intervene within the meaning of Rule 24 (a) (1). It also alleges that it possesses an absolute right within the contemplation of Rule 24 (a) (2), the representation of its interest by existing parties being inadequate and the possibility that it may be bound by a judgment in the action being a real one. No claim to permissive intervention under Rule 24 (b) is made; nor is there a contention that the District Court abused any discretion it might have had. In our view, § 17 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act does give the Brotherhood an absolute right to intervene in the instant proceeding within the meaning of Rule 24 (a) (1). As set forth in 54 Stat. 916, this portion of the Act reads: “Representatives of employees of a carrier, duly designated as such, may intervene and be heard in any proceeding arising under this Act affecting such employees.” The following considerations make obvious the fact that the Brotherhood meets all the requirements of this provision: First. It is unquestioned that the Brotherhood is the duly designated representative of the River Road trainmen. Second. The right of intervention granted to such a representative by § 17 (11) applies to a court proceeding under § 16 (12) of the Act, the plain language of § 17 (11) extending its reach to “any proceeding arising under this Act.” On this point, however, the appellee railroads contend that § 17 (11) must be confined to proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission, to the exclusion of court proceedings. In support of this contention, they point to the fact that § 17 as a whole is primarily concerned with Commission procedure and organization. That fact is emphasized by the heading of § 17 as it appears in the Statutes at Large, 54 Stat. 913, and the United States Code, 49 U. S. C. § 17, a heading that reads: “Commission procedure; delegation of duties; rehearings.” The inference is then made that paragraph (11), with which we are concerned, must be limited by that heading and by the general context of § 17 as a whole. The result of the contention is that the phrase “any proceeding arising under this Act,” as found in paragraph (11), is rewritten by construction to refer only to “any proceeding before the Commission arising under this section.” We cannot sanction such a construction of these words. It is true, of course, that § 17 is concerned primarily with the organization of the Commission and its subdivisions and with the administrative disposition of matters coming within that agency’s jurisdiction. At least ten of the twelve paragraphs of § 17 deal with those matters. And before § 17 was cast into its present form in 1940, all five of its paragraphs related exclusively to those matters. Congress rewrote the section when it enacted the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 898, continuing and modifying previous provisions and consolidating and including matters which had formerly been scattered throughout the Act. At the same time, however, it was expressly recognized that certain paragraphs were being added which were entirely new, paragraphs which went beyond purely administrative matters. Thus the pertinent committee reports stated that “A new paragraph (9) is included providing that orders of a division, an individual Commissioner, or a board shall be subject to judicial review as in the case of full Commission orders, after an application for rehearing has been made and acted upon.” And as to paragraph (11), it was said that “A new paragraph is added at the end of section 17 providing that representatives of employees of a carrier may intervene and be heard in any proceedings arising under part I affecting such employees.” By such language in their reports, the framers of § 17 recognized the obvious fact that certain provisions of that section deal with something more than might be indicated by the heading. That the heading of § 17 fails to refer to all the matters which the framers of that section wrote into the text is not an unusual fact. That heading is but a short-hand reference to the general subject matter involved. While accurately referring to the subjects of Commission procedure and organization, it neglects to reveal that § 17 also deals with judicial review of administrative orders and with intervention by employee representatives. But headings and titles are not meant to take the place of the detailed provisions of the text. Nor are they necessarily designed to be a reference guide or a synopsis. Where the text is complicated and prolific, headings and titles can do no more than indicate the provisions in a most general manner; to attempt to refer to each specific provision would often be ungainly as well as useless. As a result, matters in the text which deviate from those falling within the general pattern are frequently unreflected in the headings and titles. Factors of this type have led to the wise rule that the title of a statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the plain meaning of the text. United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386; Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U. S. 418, 430; Strathearn S. S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U. S. 348, 354. For interpretative purposes, they are of use only when they shed light on some ambiguous word or phrase. They are but tools available for the resolution of a doubt. But they cannot undo or limit that which the text makes plain. Here the meaning of § 17 (11) is unmistakable on its face. There is a simple, unambiguous reference to “any proceeding arising under this Act” or, as the House committee paraphrased it, to “any proceedings arising under part I.” There is not a word which would warrant limiting this reference so as to allow intervention only in proceedings arising under § 17 or in proceedings before the Commission. The proceedings mentioned are those which arise under this Act, an Act under which both judicial and administrative proceedings may arise. The instant case is a ready illustration of a judicial proceeding arising under this Act; a suit of this nature is authorized solely by § 16 (12) of the Act. Hence it is a proceeding to which the right of intervention may attach by virtue of §17(11). Nor do we perceive any reason of statutory policy why the framers of § 17 (11) should have wished to confine the right of intervention by employee representatives to proceedings before the Commission. Occasions may arise, as in this case, where the employee representatives have no interest in intervening in the original administrative proceeding, but where they have a very definite interest in intervening in a subsequent judicial proceeding arising under the Act. When the framers have used language which covers both types of proceedings, we would be unjustified in formulating some policy which they did not see fit to express to limit that language in any way. Third. This is a proceeding arising under the Act which affects the employees represented by the Brotherhood. Nothing could make this plainer than the fact that direct injunctive relief was sought and obtained against these employees. The appellee railroads sued to enjoin River Road and its employees from disobeying the third condition of the 1922 Commission order. It was alleged that this condition required River Road and its employees to permit the railroads to use their own power and crews in moving cars over the River Road line. Yet that was precisely the subject matter of the conflict between River Road and the Brotherhood, resulting in the insertion of important provisions in the contract between them. If the Commission order did require the River Road employees to forego operating the livestock cars, their contract rights with River Road were affected in a very real sense. Acts done by the employees in performance of this contract obviously prompted this suit; and any such acts performed after the issuance of an injunction might give rise to contempt action. It is thus impossible to say that this proceeding is not one “affecting such employees” within the meaning of§ 17 (11). Since all the conditions of § 17 (11) have been satisfied in this case, the only question that remains is whether the Brotherhood is thereby accorded a permissive or an absolute right to intervene. The language of § 17 (11) is in terms of “may intervene and be heard,” which might be construed as giving only a discretionary right. But our view, as we have indicated, is that once the requirements of § 17 (11) have been met, the employees’ representative acquires an absolute right of intervention. Some statutes speak of intervention “as of right.” Thus where suit is brought by or against the United States to enforce or set aside a Commission order, the Commission or the parties in interest to the proceeding before the Commission “may appear as parties thereto ... as of right.” 28 U. S. C. § 45a. In such a case, the right to intervene is absolute and unconditional. Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U. S. 249, 255. No less absolute or unconditional is the right to intervene under § 17 (11), which permits intervention where the employees are affected by the proceeding. To be sufficiently affected within the meaning of this provision requires that the employees be prejudiced or bound by any judgment that might be entered in the case, as is the situation relative to the River Road employees. Once it is clear that an effect of that degree is present, however, there is no room for the operation of a court’s discretion. Whether the employees’ interests should be asserted or defended in a proceeding where those interests are at stake is a question to be decided by the employees’ representative, not by the court. The statutory term “may intervene” thus means “may intervene if the employees’ representative so chooses” rather than “may intervene in the discretion of the court.” And if the representative does choose to intervene, it may do so as a matter of right within the meaning of Rule 24 (a) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such is this case. We thus conclude that § 17 (11) gives the Brotherhood an absolute right to intervene in this proceeding, making it unnecessary to discuss whether, and to what extent, the Brotherhood would have had such a right apart from § 17 (11). It follows that we have jurisdiction to consider the appeal on its merits. And in the exercise of that jurisdiction, we reverse the judgment of the District Court denying leave to the Brotherhood to intervene. Reversed. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United States (unreported), United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Equity No. 3427, January 15,1929. The court approved the Commission order as amended in 150 I. C. C. 32. That amendment is not germane to this case. The Commission based its complaint upon § 5 (8) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (8), which authorizes the Commission to seek, and grants jurisdiction to the federal district courts to issue, injunctive or mandatory relief to restrain violation of or compel obedience to an order issued under § 5. On appeal by Junction, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decree as to Junction, holding that Junction had no control over and nothing to do with the acts complained of by the appellees. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Chicago Junction R. Co., 156 F. 2d 357. 54 Stat. 916, 49 U. S. C. § 17 (11). See also Ex parte Cutting, 94 U. S. 14; Credits Commutation Co. v. United States, 177 U. S. 311; Ex parte Leaf Tobacco Board of Trade, 222 U. S. 578; In re Engelhard, 231 U. S. 646; City of New York v. Consolidated Gas Co., 253 U. S. 219; New York City v. New York Telephone Co., 261 U. S. 312. As it appears in the United States Code, 49 U. S. C. § 17 (11), this paragraph reads: “Representatives of employees of a carrier, duly designated as such, may intervene and be heard in any proceeding arising under this chapter and chapters 8 and 12 of this title affecting such employees.” The words “this chapter” refer to Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act, which embodies the original statute known by that name prior to its division into parts. Chapter 8 relates to Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, originally known as the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. Section 305 (h) of Part II is a cross-reference to § 17 of Part I: “All the provisions of section 17 of this title shall apply to all proceedings under this chapter.” Chapter 12 is the equivalent of Part III of the Interstate Commerce Act, which deals with water carriers. Section 916 (a) is also a cross-reference to § 17 of Part I: “The provisions of section 12 and section 17 of chapter 1 of this title and sections 46-48 of this title shall apply with full force and effect in the administration and enforcement of this chapter.” H. Rep. No. 1217, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 13; H. Rep. No. 2832, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 72. H. R. No. 2016, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 67; H. Rep. No. 2832, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 72. H. Rep. No. 1217,76th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 15. H. Rep. No. 1217,76th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 15. Section 17 (11), by referring to proceedings arising under “this Act,” also affects judicial and administrative proceedings arising under Parts II and III of the Act. See note 6, supra. Section 16 (12) is labeled “Proceedings to enforce orders other than for payment of money.” 49 U. S. C. § 16 (12). It provides that if any carrier fails to obey a Commission order other than for the payment of money, the Commission, any injured party or the United States may apply to a federal district court for the enforcement of the order.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION v. TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE LINE CORP. et al. No. 75-584. Decided January 19, 1976 Per Curiam. The Federal Power Commission seeks certiorari from an interlocutory order of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which defers that court’s review of the Commission order at issue pending completion of a certain evidentiary investigation by the Commission directed by the court. The Commission challenges the authority of the Court of Appeals to order the investigation under the statutory review provision involved, § 19 (b) of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 831, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 717r (b), and, in any event, contends that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in the circumstances of this case. The underlying case involves plans for coping with a natural gas shortage being experienced by respondent Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. (Transco). The shortage is said to require curtailment of contracted natural gas deliveries by Transco to its customers during periods of high demand. The curtailment plans concern methods of allocating the shortfall among the various customers. The curtailment plan immediately at issue was submitted by Transco to cover the period of November 1974 to November 1975. This interim plan was filed in September 1974, and was the result of a settlement agreement negotiated between Transco and its various customers. The agreement provided for a plan of allocation of natural gas supplies among Transco’s customers during periods of shortage, and a monetary compensation scheme under which customers receiving more gas than the systemwide average would compensate customers who received less natural gas than the average. The Commission rejected the proposed plan, determining that the compensation scheme would be violative of the Natural Gas Act. The Commission held that the compensation scheme would violate (1) § 4 (a) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717c (a), which requires a pipeline’s jurisdictional rate to be based on the pipeline’s cost of service plus a reasonable rate of return; (2) § 4 (b) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717c (b), which prohibits undue discrimination in rates among similarly situated customers; and (3) § 7 (c) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717f (c), which requires persons engaging in resales of natural gas in interstate commerce first to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Thereafter, Transco and several of the parties to the settlement agreement sought review of the Commission’s determination. Following oral argument on the petition for review, the Court of Appeals, “desiring to be more fully informed about the 'crisis’ on the Transco system before reviewing questions pertaining to its solution,” entered an order sua sponte directing the parties to submit certain information concerning Transco’s natural gas reserves. After receiving responses to this order, and noting the refusal of the Commission to certify the accuracy of the data supplied by Transco regarding its reserves of natural gas, the court directed the parties to show cause why it should not order the Commission to conduct an immediate investigation of Transco’s claim of reduced reserves. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals, observing that evidence of “actual shortage both underlies the concept of curtailment and justifies its application,” issued the proposed order. That order directed the Commission to complete and report to the court an investigation “of Transco’s claims of reduced reserves by immediate subpoena of Transco’s books and records pertaining to all gas supplies in which it has any legal interest . . . and by field investigation [which] has determined the extent of the reduced reserves and the bona fides of Transco and its suppliers in meeting their past and future contract commitments. . . .” The court further directed that its decision reviewing the Commission’s order would be deferred pending the investigation and report, and that the investigation and report should be made by the Commission within 30 days. It is this interlocutory order for which the Commission petitions for review by this Court. The Commission first argues that the Court of Appeals has overstepped the bounds of its reviewing authority in ordering this investigation by the Commission, and that in doing so the court has unwarrantedly interfered with the internal functional autonomy of an independent administrative agency. Additionally, the Commission argues, the Court of Appeals has abused its discretion in ordering the factual inquiry by the Commission in the circumstances presented by this case. The Commission maintains that the extent of Transco’s natural gas shortage is not material to the legal issues — concerning the lawfulness of the proposed compensation scheme — which presently confront the Court of Appeals. This is said to be particularly true where, as here, the Commission has disapproved the proposed interim plan for dealing with the alleged shortage of gas. Finally, the Commission argues that it is impossible to comply with the order, as such a complex investigation would require much longer than the 30 days allowed. First. We agree with the Commission that the challenged order, although interlocutory in nature, is properly reviewable by this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (1). Clearly the effect of the order is immediate and irreparable, and any review by this Court of the propriety of the order must be immediate to be meaningful. Second. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the existence of an actual shortage of gas supplies forms the factual predicate necessary to the Commission's assertion of authority under its transportation jurisdiction, § 1 (b) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717 (b), to approve the curtailment of gas already contracted for. FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U. S. 621 (1972). Certainly that court could properly conclude that the Commission would have abused its discretion had it approved curtailment plans in the absence of evidence whereby it “could have reasonably believed” the shortage to exist, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 416 (1971), and that “substantial evidence” in the record is necessary to support any such finding by the Commission. Third. We are of the view, however, that the Court of Appeals overstepped the bounds of its reviewing authority in issuing the order presently before us. First, we have consistently expressed the view that ordinarily review of administrative decisions is to be confined to “consideration of the decision of the agency . . . and of the evidence on which it was based.” United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U. S. 709, 714-715 (1963). “[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.” Camp v. Pitts, 411 U. S. 138, 142 (1973). If the decision of the agency “is not sustainable on the administrative record made, then the . . . decision must be vacated and the matter remanded ... for further consideration.” Id., at 143. Clearly it is this mode of review that is contemplated by the statute providing for judicial review of Commission decisions, § 19 (b) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717r (b). Secondly, although we have recognized that a court reviewing decisions of the Federal Power Commission sits as a court vested with equity powers and “may authorize the Commission in proper cases to take new evidence,” Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U. S. 283, 311-312 (1974), it is nevertheless true that ordinarily this will require a remand to. the agency in order that it can exercise its administrative discretion in deciding how, in light of internal organizational considerations, it may best proceed to develop the needed evidence and how its prior decision should be modified in light of such evidence as develops. Certainly this is the procedure contemplated by the review statute, which provides that the Commission “may modify its findings as to the facts by reason of the additional evidence so taken,” and that “such modified or new findings, ... if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .” 15 U. S. C. § 717r (b). At least in the absence of substantial justification for doing otherwise, a reviewing court may not, after determining that additional evidence is requisite for adequate review, proceed by dictating to the agency the methods, procedures, and time dimension of the needed inquiry and ordering the results to be reported to the court without opportunity for further consideration on the basis of the new evidence by the agency. Such a procedure clearly runs the risk of “propel [ling] the court into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196 (1947). “The Court, it is true, has power To affirm, modify, or set aside’ the order of the Commission ‘in whole or in part.’ . . . But that authority is not power to exercise an essentially administrative function.” FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U. S. 17, 21 (1952). Fourth. We are unable to determine with certainty, from this vantage point and on the partial record now before us, whether the evidence regarding Transco’s actual shortage with which the instant order is concerned is absolutely essential to a decision by the Court of Appeals on the issues presently before that court for review. Although Judge MacKinnon in his separate statement was apparently of the view that it was not, it is at least conceivable that the Court of Appeals could determine that the lawfulness of the proposed compensation scheme is partially a function of the actual severity of the shortage. Cf. FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., supra. Accordingly, the court below is free on remand either to proceed to the merits of the issues presented by the compensation scheme and only thereafter deal with the adequacy of the record in regard to the evidence of shortage, or immediately to remand the case to the Commission for the required inquiry. It is apparent that under neither alternative need the Court of Appeals’ ability fully and effectively to review the administrative process regarding the implementation of curtailment plans and their underlying factual premises be relinquished. Fifth. In light of the immediacy of the natural gas shortage problem with which the Commission is attempting to cope, the already protracted nature of review proceedings in this case, and the potential importance of a resolution on the merits of the compensation issues presented by the instant case, swift and priority consideration of this case by the Court of Appeals on remand is merited. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is' granted, the order of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. MR. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Although neither the petitioning Commission nor the two respondents who have filed responses to the petition for certiorari have addressed the issue, it appears that the underlying controversy is not now moot even though it concerns an interim plan covering a period of time that has by now expired. The Court of Appeals earlier granted a motion by Transco and ordered the interim plan into effect pending that court’s review of the Commission’s order disallowing the plan. Consolidated Edison Co. v. FPC, 167 U. S. App. D. C. 134, 143, 511 F. 2d 372, 381 (1974). The court ordered that the compensation payments under the plan be paid into an escrow account pending review of the Commission’s determination that the compensation scheme was unlawful. Ibid. Therefore, it appears that at the least the disposition of these payments into the escrow account will be affected by the Court of Appeals’ ultimate judgment on the merits of the case. This argument appears to accord with the views of Judge Mac-Kinnon which are set forth in a separate statement accompanying the challenged order. Judge MacKinnon expressed the view that the extent of the shortage is “peripheral,” although “not wholly irrelevant” to the legal issues confronting the Court of Appeals. ' He indicated that he would instead first reach the merits, affirm the order of the Commission, and then direct that the Commission make the complex factual inquiry regarding the shortage “prior to passing on any subsequent curtailment plan.” Section 19 (b) of the Natural Gas Act provides: "Any party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review of such order in the court of appeals of the United States for any circuit wherein the natural-gas company to which the order relates is located or has its principal place of business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia [Circuit], by filing in such court, within sixty days after the order of the Commission upon the application for rehearing, a written petition praying that the order of the Commission be modified or set aside in whole or in part. A copy of such petition shall forthwith be transmitted by the cleric of the court to any member of the Commission and thereupon the Commission shall file with the court the record upon which the order complained of was entered, as provided in section 2112 of Title 28. Upon the filing of such petition such court shall have jurisdiction, which upon the filing of the record with it shall be exclusive, to affirm, modify, or set aside such order in whole or in part. No objection to the order of the Commission shall be considered by the court unless such objection shall have been urged before the Commission in the application for rehearing unless there is reasonable ground for failure so to do. The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. If any party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence, and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce such evidence in the proceedings before the Commission, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Commission and to be adduced upon the hearing in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the court may seem proper. The Commission may modify its findings as to the facts by reason of the additional evidence so taken, and it shall file with the court such modified or new findings, which if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive, and its recommendation, if any, for the modification or setting aside of the original order. The judgment and decree of the court, affirming, modifying, or setting aside, in whole or in part, any such order of the Commission, shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari or certification as provided in sections 346 and 347 of Title 28.” We do not find the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals, largely that the Commission “has been long on notice” that data supporting the claimed existence of shortage was necessary, to be in the circumstances presented sufficient justification for the court's order. See Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FPC, 522 F. 2d 1345 (CA5 1975).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. SIMPLICITY PATTERN CO., INC. No. 406. Argued April 21, 1959. Decided June 8, 1959. Charles H. Weston argued the causes for the Federal Trade Commission. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Hansen, Earl W. Kintner and James E. Corkey. William Simon argued the causes for the Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc. With him on. the briefs were Robert L: Wald, David Vorhaus and Sidney Greenman. Together with No. 447, Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., v. Federal Trade Commission, also on certiorari to the same Court. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents, for the first time in this Court, issues relating to the availability of certain defenses to a prima facie violation of § 2 (e) of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526. The Federal Trade Commission has found that Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., one of the Nation’s largest dress pattern manufacturers, discriminated in favor of its larger customers by furnishing to them services and facilities not accorded to competing. smaller customers on proportionally equal terms. The Commission held that neither the presence of “cost justification” nor the absence of competitive injury may constitute a defense to a § 2 (e) violation. The Court of Appeals found that competition existed between the larger and smaller customers of Simplicity and, with one judge dissenting, held that an absence of competitive injury would not constitute a “justification” rebutting a prima facie showing of a § 2 (e) violation. Through a different majority, however, it remanded the case on the “cost justification” defense under § 2 (b), holding that Simplicity might rebut the prima facie case by showing that the discriminations in services and facilities were justified by differences in Simplicity’s costs in dealing with the two classes of customers. 103 U. S. App. D. C. 373, 258 F. 2d 673. The Commission, in No. 406, and Simplicity, in No. 447, filed cross-petitions for certiorari which we consider together. We granted both petitions because of the fundamental significance of these issues .in the application of an important Act of Congress. 358 U. S. 897. We have concluded that, given competition between the two classes of customers, neither absence of competitive injury nor the presence of “cost justification” defeats enforcement of the provisions of § 2 (e) of the Act. The action of the Commission in issuing the cease-and-desist order is, therefore,' affirmed. Simplicity manufactures and sells tissue patterns which are used in the home for making women’s and children’s wearing apparel. Its volume of pattern sales, in terms of sales units, is greater than that resulting from the combined effort of all other major producers. The patterns are sold to some 12,300 retailers, with 17,200 outlets. For present purposes, these customers can be divided roughly into two categories. One, consisting largely of department and variety stores, comprises only 18% of the total number of customers, but accounts for 70% of the total sales volume. The remaining 82% of the customers are small stores whose primary business is the sale of yard-good fabrics. About 600 different patterns are made available to Simplicity’s customers. New patterns are added at the rate of 40 per month, while three times annually the obsolete designs are discontinued so as to maintain the number of designs at a relatively constant level.. The different designs are displayed in a catalogue which is changed monthly in order to reflect the changes in available designs. The patterns themselves are stored and displayed in steel cabinets. The catalogues and storage cabinets are both furnished by Simplicity. The variety stores handle and sell a multitude of relatively low-priced articles. Each article, including dress patterns, is sold for the purpose of returning a profit and would be dropped if it failed to do so. The fabric stores, on the other hand, are primarily interested in selling yard goods; they handle patterns at no profit or even at a loss as an accommodation to their fabric customers and for the purpose of stimulating fabric sales. These differences in motive are reflected in the manner in which each type of store handles its patterns. The variety stores devote the minimum amount of display space consistent with adequate merchandising — consisting usually of nothing more than a place on the counter for the catalogues, with the patterns themselves stored underneath the counter in the steel cabinets furnished by Simplicity. In contrast, the fabric stores usually provide tables and chairs where the customers may peruse the catalogues in comfort and at their leisure. The retail prices of Simplicity patterns are uniform at 250, 350, or 500. Similarly, Simplicity charges a uniform price, to all its customers, of 60% of the retail price. However, in the furnishing of certain services and facilities Simplicity does not follow this uniformity. It furnishes patterns to the variety stores on- a consignment basis, requiring payment only as and when patterns are sold — thus affording them an investment-free inventory. The fabric stores are required to pay cash for their patterns in regular course. In addition, the cabinets and the catalogues are furnished to variety stores free while the fabric stores are charged therefor, the catalogues averaging from $2 to $3 each. Finally, all transportation costs in connection with, its business with variety stores are paid by Simplicity but none is paid on fabric-store transactions. The free services and facilities thus furnished variety store chains are substantial in value. As to four variety store chains, the catalogues which Simplicity furnished free in 1954 were valued at $128,904; the cabinets furnished free which those stores had on hand at the end of 1954 were valued at over $500,000; and their inventory of Simplicity’s patterns at the end of 1954 was valued, at more than $1,775,000, each of these values being based tin Simplicity’s usual sales price. . Simplicity’s president testified that it would cost over $2,000,000 annually to give its other customers the free transportation, free, catalogues, and free cabinets furnished to variety stores. Simplicity does not dispute these findings. Assuming that the existence of competition between purchasers is a necessary element in a § 2 (e) prosecution, it insists that no real competition in patterns exists between the variety and the fabric stores. It also contends that even if competition is present its conduct may be justified by a showing that no competitive injury resulted or, alternatively, that the discriminations are not unlawful if it could be shown that the differential treatment was only reflec.tive of the differences in its costs in dealing with the two types of customers. 1. Existence <Df Competition. The unanimous conclusion of the Examiner, the Commission, and the Court of Appeals on this point was, as stated by the Court of. Appeals, that the variety and fabric stores, “operating in the same cities and in the same shopping area, often side by side, were competitors, purchasing from Simplicity at the same price and then at like prices retailing the identical product to substantially the same segment of the public.” 103 U. S. App. D. C., at 377, 258 F. 2d, at 677. Simplicity argues that “motivation” controls and that since the variety store sells for a profit and the fabric store for accommodation that the competition is minuscule. But the existence of competition does not depend on such motives. Regardless of the necessity the fabric stores find in the handling of patterns it does not remove their incentive to sell those on hand, especially when cash is tied up in keeping patterns on the shelves. The discriminatory terms under which they are obliged to handle them increase their losses. Furthermore, Simplicity not only takes advantage of the captive nature of the fabric stores in not granting them these advantages but compounds the damage by creating a sales outlet in the variety-stores through the granting of these substantial incentives to engage in the pattern business. Without such partial subsidization the variety stores might not. enter into the pattern trade at all. Nor does it follow that the failure here to show specific injury to competition in patterns is inconsistent with a finding that competition in fact exists. It may be, as Simplicity argues, that the sale of patterns is minuscule in the over-all business of a variety store, but the same is true of thousands of other items. While the giving of discriminatory concessions to a variety store on any one isolated item might cause no injury to competition with a-fabric store in its over-all operation, that fact does not render nonexistent the actual competition between them in patterns. It remains, and, because' of the discriminatory concessions, causes further losses to the fabric store. As this Court said in Federal Trade Comm’n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 49 (1948), “There are many articles in a grocery store that, considered separately, are comparatively small parts of a merchant’s stock. Congress intended to protect a merchant from competitive injury attributable to discriminatory prices on any or all goods sold in interstate commerce, whether the particular goods constitúted a major or minor portion of his stock. Since a grocery store consists of many comparatively small articles, there is no possible way effectively to protect a grocer .from discriminatory prices except by applying the prohibitions Qf the Act to each individual article in the store.” 2.' Application of the Justification Defenses of § 2 (b). Simplicity contends that an absence of competitive injury constitutes a defense under the justification provisions of § 2 (b) and further that it should have been permitted, under that subsection, to dispel its discrimination in services and facilities by a showing of lower costs in its transactions with the variety stores. We agree with the Commission that the language of the Act, when considered in its entirety, will not support this construction. Section 2 (á) makes unlawful price discriminations “where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevént competition This price discrimination provision is hedged with qualifications. An exception is made for price differentials “which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery.” Care was taken that price changes are not outlawed. where made in response to changing market conditions. Finally, § 2 (a) codifies the rule of United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300 (1919), protecting the right of a persQn in commerce to select his “own customers in bopa fide transactions and not in restraint of trade.” Subsections (c), (d), and (e), on the other hand, unqualifiedly make unlawful certain business practices other than price discriminations. Subsection (c) applies to the payment or receipt of commissions or brokerage allowances “except for services rendered.” Subsection (d) prohibits the payment by a seller to a customer for any services or facilities furnished by the latter, unless “such payment ... is available on proportionally equal terms to all other [competing] customers.” Subsection (e), which as noted is the provision applicable in this case, makes it unlawful for a seller “to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale . . .• by . . . furnishing . . . any services or facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms.” In terms, the proscriptions of these three subsections are absolute. Unlike § 2 (a), none of them requires, as proof of a prima facie violation, a showing that the illicit practice has had an injurious or destructive effect on com-' petition. Similarly, none has any built-in defensive matter, as does § 2 (a). Simplicity’s contentions boil down to an argument that the exculpatory provisions which Congress has made expressly applicable only to price discriminations are somehow included as “justifications” for discriminations in services or facilities by § 2 (b), which provides that “Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the.burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor.” (Emphasis added.) We hold that the key word “justification” can be read no more broadly than to allow rebuttal of the respective offenses in one of the ways expressly made available by Congress. Thus; a discrimination in prices may be rebutted-by a showing under any of the § 2 (a) provisos, or under the § 2 (b) proviso — all of.which by their terms apply to price discriminations. On the other hand, the only escape Congress has provided for discriminations in services or. facilities is the permission to meet competition as found in the § 2 (b) proviso. We cannot supply what Congress has studiously omitted. Simplicity’s arguments to the contrary are based essentially on the ground that it would be “bad law and bad economics” to make discriminations' unlawful even where they may be accounted for by cost differentials or where there is no competitive injury. Entirely aside from the fact that this Court is not in a position to review the economic wisdom of Congress, we cannot say that the legislative decision to treat price and other discriminations differently is without a rational basis. In allowing a “cost justification” for price discriminations and not for others, Congress could very well have felt .that sellers would be forced to confine their discriminatory practices to price differentials, where they could be more readily detected and where it would be much easier to make accurate comparisons with any alleged cost savings. Biddle Purchasing Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 96 F. 2d 687, 692 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1938). And, with respect to the absence of competitive injury requirements, it suffices to say that the antitrust laws are not strangers to the policy of nipping potentially destructive practices before they reach full bloom. Cf. Klor’s, Inc., v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U. S. 207 (1959). Our conclusions are further confirmed by the historical setting of the Robinson-Patman amendments to § 2 of the Clayton Act. As originally worded in 1914 (38 Stat. 730), § 2 applied only to price discriminations, and then only where the effect of such discrimination was “to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in. any line of commerce.” Furthermore, a proviso excepted price discriminations based on “differences in the . . . quantity of the commodity sold,” regardless of whether the differences in quantity resulted in corresponding cost differentials. A lengthy investigation conducted in the 1930’s by the Federal Trade Commission disclosed that several large chain buyers were effectively avoiding § 2 by taking advantage of gaps in its coverage. Because of their'enormous purchasing power, these chains were able to exact price concessions, based on differences in quantity, which far exceeded any related cost savings to the seller. Consequently, the seller was forced to raise prices even further on smaller quantity lots in order to cover the concessions made to the large purchasers. Comparable competitive advantages were obtained by the large purchasers in several ways other than direct price concessions. Rebates were induced for “brokerage fees,” even though no brokerage services had been performed. “Advertising allowances” were paid by the sellers tó the large buyers in return for certain promotional services undertaken by the latter. Some sellers furnished special services or facilities to the chain buyers. Lacking the purchasing power to demand comparable advantages; the small independent stores were at a hbpeless competitive disadvantage. The Robinson-Patman amendments were enacted to eliminate these inequities. The exception to price discriminations based on quantitative differences was limited to those making “only due allowance for differences in . . . cost.” As noted above, false brokerage- allow-_ anees and the paying for or furnishing of nonproportional services or facilities were banned outright. The. portion of § 2 (b) preceding the proviso, on which Simplicity relies, was inserted in the House bill for the sole purpose of laying down “directions with reference to procedure including a statement with respect to burden of proof.” It was clearly not intended. to have any independent substantive weight of its own. We hold, therefore, that neither “cost-justification” nor an absence of competitive injury may constitute “justification” of a prima facie § 2 (e) violation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals must accordingly he reversed insofar as it set aside and remanded the Commission’s order and affirmed as to the remainder. It is so ordered. The complaint was in two counts, the first being under the Federal Trade Commission .Act. This count was dismissed. The second count, which is the only one before us, involves certain subsections of § 2 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13. For ready reference we quote § 2 in its entirety: “(a) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition Or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in'the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered: Provided, however, That the Federal Trade Commission may, after due investigation, and hearing to all interested parties, fix and establish quantity limits, and revise the same as it finds necessary, as to particular commodities or classes of commodities,, where it finds that available purchasers in greater quantities are so few as to render differentials on account thereof- unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly in any line of commerce;, and -the foregoing shall then not be construed to-permit differentials- based on differences in quantities greater than those so fixe.d and established: And provided further, That nothing-herein contained shall prevent persons .engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce From - selecting their own customers inbona fide, transactions and not in .restraint of trade; And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent price changes from time to time where in response to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned, such as but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods; obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned. “ (b) Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower-price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser o-r purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor. “(c) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything' of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of any party tu such transaction other than the person by whom such compensation is so granted or paid. “(d) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such person in the course of such com-' merce as compensation or in consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offering, for sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, •unless such, payment or consideration, is available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities. “(e) That it shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, with or without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to thé furnishing of, any services- or facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms. “(f) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section.” Judge Washington dissented on the “cost-justification” issue, while Judge Burger was in dissent on the competitive injury question. In dollar volume, Simplicity’s percentage-of-industry total is somewhat lower, due to the fact that its prices are among the lowest in the industry. It should be noted that Simplicity has apparently acted entirely in good faith. While the services and facilities described in the body of the opinion are admittedly furnished free only to- the variety ■stores, Simplicity asserts that other services ánd facilities are furnished only to the smaller customers. These claimed services include: A staff of 12 young- ladies travels throughout the. country giving fashion shows and sewing demonstrations in schools,.-L-H Clubs and' the like. These demonstrations- are' coordinated through the local-fabric stores to assist the latter in pushing sales both of patterns and of fabric's. Large promotional posters, portraying fabrics and fashion trends, are furnished monthly to the fabric stores. “Flyers,” or brochures, designed, printed and distributed by Simplicity solely for the small merchant, tell him (in the words of Simplicity’s president) “what the proper sources of supply, are in'New York, what the trends are, how to trim his wiiidows, how to run certain aspects of his department and a great deal of other material.” A monthly publication called the “Simplicity Pattern Book” is sold through fabric stores at an annual loss to Simplicity of over $100,000. The publication is designed to “glamorize and dramatize for the consumer and for the merchant the textiles and trends throughout the country.” These services and facilities are apparently available to the variety stores, but are not used by them because of their method of doing business. Thus, Simplicity claims that the fabric stores receive services and facilities, valued by Simplicity at more than $1,000,000 annually, which in fact if not in law are not used by the - variety stores. The parties did not explore, before the • Commission, the possibility that this tailoring of services and facilities to meet the different needs of two classes of customers in fact constituted “proportionally equal terms.” And, of course, this point was not raised in the Court of Appeals or in this Court. We note in passing, however, that the Commission has indicated a willingness to give a relatively broad scope to the-standard of proportional equality under §§ 2 (d) and 2 (e). See Lever Brothers Co., 50 F. T. C. 494, 512 (1953). (“[§ 2 (d)] does not prohibit a seller from paying for services of various types.” A “plan providing payment for promotional services and facilities . . . must be honest in its purpose and fair and reasonable in its application.”) See also Procter & Gamble Distributing Co., 50 F. T. C. 513 (1953); Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 50 F. T. C. 525 (1953); Report of the Attorney General’s National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 189-190 (1955). Since the issue is not properly before us, we of course do not pass on it. Simplicity -argues that the Examiner “affirmatively found an absence of competitive injury.” This view was apparently adopted by the Court of Appeals. 103 U. S. App. D. C., at 378, 258 F. 2d, at 678. We do not so read the record, however. What the Examiner said was that “there is no showing of competitive injury.” (Emphasis added.) Subsection (f) is a corollary to §2 (a), making it unlawful “knowingly to induce or receive” a price discrimination barred by the latter. See Automatic Canteen Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 346 U. S. 61 (1953). Simplicity .concedes this, in effect, but argues that it should be allowed under §2 (b) to “justify” the §2 (e) violation by making an affirmative showing of absence of competitive injury. In allowing a showing of “cost-justification” under §2 (b), the Court of Appeals negated any inference that it was thereby importing “§ 2 (a) criteria as matters of defense to a Section 2 (e) charge.” Rather, it held that “the justification to be shown under the first clause of § 2 (b) as to a § 2 (e) charge of discrimination in ‘facilities furnished’ to various customers, [would] depend upon the facts in a particular case.” 103 U. S. App. D. C., at 381, 258 F. 2d, at 681. (Italics in the original.) On this theory, the limits of the justification-which could be shown would be established by litigation, on a case-to-case basis. See Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 340 U. S. 231 (1951). The Courts of Appeals, prior to this case, had uniformly rejected the argument that § 2 (e) violations were subject to a cost-justification defense or required a showing of adverse effect on competition. Elizabeth Arden, Inc., v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 156 F. 2d 132 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1946) (competitive injury); Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 144 F. 2d 211, 219 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1944), aff’d on other grounds 324 U. S. 726 (competitive injury); Southgate Brokerage Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 150 F. 2d 607, 610 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1945) (dictum as to competitive injury); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 106 F. 2d 667 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1939) (dictum as to cost-justification); Oliver Bros., Inc., v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 102 F. 2d 763, 767 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1939) (dictum as to competitive injury). It does not appear that any Court of Appeals had previously been asked to decide whether an absence of competitive injury could constitute a “justification” under § 2 (b). Compare the Report of the Attorney General’s National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws (1955). The Committee recognized that as of that date subsections (c), (d) and (e) had been uniformly interpreted ’ as not requiring a showing of competitive injury, and as not allowing a cost-justification defense. Pp. 187-193. It expressed disagreement with the desirability of-this result, in view of what it deemed the “broader antitrust objectives,” and recommended that § 2 (c) be changed by legislation and § 2 (d) and (e) by “interpretive reform.”. P. 193. During congressional debates on the bill, there were continual references to the subsection (c), (d) and (e) practices as “secret” discriminations. See, e. g., 80 Cong. Rec. 8126, 8127, 8132, 8135, 8137, 8226. Compare Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1 (1958); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940), which contain examples of per se violations under the Sherman Act. It is not without significance that earlier versions of both the House and Senate bills would have outlawed even price discriminations without regard to their effect upon competition. H. R. 8442, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 3154, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. This language was retained in § 2 (a) under the Robinson-Patman Act amendment, and .the following was added, “or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.” Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 16. As reported out of Committee, the equivalent of § 2 (b) (which was § 2 (e) in the House bill) applied only to price discriminations. During the floor debate, Congressman McLaughlin introduced an amendment which would add “or services or facilities furnished” at appropriate places in the subsection. He said, “Mr. Chairman, this is a committee' amendment agreed to unanimously by : the committee.- ... It simply allows a..seller to meet not only competition in price of other competitors\but also competition in services and facilities furnished.” 80 Cong. Rec. 8225. The amendment was adopted without further comineiit. Throughout the debate, what reference there, was to this subsection (other than to .the proviso) was to the effect that it was a “procedural” or “burden of proof” provision. See, e. g., 80 Cong. Rec. 8110, 9414, 9418. Congressman Patman, referring to it as a “burden of proof” provision, said “Let me analyze that for you. What does that mean? It means exactly the rule.of law today. It is a restatement of existing law. So far as I am concerned you can strike it out.- It makes no difference.” 80 Cong. Rec. 8231. This statement, coming from one of the authors of the bill; makes it clear beyond peradventure that the provision in question was not intended to operate as .a source of substantive defenses. See also Automatic Canteen Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, supra, 346 U. S., at 78. The history of the Senate bill is not helpful. As reported out of .Committee,-it contained neither a provision comparable to § 2 (b) nor one comparable to § 2 (e). S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. A provision identical to § 2 (b) was adopted as a floor amendment at a time when the bill did not in terms even- cover the furnishing of services and facilities. 80 Cong. Rec. 6435-6436. The short debate on the amendment is not enlightening. While both of these questions have been presented to us in terms of the “justification” clause of §2(b), we are equally convinced that the competitive injury and cost-differential clauses of § 2 (a) cannot be read directly, into § 2 (e). Elizabeth Arden, Inc., v. Federal Trade Comm’n, supra, note 10; Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, supra, note 10; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, supra, note 10. It is true that, in reference to the cost-differential clause, we have said, “Time and again there was recognition in Congress of a-freedom to adopt and pass on to buyers the benefits of more economical processes.” Automatic Canteen Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, supra, 346 U. S., at 72. But the contexts of the statements referred to show that- the benefits Were to. be made available in price differentials or not at all. See, e. g., 80 Cong. Rec. 8106-8107, 8111-8112, 8114, 8127-8128, 8137, 9415; H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. See also notes 12 and 13, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MATHEWS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE v. LUCAS et al. No. 75-88. Argued January 13, 1976 Decided June 29, 1976 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 516. Deputy Solicitor General Jones argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Lee, and William Kanter. C. Christopher Brown argued the cause for appellees. On the brief was Thomas W. Pearlman. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the issue of the constitutionality, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, of those provisions of the Social Security Act that condition the eligibility of certain illegitimate children for a surviving child’s insurance benefits upon a showing that the deceased wage earner was the claimant child’s parent and, at the time of his death, was living with the child or was contributing to his support. I Robert Cuffee, now deceased, lived with Belmira Lucas during the years 1948 through 1966, but they were never married. Two children were born to them during these years: Ruby M. Lucas, in 1953, and Darin E. Lucas, in 1960. In 1966 Cuffee and Lucas separated. Cuffee died in Providence, R. I., his home, in 1968. He died without ever having acknowledged in writing his paternity of either Ruby or Darin, and it was never determined in any judicial proceeding during his lifetime that he was the father of either child. After Cuffee’s death, Mrs. Lucas filed an application on behalf of Ruby and Darin for surviving children’s benefits under i 202 (d)(1) of the Social Security Act, 70 Stat. 807, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 402 (d)(1) (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), based upon Cuffee’s earnings record. II In operative terms, the Act provides that an unmarried son or daughter of an individual, who died fully or currently insured under the Act, may apply for and be entitled to a survivor’s benefit, if the applicant is under 18 years of age at the time of application (or is a full-time student and under 22 years of age) and was dependent, within the meaning of the statute, at the time of the parent’s death. A child is' considered dependent for this purpose if the insured father was living with or contributing to the child’s support at the time of death. Certain children, however, are relieved of the burden of such individualized proof of dependency. Unless the child has been adopted by some other individual, a child who is legitimate, or a child who would be entitled to inherit personal property from the insured parent’s estate under the applicable state intestacy law, is considered to have been dependent at the time of the parent’s death. Even lacking this relationship under state law, a child, unless adopted by some other individual, is entitled to a presumption of dependency if the decedent, before death, (a) had gone through a marriage ceremony with the other parent, resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but for a nonobvious legal defect, would have been valid, or (b) in writing had acknowledged the child to be his, or (c) had been decreed by a court to be the child’s father, or (d) had been ordered by a court to support the child because the child was his. An. Examiner of the Social Security Administration, after hearings, determined that while Cuffee’s paternity was established, the children had failed to demonstrate their dependency by proof that Cuffee either lived with them or was contributing to their support at the time of his death, or by any of the statutory presumptions of dependency, and thus that they were not entitled to sur-vivorship benefits under the Act. The Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration affirmed these rulings, and they became the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Lucas then timely filed this action, pursuant to § 205 (g) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. §405 (g), in the United States District Court for-the District of Rhode Island on behalf of the two children (hereinafter sometimes called the appellees) for review of the Secretary's decision. The District Court ultimately affirmed each of the factual findings of the administrative agency: that Robert Cuffee was the children’s father; that he never acknowledged his paternity in writing; that his paternity or support obligations had not been the subject of a judicial proceeding during his lifetime; that no common-law marriage had ever been contracted between Cuffee and Lucas, so that the children could not inherit Cuffee’s personal property under the intestacy law of Rhode Island; and that, at the time of his death, he was neither living with the children nor contributing to their support. 390 F. Supp. 1310, 1312-1314 (1975). None of these factual matters is at issue here. A motion for summary judgment, filed by the appel-lees, relied on Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628 (1974). It was urged that denial of benefits in this case, where paternity was clear, violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as that provision comprehends the principle of equal protection of the laws, because other children, including all legitimate children, are statutorily entitled, as the Lucas children are not, to survivorship benefits regardless of actual dependency. Addressing this issue, the District Court ruled that the statutory classifications were constitutionally impermissible. 390 F. Supp., at 1314-1321. Recognizing that the web of statutory provisions regarding presumptive dependency was overinclusive because it entitled some children, who were not actually dependent, to survivorship benefits under the Act — although not underinclusive, since no otherwise eligible child who could establish actual dependency at the time of death was denied such benefits — the court concluded that the Act was not intended merely to replace actual support that a child lost through the death of the insured parent. Id., at 1319-1320. Rather, the court characterized the statute as one designed to replace obligations of support or potential support lost through death, where the obligation was perceived by Congress, on the basis of the responsibility of the relation between the child’s parents, to be a valid one. Thus, the court concluded: “[The Act] conditions eligibility on the basis of Congress’ views as to who is entitled to support and reflects society’s view that legitimate and ‘legitimated’ children are more entitled to support by or through a parent than are illegitimate children. But this is not a legitimate governmental interest, and thus cannot support the challenged classification. Gomez v. Perez, [409 U. S. 535 (1973)].” Id., at 1320. (Emphasis in original.) With this conclusion, the District Court reversed the administrative decision and ordered the Secretary to pay benefits for both children. Jurisdictional Statement 28a. The Secretary appealed directly to this Court. 28 U. S. C. § 1252. We noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument with Norton v. Mathews, post, p. 524. 423 U.S. 819 (1975). Ill The Secretary does not disagree that the Lucas children and others similarly circumstanced are treated differently, as a class, from those children — legitimate and illegitimate — who are relieved by statutory presumption of any requirement of proving actual dependency at the time of death through cohabitation or contribution: for children in the advantaged classes may be statutorily entitled to benefits even if they have never been dependent upon the father through whom they claim. Statutory classifications, of course, are not per se unconstitutional; the matter depends upon the character of the discrimination and its relation to legitimate legislative aims. “The essential inquiry . . . is . . . inevitably a dual one: What legitimate [governmental] interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?” Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 173 (1972). Although the District Court concluded that close judicial scrutiny of the statute's classifications was not necessary to its conclusion invalidating those classifications, it also concluded that legislation treating legitimate and illegitimate offspring differently is constitutionally suspect, 390 F. Supp., at 1318-1319, and requires the judicial scrutiny traditionally devoted to cases involving discrimination along lines of race or national origin. Appellees echo this approach. We disagree. It is true, of course, that the legal status of illegitimacy, however defined, is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual, and it bears no relation to the individual’s ability to participate in and contribute to society. The Court recognized in Weber that visiting condemnation upon the child in order to express society’s disapproval of the parents’ liaisons “is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual — as well as an unjust — way of deterring the parent.” 406 U. S., at 175. (Footnote omitted.) But where the law is arbitrary in such a way, we have had no difficulty in finding the discrimination impermissible on less demanding standards than those advocated here. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U. S. 619 (1973); Richardson v. Davis, 409 U. S. 1069 (1972); Richardson v. Griffin, 409 U. S. 1069 (1972); Weber, supra; Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68 (1968). And such irrationality in some classifications does not in itself demonstrate that other, possibly rational, distinctions made in part on the basis of legitimacy are inherently untenable. Moreover, while the law has long placed the illegitimate child in an inferior position relative to the legitimate in certain circumstances, particularly in regard to obligations of support or other aspects of family law, see generally, e. g., H. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy 21-A2 (1971); Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 19-38 (1969), perhaps in part because the roots of the discrimination rest in the conduct of the parents rather than the child, and perhaps in part because illegitimacy does not carry an obvious badge, as race or sex do, this discrimination against illegitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the historic legal and political discrimination against women and Negroes. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 684-686 (1973) (plurality opinion). We therefore adhere to our earlier view, see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U. S. 532 (1971), that the Act’s discrimination between individuals on the basis of their legitimacy does not “command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process,” San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 28 (1973), which our most exacting scrutiny would entail. See Jimenez, 417 U. S., at 631-634, 636; Weber, 406 U. S., at 173, 175-176. IV Relying on Weber, the Court, in Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535, 538 (1973), held that “once a State posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural father has not married its mother.” The same principle, which we adhere to now, applies when the judicially enforceable right to needed support lies against the Government rather than a natural father. See New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, supra. Consistent with our decisions, the Secretary explains the design of the statutory scheme assailed here as a program to provide for all children of deceased insureds who can demonstrate their “need” in terms of dependency at the times of the insureds’ deaths. Cf. Jimenez, 417 U. S., at 634. He authenticates this description by reference to the explicit language of the Act specifying that the applicant child’s classification as legitimate, or acknowledged, etc., is ultimately relevant only to the determination of dependency, and by reference to legislative history indicating that the statute was not a general welfare provision for legitimate or otherwise “approved” children of deceased insureds, but was intended just “to replace the support lost by a child when his father . . . dies . . . .” S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 110 (1965). Taking this explanation at face value, we think it clear that conditioning entitlement upon dependency at the time of death is not impermissibly discriminatory in providing only for those children for whom the loss of the parent is an immediate source of the need. Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U. S. 484, 492-497 (1974); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971). See also Weber, 406 U. S., at 174-175. But appellees contend that the actual design of the statute belies the Secretary’s description, and that the statute was intended to provide support for insured decedents’ children generally, if they had a “legitimate” claim to support, without regard to actual dependency at death; in any case, they assert, the statute’s matrix of classifications bears no adequate relationship to actual dependency at death. Since such dependency does not justify the statute’s discriminations, appellees argue, those classifications must fall under Gomez v. Perez, supra. These assertions are in effect one and the same. The basis for appellees’ argument is the obvious fact that each, of the presumptions of dependency renders the class of benefit-recipients incrementally overinclusive, in the sense that some children within each class of presumptive dependents are automatically entitled to benefits under the statute although they could not in fact prove their economic dependence upon insured wage earners at the time of death. We conclude that the statutory classifications are permissible, however, because they are reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency at death. A Congress’ purpose in adopting the statutory presumptions of dependency was obviously to serve administrative convenience. While Congress was unwilling to assume that every child of a deceased insured was dependent at the time of death, by presuming dependency on the basis of relatively readily documented facts, such as legitimate birth, or existence of a support order or paternity decree, which could be relied upon to indicate the likelihood of continued actual dependency, Congress was able to avoid the burden and expense of specific case-by-case determination in the large number of cases where dependency is objectively probable. Such presumptions in aid of administrative functions, though they may approximate, rather than precisely mirror, the results that case-by-case adjudication would show, are permissible under the Fifth Amendment, so long as that lack of precise equivalence does not exceed the bounds of substan-tiality tolerated by the applicable level of scrutiny. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 772 (1975). In cases of strictest scrutiny, such approximations must be supported at least by a showing that the Govem-merit’s dollar “lost” to overincluded benefit recipients is returned by a dollar “saved” in administrative expense avoided. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S., at 689 (plurality opinion). Under the standard of review appropriate here, however, the materiality of the relation between the statutory classifications and the likelihood of dependency they assertedly reflect need not be “ 'scientifically substantiated.’ ” James v. Strange, 407 U. S. 128, 133 (1972), quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 501 (1957) (opinion of Harlan, J.). Nor, in any case, do we believe that Congress is required in this realm of less than strictest scrutiny to weigh the burdens of administrative inquiry solely in terms of dollars ultimately “spent,” ignoring the relative amounts devoted to administrative rather than welfare uses. Cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S., at 784. Finally, while the scrutiny by which their showing is to be judged is not a toothless one, e. g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S., at 691 (Stewaet, J., concurring in judgment, Powell, J., concurring in judgment); Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971), the burden remains upon the appellees to demonstrate the insubstantiality of that relation. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78-79 (1911); cf. United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S. 63, 67 (1965). B Applying these principles, we think that the statutory classifications challenged here are justified as reasonable empirical judgments that are consistent with a design to qualify entitlement to benefits upon a child’s dependency at the time of the parent’s death. To begin with, we note that the statutory scheme is significantly different from the provisions confronted in cases in which the Court has invalidated legislative discriminations among children on the basis of legitimacy. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535 (1973); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U. S. 619 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68 (1968). These differences render those cases of little assistance to appellees. It could not have been fairly argued, with respect to any of the statutes struck down in those cases, that the legitimacy of the child was simply taken as an indication of dependency, or of some other valid ground of qualification. Under all but one of the statutes, not only was the legitimate child automatically entitled to benefits, but an illegitimate child was denied benefits solely and finally on the basis of illegitimacy, and regardless of any demonstration of dependency or other legitimate factor. See also Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (Md.), summarily aff’d, 409 U. S. 1069 (1972); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (Conn.), summarily aff’d, 409 U. S. 1069 (1972). In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, the sole partial exception, the statutory scheme provided for a child’s equal recovery under a workmen’s compensation plan in the event of the death of the father, not only if the child was dependent, but also only if the dependent child was legitimate. 406 U. S., at 173-174, and n. 12. Jimenez v. Weinberger, supra, invalidating discrimination among afterbom illegitimate children as to entitlement to a child’s disability benefits under the Social Security Act, is similarly distinguishable. Under the somewhat related statutory matrix considered there, legitimate children and those capable of inheriting personal property under state intestacy law, and those illegitimate solely on account of a nonobvious defect in their parents’ marriage, were eligible for benefits, even if they were born after the onset of the father’s disability. Other (illegitimate) afterborn children were conclusively denied any benefits, regardless of any showing of dependency. The Court held the discrimination among illegitimate afterborn children impermissible, rejecting the Secretary’s claim that the classification was based upon considerations regarding trustworthy proof of dependency, because it could not accept the assertion: “[T]he blanket and conclusive exclusion of appellants’ subclass of illegitimates is reasonably related to the prevention of spurious claims [of dependency] . Assuming that the appellants are in fact dependent on the claimant [father], it would not serve the purposes of the Act to conclusively deny them an opportunity to establish their dependency and their right to insurance benefits.” 417 U. S., at 636. Hence, it was held that “to conclusively deny one subclass benefits presumptively available to the other denies the former the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment.” Id., at 637. See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 645 (1975); cf. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U. S., at 539. But this conclusiveness in denying benefits to some classes of afterborn illegitimate children, which belied the asserted legislative reliance on dependency in Jimenez, is absent here, for, as we have noted, any otherwise eligible child may qualify for survivorship benefits by showing contribution to support, or cohabitation, at the time of death. Cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441, 452-453, n. 9 (1973), distinguishing Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (Minn. 1970), summarily aff’d, 401 U. S. 985 (1971). It is, of course, not enough simply that any child of a deceased insured is eligible for benefits upon some showing of dependency. In Frontiero v. Richardson, supra, we found it impermissible to qualify the entitlement to dependent’s benefits of a married woman in the uniformed services upon an individualized showing of her husband’s actual dependence upon her for more than half his income, when no such showing of actual dependency was required of a married man in the uniformed services to obtain dependent’s benefits on account of his wife. The invalidity of that gender-based discrimination rested upon the “overbroad” assumption, Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 508 (1975), underlying the discrimination “that male workers’ earnings are vital to the support of their families, while the earnings of female wage earners do not significantly contribute to their families’ support.” Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S., at 643; see Frontiero, 411 U. S., at 689 n. 23. Here, by contrast, the statute does not broadly discriminate between legitimates and illegitimates without more, but is carefully tuned to alternative considerations. The presumption of dependency is withheld only in the absence of any significant indication of the likelihood of actual dependency. Moreover, we cannot say that the factors that give rise to a presumption of dependency lack any substantial relation to the likelihood of actual dependency. Rather, we agree with the assessment of the three-judge court as it originally ruled in Norton v. Weinberger, 364 F. Supp. 1117, 1128 (Md. 1973): “[I]t is clearly rational to presume the overwhelming number of legitimate children are actually dependent upon their parents for support. Likewise . . . the children of an invalid marriage . . . would typically live in the wage earner's home or be supported by him. . . . When an order of support is entered by a court, it is reasonable to assume compliance occurred. A paternity decree, while not necessarily ordering support, would almost as strongly suggest support was subsequently obtained. Conceding that a written acknowledgment lacks the imprimatur of a judicial proceeding, it too establishes the basis for a rational presumption. Men do not customarily affirm in writing their responsibility for an illegitimate child unless the child is theirs and a man who has acknowledged a child is more likely to provide it support than one who does not.” Similarly, we think, where state intestacy law provides that a child may take personal property from a father’s estate, it may reasonably be thought that the child will more likely be dependent during the parent’s life and at his death. For in its embodiment of the popular view within the jurisdiction of how a parent would have his property devolve among his children in the event of death, without specific directions, such legislation also reflects to some degree the popular conception within the jurisdiction of the felt parental obligation to such an “illegitimate” child in other circumstances, and thus something of the likelihood of actual parental support during, as well as after, life. Accord, Watts v. Veneman, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 84, 88, 476 F. 2d 529, 533 (1973). To be sure, none of these statutory criteria compels the extension of a presumption of dependency. But the constitutional question is not whether such a presumption is required, but whether it is permitted. Nor, in ratifying these statutory classifications, is our role to hypothesize independently on the desirability or feasibility of any possible alternative basis for presumption. These matters of practical judgment and empirical calculation are for Congress. Drawing upon its own practical experience, Congress has tailored statutory classifications in accord with its calculations of the likelihood of actual support suggested by a narrow set of objective and apparently reasonable indicators. Our role is simply to determine whether Congress’ assumptions are so inconsistent or insubstantial as not to be reasonably supportive of its conclusions that individualized factual inquiry in order to isolate each nondependent child in a given class of cases is unwarranted as an administrative exercise. In the end, the precise accuracy of Congress’ calculations is not a matter of specialized judicial competence; and we have no basis to question their detail beyond the evident consistency and substan-tiality. Cf. United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S., at 67. We cannot say that these expectations are unfounded, or so indiscriminate as to render the statute’s classifications baseless. We conclude, in short, that, in failing to extend any presumption of dependency to appellees and others like them, the Act does not imper-missibly discriminate against them as compared with legitimate children or those illegitimate children who are statutorily deemed dependent. Reversed. Section 202 (d)(1) of the Act, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 402 (d) (1), provides in pertinent part: “Every child (as defined in section 416 (e) of this title) ... of an individual who dies a fully or currently insured individual, if such child— “ (A) has filed application for child’s insurance benefits, “(B) at the time such application was filed was unmarried and (i) either had not attained the age of 18 or was a full-time student and had not attained the age of 22 .. . and “(C) was dependent upon such individual— “(ii) if such individual has died, at the time of such death, . . . “shall be entitled to a child’s insurance benefit for each month, beginning with the first month after August 1950 in which such child becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits . . . .” Section 216 (e), 42 U. S. C. §416 (e), includes, under the definition of child, inter alia, “the child ... of an individual,” certain legally adopted children, certain stepchildren, and certain grandchildren and stepgrandehildren. Additionally, § 216 (h) (2) (A) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 416 (h) (2) (A), provides: “In determining whether an applicant is the child ... of a fully or currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Secretary shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property ... by the courts of the State in which [such insured individual] was domiciled at the time of his death .... Applicants who according to such law would have the same status relative to talcing intestate personal property as a child . . . shall be deemed such.” Section 202 (d)(3) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. §402 (d)(3), provides in pertinent part: “A child shall be deemed dependent upon his father or adopting father or his mother or adopting mother at the time specified in paragraph (1) (C) of this subsection unless, at such time, such individual was not living with or contributing to the support of such child and— “(A) such child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of such individual, or “(B) such child has been adopted by some other individual.” Additionally, any child who qualifies under §216 (h)(2)(A), see n. 1, supra, is considered legitimate for § 202 (d) (3) purposes, and thus dependent. Section 202 (d)(3), as set forth in 42 U. S. C. §402 (d)(3), provides in pertinent part that “a child deemed to be a child of a fully or currently insured individual pursuant to section 416 (h) (2) (B) or section 416 (h) (3) . . . shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of such individual,” and therefore presumptively dependent. Section 216 (h) (2) (B), as set forth in 42 U. S. C. §416 (h)(2)(B), provides: “If an applicant is a son or daughter of a fully or currently insured individual but is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of such insured individual under subparagraph (A), such applicant shall nevertheless be deemed to be the child of such insured individual if such insured individual and the mother or father, as the case maybe, of such applicant went through a marriage ceremony resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but for a legal impediment described in the last sentence of paragraph (1)(B), would have been a valid marriage.” The specified last sentence of §216 (h)(1)(B), 42 U. S. C. §416 (h)(1) (B), in turn, refers only to "an impediment (i) resulting from the lack of dissolution of a previous marriage or otherwise arising out of such previous marriage or its dissolution, or (ii) resulting from a defect in the procedure followed in connection with such purported marriage.” Section 216(h)(3), as set forth in 42 U. S. C. §416 (h)(3), provides: "An applicant who is the son or daughter of a fully or currently insured individual, but who is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of such insured individual under paragraph (2) of this subsection, shall nevertheless be deemed to be the child of such insured individual if: “(C) In the case of a deceased individual— "(i) such insured individual— “(I) had acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his son or daughter, “(II) had been decreed by a court to be the father of the applicant, or “(III) had been ordered by a court to contribute to the support of the applicant because the applicant was his son or daughter, “and such acknowledgment, court decree, or court order was made before the death of such individual, or “(ii) such insured individual is shown by evidence satisfactory to the Secretary to have been the father of the applicant, and such insured individual was living with or contributing to the support of the applicant at the time such insured individual died.” Upon the original petition for review under §205 (g), the District Court affirmed the administrative findings that had then been made, but remanded the case to the Secretary for him to determine the common-law status of the relationship between the children’s parents, a question left unconsidered in the first administrative proceeding. After an adverse determination on this point and an unsuccessful administrative appeal, Lucas, on behalf of the children, again timely sought review in the District Court, presenting the common-law marriage question and asserting a constitutional challenge to the Act. The District Court affirmed the administrative conclusion of no common-law marriage, and then turned to the constitutional questions that are the subject of this appeal. See, e. g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S., at 637; United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 533 n. 5 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 680 n. 5 (1973) (plurality opinion). The District Court affirmed the Secretary’s factual findings in a “Memorandum and Order” entered August 30, 1974, Viewing the constitutional claim as one requiring the convention of a three-judge district court under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2282 and 2284, the single District Judge did not reach that issue. A three-judge District Court was convened, but disbanded when appellees’ renewed motion for summary judgment omitted their earlier request for in-junctive relief. The constitutional claim thus was correctly determined by a single District Judge. It adds nothing to say that the illegitimate child is also saddled with the procedural burden of proving entitlement on the basis of facts the legitimate child need not prove. The legitimate child is required, like the illegitimate, to prove the facts upon which his statutory entitlement rests. Appellees do not suggest, nor could they successfully, that strict judicial scrutiny of the statutory classifications is required here because, in regulating entitlement to survivorship benefits, the statute discriminatorily interferes with interests of constitutional fundamentally. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 768-770 (1975); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). The Court, of course, has found the privacy of familial relationships to be entitled to procedural due process protections from disruption by the State, whether or not those relationships were legitimized by marriage under state law. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972). But the concerns relevant to that context are only tangential to the analysis here, since the statutory scheme does not interfere in any way with familial relations. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954). See Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633, 644-646 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). That the statutory classifications challenged here discriminate among illegitimate children does not mean, of course, that they are not also properly described as discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate children. See Frontiero v. Richardson, supra; cf. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 169, 172 (1972). In view of our conclusion regarding the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny, we need not consider how the classes of legitimate and illegitimate children would be constitutionally defined under appellees’ approach. The significance of this consideration would seem to be suggested by provisions enabling the parents to legitimatize children born illegitimate. Compare Weber, 406 U. S., at 170-171, with Labine v. Vincent, 401 U. S. 532, 539 (1971). Of course, the status of “dependency” as recognized by the statute here is wholly within the control of the parent. In Rodriguez the Court identified a “suspect class” entitled to the protections of strict judicial scrutiny as one “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.” 411 U. S., at 28. We are not bound to agree with the Secretary’s description of the legislative design if the legislative history and the structure of the provisions themselves belie it. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 648 n. 16 (1975) ; Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S., at 634. Appellees are unable, however, to summon any meaningful legislative history to support their position regarding the congressional design. They rely largely upon a section of the House-Senate Conference Committee Report on the 1965 Amendments to the Social Security Act, reproduced at 111 Cong. Rec. 18383 (1965), partially explaining, id., at 18387, the addition of §216 (h)(3), set forth in n. 3, supra, to the Act: “A child would be paid benefits based on his father’s earnings without regard to whether he has the status of a child under State inheritance laws if the father was supporting the child or had a legal obligation to do so.” But the clause’s reference to legal obligations to support hardly establishes that the statute was designed to replace any potential source of lifetime support; in our view the passage appears only to be a partial description of the actual effect of §§ 416 (h) (3) (C) (i) (II) and (III), set forth in n. 3, supra, not an enunciation of the general purpose of the Act. Thus, appellees, in order to make their case, must ultimately rely upon the asserted failure of the legislative product adequately to fit the purported legitimate aim. That these provisions may thus reflect a “secondary” purpose of Congress is, of course, of no moment. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 274-277 (1973). Vacated and remanded for further proceedings in light of Jimenez, 418 U. S. 902 (1972); adhered to on remand, 390 F. Supp. 1084 (1975); aff'd sub nom. Norton v. Mathews, post, p. 524. The Secretary, pointing out that §202 (d)(3), as set forth in 42 U. S. C. §402 (d)(3), in specific terms provides only that "a child deemed to be a child of a fully or currently insured individual pursuant to section 416 (h) (2) (B) or section 416 (h) (3) . . . shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of such individual,” urges that we misconstrued the statute in Jimenez, 417 U. S., at 631 n. 2, in concluding that an applicant qualifying as a child under § 216 (h) (2) (A) is to be considered as a legitimate child and therefore dependent under § 202 (d) (3). We have no question, however, as to the correctness of that conclusion. First, it is only through operation of § 216 (h) (2) (A) that the recognition of “legitimacy” by state law under § 202 (d) (3) (A) as giving rise to a presumption of dependency takes on a consistent operational meaning. Second, §§ 216 (h) (2) (B) and (3) specifically exclude any child qualified under § 216 (h) (2) (A); if a § 216 (h) (2) (A) child were not considered legitimate under §202 (d)(3), this would have the anomalous effect that an illegitimate child who had been acknowledged in a written statement by the insured father, for example, would be deprived of otherwise established eligibility for benefits, see § 216 (h) (3) (C) (i) (I), if under applicable state law such an acknowledgment worked to make the child an intestate heir. Moreover, the legislative history is clear that the Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. 86-778, 74 Stat. 924, §§ 208 (b) and (d), 42 U. S. G. § 408 (b) and (d), adding § 216 (h) (2) (B) to the Act and inserting the provision in § 202 (d) (3) specifying that a § 216 (h) (2) (B) child shall be deemed to be a legitimate, and therefore dependent, child for death benefit purposes, were intended to have the effect of deeming any § 216 (h) (2) child “legitimate” and thus “dependent.” See S. Rep. No. 1856, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 78-79, 133 (1960) (discussing §§ 207 (b) and (d)); H. R. Rep. No. 1799, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 91-92, 152 (1960). Appellees do not suggest, and we are unwilling to assume, that discrimination against children in appellees’ class in state intestacy laws is constitutionally prohibited, see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U. S. 532 (1971), in which case appellees would be made eligible for benefits under § 216 (h) (2) (A).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v. GABRIEL. No. 572. Decided December 16, 1968. Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Weisl, Morton Hollander, and Robert V. Zener for appellants. Norman Leonard for appellee. Per Curiam. Appellee’s draft Board rejected his claim to classification as a conscientious objector and classified him I-A. His appeals within the Selective Service System were unsuccessful. After he was ordered to report for induction he brought an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California seeking to have his induction enjoined and to have the rejection of his claim to conscientious objector classification declared improper on the grounds that it had no basis in fact, that the Board had misapplied the statutory definition of conscientious objector, and that the members of the Board were improperly motivated by hostility and bias against those who claim to be conscientious objectors. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction preventing appellee’s induction until after a determination of his claim on the merits. In entering the preliminary injunction, the District Court held that it had jurisdiction to hear appellee’s claim despite § 10 (b) (3) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U. S. C. App. § 460 (b)(3) (1964 ed., Supp. Ill), which provides: “No judicial review shall be made of the classification or processing of any registrant by local boards, appeal boards, or the President, except as a defense to a criminal prosecution instituted under section 12 of this title, after the registrant has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report for induction, or for civilian work in the case of a registrant determined to be opposed to participation in war in any form: Provided, That such review shall go to the question of the jurisdiction herein reserved to local boards, appeal boards, and the President only when there is no basis in fact for the classification assigned to such registrant.” Acknowledging that this statute if applicable would prevent pre-induction review of appellee’s classification, the District Court held that, so applied, § 10 (b) (3) was unconstitutional because to provide for judicial consideration of the lawfulness of the Board’s action only as a defense to a criminal prosecution would require that appellee pursue a “tortuous judicial adventure” so beset by “hazards” and “penalties” as to result “in no review at all.” The Government has appealed under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 which allows direct appeal to this Court of “an interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of any court of the United States . . . holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action ... to which the United States ... or any officer . . . thereof ... is a party.” This Court has today, after full consideration, decided Oestereich v. Selective Service Bd., ante, p. 233. Because the result here is dictated by the principles enunciated in that case, it is appropriate to decide this case summarily, reversing the District Court. In Oestereich the delinquency procedure by which the registrant was reclassified was without statutory basis and in conflict with petitioner’s rights explicitly established by the statute and not dependent upon an act of judgment by the Board. Oestereich, as a divinity student, was by statute unconditionally entitled to exemption. Here, by contrast, there is no doubt of the Board’s statutory authority to take action which appellee challenges, and that action inescapably involves a determination of fact and an exercise of judgment. By statute, classification as a conscientious objector is expressly conditioned on the registrant’s claim being “sustained by the local board.” 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (j) (1964 ed., Supp. III). Here the Board has exercised its statutory discretion to pass on a particular request for classification, “evaluating evidence and . . . determining whether a claimed exemption is deserved.” Oestereich v. Selective Service Bd., supra, at 238. A Local Board must make such a decision in respect of each of the many classification claims presented to it. To allow pre-induction judicial review of such determinations would be to permit precisely the kind of “litigious interruptions of procedures to provide necessary military manpower” (113 Cong. Rec. 15426 (report by Senator Russell on Conference Committee action)) which Congress sought to prevent when it enacted §10 (b)(3). We find no constitutional objection to Congress’ thus requiring that assertion of a conscientious objector’s claims such as those advanced by appellee be deferred until after induction, if that is the course he chooses, whereupon habeas corpus would be an available remedy, or until defense of the criminal prosecution which would follow should he press his objections to his classification to the point of refusing to submit to induction. Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114 (1946); Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549 (1944). The motion of appellee for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The decision of the District Court is reversed, and the case remanded for issuance of an order dissolving the preliminary injunction and dismissing the action.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. DALM No. 88-1951. Argued January 10, 1990 Decided March 20, 1990 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 612. Christine Desan-Husson argued the cause pro hac vice for the United States. On the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Peterson, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Alan I. Horowitz, Gilbert S. Rothenberg, and Charles Bricken. Robert B. Pierce argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Paul T. Mengel. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Single transactions, it is well known, may be susceptible to different, and inconsistent, theories of taxation. In the case before us, the taxpayer treated moneys derived from her deceased employer’s estate as a gift and paid gift tax on the transfer. Some years later, the Government contended that the money the taxpayer had received from the transaction was income. The taxpayer disagreed, and the Government’s assertion of an income tax deficiency was the subject of proceedings in the United States Tax Court. The question presented is whether, the statute of limitations long since having run, the doctrine of equitable recoupment supports a separate suit for refund of the earlier paid gift tax after the taxpayer settled the Tax Court deficiency proceeding and agreed to pay income tax on the transaction. We hold that it does Hot. I • The taxpayer, Frances Dalm, is the respondent here. Dalm was appointed administratrix of the estate of Harold Schrier in May 1975, at the request of Schrier’s surviving brother, Clarence. It appears Dalm had been the decedent’s loyal secretary for many years and that Clarence wanted her to take charge of the affairs of the estate and receive some of the moneys that otherwise would belong to him. Dalm received fees from the estate, approved by the probate court, of $30,000 in 1976 and $7,000 in 1977. She also received from Clarence two payments, $180,000 in 1976 and $133,813 in 1977. Clarence and his wife filed a gift tax return in December 1976 reporting the $180,000 payment as a gift to Dalm, and in that same month Dalm paid the gift tax of $18,675. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) later assessed an additional $1,587 in penalties and interest with respect to the transfer. The Schriers paid the penalties and interest in 1977, and were reimbursed by Dalm. But no gift tax return was filed with respect to the 1977 payment of $133,813. After auditing Dalm’s 1976 and 1977 income tax returns, the IRS determined that the payments from Clarence represented additional fees for Dalm’s services as administratix of the estate and should have been reported as income. The IRS asserted deficiencies in her income tax of $91,471 in 1976, and $70,639 in 1977, along with additions to the taxes under § 6653(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC), 26 U. S. C. § 6653(a) (1982 ed.). Dalm petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of the asserted deficiencies, as was her right under § 6213(a). In her petition, she argued that the 1976 and 1977 payments from Clarence were gifts to carry out the wish of the decedent that she share in the estate. After two days of trial, Dalm and the IRS settled the case, with the parties agreeing to a stipulated decision that respondent owed income tax deficiencies of $10,416 for 1976 and $70,639 for 1977. No claim for a credit or recoupment of the gift tax paid by Dalm was raised in the Tax Court proceedings, although there is some dispute whether the gift tax was one of the factors considered in arriving at the terms of the settlement. See n. 2, infra. Immediately after agreeing to the settlement, Dalm filed an administrative claim for refund of the $20,262 in gift tax, interest, and penalties paid with respect to the $180,000 transfer in 1976. The claim was filed in November 1984, even though the IRC required Dalm to file any claim for a refund of the gift tax by December 1979. See § 6511(a). When the IRS failed to act upon her claim within six months, Dalm filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, seeking what in her complaint she denominated a refund of “overpaid gift tax.” Her complaint alleged that the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1) (1982 ed.). The Government moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction and for summary judgment, arguing that the suit was untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. The District Court granted the Government’s motions, rejecting Dalm’s contention that her suit was timely under the doctrine of equitable recoupment as set forth in our opinion in Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247 (1935), a case we shall discuss. The court held that equitable recoupment did not authorize it to exercise jurisdiction over “an independent lawsuit, such as this suit, . . . maintained for a refund for a year in which the statute of limitations has expired.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. 867 F. 2d 305 (1989). The court found Dalm’s claim satisfied all of the requirements for equitable recoupment expressed in our cases. It rejected the District Court’s characterization of Dalm’s action as an independent lawsuit barred by the statute of limitations, reasoning that she could maintain an otherwise barred action for refund of gift tax because the Government had made a timely claim of a deficiency in her income tax based upon an inconsistent legal theory. Id., at 311-312 (citing Kolom v. United States, 791 F. 2d 762 (CA9 1986)). Because the approach taken by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits is in conflict with that adopted by Seventh Circuit, see O’Brien v. United States, 766 F. 2d 1038 (1985), we granted certiorari, 493 U. S. 807 (1989), and now reverse. II The ultimate question in the case is whether the District Court had jurisdiction over Dalm’s suit seeking a refund of the gift tax, interest, and penalties paid on the 1976 transfer. We hold that it did not. A In her complaint, Dalm invoked 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1) (1982 ed.), under which a district court has jurisdiction over a “civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws.” Despite its spacious terms, § 1346(a)(1) must be read in conformity with other statutory provisions which qualify a taxpayer’s right to bring a refund suit upon compliance with certain conditions. The first is § 7422(a), which, tracking the language of § 1346(a)(1), limits a taxpayer’s right to bring a refund suit by providing that “[n]o suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof.” Second, § 6511(a) provides that if a taxpayer is required to file a return with respect to a tax, such as the gift tax, the taxpayer must file any claim for refund within three years from the time the return was filed or two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever period expires later. Read together, the import of these sections is clear: unless a claim for refund of a tax has been filed within the time limits imposed by § 6511(a), a suit for refund, regardless of whether the tax is alleged to have been “erroneously,” “illegally,” or “wrongfully collected,” §§ 1346(a)(1), 7422(a), may not be maintained in any court. See United States v. Kales, 314 U. S. 186, 193 (1941). There is no doubt that Dalm failed to comply with these statutory requirements. The Schriers filed their gift tax return and Dalm paid the gift tax on the 1976 transfer in December 1976. She paid the penalties and interest on that tax in March 1977. Dalm did not file her claim for refund of the gift tax until November 1984, long after the limitations period expired. Under the plain language of §§ 6511(a) and 7422(a), the District Court was barred from entertaining her suit for a refund of the tax. B The Court of Appeals did not contest this analysis; indeed, it recognized that “[tjhere is no statutory basis for permitting the recovery of a tax overpayment after the statute of limitations has expired.” 867 F. 2d, at 308. Despite the lack of a statutory basis for recovery, the court concluded that the doctrine of equitable recoupment permits Dalm to maintain an action to recover the overpaid gift tax. We disagree. The doctrine of equitable recoupment was first addressed by us in our opinion in Bull v. United States, supra. There, the dispute centered on whether partnership distributions received by a decedent’s estate after his death were subject to estate tax or income tax. After an audit, the executor of the estate included the sums in the estate tax return and paid the estate tax in 1920 and 1921. In 1925, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue notified the estate of a deficiency in the estate’s income tax for the 1920 tax year, contending that the same distributions upon which estate tax had been paid should have been treated as income. The Commissioner, however, did not give credit for the estate tax earlier paid on the value of the distributions. That same year, the estate petitioned to the Board of Tax Appeals for a redetermination of the deficiency. After the Board sustained the Commissioner’s deficiency determination, the estate paid the additional income tax and filed a claim for refund of the income tax paid. The Commissioner rejected the claim, and, in September 1930, the executor sued in the Court of Claims for a refund of the income tax. In his petition to the Court of Claims, the executor argued (1) that the amount taxed was not income, so that the estate was entitled to a refund of the entire amount of income tax paid; and (2) alternatively, if the amount taxed was income, the Government should credit against the income tax due the overpayment of estate tax, plus interest, attributable to the inclusion of the amount in the taxable estate. The Court of Claims rejected both arguments. We reversed, holding that the executor was entitled to a credit against the income tax deficiency in the amount of the overpayment of estate tax, with interest. 295 U. S., at 263. We began by acknowledging that the executor had not filed a claim for refund of the estate tax within the limitations period, and that any action for refund of the tax was now barred. Id., at 259, 260-261. “If nothing further had occurred Congressional action would have been the sole avenue of redress.” Id., at 261. What did occur, however, was that after the limitations period on the estate tax had run, the Government assessed a deficiency in the estate’s income tax based upon the same taxable event, and the deficiency became the subject of litigation between the estate and the Government. We reasoned that a tax assessment is in essence an assertion by the sovereign that the taxpayer owes a debt to it; but that, because “taxes are the life-blood of government,” it was necessary for the tax assessed to be collected prior to adjudication of whether the assessment was erroneous or unlawful. As a result, “the usual procedure for the recovery of debts is reversed in the field of taxation. Payment precedes defense, and the burden of proof, normally on the claimant, is shifted to the taxpayer. . . . But these reversals of the normal process of collecting a claim cannot obscure the fact that after all what is being accomplished is the recovery of a just debt owed the sovereign.” Id., at 260. Under our reasoning, the proceeding between the executor and the Government was in substance an attempt by the Government to recover a debt from the estate. The debt was the income tax that was owed, even though in fact it already had been paid. Had the Government followed the “usual procedure” of recovering debts by instituting an action at law for the income tax owed, the executor would have been able to defend against the suit by “demanding recoupment of the amount mistakenly collected as estate tax and wrongfully retained.” Id., at 261 (citing United States v. State Bank, 96 U. S. 30 (1878)). “If the claim for income tax deficiency had been the subject of a suit, any counter demand for recoupment of the overpayment of estate tax could have been asserted by way of defense and credit obtained notwithstanding the statute of limitations had barred an independent suit against the Government therefor. This is because recoupment is in the nature of a defense arising out of some feature of the transaction upon which the plaintiff’s action is grounded. Such a defense is never barred by the statute of limitations so long as the main action itself is timely.” 295 U. S., at 262. We found it immaterial that, rather than the Government having to sue to collect the income tax, the executor was required first to pay it and then seek a refund. “This procedural requirement does not obliterate his substantial right to rely on his cross-demand for credit of the amount which if the United States had sued him for income tax he could have recouped against his liability on that score.” Id., at 263. Dalm contends that the only distinction between her case and Bull is the “meaningless procedural distinction” that her claim of equitable recoupment is raised in a separate suit for refund of gift tax, after she had litigated the income tax deficiency, while in Bull the claim of equitable recoupment of the estate tax was litigated as part of a suit for refund of that tax alleged to be inconsistent with the estate tax. A distinction that has jurisdiction as its central concept is not meaningless. In Bull, the executor sought equitable recoupment of the estate tax in an action for refund of income tax, over which it was undisputed that the Court of Claims had jurisdiction. See n. 4, supra. All that was at issue was whether the Court of Claims, in the interests of equity, could adjust the income tax owed to the Government to take account of an estate tax paid in error but which the executor could not recover in a separate refund action. Here, Dalm does not seek to invoke equitable recoupment in determining her income tax liability; she has already litigated that liability without raising a claim of equitable recoupment and is foreclosed from relitigating it now. See § 6512(a). She seeks to invoke equitable recoupment only in a separate action for refund of gift tax, an action for which there is no statutory authorization by reason of the bar of the limitations statute. It is instructive to consider what the facts in Bull would have to be if Dalm’s contention is correct that her case is identical to Bull in all material respects. The executor in Bull would have litigated the income tax liability, without raising a claim of equitable recoupment, in the Board of Tax Appeals and/or in the Court of Claims, with' the Government winning in each forum. Then, having exhausted his avenues of litigating the income tax liability and paid the tax, the executor would have filed a claim for refund of the estate tax with the Commissioner, asserting equitable recoupment as the basis for the refund, with the Commissioner rejecting it as untimely. At that point, the executor would have brought suit for refund of the estate tax in the Court of Claims after the statute of limitations had run. Had the case come to us with those facts, we would have faced the issue presented here: whether the court in which the taxpayer was seeking a refund was barred from entertaining the suit. We can say with assurance that we were not presented with this issue in Bull and did not consider it. Even had the issue been raised, Bull itself suggests that we would have rejected Dalm’s argument out of hand. See Bull, 295 U. S., at 259 (“The fact that the petitioner relied on the Commissioner’s assessment for estate tax, and believed the inconsistent claim of deficiency of income tax was of no force, cannot avail to toll the statute of limitations, which forbade the bringing of any action in 1930 for refund of estate tax payments made in 1921”). The only other decision in which we have upheld a claim or defense premised upon the doctrine of equitable recoupment is consistent with our analysis today. In Stone v. White, 301 U. S. 532 (1937), a trust had paid the income it received from the corpus to its sole beneficiary and also paid the tax due on the income. After the statute of limitations governing the Government’s right to collect the income tax from the beneficiary had run, the trust filed a timely suit seeking a refund of the income tax paid on the theory thát the beneficiary, not the trust, was liable for the tax. We held that, given the identity of interest between the beneficiary and the trust, the Government could invoke equitable recoupment to assert its now-barred claim against the beneficiary as a defense to the trust’s timely claim for a refund. Id., at 537-539. As in Bull, there was no dispute that the court in which we allowed the doctrine of equitable recoupment to be raised had jurisdiction over the underlying action: the trust’s timely action for a refund of income tax. In sum, our decisions in Bull and Stone stand only for the proposition that a party litigating a tax claim in a timely proceeding may, in that proceeding, seek recoupment of a related, and inconsistent, but now time-barred tax claim relating to the same transaction. In both cases, there was no question but that the courts in which the refund actions were brought had jurisdiction. To date, we have not allowed equitable recoupment to be the sole basis for jurisdiction. C Under settled principles of sovereign immunity, “the United States, as sovereign, ‘is immune from suit, save as it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.’” United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586 (1941)). A statute of limitations requiring that a suit against the Government be brought within a certain time period is one of those terms. See United States v. Mottaz, 476 U. S. 834, 841 (1986); Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273, 287 (1983). “[Although we should not construe such a time-bar provision unduly restrictively, we must be careful not to interpret it in a manner that would ‘extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended.’” Ibid. (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111, 117-118 (1979)); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S. 310, 318 (1986); United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4 (1969) (waivers of sovereign immunity by Congress “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed”). As we have determined, our previous equitable recoupment cases have not suspended rules of jurisdiction and so have not deviated from these principles. We likewise refuse Dalm’s invitation to do so here. She seeks a refund not of income tax but of gift tax on which the return was filed and the tax paid in December 1976. For the District Court to have jurisdiction over her suit for refund, Dalm was required to file a claim for refund of the tax within three years of the time the gift tax return was filed or two years of the time the tax was paid, whichever period expires later. See §§ 6511 (a), 7422(a). There is no question but that she failed to do so. Having failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking a refund, she asks us to go beyond the authority Congress has given us in permitting suits against the Government. If any principle is central to our understanding of sovereign immunity, it is that the power to consent to such suits is reserved to Congress. Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Congress has legislated a set of exceptions to the limitations period prescribed by §§ 7422 and 6511(a). In 1938, Congress adopted what are known as the mitigation provisions, now codified at §§1311-1314. These statutes, in specified circumstances, permit a taxpayer who has been required to pay inconsistent taxes to seek a refund of a tax the recovery of which is otherwise barred by §§ 7422(a) and 6511(a). It is undisputed that Dalm’s action does not come within these provisions; were we to allow her to maintain a suit for refund on the basis of equitable recoupment, we would be doing little more than overriding Congress’ judgment as to when equity requires that there be an exception to the limitations bar. Our holding today does not leave taxpayers in Dalm’s position powerless to invoke the doctrine of equitable recoupment. Both the Secretary, at the administrative level, see Rev. Rui. 71-56, 1971-1 Cum. Bull. 404 (revoking Rev. Rul. 55-226, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 469), and a court which has jurisdiction over a timely suit for refund may consider an equitable recoupment claim for an earlier tax paid under an inconsistent theory on the same transaction. Ill The Court of Appeals reasoned that recoupment should be permitted because it effected, with respect to a single transaction, the recovery of a tax based upon a theory inconsistent with the theory upon which a later tax was paid. But to permit an independent action for recoupment because there is but one transaction is to mistake the threshold requirement for its rationale. It is true that our precedents allowing recoupment pertain to cases where a single transaction is subjected to inconsistent taxation, but the reason the statute of limitations is not a bar in those cases is that the court has uncontested jurisdiction to adjudicate one of the taxes in question. In such cases, a court has the equitable power to examine and consider the entire transaction: “The essence of the doctrine of recoupment is stated in the Bull case: ‘recoupment is in the nature of a defense arising out of some feature of the transaction upon which the plaintiff’s action is grounded.’ 295 U. S. 247, 262. It has never been thought to allow one transaction to be offset against another, but only to permit a transaction which is made the subject of suit by plaintiff to be examined in all its aspects, and judgment to be rendered that does justice in view of the one transaction as a whole.” Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U. S. 296, 299 (1946). Here the Government asserted an income tax deficiency on a theory inconsistent with the theory upon which Dalm relied in paying gift tax. She chose to litigate the deficiency in the Tax Court, where she did not attempt to raise a recoupment claim. She cannot choose this avenue to adjudicate the income tax consequences of the transaction, and then seek to reopen the matter and override the statute of limitations for the sole purpose of seeking recoupment. The controlling jurisdictional statutes do not permit her to do so. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting. This is not a decision that will be much celebrated or often cited. New cases are affected, and not a single brief amicus curiae was filed. The Court reserves in a footnote an issue that would render obsolete its holding. The case casts a shadow on the Executive — and on this Court — but otherwise has no apparent importance. Indeed, the Court’s opinion is remarkable not at all for what it says but rather for what it leaves unsaid. The majority’s parsing of sovereign immunity and jurisdiction masks what is the ultimate question before us: whether a statute of limitations otherwise barring a refund of federal income tax is tolled by Government conduct that this Court has censured as “immoral” and tantamount to “a fraud on the taxpayer’s rights.” See Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247, 261 (1935). The Court today offers a jurisdictional apology when it could — and should — follow the just rule of the Bull case. I This case is remarkably similar to its 55-year-old precursor. The Bull case involved an attempt by the Government to collect income tax on partnership distributions received by the estate of a deceased partner. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue had already collected an estate tax on the distributions on the assumption that they constituted part of the estate corpus. The Commissioner contended, first, that the same transactions could constitute both corpus and income and thus be subject to both an estate tax and an income tax, and, second, that, in any event, the statute of limitations barred a recovery of the estate tax. This Court rejected the Commissioner’s first argument, and characterized as follows his claim that the Government could retain the estate tax while collecting a second tax on the same transaction pursuant to an inconsistent theory: “The United States, we have held, cannot, as against the claim of an innocent party, hold his money which has gone into its treasury by means of the fraud of its agent. United States v. State Bank, 96 U. S. 30. While here the money was taken through mistake without any element of fraud, the unjust retention is immoral and amounts in law to a fraud on the taxpayer’s rights.” 295 U. S., at 261. This case involves an equally unjust retention of a previously paid tax. The Government has collected an income tax on a transfer of $180,000 to respondent while retaining the gift tax previously paid on the same transfer. The Court’s decision assumes, as the summary judgment record requires, that when the Government compromised its claim for an income tax deficiency, it allowed respondent no credit for the gift tax that had previously been paid. Thus, the critical fact that made the Government’s position in Bull immoral is present here: a single taxable event has been subjected to two taxes on mutually inconsistent theories. II Even with the parallel between Bull and this case clearly in mind, most readers of the majority’s opinion must wonder how this case ever came before our Court, and why the majority must recite so much law to decide it. According to the majority, respondent chose to litigate in the Tax Court the deficiency assessed against her, and, having made this choice, cannot “then seek to reopen the matter and override the statute of limitations for the sole purpose of seeking recoupment.” Ante, at 611. This may seem fair enough, but also plain enough: A legal claim that might have been settled in an earlier proceeding is usually barred by rules of claim preclusion. If the claim is not barred by the settlement agreement in this case, then surely the Government can— without any help from this Court — avoid such problems in the future by drafting its settlement agreements more carefully. There is accordingly no justification for the Court’s exercise of certiorari jurisdiction in this case, a discretionary act which has done nothing more useful than deprive the twice-taxed respondent in this case of a remedy for a wrong done by the Government. Two facts explain why the Government does not rely on principles of claim preclusion as a defense in this case. The first is this: It is undisputed by the parties to this case that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to consider recoupment of the gift tax payment against the income tax deficiency. According to the Government, respondent cannot, and for that reason did not, raise her equitable recoupment claim in the Tax Court: “respondent’s choice of the Tax Court forum precluded her from claiming equitable recoupment against the income tax deficiency.” Reply Brief for United States 6. The Government acknowledges that respondent may have had a sound claim for recoupment, but insists that to pursue this claim she should have “paid the 1976 and 1977 income tax deficiencies and then brought a timely refund suit in district court or the Claims Court.” Id., at 3-4. The second fact is this.: an affluent taxpayer, but not a less fortunate one, can pay a deficiency assessment and file suit for a refund. It is undisputed that if respondent had the means to do so, she could have recovered the gift tax that had been paid in 1976 by a refund action filed after she received the notice of income tax deficiency in 1983, even though the statute of limitations had long since run. One might infer from the posture of this case — as respondent’s counsel represented to the Court — that respondent’s limited means foreclosed this avenue of relief for her. She therefore challenged the deficiency in the Tax Court. These two facts explain what the majority does not: why we are not addressing a simple case of res judicata. It is clear that the basis for respondent’s equitable recoupment claim did not exist until it was determined that the payment made in 1976 was taxable as income. Thus, respondent could apparently obtain a forum to hear her equitable recoupment claim only by seeking a refund of the previously paid gift tax — an action which all agree was barred by limitations when respondent received the notice of deficiency in 1983. When that determination was made — that is to say, when the income tax case was settled — respondent promptly asserted her recoupment claim in the only forum available. Indeed, she filed her claim for a gift tax refund even before the settlement agreement was consummated. In view of the fact that the character of the 1976 transaction remained in dispute until the claim was filed, none of the policy reasons that normally support the application of a statute of limitations is implicated by this case. Ill The Court nevertheless denies respondent the relief devised by the Bull Court. Ignoring both the policies underlying the statute of limitations and the principles of just conduct underlying Bull, the Court confronts respondent with the majestic voices of “jurisdiction” and “sovereign immunity” — voices that seem to have a haunting charm for this Court’s current majority. The Court that decided the Bull case reasoned not in obeisance to these siren-like voices but rather under the reliable guidance of a bright star in our jurisprudence: the presumption that for every right there should be a remedy. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 162-163 (1803). Without any sacrifice of technical propriety, the Bull Court could have found that the lapse of time had divested the Court of Claims of jurisdiction to allow the taxpayer credit for the previously paid estate tax. It easily avoided that unjust result, however, by relying on the special features of the tax collection procedures that impose burdens on the taxpayer unlike those imposed on ordinary litigants. The net effect of its analysis was to hold that in a refund action based on the multiple and inconsistent taxation of a single transaction, the taxpayer is to be treated as though she were the defendant even though she is actually the plaintiff. I would adopt the same course in this case. By initiating a proceeding to recover income tax based on the 1976 payment, the Government waived the time bar that would otherwise have precluded a claim for refund of the gift tax. Had respondent paid the deficiency and asserted the claim for a gift tax refund as a second count in one action, even this Court would agree that the claim was timely. If we adopt the Court’s reasoning in Bull, it is proper to treat the second count of the refund action as timely even when the income tax issues are litigated before the Tax Court, because the deficiency assessment was sufficient to put in issue the right to recoupment and to justify treating the taxpayer as a defendant, rather than a plaintiff. If it was not too late for the Government to litigate' the tax consequences, of the 1976 payment, it should not be too late for the taxpayer to do so. “A different result here [is] a reproach to our jurisprudence.” United States v. State Bank, 96 U. S. 30, 36 (1878). IV It may reasonably be said that the disposition in Bull involved an unusually flexible treatment of legal categories. The rights of a plaintiff are construed by reference to the status of a defendant so as to permit, in effect, the equitable tolling of a limitations period. A doctrinal innovation that appears imaginative may, however, be nothing more than the necessary expression of an exception to a generally appropriate definition. This particular exception deserves the status of a legal rule by virtue of our decision in Bull. There is no reason to retreat from the direction of that precedent today. There is, moreover, nothing especially sober or unflinching about the majority’s disposition of this case. Quite the contrary is true. The majority’s approach depends upon showing that this Court is constrained by tightly drawn jurisdictional boundaries, but, as the majority concedes, the relevant jurisdictional statute speaks in “spacious terms.” Ante, at 601. Indeed, the statute confers jurisdiction not only over any “civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected,” but also over any such action to recover “any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal revenue laws.” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1) (1982 ed.). The majority correctly recognizes that this blanket waiver of immunity can be converted into a jurisdictional straitjacket only by recourse to limitations spelled out elsewhere. The majority would find these limitations in § 7422 and § 6511(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. The first of these provisions stipulates that no tax refund suit “shall be maintained . . . until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof.” 26 U. S. C. §7422(a) (1982 ed.). The second provision establishes a statute of limitations applicable to actions for refund of taxes paid by filing a return or by means of a stamp. 26 U. S. C. § 6511(a) (1982 ed.). It is the latter of these two provisions which gives the majority the shackles it seeks: the statute of limitations in § 6511(a) is a provision of law that, under § 7422(a), restricts the capacity of taxpayers to maintain suits. Denominating respondent’s suit an action for refund of overpaid gift tax, the majority declares there can be “no doubt” that the combined operation of § 7422(a) and § 6511(a) strips the federal courts of the jurisdiction otherwise accorded by 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1) (1982 ed.) over the recoupment suit. I have no doubt that § 6511 prescribes the statute of limitations applicable to actions for the refund of overpaid gift tax, and that, if this were such an action, the section would at least support the majority’s argument. This suit is not, however, technically a suit for the refund of overpaid gift tax within the meaning of § 6511(a). The gravamen of respondent’s claim is not that the gift tax was overpaid, but that it was unjustly retained. According to the Bull Court, “[wjhile here the money was taken through mistake without any element of fraud, the unjust retention is immoral and amounts in law to a fraud on the taxpayer’s rights.” 295 U. S., at 261. In my opinion, a sum fraudulently retained under the internal revenue laws is an amount included within § 1346(a)(l)’s provision for recovery of “any sum ... in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws.” The jurisdictional grant expressly distinguishes such wrongfully collected sums from those sums which are simply “excessive,” and from taxes “erroneously or illegally assessed or collected.” These latter phrases would appear to cover actions for refund of an overpaid gift tax, but the payment fraudulently retained in this case is better characterized as a “sum. . . wrongfully collected.” Likewise, § 6511(a) by its express terms applies only to actions for refund of an “overpayment of any tax” paid by means of a return or a stamp. It is odd to speak of the overpayment of a fraud, and one is not ordinarily required to file a return in order to be defrauded — even when the sovereign is the malefactor. I conclude that, technically speaking, this action is one for the recoupment of tax wrongfully collected because fraudulently retained, and not for the refund of tax overpaid. The plain language of § 1346(a)(1) accords jurisdiction over respondent’s suit, and the terms of § 6511(a) do not divest it. The majority’s affection for plain language seems to end where its devotion to sovereign immunity begins. The majority is able to complete its argument only by inventing a small, but blatant, fiction: that respondent is bringing a suit for the refund of overpaid gift tax within the meaning of 26 U. S. C. § 6511(a) (1982 ed.). This minor fiction is then conscripted by the majority’s strategy to serve the vainest of all legal fictions, the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The doctrine has its origin in the ancient myth that the “[K]ing can do no wrong.” See 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *238. Whatever might be said in favor of this polite falsehood in English law, the doctrine is an anomalous import within our own. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 414-415 (1979); see also Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 87 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Its persistence cannot be denied but ought not to be celebrated. Nor should its Active origin ever be forgotten. There is no cause to expand the doctrine, and we do better to interpret § 1346(a)(1) by the light of equity and with due regard for the practicalities of revenue collection discussed in Bull. To be useful, legal concepts must accommodate most disputes without the dissonance accompanying blended categories, but must also permit such flexibility when judgment demands it. It is not surprising that our concepts should be stressed when the Government taxes a citizen twice upon inconsistent theories and then subjects the citizen to a choice among competing fora, each of which provides only half a remedy. It is equally unsurprising, and in fact encouraging, that such problems occur so rarely that Congress has not made any explicit provision for them. What is surprising is that this Court believes the equitable decision of the Court of Appeals in need of correction. The Court today has taken discretionary jurisdiction over a case of no broad import, and has undone equity by rendering an opinion true to neither the spirit nor the letter of American law. The Court takes its stand upon the grave declaration that a “distinction that has jurisdiction as its central concept is not meaningless.” Ante, at 606. I am not sure what this solemn truism means, but I do know that it does not decide this case. Because I am unable to discover any just reason for distinguishing this case from Bull, I respectfully dissent. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U. S. C.), as amended. In its opinion granting summary judgment to the Government, the District Court had suggested that an alternative ground for decision was that the only plausible explanation for the allocation of the agreed income tax liability between 1976 and 1977 in the Tax Court settlement was that the allocation reflected the previously paid gift tax on the 1976 transfer. The Sixth Circuit held that the District Court had erred in granting summary judgment on this issue, giving the taxpayer an opportunity to show the parties’ intent in effecting the settlement. Accordingly, it remanded the case for further proceedings on this issue. 867 F. 2d, at 312. The Board of Tax Appeals, the forerunner to the United States Tax Court, was established by the Revenue Act of 1924 as “an independent agency in the executive branch of the Government.” Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. 176, § 900(k), 43 Stat. 338. Under the Act, a taxpayer was permitted to challenge an income tax deficiency asserted by the Commissioner, prior to paying the deficiency, by way of a petition to the Board. See id., §§274, 900; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716, 721 (1929). Before the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1926, there was no direct review of Board of Tax Appeals decisions. As a result, a taxpayer who lost in proceedings before the Board was permitted to sue in district court or the Court of Claims for a refund after payment of the deficiency. In effect, the refund suit, although nominally a separate proceeding, was a mechanism by which taxpayers could obtain review of Board decisions. See Old Colony Trust Co., supra, at 721-722; Ferguson, Jurisdictional Problems in Federal Tax Controversies, 48 Iowa L. Rev. 312, 350-351 (1963). The Revenue Act of 1926 put an end to this circuitous process. First, it provided for direct judicial review of Board decisions in the courts of appeals. Revenue Act of 1926, eh. 27, § 1001(a), 44 Stat. 109. Second, the Act provided that, once a taxpayer had filed a timely petition with the Board, the taxpayer generally could not institute a new suit in another court for refund of the same tax. Id., § 284(d), 44 Stat. 67. Under our decision in Old Colony Trust Co., supra, at 725-728, the Act did not apply to cases where, as in Bull, the taxpayer filed his or her petition with the Board and the Board had not issued a decision prior to the enactment of the Act in 1926. See generally Andrews, Modern-Day Equitable Recoupment and the “Two Tax Effect:” Avoidance of the Statutes of Limitation in Federal Tax Controversies, 28 Ariz. L. Rev. 595, 599, n. 20 (1986). Since Bull, we have emphasized that a claim of equitable recoupment will lie only where the Government has taxed a single transaction, item, or taxable event under two inconsistent theories. See Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U. S. 296, 299-300 (1946); cf. Stone v. White, 301 U. S. 532 (1937) (permitting the Government to invoke equitable recoupment as a defense against a claim for refund of income tax paid by a trust where there was a complete identity of interest between the trust and the beneficiary who had received the income, and a claim against the beneficiary for the income tax was then barred). Justice Stevens calls it a fiction to cast Dalm’s action as a suit for refund. He creates instead a distinction between refund actions and suits for funds wrongfully retained. See post, at 620-622. Neither the IRC nor our authorities support the distinction. Section 6511(a) applies to claims for refund of a tax “overpayment.” The commonsense interpretation is that a tax is overpaid when a taxpayer pays more than is owed, for whatever reason or no reason at all. Even in Bull, the case upon which the dissent relies to assert that retention of the gift tax is unjust or fraudulent, we described the inconsistent tax as being an “overpayment.” See, e. g., 295 U. S., at 258, 262, 263. The word encompasses “erroneously,” “illegally,” or “wrongfully” collected taxes, as those terms are used in 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1) (1982 ed.) and § 7422(a). There is a further statutory point. By its express language, § 7422(a) conditions a district court’s authority to hear a refund suit, regardless of whether the tax is alleged to have been erroneously, illegally, or wrongfully collected, upon the filing of a claim for refund. If, as even Justice Stevens appears to concede, see post, at 620, the term “overpayment” as used in § 6511(a) encompasses erroneous or illegal collection, there is no reason to conclude that it does not also encompass wrongful collection. As a final matter, we note that both Dalm and the Court of Appeals must have been misled by what Justice Stevens now thinks a fiction. Dalm’s complaint sought a “refund” of “overpaid gift taxes”; and the Court of Appeals treated the claim as one for “recovery of a tax overpayment.” See Complaint, 2-3; 867 F. 2d 305, 308 (CA6 1989). We have no doubt that these characterizations were correct. In a final attempt to bring her refund suit within the statute, Dalm contends that her suit was timely. She argues that the gift tax was not paid for the purposes of § 6511(a) until 1984, when it was determined that she owed income tax on the same transaction under an inconsistent theory. So, she asserts, her cause of action for refund of gift tax did not arise until that time. We disagree. The most sensible interpretation of § 6511(a) is that a tax is paid when the taxpayer tenders payment of the tax to the IRS, not when the taxpayer discovers that the payment was erroneous. The very purpose of statutes of limitations in the tax context is to bar the assertion of a refund claim after a certain period of time has passed, without regard to whether the claim would otherwise be meritorious. That a taxpayer does not learn until after the limitations period has run that a tax was paid in error, and that he or she has a ground upon which to claim a refund, does not operate to lift the statutory bar. We have no occasion to pass upon the question whether Dalm could have raised a recoupment claim in the Tax Court. Arguably the Government’s position in this case is even more outrageous than the position it took in Bull because its income tax assessment in that case was perfectly sound. In this case, however, its income tax claim was based on the remarkable theory that payments aggregating $313,813 constituted compensation for respondent’s services as administratrix of her former employer’s estate when the probate court had approved a total of $37,000 as compensation for those services. I do not, however, place any reliance on this aspect of the case, just as the Court correctly abstains from suggesting that the harshness of its holding is mitigated by the unresolved factual dispute about whether the Tax Court settlement took into account the prior gift tax payment. See ante, at 600-601, n. 2. The majority states that certiorari was granted in this case to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals. If there were such a conflict it would not be of sufficient importance to merit our attention, but in fact no relevant conflict exists. The majority correctly observes that the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in this case agrees with that of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Kolom v. United States, 791 F. 2d 762 (1986). The Court erroneously suggests that these decisions are contrary to O’Brien v. United States, 766 F. 2d 1038 (CA7 1985). O’Brien was not a case in which a taxpayer sought to litigate an equitable recoupment claim in District Court after litigating in the Tax Court the assessment that generated the recoupment claim. In O’Brien, the beneficiary of an estate sought to litigate a recoupment claim after a deficiency was assessed against, and litigated in the Tax Court by, the estate itself. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that only the estate, not the beneficiary, could assert any available recoupment claim. Id., at 1050-1051. I do not believe the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit spoke to the question at issue here, see id., at 1050, n. 15, but to the extent it did so, its remarks were obviously dicta. The Court thus today endorses a rule that no Court of Appeals has ever adopted. See Rev. Rui. 71-56, 1971-1 Cum. Bull. 404, 405 (“[T]he Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to consider a plea of equitable recoupment”); see also Estate of Schneider v. Commissioner, 93 T. C. 568 (1989). In Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U. S. 296, 303 (1946), we cited Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 320 U. S. 418 (1943), for the proposition that the Tax Court has no jurisdiction to consider recoupment. A careful reading of the Gooch Milling opinion, and of the relevant statute, however, will show that it actually considered only the question of recoupment based on an overpayment in a year other than the year in dispute. I therefore commend the Court for its careful reservation of this issue, see ante, at 611, n. 8. It is nevertheless appropriate to assume for purposes of deciding the jurisdictional issue in this case that respondent’s counsel correctly believed that no recoupment could be had in the Tax Court. Of course, if this Court were eventually to decide the reserved issue by holding that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to hear an equitable recoupment claim, today’s decision would become a complete dead letter. No taxpayer would have any reason to litigate the deficiency and the recoupment issues separately, and in any event a judgment upon the former would bar a subsequent suit upon the latter under the doctrine of res judicata. “The ordinary defendant stands in judgment only after a hearing. The taxpayer often is afforded his hearing after judgment and after payment, and his only redress for unjust administrative action is the right to claim restitution. But these reversals of the normal process of collecting a claim cannot obscure the fact that after all what is being accomplished is the recovery of a just debt owed the sovereign. If that which the sovereign retains was unjustly taken in violation of its own statute, the withholding is wrongful. Restitution is owed the taxpayer. Nevertheless he may be without a remedy. But we think this is not true here. “In a proceeding for the collection of estate tax, the United States through a palpable mistake took more than it was entitled to. Retention of the money was against morality and conscience. But claim for refund or credit was not presented or action instituted for restitution within the period fixed by the statute of limitations. If nothing further had occurred Congressional action would have been the sole avenue of redress. “To the objection that the sovereign is not liable to respond to the petitioner the answer is that it has given him a right of credit or refund, which though he could not assert it in an action brought by him in 1930, had accrued and was available to him since it was actionable and not barred in 1925 when the Government proceeded against him for the collection of income tax. “The pleading was sufficient to put in issue the right to recoupment.” Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247, 260-261, 263 (1935). The provision reads: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Claims Court, of: (1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws.” The majority quotes this provision in its entirety. See ante, at 601-602. The provision reads: “Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title in respect of which tax the taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return was filed by the taxpayer, within 2 years from the time the tax was paid. Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title which is required to be paid by means of a stamp shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the tax was paid.” The income tax deficiency was assessed against respondent in June 1983. In November 1984, respondent filed an administrative claim seeking relief from the inconsistent tax treatment of the transaction. This suit followed in September 1985. The suit would thus be timely even if the 2-year limitations period from § 6511(a) were borrowed and applied to claims arising out of a “wrongful collection” resulting from inconsistent taxation. Respondent’s complaint identifies this action as one for “recovery of Internal Revenue taxes and interest erroneously collected from” respondent, and alleges that “overpaid gift taxes” are due and owing to respondent. Respondent filed with the Internal Revenue Service claims for refund of overpaid gift tax. I do not, however, understand the majority to rely upon these details of the pleadings. Nor could it reasonably do so. As the Government’s handling of this case makes clear, it understood the basis for respondent’s cause of action. That basis is, moreover, evident from the face of the complaint, which alleges that: “4. It is inequitable for Defendant to collect taxes on the same fund on the mutually exclusive theories of said amount of money being both income and a gift. “5. Accordingly, timely Claims for Refund was [sic] filed on November 1, 1984 ____ “7. The action of the Defendant, through its agents, in assessing and collecting the amounts referred to in Paragraph 2 [alleging the payment of gift taxes in 1976 and 1977] hereof was improper, illegal and erroneous.” Nowhere does the complaint allege that the gift tax was collected as the result of erroneous calculations, mistaken facts, or misinterpreted provisions of law. The sole reason given for recognizing the gift tax as an “overpayment” is that its retention would be “inequitable.” If indeed the premise for the majority’s holding is an especially strict rule of pleading, then the majority’s holding becomes not simply trivial but absurd. The pleading rule imposed certainly does not have “jurisdiction as its central concept,” and thus would even by the majority’s logic be a ‘“meaningless procedural distinction.’” See ante, at 606. Cf. United States v. Kales, 314 U. S. 186, 194 (1941) (“This Court. . . has often held that a notice fairly advising the Commissioner of the nature of the taxpayer’s claim, which the Commissioner could reject because too general or because it does not comply with formal requirements of the statute and regulations, will nevertheless be treated as a claim, where formal defects and lack of specificity have been remedied by amendment filed after the lapse of the statutory period”). The majority supposes that its “conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Congress has legislated a set of exceptions to the limitations period” which “permit a taxpayer who has been required to pay inconsistent taxes to seek a refund óf a tax the recovery of which is otherwise barred.” See ante, at 610. The exceptions were enacted two years after Bull was decided. It is undisputed that these exceptions do not apply in this case. Unlike the majority, I am not persuaded that because Congress took special steps to ensure that twice-taxed citizens were treated equitably under some circumstances, Congress must have intended to gut judicially created doctrines which ensured equitable treatment for twice-taxed citizens under other circumstances. The contrary inference seems more plausible. See Andrews, Modern-Day Equitable Recoupment and the “Two Tax Effect:” Avoidance of the Statutes of Limitation in Federal Tax Controversies, 28 Ariz. L. Rev. 595, 619-623 (1986). '

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. HEALTH CARE & RETIREMENT CORPORATION OF AMERICA No. 92-1964. Argued February 22, 1994 Decided May 23, 1994 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, JJ., joined, post, p. 584. Michael R. Dreeben argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Jerry M. Hunter, Nicholas E. Karatinos, Norton J. Come, Linda Sher, John Emad Arbab, and Daniel Silverman. Maureen E. Mahoney argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Cary R. Cooper, Margaret J. Lockhart, and R. Jeffrey Bixler Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Marsha S. Berzon and Laurence Gold; and for the American Nurses Association by Barbara J. Sapin and Woody N. Peterson. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Health Care Association by Andrew A. Peterson, Thomas V. Walsh, and Patrick L. Vaccaro; for the Council on Labor Law Equality by Gerard C. Smetana and Michael E. Avakian; and for U. S. Home Care Corp. by William H. DuRoss III. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. The National Labor Relations Act (Act) affords employees the rights to organize and to engage in collective bargaining free from employer interference. The Act does not grant those rights to supervisory employees, however, so the statutory definition of supervisor becomes essential in determining which employees are covered by the Act. In this case, we decide the narrow question whether the National Labor Relations Board’s (Board’s) test for determining if a nurse is a supervisor is consistent with the statutory definition. I Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935. Act of July 5,1935, ch. 372,49 Stat. 449. In the early years of its operation, the Act did not exempt supervisory employees from its coverage; as a result, supervisory employees could organize as part of bargaining units and negotiate with the employer. Employers complained that this produced an imbalance between labor and management, but in 1947 this Court refused to carve out a supervisory employee exception from the Act’s broad coverage. The Court stated that “it is for Congress, not for us, to create exceptions or qualifications at odds with [the Act’s] plain terms.” Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 490 (1947). Later that year, Congress did just that, amending the statute so that the term “ ‘employee’ . . . shall not include . . . any individual employed as a supervisor.” 61 Stat. 137-138, codified at 29 U. S. C. § 152(3). Congress defined a supervisor as: “[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.” 61 Stat. 138, codified at 29 U. S. C. § 152(11). As the Board has stated, the statute requires the resolution of three questions; and each must be answered in the affirmative if an employee is to be deemed a supervisor. First, does the employee have authority to engage in 1 of the 12 listed activities? Second, does the exercise of that authority require “the use of independent judgment”? Third, does the employee hold the authority “in the interest of the employer”? Nortkcrest Nursing Home, 313 N. L. R. B. 491, 493 (1993). This case concerns only the third question, and our decision turns upon the proper interpretation of the statutory phrase “in the interest of the employer.”' In cases involving nurses, the Board admits that it has interpreted the statutory phrase in a unique manner. Tr. of Oral Arg. 52 (Board: “[t]he Board has not applied a theory that’s phrased in the same terms to other categories of professionals”). The Board has held that “a nurse’s direction of less-skilled employees, in the exercise of professional judgment incidental to the treatment of patients, is not authority exercised ‘in the interest of the employer.’” Pet. for <pert. 15. As stated in reviewing its position on this issue in its recent decision in Northcrest Nursing Home, supra, at 491-492, the Board believes that its special interpretation of “in the interest of the employer” in cases involving nurses is necessary because professional employees (including registered nurses) are not excluded from coverage under the Act. See 29 U. S. C. § 152(12). Respondent counters that “[tjhere is simply no basis in the language of the statute to conclude that direction given to aides in the interest of nursing home residents, pursuant to professional norms, is not ‘in the interest of the employer.’ ” Brief for Respondent 30. In this case, the Board’s General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that respondent, the owner and operator of the Heartland Nursing Home in Urbana, Ohio, had committed unfair labor practices in disciplining four licensed practical nurses. At Heartland, the Director of Nursing has overall responsibility for the nursing department. There is also an Assistant Director of Nursing, 9 to 11 staff nurses (including both registered nurses and the four licensed practical nurses involved in this case), and 50 to 55 nurses’ aides. The staff nurses are the senior ranking employees on duty after 5 p.m. during the week and at all times on weekends— approximately 75% of the time. The staff nurses have responsibility to ensure adequate staffing; to make daily work assignments; to monitor the aides’ work to ensure proper performance; to counsel and discipline aides; to resolve aides’ problems and grievances; to evaluate aides’ performances; and to report to management. In light of these varied activities, respondent contended, among other things, that the four nurses involved in this case were supervisors, and so not protected under the Act. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disagreed, concluding that the nurses were not supervisors. The ALJ stated that the nurses’ supervisory work did not “equate to responsibly ... directing] the aides in the interest of the employer,” noting that “the nurses’ focus is on the well-being of the residents rather than of the employer.” 306 N. L. R. B. 68, 70 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). The Board stated only that “[t]he judge found, and we agree, that the Respondent’s staff nurses are employees within the meaning of the Act.” 306 N. L. R. B. 63, 63, n. 1 (1992). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. 987 F. 2d 1256 (1993). The Court of Appeals had decided in earlier cases that the Board’s test for determining the supervisory status of nurses was inconsistent with the statute. See Beverly California Corp. v. NLRB, 970 F. 2d 1548 (1992); NLRB v. Beacon Light Christian Nursing Home, 825 F. 2d 1076 (1987). In Beverly, for example, the court had stated that “the notion that direction given to subordinate personnel to ensure that the employer’s nursing home customers receive ‘quality care’ somehow fails to qualify as direction given ‘in the interest of the employer’ makes very little sense to us.” 970 F. 2d, at 1552. Addressing the instant case, the court followed Beverly and again held the Board’s interpretation inconsistent with the statute. 987 F. 2d, at 1260. The court further stated that “it is up to Congress to carve out an exception for the health care field, including nurses, should Congress not wish for such nurses to be considered supervisors.” Id., at 1261. The court “reminded] the Board that it is the courts, and not the Board, who bear the final responsibility for interpreting the law.” Id., at 1260. After concluding that the Board’s test was inconsistent with the statute, the court found that the four licensed practical nurses involved in this case were supervisors. Id., at 1260-1261. We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 810 (1993), to resolve the conflict in the Courts of Appeals over the validity of the Board’s rule. See, e. g., Waverly-Cedar Falls Health Care Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 933 F. 2d 626 (CA8 1991); NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F. 2d 1461 (CA7 1983); Misericordia Hospital Medical Center v. NLRB, 623 F. 2d 808 (CA2 1980). II We must decide whether the Board’s test for determining if nurses are supervisors is rational and consistent with the Act. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U. S. 27, 42 (1987). We agree with the Court of Appeals that it is not. A The Board’s interpretation, that a nurse’s supervisory activity is not exercised in the interest of the employer if it is incidental to the treatment of patients, is similar to an approach the Board took, and we rejected, in NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U. S. 672 (1980). There, we had to determine whether faculty members at Yeshiva were “managerial employees.” Managerial employees are those who “formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer.” NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 288 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted). Like supervisory employees, managerial employees are excluded from the Act’s coverage. Id., at 283 (“so clearly outside the Act that no specific exclusionary provision was thought necessary”). The Board in Yeshiva argued that the faculty members were not managerial, contending that faculty authority was “exercised in the faculty’s own interest rather than in the interest of the university.” 444 U. S., at 685. To support its position, the Board placed much reliance on the faculty members’ independent professional role in designing the curriculum and in discharging their professional obligations to the students. We found the Board’s reasoning unpersuasive: “In arguing that a faculty member exercising independent judgment acts primarily in his own interest and therefore does not represent the interest of his employer, the Board assumes that the professional interests of the faculty and the interests of the institution are distinct, separable entities with which a faculty member could not simultaneously be aligned. The Court of Appeals found no justification for this distinction, and we perceive none. In fact, the faculty’s professional interests — as applied to governance at a university like Yeshiva — cannot be separated from those of the institution. “... The ‘business’ of a university is education.” Id., at 688. The Board’s reasoning fares no better here than it did in Yeshiva. As in Yeshiva, the Board has created a false dichotomy — in this case, a dichotomy between acts taken in connection with patient care and acts taken in the interest of the employer. That dichotomy makes no sense. Patient care is the business of a nursing home, and it follows that attending to the needs of the nursing home patients, who are the employer’s customers, is in the interest of the employer. See Beverly California, supra, at 1553. We thus see no basis for the Board’s blanket assertion that supervisory authority exercised in connection with patient care is somehow not in the interest of the employer. Our conclusion is supported by the case that gave impetus to the statutory provision now before us. In Packard Motor, we considered the phrase “in the interest of an employer” contained in the definition of “employer” in the original 1935 Act. We stated that “[e]very employee, from the very fact of employment in the master’s business, is required to act in his interest.” 330 U. S., at 488. We rejected the argument of the dissenters who, like the Board in this case, advanced the proposition that the phrase covered only “those who acted for management... in formulating [and] executing its labor policies.” Id., at 496 (Douglas, J., dissenting); cf. Reply Brief for Petitioner 4 (filed July 23, 1993) (nurses are supervisors when, “in addition to performing their professional duties and responsibilities, they also possess the authority to affect the job status or pay of employees working under them”). Consistent with the ordinary meaning of the phrase, the Court in Packard Motor determined that acts within the scope of employment or on the authorized business of the employer are “in the interest of the employer.” 330 U. S., at 488-489. There is no indication that Congress intended any different meaning when it included the phrase in the statutory definition of supervisor later in 1947. To be sure, Congress altered the result of Packard Motor, but it did not change the meaning of the phrase “in the interest of the employer” when doing so. And we of course have rejected the argument that a statute altering the result reached by a judicial decision necessarily changes the meaning of the language interpreted in that decision. See Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U. S. 158, 168 (1989). Not only is the Board’s test inconsistent with Yeshiva, Packard Motor, and the ordinary meaning of the phrase “in the interest of the employer,” it also renders portions of the statutory definition in §2(11) meaningless. Under §2(11), an employee who in the course of employment uses independent judgment to engage in 1 of the 12 listed activities, including responsible direction of other employees, is a supervisor. Under the Board’s test, however, a nurse who in the course of employment uses independent judgment to engage in responsible direction of other employees is not a supervisor. Only a nurse who in the course of employment uses independent judgment to engage in one of the activities related to another employee’s job status or pay can qualify as a supervisor under the Board’s test. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 4 (filed July 23, 1993) (nurses are supervisors when they affect “job status or pay of employees working under them”). The Board provides no plausible justification, however, for reading the responsible direction portion of §2(11) out of the statute in nurse cases, and we can perceive none. The Board defends its test by arguing that phrases in § 2(11) such as “independent judgment” and “responsibly to direct” are ambiguous, so the Board needs to be given ample room to apply them to different categories of employees. That is no doubt true, but it is irrelevant in this particular case because interpretation of those phrases is not the underpinning of the Board’s test. The Board instead has placed exclusive reliance on the “in the interest of the employer” language in §2(11). With respect to that particular phrase, we find no ambiguity supporting the Board’s position. It should go without saying, moreover, that ambiguity in one portion of a statute does not give the Board license to distort other provisions of the statute. Yet that is what the Board seeks us to sanction in this case. The interpretation of the “in the interest of the employer” language mandated by our precedents and by the ordinary meaning of the phrase does not render the phrase meaningless in the statutory definition. The language ensures, for example, that union stewards who adjust grievances are not considered supervisory employees and deprived of the Act’s protections. But the language cannot support the Board’s argument that supervision of the care of patients is not in the interest of the employer. The welfare of the patient, after all, is no less the object and concern of the employer than it is of the nurses. And the statutory dichotomy the Board has created is no more justified in the health care field than it would be in any other business where supervisory duties are a necessary incident to the production of goods or the provision of services. B Because the Board’s test is inconsistent with both the statutory language and this Court’s precedents, the Board seeks to shift ground, putting forth a series of nonstatutory arguments. None of them persuades us that we can ignore the statutory language and our case law. The Board first contends that we should defer to its test because, according to the Board, granting organizational rights to nurses whose supervisory authority concerns patient care does not threaten the conflicting loyalties that the supervisor exception was designed to avoid. Brief for Petitioner 25. We rejected the same argument in Yeshiva where the Board contended that there was “no danger of divided loyalty and no need for the managerial exclusion” for the Yeshiva faculty members. 444 U. S., at 684. And we must reject that reasoning again here. The Act is to be enforced according to its own terms, not by creating legal categories inconsistent with its meaning, as the Board has done in nurse cases. Whether the Board proceeds through adjudication or rulemaking, the statute must control the Board’s decision, not the other way around. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U. S. 790, 811 (1974); cf. Packard Motor, supra, at 493 (rejecting resort to policy and legislative history in interpreting meaning of the phrase “in the interest of the employer”). Even on the assumption, moreover, that the statute permits consideration of the potential for divided loyalties so that a unique interpretation is permitted in the health care field, we do not share the Board’s confidence that there is no danger of divided loyalty here. Nursing home owners may want to implement policies to ensure that patients receive the best possible care despite potential adverse reaction from employees working under the nurses’ direction. If so, the statute gives nursing home owners the ability to insist on the undivided loyalty of its nurses notwithstanding the Board’s impression that there is no danger of divided loyalty. The Board also argues that “[t]he statutory criterion of having authority ‘in the interest of the employer’ . . . must not be read so broadly that it overrides Congress’s intention to accord the protections of the Act to professional employees.” Brief for Petitioner 26; see 29 U. S. C. § 152(12). The Act does not distinguish professional employees from other employees for purposes of the definition of supervisor in § 2(11). The supervisor exclusion applies to “any individual” meeting the statutory requirements, not to “any nonprofessional employee.” In addition, the Board relied on the same argument in Yeshiva, but to no avail. The Board argued that “the managerial exclusion cannot be applied in a straightforward fashion to professional employees because those employees often appear to be exercising managerial authority when they are merely performing routine job duties.” 444 U. S., at 683-684. Holding to the contrary, we said that the Board could not support a statutory distinction between the university’s interest and the managerial interest being exercised on its behalf. There is no reason for a different result here. To be sure, as recognized in Yeshiva, there may be “some tension between the Act’s exclusion of [supervisory and] managerial employees and its inclusion of professionals,” but we find no authority for “suggesting that that tension can be resolved” by distorting the statutory language in the manner proposed by the Board. Id., at 686. Finally, as a reason for us to defer to its conclusion, the Board cites legislative history of the 1974 amendments to other sections of the Act. Those amendments did not alter the test for supervisory status in the health care field, yet the Board points to a statement in a Committee Report expressing apparent approval of the Board’s then-current application of its supervisory employee test to nurses. S. Rep. No. 93-766, p. 6 (1974); see Yeshiva, supra, at 690, n. 30. As an initial matter, it is far from clear that the Board in fact had a consistent test for nurses before 1974. Compare Avon Convalescent Center, Inc., 200 N. L. R. B. 702 (1972), with Doctors' Hospital of Modesto, Inc., 183 N. L. R. B. 950 (1970). In any event, the isolated statement in the 1974 Committee Report does not represent an authoritative interpretation of the phrase “in the interest of the employer,” which was enacted by Congress in 1947. “[I]t is the function of the courts and not the Legislature, much less a Committee of one House of the Legislature, to say what an enacted statute means.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 566 (1988). Indeed, in American Hospital Assn. v. NLRB, 499 U. S. 606 (1991), the petitioner pointed to isolated statements from the same 1974 Senate Report cited here and argued that they revealed Congress’ intent with respect to a provision of the original 1935 Act. We dismissed the argument, stating that such statements do not have “the force of law, for the Constitution is quite explicit about the procedure that Congress must follow in legislating.” Id., at 616; see also Betts, 492 U. S., at 168. In this case as well, we must reject the Board’s reliance on the 1974 Committee Report. If Congress wishes to enact the policies of the Board, it can do so without indirection. See generally Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., ante, at 185-188. Ill An examination of the professional’s duties (or in this case the duties of the four nonprofessional nurses) to determine whether 1 or more of the 12 listed activities is performed in a manner that makes the employee a supervisor is, of course, part of the Board’s routine and proper adjudicative function. In cases involving nurses, that inquiry no doubt could lead the Board in some cases to conclude that supervisory status has not been demonstrated. The Board has not sought to sustain its decision on that basis here, however. It has chosen instead to rely on an industrywide interpretation of the phrase “in the interest of the employer” that contravenes precedents of this Court and has no relation to the ordinary meaning of that language. To be sure, in applying §2(11) in other industries, the Board on occasion reaches results reflecting a distinction between authority arising from professional knowledge and authority encompassing front-line management prerogatives. It is important to emphasize, however, that in almost all of those cases (unlike in cases involving nurses) the Board’s decisions did not result from manipulation of the statutory phrase “in the interest of the employer,” but instead from a finding that the employee in question had not met the other requirements for supervisory status under the Act, such as the requirement that the employee exercise one of the listed activities in a nonroutine manner. See supra, at 573 (listing other requirements for supervisory status). That may explain why the Board did not cite in its submissions to this Court a single case outside the health care field approving the interpretation of “in the interest of the employer” the Board uses in nurse cases. That the Board sometimes finds a professional employee not to be a supervisor when applying other elements of the statutory definition of §2(11) cannot be shoehorned into the conclusion that the Board can rely on its strained interpretation of the phrase “in the interest of the employer” in all nurse cases. If we accepted the Board’s position in this case, moreover, nothing would prevent the Board from applying this interpretation of “in the interest of the employer” to all professional employees. We note further that our decision casts no doubt on Board or court decisions interpreting parts of §2(11) other than the specific phrase “in the interest of the employer.” Because the Board’s interpretation of “in the interest of the employer” is for the most part confined to nurse cases, our decision will have almost no effect outside that context. Any' parade of horribles about the meaning of this decision for employees in other industries is thus quite misplaced; indeed, the Board does not make that argument. In sum, the Board’s test for determining the supervisory status of nurses is inconsistent with the statute and our precedents. The Board did not petition this Court to uphold its order in this case under any other theory. See Brief for Respondent 21, n. 25. If the case presented the question whether these nurses were supervisors under the proper test, we would have given a lengthy exposition and analysis of the facts in the record. But as we have indicated, the Board made and defended its decision by relying on the particular test it has applied to nurses. Our conclusion that the Court of Appeals was correct to find the Board’s test inconsistent with the statute therefore suffices to resolve the case. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION et al. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM et al. No. 82-1766. Argued March 21, 1984 Decided June 28, 1984 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 160. Harvey L. Pitt argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs for petitioner A. G. Becker Incorporated were Henry A. Hubschman, David M. Miles, and Laurence H. Tribe. James B. Weidner, John M. Liftin, William J. Fitzpatrick, and Donald J. Crawford filed briefs for petitioner Securities Industry Association. Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Barbara E. Etkind, and Anthony J. Steinmeyer Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Goldman, Sachs & Co. by G. Duane Vieth, Leonard H. Becker, and Joseph McLaughlin; and for the Investment Company Institute by Louis Loss and Thomas D. Maher. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Bankers Trust Co. by John W. Bamum and Jennifer A. Sullivan; and for the New York Clearing House Association et al. by Robert S. Rifkind, William H. Smith, and Michael F. Crotty. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves a challenge to the efforts of a state commercial bank to enter the business of selling third-party commercial paper. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) concluded that such activity by state member banks is not prohibited by the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act) because commercial paper is neither a “security” nor a “note” within the meaning of that Act and therefore falls outside the Act’s proscriptions. The District Court disagreed with the Board, but the Court of Appeals deferred to the Board’s interpretation and reversed the judgment of the District Court. Because commercial paper falls within the plain language of the Act, and because the inclusion of commercial paper within the terms of the Act is fully consistent with the Act’s purposes, we conclude that commercial paper is a “security” under the Glass-Steagall Act, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. hH During 1978 Bankers Trust Company (Bankers Trust), a New York-chartered member bank of the Federal Reserve System, began serving as agent for several of its corporate customers in placing their commercial paper in the commercial-paper market. Petitioners, the Securities Industry Association (SIA), a national securities-industry trade association, and A. G. Becker Inc. (Becker), a dealer in commercial paper, informally expressed concern to the Board about Bankers Trust’s commercial-paper activities. SIA and Becker subsequently petitioned the Board for, among other things, a ruling that Bankers Trust’s activities are unlawful under §§16 and 21 of the Act, 12 U. S. C. §§24 Seventh and 378(a)(1). Section 16 prohibits commercial banks from underwriting “securities or stock,” while §21 prohibits them from marketing “stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities.” Petitioners asserted that Bankers Trust’s activities violated both § 16 and § 21. On September 26, 1980, the Board responded to petitioners’ request for enforcement of §§ 16 and 21 against Bankers Trust. See Federal Reserve System, Statement Regarding Petitions to Initiate Enforcement Action (1980), App. 122A (Board Statement). The Board acknowledged that Congress enacted the Act to prevent commercial banks from engaging in certain investment-banking activities, but explained that Congress did not intend the Act’s prohibitions to cover every instrument that could be characterized as a “note” or “security.” The Board expressed concern that such a broad interpretation might preclude commercial banks from maintaining many of their traditional activities. Accordingly, the Board took the position that “if a particular kind of financial instrument evidences a transaction that is more functionally similar to a traditional commercial banking operation than to an investment transaction, then fidelity to the purposes of the Act would dictate that the instrument should not be viewed as a security.” Id., at 135A. Applying this “functional analysis” to commercial paper, the Board concluded that such paper more closely resembles a commercial bank loan than an investment transaction and that it is not a “security” for purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act. Because of this determination, the Board did not consider whether Bankers Trust’s involvement with commercial paper constitutes “underwriting,” within the meaning of the Act. Petitioners challenged the Board’s ruling in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under, inter alia, the judicial-review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §701 et seq., claiming that the ruling was contrary to law. The District Court reversed the ruling, finding that commercial paper falls within the scope of §21’s reference to “notes ... or other securities.” A. G. Becker Inc. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 519 F. Supp. 602, 612 (1981). The court also found error in the Board’s “functional analysis” because it focused exclusively on the role that commercial paper plays in the financial affairs of the issuer. This approach ignored the commercial bank’s role in the transaction, which the District Court concluded is a central concern of the Act. Id., at 615-616. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, by a divided vote, reversed the judgment of the District Court. A. G. Becker Inc. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 224 U. S. App. D. C. 21, 693 F. 2d 136 (1982). The Court of Appeals’ majority acknowledged that § 21’s reference to “notes” was broad enough to include commercial paper, which is a promissory note. The court explained, however, that the term “note” was also susceptible of a narrower reading, limited to long-term debt securities closely resembling a bond or debenture but of shorter maturity. Id., at 28-29, 693 F. 2d, at 143-144. Because the legislative history of the Act indicates that the 1933 Congress sought to encourage commercial banks to invest more heavily in commercial paper than in longer-term, more speculative securities, the court concluded that Congress used the term “notes” in §21 in this narrower sense. Id., at 29-31, 693 F. 2d, at 144-146. Finally, the court endorsed the Board’s functional analysis of commercial paper and concluded that commercial paper more closely resembled a loan than a security because of its low default rate, the large denominations in which it is issued, and the sophistication of its buyers. In the Court of Appeals’ view, these features of commercial paper eliminate the concerns that moved Congress to pass the Glass-Steagall Act. Id., at 32-36, 693 F. 2d, at 147-151. Because of the importance of the issue for the Nation’s financial markets, we granted certiorari. 464 U. S. 812 (1983). II The Board is the agency responsible for federal regulation of the national banking system, and its interpretation of a federal banking statute is entitled to substantial deference. As the Court states elsewhere today, “the Board has primary responsibility for implementing the Glass-Steagall Act, and we accord substantial deference to the Board’s interpretation of that Act whenever its interpretation provides a reasonable construction of the statutory language and is consistent with legislative intent.” No. 83-614, Securities Industry Assn. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, post, at 217. We also have made clear, however, that deference is not to be a device that emasculates the significance of judicial review. Judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute “only sets ‘the framework for judicial analysis; it does not displace it.’” United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U. S. 16, 24 (1982), quoting United States v. Cartwright, 411 U. S. 546, 550 (1973). A reviewing court “must reject administrative constructions of [a] statute, whether reached by adjudication or by rulemaking, that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement.” FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U. S. 27, 32 (1981). Although these principles establish in general terms the appropriate standard of review, this case presents an additional consideration that counsels against full deference to the Board. At the administrative level, the Board took the position that commercial paper was not a “security” within the meaning of the Act, and that, therefore, it did “not appear necessary to examine the dangers that the Act was intended to eliminate.” Board Statement, App. 140A. Before this Court, however, the Board appears to have changed somewhat the nature of its argument. The Board’s counsel now insists that the activities of Bankers Trust “involv[e] none of the ‘hazards’ that this Court identified” as the concerns at which the Act is aimed. Brief for Respondents 40. We previously have stated that post hoc rationalizations by counsel for agency action are entitled to little deference: “It is the administrative official and not appellate counsel who possesses the expertise that can enlighten and rationalize the search for the meaning and intent of Congress.” Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617, 628 (1971); see also Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168-169 (1962). As a result, the Board’s presentation here of the policies behind the Act as they apply to this case is of less significance than it would be if it had occurred at the administrative level. Because of this apparent shift, moreover, the contours of the Board’s present position are somewhat unclear; much of the Board’s argument now addresses the particular characteristics of the commercial paper in this case, apparently leaving open the possibility that commercial paper with different characteristics would qualify as a “security” and be subject to the Glass-Steagall Act’s proscriptions. See Brief for Respondents 33-44. To the extent that the Board has changed its position from that adopted at the administrative level, its interpretation is entitled to less weight. Ill A In Camp this Court explored at some length the congressional concerns that produced the Glass-Steagall Act. Congress passed the Act in the aftermath of the banking collapse that produced the Great Depression of the 1930’s. The Act responded to the opinion, widely expressed at the time, that much of the financial difficulty experienced by banks could be traced to their involvement in investment-banking activities both directly and through security affiliates. At the very least, Congress held the view that the extensive involvement by commercial banks had been unwise; some in Congress concluded that it had been illegal. Senator Glass stated bluntly that commercial-bank involvement in securities had made “one of the greatest contributions to the unprecedented disaster which has caused this almost incurable depression.” 75 Cong. Rec. 9887 (1932). Congressional worries about commercial-bank involvement in investment-bank activities reflected two general concerns. The first was the inherent risks of the securities business. Speculation in securities by banks and their affiliates during the speculative fever of the 1920’s produced tremendous bank losses when the securities markets went sour. In addition to the palpable effect that such losses had on the assets of affected banks, they also eroded the confidence of depositors in the safety of banks as depository institutions. This crisis of confidence contributed to the runs on the banks that proved so devastating to the solvency of many commercial banks. But the dangers that Congress sought to eliminate through the Act were considerably more than the obvious risk that a bank could lose money by imprudent investment of its funds in speculative securities. The legislative history of the Act shows that Congress also focused on “the more subtle hazards that arise when a commercial bank goes beyond the business of acting as fiduciary or managing agent and enters the investment banking business.” Camp, 401 U. S., at 630. The Glass-Steagall Act reflects the 1933 Congress’ conclusion that certain investment-banking activities conflicted in fundamental ways with the institutional role of commercial banks. The Act’s legislative history is replete with references to the various conflicts of interest that Congress feared to be present when a single institution is involved in both investment and commercial banking. Congress observed that commercial bankers serve as an important source of financial advice for their clients. They routinely advise clients on a variety of financial matters such as whether and how best to issue equity or debt securities. Congress concluded that it was unrealistic to expect a banker to give impartial advice about such matters if he stands to realize a profit from the underwriting or distribution of securities. See, e. g., 75 Cong. Rec. 9912 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley). Some legislators noted that this conflict is exacerbated by the considerable fixed cost that a securities dealer must incur to build and maintain a securities-distribution system. Explaining this concern, Senator Bulkley, a major sponsor of the Act, described the pressures that commercial banks had experienced through their involvement in the distribution of securities: “In order to be efficient a securities department had to be developed; it had to have salesmen; and it had to have correspondent connections with smaller banks throughout the territory tributary to the great bank. Organizations were developed with enthusiasm and with efficiency. . . . But the sales departments were subject to fixed expenses which could not be reduced without the danger of so disrupting the organization as to put the institution at a disadvantage in competition with rival institutions. These expenses would turn the operation very quickly from a profit to a loss if there were not sufficient originations and underwritings to keep the sales departments busy.” Id., at 9911. Congress also expressed concern that the involvement of a commercial bank in particular securities could compromise the objectivity of the bank’s lending operations. Congress feared that the pressure to dispose of an issue of securities successfully might lead a bank to use its credit facilities to shore up a company whose securities the bank sought to distribute. See 1931 Hearings, pt. 7, p. 1064. Some in Congress feared that a bank might even make unsound loans to companies in whose securities the bank has a stake or to a purchaser of securities that the bank seeks to distribute. Ibid. Alternatively, a bank with loans outstanding to a company might encourage the company to issue securities through the bank’s distribution system in order to obtain the funds needed to repay bank loans. 75 Cong. Rec. 9912 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley). Congress also faced some evidence that banks had misused their trust departments to unload excessive holdings of undesirable securities. Camp, 401 U. S., at 633; 1931 Hearings, pt. 1, p. 237. The Act’s design reflects the congressional perception that certain investment-banking activities are fundamentally incompatible with commercial banking. After hearing much testimony concerning the appropriate form of a legislative response to the problems, Congress rejected the view of those who preferred legislation that simply would regulate the underwriting activities of commercial banks. Congress chose instead a broad structural approach that would “surround the banking business with sound rules which recognize the imperfection of human nature that our bankers may not be led into temptation, the evil effect of which is sometimes so subtle as not to be easily recognized by the most honorable man.” 75 Cong. Rec. 9912 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley). Through flat prohibitions, the Act sought to “separate] as completely as possible commercial from investment banking.” Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System v. Investment Company Institute, 450 U. S. 46, 70 (1981) (ICI). Such an approach was not without costs in terms of efficiency and competition, but the Act reflects the view that the subtle risks created by mixing the two activities justified a strong prophylaxis. Camp, 401 U. S., at 630. B Sections 16 and 21 of the Act are the principal provisions that demarcate the line separating commercial and investment banking. Section 16 limits the involvement of a commercial bank in the “business of dealing in stock and securities” and prohibits a national bank from buying securities, other than “investment securities,” for its own account. 12 U. S. C. §24 Seventh. In addition, the section includes the general provision that a national bank “shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock.” Section 5(c) of the Act, 12 U. S. C. §335, makes §16’s limitations applicable to state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System. It is therefore clear that Bankers Trust may not underwrite commercial paper if commercial paper is a “security” within the meaning of the Act. Section 21 also separates investment and commercial banks, but does so from the perspective of investment banks. Congress designed § 21 to prevent persons engaged in specified investment-banking activities from entering the commercial-banking business. The section prohibits any person “engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing . . . stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities” from receiving deposits. Bankers Trust receives deposits, and it therefore is clear that § 21’s prohibitions apply to it. Because § 16 and § 21 seek to draw the same line, the parties agree that the underwriting prohibitions described in the two sections are coextensive, and we shall assume that to be the case. In any event, because both § 16 and § 21 apply to Bankers Trust, its activities in this case are unlawful if prohibited by either section. The language of §21 is perhaps the more helpful, however, because that section describes in greater detail the particular activities of investment banking that Congress found inconsistent with the activity of commercial banks. It is common ground that the terms “stocks,” “bonds,” and “debentures” do not encompass commercial paper. The dispute in this case focuses instead on petitioners’ claims that commercial paper constitutes a “note” within the meaning of § 21, and, if not, that it is nevertheless encompassed within the inclusive term “other securities.” Thus, petitioners claim that the plain language of the Act makes untenable the Board’s conclusion that commercial paper is not a “security” within the meaning of the Act. Petitioners contend further that the role played by Bankers Trust in placing the commercial paper of third parties is precisely what the Glass-Steagall Act sought to prohibit. C Neither the term “notes” nor the term “other securities” is defined by the statute. “This silence compels us to 'start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.’” Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 21 (1983), quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962). Respondents do not dispute that commercial paper consists of unsecured promissory notes and falls within the general meaning of the term “notes.” See Board Statement, App. 131A; see also Brief for Respondents 2. Respondents assert, however, that the context in which the term is used suggests that Congress intended a narrower definition. Because the term appears in a phrase that includes “stocks, bonds, [and] debentures,” the Board insists that the Act’s prohibitions apply only to “notes [and] other securities” that resemble the enumerated financial instruments. The Board’s position seems to be that because “stocks, bonds, [and] debentures” normally are considered “investments,” the Act is meant to prohibit the underwriting of only those notes that “shar[e] that characteristic of an investment that is the common feature of each of the other enumerated instruments.” Brief for Respondents 23. Applying that criterion to commercial paper, the Board maintains that commercial paper more closely resembles a commercial loan and that it is therefore not an investment of the kind that qualifies as a “security” under the Act. For a variety of reasons, we find unpersuasive the notion that Congress used the terms “notes ... or other securities” in the narrow sense that respondents suggest. First, the Court noted in Camp that “there is nothing in the phrasing of either § 16 or § 21 that suggests a narrow reading of the word ‘securities.’ To the contrary, the breadth of the term is implicit in the fact that the antecedent statutory language encompasses not only equity securities but also securities representing debt.” 401 U. S., at 635. There is, moreover, considerable evidence to indicate that the ordinary meaning of the terms “security” and “note” as used by the 1933 Congress encompasses commercial paper. Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall Act as one of several pieces of legislation collectively designed to restore public confidence in financial markets. See the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U. S. C.); the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U. S. C. §77a et seq.; the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U. S. C. §78a et seq.; and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803, 15 U. S. C. §79a et seq. In each of these other statutes, the definition of the term “security” includes commercial paper, and each statute contains explicit exceptions where Congress meant for the provisions of an Act not to apply to commercial paper. These explicit exceptions demonstrate congressional cognizance of commercial paper and Congress’ understanding that, unless modified, the use of the term “security” encompasses it. The Securities Act of 1933, for example, defines the term “security” to include “any note.” 15 U. S. C. §77b(1). During the hearings on that Act, Senator Glass expressed dissatisfaction with that definition because it plainly did encompass commercial paper. With the support of the Board, he sought to amend the definition of the term to exclude commercial paper, but Congress chose instead to exempt commercial paper from only the registration requirements of the statute, see 15 U. S. C. §77c(a)(3), while preserving application of the statute’s antifraud provisions to all commercial-paper “securities.” §§77i, 77q(c). Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act two weeks later, and throughout consideration of that Act by the same Committees of the same Congress, the eponymous Senator Glass displayed no similar concern over the ordinary meaning of the broad phrase “notes ... or other securities” in §21. The difficulty with the Board’s attempt to narrow the ordinary meaning of the statutory language is evidenced by the Board’s unsuccessful efforts to articulate a meaningful distinction between notes that the Act purportedly covers and those it does not. In other statutes in which commercial paper is exempted from securities regulation, Congress either has identified a particular feature, such as maturity period, that defines the exempted class of “notes,” or it has authorized a federal agency to define it through regulation. See n. 7, supra. The Glass-Steagall Act does neither, and the efforts by the Board and the Court of Appeals to provide a workable definition that excludes commercial paper have been fraught with uncertainty and inconsistency. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Act applies only to notes that are issued “to raise money available for an extended period of time as part of the corporation’s capital structure.” 693 F. 2d, at 143. It is not clear that such a distinction finds support even with reference to the statutory language from which it purportedly derives. There is no requirement, for example, that stocks, bonds, and debentures be used only to meet the capital requirements of a corporation, and, even if there were, the legislative history provides little evidence to suggest that such a distinction was one that Congress found significant. The Board, in contrast, seems to have concluded that a note is covered by the Act only if the note is properly viewed as an “investment.” The Board contends that this approach requires it to consider a “cluster” of the note’s features, see Brief for Respondents 34, n. 60, such as its maturity period, its risk features, and its prospective purchasers. Stocks, bonds, and debentures display a wide range of each of these characteristics, however, and the Act’s underwriting prohibition does not demonstrate any sensitivity to the characteristics of a particular issue; the Act simply prohibits commercial banks from underwriting them all. Without some clearer directive from Congress that it intended the statutory terms to involve the nebulous inquiry described by the Board, we cannot endorse the Board’s departure from the literal meaning of the Act. The Court, in another context, has said pertinently: “Had Congress intended so fundamental a distinction, it would have expressed that intent clearly in the statutory language or the legislative history. It did not do so, however, and it is not this Court’s function ‘to sit as a super-legislature,’ Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482 (1965), and create statutory distinctions where none were intended.” American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 72, n. 6 (1982). In this respect, we find ourselves in substantial agreement with petitioners’ suggestion that the Board’s interpretation effectively converts a portion of the Act’s broad prohibition into a system of administrative regulation. By concluding that commercial paper is not covered by the Act, the Board in effect has obtained authority to regulate the marketing of commercial paper under its general supervisory power over member banks. The Board acknowledges that “the sale of third party commercial paper by a commercial bank could involve, at least in some circumstances, practices that are not consistent with principles of safe banking.” Board Statement, App. 141A. In response to these concerns, the Board issued guidelines for state member banks explaining the circumstances in which they properly may place the commercial paper of third parties. See n. 2, supra. Although the guidelines may be a sufficient regulatory response to the potential problems, Congress rejected a regulatory approach when it drafted the statute, and it has adhered to that rejection ever since. In 1935, for example, Congress refused to amend the Act to permit “national banks under regulations by the Comptroller of the Currency ... to underwrite and sell bonds, debentures, and notes.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1822, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 53 (1935). As recently as 1980, Congress extended to the Comptroller of the Currency authority to issue such rules as were needed to “carry out the responsibilities of the office,” but expressly continued to withhold from the Comptroller the authority to issue regulations concerning “securities activities of National Banks under the Act commonly known as the ‘Glass-Steagall Act.’ ” Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, § 708, 94 Stat. 188, 12 U. S. C. § 93a. When Congress has concluded that a particular form of notes should not be covered by the Act’s prohibitions, it has amended the statute accordingly. See Banking Act of 1935, § 303(a), 49 Stat. 707, 12 U. S. C. § 378(a)(1) (exempting mortgage notes from the coverage of § 21). In the face of Congress’ refusal to give the Board any rulemaking authority over the activities prohibited by the Act, we find it difficult to imagine that Congress intended the Board to engage in the subtle and ad hoc “functional analysis” described by the Board. D By focusing entirely on the nature of the financial instrument and ignoring the role of the bank in the transaction, moreover, the Board’s “functional analysis” misapprehends Congress’ concerns with commercial bank involvement in marketing securities. Both the Board and the Court of Appeals emphasized that Congress designed the Act to prevent future bank losses arising out of investments in speculative, long-term investments. This description of the Act’s underlying concerns is perhaps accurate but somewhat incomplete. “[I]n enacting the Glass-Steagall Act, Congress contemplated other hazards in addition to the danger of banks using bank assets in imprudent securities investments.” ICI, 450 U. S., at 66. The concern about commercial-bank underwriting activities derived from the perception that the role of a bank as a promoter of securities was fundamentally incompatible with its role as a disinterested lender and adviser. This Court explained in Camp: “In sum, Congress acted to keep commercial banks out of the investment banking business largely because it believed that the promotional incentives of investment banking and the investment banker’s pecuniary stake in the success of particular investment opportunities was destructive of prudent and disinterested commercial banking and of public confidence in the commercial banking system.” 401 U. S., at 634. At the administrative level, the Board expressly chose not to consider whether these concerns are present when a commercial bank has a pecuniary interest in promoting commercial paper. Board Statement, App. 140A. Although the Board indicates before this Court that such activities do not implicate the concerns of the Act, we are unpersuaded by this belated assertion. In adopting the Act, for example, Congress concluded that a bank’s “salesman’s interest” in an offering “might impair its ability to function as an impartial source of credit.” Camp, 401 U. S., at 631. In the commercial-paper market, where the distribution of an issue depends heavily on the creditworthiness of the issuer, a bank presumably can enhance the marketability of an issue by extending backup credit to the issuer. Similarly, as a commercial bank finds itself in direct competition with other commercial-paper dealers, it may feel pressure to purchase unsold notes in order to demonstrate the reliability of its distribution system, even if the paper does not meet the bank’s normal credit standards. Recognizing these pressures, this Court stated in Camp: “When a bank puts itself in competition with [securities dealers], the bank must make an accommodation to the kind of ground rules that Congress firmly concluded could not be prudently mixed with the business of commercial banking.” Id., at 637. The 1933 Congress also was concerned that banks might use their relationships with depositors to facilitate the distribution of securities in which the bank has an interest, and that the bank’s depositors might lose confidence in the bank if the issuer should default on its obligations. See id., at 631; 1931 Hearings, pt. 7, p. 1064. This concern would appear fully applicable to commercial-paper sales, because banks presumably will use their depositor lists as a prime source of customers for such sales. To the extent that a bank sells commercial paper to large bank depositors, the result of a loss of confidence in the bank would be especially severe. By giving banks a pecuniary incentive in the marketing of a particular security, commercial-bank dealing in commercial paper also seems to produce precisely the conflict of interest that Congress feared would impair a commercial bank’s ability to act as a source of disinterested financial advice. Senator Bulkley, during the debates on the Act, explained: “Obviously, the banker who has nothing to sell to his depositors is much better qualified to advise disinterestedly and to regard diligently the safety of depositors than the banker who uses the list of depositors in his savings department to distribute circulars concerning the advantages of this, that, or the other investment on which the bank is to receive an originating profit or an underwriting profit or a distribution profit or a trading profit or any combination of such profits.” 75 Cong. Ree. 9912 (1932). This conflict of interest becomes especially acute if a bank decides to distribute commercial paper on behalf of an issuer who intends to use the proceeds of the offering to retire a debt that the issuer owes the bank. In addressing these concerns before this Court, the Board focuses primarily on the extremely low rate of default on prime-quality commercial paper. We do not doubt that the risk of default with commercial paper is relatively low — lower perhaps than with many bank loans. For several reasons, however, we find reliance on this characteristic misplaced. First, it is not clear that the Board’s exemption of commercial paper from the proscriptions of the Act is limited to commercial paper that is “prime.” The statutory language admits of no distinction in this respect, and the logic of the Board’s opinion must exempt all commercial paper from the prohibition on underwriting by commercial banks. Second, as described above, it appears that a bank can make a particular issue “prime” simply by extending backup credit to the issuer. Such a practice would seem to fit squarely within Congress’ concern that banks would use their credit facilities to aid in the distribution of securities. More importantly, however, there is little evidence to suggest that Congress intended the Act’s prohibitions on underwriting to depend on the safety of particular securities. Stocks, bonds, and debentures exhibit the full range of risk; some are less risky than many of the loans made by a bank. And while the risk features of a security presumably affect whether it qualifies as an “investment security” that a commercial bank may purchase for its own account, the Act’s underwriting prohibition displays no appreciation for the features of a particular issue; the Act just prohibits commercial banks from underwriting any of them, with an exception for certain enumerated governmental obligations that Congress specifically has chosen to favor. See 12 U. S. C. §24 Seventh. The Act’s prophylactic prohibition on underwriting reflects Congress’ conclusion that the mere existence of a securities operation, “ ‘no matter how carefully and conservatively run, is inconsistent with the best interests’” of the bank as a whole. 75 Cong. Rec. 9913 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley, quoting a statement issued by the Bank of Manhattan Trust Co.). In this regard, the Board’s focus on the fact that commercial banks traditionally have acquired commercial paper for their own accounts is beside the point. It is clearly true, as the Board asserts before this Court, that Congress designed the Glass-Steagall Act to cause banks to invest more of their funds in short-term obligations like commercial paper instead of in longer term and more speculative securities. By so doing, Congress hoped to enhance the liquidity of funds and protect bank solvency. But the authority to discount commercial paper is very different from the authority to underwrite it. The former places banks in their traditional role as a prudent lender. The latter places a commercial bank in the role of an investment banker, which is precisely what Congress sought to prohibit in the Act. See Note, A Conduct-Oriented Approach to the Glass-Steagall Act, 91 Yale L. J. 102 (1981); Comment, 9 J. Corp. L. 321 (1984). The Board also seeks comfort in the fact that commercial paper is sold largely to “sophisticated” investors. Once again, however, the Act leaves little room for such an ad hoc analysis. In its prohibition on commercial-bank underwriting, the Act admits of no exception according to the particular investment expertise of the customer. The Act’s prohibition on underwriting is a flat prohibition that applies to sales to both the knowledgeable and the naive. Congress expressed concern that commercial-bank involvement in securities operations threatened the ability of commercial banks to act as “financial confidant and mentor” for both “the poor widow” and “the great corporation.” 75 Cong. Rec. 9912 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley). Even if purchaser-sophistication is relevant under the Act, moreover, it is not clear that commercial paper is sold only in large denominations, see Hicks, Commercial Paper: An Exempted Security Under Section 3(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933, 24 UCLA L. Rev. 227, 234, and n. 30 (1976), or only to sophisticated investors. See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F. 2d 1064 (CA7 1975), vacated and remanded, 425 U. S. 929 (1976). Finally, it is certainly not without some significance that Bankers Trust’s commercial-paper placement activities appear to be the first of that kind since the passage of the Act. The history of commercial-bank involvement in commercial paper prior to the Act is not well documented; evidently, commercial banks occasionally dealt in commercial paper, but their involvement was overwhelmingly in the role of discounter rather than dealer. See R. Foulke, The Commercial Paper Market 108 (1931); A. Greef, The Commercial Paper House in the United States 63, 403-405 (1938). Since enactment of the Act, however, there is no evidence of commercial-bank participation in the commercial-paper market as a dealer. The Board has not offered any explanation as to why commercial banks in the past have not ventured to test the limits of the Act’s prohibitions on underwriting activities. Although such behavior is far from conclusive, it does support the view that when Congress sought to “separate] as completely as possible commercial from investment banking,” ICI, 450 U. S., at 70, the banks regulated by the Act universally recognized that underwriting commercial paper falls on the investment-banking side of the line. > HH For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. “Commercial paper” refers generally to unsecured, short-term promissory notes issued by commercial entities. Such a note is payable to the bearer on a stated maturity date. Maturities vary considerably, but typically are less than nine months. See generally Hurley, The Commercial Paper Market, 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 525 (1977); Comment, The Commercial Paper Market and the Securities Acts, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 362, 363-364 (1972). Despite this conclusion, the Board responded to concerns that activity similar to that of Bankers Trust might give rise to the problems that the Act sought to avoid, and issued a policy statement with “guidelines” imposing conditions as to when state member banks may sell third-party commercial paper. See 46 Fed. Reg. 29333 (1981). The Board issued these guidelines pursuant to its supervisory authority over state member banks under §§ 9 and 11 of the Federal Reserve Act, 38 Stat. 259 and 261, as amended, 12 U. S. C. §§248, 321-338, and §202 of the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 1046, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1818(b). Several Members of Congress expressed the view that the securities activities of bank affiliates were unlawful because they were not authorized by the federal charters under which national banks operated or by the state charters under which state banks operated. See 75 Cong. Rec. 9887-9888 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Glass); id., at 9911 (remarks of Sen. Bulkley). The failure of the Bank of the United States, for example, was attributed largely to that bank’s activities with respect to its numerous securities affiliates. Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Banking Systems: Hearings pursuant to S. Res. 71 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., pts. 1, 7, pp. 116-117, 1017, 1068 (1931) (1931 Hearings). See 1931 Hearings, pt. 1, pp. 19-22 (testimony of J. Pole, Comptroller of the Currency); id., at 191-192 (testimony of A. Wiggin, chairman, Chase National Bank); id., at 238-241 (testimony of B. Trafford, vice chairman, First National Bank of Boston); id., pt. 2, pp. 301-304, 318 (testimony of C. Mitchell, chairman, National City Bank of New York); id., at 356,364-365 (testimony of 0. Young, chairman, General Electric Co.); id., pt. 3, at 539 (testimony of A. Pope, executive vice president, First National Old Colony COrp.). We recognize, of course, that there are some activities, such as the safekeeping of securities for customers, in which Congress concluded that both commercial and investment banks may safely engage. The Act merely reflects Congress’ view that those investment-banking activities that it determined to be incompatible with prudent commercial banking, such as underwriting securities, created risks that were so subtle as to justify a broad prohibition. See 15 U. S. C. § 77c(a)(3) (exempting certain “note[s]” with maturities of less than nine months from the definition of “security” for certain provisions of the Securities Act of 1933); 15 U. S. C. § 78c(a)(10) (exempting certain “note[s]” with maturities of less than nine months from the definition of “security” under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 15 U. S. C. §79i(e)(3) (exempting “commercial paper and other securities” specified by the Securities and Exchange Commission from the Public Utility Holding Company Act’s restriction prohibiting acquisition by a holding company of “securities”). See Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 98, 120 (1933); see also Federal Securities Act: Hearings on H. R. 4314 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 180-181 (1933). It is significant that the exemption for commercial paper is described using the term “note,” plainly indicating that Congress understood the ordinary meaning of that term to encompass commercial paper. It is clear that Congress’ concern with commercial-bank purchases of securities was different from its concern about commercial-bank involvement in securities underwriting activities. In 1938 Congress refused to report out of committee legislation that would have allowed national banks to “underwrite or participate in the underwriting of new issues of such securities as [they] may otherwise lawfully purchase for its own account.” H. R. 9441, § 1(b), 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). The Board makes an additional argument based on § 16’s restrictions on securities purchases by commercial banks. Section 16 prohibits commercial banks from “dealing in securities” on their own account altogether, and permits them to “purchase for [their] own account” only “investment securities,” The Board argues that commercial paper does not constitute an “investment security” within the meaning of that term in § 16, and hence that § 16 would not permit commercial banks to purchase commercial paper for their own account if commercial paper were classified as a “security.” Because commercial banks traditionally have acquired commercial paper for their own account, and because that practice universally has been assumed not to run afoul of the Glass-Steagall Act, the Board argues that the practice cannot be reconciled with § 16 unless commercial paper is not deemed a “security.” See Brief for Respondents 17-18, 26-30. Even if the Board is correct that commercial paper is not an “investment security” under § 16, something that we need not decide, we find the Board’s argument unpersuasive because it rests on the faulty premise that the process of acquiring commercial paper necessarily constitutes “the business of dealing” in securities. The underlying source of authority for national banks to conduct business is the first sentence of § 16, which originated as § 8 of the National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 101. That provision grants national banks the authority to exercise “all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking” and enumerates five constituent powers that constitute “the business of banking. ” One of those powers is “discounting and negotiating promissory notes.” 12 U. S. C. §24 Seventh. The Board appears to concede that the authority for national banks to acquire commercial paper is grounded in this authorization to discount promissory notes. See Brief for Respondents 18, n. 25. The subsequent prohibition on engaging in “[t]he business of dealing in securities” does not affect this authority; while the Glass-Steagall Act does not define the term “business of dealing” in securities, the term clearly does not include the activity of “discounting” promissory notes because that activity is defined to be a part of the “business of banking.” In short, the fact that commercial banks properly are free to acquire commercial paper for their own account implies not that commercial paper is not a “security,” but simply that the process of extending credit by “discounting” commercial paper is not part of the “business of dealing” in securities. Because of its conclusion that the commercial paper in this case was not a “security” under the Act, the Court of Appeals did not consider whether the activity of Bankers Trust constitutes “underwriting” within the meaning of § 16, or “the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing” within the meaning of § 21. We express no opinion on these matters, leaving them to be decided on remand.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FRANCHISE TAX BOARD OF CALIFORNIA, Petitioner v. Gilbert P. HYATT. No. 14-1175. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Dec. 7, 2015. Decided April 19, 2016. Paul D. Clement, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. H. Bartow Farr, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Scott W. DePeel, Franchise Tax, Board of the State of California, Sacramento, CA, Pat Lundvall, Debbie Leonard, McDonald Carano, Wilson, LLP, Las Vegas, NV, Paul D. Clement, George W. Hicks, Jr., Stephen V. Potenza, Michael D. Lieberman, Bancroft PLLC, Washington, DC, for petitioner. Justice BREYERdelivered the opinion of the Court. In Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 59 L.Ed.2d 416 (1979), this Court held that one State (here, Nevada) can open the doors of its courts to a private citizen's lawsuit against another State (here, California) without the other State's consent. In this case, a private citizen, a resident of Nevada, has brought a suit in Nevada's courts against the Franchise Tax Board of California, an agency of the State of California. The board has asked us to overrule Hall and hold that the Nevada courts lack jurisdiction to hear this lawsuit. The Court is equally divided on this question, and we consequently affirm the Nevada courts' exercise of jurisdiction over California. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 484, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 171 L.Ed.2d 570 (2008)(citing Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107, 112, 19 L.Ed. 154 (1869)). California also asks us to reverse the Nevada court's decision insofar as it awards the private citizen greater damages than Nevada law would permit a private citizen to obtain in a similar suit against Nevada's own agencies. We agree that Nevada's application of its damages law in this case reflects a special, and constitutionally forbidden, " 'policy of hostility to the public Acts' of a sister State," namely, California. U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1(Full Faith and Credit Clause); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 499, 123 S.Ct. 1683, 155 L.Ed.2d 702 (2003)(quoting Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413, 75 S.Ct. 804, 99 L.Ed. 1183 (1955)). We set aside the Nevada Supreme Court's decision accordingly. I Gilbert P. Hyatt, the respondent here, moved from California to Nevada in the early 1990's. He says that he moved to Nevada in September 1991. California's Franchise Tax Board, however, after an investigation and tax audit, claimed that Hyatt moved to Nevada later, in April 1992, and that he consequently owed California more than $10 million in taxes, associated penalties, and interest. Hyatt filed this lawsuit in Nevada state court against California's Franchise Tax Board, a California state agency. Hyatt sought damages for what he considered the board's abusive audit and investigation practices, including rifling through his private mail, combing through his garbage, and examining private activities at his place of worship. See App. 213-245, 267-268. California recognized that, under Hall, the Constitution permits Nevada's courts to assert jurisdiction over California despite California's lack of consent. California nonetheless asked the Nevada courts to dismiss the case on other constitutional grounds. California law, it pointed out, provided state agencies with immunity from lawsuits based upon actions taken during the course of collecting taxes. Cal. Govt.Code Ann. § 860.2 (West 1995); see also § 860.2 (West 2012). It argued that the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause required Nevada to apply California's sovereign immunity law to Hyatt's case. Nevada's Supreme Court, however, rejected California's claim. It held that Nevada's courts, as a matter of comity, would immunize California where Nevada law would similarly immunize its own agencies and officials (e.g., for actions taken in the performance of a "discretionary" function), but they would not immunize California where Nevada law permitted actions against Nevada agencies, say, for acts taken in bad faith or for intentional torts. App. to Pet. for Cert. in Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, O.T. 2002, No. 42, p. 12. We reviewed that decision, and we affirmed. Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 499, 123 S.Ct. 1683. On remand, the case went to trial. A jury found in Hyatt's favor and awarded him close to $500 million in damages (both compensatory and punitive) and fees (including attorney's fees). California appealed. It argued that the trial court had not properly followed the Nevada Supreme Court's earlier decision. California explained that in a similar suit against similar Nevada officials, Nevada statutory law would limit damages to $50,000, and it argued that the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause required Nevada to limit damages similarly here. The Nevada Supreme Court accepted the premise that Nevada statutes would impose a $50,000 limit in a similar suit against its own officials. See 130 Nev. ----, ----, 335 P.3d 125, 145-146 (2014); see also Nev.Rev.Stat. § 41.035(1)(1995). But the court rejected California's conclusion. Instead, while setting aside much of the damages award, it nonetheless affirmed $1 million of the award (earmarked as compensation for fraud), and it remanded for a retrial on the question of damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In doing so, it stated that "damages awarded on remand ... are not subject to any statutory cap." 130 Nev., at ----, 335 P.3d, at 153. The Nevada Supreme Court explained its holding by stating that California's efforts to control the actions of its own agencies were inadequate as applied to Nevada's own citizens. Hence, Nevada's "policy interest in providing adequate redress to Nevada's citizens [wa]s paramount to providing [California] a statutory cap on damages under comity." Id., at ----, 335 P.3d, at 147. California petitioned for certiorari. We agreed to decide two questions. First, whether to overrule Hall . And, second, if we did not do so, whether the Constitution permits Nevada to award Hyatt damages against a California state agency that are greater than those that Nevada would award in a similar suit against its own state agencies. II In light of our 4-to-4 affirmance of Nevada's exercise of jurisdiction over California's state agency, we must consider the second question: Whether the Constitution permits Nevada to award damages against California agencies under Nevada law that are greater than it could award against Nevada agencies in similar circumstances. We conclude that it does not. The Nevada Supreme Court has ignored both Nevada's typical rules of immunity and California's immunity-related statutes (insofar as California's statutes would prohibit a monetary recovery that is greater in amount than the maximum recovery that Nevada law would permit in similar circumstances). Instead, it has applied a special rule of law that evinces a " 'policy of hostility' " toward California. Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 499, 123 S.Ct. 1683(quoting Carroll v. Lanza, supra, at 413, 75 S.Ct. 804). Doing so violates the Constitution's requirement that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State." Art. IV, § 1. The Court's precedents strongly support this conclusion. A statute is a "public Act" within the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, supra, at 411, 75 S.Ct. 804; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738(referring to "[t]he Acts of the legislature" in the full faith and credit context). We have said that the Clause "does not require a State to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and events within it, the statute of another State reflecting a conflicting and opposed policy." Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S., at 412, 75 S.Ct. 804. But when affirming a State's decision to decline to apply another State's statute on this ground, we have consistently emphasized that the State had "not adopt[ed] any policy of hostility to the public Acts" of that other State. Id., at 413, 75 S.Ct. 804. In Carroll v. Lanza, the Court considered a negligence action brought by a Missouri worker in Arkansas' courts. We held that the Arkansas courts need not apply a time limitation contained in Missouri's (but not in Arkansas') workman's compensation law. Id ., at 413-414, 75 S.Ct. 804. In doing so, we emphasized both that (1) Missouri law (compared with Arkansas law) embodied "a conflicting and opposed policy," and (2) Arkansas law did not embody "any policy of hostility to the public Acts of Missouri." Id., at 412-413, 75 S.Ct. 804. This second requirement was well established in earlier law. See, e.g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642-643, 55 S.Ct. 589, 79 L.Ed. 1100 (1935)(New Jersey may not enforce a jurisdictional statute that would permit enforcement of certain claims under New Jersey law but "deny the enforcement" of similar, valid claims under New York law); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611-612, 71 S.Ct. 980, 95 L.Ed. 1212 (1951)(invalidating a Wisconsin statute that "close[d] the doors of its courts" to an Illinois cause of action while permitting adjudication of similar Wisconsin claims). We followed this same approach when we considered the litigation now before us for the first time. See Franchise Tax Bd., 538 U.S., at 498-499, 123 S.Ct. 1683. Nevada had permitted Hyatt to sue California in Nevada courts. See id., at 497, 123 S.Ct. 1683(citing Hall, 440 U.S., at 414-421, 99 S.Ct. 1182). Nevada's courts recognized that California's law of complete immunity would prevent any recovery in this case. The Nevada Supreme Court consequently did not apply California law. It applied Nevada law instead. We upheld that decision as consistent with the Full Faith and Credit Clause. But in doing so, we emphasized both that (1) the Clause does not require one State to apply another State's law that violates its "own legitimate public policy," Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 497-498, 123 S.Ct. 1683(citing Hall, supra, at 424, 99 S.Ct. 1182), and (2) Nevada's choice of law did not "exhibi[t] a 'policy of hostility to the public Acts' of a sister State." Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 499, 123 S.Ct. 1683(quoting Carroll v. Lanza, supra, at 413, 75 S.Ct. 804). Rather, Nevada had evinced "a healthy regard for California's sovereign status," we said, by "relying on the contours of Nevada's own sovereign immunity from suit as a benchmark for its analysis." Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 499, 123 S.Ct. 1683. The Nevada decision before us embodies a critical departure from its earlier approach. Nevada has not applied the principles of Nevada law ordinarily applicable to suits against Nevada's own agencies. Rather, it has applied a special rule of law applicable only in lawsuits against its sister States, such as California. With respect to damages awards greater than $50,000, the ordinary principles of Nevada law do not "conflic[t]" with California law, for both laws would grant immunity. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S., at 412, 75 S.Ct. 804. Similarly, in respect to such amounts, the "polic [ies]" underlying California law and Nevada's usual approach are not "opposed"; they are consistent. Id., at 412-413, 75 S.Ct. 804. But that is not so in respect to Nevada's special rule. That rule, allowing damages awards greater than $50,000, is not only "opposed" to California law, ibid. ; it is also inconsistent with the general principles of Nevada immunity law, see Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 499, 123 S.Ct. 1683. The Nevada Supreme Court explained its departure from those general principles by describing California's system of controlling its own agencies as failing to provide "adequate" recourse to Nevada's citizens. 130 Nev., at ----, 335 P.3d, at 147. It expressed concerns about the fact that California's agencies " 'operat[e] outside' " the systems of " 'legislative control, administrative oversight, and public accountability' " that Nevada applies to its own agencies. Ibid. (quoting Faulkner v. University of Tenn., 627 So.2d 362 (Ala.1992)). Such an explanation, which amounts to little more than a conclusory statement disparaging California's own legislative, judicial, and administrative controls, cannot justify the application of a special and discriminatory rule. Rather, viewed through a full faith and credit lens, a State that disregards its own ordinary legal principles on this ground is hostile to another State. A constitutional rule that would permit this kind of discriminatory hostility is likely to cause chaotic interference by some States into the internal, legislative affairs of others. Imagine, for example, that many or all States enacted such discriminatory, special laws, and justified them on the sole basis that (in their view) a sister State's law provided inadequate protection to their citizens. Would each affected sister State have to change its own laws? Entirely? Piece-by-piece, in order to respond to the new special laws enacted by every other State? It is difficult to reconcile such a system of special and discriminatory rules with the Constitution's vision of 50 individual and equally dignified States. In light of the "constitutional equality" among the States, Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580, 31 S.Ct. 688, 55 L.Ed. 853 (1911), Nevada has not offered "sufficient policy considerations" to justify the application of a special rule of Nevada law that discriminates against its sister States, Carroll v. Lanza, supra, at 413, 75 S.Ct. 804. In our view, Nevada's rule lacks the "healthy regard for California's sovereign status" that was the hallmark of its earlier decision, and it reflects a constitutionally impermissible " 'policy of hostility to the public Acts' of a sister State." Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 499, 123 S.Ct. 1683(quoting Carroll v. Lanza, supra, at 413, 75 S.Ct. 804). In so holding we need not, and do not, intend to return to a complex "balancing-of-interests approach to conflicts of law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause." Franchise Tax Bd., 538 U.S., at 496, 123 S.Ct. 1683. Long ago this Court's efforts to apply that kind of analysis led to results that seemed to differ depending, for example, upon whether the case involved commercial law, a shareholders' action, insurance claims, or workman's compensation statutes. See, e.g., Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 157-159, 52 S.Ct. 571, 76 L.Ed. 1026 (1932); Carroll v. Lanza, supra, at 414-420, 75 S.Ct. 804(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (listing, and trying to classify, nearly 50 cases). We have since abandoned that approach, and we continue to recognize that a State need not " 'substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.' " Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 496, 123 S.Ct. 1683(quoting Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501, 59 S.Ct. 629, 83 L.Ed. 940 (1939)). But here, we can safely conclude that, in devising a special-and hostile-rule for California, Nevada has not "sensitively applied principles of comity with a healthy regard for California's sovereign status." Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 499, 123 S.Ct. 1683; see Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272, 100 S.Ct. 2647, 65 L.Ed.2d 757 (1980)(plurality opinion) (Clause seeks to prevent "parochial entrenchment on the interests of other States"); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 323, and n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 633, 66 L.Ed.2d 521 (1981)(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (Clause is properly brought to bear when a State's choice of law "threatens the federal interest in national unity by unjustifiably infringing upon the legitimate interests of another State"); cf. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288, 105 S.Ct. 1272, 84 L.Ed.2d 205 (1985)(Privileges and Immunities Clause prevents the New Hampshire Supreme Court from promulgating a rule that limits bar admission to state residents, discriminating against out-of-state lawyers); Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 894, 108 S.Ct. 2218, 100 L.Ed.2d 896 (1988)(Commerce Clause invalidates a statute of limitations that "imposes a greater burden on out-of-state companies than it does on [in-state] companies"). For these reasons, insofar as the Nevada Supreme Court has declined to apply California law in favor of a special rule of Nevada law that is hostile to its sister States, we find its decision unconstitutional. We vacate its judgment and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice ALITOconcurs in the judgment. Chief Justice ROBERTS, with whom Justice THOMASjoins, dissenting. Petitioner Franchise Tax Board is the California agency that collects California's state income tax. Respondent Gilbert Hyatt, a resident of Nevada, filed suit in Nevada state court against the Board, alleging that it had committed numerous torts in the course of auditing his California tax returns. The Board is immune from such a suit in California courts. The last time this case was before us, we held that the Nevada Supreme Court could apply Nevada law to resolve the Board's claim that it was immune from suit in Nevada as well. Following our decision, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld a $1 million jury award against the Board after concluding that the Board did not enjoy immunity under Nevada law. Today the Court shifts course. It now holds that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires the Nevada Supreme Court to afford the Board immunity to the extent Nevada agencies are entitled to immunity under Nevada law. Because damages in a similar suit against Nevada agencies are capped at $50,000 by Nevada law, the Court concludes that damages against the Board must be capped at that level as well. That seems fair. But, for better or worse, the word "fair" does not appear in the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The Court's decision is contrary to our precedent holding that the Clause does not block a State from applying its own law to redress an injury within its own borders. The opinion also departs from the text of the Clause, which-when it applies-requires a State to give full faith and credit to another State's laws. The Court instead permits partial credit: To comply with the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Nevada Supreme Court need only afford the Board the same limited immunity that Nevada agencies enjoy. I respectfully dissent. I In 1991 Gilbert Hyatt sold his house in California and rented an apartment, registered to vote, and opened a bank account in Nevada. When he filed his 1991 and 1992 tax returns, he claimed Nevada as his place of residence. Unlike California, Nevada has no state income tax, and the move saved Hyatt millions of dollars in California taxes. California's Franchise Tax Board was suspicious, and it initiated an audit. In the course of the audit, employees of the Board traveled to Nevada and allegedly peered through Hyatt's windows, rummaged around in his garbage, contacted his estranged family members, and shared his personal information not only with newspapers but also with his business contacts and even his place of worship. Hyatt claims that one employee in particular had it in for him, referring to him in antisemitic terms and taking "trophy-like pictures" in front of his home after the audit. Brief for Respondent 3. As a result of the audit, the Board determined that Hyatt was a resident of California for 1991 and part of 1992, and that he accordingly owed over $10 million in unpaid state income taxes, penalties, and interest. Hyatt protested the audit before the Board, which upheld the audit following an 11-year administrative proceeding. Hyatt is still challenging the audit in California court. In 1998, Hyatt also filed suit against the Board in Nevada state court. In that suit, which is the subject of this case, Hyatt claimed that the Board committed a variety of torts, including fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy. The Board is immune from suit under California law, and it argued that Nevada was required under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to enforce California's immunity law. When the case reached the Nevada Supreme Court, that court held, applying general principles of comity under Nevada law, that the Board was entitled to immunity for its negligent but not intentional torts-the same immunity afforded Nevada state agencies. Not satisfied, the Board pursued its claim of complete immunity to this Court, but we affirmed. We ruled that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not prohibit Nevada from applying its own immunity law to the dispute. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 498-499, 123 S.Ct. 1683, 155 L.Ed.2d 702 (2003). On remand, the trial court conducted a four-month jury trial. The jury found for Hyatt, awarding him $1 million for fraud, $52 million for invasion of privacy, $85 million for emotional distress, and $250 million in punitive damages. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court significantly reduced the award, concluding that the invasion of privacy claims failed as a matter of law. Applying principles of comity, the Nevada Supreme Court also held that because Nevada state agencies are not subject to punitive damages, the Board was not liable for the $250 million punitive damages award. The court did hold the Board responsible for the $1 million fraud judgment, however, and it remanded for a new trial on damages for the emotional distress claim. Although tort liability for Nevada state agencies was capped at $50,000 under Nevada law, the court held that it was against Nevada's public policy to apply that cap to the Board's liability for the fraud and emotional distress claims. The Board sought review by this Court, and we again granted certiorari. 576 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2940, 192 L.Ed.2d 975 (2015). II A The Full Faith and Credit Clause provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1. The purpose of the Clause "was to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them integral parts of a single nation." Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-277, 56 S.Ct. 229, 80 L.Ed. 220 (1935). The Full Faith and Credit Clause applies in a straightforward fashion to state court judgments: "A judgment entered in one State must be respected in another provided that the first State had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter." Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 59 L.Ed.2d 416 (1979). The Clause is more difficult to apply to "public Acts," which include the laws of other States. See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 411, 75 S.Ct. 804, 99 L.Ed. 1183 (1955). State courts must give full faith and credit to those laws. But what does that mean in practice? It is clear that state courts are not always required to apply the laws of other States. State laws frequently conflict, and a "rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit clause, without regard to the statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own." Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532, 547, 55 S.Ct. 518, 79 L.Ed. 1044 (1935). Accordingly, this Court has treated the Full Faith and Credit Clause as a "conflicts of law" provision that dictates when a State must apply the laws of another State rather than its own. Franchise Tax Bd., 538 U.S., at 496, 123 S.Ct. 1683; see also Hall, 440 U.S., at 424, 99 S.Ct. 1182(California court is not required to apply Nevada law). Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, "it is frequently the case" that "a court can lawfully apply either the law of one State or the contrary law of another." Franchise Tax Bd., 538 U.S., at 496, 123 S.Ct. 1683(internal quotation marks omitted). As we have explained, "the very nature of the federal union of states, to which are reserved some of the attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to the full faith and credit clause as the means for compelling a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate." Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501, 59 S.Ct. 629, 83 L.Ed. 940 (1939). This Court has generally held that when a State chooses "to apply its own rule of law to give affirmative relief for an action arising within its borders," the Full Faith and Credit Clause is satisfied. Carroll, 349 U.S., at 413, 75 S.Ct. 804; see Hall, 440 U.S., at 424, 99 S.Ct. 1182(California court may apply California law consistent with the State's interest in "providing full protection to those who are injured on its highways" (internal quotation marks omitted)). A State may not apply its own law, however, if doing so reflects a "policy of hostility to the public Acts" of another State. Carroll, 349 U.S., at 413, 75 S.Ct. 804. A State is considered to have adopted such a policy if it has "no sufficient policy considerations to warrant" its refusal to apply the other State's laws. Ibid. For example, when a State "seeks to exclude from its courts actions arising under a foreign statute" but permits similar actions under its own laws, the State has adopted a policy of hostility to the "public Acts" of another State. Ibid. ; see Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611-613, 71 S.Ct. 980, 95 L.Ed. 1212 (1951). In such cases, this Court has held that the forum State must open its doors and permit the plaintiff to seek relief under another State's laws. See, e.g., id., at 611, 71 S.Ct. 980("Wisconsin cannot escape [its] constitutional obligation to enforce the rights and duties validly created under the laws of other states by the simple device of removing jurisdiction from courts otherwise competent"). B According to the Court, the Nevada Supreme Court violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause by applying "a special rule of law that evinces a policy of hostility toward California." Ante, at 1280 (internal quotation marks omitted). As long as Nevada provides immunity to its state agencies for awards above $50,000, the majority reasons, the State has no legitimate policy rationale for refusing to give similar immunity to the agencies of other States. The Court concludes that the Nevada Supreme Court is accordingly required to rewrite Nevada law to afford the Board the same immunity to which Nevada agencies are entitled. In the majority's view, that result is "strongly" supported by this Court's precedents. Ibid. I disagree. Carroll explains that the Full Faith and Credit Clause prohibits a State from adopting a "policy of hostility to the public Acts" of another State. 349 U.S., at 413, 75 S.Ct. 804. But it does not stop there. Carroll goes on to describe what adopting a "policy of hostility" means: A State may not refuse to apply another State's law where there are "no sufficient policy considerations to warrant such refusal." Ibid. (emphasis added). Where a State chooses a different rule from a sister State in order "to give affirmative relief for an action arising within its borders," the State has a sufficient policy reason for applying its own law, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause is satisfied. Ibid. In this case, the Nevada Supreme Court applied Nevada rather than California immunity law in order to uphold the "state's policy interest in providing adequate redress to Nevada citizens." 130 Nev. ----, ----, 335 P.3d 125, 147 (2014). This Court has long recognized that "[f]ew matters could be deemed more appropriately the concern of the state in which the injury occurs or more completely within its power" than "the bodily safety and economic protection" of people injured within its borders. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 306 U.S., at 503, 59 S.Ct. 629; see Hall, 440 U.S., at 424, 99 S.Ct. 1182. Hyatt alleges that the Board committed multiple torts, including fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See 130 Nev., at ----, 335 P.3d, at 130. Under Pacific Employers Insurance and Carroll, there is no doubt that Nevada has a "sufficient" policy interest in protecting Nevada residents from such injuries. The majority, however, does not regard that policy interest as sufficient justification for denying the Board immunity. Despite this Court's decision to get out of the business of "appraising and balancing state interests under the Full Faith and Credit Clause," Franchise Tax Bd., 538 U.S., at 498, 123 S.Ct. 1683the majority concludes that Nevada cannot really have a state policy to protect its citizens from the kinds of torts alleged here, because the State capped its own liability at $50,000 in similar situations. See ante, at 1281 - 1283. But that fails to credit the Nevada Supreme Court's explanation for why a damages cap for Nevada state agencies is fully consistent with the State's policy of protecting its citizens. According to the Nevada Supreme Court, Nevada law treats its own agencies differently from the agencies of other States because Nevada agencies are "subject to legislative control, administrative oversight, and public accountability" in Nevada. 130 Nev., at ----, 335 P.3d, at 147(internal quotation marks omitted). The same is not true of other litigants, such as the Board, who operate "outside such controls." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). The majority may think that Nevada is being unfair, but it cannot be said that the State failed to articulate a sufficient policy explanation for its decision to apply a damages cap to Nevada state agencies, but not to the agencies of other States. As the Court points out, the Constitution certainly has a "vision of 50 individual and equally dignified States," ante, at 1282, which is why California remains free to adopt a policy similar to that of Nevada, should it wish to do so. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567, 31 S.Ct. 688, 55 L.Ed. 853 (1911)(The Union "was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority, each competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United States by the Constitution itself"). Nevada is not, however, required to treat its sister State as equally committed to the protection of Nevada citizens. It is true that this Court in the prior iteration of this case found no Full Faith and Credit Clause violation in part because the "Nevada Supreme Court sensitively applied principles of comity with a healthy regard for California's sovereign status, relying on the contours of Nevada's own sovereign immunity from suit as a benchmark for its analysis." Franchise Tax Bd., 538 U.S., at 499, 123 S.Ct. 1683. But the Nevada court adhered to its policy of sensitivity to comity concerns this time around as well. In deference to the Board's sovereignty, the court threw out a $250 million punitive damages award, on top of its previous decision that the Board was not liable at all for its negligent acts. That is more than a "healthy regard" for California's sovereign status. Even if the Court is correct that Nevada violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause, however, it is wrong about the remedy. The majority concludes that in the sovereign immunity context, the Full Faith and Credit Clause is not a choice of law provision, but a create-your-own-law provision: The Court does not require the Nevada Supreme Court to apply either Nevada law (no immunity for the Board) or California law (complete immunity for the Board), but instead requires a new hybrid rule, under which the Board enjoys partial immunity. The majority's approach is nowhere to be found in the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Where the Clause applies, it expressly requires a State to give full faith and credit to another State's laws. If the majority is correct that Nevada has no sufficient policy justification for applying Nevada immunity law, then California law applies. And under California law, the Board is entitled to full immunity. Or, if Nevada has a sufficient policy reason to apply its own law, then Nevada law applies, and the Board is subject to full liability. I respectfully dissent.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

EDWARD J. DeBARTOLO CORP. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al. No. 81-1985. Argued March 22, 1983 — Decided June 24, 1983 Lawrence M. Cohen argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were W. Reynolds Allen and Mark E. Levitt. Norton J. Come argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent National Labor Relations Board were Solicitor General Lee, Linda Sher, and Elinor Hadley Stillman. Richard H. Frank, Lawrence J. Cohen, Lawrence Gold, and George Kaufmann filed a brief for respondent Florida Gulf Coast Building Trades Council, AFL-CIO. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Stephen A. Bokat for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; by Harry L. Browne for the American Retail Federation; by G. Brockwel Heylin for the Associated General Contractors of America, Inc.; and by Edward J. Sack for the International Council of Shopping Centers, Inc. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the court. As a result of a labor dispute between respondent union and the H. J. High Construction Company (High), the union passed out handbills urging consumers not to trade with a group of employers who had no business relationship of any kind with High. The question presented is whether that handbilling is exempted from the prohibition against secondary boycotts contained in § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(4), by what is known as the “publicity proviso” to that section. High is a general building contractor retained by the H. J. Wilson Company (Wilson) to construct a department store in a shopping center in Tampa, Fla. Petitioner, the Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation (DeBartolo), owns and operates the center. Most of the 85 tenants in the mall signed a standard lease with DeBartolo providing for a minimum rent (which increases whenever a large new department store opens for business) plus a percentage of gross sales, and requiring the tenant to pay a proportionate share of the costs of maintaining the mall’s common areas, to pay dues to a merchants’ association, and to take part in four joint advertising brochures. Wilson signed a slightly different land lease agreement, but it also promised to pay dues to the merchants’ association and to share in the costs of maintaining the common areas. Under the terms of Wilson’s lease, neither DeBartolo nor any of the other tenants had any right to control the manner in which High discharged its contractual obligation to Wilson. The union conducted its handbilling at all four entrances to the shopping center for about three weeks, while the new Wilson store was under construction. Without identifying High by name, the handbill stated that the contractors building Wilson’s Department Store were paying substandard wages, and asked the readers not to patronize any of the stores in the mall until DeBartolo publicly promised that all construction at the mall would be done by contractors who pay their employees fair wages and fringe benefits. The handbilling was conducted in an orderly manner, and was not accompanied by any picketing or patrolling. DeBartolo advised the union that it would not oppose this handbilling if the union modified its message to make clear that the dispute did not involve DeBartolo or any of Wilson’s cotenants, and if it limited its activities to the immediate vicinity of Wilson’s. When the union persisted in distributing handbills to all patrons of the shopping center, DeBartolo filed a trespass action in the state court and an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board. The Board’s General Counsel issued a complaint. The complaint recited the dispute between the union and High, and noted the absence of any labor dispute between the union and DeBartolo, Wilson, or any of the other tenants of the East Lake Mall. The complaint then alleged that in furtherance of its primary dispute with High, the union “has threatened, coerced or restrained, and is threatening, coercing or restraining, various tenant Employers who are engaged in business at East Lake Square Mall, and who lease space from DeBartolo in East Lake Square Mall, by handbill-ing the general public not to do business with the above-described tenant Employers . . . .” Complaint ¶ 8(a). The complaint alleged that the object of the handbilling “was and is, to force or require the aforesaid tenant Employers in East Lake Square Mall... to cease using, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in products and/or services of, and to cease doing business with DeBartolo, in order to force DeBartolo and/or Wilson’s not to do business with High.” Complaint ¶ 8(b). After the union filed its answer, the parties stipulated to the relevant facts and submitted the matter to the Board for decision. Without deciding whether the handbilling constituted a form of “coercion” or “restraint” proscribed by § 8(b)(4), the Board concluded that it was exempted from the Act by the “publicity proviso” and dismissed the complaint. Florida Gulf Coast Building Trades Council, AFL-CIO (Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.), 252 N. L. R. B. 702 (1980). The Board reasoned that there was a “symbiotic” relationship between DeBartolo and its tenants, including Wilson, and that they all would derive a substantial benefit from the “product” that High was constructing, namely Wilson’s new store. The Board did not expressly state that DeBartolo and the other tenants could be said to be distributors of that product, but concluded that High’s status as a producer brought a total consumer boycott of the shopping center within the publicity proviso. The Court of Appeals agreed. 662 F. 2d 264 (CA4 1981). It observed that our decision in NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U. S. 46 (1964), had rejected a narrow reading of the proviso and that the Board had consistently construed it in an expansive manner. Finding the Board’s interpretation consistent with the rationale of the National Labor Relations Act, it held that High was a producer and that DeBartolo and the other tenants were distributors within the meaning of the proviso. This holding reflected the court’s belief that in response to the union’s consumer handbilling, DeBartolo and the storekeepers would be able “in turn, to apply pressure on Wilson’s and High.” 662 F. 2d, at 271. Because the decision conflicts with that of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Pet, Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F. 2d 545 (1981), we granted certiorari. 459 U. S. 904 (1982). The Board and the union correctly point out that DeBartolo cannot obtain relief in this proceeding unless it prevails on three separate issues. It must prove that the union did “threaten, coerce, or restrain” a person engaged in commerce, with the object of “forcing or requiring” someone to cease doing business with someone else — that is to say, it must prove a violation of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). It must also overcome both the union’s defense based on the publicity proviso and the union’s claim that its conduct was protected by the First Amendment. Neither the Board nor the Court of Appeals considered whether the handbilling in this case was covered by § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) or protected by the First Amendment, because both found that it fell within the proviso. We therefore limit our attention to that issue. The publicity proviso applies to communications “other than picketing,” that are “truthful,” and that do not produce either an interference with deliveries or a work stoppage by employees of any person other than the firm engaged in the primary labor dispute. The Board and the Court of Appeals found that these three conditions were met, and these findings are not now challenged. The only question is whether the handbilling “advis[ed] the public . . . that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer.” The parties agree that this language limits the proviso’s protection to publicity that is designed to create consumer pressure on secondary employers who distribute the primary employer’s products. They do not agree, however, on what constitutes a producer-distributor relationship. We have analyzed the producer-distributor requirement in only one case, NLRB v. Servette, Inc., supra. Servette involved a primary dispute between a union and a wholesale distributor of candy and certain other specialty items sold to the public by supermarkets. The union passed out handbills in front of some of the chainstores urging consumers not to buy any products purchased by the store from Servette. We held that even though Servette did not actually manufacture the items that it distributed, it should still be regarded as a “producer” within the meaning of the proviso. We thus concluded that the handbills advised the public that the products were produced by an employer with whom the union had a primary dispute (Servette) and were being distributed by another employer (the supermarket). In reaching that conclusion, we looked to the legislative history of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519, which had simultaneously strengthened the secondary boycott prohibition and added the publicity proviso. We noted that a principal source of congressional concern had been the secondary boycott activities of the Teamsters Union, which for the most part represented employees of motor carriers who did not “produce” goods in the technical sense of the verb. The Teamsters’ activities were plainly intended to be covered by the new prohibitions in § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), and we declined to hold that Congress, in using the word “produced,” had intended to exclude the Teamsters entirely from the offsetting protections of the proviso. “There is nothing in the legislative history which suggests that the protection of the proviso was intended to be any narrower in coverage than the prohibition to which it is an exception, and we see no basis for attributing such an incongruous purpose to Congress.” 377 U. S., at 55. The focus of the analysis in Servette was on the meaning of the term “producer.” In this case, DeBartolo is willing to concede that Wilson distributes products that are “produced” by High within the meaning of the statute. This would mean that construction workers, like truckdrivers, may perform services that are essential to the production and distribution of consumer goods. We may therefore assume in this case that High, the primary employer, is a producer within the meaning of the proviso. Indeed, we may assume here that the proviso’s “coverage” — the types of primary disputes it allows to be publicized — is broad enough to include almost any primary dispute that might result in prohibited secondary activity. We reject, however, the Board’s interpretation of the extent of the secondary activity that the proviso permits. The only publicity exempted from the prohibition is publicity intended to inform the public that the primary employer’s product is “distributed by” the secondary employer. We are persuaded that Congress included that requirement to reflect the concern that motivates all of § 8(b)(4): “shielding unof-fending employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own.” NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U. S. 675, 692 (1951). In this case, the Board did not find that any product produced by High was being distributed by DeBartolo or any of Wilson’s cotenants. Instead, it relied on the theory that there was a symbiotic relationship between them and Wilson, and that DeBartolo and Wilson’s cotenants would derive substantial benefit from High’s work. That form of analysis would almost strip the distribution requirement of its limiting effect. It diverts the inquiry away from the relationship between the primary and secondary employers and toward the relationship between two secondary employers. It then tests that relationship by a standard so generous that it will be satisfied by virtually any secondary employer that a union might want consumers to boycott. Yet if Congress had intended all peaceful, truthful handbilling that informs the public of a primary dispute to fall within the proviso, the statute would not have contained a distribution requirement. In this case, DeBartolo is willing to assume that Wilson distributes products that are “produced” by High within the meaning of the statute. Wilson contracted with High to receive the construction services that are the subject of the primary dispute, and the cost of those services will presumably be reflected in the prices of the products sold by Wilson. But the handbills at issue in this case did not merely call for a boycott of Wilson’s products; they also called for a boycott of the products being sold by Wilson’s cotenants. Neither DeBartolo nor any of the cotenants has any business relationship with High. Nor do they sell any products whose chain of production can reasonably be said to include High. Since there is no justification for treating the products that the cotenants distribute to the public as products produced by High, the Board erred in concluding that the handbills came within the protection of the publicity proviso. Stressing the fact that this case arises out of an entirely peaceful and orderly distribution of a written message, rather than picketing, the union argues that its handbilling is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment. The Board, without completely endorsing the union’s constitutional argument, contends that it has sufficient force to invoke the Court’s prudential policy of construing Acts of Congress so as to avoid the unnecessary decision of serious constitutional questions. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 500-501 (1979). That doctrine, however, serves only to authorize the construction of a statute in a manner that is “fairly possible.” Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932). We do not believe that the Board’s expansive reading of the proviso meets that standard. Nevertheless, we do not reach the constitutional issue in this case. For, as we noted at the outset, the Board has not yet decided whether the handbilling in this case was proscribed by the Act. It rested its decision entirely on the publicity proviso and never considered whether, apart from that proviso, the union’s conduct fell within the terms of §8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Until the statutory question is decided, review of the constitutional issue is premature. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. That section makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents “(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is: “(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person _” 61 Stat. 140, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(4). That proviso reads as follows: “Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution.” 73 Stat. 543, 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(4). The handbills read: “PLEASE DON’T SHOP AT EAST LAKE SQUARE MALL PLEASE “The FLA. GULF COAST BUILDING TRADES COUNCIL, AFL-CIO is requesting that you do not shop at the stores in the East Lake Square Mall because of The Mall ownership’s contribution to substandard wages. “The Wilson’s Department Store under construction on these premises is being built by contractors who pay substandard wages and fringe benefits. In the past, the Mall’s owner, The Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation, has supported labor and our local economy by insuring that the Mall and its stores be built by contractors who pay fair wages and fringe benefits. Now, however, and for no apparent reason, the Mall owners have taken a giant step backwards by permitting our standards to be torn down. The payment of substandard wages not only diminishes the working person’s ability to purchase with earned, rather than borrowed, dollars, but it also undercuts the wage standard of the entire community. Since low construction wages at this time of inflation means decreased purchasing power, do the owners of East Lake Mall intend to compensate for the decreased purchasing power of workers of the community by encouraging the stores in East Lake Mall to cut their prices and lower their profits? “CUT-RATE WAGES ARE NOT FAIR UNLESS MERCHANDISE PRICES ARE ALSO CUT-RATE. “We ask for your support in our protest against substandard wages. Please do not patronize the stores in the East Lake Square Mall until the Mali’s owner publicly promises that all construction at the Mall will be done using contractors who pay their employees fair wages and fringe benefits. “IF YOU MUST ENTER THE MALL TO DO BUSINESS, please express to the store managers your concern over substandard wages and your support of our efforts. “We are appealing only to the public — the consumer. We are not seeking to induce any person to cease work or to refuse to make deliveries.” The Board concluded: “In sum, we find that the mutual obligations between the parties and the benefits derived from participation in the mall enterprise reflect the symbiotic nature of the relationship between DeBartolo and its tenants, not unlike the relationship between the operations of a diversified corporation. High’s contribution to this enterprise is as an employer which applies its labor to a product, i. e., the Wilson’s store, from which DeBartolo and its tenants will derive substantial benefit. Consequently, we find as a result of its relationship with Wilson’s and the shopping center enterprise that High applies capital, enterprise, and service to that enterprise, and thus that it is a ‘producer’ in the sense that that term is used in the publicity proviso as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Servette, [377 U. S. 46 (1964)], and by this Board in Pet, [244 N. L. R. B. 96 (1979)]. “Having found High to be a producer within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4), we find that Respondent’s handbilling urging a total consumer boycott of DeBartolo and its tenants other than Wilson’s is protected by the publicity proviso of that section of the Act.” 252 N. L. R. B., at 705. DeBartolo was successful in its trespass action in the state court. The handbilling at the East Lake Mall was enjoined and ceased on January 4, 1980. The parties agree, however, that the case is not moot. DeBartolo operates a number of shopping centers at various locations throughout the United States, and the union maintains that it has a right to engage in comparable handbilling in the future if a similar problem should again arise. That possibility, together with the fact that a cease-and-desist order would protect DeBartolo from a recurrence in the future, provides a sufficient basis for concluding that the case is not moot. Cf. Local 712, IBEW (Golden Dawn Foods), 134 N. L. R. B. 812 (1961) (electrical and refrigeration work); Plumbers & Pipefitters, Local 1A2 (Shop-Rite Foods), 133 N. L. R. B. 307 (1961) (refrigeration work). As the Board stated in International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 537 (Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N. L. R. B. 901, 907 (1961), “there is no suggestion either in the statute itself or in the legislative history that Congress intended the words ‘product’ and ‘produced’ to be words of special limitation.” See also Longshoremen v. Allied International, Inc., 456 U. S. 212, 223 (1982); Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U. S. 93, 100 (1958); H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (1947), 1 NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, p. 315 (1948). The Board concedes in its brief that Congress intended this language to restrict the scope of the proviso. It acknowledges that the product must be “in some manner distributed by the employers at whose customers the nonpicketing publicity is immediately directed.” Brief for Respondent NLRB 9. Concededly, “[t]he proviso was the outgrowth of a profound Senate concern that the unions’ freedom to appeal to the public for support of their case be adequately safeguarded.” NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U. S. 46, 55 (1964). Indeed, several legislators referred to the First Amendment explicitly during the debates. E. g., 105 Cong. Rec. 6232 (1959), 2 NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, p. 1037 (1959) (Sen. Humphrey); 105 Cong. Rec., at 18135, 2 NLRB Legislative History, at 1722 (Rep. Udall). That fact, however, merely confirms in this case the presumption that underlies Catholic Bishop and Crowell: when Congress legislates in a fashion that restricts communicative activity, it expects the statutory language to be construed narrowly. See Catholic Bishop, 440 U. S., at 507. It does not, however, expect the statutory language to be deprived of substantial practical effect. Cf. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, 447 U. S. 607 (1980) (picket line advocating boycott of substantial portion of secondary employer’s business is proscribed); NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U. S. 58 (1964) (“Tree Fruits”) (picket line advocating boycott of insubstantial portion of secondary employer’s business is not proscribed).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA et al. v. CONSUMERS UNION OF THE UNITED STATES, INC., et al. No. 79-198. Argued February 19, 1980 Decided June 2, 1980 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Powell, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Marshall Coleman, Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Walter H. Ryland, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Philip B. Kurland. Ellen Broadman argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Alan Mark Silbergeld, James W. Benton, Jr., and Michael Pollet. Burt Neubome, Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., and Stephen Bricker filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. This case raises questions of whether the Supreme Court of Virginia (Virginia Court) and its chief justice are officially immune from suit in an action brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 challenging the Virginia Court’s disciplinary rules governing the conduct of attorneys and whether attorney’s fees were properly awarded under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. § 1988, against the Virginia Court and its chief justice in his official capacity. I It will prove helpful at the outset to describe the role of the Virginia Court in regulating and disciplining attorneys. The Virginia Court has firmly held to the view that it has inherent authority to regulate and discipline attorneys. Button v. Day, 204 Va. 547, 552-555, 132 S. E. 2d 292, 295-298 (1963). It also has statutory authority to do so. Section 54-48 of the Code of Virginia (1978) authorizes the Virginia Court to “promulgate and amend rules and regulations . . . [p]rescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys-at-law. ...” Pursuant to these powers, the Virginia Court promulgated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility (State Bar Code, Bar Code, or Code), the provisions of which were substantially identical to the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility. Section 5A-48 provides no standards for the Virginia Court to follow in regulating attorneys; it is apparent that insofar as the substantive content of such a code is concerned, the State has vested in the court virtually its entire legislative or regulatory power over the legal profession. Section 54-48 also authorizes the Virginia Court to prescribe “procedure for disciplining, suspending and disbarring attorneys-at-law” ; and § 54^49 authorizes the court to promulgate rules and regulations “organizing and governing the association known as the Virginia State Bar, composed of the attorneys-at-law of this State, to act as an administrative agency of the Court for the purpose of investigating and reporting ... violation [s]....” Acting under this authority, the Virginia State Bar (State Bar or Bar) has been organized and its enforcement role vested in an ethics committee and in various district committees. Section 54-51 reserves to the courts the sole power to adjudicate alleged violations of the Bar Code, and hence the role of the State Bar is limited to the investigation of violations and the filing of appropriate complaints in.the proper courts. Under § 54-74, the enforcement procedure involves the filing of a complaint in a court of record, the issuance of a rule to show cause against the charged attorney, the prosecution of the case by the commonwealth attorney, and the hearing of the case by the judge issuing the rule together with two other judges designated by the chief justice of the Virginia Supreme Court. Appeal lies to the Virginia Supreme Court. The courts of Virginia, including the Supreme Court, thus play an adjudicative role in enforcing the Bar Code similar to their function in enforcing any statute adopted by the Virginia Legislature and similar or identical to the role they would play had the Bar Code been adopted by the state legislature. The Virginia Court, however, has additional enforcement power. As we have said, it asserts inherent power to discipline attorneys. Also, § 54-74 expressly provides that if the Virginia Court or any other court of record observes any act of unprofessional conduct, it may itself, without any complaint being filed by the State Bar or by any third party, issue a rule to show cause against the offending attorney. Although once the rule issues, such cases would be prosecuted by the commonwealth attorney, it is apparent that the Virginia Court and other courts in Virginia have enforcement authority beyond that of adjudicating complaints filed by others and beyond the normal authority of the courts to punish attorneys for contempt. II This case arose when, in 1974, one of the appellees, Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. (Consumers Union), sought to prepare a legal services directory designed to assist consumers in making informed decisions concerning utilization of legal services. Consumers Union sought to canvass all attorneys practicing law in Arlington County, Va., asking for information concerning each attorney’s education, legal activities, areas of specialization, office location, fee and billing practices, business and professional affiliations, and client relations. However, it encountered difficulty because lawyers declined to supply the requested information for fear of violating the Bar Code’s strict prohibition against attorney advertising. Rule 2-102 (A) (6) of the Code prohibited lawyers from being included in legal directories listing the kind of legal information that Consumers Union sought to publish. On February 27, 1975, Consumers Union and the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council brought an action pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the Virginia Court, the Virginia State Bar, the American Bar Association, and, in both their individual and official capacities, the chief justice of the Virginia Court, the president of the State Bar, and the chairman of the State Bar’s Legal Ethics Committee. With respect to the Virginia Court, the complaint identified its chief justice and alleged only that the court had promulgated the Bar Code. The other defendants were alleged to have authority to enforce the Code. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that defendants had violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to gather, publish, and receive factual, information concerning attorneys practicing in Arlington County, and a permanent injunction against the enforcement and operation of DR 2-102 (A)(6). A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281 (1970 ed.). Defendants moved for indefinite continuance of the trial on the grounds that the ABA and the State Bar were preparing amendments to relax the advertising prohibitions contained in DR 2-102 (A)(6). Over plaintiff-appellees’ opposition, the District Court granted defendants a continuance until March 25,1976. On February 17, 1976, the ABA adopted amendments to its Code of Professional Responsibility which would permit attorneys to advertise office hours, initial consultation fees, and credit arrangements. Defendants then sought and obtained a further continuance to permit the Virginia Court and the State Bar to consider amending the State Bar Code to conform to the ABA amendments. Although the governing body of the State Bar recommended that the Virginia Court adopt the ABA amendments to DR 2-102, on April 20, 1976, the court declined to adopt the amendments on the . ground that they would “not serve the best interests of the public or the legal profession.” The action then proceeded to trial on May 17, 1976, and was decided on December 17, 1976. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. American Bar Assn., 427 F. Supp. 506 (ED Va. 1976). The three-judge District Court concluded that abstention would be inappropriate in light of defendants’ failure to amend the State Bar Code despite continuances based on the speculation that DR 2-102 (A) (6) would be relaxed. Id., at 513-516. The court declared that DR 2-102 (A)(6) unconstitutionally restricted the right of plaintiff-appellees to receive and gather nonfee information and information concerning initial consultation fees. Defendants were permanently enjoined from enforcing DR 2-102 (A) (6) save for its prohibition against advertising fees for services other than the initial consultation fee. Id., at 523. Plaintiff-appellees appealed to this Court, challenging the District Court’s refusal to enjoin enforcement of the prohibition of fee advertising. Defendants brought a cross-appeal, arguing that DR 2-102 (A) (6) should have been upheld in its entirety. While these appeals were pending, we decided Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977), in which we held that enforcement of a ban on attorney advertising would violate the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of attorneys seeking to advertise the fees they charged for certain routine legal services. In light of Bates, the judgment below was vacated and the case was remanded for further consideration. 433 U. S. 917 (1977). On remand, defendants agreed that in light of Bates DR 2-102 (A) (6) could not constitutionally be enforced to prohibit attorneys from providing plaintiff-appellees with any of the information they sought to publish in their legal services directory. Defendants proposed that a permanent injunction be entered barring them from enforcing DR 2-102 (A)(6) against attorneys providing plaintiff-appellees with information. On May 8, 1979, the District Court declared DR 2-102 (A) (6) unconstitutional on its face and permanently enjoined defendants from enforcing it. Plaintiff-appellees also moved for costs, including an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. § 1988. The defendants objected to any fee award on various grounds, including judicial immunity. They did not object to their paying other costs. Although holding the individual defendants immune from attorney’s fees liability in their individual capacities, the District Court held that the Act authorized in proper circumstances the award of fees against the State Bar, the Virginia Court and the individual defendants in their official capacities. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. American Bar Assn., 470 F. Supp. 1055, 1059-1061 (ED Va. 1979). The District Court went on to conclude that special circumstances made it unjust to award attorney’s fees against the State Bar or against the State Bar officers in their official capacities because it was not these defendants but the Virginia Court that had the power to change the State Bar disciplinary rules and because the State Bar and its officers had unsuccessfully sought to persuade the court to amend the Code to conform to what they deemed to be constitutional standards. There were no similar circumstances making it unjust to award attorney’s fees against the Virginia Court and its chief justice in his official capacity. This was because the court had denied the State Bar’s petition to amend the Code to conform to what were deemed to be the requirements of Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975), and had also failed to amend the Code to conform to the holding in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra. Hence, “[i]t would hardly be unjust to order the Supreme Court of Virginia defendants to pay plaintiffs reasonable attorneys fees in light of their continued failure and apparent refusal to amend [the Code] to conform with constitutional requirements.” 470 F. Supp., at 1063. The parties were directed to attempt to reach an agreement on a reasonable sum, failing which the court would determine the fee. On May 23, 1979, defendants filed a petition for rehearing, arguing for the first time, on judicial immunity grounds, that the Virginia Court and its chief justice were exempt from having declaratory and injunctive relief entered against them. It was also argued that in any event it was an abuse of discretion to enter the fee award against the Virginia Court and its chief justice. Following denial of rehearing, the Virginia Court and its chief justice appealed, presenting the following questions: 1. Is the Supreme Court of Virginia immune from judgment under the doctrine of judicial immunity? 2. May the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 be construed to permit an award of attorneys’ fees against the Supreme Court of Virginia for its judicial acts? 3. Does the doctrine of judicial immunity preclude the award of attorneys’ fees for failure to correct a challenged judicial act which is the subject of litigation? 4. On the facts before it, did the District Court abuse its discretion in awarding fees against'the Virginia Court? Appellees moved to dismiss or affirm, the motion to dismiss urging that the claim of judicial immunity from declaratory or injunctive relief was not properly before the Court because it had not been timely raised in the District Court and had therefore been waived. We noted probable jurisdiction, 444 U. S. 914(1979). Ill Title 42 U. S. C. § 1988, as amended by the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, provides in pertinent part: “In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” The District Court held that in light of the § 1983 judgment that had been entered in favor of appellees, the Act authorized an award of attorney’s fees against appellants. Appellants urge that this was error. Their primary contention is that on the grounds of absolute legislative or judicial immunity they should have been excluded from the judgment below and also from liability for attorney’s fees. Appellees on the other hand assert that neither judicial nor legislative immunity immunized these defendants from declaratory or injunctive relief as distinguished from a damages award; and in any event they insist that the judgment stand against these defendants because the Virginia Court itself shares direct enforcement authority with the State Bar and hence is subject to prospective judgments just as other enforcement officials are. A Appellees sought declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to particular provisions of the State Bar Code propounded by the Virginia Court. Although it is clear that under Virginia law the issuance of the Bar Code was a proper function of the Virginia Court, propounding the Code was not an act of adjudication but one of rulemaking. The District Court below referred to the issuance of the Code as a judicial function, but this is not conclusive upon us for the purpose of deciding whether issuance of the Code is a judicial act entitled to immunity under § 1983. Judge Warriner, dissenting in the District Court, agreed with a prior District Court holding in Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137, 1156 (ED Va. 1976), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F. 2d 356 (CA4 1979), that in promulgating disciplinary rules the Virginia Supreme Court acted in a legislative capacity. Judge Warriner said: “Disciplinary rules are rules of general application and are statutory in character. They act not on parties litigant but on all those who practice law in Virginia. They do not arise out of a controversy which must be adjudicated, but instead out of a need to regulate conduct for the protection of all citizens. It is evident that, in enacting disciplinary rules, the Supreme Court of Virginia is constituted a legislature.” 470 F. Supp., at 1064. We agree with this analysis and hence must inquire whether the Virginia Court and its chief justice are immune from suit for acts performed in their legislative capacity. We have already decided that the Speech or Debate Clause immunizes Congressmen from suits for either prospective relief or damages. Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U. S. 491, 502-503 (1975). The purpose of this immunity is to insure that the legislative function may be performed independently without fear of outside interference. Ibid. To preserve legislative independence, we have concluded that “legislators engaged ‘in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity,' Tenney v. Brandhove, [341 U. S. 367, 376 (1951)], should be protected not only from the consequences of litigation’s results but also from the burden of defending themselves.” Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82, 85 (1967). We have also recognized that state legislators enjoy common-law immunity from liability for their legislative acts, an immunity that is similar in origin and rationale to that accorded Congressmen under the Speech or Debate Clause. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951). In Tenney we concluded that Congress did not intend § 1983 to abrogate the common-law immunity of state legislators. Although Tenney involved an action for damages under § 1983, its holding is equally applicable to § 1983 actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. In holding that § 1983 “does not create civil liability” for acts unknown “in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act/’ id., at 379, we did not distinguish between actions for damages and those for prospective relief. Indeed, we have recognized elsewhere that “a private civil action, whether for an injunction or damages, creates a distraction and forces [legislators] to divert their time, energy, and attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation.” Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, supra, at 503. Although the separation-of-powers doctrine justifies a broader privilege for Congressmen than for state legislators in criminal actions, United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360 (1980), we generally have equated the legislative immunity to which state legislators are entitled under § 1983 to that accorded Congressmen under the Constitution. Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, supra, at 502-503, 505, 506; Dombrowski v. Eastland, supra, at 84-85; United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S. 169, 180 (1966); Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, at 377-379. Thus, there is little doubt that if the Virginia Legislature had enacted the State Bar Code and if suit had been brought against the legislature, its committees, or members for refusing to amend the Code in the wake of our cases indicating that the Code in some respects would be held invalid, the defendants in that suit could successfully have sought dismissal on the grounds of absolute legislative immunity. Appellees submit that whatever may be true of state legislators, the Virginia Court and its members should not be accorded the same immunity where they are merely exercising a delegated power to malee rules in the same manner that many executive and agency officials wield authority to make rules in a wide variety of circumstances. All of such officials, it is urged, are not absolutely immune from civil suit. As much could be conceded, but it would not follow that, as appellees would have it, in no circumstances do those who exercise delegated legislative power enjoy legislative immunity. In any event, in this case the Virginia Court claims inherent power to regulate the Bar, and as the dissenting judge below indicated, the Virginia Court is exercising the State’s entire legislative power with respect to regulating the Bar, and its members are the State’s legislators for the purpose of issuing the Bar Code. Thus the Virginia Court and its members are immune from suit when acting in their legislative capacity. B If the sole basis for appellees’ § 1983 action against the Virginia Court and its chief justice were the issuance of, or failure to amend, the challenged rules, legislative immunity would foreclose suit against appellants. As has been pointed out, however, the Virginia Court performs more than a legislative role with respect to the State Bar Code. It also hears appeals from lower court decisions in disciplinary cases, a traditional adjudicative task; and in addition, it has independent enforcement authority of its own. Adhering to the doctrine of Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872), we have held that judges defending against § 1983 actions enjoy absolute immunity from damages liability for acts performed in their judicial capacities. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978). However, we have never held that judicial immunity absolutely insulates judges from declaratory or injunctive relief with respect to their judicial acts. The Courts of Appeals appear to be divided on the question whether judicial immunity bars declaratory or injunctive relief; we have not addressed the question. We need not decide whether judicial immunity would bar prospective relief, for we believe that the Virginia Court and its chief justice properly were held liable in their enforcement capacities. As already indicated, § 54-74 gives the Virginia Court independent authority of its own to initiate proceedings against attorneys. For this reason the Virginia Court and its members were proper defendants in a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, just as other enforcement officers and agencies were. Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from damages liability, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976), but they are natural targets for § 1983 injunctive suits since they are the state officers who are threatening to enforce and who are enforcing the law. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), is only one of a myriad of such cases since Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), decided that suits against state officials in federal courts are not barred by thé Eleventh Amendment. If prosecutors and law enforcement personnel cannot be proceeded against for declaratory relief, putative plaintiffs would have to await the institution of state-court proceedings against them in order to assert their federal constitutional claims. This is not the way the law has developed, and, because of its own inherent and statutory enforcement powers, immunity does not shield the Virginia Court and its chief justice from suit in this case. IV Because appellees properly prevailed in their § 1983 action, the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1988, authorized the District Court, “in its discretion,” to award them “a reasonable attorney’s fee,” which may be recovered from state officials sued in their official capacities. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 694 (1978). Applying the standard of Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U. S. 400, 402 (1968), the District Court indicated that attorney’s fees should ordinarily be awarded “ 'unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.’ ” 470 F. Supp., at 1061. Accordingly, enforcement authorities against whom § 1983 judgments have been entered would ordinarily be charged with attorney’s fees. The District Court nevertheless considered it unjust to require the State Bar defendants to pay attorney’s fees because they had recommended that the State Bar Code be amended to conform to what the Bar thought our cases required and because the Virginia Court declined or failed to adopt this proposal. No similar circumstances excused the Virginia Court, the court held, for it was the very authority that had propounded and failed to amend the challenged provisions of the Bar Code. We are unable to agree that attorney’s fees should have been awarded for the reasons relied on by the District Court. Although the Virginia Court and its chief justice were subject to suit in their direct enforcement role, they were immune in their legislative roles. Yet the District Court’s award of attorney’s fees in this case was premised on acts or omissions for which appellants enjoyed absolute legislative immunity. This was error. We held in Hutto v. Finney, supra, that Congress intended to waive whatever Eleventh Amendment immunity would otherwise bar an award of attorney’s fees against state officers, but our holding was based on express legislative history indicating that Congress intended the Act to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. There is no similar indication in the legislative history of the Act to suggest that Congress intended to permit an award of attorney’s fees to be premised on acts for which defendants would enjoy absolute legislative immunity. The House Committee Report on the Act indicates that Congress intended to permit attorney’s fees awards in cases in which prospective relief was properly awarded against defendants who would be immune from damages awards, H. R. Rep. No. 94^1558, p. 9 (1976), but there is no indication that Congress intended to permit an award of attorney’s fees to be premised on acts that themselves would be insulated from even prospective relief. Because the Virginia Court is immune from suit with respect to its legislative functions, it runs counter to that immunity for a district court’s discretion in allowing fees to be guided by considerations centering on the exercise or nonexercise of the state court’s legislative powers. This is not to say that absent some special circumstances in addition to what is disclosed in this record, a fee award should not have been made in this case. We are not convinced that it would be unfair to award fees against the State Bar, which by statute is designated as an administrative agency to help enforce the State Bar Code. Fee awards against enforcement officials are run-of-the-mill occurrences, even though, on occasion, had a state legislature acted or reacted in a different or more timely manner, there would have been no need for a lawsuit or for an injunction. Nor would we disagree had the District Court awarded fees not only against the Bar but also against the Virginia Court because of its own direct enforcement role. However, we hold that it was an abuse of discretion to award fees because the Virginia Court failed to exercise its rulemaking authority in a manner that satisfied the District Court. We therefore vacate the award of attorney’s fees and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. “§ 54-48. Rules and regulations defining practice of law and prescribing procedure for practice by law students, codes of ethics and disciplinary procedure. — The Supreme Court may, from time to time, prescribe, adopt, promulgate and amend rules and regulations: “(a) Defining the practice of law. “(al) Prescribing procedure for limited practice of law by third-year law students. “(b) Prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attomeys-at-law including the practice of law or patent law through professional law corporations, professional associations and partnerships, and a code of judicial ethics. “(e) Prescribing procedure for disciplining, suspending, and disbarring attomeys-at-law.” “§ 54r-49. Organization and government of Virginia State Bar. — The Supreme Court may, from time to time, prescribe, adopt, promulgate and amend rules and regulations organizing and governing the association known as the Virginia State Bar, composed of the attorneys-at-law of this State, to act as an administrative agency of the Court for the purpose of investigating and reporting the violation of such rules and regulations as are adopted by the Court under this article for such proceedings as may be necessary, and requiring all persons practicing law in this State to be members thereof in good standing.” “§ 54r-51. Restrictions as to rules and regulations. — Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this article, the Supreme Court shall not adopt or promulgate rules or regulations prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attomeys-at-law, which shall be inconsistent with any statute; nor shall it adopt or promulgate any rule or regulation of method of procedure which shall eliminate the jurisdiction of the Courts to deal with the discipline of attorneys-at-law as provided by law; and in no case shall an attorney, who demands to be tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for the violation of any rule or regulation adopted under this article be tried in any other manner.” “§54-74. Procedure for suspension or revocation of license. — (1) Issuance of rule. — If the Supreme Court of Virginia, or any court of record of this State, observes, or if complaint, verified by affidavit, be made by any person to such court of any malpractice or of any unlawful or dishonest or unworthy'or corrupt or unprofessional conduct on the part of any attorney, or that any person practicing law is not duly licensed to practice in this State, such court shall, if it deems the case a proper one for such action, issue a rule against such attorney or other person to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked or suspended. If the complaint, verified by affidavit, be made by a District Committee of the Virginia State Bar, such court shall issue a rule against such attorney to show cause why his license to practice law shall not be revoked or suspended. “(2) Judges hearing case. — At the time such rule is issued the court issuing the same shall certify the fact of such issuance and the time and place of the hearing thereon, to the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia, who shall designate two judges, other than the judge of the court issuing the rule, of circuit courts or courts of record of cities of the first class to hear and decide the ease in conjunction with the judge issuing the rule, which such two judges shall receive as compensation ten dollars per day and necessary expenses while actually engaged in the performance of their duties, to be paid out of the State treasury, from the appropriation for criminal charges. “(3) Duty of Commonwealth’s attorney. — It shall be the duty of the attorney for the Commonwealth for the county or city in which such case is pending to appear at the hearing and prosecute the case. “(4) Action of court. — Upon the hearing, if the defendant be found guilty by the court, his license to practice law in this State shall be revoked, or suspended for such time as the court may prescribe; provided, that the court, in lieu of revocation or suspension, may, in its discretion, reprimand such attorney. “(5) Appeal. — The person or persons making the complaint or the defendant, may, as of right, appeal from the judgment of the court to the Supreme Court of Virginia, by petition based upon a true transcript of the record, which shall be made up and certified as in actions at law. In all such cases where a defendant's license to practice law has been revoked by the judgment of the court, his privilege to practice law shall be suspended pending appeal.” Effective July 1, 1981, the judge issuing the rule to show cause will not participate in disciplinary cases, which are to be heard by three judges designated by the chief justice from any circuit other than the one in which the case is pending. At the time Consumers Union sought to canvass Virginia attorneys, Disciplinary Rule 2-102 (A) of the State Bar Code provided in pertinent part: “A lawyer or law firm shall not use professional cards, professional announcement cards, office signs, letterheads, telephone directory listings, law lists, legal directory listings, or similar professional notices or devices, except that the following may be used if they are in dignified form: (6) A listing in a reputable law list or legal directory giving brief biographical and other informative data. . . . The published data may include only the following: name, including name of law firm and names of professional associates; addresses and telephone numbers; one or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm concentrates; a statement that practice is limited to one or more fields of law; a statement that the lawyer or law firm specializes in a particular field of law or law practice . . . ; date and place of birth; date and place of admission to the bar of state and federal courts; schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees, and other scholastic distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; military service; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; memberships, offices, committee assignments, and section memberships in bar associations; memberships and offices in legal fraternities and legal societies; technical and professional associations and societies; foreign language ability; names and addresses of references, and, with their consent, names of clients regularly represented.” The District Court’s final order provided in pertinent part: “1. The publication described in plaintiff’s complaint, as amended, is declared valid and constitutionally protected; “2. The Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 2-102 (A) (6) is declared unconstitutional on its face; “3. The defendants, their successors in office, their agents and attorneys and all acting in concert therewith are permanently enjoined from enforcement of Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 2-102 (A) (6).” The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act was enacted into law on October 19, 1976, five months after the trial in this action and two months before the District Court’s initial decision. The Act is applicable in this case because Congress intended for the Act to apply to actions that were pending when the Act was passed. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 694-695, n. 23 (1978). Judge Warriner dissented on the grounds that legislative immunity barred an award of attorney’s fees and that it would be unjust to award attorney’s fees against a state supreme court in the absence of a showing of bad faith. 470 F. Supp., at 1063. As indicated in the text, the motion to dismiss the appeal rested on the failure of appellants to have raised the immunity issue at an earlier time. We noted probable jurisdiction, and appellees’ brief on the merits has not again urged that the claim of immunity was not timely raised either with respect to the fee question alone or with respect to the entry of prospective relief against the Virginia Court and its chief justice. Their arguments, like those of appellants, are centered on the issues of judicial and legislative immunity. This seems to be the view of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in its recent holding in Star Distributors, Ltd. v. Marino, 613 F. 2d 4 (1980). That court held that the legislative immunity enjoyed by the members of a state legislative committee bars an action for declaratory and injunctive relief just as it bars an action for damages. Understanding that Tenney was based on the similarity between common-law immunity and the Speech or Debate Clause, the Second Circuit reasoned that legislative immunity should protect state legislators in a manner similar to the protection afforded Congressmen. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have dismissed on immunity grounds suits seeking both damages and injunctive relief but without separately addressing the issue of immunity from prospective relief. Safety Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F. 2d 1251 (CA5 1976); Smith v. Klecker, 554 F. 2d 848 (CA8 1977); Green v. DeCamp, 612 F. 2d 368 (CA8 1980). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, takes the contrary view and rejects the notion that the legislative immunity enjoyed by state officials bars suits for prospective relief. Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F. 2d 597 (1963); Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F. 2d 225, 230 (1973). Both opinions of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, were rendered prior to this Court’s decision in Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U. S. 491 (1975). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit may have a similar view with respect to the immunity enjoyed by officials of a regional body exercising both legislative and executive powers. Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 F. 2d 1353 (1977). Contrary to appellees’ suggestion, we do not view Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391 (1979), as indicating our approval of injunctive relief against a regional legislative body or its officers. No injunctive relief had been awarded when Lake Country Estates reached this Court. Although it is not entirely clear, the Court of Appeals in that case seemed to believe that immunity would not bar a suit for equitable relief against officials of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA). The court did not specify whether equitable relief could be founded on acts for which the officials would otherwise enjoy legislative immunity, and this Court did not have occasion to express any view on this question because the TRPA never challenged this aspect of the Court of Appeals’ decision. We simply affirmed the Court of Appeals’ holding that TRPA officials could not be held liable in damages for their legislative acts. Of course, legislators sued for enacting a state bar code might also succeed in obtaining dismissals at the outset on grounds other than legislative immunity, such as the lack of a case or controversy. The Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits are of the view that judicial immunity does not extend to declaratory and injunctive relief. Heimbach v. Village of Lyons, 597 F. 2d 344, 347 (CA2 1979); Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F. 2d 811, 814 (CA4 1975); Fowler v. Alexander, 478 F. 2d 694, 696 (CA4 1973); Harris v. Harvey, 605 F. 2d 330, 335, n. 7 (CA7 1979); Hansen v. Ahlgrimm, 520 F. 2d 768, 769 (CA7 1975); Jacobson v. Schaefer, 441 F. 2d 127, 130 (CA7 1971). Three other Courts of Appeals, the Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits seem to agree. Kelsey v. Fitzgerald, 574 F. 2d 443, 444 (CA8 1978); Williams v. Williams, 532 F. 2d 120, 121-122 (CA8 1976); Shipp v. Todd, 568 F. 2d 133, 134 (CA9 1978); Briggs v. Goodwin, 186 U. S. App. D. C. 179, 184, n. 4, 569 F. 2d 10, 15, n. 4 (1977). It is rare, however, that any kind of relief has been entered against judges in actions brought under § 1983 and seeking to restrain or otherwise control or affect the future performance of their adjudicative role. Such suits have been recurringly dismissed for a variety of reasons other than immunity. Hence, the question of awarding attorney's fees against judges will not often arise. Although we did not address the issue, a state judge was among the defendants in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225 (1972), where the Court held that § 1983 served to pierce the shield of 28 U. S. C. § 2283 against a federal court enjoining state-court proceedings. The Court did say, quoting from Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 346 (1880), to this effect, that § 1983 was designed to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against all state action, whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial. The Court also noted that the proponents of § 1983 at the time it was enacted insisted that state courts were being used to harass and injure citizens, perhaps because they were powerless to stop deprivations or were in league with those who were bent upon abrogating federally-protected rights. 407 U. S., at 242. In Boyle v. Landry, 401 U. S. 77 (1971), and O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488 (1974), lower courts had entered injunctions against state officials including state-court judges. In each case, we reversed on the grounds that no case or controversy had been made out against any of the appellants in this Court; and in O’Shea, we concluded that even assuming that there was a case or controversy, insufficient grounds for equitable relief had been presented. We did not suggest, however, that judges were immune from suit in their judicial capacity. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), involved a judgment against state-court judges and a prosecuting official declaring unconstitutional and enjoining the enforcement of certain state statutes. The prosecutor brought the case to this Court. We affirmed the declaration that the Florida procedures at issue were unconstitutional and held that Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), did not bar injunctive relief in the circumstances of the case. No issue of absolute immunity was raised or addressed. Of course, as Boyle v. Landry, supra, and O’Shea v. Littleton, supra, indicate, mere enforcement authority does not create a case or controversy with the enforcement official; but in the circumstances of this case, a sufficiently concrete dispute is as well made out against the Virginia Court as an enforcer as against the State Bar itself. See Person v. Association of the Bar of New York, 554 F. 2d 534, 536-537 (CA2 1977). Although appellants argued below that the Virginia Court as an entity is not a "person” suable under § 1983, they have not raised this issue before this Court. In any event, prospective relief was properly awarded against the chief justice in his official capacity; and absent a valid claim of immunity, the question remains whether the District Court’s award of attorney’s fees was proper. Although we would not have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 to decide the attorney’s fees question had it alone been appealed, because the case is properly here on the § 1983 issue we have jurisdiction to decide the attorney’s fees issue. Cf. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 404-405 (1970). The District Court derived this standard from the Senate Committee Report on the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, which stated: “It is intended that the standards for awarding fees be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the statutes covered by [the Act], if successful, ‘should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.’ Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 402 (1968).” S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 4 (1976).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BARBER, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, v. GONZALES. No. 431. Argued March 10, 1954. Decided June 7, 1954. Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Robert L. Stern, then Acting Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General Olney and Beatrice Rosenberg. Blanch Freedman argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was Lloyd E. McMurray. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent was born in the Philippine Islands in 1913 and came therefrom to the continental United States in 1930. He has lived here ever since. In 1941, he was convicted in the State of California of assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year in the Alameda County jail. In 1950, he was convicted in the State of Washington of second degree burglary and was sentenced under the indeterminate sentence law of that State to a minimum term of two years in the state penitentiary. In 1951, after an administrative hearing, he was ordered deported to the Philippine Islands under § 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917 as an alien who “after entry” had been sentenced more than once to imprisonment for terms of one year or more for crimes involving moral turpitude. 39 Stat. 889, as amended, formerly 8 U. S. C. § 155 (a). After respondent was taken into custody, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The petition attacked the validity of the deportation order on the ground, among others, that he was not subject to deportation under § 19 (a) since he had not made an “entry” within the meaning of that section. The District Court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with one judge dissenting, reversed the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case with directions to order respondent’s release from custody. 207 F. 2d 398. We granted cer-tiorari. 346 U. S.914. The sole question presented is whether respondent— who was born a national of the United States in the Philippine Islands, who came to the continental United States as a national prior to the Philippine Independence Act of 1934, and who was sentenced to imprisonment in 1941 and 1950 for crimes involving moral turpitude — may now be deported under § 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917. It is conceded that respondent was born a national of the United States; that as such he owed permanent allegiance to the United States, including the obligation of military service; that he retained this status when he came to the continental United States in 1930 and hence was not then subject to the Immigration Act of 1917 or any other federal statute relating to the exclusion or deportation of aliens. The Government, however, contends that respondent’s status as a national was changed by the Philippine Independence Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 456, which provided for the eventual independence of the Philippines, subsequently achieved in 1946, 60 Stat. 1352. Section 8 (a)(1) of the 1934 Act provides: “For the purposes of the Immigration Act of 1917, . . . this section, and all other laws of the United States relating to the immigration, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens, citizens of the Philippine Islands who are not citizens of the United States shall be considered as if they were aliens. For such purposes the Philippine Islands shall be considered as a separate country and shall have for each fiscal year a quota of fifty.” The Government urges that the reference in §8 (a)(1) to “citizens of the Philippine Islands” includes Filipinos then residing in the United States; that by virtue of this provision the respondent was assimilated to the status of an alien for purposes of “immigration, exclusion, or expulsion”; and that, having been twice convicted thereafter of crimes involving moral turpitude, he is deportable under § 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917. The Government’s argument is premised on the assumption that respondent made an “entry” within the meaning of § 19 (a). If he did not make such an “entry,” then he is not deportable under that section, even assuming that the Government is correct in its broad construction of the 1934 Philippine Independence Act. Section 19 (a) provides: “. . . except as hereinafter provided, any alien who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude, committed within five years after the entry of the alien to the United States, or who is hereafter sentenced more than once to such a term of imprisonment because of conviction in this country of any crime involving moral turpitude, committed at any time after entry . . . shall, upon the warrant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and deported. . . (Italics added.) The Court of Appeals sustained respondent’s contention that he had never made the requisite “entry.” With this conclusion, we agree. The Government would have us interpret “entry” in § 19 (a) in its “ordinary, everyday sense” of a “coming into the United States.” Under this view, respondent’s “coming into the United States” from the Philippine Islands in 1930 would satisfy the “entry” requirement. While it is true that statutory language should be interpreted whenever possible according to common usage, some terms acquire a special technical meaning by a process of judicial construction. So it is with the word “entry” in § 19 (a). E. g., Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388; United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U. S. 398; Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F. 2d 878; Del Guercio v. Gabot, 161 F. 2d 559. Cf. United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U. S. 422, 425. In United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, supra, at 401, this Court stated the applicable rule: “The word 'entry’ [in § 19 (a)] by its own force implies a coming from outside. The context shows that in order that there be an entry within the meaning of the Act there must be an arrival from some foreign port or place. There is no such entry where one goes to sea on board an American vessel from a port of the United States and returns to the same or another port of this country without having been in any foreign port or place.” (Italics added.) See also United States ex rel. Stapf v. Corsi, 287 U. S. 129, 132; Carmichael v. Delaney, 170 F. 2d 239, 242-243. This concept of “entry” was codified by Congress in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. At the time respondent came to the continental United States, he was not arriving “from some foreign port or place.” On the contrary, he was a United States national moving from one of our insular possessions to the mainland. It was not until the 1934 Philippine Independence Act that the Philippines could be regarded as “foreign” for immigration purposes. Having made no “entry,” respondent is not deportable under § 19 (a) as an alien who “after entry” committed crimes involving moral turpitude. The Government warns that this conclusion is inconsistent with a broad congressional purpose to terminate the United States residence of alien criminals. But we believe a different conclusion would not be permissible in view of the well-settled meaning of “entry” in § 19 (a). Although not penal in character, deportation statutes as a practical matter may inflict “the equivalent of banishment or exile,” Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U. S. 6, 10, and should be strictly construed. See Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388, 391. In the absence of explicit language showing a contrary congressional intent, we must give technical words in deportation statutes their usual technical meaning. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. From the Spanish cession in 1898 until final independence in 1946, the Philippine Islands were American territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 674-676. Persons born in the Philippines during this period were American nationals entitled to the protection of the United States and conversely owing permanent allegiance to the United States. They could not be excluded from this country under a general statute relating to the exclusion of “aliens.” See Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U. S. 1, 12-13; Toyota v. United States, 268 U. S. 402, 411. But, until 1946, neither could they become United States citizens. See Toyota v. United States, supra; 60 Stat. 416. In the Volpe case, the Court stated: “We accept the view that the word ‘entry’ ... [in § 19 (a)] . . . includes any coming of an alien from a foreign country into the United States whether such coming be the first or any subsequent one. And this requires affirmance of the challenged judgment. . . . That the second coming of an alien from a foreign country into the United States is an entry within the usual acceptation of that word is clear enough from Lewis v. Frick, 233 U. S. 291; Claussen v. Day, 279 U. S. 398. An examination of the Immigration Act of 1917, we think, reveals nothing sufficient to indicate that Congress did not intend the word ‘entry’ in § 19 should have its ordinary meaning.” (Italics added.) The context of the latter sentence makes it clear that the Court regarded the word’s “ordinary meaning” as being “any coming of an alien from a foreign country.” In the Delgadillo case, supra, the Court narrowed this definition even further by holding that a resident alien does not make an “entry” from a foreign country if his arrival in the foreign country was unintentional. Section 101 (a) (13) of the 1952 Act, 66 Stat. 167, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a) (13), provides in pertinent part: “The term ‘entry’ means any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession . . . .” Section 101 (a) (29), 66 Stat. 170, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a) (29), defines “outlying possessions” as American Samoa and Swains Island. By a special provision in the 1952 Act, the exclusion process is made applicable to any alien coming to the continental United States from Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands. 66 Stat. 188, 8 U. S. C. §1182 (d) (7). The respondent also attacks the validity of the deportation order on the grounds: (1) that he made no “entry” because he was not an alien when he came to this country; (2) that §8 (a)(1) of the 1934 Philippine Independence Act did not apply to Filipinos already residing here and that hence he was not an alien in 1941 when he was sentenced for one of the two crimes involved in this proceeding; (3) that he is not an alien today because Congress lacked the power to deprive him of his status as a national. Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to consider these contentions.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Petitioner v. Elizabeth S. JACOBS et al. No. 12-815. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Nov. 5, 2013. Decided Dec. 10, 2013. Syllabus* Sprint Communications, Inc. (Sprint), a national telecommunications service provider, withheld payment of intercarrier access fees imposed by Windstream Iowa Communications, Inc. (Windstream), a local telecommunications carrier, for long distance Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) calls, after concluding that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 preempted intrastate regulation of VoIP traffic. Windstream responded by threatening to block all Sprint customer calls, which led Sprint to ask the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB) to enjoin Windstream from discontinuing service to Sprint. Windstream retracted its threat, and Sprint moved to withdraw its complaint. Concerned that the dispute would recur, the IUB continued the proceedings in order to resolve the question whether VoIP calls are subject to intrastate regulation. Rejecting Sprint's argument that this question was governed by federal law, the IUB ruled that intrastate fees applied to VoIP calls. Sprint sued respondents, IUB members (collectively IUB), in Federal District Court, seeking a declaration that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 preempted the IUB's decision. As relief, Sprint sought an injunction against enforcement of the IUB's order. Sprint also sought review of the IUB's order in Iowa state court, reiterating the preemption argument made in Sprint's federal-court complaint and asserting several other claims. Invoking Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669, the Federal District Court abstained from adjudicating Sprint's complaint in deference to the parallel state-court proceeding. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's abstention decision, concluding that Younger abstention was required because the ongoing state-court review concerned Iowa's important interest in regulating and enforcing state utility rates. Held: This case does not fall within any of the three classes of exceptional cases for which Younger abstention is appropriate. Pp. 590 - 594. (a) The District Court had jurisdiction to decide whether federal law preempted the IUB's decision, see Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871, and thus had a "virtually unflagging obligation" to hear and decide the case, Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483. In Younger, this Court recognized an exception to that obligation for cases in which there is a parallel, pending state criminal proceeding. This Court has extended Younger abstention to particular state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions, see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482, or that implicate a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts, see Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1, but has reaffirmed that "only exceptional circumstances justify a federal court's refusal to decide a case in deference to the States," New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298( NOPSI ).NOPSI identified three such "exceptional circumstances." First, Younger precludes federal intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions. See 491 U.S., at 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506. Second, certain "civil enforcement proceedings" warrant Younger abstention. Ibid. Finally, federal courts should refrain from interfering with pending "civil proceedings involving certain orders ... uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions." Ibid. This Court has not applied Younger outside these three "exceptional" categories, and rules, in accord with NOPSI, that they define Younger 's scope. Pp. 590 - 592. (b) The initial IUB proceeding does not fall within any of NOPSI 's three exceptional categories and therefore does not trigger Younger abstention. The first and third categories plainly do not accommodate the IUB's proceeding, which was civil, not criminal in character, and which did not touch on a state court's ability to perform its judicial function. Nor is the IUB's order an act of civil enforcement of the kind to which Younger has been extended . The IUB proceeding is not "akin to a criminal prosecution." Huffman, 420 U.S., at 604, 95 S.Ct. 1200. Nor was it initiated by "the State in its sovereign capacity," Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444, 97 S.Ct. 1911, 52 L.Ed.2d 486, to sanction Sprint for some wrongful act, see, e.g.,Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423, 433-434, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116. Rather, the action was initiated by Sprint, a private corporation. No state authority conducted an investigation into Sprint's activities or lodged a formal complaint against Sprint. Once Sprint withdrew the complaint that commenced administrative proceedings, the IUB argues, those proceedings became, essentially, a civil enforcement action. However, the IUB's adjudicative authority was invoked to settle a civil dispute between two private parties, not to sanction Sprint for a wrongful act. In holding that abstention was the proper course, the Eighth Circuit misinterpreted this Court's decision in Middlesex to mean that Younger abstention is warranted whenever there is (1) "an ongoing state judicial proceeding, which (2) implicates important state interests, and (3) ... provide [s] an adequate opportunity to raise [federal] challenges." In Middlesex, the Court invoked Younger to bar a federal court from entertaining a lawyer's challenge to a state ethics committee's pending investigation of the lawyer. Unlike the IUB's proceeding, however, the state ethics committee's hearing in Middlesex was plainly "akin to a criminal proceeding": An investigation and formal complaint preceded the hearing, an agency of the State's Supreme Court initiated the hearing, and the hearing's purpose was to determine whether the lawyer should be disciplined for failing to meet the State's professional conduct standards. 457 U.S., at 433-435, 102 S.Ct. 2515. The three Middlesex conditions invoked by the Court of Appeals were therefore not dispositive; they were, instead, additional factors appropriately considered by the federal court before invoking Younger.Younger extends to the three "exceptional circumstances" identified in NOPSI, but no further. Pp. 591 - 594. 690 F.3d 864, reversed. GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. David J. Lynch, Des Moines, IA, for Respondents. David J. Lynch, Counsel of Record, Mary F. Whitman, Des Moines, IA, for Respondents. Christopher J. Wright, Counsel of Record, Timothy J. Simeone, Mark D. Davis, Wiltshire & Grannis LLP, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves two proceedings, one pending in state court, the other in federal court. Each seeks review of an Iowa Utilities Board (IUB or Board) order. And each presents the question whether Windstream Iowa Communications, Inc. (Windstream), a local telecommunications carrier, may impose on Sprint Communications, Inc. (Sprint), intrastate access charges for telephone calls transported via the Internet. Federal-court jurisdiction over controversies of this kind was confirmed in Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002). Invoking Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa abstained from adjudicating Sprint's complaint in deference to the parallel state-court proceeding, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's abstention decision. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In the main, federal courts are obliged to decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction. Abstention is not in order simply because a pending state-court proceeding involves the same subject matter. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 373, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989)( NOPSI ) ("[T]here is no doctrine that ... pendency of state judicial proceedings excludes the federal courts."). This Court has recognized, however, certain instances in which the prospect of undue interference with state proceedings counsels against federal relief. See id., at 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506. Younger exemplifies one class of cases in which federal-court abstention is required: When there is a parallel, pending state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state prosecution. This Court has extended Younger abstention to particular state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions, see Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975), or that implicate a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts, see Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). We have cautioned, however, that federal courts ordinarily should entertain and resolve on the merits an action within the scope of a jurisdictional grant, and should not "refus[e] to decide a case in deference to the States." NOPSI, 491 U.S., at 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506. Circumstances fitting within the Younger doctrine, we have stressed, are "exceptional"; they include, as catalogued in NOPSI, "state criminal prosecutions," "civil enforcement proceedings," and "civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions." Id., at 367-368, 109 S.Ct. 2506. Because this case presents none of the circumstances the Court has ranked as "exceptional," the general rule governs: "[T]he pendency of an action in [a] state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction." Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976) (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282, 30 S.Ct. 501, 54 L.Ed. 762 (1910)). I Sprint, a national telecommunications service provider, has long paid intercarrier access fees to the Iowa communications company Windstream (formerly Iowa Telecom) for certain long distance calls placed by Sprint customers to Windstream's in-state customers. In 2009, however, Sprint decided to withhold payment for a subset of those calls, classified as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), after concluding that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 preempted intrastate regulation of VoIP traffic.1 In response, Windstream threatened to block all calls to and from Sprint customers. Sprint filed a complaint against Windstream with the IUB asking the Board to enjoin Windstream from discontinuing service to Sprint. In Sprint's view, Iowa law entitled it to withhold payment while it contested the access charges and prohibited Windstream from carrying out its disconnection threat. In answer to Sprint's complaint, Windstream retracted its threat to discontinue serving Sprint, and Sprint moved, successfully, to withdraw its complaint. Because the conflict between Sprint and Windstream over VoIP calls was "likely to recur," however, the IUB decided to continue the proceedings to resolve the underlying legal question, i.e., whether VoIP calls are subject to intrastate regulation. Order in Sprint Communications Co. v. Iowa Telecommunications Servs., Inc., No. FCU-2010-0001, 2010 WL 421105 (IUB, Feb. 1, 2010), p. 6 (IUB Order). The question retained by the IUB, Sprint argued, was governed by federal law, and was not within the IUB's adjudicative jurisdiction. The IUB disagreed, ruling that the intrastate fees applied to VoIP calls.2 Seeking to overturn the Board's ruling, Sprint commenced two lawsuits. First, Sprint sued the members of the IUB (respondents here) 3 in their official capacities in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. In its federal-court complaint, Sprint sought a declaration that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 preempted the IUB's decision; as relief, Sprint requested an injunction against enforcement of the IUB's order. Second, Sprint petitioned for review of the IUB's order in Iowa state court. The state petition reiterated the preemption argument Sprint made in its federal-court complaint; in addition, Sprint asserted state law and procedural due process claims. Because Eighth Circuit precedent effectively required a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before proceeding to federal court, see Alleghany Corp. v. McCartney, 896 F.2d 1138 (1990), Sprint urges that it filed the state suit as a protective measure. Failing to do so, Sprint explains, risked losing the opportunity to obtain any review, federal or state, should the federal court decide to abstain after the expiration of the Iowa statute of limitations. See Brief for Petitioner 7-8.4 As Sprint anticipated, the IUB filed a motion asking the Federal District Court to abstain in light of the state suit, citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). The District Court granted the IUB's motion and dismissed the suit. The IUB's decision, and the pending state-court review of it, the District Court said, composed one "uninterruptible process" implicating important state interests. On that ground, the court ruled, Younger abstention was in order. Sprint Communications Co. v. Berntsen, No. 4:11-cv-00183-JAJ (S.D.Iowa, Aug. 1, 2011), App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a. For the most part, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the District Court's judgment. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument, accepted by several of its sister courts, that Younger abstention is appropriate only when the parallel state proceedings are "coercive," rather than "remedial," in nature. 690 F.3d 864, 868 (2012); cf. Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gómez, 585 F.3d 508, 522 (C.A.1 2009) ("[P]roceedings must be coercive, and in most cases, state-initiated, in order to warrant abstention."). Instead, the Eighth Circuit read this Court's precedent to require Younger abstention whenever "an ongoing state judicial proceeding ... implicates important state interests, and ... the state proceedings provide adequate opportunity to raise [federal] challenges." 690 F.3d, at 867 (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982)). Those criteria were satisfied here, the appeals court held, because the ongoing state-court review of the IUB's decision concerned Iowa's "important state interest in regulating and enforcing its intrastate utility rates." 690 F.3d, at 868. Recognizing the "possibility that the parties [might] return to federal court," however, the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment dismissing Sprint's complaint. In lieu of dismissal, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case, instructing the District Court to enter a stay during the pendency of the state-court action. Id., at 869. We granted certiorari to decide whether, consistent with our delineation of cases encompassed by the Younger doctrine, abstention was appropriate here. 569 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1805, 185 L.Ed.2d 810 (2013).5 II A Neither party has questioned the District Court's jurisdiction to decide whether federal law preempted the IUB's decision, and rightly so. In Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002), we reviewed a similar federal-court challenge to a state administrative adjudication. In that case, as here, the party seeking federal-court review of a state agency's decision urged that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 preempted the state action. We had "no doubt that federal courts ha[d federal question] jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C.] § 1331 to entertain such a suit," id., at 642, 122 S.Ct. 1753, and nothing in the Telecommunications Act detracted from that conclusion, see id., at 643, 122 S.Ct. 1753. Federal courts, it was early and famously said, have "no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given." Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821). Jurisdiction existing, this Court has cautioned, a federal court's "obligation" to hear and decide a case is "virtually unflagging." Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). Parallel state-court proceedings do not detract from that obligation. See ibid. In Younger, we recognized a "far-from-novel" exception to this general rule. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989)( NOPSI ). The plaintiff in Younger sought federal-court adjudication of the constitutionality of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act. Requesting an injunction against the Act's enforcement, the federal-court plaintiff was at the time the defendant in a pending state criminal prosecution under the Act. In those circumstances, we said, the federal court should decline to enjoin the prosecution, absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute. See 401 U.S., at 53-54, 91 S.Ct. 746. Abstention was in order, we explained, under "the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act ... to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparably injury if denied equitable relief." Id., at 43-44, 91 S.Ct. 746. "[R]estraining equity jurisdiction within narrow limits," the Court observed, would "prevent erosion of the role of the jury and avoid a duplication of legal proceedings and legal sanctions." Id., at 44, 91 S.Ct. 746. We explained as well that this doctrine was "reinforced" by the notion of " 'comity,' that is, a proper respect for state functions." Ibid. We have since applied Younger to bar federal relief in certain civil actions. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975), is the pathmarking decision. There, Ohio officials brought a civil action in state court to abate the showing of obscene movies in Pursue's theater. Because the State was a party and the proceeding was "in aid of and closely related to [the State's] criminal statutes," the Court held Younger abstention appropriate. Id., at 604, 95 S.Ct. 1200. More recently, in NOPSI, 491 U.S., at 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506, the Court had occasion to review and restate our Younger jurisprudence. NOPSI addressed and rejected an argument that a federal court should refuse to exercise jurisdiction to review a state council's ratemaking decision. "[O]nly exceptional circumstances," we reaffirmed, "justify a federal court's refusal to decide a case in deference to the States." Ibid. Those "exceptional circumstances" exist, the Court determined after surveying prior decisions, in three types of proceedings. First, Younger precluded federal intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions. See ibid. Second, certain "civil enforcement proceedings" warranted abstention. Ibid. (citing, e.g., Huffman, 420 U.S., at 604, 95 S.Ct. 1200). Finally, federal courts refrained from interfering with pending "civil proceedings involving certain orders ... uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions." 491 U.S., at 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506 (citing Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336, n. 12, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977), and Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 13, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987)). We have not applied Younger outside these three "exceptional" categories, and today hold, in accord with NOPSI, that they define Younger 's scope. B The IUB does not assert that the Iowa state court's review of the Board decision, considered alone, implicates Younger. Rather, the initial administrative proceeding justifies staying any action in federal court, the IUB contends, until the state review process has concluded. The same argument was advanced in NOPSI, 491 U.S., at 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506 .We will assume without deciding, as the Court did in NOPSI, that an administrative adjudication and the subsequent state court's review of it count as a "unitary process" for Younger purposes. Id., at 369, 109 S.Ct. 2506. The question remains, however, whether the initial IUB proceeding is of the "sort ... entitled to Younger treatment." Ibid. The IUB proceeding, we conclude, does not fall within any of the three exceptional categories described in NOPSI and therefore does not trigger Younger abstention. The first and third categories plainly do not accommodate the IUB's proceeding. That proceeding was civil, not criminal in character, and it did not touch on a state court's ability to perform its judicial function. Cf. Juidice, 430 U.S., at 336, n. 12, 97 S.Ct. 1211 (civil contempt order); Pennzoil, 481 U.S., at 13, 107 S.Ct. 1519 (requirement for posting bond pending appeal). Nor does the IUB's order rank as an act of civil enforcement of the kind to which Younger has been extended . Our decisions applying Younger to instances of civil enforcement have generally concerned state proceedings "akin to a criminal prosecution" in "important respects." Huffman, 420 U.S., at 604, 95 S.Ct. 1200. See also Middlesex, 457 U.S., at 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515 (Younger abstention appropriate where "noncriminal proceedings bear a close relationship to proceedings criminal in nature"). Such enforcement actions are characteristically initiated to sanction the federal plaintiff, i.e., the party challenging the state action, for some wrongful act. See, e.g.,Middlesex, 457 U.S., at 433-434, 102 S.Ct. 2515 (state-initiated disciplinary proceedings against lawyer for violation of state ethics rules). In cases of this genre, a state actor is routinely a party to the state proceeding and often initiates the action. See, e.g.,Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986) (state-initiated administrative proceedings to enforce state civil rights laws); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 419-420, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979) (state-initiated proceeding to gain custody of children allegedly abused by their parents); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444, 97 S.Ct. 1911, 52 L.Ed.2d 486 (1977) (civil proceeding "brought by the State in its sovereign capacity" to recover welfare payments defendants had allegedly obtained by fraud); Huffman, 420 U.S., at 598, 95 S.Ct. 1200 (state-initiated proceeding to enforce obscenity laws). Investigations are commonly involved, often culminating in the filing of a formal complaint or charges. See, e.g.,Dayton, 477 U.S., at 624, 106 S.Ct. 2718 (noting preliminary investigation and complaint); Middlesex, 457 U.S., at 433, 102 S.Ct. 2515 (same). The IUB proceeding does not resemble the state enforcement actions this Court has found appropriate for Younger abstention. It is not "akin to a criminal prosecution." Huffman, 420 U.S., at 604, 95 S.Ct. 1200. Nor was it initiated by "the State in its sovereign capacity." Trainor, 431 U.S., at 444, 97 S.Ct. 1911. A private corporation, Sprint, initiated the action. No state authority conducted an investigation into Sprint's activities, and no state actor lodged a formal complaint against Sprint. In its brief, the IUB emphasizes Sprint's decision to withdraw the complaint that commenced proceedings before the Board. At that point, the IUB argues, Sprint was no longer a willing participant, and the proceedings became, essentially, a civil enforcement action. See Brief for Respondents 31. 6 The IUB's adjudicative authority, however, was invoked to settle a civil dispute between two private parties, not to sanction Sprint for commission of a wrongful act. Although Sprint withdrew its complaint, administrative efficiency, not misconduct by Sprint, prompted the IUB to answer the underlying federal question. By determining the intercarrier compensation regime applicable to VoIP calls, the IUB sought to avoid renewed litigation of the parties' dispute. Because the underlying legal question remained unsettled, the Board observed, the controversy was "likely to recur." IUB Order 6. Nothing here suggests that the IUB proceeding was "more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases." Huffman, 420 U.S., at 604, 95 S.Ct. 1200 . In holding that abstention was the proper course, the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on this Court's decision in Middlesex.Younger abstention was warranted, the Court of Appeals read Middlesex to say, whenever three conditions are met: There is (1) "an ongoing state judicial proceeding, which (2) implicates important state interests, and (3) ... provide[s] an adequate opportunity to raise [federal] challenges." 690 F.3d, at 867 (citing Middlesex, 457 U.S., at 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515). Before this Court, the IUB has endorsed the Eighth Circuit's approach. Brief for Respondents 13. The Court of Appeals and the IUB attribute to this Court's decision in Middlesex extraordinary breadth. We invoked Younger in Middlesex to bar a federal court from entertaining a lawyer's challenge to a New Jersey state ethics committee's pending investigation of the lawyer. Unlike the IUB proceeding here, the state ethics committee's hearing in Middlesex was indeed "akin to a criminal proceeding." As we noted, an investigation and formal complaint preceded the hearing, an agency of the State's Supreme Court initiated the hearing, and the purpose of the hearing was to determine whether the lawyer should be disciplined for his failure to meet the State's standards of professional conduct. 457 U.S., at 433-435, 102 S.Ct. 2515. See also id., at 438, 102 S.Ct. 2515 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (noting the "quasi-criminal nature of bar disciplinary proceedings"). The three Middlesex conditions recited above were not dispositive; they were, instead, additional factors appropriately considered by the federal court before invoking Younger. Divorced from their quasi-criminal context, the three Middlesex conditions would extend Younger to virtually all parallel state and federal proceedings, at least where a party could identify a plausibly important state interest. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 35-36. That result is irreconcilable with our dominant instruction that, even in the presence of parallel state proceedings, abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the "exception, not the rule." Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984) (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S., at 813, 96 S.Ct. 1236). In short, to guide other federal courts, we today clarify and affirm that Younger extends to the three "exceptional circumstances" identified in NOPSI, but no further. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is Reversed. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499. The Federal Communications Commission has yet to provide its view on whether the Telecommunications Act categorically preempts intrastate access charges for VoIP calls. See In re Connect America Fund, 26 FCC Rcd. 17663, 18002, ¶ 934 (2011) (reserving the question whether all VoIP calls "must be subject exclusively to federal regulation"). At the conclusion of the IUB proceedings, Sprint paid Windstream all contested fees. For convenience, we refer to respondents collectively as the IUB. Since we granted certiorari, the Iowa state court issued an opinion rejecting Sprint's preemption claim on the merits. Sprint Communications Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., No. CV-8638, App. to Joint Supp. Brief 20a-36a (Iowa Dist.Ct., Sept. 16, 2013). The Iowa court decision does not, in the parties' view, moot this case, see Joint Supp. Brief 1, and we agree. Because Sprint intends to appeal the state-court decision, the "controversy ... remains live." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291, n. 7, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). The IUB agrees with Sprint that our decision in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943), cannot independently sustain the Eighth Circuit's abstention analysis. See Brief for Respondents 9; cf. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MIDLANTIC NATIONAL BANK v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION No. 84-801. Argued October 16, 1985 Decided January 27, 1986 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and White and O’CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 507. A. Dennis Terrell argued the cause for petitioner in No. 84-801. With him on the brief was Kenneth S. Kasper. William F. McEnroe argued the cause for petitioner in No. 84-805. With him on the brief was Thomas J. O’Neill, pro se. Mary C. Jacobson, Deputy Attorney General of New Jersey, argued the cause for respondent in No. 84-801. With her on the brief were Irwin I. Kimmelman, Attorney General, James J. Ciancia, Assistant Attorney General, and Richard F. Engel and Ross A. Lewin, Deputy Attorneys General. Robert Hermann, Solicitor General of New York, argued the cause for respondents in No. 84-805. With him on the brief were Robert Abrams, Attorney General, Nancy Stearns, Norman Spiegel, and Christopher Keith Hall, Assistant Attorneys General, Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., and Leonard Koerner. Together with No. 84-805, O’Neill, Trustee in Bankruptcy of Quanta Resources Corp., Debtor v. City of New York et al., and O’Neill, Trustee in Bankruptcy of Quanta Resources Corp., Debtor v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, also on certiorari to the same court. Thomas H. Jackson, pro se, filed a brief as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the United States by Acting Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Habicht, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, Kathryn A. Oberly, and Dirk D. Snel; for the State of California by John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, Theodora Berger, Assistant Attorney General, and Reed Sato, Lisa S. Trankley, and Craig C. Thompson, Deputy Attorneys General; and for the State of West Virginia et al. by Charlie Brown, Attorney General of West Virginia, Steven Johnston Knopp, Assistant Attorney General, James D. Morris, and Howard J. Wein. Ronald A. Zumbrun and Robert K. Best filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. These petitions for certiorari, arising out of the same bankruptcy proceeding, present the question whether § 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 554(a), authorizes a trustee in bankruptcy to abandon property in contravention of state laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to protect the public’s health or safety. HH Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) processed waste oil at two facilities, one in Long Island City, New York, and the other in Edgewater, New Jersey. At the Edgewater facility, Quanta handled the oil pursuant to a temporary operating permit issued by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), respondent in No. 84-801. In June 1981, Midlantic National Bank, petitioner in No. 84-801, provided Quanta with a $600,000 loan secured by Quanta’s inventory, accounts receivable, and certain equipment. The same month, NJDEP discovered that Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operating permit by accepting more than 400,000 gallons of oil contaminated with PCB, a highly toxic carcinogen. NJDEP ordered Quanta to cease operations at Edgewater, and the two began negotiations concerning the cleanup of the Edgewater site. But on October 6, 1981, before the conclusion of negotiations, Quanta filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The next day, NJDEP issued an administrative order requiring Quanta to clean up the site. Quanta’s financial condition remained perilous, however, and the following month, it converted the action to a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7. Thomas J. O’Neill, petitioner in No. 84-805, was appointed trustee in bankruptcy, and subsequently oversaw abandonment of both facilities. After Quanta filed for bankruptcy, an investigation of the Long Island City facility revealed that Quanta had accepted and stored there over 70,000 gallons of toxic, PCB-contaminated oil in deteriorating and leaking containers. Since the mortgages on that facility’s real property exceeded the property’s value, the estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil plainly rendered the property a net burden to the estate. After trying without success to sell the Long Island City property for the benefit of Quanta’s creditors, the trustee notified the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey that he intended to abandon the property pursuant to § 554(a). No party to the bankruptcy proceeding disputed the trustee’s allegation that the site was “burdensome” and of “inconsequential value to the estate” within the meaning of § 554. The City and the State of New York (collectively New York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected, contending that abandonment would threaten the public’s health and safety, and would violate state and federal environmental law. New York rested its objection on “public policy” considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and on the requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b) that a trustee “manage and operate” the property of the estate “according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated.” New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order that the assets of the estate be used to bring the facility into compliance with applicable law. After briefing and argument, the court approved the abandonment, noting that “[t]he City and State are in a better position in every respect than either the Trustee or debtor’s creditors to do what needs to be done to protect the public against the dangers posed by the PCB-contaminated facility.” The District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed, and New York appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the 24-hour guard service and shut down the fire-suppression system. It became necessary for New York to decontaminate the facility, with the exception of the polluted subsoil, at a cost of about $2.5 million. On April 23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had approved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave notice of his intention to abandon the personal property at the Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contaminated oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment on May 20, over NJDEP’s objection that the estate had sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed by the hazardous waste. Because the abandonments of the New Jersey and New York facilities presented identical issues, the parties in the New Jersey litigation consented to NJDEP’s taking a direct appeal from the Bankruptcy Court to the Court of Appeals pursuant to § 405(c)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912 (1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927 (1984). Although the court found little guidance in the legislative history of § 554, it concluded that Congress had intended to codify the judge-made abandonment practice developed under the previous Bankruptcy Act. Under that law, where state law or general equitable principles protected certain public interests, those interests were not overridden by the judge-made abandonment power. The court also found evidence in other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that Congress did not intend to pre-empt all state regulation, but only that grounded on policies outweighed by the relevant federal interests. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the Bankruptcy Court erred in permitting abandonment, and remanded both cases for further proceedings. We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed § 554, 469 U. S. 1207 (1985). We now affirm. HH f-H Before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee’s abandonment power had been limited by a judicially developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state or federal interests. This was made clear by the few relevant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4 1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could not abandon several barges when the abandonment would have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal law. The court stated: “The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the public interest.” Id., at 290. In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA7), cert. denied sub nom. Chicago Junction R. Co. v. Sprague, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease its operation of a branch railway line when local law required continued operation. While the court did not forbid the trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 BCD 277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the Bankruptcy Court invoked its equitable power to “safeguard the public interest” by requiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam lines before abandoning them. Thus, when Congress enacted §554, there were well-recognized restrictions on a trustee’s abandonment power. In codifying the judicially developed rule of abandonment, Congress also presumably included the established corollary that a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in violation of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979). The Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from nonbankruptcy law, “the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable considerations of convenience in administering the estate of the bankrupt.” Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444 (1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939) (“If this old and familiar power of the states [over local railroad service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find language fitting for so drastic a change”). Although these cases do not define for us the exact contours of the trustee’s abandonment power, they do make clear that this power was subject to certain restrictions when Congress enacted § 554(a). I — I I — I H-i Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to abandon property in contravention of state or local laws designed to protect public health or safety. As we held last Term when the State of Ohio sought compensation for cleaning the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation: “Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of the site — whether it is [the debtor] or another in the event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee abandons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the bankruptcy trustee — must comply with the environmental laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of the State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions.” Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U. S. 274, 285 (1985) (emphasis added). Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative determination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ignore nonbankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there was no common-law limitation on that power, Congress has expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to governmental interest in public health and safety. Infra, at 503-504. One cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limitations upon other aspects of trustees’ operations, intended to discard a well-established judicial restriction on the abandonment power. As we held nearly two years ago in the context of the National Labor Relations Act, “the debtor-in-possession is not relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing a petition for bankruptcy.” NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U. S. 513, 534 (1984). The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, § 362(a), has been described as “one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws.” S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of § 362(a) in preserving the debtor’s estate, Congress has enacted several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the Government to commence or continue legal proceedings. For example, § 362(b)(5) permits the Government to enforce “nonmone-tary” judgments against a debtor’s estate. It is clear from the legislative history that one of the purposes of this exception is to protect public health and safety: “Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989, supra, at 52 (emphasis added). Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, however, fails to acknowledge the differences between the predecessors of §§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions to the judicially created abandonment power were firmly established. But in enacting §362 in 1978, Congress significantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W. Norton, Bankruptcy Law and Practice §20.03, pp. 5-6 (1981), an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., §20.02, at 4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the expanded automatic stay to foreclose States’ efforts to enforce their antipollution laws, and Congress wanted to overrule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to limit this new power expressly. Title 28 U. S. C. § 959(b) provides additional evidence that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws. Section 959(b) commands the trustee to “manage and operate the property in his possession ... according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State.” Petitioners have contended that § 959(b) is relevant only when the trustee is actually operating the business of the debtor, and not when he is liquidating it. Even though § 959(b) does not directly apply to an abandonment under § 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code — and therefore does not delimit the precise conditions on an abandonment — the section nevertheless supports our conclusion that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre-empt all state laws that otherwise constrain the exercise of a trustee’s powers. r*H <1 Although the reasons elaborated above suffice for us to conclude that Congress did not intend for the abandonment power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find additional support for restricting that power in repeated congressional emphasis on its “goal of protecting the environment against toxic pollution.” Chemical Manufacturers Assn., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S. 116, 143 (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U. S. C. §§6901-6987, to regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after their permanent disposal. That Act authorizes the United States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities involving hazardous wastes that “may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. ” 42 U. S. C. §6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983). Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened the regulatory restraints in 1984. In the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress established a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and required certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or the parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empowers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be necessary to avert “imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance.” 42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress’ undisputed concern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume that by enactment of § 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned longstanding restrictions on the common-law abandonment power. V In the light of the Bankruptcy trustee’s restricted pre-1978 abandonment power and the limited scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that Congress did not intend for § 554(a) to pre-empt all state and local laws. The Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize an abandonment without formulating conditions that will adequately protect the public’s health and safety. Accordingly, without reaching the question whether certain state laws imposing conditions on abandonment may be so onerous as to interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself, we hold that a trustee may not abandon property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from identified hazards. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. It is so ordered. Section 554(a) reads: “After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate.” Technical amendments in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 added the words “and benefit” after “value” in § 554(a). Pub. L. 98-353, Tit. Ill, § 468(a), 98 Stat. 380. The sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may abandon property under § 554 in contravention of local laws designed to protect the public’s health and safety. New York is claiming reimbursement for its expenditures as an administrative expense. That question, however, like the question of the ultimate disposition of the property, is not before us. The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents. Moreover, the trustee’s abandonment at both sites aggravated already existing dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry, vandalism, and fire. Joint Appendix in No. 83-5142 (CA3), pp. 11-12 (affidavit of Richard Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for N. Y. City Fire Department); id., at 26 (transcript of proceedings before DeVito, J.). The 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil in unguarded, deteriorating containers “present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic damage, or death through personal contact.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 23; see Joint Appendix, supra, at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Appendix in No. 83-5730 (CA3), p. A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey site); id., at A46 (deteriorating containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11 (deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 (guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); id., at 11 (contamination of adjacent areas); id., at 20 (health effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives). Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that §554 permits abandonment without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic stay. The dissent further contended that the majority’s interpretation of § 554 raised substantial questions under the Takings Clause by potentially destroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to address the important underlying issue of the priority of the States’ claims for reimbursement. Section 362(a) provides: “(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. 78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of— “(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; “(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title; “(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate; “(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate; “(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; “(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; “(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; and “(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor.” See, e. g., In re Hillsdale Foundry Co., 1 BCD 195 (Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to enforce State’s antipollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The House Report also referred to an unreported case from Texas where a stay prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor’s plant that was polluting a river in violation of the State’s environmental protection laws. H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, pp. 174-175 (1977). Section 959(b) provides: “Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof.” Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected many more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. § 6921(d) (1982 ed., Supp. III)). Another provision automatically broadens the Act’s coverage by automatically assigning a hazardous rating to substances that the Environmental Protection Agency does not classify by a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. §§6924(d), (e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (1982 ed., Supp. III)). Amended enforcement provisions allow more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. § 6973 (1982 ed., Supp. Ill)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel “corrective action” after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at 42 U. S. C. § 6928(h) (1982 ed., Supp. III)). This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by § 554 is a narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and identifiable harm.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TOOAHNIPPAH (GOOMBI), ADMINISTRATRIX, et al. v. HICKEL, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al. No. 300. Argued January 14, 1970 Decided April 27, 1970 Omer huellen argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. Richard B, Stone argued the cause for respondent Hickel, pro hac vice. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Kashiwa, Edmund B. Clark, and Robert S. Lynch. Houston Bus Hill argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Horse. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted the writ to review the action of the Court of Appeals holding that the decision of the Regional Solicitor, acting for the Secretary of the Interior, disapproving the will of a Comanche Indian constitutes final and unreviewable agency action. We conclude that such decision is subject to judicial review. George Chahsenah, a Comanche Indian, died on October 11, 1963, unmarried and without a surviving father, mother, brother, or sister. His estate consisted of interests in three Comanche allotments situated in Oklahoma under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior. Shortly after Chahsenah’s death, the value of those interests was fixed at $34,867. On March 14, 1963, Chahsenah had made a will devising and bequeathing his estate to a niece, Viola Atewooftakewa Tate, and her three children, these devisees or their representatives being the petitioners herein. Chahsenah had resided with this niece a considerable portion of the later years of his life. His will made no mention of a surviving daughter, but stated that he was leaving nothing to his “heirs at law ... for the reason that they have shown no interest in me.” The beneficiaries under the will sought to have it approved by the Secretary of the Interior, as required by 25 U. S. C. § 373. A hearing was had before an Examiner of Inheritance, Office of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior. Dorita High Horse, claiming as sole surviving issue, and certain nieces and nephews of the testator contended that the will was not entitled to departmental approval, arguing that due to the effects of chronic alcoholism, cirrhosis of the liver, and diabetes, George Chahsenah was incompetent to make a will. Pursuant to the provisions of § 5 of the Act of February 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, 25 U. S. C. § 371, if Chah-senah had died intestate his putative daughter, Dorita High Horse, would have been an heir at law, whether or not her parents were married. The Examiner found that the will of March 14, 1963, drawn on a form printed by the Department of the Interior for that purpose, was Chahsenah’s last will and testament and that it had been prepared by an attorney employed by the Department of the Interior who advised the testator concerning the will. He also found that at the time the will was made the attorney and the witnesses executed an affidavit attesting that the will was properly made and executed, and that the decedent was of sound and disposing mind and memory and not acting under undue influence, fraud, duress, or coercion at the time of its execution. The Examiner found that Dorita High Horse was George Chahsenah’s illegitimate daughter and his sole heir at law. He concluded, however, that the evidence presented by the contestants was not sufficient to outweigh the presumption of correctness attaching to a properly executed will, in addition to which were the unimpeached statements of the draftsman and witnesses that Chahsenah possessed testamentary capacity. The Examiner concluded that the testator’s failure to provide for Dorita High Horse was not unnatural since there was no evidence of any close relationship between the two during any part of their lives. The will was approved and distribution in accordance with its provisions was ordered. A petition for rehearing, contending that the evidence did not support the Examiner’s conclusion regarding the decedent’s competency, was denied. An appeal was taken to the Regional Solicitor, Department of the Interior, an officer having authority to make a final decision in the matter on behalf of the Secretary. He concluded that although the evidence supported the Examiner’s finding that decedent’s will met the technical requirements for a valid testamentary instrument, 25 U. S. C. § 373 vested in the Secretary broad authority to approve or disapprove the will. In exercising that discretion, the Regional Solicitor viewed his authority as requiring him to examine all the circumstances to determine whether “approval will most nearly achieve just and equitable treatment of the beneficiaries thereunder and the decedent’s heirs-at-law.” Under this standard he concluded that the decedent, an unemployed person addicted to alcohol and living on the income he received from his inherited land allotments, had not fulfilled his obligations to his illegitimate daughter and had ceased cohabiting with her mother shortly before Dorita’s birth, thus failing to provide her with a “normal home life during her childhood.” The Regional Solicitor concluded that although the daughter was a married adult and could not legally claim support monies from her father or his estate, “it is inappropriate that the Secretary perpetuate this utter disregard for the daughter’s welfare . . . .” Accordingly, he found that under the circumstances the Examiner’s approval of the will was not a reasonable exercise of the discretionary responsibility vested in the Secretary. He thereupon set aside the Examiner’s action, disapproved the will, and ordered the entire estate distributed by intestate succession to Dorita High Horse as sole heir at law. The beneficiaries under the will brought an action against the Secretary of the Interior in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma contending that the action of the Regional Solicitor was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, and that it exceeded the authority conferred upon the Secretary by 25 U. S. C. § 373. The plaintiffs sought to have the District Court review the Regional Solicitor’s action in accord with the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 701-706 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), arguing that the District Court had jurisdiction over the matter by virtue of either that Act or 28 U. S. C. § 1361. Dorita High Horse was allowed to intervene as a party defendant. Both the Secretary and Dorita High Horse moved for summary judgment, contending that the action of the Regional Solicitor was within the authority conferred upon the Secretary, and, as such, is made final and unreviewable by 25 U. S. C. § 373. They also contended that the Regional Solicitor’s decision was in accordance with the evidence, was not arbitrary or capricious, and did not involve an abuse of discretion. Although the Secretary conceded that the District Court had jurisdiction to review the action of the Regional Solicitor, Dorita High Horse contended that neither the Administrative Procedure Act nor 28 U. S. C. § 1361 allowed judicial review. The District Court held that while there was some question as to whether jurisdiction existed under the Administrative Procedure Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1361 did provide a basis for jurisdiction, “in order to effectuate the purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act by providing the review function which the act contemplates.” 277 F. Supp. 464, 465 n. 1. The court then reasoned that, unlike § 1 of the Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 855, 25 U. S. C. § 372, § 2, 36 Stat. 856, as amended by the Act of February 14, 1913, 37 Stat. 678, 25 U. S. C. § 373, contains no language conferring unreviewable finality upon a decision of the Secretary approving or disapproving an Indian’s will. The District Judge concluded that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 701 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), does not preclude judicial review of the Regional Solicitor’s action. On the merits he held that Congress had conferred upon adult Indians the right to make a will, limited only by the requirement that it be approved by the Secretary. The District Court held that the review powers of the Secretary are not so broad as to defeat a plainly expressed and rationally based distribution by one who possessed testamentary capacity. The court concluded that the Regional Solicitor incorrectly viewed the Secretary's powers as authorizing disapproval of any will thought unwise or inequitable, and stated: “Congress has conferred the right to make a will upon the Indian and not upon the Secretary. The Secretary can no more use his approval powers to substitute his will for that of the Indian than he can dictate its terms.” 277 F. Supp., at 468. The case was remanded to the Secretary with directions to approve the will and distribute the estate in accordance with its provisions. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that the Secretary’s action under 25 U. S. C. § 373 was unreviewable. Two basic questions are presented here: First, whether the Secretary’s action is subject to judicial review; and second, if judicial review is available, whether on this record the Secretary’s decision on the validity of the will was within the scope of authority vested in him under 25 U. S. C. § 373. I The Administrative Procedure Act contemplates judicial review of agency action “except to the extent that— (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. . . .” 6 U. S. C. § 701 (1964 ed., Supp. IV). Earlier in this Term in City of Chicago v. United States, 396 U. S. 162, 164 (1969), relying on Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967), we noted that “we start with the presumption that aggrieved persons may obtain review of administrative decisions unless there is ‘persuasive reason to believe' that Congress had no such purpose.” Section 2 of the Act of 1910 contains no language displaying a congressional intention to make unreviewable the Secretary’s approval or disapproval of an Indian’s will. The respondents argue that we should follow the course taken by the Court of Appeals, reading into § 2 the language of the first section of the 1910 Act, which declares that the Secretary’s decisions ascertaining the legal heirs of deceased Indians are “final and conclusive.” Cf. First Moon v. White Tail, 270 U. S. 243, 244 (1926). The respondents contend that §§ 1 and 2 of the 1910 Act must be read in pari materia because both deal with the Secretary’s power over the devolution of lands held in trust by the United States and both vest in the Secretary broad managerial and supervisory power over allotted lands. We find this unpersuasive. First, while § 1 of the 1910 Act applies only to Indians possessed of allotments, § 2, as amended in 1913, also applies to all Indians having individual Indian monies or other properties held in trust by the United States. Thus, the coverage of these sections is not identical. Second, the 1910 Act is composed of some 33 sections, virtually all of which deal with the Secretary’s managerial and supervisory powers over Indian lands. Many of these provisions vest in the Secretary discretionary authority. For example, § 3 of the Act permits transfers of beneficial ownership of allotments by providing that allottees can relinquish allotments to their unallotted children if the Secretary “in his discretion” approves. 25 U. S. C. § 408. Yet neither this section nor any of the others in the enactment contains language cloaking the Secretary's actions with immunity from judicial review. If the respondents’ position were accepted and we implied the finality language of § 1 into § 2, it would be difficult to justify on a reading of the statute a later refusal to extend the “final and conclusive” clause to other sections, such as § 3. Congress quite plainly stated that the Secretary’s action under § 1 was not to be subject to judicial scrutiny. Similar language in § 2 would have made clear that Congress desired to work a like result under that section. Cf. City of Chicago v. United States, supra. II The Regional Solicitor accepted the findings and conclusions of the Examiner of Inheritance that the testator had testamentary capacity when he executed the instrument, that he was not unduly influenced in its execution, and that it was executed in compliance with the prescribed formalities. This removes from the case before us all questions except the scope of the Secretary’s power to grant or withhold approval of the instrument under 25 U. S. C. § 373. The Regional Solicitor’s view of the scope of the Secretary’s power is reflected in his statement: “When a purported will is submitted for approval and it has been determined that it meets the technical requirements for a valid will, further consideration must be given before approving or disapproving it to determine whether approval will most nearly achieve just and equitable treatment of the beneficiaries thereunder and the decedent’s heirs-at-law.” App. 84-85. (Emphasis added.) The basis of the Regional Solicitor’s action emerges most clearly from his reliance on the legal relationship of the testator to his daughter and his failure to support her. From this he concluded that failure to provide for the daughter in the will did not meet the just and equitable “standard” that he considered the Secretary was authorized to apply in passing on an Indian will. The Regional Solicitor related the failure to support the daughter in her childhood to the absence of provision for her in the will and declared that the decedent “had an obligation to his daughter which was not discharged either during his lifetime or under the terms of his purported will. For this reason it is inappropriate that the Secretary perpetuate this utter disregard for the daughter’s welfare . . . .” (Emphasis added.) While thus stressing the natural ties with Dorita High Horse, the Regional Solicitor neither challenged nor gave weight to the predicate of the Examiner's determination which was that the decedent had a close and sustained familial relationship with his niece and had resided in her home, while, in contrast, he had virtually no contact with his natural daughter. To sustain the administrative action performed on behalf of the Secretary would, on this record, be tantamount to holding that a public officer can substitute his preference for that of an Indian testator. We need not here undertake to spell out the scope of the Secretary’s power, but we cannot assume that Congress, in giving testamentary power to Indians respecting their allotted property with the one hand, was taking that power away with the other by vesting in the Secretary the same degree of authority to disapprove such a disposition. In reaching our conclusions it is not necessary to accept the contention of the petitioners that the Secretary's authority is narrowly limited to passing on the formal sufficiency of a document claimed to be a will. The power to make testamentary dispositions arises by statute; here we deal with a special kind of property right under allotments from the Government. The right is not absolute; the allottee is the beneficial owner while the Government is trustee. 25 U. S. C. § 348. The Indian’s right to make inter vivos dispositions is limited and requires approval of the Secretary. The legislative history reflects the concern of the Government to protect Indians from improvident acts or exploitation by others, and comprehensive regulations govern the process of such inter vivos dispositions. No comparable regulations govern the right to make testamentary dispositions, and from this one might argue that the power of an Indian relating to testamentary disposition of allotted property is uninhibited. The legislative history on this score is perhaps no more or less reliable an indicator of what Congress intended than is usual when the scope of administrative discretion is in question. Whatever may be the scope of the Secretary’s power to grant or withhold approval of a will under 25 U. S. C. § 373, we perceive nothing in the statute or its history or purpose that vests in a governmental official the power to revoke or rewrite a will that reflects a rational testamentary scheme with a provision for a relative who befriended the testator and omission of one who did not, simply because of a subjective feeling that the disposition of the estate was not “just and equitable.” The Regional Solicitor’s action was based on nothing more that we can discern than his concept of equity and in our view this was not the kind or degree of discretion Congress vested in him. Cf. Attocknie v. Udall, 261 F. Supp. 876 (D. C. W. D. Okla. 1966), reversed on other grounds, 390 F. 2d 636 (C. A. 10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 833 (1968). The Secretary’s task is not always an easy one and perhaps is rendered more difficult by the absence of regulations giving guidelines. It is not difficult to conceive of dispositions so lacking in rational basis that the Secretary’s approval could reasonably be withheld under § 373 even though the same scheme of disposition by a non-Indian of unrestricted property might pass muster in a conventional probate proceeding; on this record, however, we see no basis for the decision of the Regional Solicitor and must hold it arbitrary and capricious. There being no suggestion that the record need or could be supplemented by added factual material, the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to reinstate the judgment of the District Court. Reversed and remanded. Me. Justice Black, for the reasons set forth by the Court of Appeals in this case, 407 F. 2d 394, and in Heffelman v. Udall, 378 F. 2d 109 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1967), would affirm the judgments below. The Court of Appeals decision, which held that the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma had erred in reviewing the Regional Solicitor’s action, is reported as High Horse v. Tate, 407 F. 2d 394. The General Allotment Act of February 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388, as amended by Act of February 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 794, as amended by Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 855, 25 U. S. C. § 331 et seq., provides, inter alia, for the. allotment to individual Indians of parcels of land. The title to these lands is held by the United States in trust for the allottee, or his heirs, during the trust period, or any extension thereof. Chahsenah had inherited the interests he held at his death. Section 2 of the Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 856, as amended by Act of February 14, 1913, 37 Stat. 678, 25 U. S. C. § 373, provides in pertinent part: “Any persons of the age of twenty-one years having any right, title, or interest in any allotment held under trust or other patent containing restrictions on alienation or individual Indian moneys or other property held in trust by the United States shall have the right prior to the expiration of the trust or restrictive period, and before the issuance of a fee simple patent or the removal of restrictions, to dispose of such property by will, in accordance with regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior: Provided, however, That no will so executed shall be valid or have any force or effect unless and until it shall have been approved by the Secretary of the Interior: Provided further, That the Secretary of the Interior may approve or disapprove the will either before or after the death of the testator .... Provided also, That this section and section 372 of this title shall not apply to the Five Civilized Tribes or the Osage Indians.” Reference to Chahsenah’s supposed alcohol addiction carries an intimation that the Regional Solicitor saw some want of testamentary capacity, a notion contrary to his approval of the Examiner’s finding of testamentary capacity and absence of undue influence. The Regional Solicitor gratuitously volunteered that if any of the five previous wills made by the testator between 1956 and 1963 were presented he would disapprove them because they made no provision for Dorita High Horse. The record discloses no inquiry by him into the circumstances of the execution of those wills, the testator’s state of health at the time of their execution or his reasons for omitting provision for Dorita High Horse. The plaintiffs supporting the will appear to have relied upon 5 U. S. C. §702 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), which provides: “A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 28 U. S. C. §1361 provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” We express no opinion as to the correctness of this determination. The complaint alleged that the amount in dispute was in excess of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and that the dispute arose under the laws of the United States. Independently of the District Court’s ruling, it had jurisdiction over the complaint under 28 U. S. C. § 1331. Cf. Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U. S. 682, 685 n. 2 (1963); AFL v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582, 589-591 (1946). That section provides in pertinent part: “When any Indian to whom an allotment of land has been made, or may hereafter be made, dies before the expiration of the trust period and before the issuance of a fee simple patent, without having made a will disposing of said allotment as hereinafter provided, the Secretary of the Interior, upon notice and hearing, under such rules as he may prescribe, shall ascertain the legal heirs of such decedent, and his decision thereon shall be final and conclusive. . . .” (Emphasis added.) There is a conflict in the circuits on this point. Compare Hayes v. Seaton, 106 U. S. App. D. C. 126, 128, 270 F. 2d 319, 321 (1959); Homovich v. Chapman, 89 U. S. App. D. C. 150, 153, 191 F. 2d 761, 764 (1951), with Heffelman v. Udall, 378 F. 2d 109 (C. A. 10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 926 (1967); Attocknie v. Udall, 390 F. 2d 636 (C. A. 10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 833 (1968). See also Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, ante, p. 150; Barlow v. Collins, ante, p. 159. This is borne out by the Secretary’s interpretation of § 373 in an arguably “improvident” testamentary disposition. As to a will naming a Caucasian as a beneficiary, a memorandum, dated May 10, 1941, from the Solicitor’s Office to the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, stated, inter alia, “Whatever discretion the Secretary may have in the matter of approving or disapproving the will, it is clear that this discretion should not be exercised to the extent of substituting his will for that of the testator. . . .”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS v. SANDERS No. 07-1209. Argued December 8, 2008 Decided April 21, 2009 Eric D. Miller argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Garre, Assistant Attorney General Katsas, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Todd M. Hughes, and Paul J. Hutter. Christopher J. Meade argued the cause for respondent Simmons. With him on the brief was Anne K. Small. Mark R. Lippman argued the cause for respondent Sanders. With him on the brief was Michael A. Mor in Together with Shinseki, Secretary of Veterans Affairs v. Simmons (see this Court’s Rule 12.4), also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Legion et al. by Beth S. Brinkmann, Brian R. Matsui, and Barton F. Stichman; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp. Blair Elizabeth Taylor filed a brief for the Federal Circuit Bar Association as amicus curiae. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. In these two civil cases, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) denied veterans’ claims for disability benefits. In both cases the VA erroneously failed to provide the veteran with a certain kind of statutorily required notice. See 38 U. S. C. § 5103(a). In both cases the VA argued that the error was harmless. And in both cases the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, after setting forth a framework for determining whether a notice error is harmless, rejected the VA’s argument. In our view, the Federal Circuit’s “harmless-error” framework is too complex and rigid, its presumptions impose unreasonable evidentiary burdens upon the VA, and it is too likely too often to require the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) to treat as harmful errors that in fact are harmless. We conclude that the framework conflicts with established law. See § 7261(b)(2) (Veterans Court must “take due account of the rule of prejudicial error”). I A The law entitles veterans who have served on active duty in the United States military to receive benefits for disabilities caused or aggravated by their military service. The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 requires the VA to help a veteran develop his or her benefits claim. §5103A. In doing so, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (Secretary), upon “receipt of” an “application” for benefits, must “notify the claimant... of any information, and any medical or lay evidence, not previously provided to the Secretary that is necessary to substantiate the claim.” As “part of” the required “notice,” the Secretary must also “indicate which portion of” the required “information and evidence ... is to be provided by the claimant and which portion ... the Secretary ... will attempt to obtain.” §5103(a). Repeating these statutory requirements in its regulations, the VA has said it will provide a claimant with a letter that tells the claimant (1) what further information is necessary to substantiate his or her claim; (2) what portions of that information the VA will obtain for the claimant; and (3) what portions the claimant must obtain. 38 CFR § 3.159(b) (2008). At the time of the decisions below, the regulations also required the VA to tell the claimant (4) that he may submit any other relevant information that he has available. § 3.159(b)(1). (The VA refers to these notice requirements as Type One, Type Two, Type Three, and Type Four, respectively.) B The VA’s regional offices decide most claims. A claimant may appeal an adverse regional office decision to the VA’s Board of Veterans’ Appeals, an administrative board with the power to consider certain types of new evidence. 38 U. S. C. §§ 7107(b), 7109(a); 38 CFR § 20.1304(c). The claimant may seek review of an adverse Board decision in the Veterans Court, an Article I court. And the claimant (or the Government) may appeal an adverse decision of the Veterans Court to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit — but only in respect to certain legal matters, namely, “the validity ... of any statute or regulation ... or any interpretation thereof . . . that was relied on” by the Veterans Court in making its decision. 38 U. S. C. § 7292. A specific statute requires the Veterans Court to “take due account of the rule of prejudicial error.” § 7261(b)(2). In applying this statutory provision, the Veterans Court has developed its own special framework for notice errors. Under this framework, a claimant who argues that the VA failed to give proper notice must explain precisely how the notice was defective. Then the reviewing judge will decide what “type” of notice error the VA committed. The Veterans Court has gone on to say that a Type One error (i. e., a failure to explain what further information is needed) has the “natural effect” of harming the claimant; but errors of Types Two, Three, or Four (i. e., a failure to explain just who, claimant or agency, must provide the needed material or to tell the veteran that he may submit any other evidence available) do not have the “natural effect” of harming the claimant. In these latter instances, the claimant must show how the error caused harm, for example, by stating in particular just “what evidence” he would have provided (or asked the Secretary to provide) had the notice not been defective, and explaining just “how the lack of that notice and evidence affected the essential fairness of the adjudication.” Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 103, 121 (2005). C In the first case, Woodrow Sanders, a veteran of World War II, claimed that a bazooka exploded near his face in 1944, causing later blindness in his right eye. His wartime medical records, however, did not indicate any eye problems. Indeed, his 1945 discharge examination showed near-perfect vision. But a 1948 eye examination revealed an inflammation of the right-eye retina and surrounding tissues — a condition that eventually left him nearly blind in that eye. Soon after the examination Sanders filed a claim for disability benefits. But in 1949 the VA denied benefits on the ground that Sanders had failed to show a connection between his eye condition and his earlier military service. Forty-two years later, Sanders asked the VA to reopen his benefits claim. He argued that the 1944 bazooka explosion had hurt his eye, and added that he had begun to experience symptoms — blurred vision, swelling, and loss of sight — in 1946. He included a report from a VA doctor, Dr. Joseph Ruda, who said that “[i]t is not inconceivable that” the condition “could have occurred secondary to trauma, as stated ... by” Sanders. A private ophthalmologist, Dr. Gregory Strainer, confirming that Sanders’ right retina was scarred, added that this “type of . . . injury . . . can certainly be concussive in character.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a-27a. In 1992, the VA reopened Sanders’ claim. Id., at 29a. After obtaining Sanders’ military medical records, the VA arranged for a further medical examination, this time by VA eye specialist Dr. Sheila Anderson. After examining Sanders’ medical history (including records of the examinations made at the time of Sanders’ enlistment and discharge), Anderson agreed with the medical diagnosis but concluded that Sanders’ condition was not service related. Since Sanders’ right-eye “visual acuity” was “20/20” upon enlistment and “20/25” upon discharge, and he had “reported decreased vision only 6 months prior” to his 1948 doctor’s “visit,” and since “there are no other signs of ocular trauma,” Anderson thought that Sanders’ condition “is most likely infectious in nature, although the etiology at this point is impossible to determine.” “Based on the documented records,” she concluded, “the patient did not lose vision while on active duty.” The VA regional office denied Sanders’ claim. Ibid. Sanders sought Board review, and in the meantime he obtained the opinion of another VA doctor, Dr. Duane Nii, who said that the “etiology of the patient’s” eye condition “is ... difficult to ascertain.” He thought that “it is possible that” the condition “could be related to” a bazooka explosion, though the “possibility of” an infection “as the etiology .. . could also be entertained.” Id., at 30a. The Board concluded that Sanders had failed to show that the eye injury was service connected. The Board said that it had relied most heavily upon Anderson’s report because, unlike other reports, it took account of Sanders’ military medical records documenting his eyesight at the time of his enlistment and discharge. And the Board consequently affirmed the regional office's denial of Sanders’ claim. Sanders then appealed to the Veterans Court. There he argued, among other things, that the VA had made a notice error. Sanders conceded that the VA had sent him a letter telling him (1) what further information was necessary to substantiate his claim. But, he said, the VA letter did not tell him (2) which portions of the information the Secretary would provide or (3) which portions he would have to provide. That is to say, he complained about notice errors Type Two and Type Three. The Veterans Court held that these notice errors were harmless. It said that Sanders had not explained how he would have acted differently, say, by identifying what different evidence he would have produced or asked the Secretary to obtain for him, had he received proper notice. Finding no other error, the Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s decision. D The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Veterans Court’s decision and held that the Veterans Court was wrong to find the notice error harmless. The Federal Circuit wrote that when the VA provides a claimant with a notice letter that is deficient in any respect (to the point where a “reasonable person” would not have read it as providing the necessary information), the Veterans Court “should . . . presum[e]” that the notice error is “prejudicial, requiring reversal unless the VA can show that the error did not affect the essential fairness of the adjudication.” Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F. 3d 881, 889 (2007). To make this latter showing, the court added, the VA must “demonstrate” (1) that the “defect was cured by actual knowledge on the” claimant’s “part,” or (2) “that a benefit could not have been awarded as a matter of law.” Ibid. Because the VA had not made such a showing, the Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans Court’s decision. E In the second case before us, the claimant, Patricia Simmons, served on active military duty from December 1978 to April 1980. While on duty she worked in a noisy environment close to aircraft; after three months she began to lose hearing in her left ear; and by the time she was discharged, her left-ear hearing had become worse. Soon after her discharge, Simmons applied for disability benefits. The VA regional office found her hearing loss was service connected; but it also found the loss insufficiently severe to warrant compensation. In November 1980, it denied her claim. In 1998, Simmons asked the VA to reopen her claim. She provided medical examination records showing further loss of hearing in her left ear along with (what she considered related) loss of hearing in her right ear. The VA arranged for hearing examinations by VA doctors in 1999, 2001, and 2002. The doctors measured her left-ear hearing loss, ranking it as moderate to severe; they also measured her right-ear hearing loss, ranking it as mild to moderate. After comparing the results of the examinations with a VA hearing-loss compensation schedule, the regional office concluded that Simmons’ left-ear hearing loss, while service connected, was not severe enough to warrant compensation. At the same time, the regional office concluded that her right-ear hearing loss was neither service connected nor sufficiently severe. Simmons appealed the decision to the Board, which affirmed the regional office’s determination. In 2003, Simmons appealed to the Veterans Court. Among other things, she said that she had not received a notice about (and she consequently failed to attend) a further right-ear medical examination that the VA later told her it had arranged. She added that, in respect to her claim for benefits for loss of hearing in her left ear, the VA had made a Type One notice error (i e., it had failed to tell her what further information was needed to substantiate her claim). Simmons conceded that she had received a letter from the VA. But the letter told her only what, in general, a person had to do to show that a hearing injury was service connected. It did not tell her anything about her specific problem, namely, what further information she must provide to show a worsening of hearing in her left ear, to the point where she could receive benefits. The Veterans Court agreed with Simmons, and it found both errors prejudicial. In respect to Simmons’ left-ear hearing loss (the matter at issue here), it pointed out that it had earlier said (in Mayfield, 19 Vet. App., at 120-124) that a Type One notice error has the “ ‘natural effect’ of producing prejudice.” The court added that its “revie[w] [of] the record in its entirety” convinced it that Simmons did not have “actual knowledge of what evidence was necessary to substantiate her claim” and, had the VA told Simmons more specifically about what additional medical information it needed, Simmons might have “obtained” a further “private” medical “examination substantiating her claim.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 81a. The Veterans Court consequently remanded the case to the Board. The Government appealed the Veterans Court’s determination to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. And that court affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision on the basis of its decision in Sanders. Simmons v. Nicholson, 487 F. 3d 892 (2007). F We granted certiorari in both Sanders’ and Simmons’ cases in order to determine the lawfulness of the Federal Circuit’s “harmless-error” holdings. II The Federal Circuit’s holdings flow directly from its use of the “harmless-error” framework that we have described. Supra, at 404. Thus we must decide whether that framework is consistent with a particular statutory requirement, namely, the requirement that the Veterans Court “take due account of the rule of prejudicial error,” 38 U. S. C. § 7261(b)(2). See supra, at 401. We conclude that the framework is not consistent with the statutory demand. A We believe that the statute, in stating that the Veterans Court must “take due account of the rule of prejudicial error,” requires the Veterans Court to apply the same kind of “harmless-error” rule that courts ordinarily apply in civil cases. The statutory words “take due account” and “prejudicial error” make clear that is so. Congress used the same words in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 5 U. S. C. § 706 (“[A] court shall review the whole record . . . and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error”). The Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act explained that the APA’s reference to “prejudicial error” is intended to “su[mj up in succinct fashion the ‘harmless error’ rule applied by the courts in the review of lower court decisions as well as of administrative bodies.” Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 110 (1947) (emphasis added). And we have previously described § 706 as an “ ‘administrative law... harmless error rule.’ ” National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U. S. 644, 659-660 (2007) (quoting PDK Labs. Inc. v. United States Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F. 3d 786, 799 (CADC 2004)). Legislative history confirms that Congress intended the Veterans Court “prejudicial error” statute to “incorporate a reference” to the APA’s approach. S. Rep. No. 100-418, p. 61 (1988). We have no indication of any relevant distinction between the manner in which reviewing courts treat civil and administrative eases. Consequently, we assess the lawfulness of the Federal Circuit’s approach in light of our general case law governing application of the harmless-error standard. B Three related features of the Federal Circuit's framework, taken together, convince us that it mandates an approach to harmless error that differs significantly from the approach courts normally take in ordinary civil cases. First, the framework is complex, rigid, and mandatory. In every case involving a notice error (of no matter which kind) the Veterans Court must find the error harmful unless the VA “demonstrate[s]” (1) that the claimant’s “actual knowledge” cured the defect or (2) that the claimant could not have received a benefit as a matter of law. Suppose the notice error, as in Sanders’ case, consisted of a failure to describe what additional information, if any, the VA would provide. It might be obvious from the record in the particular case that the error made no difference. But under the Federal Circuit’s rule, the Veterans Court would have to remand the case for new proceedings regardless. We have previously warned against courts’ determining whether an error is harmless through the use of mandatory presumptions and rigid rules rather than case-specific application of judgment, based upon examination of the record. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 760 (1946). The federal “harmless-error” statute, now codified at 28 U. S. C. §2111, tells courts to review cases for errors of law “without regard to errors” that do not affect the parties’ “substantial rights.” That language seeks to prevent appellate courts from becoming “ ‘impregnable citadels of technieality,’ ” Kotteakos, 328 U. S., at 759. And we have read it as expressing a congressional preference for determining “harmless error” without the use of presumptions insofar as those presumptions may lead courts to find an error harmful, when, in fact, in the particular case before the court, it is not. See id., at 760; O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U. S. 432, 436-437 (1995); see also R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 26 (1970) (hereinafter Traynor) (reviewing court normally should “determine whether the error affected the judgment. . . without benefit of such aids as presumptions ... that expedite fact-finding at the trial”). The Federal Circuit’s presumptions exhibit the very characteristics that Congress sought to discourage. In the cases before us, they would prevent the reviewing court from directly asking the harmless-error question. They would prevent that court from resting its conclusion on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. And they would require the reviewing court to find the notice error prejudicial even if that court, having read the entire record, conscientiously concludes the contrary. Second, the Federal Circuit’s framework imposes an unreasonable evidentiary burden upon the VA. How is the Secretary to demonstrate, in Sanders’ case for example, that Sanders knew that he, not the VA, would have to produce more convincing evidence that the bazooka accident caused his eye injury? How could the Secretary demonstrate that there is no evidence anywhere that would entitle Sanders to benefits? To show a claimant’s state of mind about such a matter will often prove difficult, perhaps impossible. And even if the VA (as in Sanders’ case) searches the military records and comes up emptyhanded, it may still prove difficult, or impossible, to prove the nonexistence of evidence lying somewhere about that might significantly help the claimant. We have previously pointed out that setting an evidentiary “barrier so high that it could never be surmounted would justify the very criticism that spawned the harmless-error doctrine,” namely, reversing for error “ ‘regardless of its effect on the judgment.’ ” Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 18 (1999) (quoting Traynor 50). The Federal Circuit’s evidentiary rules increase the likelihood of reversal in cases where, in fact, the error is harmless. And, as we pointed out in Neder, that likelihood encourages abuse of the judicial process and diminishes the public’s confidence in the fair and effective operation of the judicial system. 527 U. S., at 18. Third, the Federal Circuit’s framework requires the VA, not the claimant, to explain why the error is harmless. This Court has said that the party that “seeks to have a judgment set aside because of an erroneous ruling carries the burden of showing that prejudice resulted.” Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109, 116 (1943); see also Tipton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 375 U. S. 34, 36 (1963) (per curiam); United States v. Borden Co., 347 U. S. 514, 516-517 (1954); cf. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U. S. 548, 553 (1984); Market Street R. Co. v. Railroad Common of Cal., 324 U. S. 548, 562 (1945) (finding error harmless “in the absence of any showing of.. . prejudice”). Lower court cases make clear that courts have correlated review of ordinary administrative proceedings to appellate review of civil cases in this respect. Consequently, the burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination. See, e. g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 202 F. 3d 788, 797 (CA5 2000) (declining to remand where appellant failed to show that error in administrative proceeding was harmful); Air Canada v. Department of Transp., 148 F. 3d 1142, 1156-1157 (CADC 1998) (same); Nelson v. Apfel, 131 F. 3d 1228, 1236 (CA7 1997) (same); Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F. 2d 735, 740 (CA10 1993) (same); Camden v. Department of Labor, 831 F. 2d 449, 451 (CA3 1987) (same); Panhandle Co-op Assn. v. EPA, 771 F. 2d 1149, 1153 (CA8 1985) (same); Frankfort v. FERC, 678 F. 2d 699, 708 (CA7 1982) (same); NLRB v. Seine & Line Fishermen, 374 F. 2d 974, 981 (CA9 1967) (same). To say that the claimant has the “burden” of showing that an error was harmful is not to impose a complex system of “burden shifting” rules or a particularly onerous requirement. In ordinary civil appeals, for example, the appellant will point to rulings by the trial judge that the appellant claims are erroneous, say, a ruling excluding favorable evidence. Often the circumstances of the case will make clear to the appellate judge that the ruling, if erroneous, was harmful and nothing further need be said. But, if not, then the party seeking reversal normally must explain why the erroneous ruling caused harm. If, for example, the party seeking an affirmance makes a strong argument that the evidence on the point was overwhelming regardless, it normally makes sense to ask the party seeking reversal to provide an explanation, say, by marshaling the facts and evidence showing the contrary. The party seeking to reverse the result of a civil proceeding will likely be in a position at least as good as, and often better than, the opposing party to explain how he has been hurt by an error. Cf. United States v. Fior D'Italia, Inc., 536 U. S. 238, 256, n. 4 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting). Respondents urge the creation of a special rule for this context, placing upon the agency the burden of proving that a notice error did not cause harm. But we have placed such a burden on the appellee only when the matter underlying review was criminal. See, e. g., Kotteakos, supra, at 760. In criminal cases the Government seeks to deprive an individual of his liberty, thereby providing a good reason to require the Government to explain why an error should not upset the trial court’s determination. And the fact that the Government must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt justifies a rule that makes it more difficult for the reviewing court to find that an error did not affect the outcome of a case. See United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 741 (1993) (stating that the Government bears the “burden of showing the absence of prejudice”). But in the ordinary civil case that is not so. See Palmer, supra, at 116. C Our discussion above is subject to two important qualifications. First, we need not, and we do not, decide the lawfulness of the use by the Veterans Court of what it called the “natural effects” of certain kinds of notice errors. We have previously made clear that courts may sometimes make empirically based generalizations about what kinds of errors are likely, as a factual matter, to prove harmful. See Kotteakos, 328 U. S., at 760-761 (reviewing courts may learn over time that the “ ‘natural effect’ ” of certain errors is “ ‘to prejudice a litigant’s substantial rights’ ” (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 913, 65th Cong., 3d Sess., 1 (1919))). And by drawing upon “experience” that reveals some such “‘natural effect,’” a court might properly influence, though not control, future determinations. See Kotteakos, supra, at 760-761. We consider here, however, only the Federal Circuit’s harmless-error framework. That framework, as we have said, is mandatory. And its presumptions are not based upon an effort to determine “natural effects.” Indeed, the Federal Circuit is the wrong court to make such determinations. Statutes limit the Federal Circuit’s review to certain kinds of Veterans Court errors, namely, those that concern “the validity of... any statute or regulation ... or any interpretation thereof.” 38 U. S. C. § 7292(a). But the factors that inform a reviewing court’s “harmless-error” determination are various, potentially involving, among other case-specific factors, an estimation of the likelihood that the result would have been different, an awareness of what body (jury, lower court, administrative agency) has the authority to reach that result, a consideration of the error’s likely effects on the perceived fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, and a hesitancy to generalize too broadly about particular kinds of errors when the specific factual circumstances in which the error arises may well make all the difference. See Neder, 527 U. S., at 18-19; Kotteakos, supra, at 761-763; Traynor 33-37. It is the Veterans Court, not the Federal Circuit, that sees sufficient case-specific raw material in veterans’ cases to enable it to make empirically based, nonbinding generalizations about “natural effects.” And the Veterans Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over these cases, is likely better able than is the Federal Circuit to exercise an informed judgment as to how often veterans are harmed by which kinds of notice errors. Cf. United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U. S. 380, 394 (1999) (Article I court’s special “expertise... guides it in making complex determinations in a specialized area of the law”). Second, we recognize that Congress has expressed special solicitude for the veterans’ cause. See post, at 415-416 (Souter, J., dissenting). A veteran, after all, has performed an especially important service for the Nation, often at the risk of his or her own life. And Congress has made clear that the VA is not an ordinary agency. Rather, the VA has a statutory duty to help the veteran develop his or her benefits claim. See Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, 38 U. S. C. §5103A. Moreover, the adjudicatory process is not truly adversarial, and the veteran is often unrepresented during the claims proceedings. See Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U. S. 305, 311 (1985). These facts might lead a reviewing court to consider harmful in a veteran’s ease error that it might consider harmless in other circumstances. But that is not the question before us. And we need not here decide whether, or to what extent, that may be so. Ill We have considered the two cases before us in light of the principles discussed. In Sanders’ case, the Veterans Court found the notice error harmless. And after reviewing the record, we conclude that finding is lawful. The VA told Sanders what further evidence would be needed to substantiate his claim. It failed to specify what portion of any additional evidence the Secretary would provide (we imagine none) and what portion Sanders would have to provide (we imagine all). How could the VA’s failure to specify this (or any other) division of labor have mattered? Sanders has pursued his claim for over six decades; he has had numerous medical examinations; and he should be aware of the respect in which his benefits claim is deficient (namely, his inability to show that his disability is connected to his World War II service). See supra, at 403. Sanders has not told the Veterans Court, the Federal Circuit, or this Court what specific additional evidence proper notice would have led him to obtain or seek. He has not explained to the Veterans Court, to the Federal Circuit, or to us how the notice error to which he points could have made any difference. The Veterans Court did not consider the harmlessness issue a borderline question. Nor do we. We consequently reverse the Federal Circuit’s judgment and remand the case so that the court can reinstate the judgment of the Veterans Court. Simmons’ ease is more difficult. The Veterans Court found that the VA had committed a Type One error, i. e., a failure to tell Simmons what information or evidence she must provide to substantiate her claim. The VA sent Simmons a letter that provided her only with general information about how to prove a claim while telling her nothing at all about how to proceed further in her own case, a case in which the question was whether a eoncededly service-connected left-ear hearing problem had deteriorated to the point where it was compensable. And the VA did so in the context of having arranged for a further right-ear medical examination, which (because of lack of notice) Simmons failed to attend. The Veterans Court took the “natural effect” of a Type One error into account while also reviewing the record as a whole. Some features of the record suggest the error was harmless, for example, the fact that Simmons has long sought benefits and has a long history of medical examinations. But other features — e. g., the fact that her left-ear hearing loss was concededly service connected and has continuously deteriorated over time, and the fact that the VA had scheduled a further examination of her right ear that (had notice been given) might have revealed further left-ear hearing loss— suggest the opposite. Given the uncertainties, we believe it is appropriate to remand this case so that the Veterans Court can decide whether reconsideration is necessary. * * * We conclude that the Federal Circuit’s harmless-error framework is inconsistent with the statutory requirement that the Veterans Court take “due account of the rule of prejudicial error.” 38 U. S. C. §7261(b)(2). We reverse the Federal Circuit’s judgment in Sanders’ case, and we vacate its judgment in Simmons’ case. We remand both cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting. Federal law requires the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims to “take due account of the rule of prejudicial error.” 38 U. S. C. § 7261(b)(2). Under this provision, when the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) fails to notify a veteran of the information needed to support his benefit claim, as required by § 5103(a), must the veteran prove the error harmful, or must the VA prove its error harmless? The Federal Circuit held that the VA should bear the burden. Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F. 3d 881 (2007). The Court reverses because the Federal Circuit’s approach is “complex, rigid, and mandatory,” ante, at 407, “imposes an unreasonable evidentiary burden upon the VA,” ante, at 408, and contradicts the rule in other civil and administrative cases by “requiring] the VA, not the claimant, to explain why the error is harmless,” ante, at 409. I respectfully disagree. Taking the last point first, the Court assumes that there is a standard allocation of the burden of proving harmlessness that Congress meant to adopt in directing the Veterans Court to “take due account of the rule of prejudicial error.” § 7261(b)(2). But as both the majority and the Government concede, “[t]here are no hard-and-fast standards governing the allocation of the burden of proof in every situation,” Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 413 U. S. 189, 209 (1973), and courts impose the burden of dealing with harmlessness differently in different circumstances. As the Court says, the burden is on the Government in criminal cases, ante, at 410, and even in civil and administrative appeals courts sometimes require the party getting the benefit of the error to show its harmlessness, depending on the statutory setting or specific sort of mistake made, see, e. g., McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F. 2d 1317, 1324 (CADC 1988) (declaring that imposing the burden of proving harm “on the challenger is normally inappropriate where the agency has completely failed to comply with” notice and comment procedures). Thus, the question is whether placing the burden of persuasion on the veteran is in order under the statutory scheme governing the VA. I believe it is not. The VA differs from virtually every other agency in being itself obliged to help the claimant develop his claim, see, e. g., 38 U. S. C. §5103A, and a number of other provisions and practices of the VA’s administrative and judicial review process reflect a congressional policy to favor the veteran, see, e. g., § 5107(b) (“[T]he Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant” whenever “there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter”); § 7252(a) (allowing the veteran, but not the Secretary, to appeal an adverse decision to the Veterans Court). Given Congress’s understandable decision to place a thumb on the scale in the veteran’s favor in the course of administrative and judicial review of VA decisions, I would not remove a comparable benefit in the Veteran’s Court based on the ambiguous directive of § 7261(b)(2). And even if there were a question in my mind, I would come out the same way under our longstanding “rule that interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994). The majority's other arguments are open to judgment, but I do not see that placing the burden of showing harm on the VA goes so far as to create a “complex, rigid, and mandatory” scheme, ante, at 407, or to impose “an unreasonable evidentiary burden upon the VA,” ante, at 408. Under the Federal Circuit’s rule, the VA simply “must persuade the reviewing court that the purpose of the notice was not frustrated, e. g., by demonstrating: (1) that any defect was cured by actual knowledge on the part of the claimant, (2) that a reasonable person could be expected to understand from the notice what was needed, or (3) that a benefit could not have been awarded as a matter of law.” Sanders, supra, at 889. This gives the VA several ways to show that an error was harmless, and the VA has been able to shoulder the burden in a number of cases. See, e. g., Holmes v. Peake, No. 06-0852, 2008 WL 974728, *2 (Vet. App., Apr. 3, 2008) (Table) (finding notice error harmless because the claimant had “actual knowledge of what was required to substantiate” his claim); Clark v. Peake, No. 05-2422, 2008 WL 852588, *4 (Vet. App., Mar. 24, 2008) (Table) (same). The Federal Circuit’s rule thus strikes me as workable and in keeping with the statutory scheme governing veterans’ benefits. It has the added virtue of giving the VA a strong incentive to comply with its notice obligations, obligations “that g[o] to the very essence of the nonadversarial, pro-claimant nature of the VA adjudication system ... by affording a claimant a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the processing of his or her claim.” Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 103, 120-121 (2005). I would affirm the Federal Circuit and respectfully dissent.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

JAPAN LINE, LTD., et al. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al. No. 77-1378. Argued January 8, 1979 Decided April 30, 1979 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BreNnan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 457. Peter L. Briger argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Sheldon S. Cohen and Reed M. Williams. James Dexter Clark argued the cause for appellees. With him on the briefs was John H. Larson. Kent L. Jones argued the cause pro hac vice for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorneys General Babcock and Ferguson, Leonard Schaitman, and Ernest J. Brown. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Cary J. Torre and Arthur K. Mason for Aer Lingus et ah; by Edward A. McDermott and Allen R. Snyder for the Council of European and Japanese National Shipowners’ Assns.; and by James W. McGrath for Sea Land Service, Inc. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Ernest P. Goodman, Assistant Attorney General, and Philip C. Griffin and Patti S. Kitching, Deputy Attorneys General, for the State of California; and by William D. Dexter for the Multistate Tax Commission. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by George S. Lapham, Jr., and Kathleen 0. Argiropoulos for Air New England, Inc., et ah; by Jay D. Howell, Jr., for the city of Houston; and by Dennis J. Kenny for the Institute of International Container Lessors, Ltd. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether a State, consistently with the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, may impose a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on foreign-owned instrumentalities (cargo containers) of international commerce. I The facts were “stipulated on appeal,” App. 29, and were found by the trial court, id., at 33-36, as follows: Appellants are six Japanese shipping companies; they are incorporated under the laws of Japan, and they have their principal places of business and commercial domiciles in that country. Id., at 34. Appellants operate vessels used exclusively in foreign commerce; these vessels are registered in Japan and have their home ports there. Ibid. The vessels are specifically designed and constructed to accommodate large cargo shipping containers. The containers, like the ships, are owned by appellants, have their home ports in Japan, and are used exclusively for hire in the transportation of cargo in foreign commerce. Id., at 35. Each container is in constant transit save for time spent undergoing repair or awaiting loading and unloading of cargo. All appellants’ containers are subject to property tax in Japan and, in fact, are taxed there. Appellees are political subdivisions of the State of California. Appellants’ containers, in the course of their international journeys, pass through appellees’ jurisdictions intermittently. Although none of appellants’ containers stays permanently in California, some are there at any given time; a container’s average stay in the State is less than three weeks. Ibid. The containers engage in no intrastate or interstate transportation of cargo except as continuations of international voyages. Id., at 30. Any movements or periods of nonmovement of containers in appellees’ jurisdictions are essential to, and inseparable from, the containers’ efficient use as instrumentalities of foreign commerce. Id., at 35-36. Property present in California on March 1 (the “lien date” under California law) of any year is subject to ad valorem property tax. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. §§ 117, 405, 2192 (West 1970 and Supp. 1979). A number of appellants’ containers were physically present in appellees’ jurisdictions on the lien dates in 1970, 1971, and 1972; this number was fairly representative of the containers’ “average presence” during each year. App. 35. Appellees levied property taxes in excess of $550,000 on the assessed value of the containers present on March 1 of the three years in question. Id., at 36. During the same period, similar containers owned or controlled by steamship companies domiciled in the United States, that appeared from time to time in Japan during the course of international commerce, were not subject to property taxation in Japan, and therefore were not, in fact, taxed in that country. Id., at 35. Appellants paid the taxes, so levied, under protest and sued for their refund in the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles. That court awarded judgment in appellants’ favor. Id., at 39-40. The court found that appellants’ containers were instrumentalities of foreign commerce that had their home ports in Japan where they were taxed. The federal courts, however, in the trial court’s view, had “consistently held that vessels which are instrumentalities of foreign eom-merce and engaged in foreign commerce can be taxed in their home port only.” Id., at 24. This rule, said the court, was necessary to avoid multiple taxation, id., at 23; whereas apportionment of taxes can be used to prevent duplicative taxation in interstate commerce, apportionment is “not practical” when one of the taxing entities is a foreign sovereign. In such cases, “[t]here is no tribunal that can adjudicate [competing] rights unless it be the International Court and to invoke its services jurisdiction must be consented to by all parties.” Id., at 24. The application of appellees’ taxes in derogation of the “home port doctrine,” the court concluded, subjected international commerce to multiple taxation and thus was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. In so holding, the court followed Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11, 363 P. 2d 25, cert. denied, 368 U. S. 899 (1961) (hereinafter SAS) (ruling that ad valorem property tax levied by California upon aircraft owned, based, and registered abroad and used exclusively in international commerce, was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause). The Court of Appeal reversed. 132 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1976). The court appeared to conclude that SAS had been effectively overruled by Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. County of Alameda, 12 Cal. 3d 772, 528 P. 2d 56 (1974). In Sea-Land, the Supreme Court of California had criticized the home port doctrine and labeled it “anachronistic,” and had upheld apportioned property taxation of containers owned by a domestic corporation and used in both intercoastal and foreign commerce. Id., at 787, 528 P. 2d, at 66. The Court of Appeal rejected appellants’ arguments that a different result was required here in view of their containers’ foreign ownership and exclusively international use. The court likewise dismissed any argument as to multiple taxation. “[T]he possibility of international double taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce,” it concluded, is “no reason to limit the local power to tax them upon a nondiscriminatory apportioned basis.” 132 Cal. Rptr., at 533. The California Supreme Court granted a hearing of the case and it, too, reversed the judgment of the Superior Court, essentially adopting the opinion of the Court of Appeal. 20 Cal. 3d 180, 571 P. 2d 254 (1977). It concluded that “the threat of double taxation from foreign taxing authorities has no role in commerce clause considerations of multiple burdens, since burdens in international commerce are not attributable to discrimination by the taxing state and are matters for international agreement.” Id., at 185, 571 P. 2d, at 257. Deeming the containers’ foreign ownership and use irrelevant for purposes of constitutional analysis, id., at 186, 571 P. 2d, at 257-258, the court rejected appellants’ Commerce Clause challenge and sustained the validity of the tax as applied. Appellants appealed. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 436 U. S. 955 (1978). II This Court has appellate jurisdiction to review a final judgment rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had “where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.” 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). In this case, appellants drew in question the validity of California’s ad valorem property tax, contending that the tax, as applied to their containers, was repugnant to the Commerce Clause and various treaties, and the California Supreme Court sustained the validity of the tax. Under these circumstances, this Court’s appellate jurisdiction would seem manifest. Appellees suggest that the California courts did not in reality uphold the tax statute against constitutional attack, but simply refused to extend to appellants a constitutional immunity from taxation. Motion to Dismiss or Affirm 2. Appellees’ suggested recharacterization is unpersuasive. Appellants squarely challenged the constitutionality of the tax statute, as applied, and the California Supreme Court just as squarely sustained its validity, as applied. We have held consistently that a state statute is sustained within the meaning of § 1257 (2) when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set of facts as against the contention that such application is invalid on federal grounds. E. g., Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 17-18 (1971); Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U. S. 685, 686, and n. 1 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 61 n. 3 (1963) ; Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 288-290 (1921). We conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction of this case. Ill A The “home port doctrine” was first alluded to in Hays v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 17 How. 596 (1855). In Hays, California sought to impose property taxes on oceangoing vessels intermittently touching its ports. The vessels’ home port was New York City, where they were owned, registered, and based; they engaged in intercoastal commerce by way of the Isthmus of Panama, and remained in California briefly to unload cargo and undergo repairs. This Court held that the ships had established no tax situs in California: “We are satisfied that the State of California had no jurisdiction over these vessels for the purpose of taxation; they were not, properly, abiding within its limits, so as to become incorporated with the other personal property of the State; they were there but temporarily, engaged in lawful trade and commerce, with their situs at the home port, where the vessels belonged, and where the owners were liable to be taxed for the capital invested, and where the taxes had been paid.” Id., at 599-600. Because the vessels were properly taxable in their home port, this Court concluded, they could not be taxed in California at all. The “home port doctrine” enunciated in Hays was a corollary of the medieval maxim mobilia sequuntur personam (“movables follow the person,” see Black’s Law Dictionary 1154 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)) and resulted in personal property being taxable in full at the domicile of the owner. This theory of taxation, of course, has fallen into desuetude, and the “home port doctrine,” as a rule for taxation of moving equipment, has yielded to a rule of fair apportionment among the States. This Court, accordingly, has held that various instrumen-talities of commerce may be taxed, on a properly apportioned basis, by the nondomiciliary States through which they travel. E. g., Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (1891); Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U. S. 169 (1949); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization, 347 U. S. 590 (1954). In discarding the “home port” theory for the theory of apportionment, however, the Court consistently has distinguished the case of oceangoing vessels. E. g., Pullman’s Palace, 141 U. S., at 23-24 (approving apportioned tax on railroad rolling stock, but distinguishing vessels “engaged in interstate or foreign commerce upon the high seas”); Ott, 336 U. S., at 173-174 (approving apportioned tax on barges navigating inland waterways, but “not reach [ing] the question of taxability of ocean carriage”) ; Braniff, 347 U. S., at 600 (approving apportioned tax on domestic aircraft, but distinguishing vessels “used to plow the open seas”). Relying on these cases, appellants argue that the “home port doctrine,” yet vital, continues to prescribe the proper rule for state taxation of oceangoing ships. Since containers are “functionally a part of the ship,” Leather’s Best, Inc. v. S. S. Mormaclynx, 451 F. 2d 800, 815 (CA2 1971), appellants conclude, the containers, like the ships, may be taxed only at their home ports in Japan, and thus are immune from tax in California. Although appellants' argument, as will be seen below, has an inner logic, we decline to cast our analysis of the present case in this mold. The “home port doctrine” can claim no unequivocal constitutional source; in assessing the legitimacy of California’s tax, the Hays Court did not rely on the Commerce Clause, nor could it, in 1854, have relied on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The basis of the “home port doctrine,” rather, was common-law jurisdiction to tax. Given its origins, the doctrine could be said to be “anachronistic”; given its underpinnings, it may indeed be said to have been “abandoned.” Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 320 (1944) (Stone, C. J., dissenting) . As a theoretical matter, then, to rehabilitate the “home port doctrine” as a tool of Commerce Clause analysis would be somewhat odd. More importantly, to hold in this case that the “home port doctrine” survives would be to prove too much. If an oceangoing vessel could indeed be taxed only at its home port, taxation by a nondomiciliary State logically would be barred, regardless of whether the vessel were domestically or foreign owned, and regardless of whether it were engaged in domestic or foreign commerce. In Hays itself, the vessel was owned in New York and was engaged in interstate commerce through international waters. There is no need in this case to decide currently the broad proposition whether mere use of international routes is enough, under the “home port doctrine,” to render an instrumentality immune from tax in a nondomiciliary State. The question here is a much more narrow one, that is, whether instrumentalities of commerce that are owned, based, and registered abroad and that are used exclusively in international commerce, may be subjected to apportioned ad valorem property taxation by a State. B The Constitution provides that “Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In construing Congress' power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,” the Court recently has affirmed that the Constitution confers no immunity from state taxation, and that “interstate commerce must bear its fair share of the state tax burden.” Washington Revenue Dept. v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S. 734, 750 (1978). Instrumentalities of interstate commerce are no exception to this rule, and the Court regularly has sustained property taxes as applied to various forms of transportation equipment. See Pullman’s Palace, supra (railroad rolling stock); Ott, supra (barges on inland waterways); Braniff, supra (domestic aircraft). Cf. Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U. S. 653, 663 (1948) (motor vehicles). If the state tax “is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State,” no impermissible burden on interstate commerce will be found. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 279 (1977); Washington Revenue Dept., 435 U. S., at 750. Appellees contend that cargo shipping containers, like other vehicles of commercial transport, are subject to property taxation, and that the taxes imposed here meet Complete Auto’s fourfold requirements. The containers, they argue, have a “substantial nexus” with California because some of them are present in that State at all times; jurisdiction to tax is based on “the habitual employment of the property within the State,” Braniff, 347 U. S., at 601, and appellants’ containers habitually are so employed. The tax, moreover, is “fairly apportioned,” since it is levied only on the containers’ “average presence” in California. The tax “does not discriminate,” thirdly, since it falls evenhandedly on all personal property in the State; indeed, as an ad valorem tax of general application, it is of necessity nondiscriminatory. The tax, finally, is “fairly related to the services provided by” California, services that include not only police and fire protection, but also the benefits of a trained work force and the advantages of a civilized society. These observations are not without force. We may assume that, if the containers at issue here were instrumentalities of purely interstate commerce, Complete Auto would apply and be satisfied, and our Commerce Clause inquiry would be at an end. Appellants’ containers, however, are instrumentalities of foreign commerce, both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law. The premise of appellees’ argument is that the Commerce Clause analysis is identical, regardless of whether interstate or foreign commerce is, involved. This premise, we have concluded, must be rejected. When construing Congress’ power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” a more extensive constitutional inquiry is required. When a State seeks to tax the instrumentalities of foreign commerce, two additional considerations, beyond those articulated in Complete Auto, come into play. The first is the enhanced risk of multiple taxation. It is a commonplace of constitutional jurisprudence that multiple taxation may well be offensive to the Commerce Clause. E. g., Evco v. Jones, 409 U. S. 91, 94 (1972); Central R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U. S. 607, 612 (1962); Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U. S. 382, 384-385 (1952); Ott, 336 U. S., at 174; J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 311 (1938). In order to prevent multiple taxation of interstate commerce, this Court has required that taxes be apportioned among taxing jurisdictions, so that no instrumentality of commerce is subjected to more than one tax on its full value. The corollary of the apportionment principle, of course, is that no jurisdiction may tax the instrumentality in full. “The rule which permits taxation by two or more states on an apportionment basis precludes taxation of all of the property by the state of the domicile. . . . Otherwise there would be multiple taxation of interstate operations.” Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U. S., at 384-385; Braniff, 347 U. S., at 601. The basis for this Court’s approval of apportioned property taxation, in other words, has been its ability to enforce full apportionment by all potential taxing bodies. Yet neither this Court nor this Nation can ensure full apportionment when one of the taxing entities is a foreign sovereign. If an instrumentality of commerce is domiciled abroad, the country of domicile may have the right, consistently with the custom of nations, to impose a tax on its full value. If a State should seek to tax the same instrumentality on an apportioned basis, multiple taxation inevitably results. Hence, whereas the fact of apportionment in interstate commerce means that “multiple burdens logically cannot occur,” Washington Revenue Dept., 435 U. S., at 746-747, the same conclusion, as to foreign commerce, logically cannot be drawn. Due to the absence of an authoritative tribunal capable of ensuring that the aggregation of taxes is computed on no more than one full value, a state tax, even though “fairly apportioned” to reflect an instrumentality’s presence within the State, may subject foreign commerce “ ‘to the risk of a double tax burden to which '[domestic] commerce is not exposed, and which the commerce clause forbids.’ ” Evco v. Jones, 409 U. S., at 94, quoting J. D. Adams Mfg. Co., 304 U. S., at 311. Second, a state tax on the instrumentalities of foreign commerce may impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential. Foreign commerce is preeminently a matter of national concern. “In international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the United States act through a single government with unified and adequate national power.” Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U. S. 48, 59 (1933). Although the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, grants Congress power to regulate commerce “with foreign Nations” and “among the several States” in parallel phrases, there is evidence that the Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater. Cases of this Court, stressing the need for uniformity in treating with other nations, echo this distinction. In approving state taxes on the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, the Court consistently has distinguished oceangoing traffic, supra, at 442; these cases reflect an awareness that the taxation of foreign commerce may necessitate a uniform national rule. Indeed, in Pullman’s Palace, the Court wrote that the “ Vehicles of commerce by water being instruments of intercommunication with other nations, the regulation of them is assumed by the national legislature/ ” 141 U. S., at 24, quoting Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 456, 470 (1875). Finally, in discussing the Import-Export Clause, this Court, in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U. S. 276, 285 (1976), spoke of the Framers’ overriding concern that “the Federal Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.” The need for federal uniformity is no less paramount in ascertaining the negative implications of Congress’ power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations” under the Commerce Clause. A state tax on instrumentalities of foreign commerce may frustrate the achievement of federal uniformity in several ways. If the State imposes an apportioned tax, international disputes over reconciling apportionment formulae may arise. If a novel state tax creates an asymmetry in the international tax structure, foreign nations disadvantaged by the levy may retaliate against American-owned instrumentalities present in their jurisdictions. Such retaliation of necessity would be directed at American transportation equipment in general, not just that of the taxing State, so that the Nation as a whole would suffer. If other States followed the taxing State’s example, various instrumentalities of commerce could be subjected to varying degrees of multiple taxation, a result that would plainly prevent this Nation from “speaking with one voice” in regulating foreign commerce. For these reasons, we believe that an inquiry more elaborate than that mandated by Complete Auto is necessary when a State seeks to tax the instrumentalities of foreign, rather than of interstate, commerce. In addition to answering the nexus, apportionment, and nondiscrimination questions posed in Complete Auto, a court must also inquire, first, whether the tax, notwithstanding apportionment, creates a substantial risk of international multiple taxation, and, second, whether the tax prevents the Federal Government from “speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.” If a state tax contravenes either of these precepts, it is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. C Analysis of California's tax under these principles dictates that the tax, as applied to appellants’ containers, is impermissible. Assuming, arguendo, that the tax passes muster under Complete Auto, it cannot withstand scrutiny under either of the additional tests that a tax on foreign commerce must satisfy. First, California’s tax results in multiple taxation of the instrumentalities of foreign commerce. By stipulation, appellants’ containers are owned, based, and registered in Japan; they are used exclusively in international commerce; and they remain outside Japan only so long as needed to complete their international missions. Under these circumstances, Japan has the right and the power to tax the containers in full. California’s tax, however, creates more than the risk of multiple taxation; it produces multiple taxation in fact. Appellants’ containers not only “are subject to property tax ... in Japan,” App. 32, but, as the trial court found, “are, in fact, taxed in Japan.” Id., at 35. Thus, if appellees’ levies were sustained, appellants “would be paying a double tax.” Id., at 23. Second, California’s tax prevents this Nation from “speaking with one voice” in regulating foreign trade. The desirability of uniform treatment of containers used exclusively in foreign commerce is evidenced by the Customs Convention on Containers, which the United States and Japan have signed. See n. 10, supra. Under this Convention, containers temporarily imported are admitted free of “all duties and taxes whatsoever chargeable by reason of importation.” 20 U. S. T., at 304. The Convention reflects a national policy to remove impediments to the use of containers as “ir struments of international trafile.” 19 U. S. C. § 1322 (a). California’s tax, however, will frustrate attainment of federal uniformity. It is stipulated that American-owned containers are not taxed in Japan. App. 35. California’s tax thus creates an asymmetry in international maritime taxation operating to Japan’s disadvantage. The risk of retaliation by Japan, under these circumstances, is acute, and such retaliation of necessity would be felt by the Nation as a whole. If other States follow California’s example (Oregon already has done so), foreign-owned containers will be subjected to various degrees of multiple taxation, depending on which American ports they enter. This result, obviously, would make “speaking with one voice” impossible. California, by its unilateral act, cannot be permitted to place these impediments before this Nation’s conduct of its foreign relations and its foreign trade. Because California’s ad valorem tax, as applied to appellants’ containers, results in multiple taxation of the instrumentalities of foreign commerce, and because it prevents the Federal Government from “speaking with one voice” in international trade, the tax is inconsistent with Congress’ power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” We hold the tax, as applied, unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. D Appellees proffer several objections to this holding. They contend, first, that any multiple taxation in this case is attributable, not to California, but to Japan. California, they say, is just trying to take its share; it should not be foreclosed by Japan’s election to tax the containers in full. California’s tax, however, must be evaluated in the realistic framework of the custom of nations. Japan has the right and the power to tax appellants’ containers at their full value; nothing could prevent it from doing so. Appellees’ argument may have force in the interstate commerce context. Cf. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267, 277, and n. 12 (1978). In interstate commerce, if the domiciliary State is “to blame” for exacting an excessive tax, this Court is able to insist upon rationalization of the apportionment. As noted above, however, this Court is powerless to correct malapportionment of taxes imposed from abroad in foreign commerce. Appellees contend, secondly, that any multiple taxation created by California’s tax can be cured by congressional action or by international agreement. We find no merit in this contention. The premise of appellees’ argument is that a State is free to impose demonstrable burdens on commerce, so long as Congress has not pre-empted the field by affirmative regulation. But it long has been “accepted constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation . . . affords some protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce, and that in such cases, where Congress has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature, is under the commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests.” Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U. S. 761, 769 (1945). Accord, Hughes v. Oklahoma, ante, at 326, and n. 2; Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U. S. 318, 328 (1977). Appellees’ argument, moreover, defeats, rather than supports, the cause it aims to promote. For to say that California has created a problem susceptible only of congressional — indeed, only of international — solution is to concede that the taxation of foreign-owned containers is an area where a uniform federal rule is essential. California may not tell this Nation or Japan how to run their foreign policies. Third, appellees argue that, even if California’s tax results in multiple taxation, that fact, after Moorman, is insufficient to condemn a state tax under the Commerce Clause. In Moorman, the Court refused to invalidate Iowa’s single-factor income tax apportionment formula, even though it posed a credible threat of overlapping taxation because of the use of three-factor formulae by other States. See also the several opinions in Moorman in dissent. 437 U. S., at 281, 282, and 283. That case, however, is quite different from this one. In Moorman, the existence of multiple taxation, on the record then before the Court, was “speculative,” id., at 276; on the record of the present case, multiple taxation is a fact. In Moorman, the problem arose, not from lack of apportionment, but from mathematical imprecision in apportionment formu-lae. Yet, this Court consistently had held that the Commerce Clause “does not call for mathematical exactness nor for the rigid application of a particular formula; only if the resulting valuation is palpably excessive will it be set aside.” Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U. S., at 325 (Stone, C. J., dissenting). Accord, Moorman, 437 U. S., at 274 (citing cases). See Hellerstein, State Taxation Under the Commerce Clause: An Historical Perspective, 29 Vand. L. Rev. 335, 347 (1976). This case, by contrast, involves no mere mathematical imprecision in apportionment; it involves a situation where true apportionment does not exist and cannot be policed by this Court at all. Moorman, finally, concerned interstate commerce. This case concerns foreign commerce. Even a slight overlapping of tax — a problem that might be deemed de minimis in a domestic context — assumes importance when sensitive matters of foreign relations and national sovereignty are concerned. Finally, appellees present policy arguments. If California cannot tax appellants’ containers, they complain, the State will lose revenue, even though the containers plainly have a nexus with California; the State will go uncompensated for the services it undeniably renders the containers; and, by exempting appellants’ containers from tax, the State in effect will be forced to discriminate against domestic, in favor of foreign, commerce. These arguments are not without weight, and, to the extent appellees cannot recoup the value of their services through user fees, they may indeed be disadvantaged by our decision today. These arguments, however, are directed to the wrong forum. “Whatever subjects of this [the commercial] power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.” Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 319 (1852). The problems to which appellees refer are problems that admit only of a federal remedy. They do not admit of a unilateral solution by a State. The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is reversed. It is so ordered. Substantially for the reasons set forth by Justice Manuel in his opinion for the unanimous Supreme Court of California, 20 Cal. 3d 180, 571 P. 2d 254, Mr. Justice Rehnquist is of the opinion that the judgment of that court should be affirmed. “A container is a permanent reusable article of transport equipment. .. durably made of metal, and equipped with doors for easy access to the goods and for repeated use. It is designed to facilitate the handling, loading, stowage aboard ship, carriage, discharge from ship, movement, and transfer of large numbers of packages simultaneously by mechanical means to minimize the cost and risks of manually processing each package.” Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, 5 J. Mar. L. & Com. 507, 513 (1974). See Customs Convention on Containers, Art. I (6), May 18,1956, [1969] 20 U. S. T. 301, 304, T. I. A. S. No. 6634. Although containers may be as small as 1 cubic meter (35.3 cubic feet), 49 CFR §420.3 (c)(5) (1977), they are typically 8 feet high, 8 feet wide, and between 8 and 40 feet long. Simon, 5 J. Mar. L. & Com., at 510. The opinion of the Superior Court is not officially reported. The Court of Appeal also rejected, 132 Cal. Rptr., at 534, appellants’ argument that California’s tax was prohibited by Art. XI, §§ 1 and 4, and by Art. XXII, § 2, of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United States of America and Japan, Apr. 2, 1953, [1953] 4 U. S. T. 2063, T. I. A. S. No. 2863 (providing that Japanese nationals residing in the United States may not be subjected to payment of taxes “more burdensome than those borne by” United States nationals, and according Japan “most favored nation” status). Appellants repeat this argument here, and we reject it. The provisions appellants cite interdict discrimination against Japanese nationals; there is no evidence that California has treated Japanese containers differently from domestic containers for purposes of applying its property tax. The Court of Appeal likewise rejected, 132 Cal. Rptr., at 533, appellants’ argument that California’s tax constituted an indirect “Duty of Tonnage” proscribed by U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Appellants repeat this argument here; in view of oür disposition, we do not reach it. The Court of Appeal noted that appellants did not challenge California’s tax on due process grounds. See 132 Cal. Rptr., at 532 n. 2. Although appellants proffer a due process challenge here, we need not reach it either. The California Supreme Court also rejected appellants’ argument that California’s tax constituted “Imposts or Duties” proscribed by U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 20 Cal. 3d, at 186-188, 571 P. 2d, at 258-259. Appellants reiterate this argument here; in view of our disposition, we do not consider it. In their petition for rehearing, appellants argued that the tax contravened Art. Ill, §§ 1 and 2 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 61 Stat. A18 (providing that “imported products” may not be subjected to heavier taxes, or to less favorable treatment, than like products of domestic origin). Pet. for Rehearing 35-40. The court rejected this latter argument sub silentio. 20 Cal. 3d, at 190. Appellants repeat this argument here, and we deem it frivolous. Assuming, arguendo, that appellants’ containers, as instrumentalities of commerce entering this country subject to re-exportation, could be labeled “imported products” within the meaning of GATT, the provisions on which appellants rely prohibit only discriminatory treatment. As noted in n. 3, supra, there is no evidence that California has treated Japanese containers differently from domestic containers for purposes of applying its property tax. The “home port doctrine” was reaffirmed, as to oceangoing vessels, in Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471, 476-477 (1873), and in Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 69 (1911). It was applied to vessels moving in inland waters in St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423 (1871), and in Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409, 421-423 (1906). See, e. g., Note, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 968, 970-971 (1961); Note, State Taxation of International Air Transportation, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 518, 522, and n. 19 (1959); Page, Jurisdiction to Tax Tangible Movables, 1945 Wis. L. Rev. 125, 143-144. Accordingly, we do not reach questions as to the taxability of foreign-owned instrumentalities engaged in interstate commerce, or of domestically owned instrumentalities engaged in foreign commerce. Cf. Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. County of Alameda, 12 Cal. 3d 772, 528 P. 2d 56 (1974) (domestically owned containers used in intercoastal and foreign commerce held subject to apportioned property tax); Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 314, 333 P. 2d 323 (1958) (domestically owned aircraft used in foreign commerce held subject to apportioned property tax). By taxing property present on the “lien date,” California roughly apportions its property tax for mobile goods like containers. For example, if each of appellants’ containers is in California for three weeks a year, the number present on any arbitrarily selected date would be roughly %2 of the total entering the State that year. Taxing %s of the containers at full value, however, is the same as taxing all the containers at %2 value. Thus, California effectively apportions its tax to reflect the containers’ “average presence,” i. e., the time each container spends in the State per year. As noted above, the trial court found that appellants’ containers are “instrumentalities of foreign commerce” that are “used constantly and exclusively for the transportation of cargo for hire in foreign commerce.” App. 35, 36. Appellants’ containers entered the United States pursuant to the Customs Convention on Containers, see n. 1, supra, which grants containers “temporary admission free of import duties and import taxes and free of import prohibitions and restrictions,” provided they are used solely in foreign commerce and are subject to re-exportation. 20 U. S. T., at 304. Similarly, 19 CFR § 10.41a (a) (3) (1978) designates containers “instruments of international traffic,” with the result that they “may be released without entry or the payment of duty” under 19 U. S. C. § 1322 (a). See 19 CFR § 10.41a (a) (1) (1978). A bilateral tax Convention between Japan and the United States associates containers with the vehicles that carry them, and provides that income “derived by a resident of a Contracting State . . . from the use, maintenance, and lease of containers and related equipment ... in connection with the operation in international traffic of ships or aircraft ... is exempt from tax in the other Contracting State.” Convention Between the United States of America and Japan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 8, 1971, [1972] 23 U. S. T. 967, 1084-1085, T. I. A. S. No. 7365. Oceangoing vessels, for example, are generally taxed only in their nation of registry; this fact in part explains the phenomenon of “flags of convenience” (a term deemed derogatory in some quarters), whereby vessels are registered under the flags of countries that permit the operation of ships “at a nominal level of taxation.” See B. Boczek, Flags of Convenience 5, 56-57 (1962). Aircraft engaged in international traffic, apparently, are likewise “subject to taxation on an unapportioned basis by their country of origin.” Note, 11 Stan. L. Rev., supra n. 6, at 519, and n. 11. See, e. g., SAS, 56 Cal. 3d, at 17, and n. 3, 363 P. 2d, at 28, and n. 3. E. g., The Federalist No. 42, pp. 279-283 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Madison) ; 3 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 478 (1911) (Madison). See Note, State Taxation of International Air Carriers, 57 Nw. U. L. Rev. 92, 101, and n. 42 (1962); Note, 11 Stan. L. Rev., supra n. 6, at 525-526, and n. 29; Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 432, 465-475 (1941) (concluding, after an exhaustive survey of contemporary materials: “Despite the formal parallelism of the grants, there is no tenable reason for believing that anywhere nearly so large a range of action was given over commerce 'among the several states’ as over that 'with foreign nations.’ ” Id., at 475). E. g., Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 492-493 (1904) (“exclusive and absolute” power of Congress over foreign commerce); Bowman v. Chicago & N. R. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 482 (1888) (“It may be argued [that] the inference to be drawn from the absence of legislation by Congress on the subject excludes state legislation affecting commerce with foreign nations more strongly than that affecting commerce among the States. Laws which concern the exterior relations of the United States with other nations and governments are general in their nature, and should proceed exclusively from the legislative authority of the nation”); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259, 273 (1876) (regulation “must of necessity be national in its character” when it affects “a subject which concerns our international relations, in regard to which foreign nations ought to be considered and their rights respected”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 228-229 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring). See also Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 434 (1932). In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), the Court noted that Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce may be restricted by considerations of federalism and state sovereignty. It has never been suggested that Congress’ power to regulate foreign commerce could be so limited. The policies animating the Import-Export Clause and the Commerce Clause are much the same. In Michelin, the Court noted that the Import-Export Clause met three main concerns: “[T]he Federal Government must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments . . . ; import revenues were to be the major source of revenue of the Federal Government and should not be diverted to the States; and harmony among the States might be disturbed unless seaboard States . . . were prohibited from levying taxes on [goods in transit].” 423 U. S., at 285-286 (footnotes omitted). Abel, see n. 12, supra, observed that the Commerce Clause was directed to similar concerns. See 25 Minn. L. Rev., at 448, and n. 67, 452, and n. 81, 456-457, and n. 110 (need to deal in unified manner with foreign nations); id., at 446-451 (need to preserve federal revenue); id., at 448-449, and nn. 69-70, 470-471, 472-473 (need to prevent disharmony among States on account of import duties). In Washington Revenue Dept. v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S. 734 (1978), we noted that the third Michelin factor — preserving harmony among the States — -mandated the same inquiry as to the effect of a state tax as the Interstate Commerce Clause. See id., at 754-755. In this case, similarly, the first Michelin factor — the need to speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments — mandates the same inquiry as to the effect of a state tax as the Foreign Commerce Clause. In Washington Revenue Dept., the Court, holding that the state tax at issue did not prevent “speaking with one voice,” noted: “No foreign business or vessel is taxed.” 435 U. S., at 754. See Note, Developments in the Law — Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 953, 986 (1962) (noting the difficulty of allocating “international bridge time” for aircraft engaged in international commerce, with consequent risk of multiple taxation from overlapping apportionment formulae, and concluding that apportioned state taxation of foreign-owned aircraft should be forbidden). Cf. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275, 279 (1876) (invalidating California’s bond requirement for Chinese immigrants): “[I]f this plaintiff and her twenty companions had been subjects of the Queen of Great Britain, can any one doubt that this matter would have been the subject of international inquiry, if not of a direct claim for redress? Upon whom would such a claim be made? Not upon the State of California; for, by our Constitution, she can hold no exterior relations with other nations. It would be made upon the government of the United States. If that government should get into a difficulty which would lead to war, or to suspension of intercourse, would California alone suffer, or all the Union?” The stipulation of facts, App. 32, like the trial court’s finding, id., at 35, states that “[a]ll containers of [appellants] are subject to property tax and are, in fact, taxed in Japan.” The record does not further elaborate on the nature of Japan’s property tax. Appellants have uniformly insisted, Brief 9; Tr. of Oral Arg. 3, that Japan’s property tax is unap-portioned, i. e., that it is imposed on the containers’ full value, and we so understand the trial court’s finding. Although appellees do not seriously challenge this understanding, Brief 10-11, and n. 2, amicus curiae Multistate Tax Commission suggests that the record is inadequate to establish double taxation in fact: Japan, amicus says, may offer “credits ... for taxes paid elsewhere.” Brief 8. Amicus provides no evidence to support this theory. Both the Solicitor General, Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19 n. 9, and the Department of State, id., at 17a, assure us that Japan taxes appellants’ containers at their “full value,” and we accept this interpretation of the trial court’s factual finding. Because California’s tax in this case creates multiple taxation in fact, we have no occasion here to decide under what circumstances the mere risk of multiple taxation would invalidate a state tax, or whether this risk would be evaluated differently in foreign, as opposed to interstate, commerce. Compare Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267, 276-277 (1978), and Washington Revenue Dept., 435 U. S., at 746, with, e. g., Central R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U. S. 607, 615 (1962); Ott v. Mississippi Barge Line Co., 336 U. S. 169, 175 (1949); and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 326 (1944) (Stone, C. J., dissenting). Retaliation by some nations could be automatic. West Germany’s wealth tax statute, for example, provides an exemption for foreign-owned instrumentalities of commerce, but only if the owner’s country grants a reciprocal exemption for German-owned instrumentalities. Vermogen-steuergesetz (VStG), Art. 1, §2(3), reprinted in I Bundesgesetzblatt (BGB1) 950 (Apr. 23, 1974). The European Economic Community (EEC), when apprised of California’s tax on foreign-owned containers, apparently determined to consider “suitable counter-measures.” Press Release, Council of the European Communities, 521st Council Meeting— Transport (Luxembourg, June 12,1978), p. 21. Ore. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 7709 (Jan. 31, 1979) (citing decision below). Appellees’ reliance on Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28 (1948), is also misplaced. In that case, the appellant, a Michigan corporation, transported passengers from Detroit to an amusement park on an island in the Province of Ontario; the appellant refused to accept Negro passengers and was prosecuted under a Michigan civil rights statute. In sustaining the statute’s application against Commerce Clause attack, the Court emphasized that the appellant conducted "foreign commerce” in name only. The sole business on the island was the amusement park, and it catered solely to American patrons. There were “no established means of access from the Canadian shore to the island,” id., at 36, and the island was “economically and socially ... an amusement adjunct of the city of Detroit.” Id., at 35. The “highly closed and localized manner” in which the business was run insulated it “from all commercial or social intercourse and traffic with the people of another country usually characteristic of foreign commerce.” Id., at 36. The Court noted that the possibility of conflicting Canadian regulation was “so remote that it [was] hardly more than conceivable,” id., at 37, and concluded that, on the facts of the case, it was "difficult to imagine what national interest or policy, whether of securing uniformity in regulating commerce affecting relations with foreign nations or otherwise, could reasonably be found to be adversely affected by applying Michigan’s statute to these facts or to outweigh her interest in doing so.” Id., at 40. Bob-Lo is consistent with both the analysis and the result in the present case. Whereas in Bob-Lo the risk that foreign commerce would be burdened by inconsistent international regulation was “remote,” the risk that foreign commerce will be burdened by international multiple taxation here has been realized in fact. And whereas the Michigan statute posed no threat at all to the Federal Government’s ability to “speak with one voice” in regulating foreign trade, the impairment of federal uniformity worked by California’s statute is substantial.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DELGADILLO v. CARMICHAEL, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE. No. 63. Argued October 22, 1947. Decided November 10, 1947. Fred Okrand argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was A. L. Wirin. Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Robert S. Erdahl and Sheldon E. Bernstein. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner is detained by respondent under a deportation order, the validity of which is challenged by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The District Court granted the petition and discharged petitioner. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 159 F. 2d 130. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because of the seeming conflict between the decision below and Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F. 2d 878, from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Petitioner is a Mexican citizen who made legal entry into this country in 1923 and resided here continuously until 1942. In June of that year, when this nation was engaged in hostilities with Germany and Japan, he shipped out of Los Angeles on an inter coastal voyage to New York City as a member of the crew of an American merchant ship. The ship was torpedoed after passing through the Panama Canal on its way to New York City. Petitioner was rescued and taken to Havana, Cuba, where he was taken care of by the American Consul for about one week. On July 19, 1942, he was returned to the United States through Miami, Florida, and thereafter continued to serve as a seaman in the merchant fleet of this nation. In March 1944 he was convicted in California of second-degree robbery and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year to life. While he was confined in the California prison, proceedings for deportation were commenced against him under § 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 874, as amended 54 Stat. 671, 8U. S. C. § 155 (a). That section provides in part: “. . . any alien who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude, committed within five years after the entry of the alien to the United States . . . shall, upon the warrant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and deported. . . .” Those requirements for deportation are satisfied if petitioner’s passage from Havana, Cuba, to Miami, Florida, on July 19, 1942, was “the entry of the alien to the United States” within the meaning of the Act. In United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U. S. 398, United States ex rel. Stapf v. Corsi, 287 U. S. 129, and United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U. S. 422, there is language which taken from its context suggests that every return of an alien from a foreign country to the United States constitutes an “entry” within the meaning of the Act. Thus in the Smith case it was stated, 289 U. S. p. 425, that “any coming of an alien from a foreign country into the United States whether such coming be the first or any subsequent one” is such an “entry.” But those were cases where the alien plainly expected or planned to enter a foreign port or place. Here he was catapulted into the ocean, rescued, and taken to Cuba. He had no part in selecting the foreign port as his destination. His itinerary was forced on him by wholly fortuitous circumstances. If, nonetheless, his return to this country was an “entry” into the United States within the meaning of the Act, the law has been given a capricious application as Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, supra, suggests. In that case an alien traveled between Buffalo and Detroit on a railroad which, unknown to him, passed through Canada. He was asleep during the time he was in transit through Canada and was quite unaware that he had left or returned to this country. The court refused to hold that the alien had made an “entry,” for to do so would impute to Congress a purpose to subject aliens “to the sport of chance.” 158 F. 2d 879. In this case petitioner, of course, chose to return to this country, knowing he was in a foreign place. But the exigencies of war, not his voluntary act, put him on foreign soil. It would indeed be harsh to read the statute so as to add the peril of deportation to such perils of the sea. We might as well hold that if he had been kidnapped and taken to Cuba, he made a statutory “entry” on his voluntary return. Respect for law does not thrive on captious interpretations. Deportation can be the equivalent of banishment or exile. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 147. The stakes are indeed high and momentous for the alien who has acquired his residence here. We will not attribute to Congress a purpose to make his right to remain here dependent on circumstances so fortuitous and capricious as those upon which the Immigration Service has here seized. The hazards to which we are now asked to subject the alien are too irrational to square with the statutory scheme. Other grounds are now sought to be advanced for the first time in support of the deportation order. They are not open on the record before us. Reversed. If his intercoastal voyage had continued without interruption, it is clear that he would not have made an “entry” when he landed at its termination. United, States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, supra, p. 401.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, et al., Petitioners v. COWPASTURE RIVER PRESERVATION ASSOCIATION et al.; Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, Petitioner v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association, et al. Nos. 18-1584 18-1587 Supreme Court of the United States. Argued February 24, 2020 Decided June 15, 2020 Anthony A. Yang, Washington, DC, for the petitioners in No. 18-1584. Paul D. Clement, Washington, DC, for the petitioner in No. 18-1587. Michael K. Kellogg, Washington, DC, for the respondents. Stephen A. Vaden, General Counsel, Sarah Kathmann, Attorney Advisor, Department of Agriculture, Daniel H. Jorjani, Solicitor, John M. Henson, Attorney Advisor, Department of the Interior, Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Eric Grant, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Andrew C. Mergen, J. David Gunter II, Avi M. Kupfer, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for the Federal Petitioners. Paul D. Clement, Erin E. Murphy, William K. Lane III, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, DC, for petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC. Austin D. Gerken, Jr., Amelia Burnette, J. Patrick Hunter, Southern Environmental Law Center, Asheville, NC, Michael K. Kellogg, Gregory G. Rapawy, Bradley E. Oppenheimer, Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick, P.L.L.C., Washington, DC, Gregory Buppert, Southern Environmental Law Center, Charlottesville, VA, for respondents Cowpasture River Preservation, Association, Highlanders for Responsible, Development, Shenandoah Valley Battlefields Foundation, Shenandoah, Valley Network, and Virginia Wilderness Committee. Nathan Matthews, Sierra Club Environmental Law Program, Oakland, CA, for respondents, Sierra Club and, Wild Virginia, Inc. Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari in these consolidated cases to decide whether the United States Forest Service has authority under the Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. , to grant rights-of-way through lands within national forests traversed by the Appalachian Trail. 588 U. S. ----, 140 S.Ct. 36, 204 L.Ed.2d 1193 (2019) ; 588 U. S. ----, 140 S.Ct. 36, 204 L.Ed.2d 1193 (2019). We hold that the Mineral Leasing Act does grant the Forest Service that authority and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. I A In 2015, petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC (Atlantic) filed an application with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to construct and operate an approximately 604-mile natural gas pipeline extending from West Virginia to North Carolina. The pipeline's proposed route traverses 16 miles of land within the George Washington National Forest. The Appalachian National Scenic Trail (Appalachian Trail or Trail) also crosses parts of the George Washington National Forest. To construct the pipeline, Atlantic needed to obtain special use permits from the United States Forest Service for the portions of the pipeline that would pass through lands under the Forest Service's jurisdiction. In 2018, the Forest Service issued these permits and granted a right-of-way that would allow Atlantic to place a 0.1-mile segment of pipe approximately 600 feet below the Appalachian Trail in the George Washington National Forest. B Respondents Cowpasture River Preservation Association, Highlanders for Responsible Development, Shenandoah Valley Battlefields Foundation, Shenandoah Valley Network, Sierra Club, Virginia Wilderness Committee, and Wild Virginia filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit. They contended that the issuance of the special use permit for the right-of-way under the Trail, as well as numerous other aspects of the Forest Service's regulatory process, violated the Mineral Leasing Act (Leasing Act), 41 Stat. 437, 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. , the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. , the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2952, 16 U.S.C. § 1604, and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. Atlantic intervened in the suit. The Fourth Circuit vacated the Forest Service's special use permit after holding that the Leasing Act did not empower the Forest Service to grant the pipeline right-of-way beneath the Trail. As relevant here, the court concluded that the Appalachian Trail had become part of the National Park System because, though originally charged with the Trail's administration, 16 U.S.C. § 1244(a)(1), the Secretary of the Interior delegated that duty to the National Park Service, 34 Fed. Reg. 14337 (1969). In the Fourth Circuit's view, this delegation made the Trail part of the National Park System because the Trail was now an "area of land ... administered by the Secretary [of the Interior] acting through the Director [of the National Park Service]." 54 U.S.C. § 100501. Because it concluded the Trail was now within the National Park System, the court held that the Trail was beyond the authority of "the Secretary of the Interior or appropriate agency head" to grant pipeline rights-of-way under the Leasing Act. 30 U.S.C. § 185(a). See 911 F.3d 150, 179-181 (CA4 2018). II These cases involve the interaction of multiple federal laws. We therefore begin by summarizing the relevant statutory and regulatory background. A Congress enacted the Weeks Act in 1911, Pub. L. 61-435, 36 Stat. 961, which provided for the acquisition of lands for inclusion in the National Forest System, see 16 U.S.C. §§ 516 - 517. The Weeks Act also directed that lands acquired for the National Forest System "shall be permanently reserved, held, and administered as national forest lands." § 521. Though Congress initially granted the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to administer national forest lands, § 472, the Secretary has delegated that authority to the Forest Service, 36 C.F.R. § 200.3(b)(2)(i) (2019). What is now known as the George Washington National Forest was established as a national forest in 1918, see Proclamation No. 1448, 40 Stat. 1779, and renamed the George Washington National Forest in 1932, Exec. Order No. 5867. No party here disputes that the George Washington National Forest was acquired for inclusion in the National Forest System and that it is under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service. See 16 U.S.C. § 1609. B Enacted in 1968, the National Trails System Act (Trails Act), among other things, establishes national scenic and national historic trails. 16 U.S.C. § 1244(a). See 82 Stat. 919, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1241 et seq. The Appalachian Trail was one of the first two trails created under the Act. § 1244(a)(1). Under the statute, the Appalachian Trail "shall be administered primarily as a footpath by the Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture." Ibid. The statute empowers the Secretary of the Interior to establish the location and width of the Appalachian Trail by entering into "rights-of-way" agreements with other federal agencies as well as States, local governments, and private landowners. §§ 1246(a)(2), (d), (e). However, the Trails Act also contains a proviso stating that "[n]othing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to transfer among Federal agencies any management responsibilities established under any other law for federally administered lands which are components of the National Trails System." § 1246(a)(1)(A). The Trails Act currently establishes 30 national historic and national scenic trails. See §§ 1244(a)(1)-(30). It assigns responsibility for most of those trails to the Secretary of the Interior. Ibid. Though the Act is silent on the issue of delegation, the Department of the Interior has delegated the administrative responsibility over each of those trails to either the National Park Service or the Bureau of Land Management, both of which are housed within the Department of the Interior. Congressional Research Service, M. De Santis & S. Johnson, The National Trails System: A Brief Overview 2-3 (Table 1), 4 (Fig. 1) (2020). Currently, the National Park Service administers 21 trails, the Bureau of Land Management administers 1 trail, and the two agencies co-administer 2 trails. Ibid. The Secretary of Interior delegated his authority over the Appalachian Trail to the National Park Service in 1969. 34 Fed. Reg. 14337. C In 1920, Congress passed the Leasing Act, which enabled the Secretary of the Interior to grant pipeline rights-of-way through "public lands, including the forest reserves," § 28, 41 Stat. 449. Congress amended the Leasing Act in 1973 to provide that not only the Secretary of the Interior but also any "appropriate agency head" may grant "[r]ights-of-way through any Federal lands ... for pipeline purposes." Pub. L. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576, codified at 30 U.S.C. § 185(a). Notably, the 1973 amendment also defined "Federal lands" to include "all lands owned by the United States, except lands in the National Park System, lands held in trust for an Indian or Indian tribe, and lands on the Outer Continental Shelf." 87 Stat. 577, codified at 30 U.S.C. § 185(b). In 1970, Congress defined the National Park System as "any area of land and water now and hereafter administered by the Secretary of the Interior, through the National Park Service for park, monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes." § 2(b), 84 Stat. 826, codified at 54 U.S.C. § 100501. III We are tasked with determining whether the Leasing Act enables the Forest Service to grant a subterranean pipeline right-of-way some 600 feet under the Appalachian Trail. To do this, we first focus on the distinction between the lands that the Trail traverses and the Trail itself, because the lands (not the Trail) are the object of the relevant statutes. Under the Leasing Act, the "Secretary of the Interior or appropriate agency head" may grant pipeline rights-of-way across "Federal lands ." 30 U.S.C. § 185(a) (emphasis added). The Forest Service is an "appropriate agency head" for "Federal lands" over "which [it] has jurisdiction." § 185(b)(3). As stated above, it is undisputed that the Forest Service has jurisdiction over the "Federal lands" within the George Washington National Forest. The question before us, then, becomes whether these lands within the forest have been removed from the Forest Service's jurisdiction and placed under the Park Service's control because the Trail crosses them. If no transfer of jurisdiction has occurred, then the lands remain National Forest lands, i.e. , "Federal lands" subject to the grant of a pipeline right-of-way. If, on the other hand, jurisdiction over the lands has been transferred to the Park Service, then the lands fall under the Leasing Act's carve-out for "lands in the National Park System," thus precluding the grant of the right-of-way. § 185(b)(1) (emphasis added). We conclude that the lands that the Trail crosses remain under the Forest Service's jurisdiction and, thus, continue to be "Federal lands" under the Leasing Act. A We begin our analysis by examining the interests and authority granted under the Trails Act. Pursuant to the Trails Act, the Forest Service entered into "right-of-way" agreements with the National Park Service "for [the] approximately 780 miles of Appalachian Trail route within national forests," including the George Washington National Forest. 36 Fed. Reg. 2676 (1971) ; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1246(a)(2) ; 36 Fed. Reg. 19805. These "right-of-way" agreements did not convert "Federal lands" into "lands" within the "National Park System." 1 A right-of-way is a type of easement. In 1968, as now, principles of property law defined a right-of-way easement as granting a nonowner a limited privilege to "use the lands of another." Kelly v. Rainelle Coal Co. , 135 W.Va. 594, 604, 64 S.E.2d 606, 613 (1951) ; Builders Supplies Co. of Goldsboro, N. C., Inc. v. Gainey , 282 N.C. 261, 266, 192 S.E.2d 449, 453 (1972) ; see also R. Powell & P. Rohan, Real Property § 405 (1968); Restatement (First) of Property § 450 (1944). Specifically, a right-of-way grants the limited "right to pass ... through the estate of another." Black's Law Dictionary 1489 (4th ed. 1968). Courts at the time of the Trails Act's enactment acknowledged that easements grant only nonpossessory rights of use limited to the purposes specified in the easement agreement. See, e.g. , Bunn v. Offutt , 216 Va. 681, 684, 222 S.E.2d 522, 525 (1976). And because an easement does not dispossess the original owner, Barnard v. Gaumer , 146 Colo. 409, 412, 361 P.2d 778, 780 (1961), "a possessor and an easement holder can simultaneously utilize the same parcel of land," J. Bruce & J. Ely, Law of Easements and Licenses in Land § 1:1, p. 1-5 (2015). Thus, it was, and is, elementary that the grantor of the easement retains ownership over "the land itself ." Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler , 287 Minn. 254, 257, 177 N.W.2d 786, 789 (1970) (emphasis added). Stated more plainly, easements are not land, they merely burden land that continues to be owned by another. See Bruce, Law of Easements and Licenses in Land § 1:1, at 1-2. If analyzed as a right-of-way between two private landowners, determining whether any land had been transferred would be simple. If a rancher granted a neighbor an easement across his land for a horse trail, no one would think that the rancher had conveyed ownership over that land. Nor would anyone think that the rancher had ceded his own right to use his land in other ways, including by running a water line underneath the trail that connects to his house. He could, however, make the easement grantee responsible for administering the easement apart from the land. Likewise, when a company obtains a right-of-way to lay a segment of pipeline through a private owner's land, no one would think that the company had obtained ownership over the land through which the pipeline passes. Although the Federal Government owns all lands involved here, the same general principles apply. We must ascertain whether one federal agency has transferred jurisdiction over lands-meaning "jurisdiction to exercise the incidents of ownership"-to another federal agency. Brief for Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 22-23, n. 2. The Trails Act refers to the granted interests as "rights-of-way," both when describing agreements with the Federal Government and with private and state property owners. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1246(a)(2), (e). When applied to a private or state property owner, "right-of-way" would carry its ordinary meaning of a limited right to enjoy another's land. Nothing in the statute suggests that the term adopts a more expansive meaning when the right is granted to a federal agency, and we do "not lightly assume that Congress silently attaches different meanings to the same term in the same ... statute," Azar v. Allina Health Services , 587 U. S. ----,---- - ----, 139 S.Ct. 1804, 1812, 204 L.Ed.2d 139 (2019). Accordingly, as would be the case with private or state property owners, a right-of-way between two agencies grants only an easement across the land, not jurisdiction over the land itself. The dissent notes that the Federal Government has referred to the Trail as an "area" and a "unit" and has described the Trail in terms of "acres." See post , at 1853 - 1855, 1857 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). In the dissent's view, this indicates that the Trail and the land are the same. This is not so. Like other right-of-way easements, the Trail burdens "a particular parcel of land." Bruce, Law of Easements and Licenses in Land § 1:1, at 1-6. It is thus not surprising that the Government might refer to the Trail as an "area," much as one might mark out on his property the "area" of land burdened by a sewage easement. The fact remains that the land and the easement are still separate. The dissent also cites provisions of the Trails Act that discuss "lands" to be included in the Trail. See post , at 1856 - 1857. But this, too, is consistent with our conclusion that the Trail is an easement. Like all easements, the parcel of land burdened by the easement has particular metes and bounds. See, e.g. , Carnemella v. Sadowy , 147 App.Div.2d 874, 876, 538 N.Y.S.2d 96, 98 (1989) ("[T]he subject easement ... reasonably described the portion of the property where the easement existed"); Sorrell v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. , 314 S.W.2d 193, 195-196 (Ky. 1958). In fact, without such descriptions, parties to an easement agreement would be unable to understand their rights or enforce another party's obligations under the easement agreement. Thus, there is nothing noteworthy about the fact that the Trails Act discusses whether particular lands should be included within the metes and bounds of the tracts of land burdened by the easement. In short, none of the characterizations identified by the dissent changes the fact that the burden on the land and the land itself remain separate. In sum, read in light of basic property law principles, the plain language of the Trails Act and the agreement between the two agencies did not divest the Forest Service of jurisdiction over the lands that the Trail crosses. It gave the Department of the Interior (and by delegation the National Park Service) an easement for the specified and limited purpose of establishing and administering a Trail, but the land itself remained under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service. To restate this conclusion in the parlance of the Leasing Act, the lands that the Trail crosses are still "Federal lands," 30 U.S.C. § 185(a), and the Forest Service may grant a pipeline right-of-way through them-just as it granted a right-of-way for the Trail. Sometimes a complicated regulatory scheme may cause us to miss the forest for the trees, but at bottom, these cases boil down to a simple proposition: A trail is a trail, and land is land. 2 The various duties described in the Trails Act reinforce that the agency responsible for the Trail has a limited role of administering a trail easement, but that the underlying land remains within the jurisdiction of the Forest Service. The Trails Act states that the Secretary of the Interior (and by delegation the National Park Service) shall "administe[r]" the Trail "primarily as a footpath." 16 U.S.C. § 1244(a)(1). The Secretary is charged with designating Trail uses, providing Trail markers, and establishing interpretative and informational sites "to present information to the public about the [T]rail." § 1246(c). He also has the authority to pass regulations governing Trail protection and good conduct and can regulate the "protection, management, development, and administration" of the Trail. § 1246(i). Though the Trails Act states that the responsible agency shall "provide for" the maintenance of the Trail, § 1246(h)(1) (emphasis added), it is the Forest Service that performs the necessary physical work. As the Government explained at oral argument (and as respondents did not dispute), "[i]f a tree falls on forest lands over the trail, it's the Forest Service that's responsible for it. You don't call the nine [National] Park Service employees at Harpers Ferry [in West Virginia] and ask them to come out and fix the tree." Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. These statutory duties refer to the Trail easement, not the lands over which the easement passes. The dissent resists this conclusion by asserting that the National Park Service "administers" the Trail, and that so long as that is true, the Trail is land within the National Park System. See post , at 1858 - 1859. But the National Park Service does not administer the "land" crossed by the Trail. It administers the Trail as an easement-an easement that is separate from the underlying land. 3 Finally, Congress has used unequivocal and direct language in multiple statutes when it wished to transfer land from one agency to another, just as one would expect if a property owner conveyed land in fee simple to another private property owner. In the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, for instance, which was enacted the same day as the Trails Act, Congress specified that "[a]ny component of the national wild and scenic rivers system that is administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the National Park Service shall become a part of the [N]ational [P]ark [S]ystem ." § 10(c), 82 Stat. 916, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1281(c) (emphasis added). That statute also explicitly permits the head of an agency "to transfer to the appropriate secretary jurisdiction over such lands ." § 6(e), 82 Stat. 912-913, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1277(e) (emphasis added). Congress has also authorized the Department of the Interior "to transfer to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agriculture for national forest purposes lands or interests in lands acquired for or in connection with the Blue Ridge Parkway" and specifies that "[l]ands transferred under this Act shall become national forest lands." Pub. L. 82-336, 66 Stat. 69 (emphasis added). Similar language appears in a host of other statutes. See §§ 5(a)(2), 8(c)(2), 114 Stat. 2529, 2533; Pub. L. 89-446, 80 Stat. 199 ; § 7(c), 79 Stat. 217; Pub. L. 88-415, 78 Stat. 388. The fact that Congress chose to speak in terms of rights-of-way in the Trails Act, rather than in terms of land transfers, reinforces the conclusion that the Park Service has a limited role over only the Trail, not the lands that the Trail crosses. See Reves v. Ernst & Young , 507 U.S. 170, 178-179, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993). For these reasons, we hold that the Trails Act did not transfer jurisdiction of the lands crossed by the Trail from the Forest Service to the Department of the Interior. It created a trail easement and gave the Department of the Interior the administrative responsibilities concomitant with administering the Trail as a trail. Accordingly, because the Department of the Interior had no jurisdiction over any lands, its delegation to the National Park Service did not convert the Trail into "lands in the National Park System," 30 U.S.C. § 185(b)(1) (emphasis added)-i.e. , an "area of land ... administered by the Secretary [of the Interior] acting through the Director [of the National Park Service]." 54 U.S.C. § 100501 (emphasis added). The Forest Service therefore retained the authority to grant Atlantic a pipeline right-of-way. B 1 Respondents take a markedly different view, which is shared by the dissent. According to respondents, the Trail cannot be separated from the underlying land. In their view, if the National Park Service administers the Trail, then it also administers the lands that the Trail crosses, and no pipeline rights-of-way may be granted. Respondents' argument that the National Park Service administers the Trail (and therefore the lands that the Trail crosses) proceeds in four steps. First, the Trails Act granted the Department of the Interior the authority to administer the Trail. 16 U.S.C. § 1244(a)(1). Second, the Department of the Interior delegated those responsibilities to the National Park Service in 1969. 34 Fed. Reg. 14337. Third, in 1970, Congress defined the National Park System to include "any area of land and water administered by the Secretary [of the Interior] acting through the Director [of the National Park Service]." 54 U.S.C. § 100501. Under respondents' view, the 1970 National Park System definition made the Trail part of the National Park System. But one more step was still required to place the Trail outside the Forest Service's Leasing Act pipeline authority. That final step occurred in 1973, when the amendment to the Leasing Act carved out lands in the National Park System from the definition of the "Federal lands" through which pipeline rights-of-way could be granted. 30 U.S.C. § 185(b)(1). Because the Trail had become part of the National Park Service in 1970, respondents conclude that the 1973 carve-out applied to the Trail. Therefore, in their view, the Forest Service cannot grant pipeline rights-of-way under the parcels on which there is a right-of-way for the Appalachian Trail. This circuitous path misses the mark. As described above, under the plain language of the Trails Act and basic property principles, responsibility for the Trail and jurisdiction over the lands that the Trail crosses can and must be separated for purposes of determining whether the Forest Service can grant a right-of-way. See supra , at 1844 - 1846. 2 Even accepting respondents' argument on its own terms, however, we remain unpersuaded. Respondents' entire theory depends on an administrative action about which the statutes at issue are completely silent: the Department of the Interior's voluntary decision to assign responsibility over a given trail to the National Park Service rather than to the Bureau of Land Management. To reiterate, respondents contend that the Department of the Interior's decision to delegate responsibility over a trail to the National Park Service renders that trail an "area of land ... administered by the Secretary [of the Interior], acting through the [Park Service.]" 54 U.S.C. § 100501. Respondents' theory requires us to accept that, without a word from Congress, the Department of the Interior has the power to vastly expand the scope of the National Park Service's jurisdiction through its delegation choices. See Addendum to Reply Brief for Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 1a-2a. After all, respondents' view would not just apply to the approximately 2,000-mile-long Appalachian Trail. It would apply equally to all 21 national historic and national scenic trails currently administered by the National Park Service. See Congressional Research Service, National Trails System. Under our precedents, when Congress wishes to " 'alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme,' " as respondents contend it did here through delegation, we would expect it to speak with the requisite clarity to place that intent beyond dispute. See Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis , 584 U. S. ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1617, 200 L.Ed.2d 889 (2018) (quoting Whitman v. American Trucking Assns. , Inc. , 531 U.S. 457, 468, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001) ). We will not presume that the act of delegation, rather than clear congressional command, worked this vast expansion of the Park Service's jurisdiction and significant curtailment of the Forest Service's express authority to grant pipeline rights-of-way on "lands owned by the United States." 30 U.S.C. § 185(b). Respondents' theory also has striking implications for federalism and private property rights. Respondents do not contest that, in addition to federal lands, these 21 trails cross lands owned by States, local governments, and private landowners. See also post , at ---- (acknowledging that the Trail alone "comprises 58,110.94 acres of Non-Federal land, including 8,815.98 acres of Private land" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Under respondents' view, these privately owned and state-owned lands would also become lands in the National Park System. Our precedents require Congress to enact exceedingly clear language if it wishes to significantly alter the balance between federal and state power and the power of the Government over private property. Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft , 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991). Finally, reliance on the Department of the Interior's delegation of its Trails Act authority is especially questionable here, given that Congress has used express language in other statutes when it wished to transfer lands between agencies. See supra , at 1847. Congress not only failed to enact similar language in the Trails Act, but it clearly expressed the opposite view. The entire Trails Act must be read against the backdrop of the Weeks Act, which states that lands acquired for the National Forest System-including the George Washington National Forest-"shall be permanently reserved, held, and administered as national forest lands." 16 U.S.C. § 521. The Trails Act further provides that "[n]othing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to transfer among Federal agencies any management responsibilities established under any other law for federally administered lands which are components of the National Trails System." § 1246(a)(1)(A). These two provisions, when combined with the Trails Act's use of the term "rights-of-way" and the administrative duties set out in the Trails Act, provide much clearer-and more textual-guides to Congress' intent than an agency's silent decision to delegate responsibilities to the National Park Service. In sum, we conclude that the Department of the Interior's unexplained decision to assign responsibility over certain trails to the National Parks System and the Leasing Act's definition of federal lands simply cannot bear the weight of respondents' interpretation. IV We hold that the Department of the Interior's decision to assign responsibility over the Appalachian Trail to the National Park Service did not transform the land over which the Trail passes into land within the National Park System. Accordingly, the Forest Service had the authority to issue the permit here. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered . Justice SOTOMAYOR, with whom Justice KAGAN joins, dissenting. The majority's complicated discussion of private-law easements, footpath maintenance, differently worded statutes, and policy masks the simple (and only) dispute here. Is the Appalachian National Scenic Trail "lan[d] in the National Park System"? 30 U.S.C. § 185(b)(1). If it is, then the Forest Service may not grant a natural-gas pipeline right-of-way that crosses the Trail on federally owned land. So says the Mineral Leasing Act, and the parties do not disagree. See Brief for Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 10; Brief for Federal Petitioners 3; Brief for Respondents 1. By definition, lands in the National Park System include "any area of land" "administered" by the Park Service for "park, monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes." 54 U.S.C. § 100501. So says the National Park Service Organic Act, and the parties agree. See Brief for Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 38; Brief for Federal Petitioners 45-46; Brief for Respondents 5-6. The Appalachian Trail, in turn, is "administered" by the Park Service to ensure "outdoor recreation" and to conserve "nationally significant scenic, historic, natural, or cultural qualities." §§ 3(b), 5(a)(1), 82 Stat. 919-920; see also 34 Fed. Reg. 14337 (1969). So say the National Trails System Act and relevant regulations, and again the parties agree. See Brief for Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 6, 8-9; Brief for Federal Petitioners 9, 26; Brief for Respondents 5. Thus, as the Government puts it, the only question here is whether parts of the Appalachian Trail are " 'lands' " within the meaning of those statutes. Brief for Federal Petitioners 3. Those laws, a half century of agency understanding, and common sense confirm that the Trail is land, land on which generations of people have walked. Indeed, for 50 years the "Federal Government has referred to the Trail" as a " 'unit' " of the National Park System. Ante , at 1845 - 1846; see Part I-C, infra . A "unit" of the Park System is by definition either "land" or "water" in the Park System. 54 U.S.C. §§ 100102(6), 100501. Federal law does not distinguish "land" from the Trail any more than it distinguishes "land" from the many monuments, historic buildings, parkways, and recreational areas that are also units of the Park System. Because the Trail is land in the Park System, "no federal agency" has "authority under the Mineral Leasing Act to grant a pipeline right-of-way across such lands." Brief for Federal Petitioners 3. By contrast, today's Court suggests that the Trail is not "land" in the Park System at all. The Court strives to separate "the lands that the Trail traverses" from "the Trail itself," reasoning that the Trail is simply an "easement," "not land." Ante , at 1844, 1844 - 1845. In doing so, however, the Court relies on anything except the provisions that actually answer the question presented. Because today's Court condones the placement of a pipeline that subverts the plain text of the statutes governing the Appalachian Trail, I respectfully dissent. I Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, seeks to construct a natural-gas pipeline across the George Washington National Forest. The proposed route traverses 21 miles of national forests and requires crossing 57 rivers, streams, and lakes within those forests. See 911 F.3d 150, 155 (CA4 2018) (case below in No. 18-1584); App. in No. 18-1144 (CA4), p. 1659. The plan calls for "clearing trees and other vegetation from a 125-foot right of way (reduced to 75 feet in wetlands) through the national forests, digging a trench to bury the pipeline, and blasting and flattening ridgelines in mountainous terrains." 911 F.3d at 155. Construction noise will affect Appalachian Trail use 24 hours a day. See App. 79-80. Atlantic's machinery (including the artificial lights required to work all night) will dim the stars visible from the Trail. See id. , at 80. As relevant here, at one stretch the pipeline would cross the Trail. A Three interlocking statutes foreclose this proposal. The Mineral Leasing Act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior "or appropriate agency head" to grant rights-of-way for natural-gas pipelines "through any Federal lands." 30 U.S.C. § 185(a) ; see also § 185(q) (governing renewals of pre-existing pipeline rights-of-way "across Federal lands"). "For the purposes of " § 185, however, " 'Federal lands' " exclude "lands in the National Park System." § 185(b). Thus, as all acknowledge, if a proposed pipeline would cross any land in the Park System, then no federal agency would have "authority under the Mineral Leasing Act to grant" a "right-of-way across" that land. Brief for Federal Petitioners 3; see also Brief for Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 10; Brief for Respondents 1. Although the Mineral Leasing Act does not define "lands in the National Park System," the Park Service Organic Act does. Under the Organic Act, the Park System and any "unit" of the Park System "include any area of land and water administered by the Secretary" of the Interior, "acting through the Director" of the Park Service, for "park, monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes." 54 U.S.C. §§ 100102, 100501. That definition is sweeping; whether land or water, "any area" so "administered" by the Park Service is in the Park System. § 100501. In turn, the National Trails System Act of 1968 (Trails Act), 82 Stat. 919, provides that the Appalachian Trail "shall be administered" "by the Secretary of the Interior" to "provide for maximum outdoor recreation potential and for the conservation and enjoyment" of "nationally significant scenic, historic, natural, or cultural qualities." §§ 3(b), 5(a)(1), id. , at 919-920; see also 16 U.S.C. §§ 1242(a)(2), 1244(a)(1). The Trails Act provides that the Secretary of the Interior has authority to "grant easements and rights-of-way," among other things, "under" the Appalachian Trail's surface. § 9(a), 82 Stat. 925; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1248(a). In 1969, the Secretary of the Interior assigned all these powers to the Park Service, naming it the Trail's "land administering bureau." 34 Fed. Reg. 14337. Since then, the Federal Government has consistently identified the Trail as a " 'unit' " of, and thus land in, the National Park System. 54 U.S.C. §§ 100102(6), 100501 ; see also, e.g. , ante , at 1845 - 1846; Part I-C, infra . By statutory definition, the Appalachian Trail is land in the National Park System, and the Mineral Leasing Act does not permit pipeline rights-of-way across it. B Statutory history reinforces that the Appalachian Trail is land in the National Park System. When the Trails Act designated the Appalachian Trail in 1968, then-existing law provided that "all federally owned or controlled lands" administered by the Park Service for certain purposes were within the Park System. § 2(a), 67 Stat. 496. At the time, though, many "lands" owned by the Federal Government were "supervis[ed]" by the Park Service "pursuant to cooperative agreement[s]" but technically "under the administrative jurisdiction" of other federal agencies. § 2(b), ibid. The law defined these as " 'miscellaneous areas' " outside of the Park System. Ibid. In 1970, after the Park Service had begun its role as the Trail's land-administering bureau, Congress enacted the General Authorities Act. This Act declared that the Park System had "grown to include superlative natural, historic, and recreation areas in every major region" and Territory of the United States, and that the Act's "purpose" was "to include all such areas in the [Park] System and to clarify the authorities applicable to the system." Pub. L. 91-383, § 1, 84 Stat. 825. To that end, Congress eliminated the " 'miscellaneous areas' " classification, see § 2(a), id. , at 826, and amended the Park Service Organic Statute to define the National Park System as " 'any area of land and water now or hereafter administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the National Park Service.' " § 2(b), ibid. ; see also 54 U.S.C. §§ 100102(2), (5), (6), 100501. Of course, the Appalachian Trail was then (and " '[t]hereafter' ") " 'administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the National Park Service.' " § 2(b), 84 Stat. 826. In 1973, having broadly defined lands in the Park System, Congress amended the Mineral Leasing Act by eliminating authority to grant rights-of-way across those lands. Before then, the Mineral Leasing Act had provided limited permission to grant rights-of-way through "public lands," § 28, 41 Stat. 449, a term of art referring to certain federally owned land that had never been owned by a State or private individual, see Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp. , 384 U.S. 63, 65, and n. 2, 86 S.Ct. 1301, 16 L.Ed.2d 369 (1966). The 1973 amendments replaced the Mineral Leasing Act's reference to "public lands" with " 'all lands owned by the United States' " and carved out " 'lands in the National Park System.' " § 101, 87 Stat. 577; see also 30 U.S.C. § 185(b). This carve-out meant that parties seeking to build natural-gas pipelines across federally owned land in the Park System could not rely on the Mineral Leasing Act. § 101, 87 Stat. 577; 30 U.S.C. § 185(b). Put simply, "any area of land and water administered by" the Park Service is a unit of the Park System and must be "regulate[d]" through "means and measures" that "conserve" and "provide for the enjoyment of the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life" in ways "as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." 54 U.S.C. §§ 100101, 100501. By 1970, the Appalachian Trail was no doubt such an area, as Congress knew when it excluded all federally owned land "in the National Park System" from the Mineral Leasing Act in 1973. Because the proposed pipeline here would cross that park land, Atlantic cannot rely on the Mineral Leasing Act to authorize its proposal. C Agency practice confirms this conclusion. For a half century the Park Service has acknowledged that the Appalachian Trail is a unit of (and land in) the Park System. Recall that a year after the Trails Act's enactment, the Secretary of Interior named the Park Service the "land administering bureau" for the Appalachian Trail. 34 Fed. Reg. 14337. In 1972, the Park Service identified the Trail as a "recreational are[a]" that it "administered." National Park Service (NPS), National Parks & Landmarks 88 (capitalization deleted). Similarly, as the administrator of that land, the Park Service issued regulations for the Trail under the umbrella, "Areas of the National Park System." 36 C.F.R. pt. 7 (1983) (capitalization deleted); see also id. , § 7.100; 48 Fed. Reg. 30252 (1983). When it did so, the Park Service explained that "[t]hese regulations will be utilized to fulfill the statutory purposes of units of the National Park System." 36 C.F.R. § 1.1 ; 48 Fed. Reg. 30275. All those terms-land, area, administer, recreation, unit of the National Park System-trace the Organic Act's definition of land in the Park System. See, e.g. , 54 U.S.C. §§ 100102(6), 100501. More recently, a 2005 Park Service history stated that the Appalachian Trail was "brought into the National Park System" by the Trails Act and that, with the Trail's "inclusion in the System, the [Park Service] became responsible for its protection and maintenance within federally administered areas." NPS, The National Parks: Shaping the System 77. A 2006 Park Service handbook stated that "[s]everal components of the National Trails System which are administered by the [Park] Service," including the Appalachian Trail, "have been designated as units of the national park system" and "are therefore managed as national park areas." NPS, Management Policies 2006, § 9.2.2.7, p. 134. A 2016 Park Service index similarly listed the Trail as "a unit of the National Park System." NPS, The National Parks: Index 2012-2016, p. 142 (NPS Index). Still taking cues from statutory text, the Park Service continues to refer to the Appalachian Trail as land in the Park System. Just last year, the Park Service issued a reference manual describing the Appalachian Trail as a "land protection project" that has "been formally declared [a] uni[t] of the National Park System." NPS, National Trails System: Reference Manual 45, pp. 28, 221 (2019) (NPS, Reference Manual). The Park Service's compendium of regulations similarly explains that the General Authorities Act "brought all areas administered by the [Park Service] into one National Park System." NPS, Appalachian Trail Superintendent's Compendium 2 (2019). Even the Park Service's recent budget justification to Congress identified the Appalachian Trail as a "Park Base Uni[t]," a "Park Uni[t]," and a national "par[k]." Dept. of Interior, Budget Justifications and Performance Information-Fiscal Year 2020: National Park Service, at Overview-16, ONPS-89, -105 (Budget Justifications) (capitalization deleted). The Government has even brought this understanding to bear against private citizens. For example, the Government (including the Park Service and the Forest Service) filed a damages lawsuit against an individual, invoking the Organic Act and asserting that a segment of the Appalachian Trail passing through Forest Service lands was a unit of the National Park System. See Record in United States v. Reed , No. 1:05-cv-00010 (WD Va.), Doc. 1, p. 2 ("The United States ... has established the Appalachian National Scenic Trail ... as [a] uni[t] of the National Park Service"). In that case, the Government obtained a jury verdict against someone who had caused a fire on a Trail segment that was, as the Government alleged, land in the Park System. See ibid. , see also id. , Doc. 31 (judgment). Here, at least before they reached this Court, both the Park Service and Forest Service explained in proceedings below that the Trail is land in the Park System. The Park Service noted that the Appalachian Trail is a "protected corridor (a swath of land averaging about 1,000 feet in width ...)" that the Park Service "administers." App. 97. Thus, the Park Service detailed, "the entire Trail corridor" is a "park unit." Ibid. For its part, the Forest Service acknowledged that the Park Service "is the lead federal administrator agency for the entire [Appalachian Trail], regardless of land ownership." Id. , at 126. Again, this statement echoes the Organic Act's definition of land in the Park System, see 54 U.S.C. § 100501, further reflecting that the Trail is land in the Park System. The agencies' common ground does not stop there. The Park Service's Land Resources Division estimates that the Appalachian Trail corridor constitutes nearly 240,000 acres. NPS, Land Resources Div., Acreage Reports, Listing of Acreage, p. 1 (Dec. 31, 2019) (NPS, 2019 Acreage Report). The Forest Service concurs. See Dept. of Agriculture, Revised Land and Resource Mgmt. Plan-George Washington Nat. Forest 4-42 (2014) (Forest Service Land Plan). In its own management plan, the Forest Service explained that the Secretary of the Interior "administer[s]" in the George Washington National Forest "about 9,000 acres." Ibid. Acres of land, that is. As federally owned land administered by the Park Service, the Trail segment that Atlantic aims to cross is exempt from the Mineral Leasing Act's grant of right-of-way authority. II The Court resists this conclusion for three principal reasons. Each tries to detach the Appalachian Trail from land, but none adheres to the plain text and history described above. A First, the Court posits that the Forest Service granted the Park Service only an "easement" for the Trail's route through the George Washington National Forest. See ante , at 1844 - 1846. Because private-law "easements are not land," the Court reasons, nothing "divest[ed] the Forest Service of jurisdiction over the lands that the Trail crosses." Ante , at 1844 - 1845, 1846. That reasoning is self-defeating. Despite recognizing that the Park Service "administers the Trail ," the Court insists that this administration excludes "the underlying land" constituting the Trail. Ante , at 1846 - 1847. But the Court does not disclose how the Park Service could administer the Trail without administering the land that forms it. Neither does the Court explain how the Trail could be a unit of the Park System if it is not land. The Court declares that the Trail's status as a System " 'unit' " does not "indicat[e] that the Trail and the land are the same." Ante , at 1845. But the Court cites no statutory authority for this view. Nor could it. The Organic Act says the opposite: A " 'System unit' " is by definition "land" or "water." 54 U.S.C. §§ 100102(6), 100501. Unless the Court means to imply that the Appalachian Trail is water, the Trail must be land in the Park System. Indeed, the Court's atextual reading unsettles much of the Park System as we know it. Other System units include the Booker T. Washington National Monument, George Washington's birthplace, the Harriet Tubman Underground Railroad National Historical Park, the Blue Ridge Parkway, and the Golden Gate National Recreation Area. See, e.g. , Budget Justifications, ONPS-89, -92, -109; accord, NPS Index, at 32, 61, 85, 104, 105. These monuments, houses, roads, and recreational areas are just as much "land" in the Park System as is a foot trail worn into the earth. The Court's analysis of private-law easements is also unconvincing. In the Court's words, a private-law easement is "a limited privilege" granted to "a nonowner" of land. Ante , at 1844 - 1845; see also ibid. (adding that "the grantor of [an] easement retains ownership" over the land and that "easements are not land, they merely burden land that continues to be owned by another"). But as the Court recognizes, "the Federal Government owns all lands involved here," ante , at 1845, so private law is inapposite. Precisely because the Government owns all the lands at issue, it makes little sense to ask whether the Government granted itself an easement over its own land under state-law principles. Between agencies of the Federal Government, federal statutory commands, not private-law analogies, govern. In any event, the Trails Act provides that the "rights-of-way" for the Appalachian Trail "shall include lands protected for it" where "practicable." 16 U.S.C. § 1244(a)(1) ; cf. § 1246(d) (listing the "areas ... included" in a right-of-way); § 1246(e) (providing that the Government may "acquire such lands or interests therein to be utilized as segments of " a trail and that "lands involved in such rights-of-way should be acquired in fee"). Thus, even with a so-called "easement" through a federal forest, the Park Service still administers land "acquire[d]" and "protected" for the Trail. That is why the Park Service refers to the Trail as a "swath of land," App. 97; why the Forest Service admits that the Park Service administers those "acres," Forest Service Land Plan 4-42; and why the Secretary of the Interior has authority to grant rights-of-way "under" the Trail's surface, § 1248(a). Tellingly, the Court recognizes that § 1248(a) "extends a positive grant of authority to the agency responsible for the Trail." Ante , at 1845, n. 3. Indeed. That only scratches the surface. The Park Service may control what happens under the Trail consistent with "units of the national park system." § 1246(i). The Park Service also determines which "uses along the trail" to permit, § 1246(c), and provides for the Trail's "protection, management, development, and administration," § 1246(i). But under the Court's atextual reading of the relevant statutes, the agency tasked with protecting the Trail (and empowered to grant rights-of-way under it) could be excluded from determining whether a pipeline bores across the Trail. The Court's interpretation means that the Mineral Leasing Act would not even stop Atlantic from building a pipeline on top of an undisputed unit of the Park System. Cf. ante , at 1850, n. 7. That cannot be right. The Court also appears to assume that the Park Service's administrative jurisdiction over lands making up the Appalachian Trail must be mutually exclusive with the Forest Service's jurisdiction. See ante , at 1844 - 1846 (focusing on whether "jurisdiction over the lands" making up the Trail was "transferred," "convert[ed]," or "divest[ed]"). But this is not a zero-sum inquiry. The question is "not whether those portions of the [Appalachian Trail] were removed from the George Washington National Forest; the question is whether they were added to the National Park System." Brief for National Resources Defense Council et al. as Amici Curiae 2. As explained above, the lands making up the Appalachian Trail were indeed added to the National Park System. That the Trail may fall within both the Forest System and the Park System is not surprising. The Trails Act recognizes that two agencies may have overlapping authority over the Appalachian Trail. See 16 U.S.C. § 1244(a)(1) (giving the Secretary of the Interior administrative authority "in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture"); § 1246(a)(2) ("Development and management of each segment of the National Trails System shall be designed to harmonize with and complement any established multiple-use plans for that specific area"). So too the Mineral Leasing Act contemplates that multiple agencies may share authority over federally owned land implicated in proposed rights-of-way. See 30 U.S.C. § 185(c) ; see also n. 2, supra . The Court appears to recognize this point, see ante , at 1845, n. 3, but does not follow it to its logical conclusion: that land may be in both the Park Service and the Forest Service and thus excluded from the Mineral Leasing Act's right-of-way authority. The Mineral Leasing Act's carve-out simply asks whether the federally owned land is in the Park System at all. See § 185(b). If it is, then (as the parties recognize) the Mineral Leasing Act does not permit pipelines to cross that park land. The Court also cites a 1983 amendment to the Trails Act for the proposition that the lands making up the Appalachian Trail are not administered by the Park Service. See ante , at 1850 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1246(a)(1)(A) ). This provision states that "nothing" in the Trails Act "shall be deemed to transfer among Federal agencies any management responsibilities ... for federally administered lands which are components of the National Trails System." § 1246(a)(1)(A) ; see also § 207, 97 Stat. 45-46. It does not aid the Court's analysis. For one thing, § 1246(a)(1)(A) undercuts the Court's distinction between a trail and land: The statute equates "components of the National Trails System" like the Appalachian Trail with "lands." Ibid. ; see also § 1241(b) (Appalachian Trail is a "componen[t]" of the National Trails System). For another, in relying on this provision, the Court elides two terms of art: "administering" land and "managing" it. See ante , at 1846 - 1847, 1850. "Trail administration is distinguished from on-the-ground trail management." NPS, Reference Manual 45, at 21. Section 1246(a)(1)(A) itself differentiates the terms because it uses both, but disclaims only the transfer of "management," not "administration." When, as here, " ' "Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another," ' " this Court "generally presumes" that "Congress ' "intended a difference in meaning." ' " Maine Community Health Options v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 140 S.Ct. 1308, 1323, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2020). This distinction between administration and management tracks the Park Service Organic Act. The Organic Act defines the Park System as land "administered" by the Park Service. 54 U.S.C. § 100501 ; see also § 100502 (reflecting difference between administration and management). Similarly, the rest of the Trails Act differentiates the two terms by giving the Secretary of the Interior (and by extension the Park Service) power to "administe[r]" the lands making up the Appalachian Trail, § 5(a)(1), 82 Stat. 920, in consultation with other parties about proper Trail "management," § 7(i), id. , at 925. Even the Mineral Leasing Act echoes this difference by equating land "under the jurisdiction of [a] Federal agency" with land "administered" by that agency. 30 U.S.C. §§ 185(c)(1), (2). The Court may be right that the Park Service " 'provide[s] for' the maintenance of the Trail" while the Forest Service "performs the necessary physical work," ante , at 1846 - 1847, but that only punctuates the contrast between administration and management. See, e.g. , NPS, Reference Manual 45, at 8, 10, 21. There is no disputing that the Park Service administers the Appalachian Trail, even if the Forest Service manages it. At bottom, 16 U.S.C. § 1246(a)(1)(A) does not change the fact that the Park Service administers the Appalachian Trail as a unit of the Park System. Nor does it supersede the Park Service Organic Act's definition of Park System lands or the Mineral Leasing Act's exclusion of those lands. B Second, the Court maintains that Congress should have used "unequivocal and direct language" had it intended for the Trail to be land in the Park System. Ante , at 1847. The Court cites the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (Rivers Act) and the Blue Ridge Parkway statutes, noting that Congress "failed to enact similar language in the Trails Act." Ante , at 1850. But as the Government explained, "[m]agic words such as 'transfer jurisdiction' are unnecessary." Reply Brief for Federal Petitioners 9 (citation omitted). Indeed, neither example lends the Court much support. Certainly the Rivers Act, 82 Stat. 906, stated that any component of the Rivers System would "become a part of " the National Park System. § 10(c), id. , at 916. But this shows that Congress has many means to make land a unit of the Park System. Congress charted another path for the Appalachian Trail by enacting the General Authorities Act, a statute just as explicit as the Rivers Act. Again, it was after the Park Service had become the Trail's "land administering bureau," 34 Fed. Reg. 14337, that Congress provided that " 'any area of land ... now or hereafter administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the National Park Service' " is land in the Park System, § 2(b), 84 Stat. 826; see also 54 U.S.C. §§ 100102(2), (6), 100501. Resembling the Rivers Act, the General Authorities Act unambiguously provided that a component of the Trails System would become land in the National Park System. The Blue Ridge Parkway statutes also undermine the Court's conclusion. The Court cites a 1952 statute and some more recent laws, see ante , at 1847, but the enactments that originally created the Blue Ridge Parkway did not include language about "transferring" land from one agency to another. Rather, they stated that the parkway "shall be administered and maintained by the Secretary of the Interior through the National Park Service" and be "subject to" the Park Service Organic Act, even though the relevant lands included national forests. See 49 Stat. 2041; ch. 277, 54 Stat. 249-250; NPS, Blue Ridge Parkway: Virginia and North Carolina Final General Management Plan 12 (2013). The only salient difference between the original Blue Ridge Parkway statutes and the Trails Act is that, for the latter, Congress took an additional step by enacting the General Authorities Act. For similar reasons, it is not significant that the National Trails Act allowed the Secretary of the Interior to decide which agency in the Interior Department would administer the Appalachian Trail. Cf. ante , at 1848 - 1850. That was a choice for Congress and the Executive Branch, not the Judiciary. See § 5(a), 82 Stat. 920. More important, this designation had occurred before Congress enacted the General Authorities Act and amended the Mineral Leasing Act, and Congress was aware that the Park Service had already been selected to administer the land. The Court is therefore incorrect to suggest that Congress altered a regulatory scheme "through delegation." Ante , at 1848 - 1850. Congress did so instead explicitly through legislation and ratification. C Last, the Court objects on policy grounds that hewing to the statutes' plain meaning would have "striking implications for federalism and private property rights." Ibid. Not so. For starters, the pertinent provisions under the Mineral Leasing Act apply only to "lands owned by the United States." 30 U.S.C. § 185(b)(1). That statute does not address a State or private landowner's ability to grant rights-of-way for pipelines. Congress, moreover, already addressed the Court's concerns. The Trails Act prescribed the means by which nonfederal "land necessary for [the Trail] may be acquired": by voluntary arrangements or, if "all voluntary means for acquiring the property fail," through "condemnation proceedings." Preseault v. ICC , 494 U.S. 1, 5, n. 1, 110 S.Ct. 914, 108 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1246(e), (g) ). "Where practicable," the Trails Act incorporated preexisting cooperative agreements. § 1244(a)(1). And as the Park Service has explained, it took the cooperative path to acquire private and state land for the Trail. See, e.g. , NPS, Reference Manual 45, at 41 (extolling the Trail's cooperative agreements that became "a laboratory for developing sustainable partnerships that can care for and protect interstate trails"). True, that the Appalachian Trail is land in the Park System means the Park Service has some power to regulate nonfederal property. But that authority is not new. For decades the Park Service has regulated waste disposal on "all lands and waters within the boundaries of all units of the National Park System, whether federally or nonfederally owned." 36 C.F.R. § 6.2 (1995). It also has power to regulate the entire Appalachian Trail, including lands that the Government does not own. 16 U.S.C. § 1246(c) (requiring private landowners to act "in accordance with regulations" governing "the use of motorized vehicles" on the Trail). Nor is the Park Service's authority over Trail lands remarkable. Uniform regulatory power is a feature of a unified National Park System. After all, Congress designed the Park System to "expres[s] a single national heritage" and to "conserve" the country's "scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life" for "the common benefit of all the people of the United States." 54 U.S.C. §§ 100101(a), (b). Thus, "the Secretary [of the Interior], acting through the Director of the Park Service, has broad authority under the National Park Service Organic Act ... to administer both lands and waters within all system units in the country." Sturgeon v. Frost , 587 U. S. ----, ----, 139 S.Ct. 1066, 1076, 203 L.Ed.2d 453 (2019) ; see also § 100751(a) (Secretary of the Interior "shall prescribe such regulations as [he or she] considers necessary or proper for the use and management of System units"). Because "[t]hose statutory grants of power make no distinctions based on the ownership of either lands or waters," id. , at ----, 139 S.Ct., at 1706, "park boundaries can encompass both federally and nonfederally owned lands and waters," all "subject to [Park] Service regulations," id. , at ----, 139 S.Ct., at 1089 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring). Despite all this, the Court insists that Congress use "exceedingly clear language" when it wishes "to significantly alter the balance between federal and state power and the power of the Government over private property." Ante , at 1848 - 1850. But Congress did. It used language so clear, in fact, that every year the Park Service provides an acreage report listing state and private land as part of the Appalachian Trail system unit. Last year, the Park Service's report listed that the Trail system unit comprises 58,110.94 acres of "Non-Federal" land, including 8,815.98 acres of "Private" land. See NPS, 2019 Acreage Report. * * * Today's outcome is inconsistent with the language of three statutes, longstanding agency practice, and common sense. The Park Service administers acres of land constituting the Appalachian Trail for scenic, historic, cultural, and recreational purposes. §§ 3(b), 5(a)(1), 82 Stat. 919-920; 34 Fed. Reg. 14337. "[A]ny area of land" so "administered" by the Park Service is a unit of and thus land in the National Park System. 54 U.S.C. §§ 100102(6), 100501. The Mineral Leasing Act does not permit natural-gas pipelines across such federally owned lands. 30 U.S.C. § 185(b). Only Congress, not this Court, should change that mandate. I respectfully dissent. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. , 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499. Justice GINSBURG joins all but Part III-B-2 of this opinion. The Fourth Circuit also ruled for respondents on their other statutory claims. The specifics of the agreement between the two agencies is not in the record before us. It is of no moment that the Trails Act also permits the agency responsible for the Trail to grant "rights-of-way upon, over, under, across, or along any component of the national trails system." 16 U.S.C. § 1248(a). See post , at 1857 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). This provision merely extends a positive grant of authority to the agency responsible for the Trail; it does not divest the original agency of that same authority. See J. Bruce & J. Ely, The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land § 1:1, p. 1-5 (2015) (noting that "a possessor and an easement holder can simultaneously utilize the same parcel of land"). The dissent suggests that we are not engaging in statutory interpretation and that, relatedly, we should not look to state law for our analysis. See post , at 1854, n. 8, 1856 - 1857, n. 9. Neither criticism is warranted. We are principally concerned with the meaning of the term "right-of-way," which, as the dissent's own authority acknowledges, carries the same meaning whether it appears in federal or state law. In New Mexico v. United States Trust Co. , 172 U.S. 171, 19 S.Ct. 128, 43 L.Ed. 407 (1898), for instance, the Court interpreted the term in a federal statute. There, the Court acknowledged that there is a difference between " 'an easement in land [and] the land itself ' " and that a "right of way ... constitute[s] no ... right of possession of the land itself." Id. , at 182, 184, 19 S.Ct. 128. We have more recently confirmed that it is appropriate to look to "basic common law principles" when interpreting the terms right-of-way and easement. See Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States , 572 U.S. 93, 106, 134 S.Ct. 1257, 188 L.Ed.2d 272 (2014) ; id. , at 105, n. 4, 134 S.Ct. 1257. The dissent argues that its position is supported by the fact that the terms "administer" and "manage" are "terms of art." Post , at 1858. The dissent, however, does not demonstrate that either term carries a "widely accepted meaning," FCC v. AT & T Inc. , 562 U.S. 397, 405, 131 S.Ct. 1177, 179 L.Ed.2d 132 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted), let alone that Congress "borrow[ed] terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice," Carter v. United States , 530 U.S. 255, 264, 120 S.Ct. 2159, 147 L.Ed.2d 203 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis deleted). The dissent contends that this concern is misplaced because, under its view, though the National Park Service will be administering the thousands of miles of land that the 21 trails cross, the Federal Government will not have ownership over it. See post , at 1860 - 1861. As explained supra , at 1844 - 1846, this argument suffers from the same flaw-namely, that the Trail easement and the land that the Trail crosses are one and the same. Moreover, under the dissent's view, the National Park Service would still gain power over numerous tracts of privately owned and state-owned land. The dissent cites no authority to explain why this assertion of "administrative" jurisdiction would not pose many of the same difficulties as outright ownership. For instance, the National Park Service provides for the maintenance of the Trail where it crosses federal lands. 16 U.S.C. § 1246(h)(1). Over half of the States through which the Trail passes have analogous laws for state-owned lands. See, e.g. , N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 143B-135.76 (2019) ; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 11-11-106, 11-11-117 (2012); Va. Code Ann. § 10.1-203 (2018) ; Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 5-1001 (2018); 64 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 803(b) (2010); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 13:8-39 (West 2003) ; Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 132A, § 12 (2018); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 23-69, 23-70 (2017); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 216-D:2 (2019) ; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, § 1892 (2020 Cum. Supp.). The dissent's view would allow the Federal Government to displace all such laws. Attempting to downplay the implications of its position, the dissent asserts that the National Park Service already has such jurisdiction under the Trails Act and its implementing regulations. See post , at 1860 - 1861, n. 13. This, too, is incorrect. Recognizing the fact that "[National Park Service] lands are intermingled with private, local, [and] state" lands, 67 Fed. Reg. 8479 (2002), the National Park Service has concluded that the regulations governing the Trail pointed to by the dissent "do not apply on non-federally owned lands," 36 C.F.R. 1.2(b) (2019) ; see also 48 Fed. Reg. 30253 (1983) ; Dept. of Interior, W. Janssen, Appalachian National Scenic Trail, Superintendent's Compendium of Designations, Closures, Permit Requirements and Other Restrictions Imposed Under Discretionary Authority § 5, p. 3 (2019) ("The rules contained in this Compendium apply to all persons entering, using, visiting or otherwise present on federally owned lands"). Thus, the dissent points to nothing indicating that the National Park Service has ever adopted its novel theory, with its attendant federalism concerns. Objections that a pipeline segment interferes with rights of use enjoyed by the National Park Service would present a different issue. See Bruce, Law of Easements and Licenses in Land § 1:1. These cases do not present anything resembling such a scenario. Under the current proposal, the workstations for laying the challenged segment of the pipeline will be located on private land, approximately 1,400 feet and 3,400 feet respectively from the Trail. Atlantic plans to use a method of drilling that will not require the company to clear any land or dig on the Trail's surface. The entry and exit sites will not be visible from the Trail, nor will any detour be required. And, the final pipeline will lie approximately 600 feet below the Trail. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also found that Atlantic's proposal may conflict with several environmental laws, including the National Forest Management Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. See 911 F.3d at 154-155, 160-179 (remanding for further agency review). Those aspects of the Fourth Circuit's decision are not before this Court. If the "surface" of "all of the Federal lands involved" is "under the jurisdiction of one Federal agency," then the head of that agency (rather than the Secretary of the Interior) has authority to grant the right-of-way across federal land. 30 U.S.C. § 185(c)(1). If, by contrast, the surface of that land "is administered by the Secretary [of the Interior] or by two or more Federal agencies," then only the Secretary may grant the right-of-way. § 185(c)(2). Although the Mineral Leasing Act's right-of-way authority excludes lands in the Park System, Congress may enact separate legislation permitting natural-gas pipelines across such lands. See, e.g. , § 1(a), 126 Stat. 2441 (providing that "[t]he Secretary of the Interior may issue right-of-way permits" for certain natural-gas pipelines across Glacier National Park). Here, however, Atlantic and the Government have identified no other permitting authority besides the Mineral Leasing Act. The legal meaning of "land" when Congress enacted the relevant statutes was "any ground, soil, or earth whatsoever." Black's Law Dictionary 1019 (4th ed. 1968). The ordinary meaning of land was much the same. Webster's New International Dictionary 1388 (2d ed. 1949) ("The solid part of the surface of the earth, as distinguished from water"; "Any ground, soil, or earth whatsoever ... and everything annexed to it, whether by nature ... or by man"). It is undisputed that 16 U.S.C. § 1248 does not authorize rights-of-way for natural-gas pipelines. Atlantic therefore does not rely on this provision. Congress reiterated that the Trail is land in the Park System in 1983. It amended the Trails Act to provide that that the Secretary of Interior's " 'administrative responsibilities' " over the Appalachian Trail would be " 'carr[ied] out' " by " 'utiliz[ing] authorities related to units of the national park system.' " § 207(h), 97 Stat. 47; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1246(i). See § 2(b), 84 Stat. 826 (General Authorities Act); H. R. Rep. No. 91-1265, p. 2 (1970) ("The national park system which we know and cherish today has grown and matured over the years [and] has broadened to include ... areas primarily significant for their outdoor recreation potential"); ibid. (explaining that amendments to the Park Service Organic Act "reference ... more recent concepts like national recreation areas" as "units of the national park system"); see also § 101, 87 Stat. 576-577 (Mineral Leasing Act); S. Rep. No. 93-207, p. 29 (1973) (explaining that the Mineral Leasing Act "is not intended to grant rights-of-way through the National Park System" and citing the recently revised Park Service Organic Act). The Court acknowledges that "the Government might refer to the Trail" as " 'area' of land,' " but concludes that those references must pertain only to easements as defined by state law. Ante , at 1845 - 1846 (analogizing to sewage easements and citing state law). That view strays far from the federal statutes at issue. The simpler conclusion is that when the Government uses terms that define land in the Park System, the Government refers to land in the Park System. The Court maintains that these provisions are also "consistent with" its private-law paradigm, ante , at 1845 - 1846, but private law does not override the plain text of the relevant statutes. See Part I-A, supra . The Court simply works backwards from state law, even though statutory interpretation is supposed to start with statutory text. See, e.g. , Rotkiske v. Klemm , 589 U. S. ----, ----, 140 S.Ct. 27, ----, 204 L.Ed.2d 1182 (2019) (slip op., at 4). Indeed, the Court offers almost no analysis on the language of the General Authorities Act or the Park Service Organic Act. A right-of-way may include not just a right of passage, but also the land itself. See, e.g. , 16 U.S.C. § 521e(3) (providing that certain "rights-of-way" are "lands"); Black's Law Dictionary 1587 (11th ed. 2019) ("rightof-way" can refer to "[t]he strip of land"); Black's Law Dictionary 1489 (4th ed. 1968) (similar); see also New Mexico v. United States Trust Co. , 172 U.S. 171, 181-182, 19 S.Ct. 128, 43 L.Ed. 407 (1898) (discussing these two definitions and explaining that the "intention of the legislature" controls). Although the Court quotes New Mexico for the proposition that a " 'right of way' " cannot constitute " 'possession of the land itself,' " ante , at 1846, n. 4, that passage had to do with a "naked right of way," i.e. , a simple right of passage. 172 U.S. at 184, 19 S.Ct. 128 (emphasis added). The Park Service Reference Manual defines "Administration" as a term referencing the agency broadly "responsible for Federal funding and staffing necessary to operate the trail and exercising trailwide authorities from the [Trails Act] and [the administering agency's] own organic legislation." NPS, Reference Manual 45, at 8; see also ibid. ("Trail administration provides trailwide coordination and consistency"). "Management," by contrast, refers to localized matters like "local visitor services," "law enforcement," "site-specific compliance," "site interpretation," "trail maintenance" and "marking," "resource preservation and protection," and "viewshed protection." Id. , at 10. Mere months after Congress had enacted § 1246(a)(1)(A) to clarify that it had not transferred "management responsibilities," the Park Service issued a final rule for "General Regulations for Areas Administered by the National Park Service," reaffirming that the Appalachian Trail was land in the Park System. See 48 Fed. Reg. 30252. That agency action makes little sense under the Court's view. The Court predicts that "difficulties" would arise if the Trail were land in the Park System, asserting that the Park Service's " 'administrative' " authority could allow the Government to "displace" state laws providing for Trail maintenance. Ante , at 1849, n. 6. The Court's concerns do not follow. Even with the Supremacy Clause, U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, federal and state laws can (and do) coexist in this context and myriad others. See, e.g. , NPS, Reference Manual 45, at 8 (Park Service's "Trail administration provides trailwide coordination and consistency" among "government agencies, landowners, interest groups, and individuals"). The Court's core objection seems to be that the Park Service could "gain power over numerous tracts of privately owned and state-owned land." Ante , at 1849, n. 6. But it already did. See 16 U.S.C. § 1246(c) ; 54 U.S.C. § 100751(a) ; Pub. L. 91-383, §§ 1, 2(b), 84 Stat. 825-826; 36 C.F.R. § 7.100 ; 67 Fed. Reg. 8479 (2002) ; 48 Fed. Reg. 30252 ; see also Sturgeon v. Frost , 587 U. S. ----, ----, 139 S.Ct. 1066, 1076, 203 L.Ed.2d 453 (2019). Despite that fact, none of the Court's supposed "difficulties" has arisen. Compare ante , at 1849, n. 6, with, e.g. , NPS, Reference Manual 45, at 41 (explaining complementary "Federal, State, and nonprofit roles" in the Trail's successful "management"). Rather, as the Court points out, the Park Service has not fully exercised its authority, applying fewer regulations on private lands than on federal lands out of respect for private interests. 67 Fed. Reg. 8480. That the Park Service chooses not to regulate, however, does not mean it is powerless to do so. In any case, the Court's policy objections do not bear on the statutory question here. And the Court's citations only confirm that the Trail is among the Park Service's "administered lands." Id. , at 8479. As those sources show, the Park Service's "general" regulations for lands "administered by the National Park Service" apply to Trail segments under the agency's "primary land management responsibility." 48 Fed. Reg. 30252-30253 ; see also id. , at 30253 (noting that because the Park Service "cannot abrogate [its] responsibility by excluding areas of the National Park System from coverage," it may also impose "special" regulations applicable to private lands). Those authorities thus reveal that administration differs from management, and that either way the Trail segment at issue is land in the Park System. If any Park Service regulations impair state or private-property rights, the Takings Clause and the Trails Act provide for compensation in appropriate cases. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 5; 16 U.S.C. §§ 1246(e), (g).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

McCLANAHAN v. MORAUER & HARTZELL, INC., et al. No. 70-5097. Argued October 21, 1971 Decided November 8, 1971 John Louis Smith, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was George H. Mitchell, Jr. James C. Gregg argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was James F. Bromley. Per Curiam. Under § 33 (g) of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, an employer is not obligated to pay compensation to an employee who, without the employer’s written approval, settles a claim against a third person for an amount less than the compensation to which the employee is entitled under the Act. 44 Stat. 1441, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 933 (g). Certiorari was granted in this case, 402 U. S. 1008 (1971), on the assumption that it presented the question whether the consent judgment entered by the District Judge awarding petitioner damages against a third person evidenced a “compromise” subject to § 33 (g), or an award of damages “determined ... by the independent evaluation of a trial judge,” not subject to § 33 (g) under Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Assn., 390 U. S. 459, 467 (1968). Fuller examination of the case on oral argument discloses that the record does not adequately present that question. The writ of certiorari is therefore dismissed as improvidently granted. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SHALALA, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. SCHAEFER No. 92-311. Argued March 31, 1993 Decided June 24, 1993 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Black-mun, J., joined, post, p. 303. William K. Kelley argued the cause pro hac vice for petitioner. On the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Assistant Attorney General Ger-son, Deputy Solicitor General Mahoney, Edwin S. Kneedler, and William Kanter. Randall J. Fuller argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Brian Wolf man and David C. Vladeck Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Legal Services of Northern California, Inc., et al. by Gary F. Smith and Gill Deford; and for the National Organization of Social Security Claimants’ Representatives by Nancy G. Shor and Kirk B. Roose. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the proper timing of an application for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) in a Social Security case. Under 42 U. S. C. § 405(g), a claimant has the right to seek judicial review of a final decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services denying Social Security benefits. One possible outcome of such a suit is that the district court, pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g), will enter “a judgment . . . reversing the decision of the Secretary . . . [and] remanding the cause for a rehearing.” The issue here is whether the 30-day period for filing an application for EAJA fees begins immediately upon expiration of the time for appeal of such a “sentence-four remand order,” or sometime after the administrative proceedings on remand are complete. I In 1986, respondent Richard Schaefer filed an application for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 622, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 401 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. III). He was denied benefits at the administrative level, and sought judicial review by filing suit against the Secretary as authorized by § 405(g). Schaefer and the Secretary filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On April 4,1989, the District Court held that the Secretary had committed three errors in ruling on Schaefer’s case and entered an order stating that “the Secretary’s decision denying disability insurance benefits to [Schaefer] is reversed, that the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment are denied, and that the case is remanded to the Secretary for further consideration in light of this Order.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a. In accordance with this order, Schaefer’s application for benefits was reconsidered at the administrative level, and was granted. On July 18, 1990, Schaefer returned to the District Court and filed an application for attorney’s fees pursuant to EAJA. In response, the Secretary noted that Schaefer was required to file any application for EAJA fees “within thirty days of final judgment in the action,” 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), and argued that the relevant “final judgment” in the case was the administrative decision on remand, which had become final on April 2,1990. The District Court stayed action on Schaefer’s EAJA application pending this Court’s imminent ruling in Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U. S. 89 (1991). Melkonyan was announced shortly thereafter, holding that a final administrative decision could not constitute a “final judgment” for purposes of § 2412(d)(1)(B). Id., at 96. In light of Melkonyan, the Secretary changed positions to argue that EAJA’s 30-day clock began running when the District Court’s April 4, 1989 order (not the administrative ruling on remand) became final, which would have occurred at the end of the 60 days for appeal provided under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). Thus, the Secretary concluded, Schaefer’s time to file his EAJA application expired on July 3,1989, over a year before the application was filed. The District Court, however, found Schaefer’s EAJA application timely under the controlling Circuit precedent of Welter v. Sullivan, 941 F. 2d 674 (CA8 1991), which held that a sentence-four remand order is not a final judgment where “the district court retain[s] jurisdiction . . . and plan[s] to enter dispositive sentence four judgmen[t]” after the administrative proceedings on remand are complete. Id., at 675. The District Court went on to rule that Schaefer was entitled to $1,372.50 in attorney’s fees. The Secretary fared no better on appeal. The Eighth Circuit declined the Secretary’s suggestion for en banc reconsideration of Welter, and affirmed the District Court in an unpublished per curiam opinion. Judgt. order reported at 960 F. 2d 1053 (1992). The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari, urging us to reverse the Court of Appeals summarily. We granted certiorari, 506 U. S. 997 (1992), and set the case for oral argument. II The first sentence of 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) provides: “A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an itemized statement from any attorney or expert witness representing or appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed.” (Emphasis added.) In Melkonyan v. Sullivan, we held that the term “final judgment” in the highlighted phrase above “refers to judgments entered by a court of law, and does not encompass decisions rendered by an administrative agency.” See 501 U. S., at 96. Thus, the only order in this case that could have resulted in the starting of EAJA’s 30-day clock was the District Court’s April 4, 1989, order, which reversed the Secretary’s decision denying disability benefits and remanded the case to the Secretary for further proceedings. In cases reviewing final agency decisions on Social Security benefits, the exclusive methods by which district courts may remand to the Secretary are set forth in sentence four and sentence six of § 405(g), which are set forth in the margin. See Melkonyan, supra, at 99-100. Schaefer correctly concedes that the District Court’s remand order in this case was entered pursuant to sentence four. He argues, however, that a district court proceeding under that provision need not enter a judgment at the time of remand, but may postpone it and retain jurisdiction pending completion of the administrative proceedings. That argument, however, is inconsistent with the plain language of sentence four, which authorizes a district court to enter a judgment “with or without” a remand order, not a remand order “with or without” a judgment. See Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U. S. 617, 629 (1990). Immediate entry of judgment (as opposed to entry of judgment after postremand agency proceedings have been completed and their results filed with the court) is in fact the principal feature that distinguishes a sentence-four remand from a sentence-six remand. See Melkonyan, supra, at 101-102. Nor is it possible to argue that the judgment authorized by sentence four, if it includes a remand, does not become a “final judgment” — as required by § 2412(d) — upon expiration of the time for appeal. If that were true, there would never be any final judgment in cases reversed and remanded for further agency proceedings (including those which suffer that fate after the Secretary has filed the results of a sentence-six remand). Sentence eight of § 405(g) states that “tt]he judgment of the court” — which must be a reference to a sentence-four judgment, since that is the only judgment authorized by § 405(g) — “shall be final except that it shall be subject to review in the same manner as a judgment in other civil actions.” Thus, when the time for seeking appellate review has run, the sentence-four judgment fits squarely within the term “final judgment” as used in § 2412(d), which is defined to mean “a judgment that is final and not appeal-able.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G). We described the law with complete accuracy in Melkonyan, when we said: “In sentence four cases, the filing period begins after the final judgment (‘affirming, modifying, or reversing’) is entered by the court and the appeal period has run, so that the judgment is no longer appealable. ... In sentence six cases, the filing period does not begin until after the postremand proceedings are completed, the Secretary returns to court, the court enters a final judgment, and the appeal period runs.” 501 U. S., at 102. Schaefer raises two arguments that merit further discussion. The first is based on our decision in Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U. S. 877, 892 (1989), which held that fees incurred during administrative proceedings held pursuant to a district court’s remand order could be recovered under EAJA. In order “to effectuate Hudson,” Schaefer contends, a district court entering a sentence-four remand order may properly hold its judgment in abeyance (and thereby delay the start of EAJA’s 30-day clock) until postremand administrative proceedings are complete; otherwise, as far as fees incurred during the yet-to-be-held administrative proceedings are concerned, the claimant would be unable to comply with the requirement of § 2412(d)(1)(B) that the fee application include “the amount sought” and “an itemized statement... [of] the actual time expended” by attorneys and experts. In response, the Secretary argues that Hudson applies only to cases remanded pursuant to sentence six of § 405(g), where there is no final judgment and the clock does not begin to rim. The difficulty with that, Schaefer contends, is that Hudson itself clearly involved a sentence-four remand. On the last point, Schaefer is right. Given the facts recited by the Court in Hudson, the remand order there could have been authorized only under sentence four. See 490 U. S., at 880-881; cf. n. 2, supra. However, the facts in Hudson also show that the District Court had not terminated the case, but had retained jurisdiction during the remand. And that was a central element in our decision, as the penultimate sentence of the opinion shows: “We conclude that where a court orders a remand to the Secretary in a benefits litigation and retains continuing jurisdiction over the case pending a decision from the Secretary which will determine the claimant’s entitlement to benefits, the proceedings on remand are an integral part of the ‘civil action’ for judicial review, and thus attorney’s fees for representation on remand are available subject to the other limitations in the EAJA.” 490 U. S., at 892 (emphasis added). We have since made clear, in Finkelstein, that that retention of jurisdiction, that failure to terminate the case, was error: Under § 405(g), “each final decision of the Secretary [is] reviewable by a separate piece of litigation,” and a sentence-four remand order “terminate[s] the civil action” seeking judicial review of the Secretary’s final decision. 496 U. S., at 624-625 (emphases added). What we adjudicated in Hudson, in other words, was a hybrid: a sentence-four remand that the District Court had improperly (but without objection) treated like a sentence-six remand. We specifically noted in Melkonyan that Hudson was limited to a “narrow class of qualifying administrative proceedings” where “the district court retains jurisdiction of the civil action” pending the completion of the administrative proceedings. 501 U. S., at 97. We therefore do not consider the holding of Hudson binding as to sentence-four remands that are ordered (as they should be) without retention of jurisdiction, or that are ordered with retention of jurisdiction that is challenged. Schaefer’s second argument is that a sentence-four remand order cannot be considered a “final judgment” for purposes of § 2412(d)(1)(B) because that provision requires the party seeking fees to submit an application “show[ing] that [he] is a prevailing party.” That showing, Schaefer contends, cannot be made until the proceedings on remand are complete, since a Social Security claimant does not “prevail” until he is awarded Social Security benefits. The premise of this argument is wrong. No holding of this Court has ever denied prevailing-party status (under § 2412(d)(1)(B)) to a plaintiff who won a remand order pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g). Dicta in Hudson stated that “a Social Security claimant would not, as a general matter, be a prevailing party within the meaning of the EAJA merely because a court had remanded the action to the agency for further proceedings.” 490 U. S., at 887. But that statement (like the holding of the case) simply failed to recognize the distinction between a sentence-four remand, which terminates the litigation with victory for the plaintiff, and a sentence-six remand, which does not. The sharp distinction between the two types of remand had not been made in the lower court opinions in Hudson, see Hudson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F. 2d 1453 (CA11 1988); App. to Pet. for Cert. in Sullivan v. Hudson, O. T. 1988, No. 616, pp. 17a-20a (setting forth unpublished District Court opinion), was not included in the question presented for decision, and was mentioned for the first time in the closing pages of the Secretary’s reply brief, see Reply Brief for Petitioner in Sullivan v. Hudson, O. T. 1988, No. 616, pp. 14-17. It is only decisions after Hudson — specifically Finkelstein and Melkonyan— which establish that the sentence-four, sentence-six distinction is crucial to the structure of judicial review established under § 405(g). See Finkelstein, 496 U. S., at 626; Melkonyan, 501 U. S., at 97-98. Hudson’s dicta that remand does not generally confer prevailing-party status relied on three cases, none of which supports that proposition as applied to sentence-four remands. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U. S. 754, 758-759 (1980), rejected an assertion of prevailing-party status, not by virtue of having secured a remand, but by virtue of having obtained a favorable procedural ruling (the reversal on appeal of a directed verdict) during the course of the judicial proceedings. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755 (1987), held that a plaintiff does not become a prevailing party merely by obtaining “a favorable judicial statement of law in the course of litigation that results injjudgment against the plaintiff” id., at 763 (emphasis added). (A sentence-four remand, of course, is a judgment for the plaintiff.) And the third case cited in Hudson, Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U. S. 782 (1989), affirmatively supports the proposition that a party who wins a sentence-four remand order is a prevailing party. Garland held that status to have been obtained “[i]f the plaintiff has succeeded on any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit. . . sought in bringing suit.” Id., at 791-792 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Obtaining a sentence-four judgment reversing the Secretary’s denial of benefits certainly meets this description. See also Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 103 (1992). Ill Finally, Schaefer argues that, even if the District Court should have entered judgment in connection with its April 4, 1989 order remanding the case to the Secretary, the fact remains that it did not. And since no judgment was entered, he contends, the 30-day time period for filing an application for EAJA fees cannot have run. We agree. An EAJA application may be filed until 30 days after a judgment becomes “not appealable” — i. e., 30 days after the time for appeal has ended. See §§ 2412(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(G); see also Melkonyan, 501 U. S., at 102. Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure establishes that, in a civil case to which a federal officer is a party, the time for appeal does not end until 60 days after “entry of judgment,” and that a judgment is considered entered for purposes of the Rule only if it has been “entered in compliance with Rul[e] 58 ... of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Fed. Rules App. Proc. 4(a)(1), (7). Rule 58, in turn, requires a district court to set forth every judgment “on a separate document” and provides that “[a] judgment is effective only when so set forth.” See United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U. S. 216, 220 (1973) (per curiam). Since the District Court’s April 4 remand order was a final judgment, see supra, at 299, a “separate document” of judgment should have been entered. It is clear from the record that this was not done. The Secretary does not dispute that, but argues that a formal “separate document” of judgment is not needed for an order of a district court to become appealable. That is quite true, see 28 U. S. C. § 1291; Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U. S. 381 (1978) (per curiam); Finkelstein, supra, at 628, n. 7, but also quite irrelevant. EAJA’s 30-day time limit runs from the end of the period for appeal, not the beginning. Absent a formal judgment, the District Court’s April 4 order remained “appealable” at the time that Schaefer filed his application for EAJA fees, and thus the application was timely under § 2412(d)(1). He * * For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Sentences four and six of 42 U. S. C. § 405(g) provide: “[4] The [district] court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. ... [6] The court may, on motion of the Secretary made for good cause shown before he files his answer, remand the case to the Secretary for further action by the Secretary, and it may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding; and the Secretary shall, after the case is remanded, and after hearing such additional evidence if so ordered, modify or affirm his findings of fact or his decision, or both, and shall file with the court any such additional and modified findings of fact and decision, and a transcript of the additiohal record and testimony upon which his action in modifying or affirming was based.” Sentence-six remands may be ordered in only two situations: where the Secretary requests a remand before answering the complaint, or where new, material evidence is adduced that was for good cause not presented before the agency. See § 405(g) (sentence six); Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U. S. 89, 99-100, and n. 2 (1991); cf. Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U. S. 617, 626 (1990). The District Court’s April 4, 1989, remand order clearly does not fit withih either situation. The Secretary not only failed to object to the District Court’s retention of jurisdiction, but affirmatively endorsed the practice as a means of accommodating the lower court cases holding that a § 405(g) plaintiff does not become a prevailing party until Social Security benefits are actually awarded. Reply Brief for Petitioner in Sullivan v. Hudson, O. T. 1988, No. 616, pp. 12-13. Those precedents were highly favorable to the Government, of course, because they relieved the Secretary of liability for EAJA fees in all cases where Social Security benefits were ultimately denied. But they were also at war with the view — expressed later in the Secretary's Hudson reply brief — that a sentence-four remand order is a “final judgment” in the civil action. Id., at 16. Essentially, the Secretary in Hudson wanted it both ways: He wanted us to regard retention of jurisdiction as proper for purposes of determining prevailing-party status, but as improper for purposes of awarding fees on remand. Justice Stevens says that our holding “overrul[es]” Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U. S. 877 (1989). Post, at 304, 311. We do not think that is an accurate characterization. Hudson remains good law as applied to remands ordered pursuant to sentence six. And since the distinction between sentence-four and sentence-six remands was neither properly presented nor considered in Hudson, see supra, at 299, and n. 3, and infra this page and 301, limiting Hudson to sentence-six cases does not “overrule” the decision even in part. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 631 (1993). We agree with Justice Stevens that until today there has been some contradiction in our case law on this subject. In resolving it, however, we have not simply chosen Melkonyan’s dicta over Hudson, but have grounded our decision in the text and structure of the relevant statutes, particularly § 405. As formulated in the Secretary’s petition, the question on which the Court granted certiorari in H-udson was: “Whether Social Security administrative proceedings conducted after a remand from the courts are ‘adversary adjudications’ for which attorney fees are available under the [EAJA].” Pet. for Cert. in Sullivan v. Hudson, O. T. 1988, No. 616, p. I. We disagree with Justice Stevens’ assertion that “the respondent has prevailed precisely because the District Court in this case did enter a remand order without entering a judgment.” Post, at 305, n. 2 (emphasis in original). By entering a sentence-four remand order, the District Court did enter a judgment; it just failed to comply with the formalities of Rule 58 in doing so. That was error but, as detailed in the text, the relevant rules and statutes impose the burden of that error on the party seeking to assert an untimeliness defense, here the Secretary. Thus, contrary to Justice Stevens’ suggestion, see ibid,., our ruling in favor of respondent is not at all inconsistent with the proposition that sentence four and sentence six provide the exclusive methods by which district courts may remand a § 405 case to the Secretary.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

H. K. PORTER CO., INC., et al. v. CENTRAL VERMONT RAILWAY, INC., et al. No. 257. Argued April 20, 1961. Decided May 22, 1961. Richard A. Solomon argued the cause for the United States in No. 266. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Rankin, Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney' General Bicks, Acting Assistant Attorney General Kirkpatrick and Charles H. Weston. Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for appellant in No. 258. With him on the briefs was H. Neil Garson. E. B. Ussery and John D. Carbine submitted the cause on briefs for appellants in No. 257. J. Edgar McDonald argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were J. Raymond Hoover, William H. Parsons, Horace H. Powers, John F. Reilly and William F. Zearfaus. Together with No. 258, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Central Vermont Railway, Inc., et al., and No. 266, United States v. Centred Vermont Railway, Inc., et al., also on appeals from the same Court. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The Interstate Commerce Act confers broad powers upon the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate railroad transportation in the United States or to or from a foreign country, “but only insofar as such transportation . . . takes place within the United States.” In this case, here on appeal under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1253 and 2101 (b), a three-judge District Court set aside a Commission order on the ground that the Commission was attempting to regulate railroad transportation in Canada in excess of the Commission’s jurisdiction. The Province of Quebec, Canada, is a principal source of asbestos for manufacturers of asbestos products in this country. It is transported by Canadian railroads through southern Canada to points in Vermont three to five miles south of the border and carried from there by the various appellee railroads to other points in the United States. Canadian and American carriers have joined in the publication of joint through rates available to consignees in “official territory” in the Northeastern States, which rates are substantially lower than the combination of separate or local rates that are published and available as combination through rates for consignees in the Southern States. On the basis of these and other facts the Commission found after hearings that the higher combination rates to complainants in the South were: (a) “unjust and unreasonable” and therefore in violation of § 1 (6) of the Act, and (b) “unduly prejudicial” to the southern consignees and “unduly preferential” to the northern consignees enjoying the lower joint rates, and therefore in violation of § 3 (1). The Commission then entered its order directing the railroads to cease and desist from continuing to practice the undue prejudice and preference it had found and to establish, post and maintain rates and practices which would thereafter “prevent and avoid” such prejudice and preference. The District Court’s holding that the Commission was without jurisdiction was based on its assumption that the Commission’s order attempted to control the Canadian part of the transportation. But the order did not run against any transportation except that taking place “within the United States.” The order directed the defendant railroads, “according as they participate in the transportation within the United States,” to take action within their power to cease their participation in a transportation practice that the Commission had found to be prejudicial in violation of §3 (1). The affected transportation within this country was that “from a foreign country” over which §1(1) (a) specifically gives the Commission jurisdiction, and the order did nothing more than direct railroads engaged in that transportation to adjust their transportation practices “within the United States” in such a way as to eliminate illegal discriminations. These railroads operating within the United States undoubtedly have complete power to stop these discriminations. Mere withdrawal by the American railroads from the preferential joint through-rate agreements would be an obvious way to do so, and an alternative method would be to lower the combination through rates to southern territory by reduction of the rates from the Vermont interchange points to the South. It has long been settled that the Commission’s power to forbid unlawful rate discriminations is in no way diminished because the rates are published as joint through rates or combination through rates. This power likewise is not lost merely because the particular transportation by railroads carrying goods in this country happens to be a continuation of carriage from another country. Otherwise the Commission’s mandate to protect shippers against all undue discriminations would be frustrated with respect to rates that in part include payment for transportation that takes place in a foreign country. It was error to set aside the Commission’s order for lack of jurisdiction, and therefore the District Court’s judgment is Reversed. 49 U. S. C. § 1 (1)(a) and §1 (2). 182 F. Supp. 516. “Official territory” is in general that .area of the United States lying east of the Mississippi River and north of the Potomac and Ohio Rivers. See Class Rate Investigation, 1939, 262 I. C. C. 447, 457. 49 U. S. C. §1 (5). 49 U. S. C. §3 (1). Since the challenged order prescribed no “reasonable rates” to be observed, we have no occasion to consider the contention that the Commission was without jurisdiction to prescribe such rates. Nor did the Commission enter any final order that a complainant is entitled to an award of damages because it had been charged unlawful rates. Such an order, when and if made, can be challenged before a single judge under 49 U. S. C. § 16 (2). See United States v. I. C. C., 337 U. S. 426, 442-443; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States, 363 U. S. 202, 205. See United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 263 U. S. 515, 527. Cf. Commissioner Eastman’s concurring opinion in Cyanamid and Crude Cyanide from Niagara Falls, Ontario, 155 I. C. C. 488, 501-502.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

METROPOLITAN STEVEDORE CO. v. RAMBO ET AL. No. 94-820. Argued April 25,1995 — Decided June 12, 1996 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 301. Robert Evans Babcock argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Jeffrey R Minear argued the cause for the federal respondent in support of petitioner under this Court’s Rule 12.4. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Allen H. Feldman, Nathaniel I. Spiller, and Edward D. Sieger. Thomas J. Pierry argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Rambo. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Industrial Indemnity Insurance Co. by Roger A Levy; and for the National Association of Waterfront Employers et al. by Charles T. Carroll, Jr., Thomas D. Wilcox, and Franklin W. Losey. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 22 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), 44 Stat. 1437, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 922, allows for modification of a disability award “on the ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of fact.” The question in this case is whether a party may seek modification on the ground of “change in conditions” when there has been no change in the employee’s physical condition but rather an increase in the employee’s wage-earning capacity due to the acquisition of new skills. I In 1980, respondent John Rambo injured his back and leg while working as a longshore frontman for petitioner Metropolitan Stevedore Company. Rambo filed a claim with the Department of Labor that was submitted to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After Rambo and petitioner stipulated that Rambo sustained a 22>k% permanent partial disability and a corresponding $120.24 decrease in his $534.38 weekly wage, the ALJ, pursuant to LHWCA §8(c)(21), awarded Rambo 66%% of that figure, or $80.16 per week. App. 5. Because the ALJ also found that Rambo’s disability was not due solely to his work-related injury and was “materially and substantially greater than that which would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone,” LHWCA § 8(f)(1), 33 U. S. C. § 908(f)(1), he limited the period of petitioner’s liability to pay compensation to 104 weeks. Ibid.; App. 6. Later payments were to issue from the special fund administered by respondent Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP), LHWCA § 8(f)(2), 33 U. S. C. § 908(f)(2). Employers (or their insurance carriers) contribute to the fund based on their outstanding liabilities. See LHWCA § 44(c)(2)(B), 33 U. S. C. § 944(c)(2)(B). After the award, Rambo began attending crane school. With the new skills so acquired, he obtained longshore work as a crane operator. He also worked in his spare time as a heavy lift truck operator. Between 1985 and 1990, Rambo’s average weekly wages ranged between $1,307.81 and $1,690.50, more than three times his preinjury earnings, though his physical condition remained unchanged. In light of the increased wage-earning capacity, petitioner, which may seek modification even when the special fund has assumed responsibility for payments, see LHWCA §22, 33 U. S. C. §922; 20 CFR § 702.148(b) (1994), filed an application to modify the disability award under LHWCA §22. Petitioner asserted there had been a “change in conditions” so that Rambo was no longer “disabled” under the Act. The ALJ agreed that an award may be modified based on changes in the employee’s wage-earning capacity, even absent a change in physical condition. After discounting wage increases due to inflation and considering Rambo’s risk of job loss and other employment prospects, the ALJ concluded Rambo “no longer has a wage-earning capacity loss” and terminated his disability payments. App. 68. The Benefits Review Board affirmed, relying on Fleetwood v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 16 BRBS 282 (1984), aff’d, 776 F. 2d 1225 (CA4 1985), which held that “change in condition[s]” means change in wage-earning capacity, as well as change in physical condition. App. 73. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Rambo v. Director, OWCP, 28 F. 3d 86 (1994). Rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s approach in Fleetwood, the Ninth Circuit held that LHWCA §22 authorizes modification of an award only where there has been a change in the claimant’s physical condition. We granted certiorari to resolve this split, 513 U. S. 1106 (1995), and now reverse. II The LHWCA is a comprehensive scheme to provide compensation “in respect of disability or death of an employee ... if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States.” LHWCA § 3, 33 U. S. C. § 903(a). Section 22 of the Act provides for modification of awards “on the ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of fact.” 33 U. S. C. § 922. In Rambo’s view and that of the Ninth Circuit, “change in conditions” means change in physical condition and does not include changes in other conditions relevant to the initial entitlement to benefits, such as a change in wage-earning capacity. In our view, this interpretation of “change in conditions” cannot stand in the face of the language, structure, and purpose of the Act. A Neither Rambo nor the Ninth Circuit has attempted to base their position on the language of the statute, where analysis in a statutory construction case ought to begin, for “when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute’s meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished.” Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 475 (1992); Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U. S. 184, 190 (1991). Section 22 of the Act provides the only way to modify an award once it has issued. The section states: “Upon his own initiative, or upon the application of any party in interest (including an employer or carrier which has been granted relief under section 908(f) of this title), on the ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of fact by the deputy commissioner, the deputy commissioner may, at any time prior to one year after the date of the last payment of compensation, ... or at any time prior to one year after the rejection of a claim, review a compensation case ... and .. . issue a new compensation order which may terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or decrease such compensation, or award compensation.” 33 U.S. C. §922. On two occasions we have construed the phrase “mistake in a determination of fact” and observed that nothing in the statutory language supports attempts to limit it to particular kinds of factual errors or to cases involving new evidence or changed circumstances. See O’Keeffe v. Aerojet-General Shipyards, Inc., 404 U. S. 254, 255-256 (1971) (per curiam); Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers Assn., Inc., 390 U. S. 459, 465 (1968). The language of §22 also provides no support for Rambo’s narrow construction of the phrase “change in conditions.” The use of “conditions,” a word in the plural, suggests that Congress did not intend to limit the bases for modifying awards to a single condition, such as an employee’s physical health. See 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47.34, p. 274 (5th rev. ed. 1992) (“ ‘Ordinarily the legislature by use of a plural term intends a reference to more than one matter or thing’”) (quoting N. Y. Statutes Law §252 (McKinney 1971)); cf. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (“[WJords importing the plural include the singular”). Rather, under the “normal” or “natural reading,” Estate of Cowart, supra, at 477, the applicable “conditions” are those that entitled the employee to benefits in the first place, the same conditions on which continuing entitlement is predicated. Our interpretation is confirmed by the language of LHWCA §§2(10) and 8(c)(21). Section 2(10) defines “[disability” as “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” 33 U. S. C. § 902(10). For certain injuries the statute creates a conclusive presumption of incapacity to earn wages and sets compensation at 66%% of the claimant’s actual wage for a fixed number of weeks, according to a statutory schedule. See LHWCA §§8(c)(l)-(20), (22), 33 U.S.C. §§908(c)(l)-20, (22). When these types of scheduled injuries occur, a claimant simply proves the relevant physical injury and compensation follows for a finite period of time. See Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 506 U. S. 153, 156, n. 4 (1993); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 449 U. S. 268, 269 (1980). “In all other cases,” however, the statute provides “the compensation shall be 66% per centum of the difference between the average weekly wages of the employee and the employee’s wage-earning capacity thereafter in the same employment or otherwise, payable during the continuance of partial disability.” LHWCA §8(c)(21), 33 U. S. C. § 908(c)(21). For these nonscheduled injuries, the type at issue in this case, loss of wage-earning capacity is an element of the claimant’s case, for without the statutory presumption that accompanies scheduled injuries, a claimant is not “disabled” unless he proves “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages.” LHWCA § 2(10), 33 U. S. C. §902(10). See Bath Iron Works, supra, at 156; Potomac Elec. Power Co., supra, at 269-270. These two sections make it clear that compensation, as an initial matter, is predicated on loss of wage-earning capacity, and that such compensation should continue only “during the continuance of partial disability,” LHWCA § 8(c)(21), 33 U. S. C. §908(c)(21), i. e., during the continuance of the “incapacity ... to earn the wages,” LHWCA §2(10), 33 U. S. C. §902(10). Section 22 accommodates this statutory requirement by providing for modification of an award on the ground of “a change in conditions.” 33 U. S. C. § 922. Rambo’s insistence on what seems to us a “ ‘narrowly technical and impractical construction’ ” of this phrase, O’Keeffe, supra, at 255 (quoting Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. Norton, 106 F. 2d 137, 138 (CA3 1939)), does more than disregard the plain language of §§ 22, 2(10), and 8(c)(21). It also is inconsistent with the structure and purpose of the LHWCA. Like most other workers’ compensation schemes, the LHWCA does not compensate physical injury alone but the disability produced by that injury. See LHWCA §§3(a), 8, 33 U. S. C. §§ 903(a), 908; see also 1C A. Larson, Law of Workmen’s Compensation §57.11 (1994). Disability under the LHWCA, defined in terms of wage-earning capacity, LHWCA §2(10), is in essence an economic, not a medical, concept. Cf. 3 Larson, supra, § 81.31(e), p. 15-1150 (1995) (“[Disability in the compensation sense has an economic as well as a medical component”). It may be ascertained for nonscheduled injuries according to the employee’s actual earnings, if they “fairly and reasonably represent his wage-earning capacity,” and if they do not, then with “due regard to the nature of [the employee’s] injury, the degree of physical impairment, his usual employment and any other factors or circumstances in the case which may affect his capacity to earn wages in his disabled condition, including the effect of disability as it may naturally extend into the future.” LHWCA § 8(h), 33 U. S. C. § 908(h). The fundamental purpose of the Act is to compensate employees (or their beneficiaries) for wage-earning capacity lost because of injury; where that wage-earning capacity has been reduced, restored, or improved, the basis for compensation changes and the statutory scheme allows for modification. B Given that the language of §22 and the structure of the Act itself leave little doubt as to Congress’ intent, any argument based on legislative history is of minimal, if any, relevance. See Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 254, (1992); Ardestani v. INS, 502 U. S. 129, 136 (1991); cf. Intercounty Constr. Corp. v. Walter, 422 U. S. 1, 8 (1975) (construing ambiguity in application of §22’s 1-year limitations period). In any event, we find Rambo’s arguments that the legislative history provides support for his view lacking in force. From congressional Reports accompanying amendments to § 22 in 1934,1938, and 1984, Reports suggesting Congress was unwilling to extend the 1-year limitations period in which a party may seek modification, Rambo would have us infer that Congress intended a narrow construction of other parts of § 22, including the circumstances that would justify reopening an award. We rejected this very argument in Banks, supra, at 465, and its logic continues to elude us. Congress’ decision to maintain a 1-year limitations period has no apparent relevance to which changed conditions may justify modifying an award. Rambo next contends that following McCormick S. S. Co. v. United States Employees’ Compensation Comm’n, 64 F. 2d 84 (CA9 1933), the Courts of Appeals unanimously held that “change in conditions” refers only to changes in physical conditions, so Congress’ reenactment of the phrase “change in conditions” when it amended other parts of § 22 as late as 1984 must be understood to endorse that approach. We have often relied on Congress’ “reenact[ment of] statutory language that has been given a consistent judicial construction,” Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 185 (1994); see Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 566-567 (1988), in particular where Congress was aware of or made reference to that judicial construction, see Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 121 (1994); United States v. Calamaro, 354 U. S. 351, 359 (1957). The cases in the relevant period, however, were based on a misreading of McCormick, supra, which did not reject the idea that §22 included a change in wage-earning capacity, but merely expressed doubt that §22 “applies to a change in earnings due to economic conditions,” 64 F. 2d, at 85; they involved dicta, not holdings, see, e. g., Pillsbury v. Alaska Packers Assn., 85 F. 2d 758, 760 (CA9 1936), rev’d on other grounds, 301 U. S. 174 (1937); Burley Welding Works, Inc. v. Lawson, 141 F. 2d 964, 966 (CA5 1944); General Dynamics Corp. v. Director, OWCP, 673 F. 2d 23, 25, n. 6 (CA1 1982) (per curiam); and they were not uniform in their approach, see, e. g., Hole v. Miami Shipyards Corp., 640 F. 2d 769, 772 (CA5 1981) (“[T]he compensation award may be modified years later to reflect... greater or lesser economic injury”). Under these circumstances, we are not persuaded that congressional silence in the reenactment of the phrase “change in conditions” carries any significance. In a related argument, Rambo criticizes petitioner’s reading of § 22 because it sweeps away an accumulation of more than 50 years of dicta. Far from counseling hesitation, however, we think this step long overdue. “[A]ge is no antidote to clear inconsistency with a statute,” Brown v. Gardner, supra, at 122, and the dictum of Pillsbury and Burley Welding Works has not even aged with integrity, see, e. g., Fleetwood v. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 16 BRBS 282 (1984); LaFaille v. Benefits Review Board, U. S. Dept. of Labor, 884 F. 2d 54, 62 (CA2 1989); Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Guidry, 967 F. 2d 1039, 1042, n. 6 (CA5 1992) (dictum). Breath spent repeating dicta does not infuse it with life. The unnecessary observations of these Courts of Appeals “are neither authoritative nor persuasive.” McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U. S. 477, 482 (1921); cf. United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U. S. 286, 295 (1970). Finally, Rambo argues that including a change in wage-earning capacity as a change in conditions under §22 will flood the OWCP and the courts with litigation because parties will request modification every time an employee’s wages change or the economy takes a turn in one direction or the other. Experience in the 11 years since the Benefits Review Board decided Fleetwood, supra, suggests otherwise, but that argument is, in any case, better directed at Congress or the Director in her rulemaking capacity, see LHWCA § 39(a), 33 U. S. C. § 939(a); Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U. S. 122, 134 (1995), than at the courts. It is also based on a misconception of the LHWCA and our holding today. We recognize only that an award in a nonscheduled-injury case may be modified where there has been a change in wage-earning capacity. A change in actual wages is controlling only when actual wages “fairly and reasonably represent . . . wage-earning capacity.” LHWCA § 8(h), 33 U. S. C § 908(h). Otherwise, wage-earning capacity may be determined according to the many factors identified in §8(h), including “any . . . factors or circumstances in the case which may affect [the employee’s] capacity to earn wages in his disabled condition, including the effect of disability as it may naturally extend into the future.” This circumspect approach does not permit a change in wage-earning capacity with every variation in actual wages or transient change in the economy. There may be cases raising difficult questions as to what constitutes a change in wage-earning capacity, but we need not address them here. Rambo acquired additional, marketable skills and the ALJ, recognizing that higher wages do not necessarily prove an increase in wage-earning capacity, took care to account for inflation and risk of job loss in evaluating Rambo’s new “wage-earning capacity in an open labor market under normal employment conditions.” App. 66. We hold that a disability award may be modified under § 22 where there is a change in the employee’s wage-earning capacity, even without any change in the employee’s physical condition. Because Rambo raised other arguments before the Ninth Circuit that the panel did not have the opportunity to address, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. BEAUMONT et al. No. 02-403. Argued March 25, 2003 Decided June 16, 2003 Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 163. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 164. Deputy Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCollum, Gregory G. Garre, Douglas N. Letter, Edward Himmelfarb, and Jonathan H. Levy. James Bopp, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Richard E. Coleson and Thomas J. Marzen. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White; for the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of'Law by Burt Neu-borne, Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, and Deborah Goldberg; and for Public Citizen, Inc., et al. by Scott L. Nelson, Alan B. Morrison, and David C. Vladeck. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Taxpayers Alliance by Alan R Dye; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Deborah J. La Fetra; and for RealCampaignReform.org, Inc., et al. by William J. Olson, John S. Miles, and Herbert W. Titus. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. Since 1907, federal law has barred corporations from contributing directly to candidates for federal office. We hold that applying the prohibition to nonprofit advocacy corporations is consistent with the First Amendment. I The current statute makes it unlawful... for any corporation whatever ... to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with” certain federal elections, 90 Stat. 490, as renumbered and amended, 2 U. S. C. § 441b(a), “contribution or expenditure” each being defined to include “anything of value,” § 441b(b)(2). The prohibition does not, however, forbid “the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes.” § 441b(b)(2)(C); see § 431(4)(B). Such a PAC (so called after the political action committee that runs it) may be wholly controlled by the sponsoring corporation, whose employees and stockholders or members generally may be solicited for contributions. See §§ 441b(b)(4)(B)-(C); Federal Election Comm’n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 200, n. 4 (1982). While federal law requires PACs to register and disclose their activities, §§ 432-434; see Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 253-254 (1986), the law leaves them free to make contributions as well as other expenditures in connection with federal elections, § 441b(b)(2)(C). Respondents are a corporation known as North Carolina Right to Life, Inc., three of its officers, and a North Carolina voter (here, together, NCRL), who have sued the Federal Election Commission, the independent agency set up to “administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate policy with respect to” the federal electoral laws. §437c (b)(1). NCRL challenges the constitutionality of § 441b and the FEC’s regulations implementing that section, 11 CFR §§ 114.2(b), 114.10 (2003), but only so far as they apply to NCRL. The corporation is organized under the laws of North Carolina to provide counseling to pregnant women and to urge alternatives to abortion, and as a nonprofit advocacy corporation it is exempted from federal taxation by § 501(e)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 501(c)(4). ' It has no shareholders and, although it receives some donations from traditional business corporations, it is “overwhelmingly funded by private contributions from individuals.” App. 14. NCRL has made contributions and expenditures in connection with state elections, but not federal, owing to 2 U. S. C. § 441b. Instead, it has established a PAC, the North Carolina Right to Life, Inc., Political Action Committee, which has contributed to federal candidates. See North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F. 3d 705, 709 (CA4 1999), cert. denied, 528 U. S. 1153 (2000). The District Court granted summary judgment to NCRL and held §441b unconstitutional as applied to the corporation, both as to direct contributions and independent expenditures. 137 F. Supp. 2d 648 (EDNC 2000). A divided Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, 278 F. 3d 261 (2002), relying primarily on Massachusetts Citizens for Life, in which this Court held it unconstitutional to apply the statute to independent expenditures by Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., a nonprofit advocacy corporation in some respects like NCRL. The Court of Appeals ruled, first, that the prohibition on independent expenditures may not be applied to NCRL. Although the panel acknowledged that Massachusetts Citizens for Life, unlike NCRL, had a formal policy against accepting corporate donations, see Massachusetts Citizens for Life, supra, at 263-264 (describing this feature of the organization as “essential to our holding”), it nevertheless treated NCRL as materially indistinguishable from Massachusetts Citizens for Life. To the point for present purposes, the Court of Appeals went on to hold the ban on direct contributions likewise unconstitutional as applied to NCRL. While the majority of the divided court recognized that regulation of campaign contributions has received greater deference under First Amendment cases than regulation of independent expenditures, 278 F. 3d, at 274 (citing Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 386-388 (2000)), it held the ban on direct contributions unjustified as applied to “[Massachusetts Citizens for Life]-type corporations,” which it thought “pose[d] no risk of ‘unfair deployment of wealth for political purposes.’ ” 278 F. 3d, at 275 (quoting Massachusetts Citizens for Life, supra, at 259). The Court of Appeals reasoned that “[t]he rationale utilized by the Court in [Massachusetts Citizens for Life] to declare prohibitions on independent expenditures unconstitutional as applied to [the advocacy corporation involved there] is equally applicable in the context of direct contributions.” 278 F. 3d, at 275. Judge Gregory dissented from the others on this point, since he saw no way to square their conclusion with this Court’s reasoning in National Right to Work. 278 F. 3d, at 282. After the Fourth Circuit divided 7 to 4 in denying rehearing en banc, the FEC petitioned for certiorari solely as to the constitutionality of the ban on direct contributions. Because on that issue the Fourth Circuit is in conflict with the Sixth, see Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F. 3d 637, 645-646 (1997) (upholding a provision of Kentucky law analogous to §441b), we granted certiorari, 537 U. S. 1027 (2002). We now reverse. II A Any attack on the federal prohibition of direct corporate political contributions goes against the current of a century of congressional efforts to curb corporations’ potentially “deleterious influences on federal elections,” which we have canvassed a number of times before. United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 585 (1957); see id., at 570-584; see also National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 208-209; Pipe-fitters v. United States, 407 U. S. 385, 402-412 (1972); United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106, 113-115 (1948). The current law grew out of a “popular feeling” in the late 19th century “that aggregated capital unduly influenced politics, an influence not stopping short of corruption.” Automobile Workers, supra, at 570. A demand for congressional action gathered force in the campaign of 1904, which made a national issue of the political leverage exerted through corporate contributions, and after the election and new revelations of corporate political overreaching, President Theodore Roosevelt made banning corporate political contributions a legislative priority. R. Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and Courts: The Making of Federal Campaign Finance Law 1-8 (1988); see Automobile Workers, 352 U. S., at 571-575. Although some congressional proposals would have “prohibited political contributions by [only] certain classes of corporations,” id., at 573, the momentum was “for elections ‘free from the power of money,’ ” id., at 575 (citation omitted), and Congress acted on the President’s call for an outright ban, not with half measures, but with the Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. This “first federal campaign finance law,” Mutch, supra, at xvii, banned “any corporation whatever” from making “a money contribution in connection with” federal elections, 34 Stat. 864-865. Since 1907, there has been continual congressional attention to corporate political activity, sometimes resulting in refinement of the law, sometimes in overhaul. One feature, however, has stayed intact throughout this “careful legislative adjustment of the federal electoral laws,” National Right to Work, supra, at 209, and much of the periodic amendment was meant to strengthen the original, core prohibition on direct corporate contributions. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, for example, broadened the ban on contributions to include “anything of value,” and criminalized the act of receiving a contribution to match the criminality of making one. Ch. 368, §§302, 313, 43 Stat. 1070,1074. So, in another instance, the 1947 Labor Management Relations Act drew labor unions permanently within the law’s reach and invigorated the earlier prohibition to include “expenditure[s]” as well. Ch. 120, §304, 61 Stat. 159; see Pipefitters, supra, at 402. Today, as in 1907, the law focuses on the “special characteristics of the corporate structure” that threaten the integrity of the political process. National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 209; see id., at 207; see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, 658-659 (1990); Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U. S., at 257-258; Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 500-501 (1985). As we explained it in Austin, “State law grants corporations special advantages — such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets— that enhance their ability to attract capital and to deploy their resources in ways that maximize the return on their shareholders’ investments. These state-created advantages not only allow corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation’s economy, but also permit them to use ‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace’ to obtain ‘an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.’ ” 494 U. S., at 658-659 (quoting Massachusetts Citizens for Life, supra, at 257). Hence, the public interest in “restrict[ing] the influence of political war chests funneled through the corporate form.” National Conservative Political Action Comm., supra, at 500-501; see National Right to Work, supra, at 207 (“[Substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate form of organization should not be converted into political ‘war chests’ which could be used to incur political debts from legislators”). As these excerpts from recent opinions show, not only has the original ban on direct corporate contributions endured, but so have the original rationales for the law. In barring corporate earnings from conversion into political “war chests,” the ban was and is intended to “preven[t] corruption or the appearance of corruption.” National Conservative Political Action Comm., supra, at 496-497; see also First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 788, n. 26 (1978) (“The importance of the governmental interest in preventing [corruption] has never been doubted”). But the ban has always done further duty in protecting “the individuals who have paid money into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates from having that money used to support political candidates to whom they may be opposed.” National Right to Work, supra, at 208; see CIO, 335 U. S., at 113; see also Austin, supra, at 673-678 (Brennan, J., concurring). Quite aside from war-chest corruption and the interests of contributors and owners, however, another reason for regulating corporate electoral involvement has emerged with restrictions on individual contributions, and recent cases have recognized that restricting contributions by various organizations hedges against their use as conduits for “circumvention of [valid] contribution limits.” Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 456, and n. 18 (2001); see Austin, supra, at 664. To the degree that a corporation could contribute to political candidates, the individuals “who created it, who own it, or whom it employs,” Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U. S. 158, 163 (2001), could exceed the bounds imposed on their own contributions by diverting money through the corporation, cf. Colorado Republican, 533 U. S., at 446-447. As we said on the subject of limiting coordinated expenditures by political parties, experience “demonstrates how candidates, donors, and parties test the limits of the current law, and it shows beyond serious doubt how contribution limits would be eroded if inducement to circumvent them were enhanced.” Id., at 457. In sum, our cases on campaign finance regulation represent respect for the “legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation.” National Right to Work, supra, at 209-210. And we have understood that such deference to legislative choice is warranted particularly when Congress regulates campaign contributions, carrying as they do a plain threat to political integrity and a plain warrant to counter the appearance and reality of corruption and the misuse of corporate advantages. See, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 26-28, 47 (1976) (per curiam). As we said in Colorado Republican, “limits on contributions are more clearly justified by a link to political corruption than limits on other kinds of . . . political spending are (corruption being understood not only as quid pro quo agreements, but also as undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence).” 533 U. S., at 440-441 (citation omitted). B That historical prologue would discourage any broadside attack on corporate campaign finance regulation or regulation of corporate contributions, and NCRL accordingly questions § 441b only to the extent the law places nonprofit advocacy corporations like itself under the general ban on direct contributions. But not even this more focused challenge can claim a blank slate, for . Judge Gregory rightly said in his dissent that our explanation in National Right to Work all but decided the issue against NCRL’s position. National Right to Work addressed the provision of §441b restricting a nonstock corporation to its membership when soliciting contributions to its PAC, and we considered whether a nonprofit advocacy corporation without members of the usual sort could be held to violate the law by soliciting a donation to its PAC from any individual who had at one time contributed to the corporation. See 459 U. S., at 199-200. We sustained the FEC’s position that a fund drive as broad as this went beyond the solicitation of “members” permitted by § 441b, and we invoked the history distilled above in holding that the statutory restriction was no infringement on those First Amendment associational rights closely akin to speech. Id., at 206-209. We concluded that the congressional judgment to regulate corporate political involvement “warrants considerable deference” and “reflects a permissible assessment of the dangers posed by [corporations] to the electoral process.” Id., at 207-211. It would be hard to read our conclusion in National Right to Work, that the PAC solicitation restrictions were constitutional, except on the practical understanding that the corporation’s capacity to make contributions was legitimately limited to indirect donations within the scope allowed to PACs. See, e. g., id., at 208 (reviewing both “the statutory prohibitions and exceptions”). In fact, we specifically rejected the argument made here, that deference to congressional judgments about proper limits on corporate contributions turns on details of corporate form or the affluence of particular corporations. In the same breath, we remarked on the broad applicability of §441b to “corporations and labor unions without great financial resources, as well as those more fortunately situated,” and made a point of refusing to “second-guess a legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil feared.” Id., at 210. Later cases have repeatedly acknowledged, without questioning, the reading of National Right to Work as generally approving the §441b prohibition on direct contributions, even by nonprofit corporations “without great financial resources.” Ibid. In National Conservative Political Action Committee, for example, we not only spoke of National Right to Work as consistent with “the well-established constitutional validity of legislative regulation of corporate contributions to candidates for public office,” but went on to reaffirm that the Court in that case had “rightly concluded that Congress might include, along with labor unions and corporations traditionally prohibited from making contributions to political candidates, membership corporations, though contributions by the latter might not exhibit all of the evil that contributions by traditional economically organized corporations exhibit.” 470 U. S., at 495, 500; see id., at 500 (describing National Right to Work as giving “proper deference to a congressional determination of the need for a prophylactic rule”). Relying again on National Right to Work, we made a similar point in Austin when we sustained Michigan’s ban on direct corporate contributions, even though the ban “included] within its scope closely held corporations that do not possess vast reservoirs of capital.” 494 U. S., at 661. “Although. some closely held corporations, just as some publicly held ones, may not have accumulated significant amounts of wealth, they receive from the State the special benefits conferred by the corporate structure and present the potential for distorting the political process. This potential for distortion justifies [the state law’s] general applicability to all corporations.” Ibid. But National Right to Work does not stand alone in its bearing on the issue here, and equal significance must be accorded to Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the very case upon which NCRL and the Court of Appeals have placed principal reliance. There, we held the prohibition on independent expenditures under §441b unconstitutional as applied to a nonprofit advocacy corporation. While the majority explained generally that the “potential for unfair deployment of wealth for political purposes” fell short of justifying a ban on expenditures by groups like Massachusetts Citizens for Life that “do not pose that danger of corruption,” the majority’s response to the dissent pointed to a different resolution of the present case. 479 U. S., at 259. The Chief Justice’s dissenting opinion noted that Massachusetts Citizens for Life “was not unlike” the corporation at issue in National Right to Work, which he read as supporting the ban on independent expenditures. 479 U. S., at 269. Without disagreeing about the similarity of the two organizations, the majority nonetheless distinguished National Right to Work on the ground of its addressing regulation of contributions, not expenditures. See 479 U. S., at 259-260 (“[R]estrictions on contributions require less compelling justification than restrictions on independent spending”). “In light of the historical role of contributions in the corruption of the electoral process, the need for a broad prophylactic rule [against contributions] was thus sufficient in [National Right to Work]” Id., at 260. C The upshot is that, although we have never squarely held against NCRL’s position here, we could not hold for it without recasting our understanding of the risks of harm posed by corporate political contributions, of the expressive significance of contributions, and of the consequent deference owed to legislative judgments on what to do about them. NCRL’s efforts, however, fail to unsettle existing law on any of these points. First, NCRL argues that on a class-wide basis "[Massachusetts Citizens for Life]-type corporations pose no potential of threat to the political system,” so that the governmental interest in combating corruption is as weak as the Court held it to be in relation to the particular corporation considered in Massachusetts Citizens for Life. Brief for Respondents 19. But this generalization does not hold up. For present purposes, we will assume advocacy corporations are generally different from traditional business corporations in the improbability that contributions they might make would end up supporting causes that some of their members would not approve. See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, supra, at 260-262. But concern about the corrupting potential underlying the corporate ban may indeed be implicated by advocacy corporations. They, like their for-profit counterparts, benefit from significant “state-created advantages,” Austin, supra, at 659, and may well be able to amass substantial “political 'war chests,’ ” National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 207. Not all corporations that qualify for favorable tax treatment under § 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code lack substantial resources, and the category covers some of the Nation’s most politically powerful organizations, including the AARP, the National Rifle Association, and the Sierra Club. Nonprofit advocacy corporations are, moreover, no less susceptible than traditional business companies to misuse as conduits for circumventing the contribution limits imposed on individuals. Cf. Austin, supra, at 664 (noting that a nonprofit corporation is capable of “serving] as a conduit for corporate political spending”). Second, NCRL argues that application of the ban on its contributions should be subject to a strict level of scrutiny, on the ground that § 441b does not merely limit contributions, but bans them on the basis of their source. Brief for Respondents 14-16. This argument, however, overlooks the basic premise we have followed in setting First Amendment standards for reviewing political financial restrictions: the level of scrutiny is based on the importance of the “political activity at issue” to effective speech or political association. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U. S., at 259; see Colorado Republican, 533 U. S., at 440-442, and nn. 6-7; Nixon, 528 U. S., at 386-388. Going back to Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), restrictions on political contributions have been treated as merely “marginal” speech restrictions subject to relatively complaisant review under the First Amendment, because contributions lie closer to the edges than to the core of political expression. See Colorado Republican, supra, at 440. “While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association ... , the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor.” Buckley, supra, at 20-21. This is the reason that instead of requiring contribution regulations to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, “a contribution limit involving ‘significant interference’ with associational rights” passes muster if it satisfies the lesser demand of being “ ‘closely drawn’ to match a ‘sufficiently important interest.’ ” Nixon, supra, at 387-388 (quoting Buckley, supra, at 25); cf. Austin, 494 U. S., at 657; Buckley, supra, at 44-45. Indeed, this recognition that degree of scrutiny turns on the nature of the activity regulated is the only practical way to square two leading cases: National Right to Work approved strict solicitation limits on a PAC organized to make contributions, see 459 U. S., at 201-202, whereas Massachusetts Citizens for Life applied a compelling interest test to invalidate the ban on an advocacy corporation’s expenditures in light of PAC regulatory burdens, see 479 U. S., at 252-255; see also id., at 265-266 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). Each case involved §441b, after all, and the same “ban” on the same corporate “sources” of political activity applied in both cases. It is not that the difference between a ban and a limit is to be ignored; it is just that the time to consider it is when applying scrutiny at the level selected, not in selecting the standard of review itself. But even when NCRL urges precisely that, and asserts that § 441b is not sufficiently “closely drawn,” the claim still rests on a false premise, for NCRL is simply wrong in characterizing §441b as a complete ban. As we have said before, the section “permits some participation of unions and corporations in the federal electoral process by allowing them to establish and pay the administrative expenses of [PACs].” National Right to Work, supra, at 201; see also Austin, supra, at 660; Massachusetts Citizens for Life, supra, at 252. The PAC option allows corporate political participation without the temptation to use corporate funds for political influence, quite possibly at odds with the sentiments of some shareholders or members, and it lets the Government regulate campaign activity through registration and disclosure, see §§432-434, without jeopardizing the associational rights of advocacy organizations’ members, see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 462 (1958) (holding that “Compelled disclosure of membership in an organization engaged in advocacy of particular beliefs” may violate the First Amendment). NCRL cannot prevail, then, simply by arguing that a ban on an advocacy corporation’s direct contributions is bad tailoring. NCRL would have to demonstrate that the law violated the First Amendment in allowing contributions to be made only through its PAC and subject to a PAC’s administrative burdens. But a unanimous Court in National Right to Work did not think the regulatory burdens on PACs, including restrictions on their ability to solicit funds, rendered a PAC unconstitutional as an advocacy corporation’s sole avenue for making political contributions. See 459 U. S., at 201-202. There is no reason to think the burden on advocacy corporations is any greater today, or to reach a different conclusion here. III The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. Section 501(c)(4)(A) grants exemption to “[cjivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare,... the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.” An organization “may carry on lawful political activities and remain exempt under section 501(c)(4) as long as it is primarily engaged in activities that promote social welfare.” Rev. Rui. 81-95,1981-1 Cum. Bull. 332. Unlike contributions to § 501(c)(3) organizations, donations to those recognized under § 501(c)(4) are not tax deductible. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash, 461 U. S. 540, 543 (1983). We thus have no occasion to say whether the Court of Appeals correctly held NCRL entitled to the so-called “Massachusetts Citizens for Life exception” to the statute’s ban on independent expenditures. See, e. g., Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822; Act of Aug. 19, 1911, ch. 33, 37 Stat. 25; Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070; Act of July 19, 1940 (Hatch Act), 54 Stat. 767; War Labor Disputes Act, 1943, ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 167; Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, §304,61 Stat. 159; Act of Oct. 31, 1951, §21,65 Stat. 718; Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 86 Stat. 3; FECA Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263; FECA Amendments of 1976, 90 Stat. 475; FECA Amendments of 1979, 93 Stat. 1339; Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 81. Section 441b(b)(4)(A) bars a corporation from soliciting contributions to a PAC established by the corporation, except from stockholders or other specified categories of persons. Section 441b(b)(4)(C), the specific provision at issue in National Right to Work, provides, in relevant part, that § 441b(b)(4)(A) “shall not prevent a . . . corporation without capital stock ... from soliciting contributions to [a PAC established by the corporation] from members of such .. . corporation.” That said, this concern is not wholly inapplicable to advocacy corporations, as “persons may desire that an organization use their contributions to further a certain cause, but may not want the organization to use their money to urge support for or opposition to political candidates solely on the basis of that cause.” Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U. S., at 261. In any event, we have never intimated that the risk of corruption alone is insufficient to support regulation of political contributions. See, e. g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, 658-659 (1990); Federal Election Comm’n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 208 (1982); cf. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 388-389 (2000). See http://www.aarp.org/press/disclosure.html (as visited June 12, 2003) (available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (AARP); http://www.give.org/ reports/index.asp (as visited June 12, 2003) (available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (National Rifle Association and Sierra Club). These examples answer NCRL’s argument that the Massachusetts Citizens for Life exception is “self-limiting.” See Brief for Respondents 27 (“If [a Massachusetts Citizens for Life}-type corporation begins generating or receiving substantial business income or business corporation contributions, by definition, it automatically is no longer [a Massachusetts Citizens for Life]- type corporation” (citing Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 263-264 (1986))). The nonprofit advocacy corporations mentioned (one of which has, in fact, been granted "[Massachusetts Citizens for Life]-type” status by a Court of Appeals, see, e. g., FEC v. National Rifle Assn., 254 F. 3d 173, 192 (CADC 2001)) show that “political “war chests’ ” may be amassed simply from members’ contributions. 459 U. S., at 207. NCRL suggests that the Government’s interest in combating circumvention of the campaign finance laws would be sufficiently met by allowing limited contributions subject to the earmarking rule of §441a(a)(8), which provides that “contributions which are in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediate or conduit to [a] candidate” are treated as contributions to the candidate (thus triggering the disclosure requirements of § 434(b)(3)(A)). Brief for Respondents 31. We rejected this precise argument, however, in Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431 (2001), where we concluded that it “ignores the practical difficulty of identifying and directly combating circumvention under actual political conditions.” Id., at 462. “The earmarking provision... would reach only the most clumsy attempts to pass contributions through to candidates. To treat the earmarking provision as the outer limit of acceptable tailoring would disarm any serious effort to limit [circumvention].” Ibid. Within the realm of contributions generally, corporate contributions are furthest from the core of political expression, since corporations’ First Amendment speech and association interests are derived largely from those of their members, see, e. g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 458-459 (1958), and of the public in receiving information, see, e. g., First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 777 (1978). A ban on direct corporate contributions leaves individual members of corporations free to make their own contributions, and deprives the public of little or no material information. Judicial deference is particularly warranted where, as here, we deal with a congressional judgment that has remained essentially unchanged throughout a century of “careful legislative adjustment.” National Right to Work, supra, at 209; cf. Nixon, supra, at 391 (“The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised”).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

JAPAN WHALING ASSOCIATION et al. v. AMERICAN CETACEAN SOCIETY et al. No. 85-954. Argued April 30, 1986 Decided June 30, 1986 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and Powell, Stevens, and O’ConnoR, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, post, p. 241. Associate Attorney General Burns argued the cause for petitioners in No. 85-955. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Habicht, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Peter R. Steenland, Jr., Donald A. Carr, Dianne H. Kelly, and Abraham D. Sofaer. Scott C. Whitney argued the cause for petitioners in No. 85-954. With him on the briefs were Steven R. Perles and William H. Allen. William D. Rogers argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief were James A. Beat and Donald T. Hornstein. Together with No. 85-955, Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce, et al. v. American Cetacean Society et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Steven R. Ross, Charles Tiefer, and Michael L. Murray filed a brief for the Speaker of the House of Representatives et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. In these cases, we address the question whether, under what are referred to in these cases as the Pelly and Packwood Amendments, 85 Stat. 786, as amended, 22 U. S. C. § 1978; 90 Stat. 337, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 1821 (1982 ed. and Supp. Ill), the Secretary of Commerce is required to certify that Japan’s whaling practices “diminish the effectiveness” of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling because that country’s annual harvest exceeds quotas established under the Convention. I For centuries, men have hunted whales in order to obtain both food and oil, which, in turn, can be processed into a myriad of other products. Although at one time a harrowing and perilous profession, modern technological innovations have transformed whaling into a routine form of commercial fishing, and have allowed for a multifold increase in whale harvests worldwide. Based on concern over the effects of excessive whaling, 15 nations formed the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T. I. A. S. No. 1849 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1948). The ICRW was designed to “provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry,” id., at 1717, and today serves as the principal international mechanism for promoting the conservation and development of whale populations. See generally Smith, The International Whaling Commission: An Analysis of the Past and Reflections on the Future, 16 Nat. Resources Law. 543 (1984). The United States was a founding member of the ICRW; Japan joined in 1951. To achieve its purposes, the ICRW included a Schedule which, inter alia, regulates harvesting practices and sets harvest limits for various whale species. Art. I, 62 Stat. 1717, 1723-1727. In addition, the ICRW established the International Whaling Commission (IWC), which implements portions of the Convention and is authorized to amend the Schedule and set new harvest quotas. See Art. Ill, 62 Stat. 1717-1718; Art. V, 62 Stat. 1718-1719. See generally Smith, supra, at 547-550. The quotas are binding on IWC members if accepted by a three-fourths’ majority vote. Art. Ill, 62 Stat. 1717. Under the terms of the Convention, however, the IWC has no power to impose sanctions for quota violations. See Art. IX, 62 Stat. 1720. Moreover, any member country may file a timely objection to an IWC amendment of the Schedule and thereby exempt itself from any obligation to comply with the limit unless and until the objection is withdrawn. Art. V, 62 Stat. 1718-1719. All nonobjecting countries remain bound by the amendment. Because of the IWC’s inability to enforce its own quota and in an effort to promote enforcement of quotas set by other international fishery conservation programs, Congress passed the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen’s Protective Act of 1967. 22 U. S. C. § 1978. Principally intended to preserve and protect North American Atlantic salmon from depletion by Danish fishermen in violation of the ban imposed by the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, the Amendment protected whales as well. See 117 Cong. Rec. 34752 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Pelly); H. R. Rep. No. 92-468, p. 6 (1971). The Amendment directs the Secretary of Commerce to certify to the President if “nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing operations in a manner or under circumstances which diminish the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program . . . .” 22 U. S. C. § 1978(a)(1). Upon certification, the President, in his discretion, may then direct the Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit the importation of fish products from the certified nation. § 1978(a)(4). The President may also decline to impose any sanctions or import prohibitions. After enactment of the Pelly Amendment, the Secretary of Commerce five times certified different nations to the President as engaging in fishing operations which “diminish[ed] the effectiveness” of IWC quotas. H. R. Rep. No. 95-1029, p. 9 (1978); 125 Cong. Rec. 22084 (1979) (remarks of Rep. Oberstar). None of the certifications resulted in the imposition of sanctions by the President. After each certification, however, the President was able to use the threat of discretionary sanctions to obtain commitments of future compli- ’ anee from the offending nations. Although “the Pelly Amendment . . . served the useful function of quietly persuading nations to adhere to the decisions of international fishery conservation bodies,” H. R. Rep. No. 95-1029, supra, at 9, Congress grew impatient with the- Executive’s delay in making certification decisions and refusal to impose sanctions. See 125 Cong. Rec. 22083 (1979) (remarks of Rep. Murphy); id., at 22084 (remarks of Rep. Oberstar). As a result, Congress passed the Packwood Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U. S. C. § 1801 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III). This Amendment requires the Secretary of Commerce to “periodically monitor the activities of foreign nationals that may affect [international fishery conservation programs],” 22 U. S. C. § 1978(a)(3)(A); “promptly investigate any activity by foreign nationals that, in the opinion of the Secretary, may be cause for certification . . . ,” § 1978(a)(3)(B); and “promptly conclude; and reach a decision with respect to; [that] investigation.” § 1978(a)(3)(C). To rectify the past failure of the President to impose the sanctions authorized — but not required — under the Pelly Amendment, the Packwood Amendment removes this element of discretion and mandates the imposition of economic sanctions against offending nations. Under the Amendment, if the Secretary of Commerce certifies that “nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing operations or engaging in trade or taking which diminishes the effectiveness of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling,” 16 U. S. C. § 1821(e)(2)(A)(i), the Secretary of State must reduce, by at least 50%, the offending nation’s fishery allocation within the United States’ fishery conservation zone. § 1821(e)(2)(B). Although the Amendment requires the imposition of sanctions when the Secretary of Commerce certifies a nation, it did not alter the initial certification process, except for requiring expedition. It was also provided that a certificate under the Packwood Amendment also serves as a certification for the purposes of the Pelly Amendment. § 1821(e)(2)(A)(i). In 1981, the IWC established a zero quota for the Western Division stock of Northern Pacific sperm whales. The next year, the IWC ordered a 5-year moratorium on commercial whaling to begin with the 1985-1986 whaling season and last until 1990. In 1982, the IWC acted to grant Japan’s request for a 2-year respite — for the 1982-1983 and 1983-1984 seasons — from the IWC’s earlier decision banning sperm whaling. Because Japan filed timely objections to both the IWC’s 1981 zero quota for Northern Pacific sperm whales and 1982 commercial whaling moratorium, under the terms of the ICRW, it was not bound to comply with either limitation. Nonetheless, as the 1984-1985 whaling season grew near, it was apparently recognized that under either the Pelly or Packwood Amendment, the United States could impose economic sanctions if Japan continued to exceed these whaling quotas. Following extensive negotiations, on November 13, 1984, Japan and the United States concluded an executive agreement through an exchange of letters between the Chargé d’Affaires of Japan and the Secretary of Commerce. See App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 85-955, pp. 102A-109A. Subject to implementation requirements, Japan pledged to adhere to certain harvest limits and to cease commercial whaling by 1988. Id., at 104A-106A. In return and after consulting with the United States Commissioner to the IWC, the Secretary determined that the short-term continuance of a specified level of limited whaling by Japan, coupled with its promise to discontinue all commercial whaling by 1988, “would not diminish the effectiveness of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 1946, or its conservation program.” Id., at 107A. Accordingly, the Secretary informed Japan that, so long as Japan complied with its pledges, the United States would not certify Japan under either Amendment. See id., at 104A. Several days before consummation of the executive agreement, several wildlife conservation groups filed suit in District Court seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary of Commerce to certify Japan. Because in its view any taking of whales in excess of the IWC quotas diminishes the effectiveness of the ICRW, the District Court granted summary judgment for respondents and ordered the Secretary of Commerce immediately to certify to the President that Japan was in violation of the IWC sperm whale quota. 604 F. Supp. 1398, 1411 (DC 1985). Thereafter, Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the Secretary of Commerce that Japan would perform the second condition of the agreement-withdrawal of its objection to the IWC moratorium— provided that the United States obtained reversal of the District Court’s order. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 85-955, pp. 116A-118A. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. 247 U. S. App. D. C. 309, 768 F. 2d 426 (1985). Recognizing that the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments did not define the specific activities which would “diminish the effectiveness” of the ICRW, the court looked to the Amendments’ legislative history and concluded, as had the District Court, that the taking by Japanese nationals of whales in excess of quota automatically called for certification by the Secretary. We granted certiorari, 474 U. S. 1053 (1986), and now reverse. rH i — j We address first the Japanese petitioners’ contention that the present actions are unsuitable for judicial review because they involve foreign relations and that a federal court, therefore, lacks the judicial power to command the Secretary of Commerce, an Executive Branch official, to dishonor and repudiate an international agreement. Relying on the political question doctrine, and quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217 (1969), the Japanese petitioners argue that the danger of “embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question” bars any judicial resolution of the instant controversy. We disagree. Baker carefully pointed out that not every matter touching on politics is a political question, id., at 209, and more specifically, that it is “error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.” Id., at 211. The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch. The Judiciary is particularly ill suited to make such decisions, as “courts are fundamentally underequipped to formulate national policies or develop standards for matters not legal in nature.” United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 206 U. S. App. D. C. 405, 411, 642 F. 2d 1373, 1379 (1981) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 999 (1982). As Baker plainly held, however, the courts have the authority to construe treaties and executive agreements, and it goes without saying that interpreting congressional legislation is a recurring and accepted task for the federal courts. It is also evident that the challenge to the Secretary’s decision not to certify Japan for harvesting whales in excess of IWC quotas presents a purely legal question of statutory interpretation. The Court must first determine the nature and scope of the duty imposed upon the Secretary by the Amendments, a decision which calls for applying no more than the traditional rules of statutory construction, and then applying this analysis to the particular set of facts presented below. We are cognizant of the interplay between these Amendments and the conduct of this Nation’s foreign relations, and we recognize the premier role which both Congress and the Executive play in this field. But under the Constitution, one of the Judiciary’s characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political overtones. We conclude, therefore, that the present cases present a justiciable controversy, and turn to the merits of petitioners’ arguments. HH I — I I — I The issue before us is whether, in the circumstances of these cases, either the Pelly or Packwood Amendment required the Secretary to certify Japan for refusing to abide by the IWC whaling quotas. We have concluded that certification was not necessary and hence reject the Court of Appeals’ holding and respondents’ submission that certification is mandatory whenever a country exceeds its allowable take under the ICRW Schedule. Under the Packwood Amendment, certification is neither permitted nor required until the Secretary makes a determination that nationals of a foreign country “are conducting fishing operations or engaging in trade or taking which diminishes the effectiveness” of the ICRW. It is clear that the Secretary must promptly make the certification decision, but the statute does not define the words “diminish the effectiveness of” or specify the factors that the Secretary should consider in making the decision entrusted to him alone. Specifically, it does not state that certification must be forthcoming whenever a country does not abide by IWC Schedules, and the Secretary did not understand or interpret the language of the Amendment to require him to do so. Had Congress intended otherwise, it would have been a simple matter to say that the Secretary must certify deliberate taking of whales in excess of IWC limits. Here, as the Convention permitted it to do, Japan had filed its objection to the IWC harvest limits and to the moratorium to begin with the 1985-1986 season. It was accordingly not in breach of its obligations under the Convention in continuing to take whales, for it was part of the scheme of the Convention to permit nations to opt out of Schedules that were adopted over its objections. In these circumstances, the Secretary, after consultation with the United States Commissioner to the IWC and review of the IWC Scientific Committee opinions, determined that it would better serve the conservation ends of the Convention to accept Japan’s pledge to limit its harvest of sperm whales for four years and to cease all commerical whaling in 1988, rather than to impose sanctions and risk continued whaling by the Japanese. In any event, the Secretary made the determination assigned to him by the Packwood Amendment and concluded that the limited taking of whales in the 1984 and 1985 coastal seasons would not diminish the effectiveness of the ICRW or its conservation program, and that he would not make the certification that he would otherwise be empowered to make. The Secretary, of course, may not act contrary to the will of Congress when exercised within the bounds of the Constitution. If Congress has directly spoken to the precise issue in question, if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843 (1984). But as the courts below and respondents concede, the statutory language itself contains no direction to the Secretary automatically and regardless of the circumstances to certify a nation that fails to conform to the IWC whaling Schedule. The language of the Pelly and Packwood Amendments might reasonably be construed in this manner, but the Secretary’s construction that there are circumstances in which certification may be withheld, despite departures from the Schedules and without violating his duty, is also a reasonable construction of the language used in both Amendments. We do not understand the Secretary to be urging that he has carte blanche discretion to ignore and do nothing about whaling in excess of IWC Schedules. He does not argue, for example, that he could refuse to certify for any reason not connected with the aims and conservation goals of the Convention, or refuse to certify deliberate flouting of schedules by members who have failed to object to a particular schedule. But insofar as the plain language of the Amendments is concerned, the Secretary is not forbidden to refuse to certify for the reasons given in these cases. Furthermore, if a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the question at issue, our longstanding practice is to defer to the “executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer,” Chevron, supra, at 844, unless the legislative history of the enactment shows with sufficient clarity that the agency construction is contrary to the will of Congress. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U. S. 121, 131 (1985). See Chemical Mfrs. Assn. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S. 116, 125 (1985). » — I <! Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ and respondents views, we find nothing in the legislative history of either Amendment that addresses the nature of the Secretary’s duty and requires him to certify every departure from the IWC’s scheduled limits on whaling. The Pelly Amendment was introduced in 1971 to protect Atlantic salmon from possible extinction caused by overfishing in disregard of established salmon quotas. Under the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF), zero harvest quotas had been established in 1969 to regulate and control high seas salmon fishing, 117 Cong. Rec. 34751 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Dingell). Denmark, Germany, and Norway, members of the ICNAF, exercised their right to file timely objections to the quotas, however, and thus were exempt from their limitations. Although respondents are correct that Congress enacted the Pelly Amendment primarily as a means to enforce those international fishing restrictions against these three countries, particularly Denmark, they fail to establish that the Amendment requires automatic certification of every nation whose fishing operations exceed international conservation quotas. Both the Senate and House Committee Reports detail the “conservation nightmare” resulting from Denmark’s failure to recognize the ICNAF quota; a position which “effectively nullified” the ban on high seas harvesting of Atlantic salmon. S. Rep. No. 92-582, pp. 4-5 (1971); H. R. Rep. No. 92-468, pp. 5-6 (1971). In addition, Danish operations were seen as leading to the “eventual destruction of this valuable sports fish,” a matter of “critical concern” to both the Senate and House Committees. S. Rep. No. 92-582, at 4; H. R. Rep. No. 92-468, at 5. There is no question but that both Corn-mittees viewed Denmark’s excessive fishing operations as “diminish[ing] the effectiveness” of the ICNAF quotas, and envisioned that the Secretary would certify that nation under the Pelly Amendment. The Committee Reports, however, do not support the view that the Secretary must certify every nation that exceeds every international conservation quota. The discussion on the floor of the House by Congressman Pelly and other supporters of the Amendment further demonstrates that Congress’ primary concern in enacting the Pelly Amendment was to stave off the possible extermination of both the Atlantic salmon as well as the extinction of other heavily fished species, such as whales, regulated by international fishery conservation programs. 117 Cong. Rec. 34752-34754 (1971) (remarks of Reps. Pelly, Wylie, Clausen, and Hogan). The comments of Senator Stevens, acting Chairman of the reporting Senate Committee and the only speaker on the bill during the Senate debate, were to the same effect. See id., at 47054 (if countries continue indiscriminately to fish on the high seas, salmon may become extinct). Testimony given during congressional hearings on the Pelly Amendment also supports the conclusion that Congress had no intention to require the Secretary to certify every departure from the limits set by an international conservation program. Subsequent amendment of the Pelly Amendment in 1978 further demonstrates that Congress used the phrase, “diminish the effectiveness,” to give the Secretary a range of certification discretion. The 1978 legislation expanded coverage of the Pelly Amendment “to authorize the President to embargo wildlife products from countries where nationals have acted in a manner which, directly or indirectly, diminishes the effectiveness of any international program for the conservation of endangered or threatened species.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-1029, p. 8 (1978). This extension was premised on the success realized by the United States in using the Amendment to convince other nations to adhere to IWC quotas, thus preserving the world’s whale stocks. Id., at 9. In the House Report for the 1978 amendment, the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee specifically addressed the “dimmish the effectiveness” standard and recognized the Secretary’s discretion in making the initial certification decision: “The nature of any trade or taking which qualifies as diminishing the effectiveness of any international program for endangered or threatened species will depend on the circumstances of each case. In general, however, the trade or taking must be serious enough to warrant the finding that the effectiveness of the international program in question has been diminished. An isolated, individual violation of a convention provision will not ordinarily warrant certification under this section.” Id., at 15. This statement makes clear that, under the Pelly Amendment as construed by Congress, the Secretary is to exercise his judgment in determining whether a particular fishing operation “diminishes the effectiveness” of an international fishery conservation program like the IWC. The Court of Appeals held that this definition applies only to the 1978 addition to the Pelly Amendment, designed to enforce the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U. S. T. 1087, T. I. A. S. No. 8249, and not to the ICRW. We are unpersuaded. Congress perceived the two Conventions as seeking the same objectives. Both programs are designed to conserve endangered or threatened species, whether it be the sperm whale or the stumptail macaque. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-1029, pp. 9-10 (1978). This explains why the House Report noted that the purpose behind the 1978 extension of the Pelly Amendment was “to expand the success the United States has achieved in the conservation of whales to the conservation of endangered and threatened species.” Id., at 9. Both Conventions also operate in a similar, and often parallel, manner, and nothing in the legislative history of the 1978 amendment shows that Congress intended the phrase “diminish the effectiveness” to be applied inflexibly with respect to departures from fishing quotas, but to be applied flexibly vis-á-vis departures from endangered species quotas. Without strong evidence to the contrary, we doubt that Congress intended the same phrase to have significantly different meanings in two adjoining paragraphs of the same subsection. See Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 488-489 (1985); Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Director, OWCP, 461 U. S. 624, 633 (1983). Congress’ explanation of the scope of the Secretary’s certification duty applies to both the original Pelly Amendment and the 1978 amendment: the Secretary is empowered to exercise his judgment in determining whether “the trade or taking [is] serious enough to warrant the finding that the effectiveness of the international program in question has been diminished.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-1029, supra, at 15. Enactment of the Packwood Amendment did not negate the Secretary’s view that he is not required to certify every failure to abide by ICW’s whaling limits. There were hearings on the proposal but no Committee Reports. It was enacted as a floor amendment. It is clear enough, however, that it was designed to remove executive discretion in imposing sanctions once certification had been made — as Senator Packwood put it, “to put real economic teeth into our whale conservation efforts,” by requiring the Secretary of State to impose severe economic sanctions until the transgression is rectified. 125 Cong. Rec. 21742 (1979). But Congress specifically retained the identical certification standard of the Pelly Amendment, which requires a determination by the Secretary that the whaling operations at issue diminish the effectiveness of the ICRW. 16 U. S. C. § 1821(e)(2)(A)(i). See 125 Cong. Rec. 21743 (1979) (remarks of Sen. Magnuson); id., at 22083 (remarks of Rep. Breaux); id., at 22084 (remarks of Rep. Oberstar). We find no specific indication in this history that henceforth the certification standard would require the Secretary to certify each and every departure from ICW’s whaling Schedules. It may be that in the legislative history of these Amendments there are scattered statements hinting at the per se rule advocated by respondents, but read as a whole, we are quite unconvinced that this history clearly indicates, contrary to what we and the Secretary have concluded is a permissible reading of the statute, that all departures from IWC Schedules, regardless of the circumstances, call for immediate certification. V We conclude that the Secretary’s construction of the statutes neither contradicted the language of either Amendment, nor frustrated congressional intent. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S., at 842-843. In enacting these Amendments, Congress’ primary goal was to protect and conserve whales and other endangered species. The Secretary furthered this objective by entering into the agreement with Japan, calling for that nation’s acceptance of the worldwide moratorium on commercial whaling and the withdrawal of its objection to the IWC zero sperm whale quota, in exchange for a transition period of limited additional whaling. Given the lack of any express direction to the Secretary that he must certify a nation whose whale harvest exceeds an IWC quota, the Secretary reasonably could conclude, as he has, that, “a cessation of all Japanese commercial whaling activities would contribute more to the effectiveness of the IWC and its conservation program than any other single development.” Affidavit of Malcolm Baldrige, Brief for Petitioners in No. 85-955, Addendum III, pp. 6A-7A. We conclude, therefore, that the Secretary’s decision to secure the certainty of Japan’s future compliance with the IWC’s program through the 1984 executive agreement, rather than rely on the possibility that certification and imposition of economic sanctions would produce the same or better result, is a reasonable construction of the Pelly and Packwood Amendments. Congress granted the Secretary the authority to determine whether a foreign nation’s whaling in excess of quotas diminishes the effectiveness of the IWC, and we find no reason to impose a mandatory obligation upon the Secretary to certify that every quota violation necessarily fails that standard. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. The details of the Japanese commitments were explained in a summary accompanying the letter from the Chargé d’Affaires to the Secretary. First, the countries agreed that if Japan would withdraw its objection to the IWC zero sperm whale quota, Japanese whalers could harvest up to 400 sperm whales in each of the 1984 and 1985 coastal seasons without triggering certification. Japan’s irrevocable withdrawal of that objection was to take place on or before December 13, 1984, effective April 1, 1988. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 85-955, pp. 104A-105A. Japan fulfilled this portion of the agreement on December 11, 1984. Id., at 110A, 112A-114A. Second, the two nations agreed that if Japan would end all commercial whaling by April 1,1988, Japanese whalers could take additional whales in the interim without triggering certification. Japan agreed to harvest no more than 200 sperm whales in each of the 1986 and 1987 coastal seasons. In addition, it would restrict its harvest of other whale species — under limits acceptable to the United States after consultation with Japan — through the end of the 1986-1987 pelagic season and the end of the 1987 coastal season. The agreement called for Japan to announce its commitment to terminate commercial whaling operations by withdrawing its objection to the 1982 IWC moratorium on or before April 1, 1985, effective April 1, 1988. Id, at 105A-106A. The original plaintiffs to this action are: American Cetacean Society, Animal Protection Institute of America, Animal Welfare Institute, Center for Environmental Education, The Fund for Animals, Greenpeace U. S. A., The Humane Society of the United States, International Fund for Animal Welfare, The Whale Center, Connecticut Cetacean Society, Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of the Earth, and Thomas Garrett, former United States Representative to the IWC. In addition, plaintiffs also requested (1) a declaratory judgment that the Secretary’s failure to certify violated both the Pelly and Packwood Amendments, because any whaling activities in excess of IWC quotas necessarily “diminishes the effectiveness” of the ICRW; and (2) a permanent injunction prohibiting any executive agreement which would violate the certification and sanction requirements of the Amendments. 604 F. Supp. 1398, 1401 (DC 1985). The Japan Whaling Association and Japan Fishing Association (Japanese petitioners), trade groups representing private Japanese interests, were allowed to intervene. We also reject the Secretary’s suggestion that no private cause of action is available to respondents. Respondents brought suit against the Secretary of Commerce, the head of a federal agency, and the suit, in essence, is one to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld,” 5 U. S. C. § 706(1), or alternatively, to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” § 706(2)(A). The “right of action” in such cases is expressly created by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which states that “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review,” § 704, at the behest of “[a] person. . . adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action.” § 702 (1982 ed., Supp. III). A separate indication of congressional intent to make agency action reviewable under the APA is not necessary; instead, the rule is that the cause of action for review of such action is available absent some clear and convincing evidence of legislative intention to preclude review. See, e. g., Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 345 (1984); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 410 (1971); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 141 (1967). It is clear that respondents may avail themselves of the right of action created by the APA. First, the Secretary’s actions constitute the actions of an agency. See 5 U. S. C. § 551(1); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, supra, at 410. In addition, there has been “final agency action,” in that the Secretary formally has agreed with the Japanese that there will be no certification, and this appears to be an action “for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,” as the issue whether the Secretary’s failure to certify was lawful will not otherwise arise in litigation. Next, it appears that respondents are sufficiently “aggrieved” by the agency’s action: under our decisions in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 (1972), and United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669 (1973), they undoubtedly have alleged a sufficient “injury in fact” in that the whale watching and studying of their members will be adversely affected by continued whale harvesting, and this type of injury is within the “zone of interests” protected by the Pelly and Packwood Amendments. See Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970). Finally, the Secretary has failed to point to any expressed intention on the part of Congress to foreclose APA review of actions under either Amendment. We find, therefore, that respondents are entitled to pursue their claims under the right of action created by the APA. The Court of Appeals relied upon the statement in S. Rep. No. 92-582 that the purpose of the Amendment was “ ‘to prohibit the importation of fishery products from nations that do not conduct their fishing operations in a manner that is consistent with international conservation programs. It would accomplish this by providing that whenever the Secretary of Commerce determines that a country’s nationals are fishing in such a manner, he must certify such fact to the President.’” 247 U. S. App. D. C. 309, 319, 768 F. 2d 426, 436 (1985) (emphasis omitted), quoting S. Rep. No. 92-582, at 2. This is indeed an explicit statement of purpose, but this is not the operative language in the statute chosen to effect that purpose. The seetion-by-section analysis contained in the same Report recites that the operative section directs the Secretary of Commerce to certify to the President the fact that nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing operations in a manner or under circumstances which diminish the effectiveness of an international conservation program whenever he determines the existence of such operations. Id., at 5. These are not the words of a ministerial duty, but the imposition of duty to make an informed judgment. Even respondents do not contend that every merely negligent or unintentional violation must be certified. It should be noted that the statement of purpose contained in the House Report tracks the language of the operative provisions of the Amendment. H. R. Rep. No. 92-468, p. 2 (1971). Representative Pelly testified at the Senate hearings that the sanctions authorized by the Amendment were to be applied “in the case of flagrant violation of any international fishery conservation program to which the United States has committed itself.” Hearings on S. 1242 et al. before the Subcommittee on Oceans and Atmosphere of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 47 (1971). Similarly, Donald McKernan, Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife, and Coordinator of Ocean Affairs, United States Department of State, stated: “We do not anticipate that there would be any need to invoke the proposed legislation where conservation needs are effectively met by the agreement of all nations involved to an international conservation regime. “However, there are some situations where one or more nations have failed to agree to a program otherwise agreed among the involved nations, or having once agreed failed to abide by the agreement. “Under the proposed legislation, if the action of such countries diminished the effectiveness of the international fishery conservation program, consideration would need to be given to taking trade measures as necessary to support the conservation program.” Id., at 97. The Committee also detailed two actions which “dramatically demonstrate[d] the value of the Pelly amendment to the United States in the conduct of international fishery negotiations.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-1029, p. 9 (1978). “In November, 1977, the Secretary of Commerce reported to the President that two nonmembers of the IWC — Peru and Korea — were taking whales in excess of IWC quotas. In March, 1978, the Secretary of Commerce reported to the subcommittee that although these nations are violating IWC quotas, certification under the Pelly amendment is pending a thorough documentation and substantiation of each action that may diminish the effectiveness of the IWC conservation program.” Ibid. The fact that the Committee approved of the Secretary’s actions in not automatically certifying these nations, even though they were found to be taking whales in excess of IWC quotas, is additional evidence that the Pelly Amendment does not require the per se rule respondents now urge. The CITES regulates trade in endangered and threatened species through inclusion of those species in one of three Appendices. CITES, Arts. II-IV, 27 U. S. T. 1092-1097. The ICRW regulates whaling through the use of a Schedule which sets harvest limits for whale species. ICRW, Art. V, 62 Stat. 1718-1719. The CITES requires a two-thirds’ majority vote to amend an Appendix to include an additional species. CITES, Art. XV, 27 U. S. T. 1110-1112. The ICRW requires a three-fourths’ majority vote to amend the Schedule or to adopt regulations. ICRW, Art. Ill, 62 Stat. 1717. Both Conventions also contain analogous procedures for member nations to file timely objections to limitations imposed by the Convention. Compare CITES, Art. XV, 27 U. S. T. 1110-1112, with ICRW, Art. V, 62 Stat. 1719. See generally Recent Development, International Conservation — United States Enforcement of World Whaling Programs, 26 Va. J. Int’l L. 511, 531-532 (1986). Indeed, to the extent that the hearings on the Packwood Amendment are indicative of congressional intent, they support the Secretary’s view of his duty and authority to certify whaling in excess of IWC limits. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96 Cong., 1st Sess., 311-312, 317 (1979). We note also that in 1984, Senator Packwood introduced a further amendment to the Packwood Amendment. This proposal required that “‘[a]ny nation whose nationals conduct commercial whaling operations [after 1986] unless such whaling has been authorized by the International Whaling Commission shall be deemed to be certified for the purposes of this [act].’” Quoted in Comment, The U. S.-Japanese Whaling Accord: A Result of the Discretionary Loophole in the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, 19 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 577, 609, n. 220 (1986). Congress thus had the express opportunity to mandate that the Secretary certify any foreign nation which exceeds an IWC quota, but chose not to do so. The “diminish the effectiveness of” standard has been used in legislation other than the Pelly and Packwood Amendments. It first appeared in the 1962 amendment to the Tuna Convention Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 777, 16 U. S. C. § 951 et seq. It was also used in 1984 in the Eastern Pacific Tuna Licensing Act, 16 U. S. C. §972 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. III), which was enacted to implement the Eastern Pacific Ocean Tuna Fishing Agreement. Nothing has been called to our attention in the history of these Acts to indicate that this standard calls for automatic certification once the Secretary has discovered that foreign nationals are violating an international fishing convention or agreement. Indeed, to the extent they are relevant, they lend affirmative support to the position that Congress has employed the standard to vest a range of judgment in the Secretary as to whether a departure from an agreed limit diminishes the effectiveness of the international conservation effort and hence calls for certification.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CALIFORNIA et al. v. LO-VACA GATHERING CO. et al. No. 46. Argued November 17-18, 1964. Decided January 18, 1965. Richard E. Tuttle argued the cause for petitioners in No. 46. With him on the briefs were J. Calvin Simpson and John T. Murphy. John Ormasa argued the cause for petitioners in No. 47. With him on the brief was Milford Springer. Richard A. Solomon argued the cause for petitioner in No. 67. With him op the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Ralph S. Spritzer, Frank I. Goodman, Howard E. Wahrenbrock, Robert L. Russell and Peter H. Schiff. Sherman S. Poland argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Bradford Ross, C. Frank Reifsnyder and Hugh Q. Buck. Harry L. Albrecht filed a brief for the Independent Natural Gas Association of America, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Together with No. 47, Southern California Gas Co. et al. v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co. et al., and No. 57, Federal Power Commission v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. El Paso Natural Gas Co. is an interstate natural gas pipeline company that delivers gas at the Arizona-California border to three California distribution companies. The present controversy concerns gas to be purchased by it in Texas from Lo-Vaca Gathering Co. and Houston Pipe Line Co. Under Lo-Vaca’& contract gas produced in Texas is to be delivered to a subsidiary of El Paso’S at a Texas point for delivery, into its pipeline. The contract contains the following two clauses: “All of the gas to be purchased by El Paso from Gatherer [Lo-Vaca] under this agreement shall be used by El Paso solely as fuel in El Paso’s compressors, treating plants, boilers, camps and other facilities locátéd outside of the State of Texas. It is understood, however, that said gas will be commingled with other gas being transported in El Paso’s pipe fine system.” “It is the intent and understanding of the parties hereto that the sale of natural gas hereof is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission because this sale is not for resale.” This “restricted use” agreement provides for a Separate metering of the contract volumes prior to their delivery info El Paso’s system. El Paso will meter the. gas used for fuel purposes in its New Mexico and Arizona facilities to make certain this amount invariably exceeds the volumes of gas taken from Lo-Vaca under this agreement. El Paso and Houston made a similar contract containing a similar “restricted use” provision by which El Paso covenants that this Houston gas will be consumed by El Paso solely as fuel in its Texas operations or in another Texas plant. This contract, like the other one, also provides for metering the volume of gas delivered in Texas; and it includes a covenant by El Paso that the Texas uses will &t all times exceed the amounts supplied by Houston. In spite of these "restricted use” covenants it is conceded that the gas sold by Lo-Vaca and Houston to El Paso will flow in a commingled stream with gas from other sources and that at least a portion of the gas will in fact be resold out of Texas. The Federal Power Commission asserted jurisdiction over these sales as sales in interstate commerce “for resale,” as that term is used in § 1 (b) of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821, 15 U. S. C. § 717 (1958 ed.). 26 F. P. C. 606, rehearing denied, id., at 840. The Court of Appeals reversed, one judge dissenting. 323 F. 2d 190. The case is here on a writ of certiorari. 377 U. S. 951. We said in Connecticut Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 324 U. S. 515, 529, “Federal jurisdiction was to follow the flow of electric energy, an engineering and scientific, rather than a legalistic or governmental, test.” And that is the test we have followed under both the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act, except as Congress itself has substituted a so-called legal Standard for the technological one. Id., at 530-531. In Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 331 U. S. 682, 687, we considered the anatomy of the pipeline system to discover the channel of the constant flow; again in Federal Power Comm’n v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U. S. 464, 467; and most recently in Federal Power Comm’n v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U. S. 205, 209, n. 5. The result of our decisions is to make the sale of gas which crosses a state line at any stage of its movement from wellhead to ultimate consumption “in interstate commerce” within the meaning of the Act. Attempts have been made by one convention or another to convert a local transaction into one of interstate commerce (Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163; Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U. S. 390) or to make a segment of interstate commerce appear to be only intrastate (Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Settle, 260 U. S. 166). But those attempts have failed. Similarly, we conclude that when it comes to the question what gas is for “resale” the present contracts should not be able to change the jurisdictional result. The fact that a substantial part of the gas will be resold, in our view, invokes federal jurisdiction at the outset over the entire transaction. Were suppliers of gas and pipeline companies free to allocate by contract gas from a particular source to a particular use, havoc would be raised with the federal regulatory scheme, as it was construed arid applied in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U. S. 672. A pipeline would then be able to discriminate in favor of its “nonjurisdictional” customers. Moreover, a pipeline compariy by a contract clause could immunize a particular supplier from the reach of federal regulation as defined by Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, supra. There would be created in those and in other ways an “attractive gap” in the federal regulatory scheme (Federal Power Comm’n v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U. S. 1, 28) which the producing States might have little incentive to close, since the gap would often involve either lower costs to intrastate customers or else merely higher pipeline costs which ultimately would be reflected in rates paid by consumers in other States. Whether cases could be conjured up where in spite of original commingling there might be a separate so-called nonjurisdictional transaction of a precise amount of gas not-for-resale within the meaning of the Act is a question we need not reach. Finally it is said that the Commission should draw the appropriate lines between “jurisdictional'’ and “nonjuris-dictional” sales through the use of its rule-making power. But we cannot say. that the ádjüdicatory process is not an appropriate method, for drawing the line case-by-case (United States v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 345 U. S. 295) as in a,''host of other administrative determinations. The Commission has acted responsibly in this situation and its decision must be upheld. Reversed. Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Section 1 (b) of the Act provides: “The provisions of this Act shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.” Section 2 (7) of the Act reads as follows: “When used in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires— “(7) ‘Interstate commerce’ means commerce between any point in a State and any point outside thereof, or between points within the same State but through any place outside thereof, but only insofar as such commerce takes place within the United States.” The Commission’s Report, .Statistics of Natural Gas Companies— 1962, shows that the 40 major natural gas pipeline companies consumed more than $85,000,000 worth of gas in operating their facilities (principally compressor stations), p. xviii. This represents almost 4% of the total gas-purcháse-costs of those companies. The Commission therefore points out in its brief that pipeline companies, merely by using “restricted use” controls, could without changing their actual operations create a substantial unregulated market for the benefit of particular producers. . Our reference in Federal Power Comm’n v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U. S. 1, 4, to “direct” sales of gas to industrial users as nonjurisdictional sales is not dispositive of the present issue. For the Commission had refused a certificate for transportation of the gas because from the standpoint of conservation it considered the end use as boiler fuel to be inferior. Whether the Commissi on had authority to assert jurisdiction over .the so-called “direct” sale because it was “for resale” as a result of its commingling with other gas was not in issue. Cf. United States v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 345 U. S. 295, 317-318; City of Hastings v. Federal Power Comm’n, 221 F. 2d 31.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LYNG, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, et al. v. NORTHWEST INDIAN CEMETERY PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION et al. No. 86-1013. Argued November 30, 1987 Decided April 19, 1988 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Stevens, and Scalia, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 458. Kennedy, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Andretv J. Pincus argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Acting Assistant Attorney General Marzulla, Deputy Solicitor General Ayer, Robert L. Klarqtiist, and Jacques B. Gelin. Marilyn B. Miles argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief for the Indian respondents was Stephen V. Quesenberry. John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, R. H. Connett, Assistant Attorney General, and Edna Walz, Deputy Attorney General filed a brief for respondent State of California. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Hawaii et al. by Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington, Timothy R. Malone, Nixon Handy, and Mark S. Green, Assistant Attorneys General, Warren Price III, Attorney General of Hawaii, Roger A. Tellinghuisen, Attorney General of South Dakota, and David Wilkinson, Attorney General of Utah; for the Colorado Mining Association et al. by Lawrence E. Stevens and Patrick J. Garver; for the Howonquet Community Association et al. by Ronald A. Zumbrun and Robin L. Rivett; and for the city of Williams, Arizona, by Gary Verburg. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al. by John A. Poivell, Steven R. Shapiro, Paul L. Hoffman, Mark D. Rosenbaum, Alan L. Schlosser, Edward M. Chen, Mattheiv A. Coles, and Stephen L. Pevar; for the American Jewish Congress et al. by Marc D. Stem, Lois C. Waldman, and Amy Adelson; and for the Christian Legal Society et al. by Michael J. Woodruff, Samuel Rabinove, Richard T. Foltin, and Jordan Lorence. Steven C. Moore filed a brief for the National Congress of American Indians et al. as amici curiae. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. This case requires us to consider whether the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause prohibits the Government from permitting timber harvesting in, or constructing a road through, a portion of a National Forest that has traditionally been used for religious purposes by members of three American Indian tribes in northwestern California. We conclude that it does not. I As part of a project to create a paved 75-mile road linking two California towns, Gasquet and Orleans, the United States Forest Service has upgraded 49 miles of previously unpaved roads on federal land. In order to complete this project (the G-0 road), the Forest Service must build a 6-mile paved segment through the Chimney Rock section of the Six Rivers National Forest. That section of the forest is situated between two other portions of the road that are already complete. In 1977, the Forest Service issued a draft environmental impact statement that discussed proposals for upgrading an existing unpaved road that runs through the Chimney Rock area. In response to comments on the draft statement, the Forest Service commissioned a study of American Indian cultural and religious sites in the area. The Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation adjoins the Six Rivers National Forest, and the Chimney Rock area has historically been used for religious purposes by Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians. The commissioned study, which was completed in 1979, found that the entire area “is significant as an integral and indispensible part of Indian religious conceptualization and practice.” App. 181. Specific sites are used for certain rituals, and “successful use of the [area] is dependent upon and facilitated by certain qualities of the physical environment, the most important of which are privacy, silence, and an undisturbed natural setting.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). The study concluded that constructing a road along any of the available routes “would cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred areas which are an integral and necessary part of the belief systems and lifeway of Northwest California Indian peoples.” Id., at 182. Accordingly, the report recommended that the G-O road not be completed. In 1982, the Forest Service decided not to adopt this recommendation, and it prepared a final environmental impact statement for construction of the road. The Regional Forester selected a route that avoided archeological sites and was removed as far as possible from the sites used by contemporary Indians for specific spiritual activities. Alternative routes that would have avoided the Chimney Rock area altogether were rejected because they would have required the acquisition of private land, had serious soil stability problems, and would in any event have traversed areas having ritualistic value to American Indians. See id., at 217-218. At about the same time, the Forest Service adopted a management plan allowing for the harvesting of significant amounts of timber in this area of the forest. The management plan provided for one-half mile protective zones around all the religious sites identified in the report that had been commissioned in connection with the G-0 road. After exhausting their administrative remedies, respondents — an Indian organization, individual Indians, nature organizations and individual members of those organizations, and the State of California — challenged both the road-building and timber-harvesting decisions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Respondents claimed that the Forest Service’s decisions violated the Free Exercise Clause, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 86 Stat. 896, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. § 4321 et seq., several other federal statutes, and governmental trust responsibilities to Indians living on the Hoopa Valley Reservation. After a trial, the District Court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the Government from constructing the Chimney Rock section of the G-0 road or putting the timber-harvesting management plan into effect. See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (1983). The court found that both actions would violate the Free Exercise Clause because they “would seriously damage the salient visual, aural, and environmental qualities of the high country.” Id., at 594-595. The court also found that both proposed actions would violate the FWPCA, and that the environmental impact statements for construction of the road were deficient under the NEPA. Finally, the court concluded that both projects would breach the Government’s trust responsibilities to protect water and fishing rights reserved to the Hoopa Valley Indians. While an appeal was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Congress enacted the California Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-425, 98 Stat. 1619. Under that statute, much of the property covered by the Forest Service’s management plan is now designated a wilderness area, which means that commercial activities such as timber harvesting are forbidden. The statute exempts a narrow strip of land, coinciding with the Forest Service’s proposed route for the remaining segment of the G-O road, from the wilderness designation. The legislative history indicates that this exemption was adopted “to enable the completion of the Gasquet-Orleans Road project if the responsible authorities so decide.” S. Rep. No. 98-582, p. 29 (1984). The existing unpaved section of road, however, lies within the wilderness area and is therefore now closed to general traffic. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. v. Peterson, 795 F. 2d 688 (1986). The panel unanimously rejected the District Court’s conclusion that the Government’s proposed actions would breach its trust responsibilities to Indians on the Hoopa Valley Reservation. The panel also vacated the injunction to the extent that it had been rendered moot by the California’ Wilderness Act, which now prevents timber harvesting in certain areas covered by the District Court’s order. The District Court’s decision, to the extent that it rested on statutory grounds, was otherwise unanimously affirmed. By a divided decision, the District Court’s constitutional ruling was also affirmed. Relying primarily on the Forest Service’s own commissioned study, the majority found that construction of the Chimney Rock section of the G-0 road would have significant, though largely indirect, adverse effects on Indian religious practices. The majority concluded that the Government had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in the completion of the road, and that it could have abandoned the road without thereby creating “a religious preserve for a single group in violation of the establishment clause.” Id., at 694. The majority apparently applied the same analysis to logging operations that might be carried out in portions of the Chimney Rock area not covered by the California Wilderness Act. See id., at 692-693 (“Because most of the high country has now been designated by Congress as a wilderness area, the issue of logging becomes less significant, although it does not disappear”). The dissenting judge argued that certain of the adverse effects on the Indian respondents’ religious practices could be eliminated by less drastic measures than a ban on building the road, and that other actual or suggested adverse effects did not pose a serious threat to the Indians’ religious practices. He also concluded that the injunction against timber harvesting needed to be reconsidered in light of the California Wilderness Act: “It is not clear whether the district court would have issued an injunction based upon the development of the remaining small parcels. Accordingly, I would remand to allow the district court to reevaluate its injunction in light of the Act.” Id., at 704. II We begin by noting that the courts below did not articulate the bases of their decisions with perfect clarity. A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them. See Three Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P. C., 467 U. S. 138, 157-158 (1984); see also, e. g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U. S. 846, 854 (1985); Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U. S. 89, 99 (1981); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 346-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This principle required the courts below to determine, before addressing the constitutional issue, whether a decision on that question could have entitled respondents to relief beyond that to which they were entitled on their statutory claims. If no additional relief would have been warranted, a constitutional decision would have been unnecessary and therefore inappropriate. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals explained or expressly articulated the necessity for their constitutional holdings. Were we persuaded that those holdings were unnecessary, we could simply vacate the relevant portions of the judgment below without discussing the merits of the constitutional issue. The structure and wording of the District Court’s injunctive order, however, suggest that the statutory holdings would not have supported all the relief granted. The order is divided into four sections. Two of those sections deal with a 31,100-acre tract referred to as the Blue Creek Roadless Area. The injunction prohibits the Forest Service from engaging in timber harvesting or road building anywhere on the tract “unless and until” compliance with the NEPA and the FWPCA have been demonstrated. 565 F. Supp., at 606-607. The sections of the injunction dealing with the smaller Chimney Rock area (i. e., the area affected by the First Amendment challenge) are worded differently. The Forest Service is permanently enjoined, without any qualifying language, from constructing the proposed portion of the G-0 road “and/or any alternative route” through that area; similarly, the injunction forbids timber harvesting or the construction of logging roads in the Chimney Rock area pursuant to the Forest Service’s proposed management plan “or any other land management plan.” Id., at 606 (emphasis added). These differences in wording suggest, without absolutely implying, that an injunction covering the Chimney Rock area would in some way have been conditional, or narrower in scope, if the District Court had not decided the First Amendment issue as it did. Similarly, the silence of the Court of Appeals as to the necessity of reaching the First Amendment issue may have reflected its understanding that the District Court’s injunction necessarily rested in part on constitutional grounds. Because it appears reasonably likely that the First Amendment issue was necessary to the decisions below, we believe that it would be inadvisable to vacate and remand without addressing that issue on the merits. This conclusion is strengthened by considerations of judicial economy. The Government, which petitioned for certiorari on the constitutional issue alone, has informed us that it believes it can cure the statutory defects identified below, intends to do so, and will not challenge the adverse statutory rulings. Tr. of Oral Arg. 9-10. In this circumstance, it is difficult to see what principle would be vindicated by sending this case on what would almost certainly be a brief round trip to the courts below. Ill A The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].” It is undisputed that the Indian respondents’ beliefs are sincere and that the Government’s proposed actions will have severe adverse effects on the practice of their religion. Those respondents contend that the burden on their religious practices is heavy enough to violate the Free Exercise Clause unless the Government can demonstrate a compelling need to complete the G-0 road or to engage in timber harvesting in the Chimney Rock area. We disagree. In Bowen v. Roy, 476 U. S. 693 (1986), we considered a challenge to a federal statute that required the States to use Social Security numbers in administering certain welfare programs. Two applicants for benefits under these programs contended that their religious beliefs prevented them from acceding to the use of a Social Security number for their 2-year-old daughter because the use of a numerical identifier would “‘rob the spirit’ of [their] daughter and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual power.” Id., at 696. Similarly, in this case, it is said that disruption of the natural environment caused by the G-O road will diminish the sacredness of the area in question and create distractions that will interfere with “training and ongoing religious experience of individuals using [sites within] the area for personal medicine and growth . . . and as integrated parts of a system of religious belief and practice which correlates ascending degrees of personal power with a geographic hierarchy of power.” App. 181. Cf. id., at 178 (“Scarred hills and mountains, and disturbed rocks destroy the purity of the sacred areas, and [Indian] consultants repeatedly stressed the need of a training doctor to be undistracted by such disturbance”). The Court rejected this kind of challenge in Roy: “The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens. Just as the Government may not insist that [the Roys] engage in any set form of religious observance, so [they] may not demand that the Government join in their chosen religious practices by refraining from using a number to identify their daughter. . . . “. . . The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government’s internal procedures.” 476 U. S., at 699-700. The building of a road or the harvesting of timber on publicly owned land cannot meaningfully be distinguished from the use of a Social Security number in Roy. In' both cases, the challenged Government action would interfere significantly with private persons’ ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment according to their own religious beliefs. In neither case, however, would the affected individuals be coerced by the Government’s action into violating their religious beliefs; nor would either governmental action penalize religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens. We are asked to distinguish this case from Roy on the ground that the infringement on religious liberty here is “significantly greater,” or on the ground that the Government practice in Roy was “purely mechanical” whereas this case involves “a case-by-case substantive determination as to how a particular unit of land will be managed.” Brief for Indian Respondents 33-34. Similarly, we are told that this case can be distinguished from Roy because “the government action is not at some physically removed location where it places no restriction on what a practitioner may do.” Brief for Respondent State of California 18. The State suggests that the Social Security number in Roy “could be characterized as interfering with Roy’s religious tenets from a subjective point of view, where the government’s conduct of ‘its own internal affairs’ was known to him only secondhand and did not interfere with his ability to practice his religion.” Id., at 19 (footnote omitted; internal citation omitted). In this case, however, it is said that the proposed road will “physically destro[y] the environmental conditions and the privacy without which the [religious] practices cannot be conducted.” Ibid. These efforts to distinguish Roy are unavailing. This Court cannot determine the truth of the underlying beliefs that led to the religious objections here or in Roy, see Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U. S. 136, 144, n. 9 (1987), and accordingly cannot weigh the adverse effects on the appellees in Roy and compare them with the adverse effects on the Indian respondents. Without the ability to make such comparisons, we cannot say that the one form of incidental interference with an individual’s spiritual activities should be subjected to a different constitutional analysis than the other. Respondents insist, nonetheless, that the courts below properly relied on a factual inquiry into the degree to which the Indians’ spiritual practices would become ineffectual if the G-0 road were built. They rely on several cases in which this Court has sustained free exercise challenges to government programs that interfered with individuals’ ability to practice their religion. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972) (compulsory school-attendance law); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963) (denial of unemployment benefits to applicant who refused to accept work requiring her to violate the Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Board, Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981) (denial of unemployment benefits to applicant whose religion forbade him to fabricate weapons); Robbie, supra (denial of unemployment benefits to religious convert who resigned position that required her to work on the Sabbath). Even apart from the inconsistency between Roy and respondents’ reading of these cases, their interpretation will not withstand analysis. It is true that this Court has repeatedly held that indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions, are subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment. Thus, for example, ineligibility for unemployment benefits, based solely on a refusal to violate the Sabbath, has been analogized to a fine imposed on Sabbath worship. Sherbert, supra, at 404. This does not and cannot imply that incidental effects of government programs, which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require government to bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful actions. The crucial word in the constitutional text is “prohibit”: “For the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the government.” Sherbert, supra, at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring). Whatever may be the exact line between unconstitutional prohibitions on the free exercise of religion and the legitimate conduct by government of its own affairs, the location of the line cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual development. The Government does not dispute, and we have no reason to doubt, that the logging and road-building projects at issue in this case could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices. Those practices are intimately and inextricably bound up with the unique features of the Chimney Rock area, which is known to the Indians as the “high country. ” Individual practitioners use this area for personal spiritual development; some of their activities are believed to be critically important in advancing the welfare of the Tribe, and indeed, of mankind itself. The Indians use this area, as they have used it for a very long time, to conduct a wide variety of specific rituals that aim to accomplish their religious goals. According to their beliefs, the rituals would not be efficacious if conducted at other sites than the ones traditionally used, and too much disturbance of the area’s natural state would clearly render any meaningful continuation of traditional practices impossible. To be sure, the Indians themselves were far from unanimous in opposing the G-0 road, see App. 180, and it seems less than certain that construction of the road will be so disruptive that it will doom their religion. Nevertheless, we can assume that the threat to the efficacy of at least some religious practices is extremely grave. Even if we assume that we should accept the Ninth Circuit’s prediction, according to which the G-0 road will “virtually destroy the . .. Indians’ ability to practice their religion,” 795 F. 2d, at 693 (opinion below), the Constitution simply does not provide a principle that could justify upholding respondents’ legal claims. However much we might wish that it were otherwise, government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and desires. A broad range of government activities — from social welfare programs to foreign aid to conservation projects — will always be considered essential to the spiritual well-being of some citizens, often on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs. Others will find the very same activities deeply offensive, and perhaps incompatible with their own search for spiritual fulfillment and with the tenets of their religion. The First Amendment must apply to all citizens alike, and it can give to none of them a veto over public programs that do not prohibit the free exercise of religion. The Constitution does not, and courts cannot, offer to reconcile the various competing demands on government, many of them rooted in sincere religious belief, that inevitably arise, in so diverse a society as ours. That task, to the extent that it is feasible, is for the legislatures and other institutions. Cf. The Federalist No. 10 (suggesting that the effects of religious factionalism are best restrained through competition among a multiplicity of religious sects). One need not look far beyond the present case to see why the analysis in Roy, but not respondents’ proposed extension of Sherbert and its progeny, offers a sound reading of the Constitution. Respondents attempt to stress the limits of the religious servitude that they are now seeking to impose on the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest. While defending an injunction against logging operations and the construction of a road, they apparently do not at present object to the area’s being used by recreational visitors, other Indians, or forest rangers. Nothing in the principle for which they contend, however, would distinguish this case from another lawsuit in which they (or similarly situated religious objectors) might seek to exclude all human activity but their own from sacred areas of the public lands. The Indian respondents insist that “[pjrivacy during the power quests is required for the practitioners to maintain the purity needed for a successful journey.” Brief for Indian Respondents 8 (emphasis added; citation to record omitted). Similarly: “The practices conducted in the high country entail intense meditation and require the practitioner to achieve a profound awareness of the natural environment. Prayer seats are oriented so there is an unobstructed view, and the practitioner must be surrounded by undisturbed naturalness.” Id., at 8, n. 4 (emphasis added; citations to record omitted). No disrespect for these practices is implied when one notes that such beliefs could easily require defacto beneficial ownership of some rather spacious tracts of public property. Even without anticipating future cases, the diminution of the Government’s property rights, and the concomitant subsidy of the Indian religion, would in this case be far from trivial: the District Court’s order permanently forbade commercial timber harvesting, or the construction of a two-lane road, anywhere within an area covering a full 27 sections (i. e. more than 17,000 acres) of public land. The Constitution does not permit government to discriminate against religions that treat particular physical sites as sacred, and a law prohibiting the Indian respondents from visiting the Chimney Rock area would raise a different set of constitutional questions. Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area, however, those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land. Cf. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U. S., at 724-727 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (distinguishing between the Government’s use of information in its possession and the Government’s requiring an individual to provide such information). B Nothing in our opinion should be read to encourage governmental insensitivity to the religious needs of any citizen. The Government’s rights to the use of its own land, for example, need not and should not discourage it from accommodating religious practices like those engaged in by the Indian respondents. Cf. Sherbert, 374 U. S., at 422-423 (Harlan, J., dissenting). It is worth emphasizing, therefore, that the Government has taken numerous steps in this very case to minimize the impact that construction of the G-0 road will have on the Indians’ religious activities. First, the Forest Service commissioned a comprehensive study of the effects that the project would have on the cultural and religious value of the Chimney Rock area. The resulting 423-page report was so sympathetic to the Indians’ interests that it has constituted the principal piece of evidence relied on by respondents throughout this litigation. Although the Forest Service did not in the end adopt the report’s recommendation that the project be abandoned, many other ameliorative measures were planned. No sites where specific rituals take place were to be disturbed. In fact, a major factor in choosing among alternative routes for the road was the relation of the various routes to religious sites: the route selected by the Regional Forester is, he noted, “the farthest removed from contemporary spiritual sites; thus, the adverse audible intrusions associated with the road would be less than all other alternatives.” App. 102. Nor were the Forest Service’s concerns limited to “audible intrusions.” As the dissenting judge below observed, 10 specific steps were planned to reduce the visual impact of the road on the surrounding country. See 795 F. 2d, at 703 (Beezer, J., dissenting in part). Except for abandoning its project entirely, and thereby leaving the two existing segments of road to dead-end in the middle of a National Forest, it is difficult to see how the Government could have been more solicitous. Such solicitude accords with “the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian . . . including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.” American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), Pub. L. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469, 42 U. S. C. § 1996. Respondents, however, suggest that AIRFA goes further and in effect enacts their interpretation of the First Amendment into statutory law. Although this contention was rejected by the District Court, they seek to defend the judgment below by arguing that AIRFA authorizes the injunction against completion of the G-0 road. This argument is without merit. After reciting several legislative findings, AIRFA “resolves” upon the policy quoted above. A second section of the statute, 92 Stat. 470, required an evaluation of federal policies and procedures, in consultation with native religious leaders, of changes necessary to protect and preserve the rights and practices in question. The required report dealing with this evaluation was completed and released in 1979. Reply Brief for Petitioners 2, n. 3. Nowhere in the law is there so much as a hint of any intent to create a cause of action or any judicially enforceable individual rights. What is obvious from the face of the statute is confirmed by numerous indications in the legislative history. The sponsor of the bill that became AIRFA, Representative Udall, called it “a sense of Congress joint resolution,” aimed at ensuring that “the basic right of the Indian people to exercise their traditional religious practices is not infringed without a clear decision on the part of the Congress or the administrators that such religious practices must yield to some higher consideration.” 124 Cong. Rec. 21444 (1978). Representative Udall emphasized that the bill would not “confer special religious rights on Indians,” would “not change any existing State or Federal law,” and in fact “has no teeth in it.” Id., at 21444-21445. c The dissent proposes an approach to the First Amendment that is fundamentally inconsistent with the principles on which our decision rests. Notwithstanding the sympathy that we all must feel for the plight of the Indian respondents, it is plain that the approach taken by the dissent cannot withstand analysis. On the contrary, the path towards which it points us is incompatible with the text of the Constitution, with the precedents of this Court, and with a responsible sense of our own institutional role. The dissent begins by asserting that the “constitutional guarantee we interpret today ... is directed against any form of government action that frustrates or inhibits religious practice.” Post, at 459 (emphasis added). The Constitution, however, says no such thing. Rather, it states: “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].” U. S. Const., Arndt. 1 (emphasis added). As we explained above, Bowen v. Roy rejected a First Amendment challenge to Government activities that the religious objectors sincerely believed would “‘“rob the spirit” of [their] daughter and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual power.’” See supra, at 448 (quoting Roy, 476 U. S., at 696). The dissent now offers to distinguish that case by saying that the Government was acting there “in a purely internal manner,” whereas land-use decisions “are likely to have substantial external effects.” Post, at 470. Whatever the source or meaning of the dissent’s distinction, it has no basis in Roy. Robbing the spirit of a child, and preventing her from attaining greater spiritual power, is both a “substantial external effect” and one that is remarkably similar to the injury claimed by respondents in the case before us today. The dissent’s reading of Roy would effectively overrule that decision, without providing any compelling justification for doing so. The dissent also misreads Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972). The statute at issue in that case prohibited the Amish parents, on pain of criminal prosecution, from providing their children with the kind of education required by the Amish religion. Id., at 207-209, 223. The statute directly compelled the Amish to send their children to public high schools “contrary to the Amish religion and way of life.” Id., at 209. The Court acknowledged that the statute might be constitutional, despite its coercive nature, if the State could show with sufficient “particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish.” Id., at 236 (citation omitted). The dissent’s out-of-context quotations notwithstanding, there is nothing whatsoever in the Yoder opinion to support the proposition that the “impact” on the Amish religion would have been constitutionally problematic if the statute at issue had not been coercive in nature. Cf. post, at 466. Perceiving a “stress point in the longstanding conflict between two disparate cultures,” the dissent attacks us for declining to “balanc[e] these competing and potentially irreconcilable interests, choosing instead to, turn this difficult task over to the Federal Legislature.” Post, at 473. Seeing the Court as the arbiter, the dissent proposes a legal test under which it would decide which public lands are “central” or “indispensable” to which religions, and by implication which are “dispensable” or “peripheral,” and would then decide which government programs are “compelling” enough to justify “infringement of those practices.” Post, at 475. We would accordingly be required to weigh the value of every religious belief and practice that is said to be threatened by any government program. Unless a “showing of ‘centrality,’ ” post, at 474, is nothing but an assertion of centrality, see post, at 475, the dissent thus offers us the prospect of this Court’s holding that some sincerely held religious beliefs and practices are not “central” to certain religions, despite protestations to the contrary from the religious objectors who brought the lawsuit. In other words, the dissent’s approach would require us to rule that some religious adherents misunderstand their own religious beliefs. We think such an approach cannot be squared with the Constitution or with our precedents, and that it would cast the Judiciary in a role that we were never intended to play. IV The decision of the court below, according to which the First Amendment precludes the Government from completing the G-0 road or from permitting timber harvesting in the Chimney Rock area, is reversed. In order that the District Court’s injunction may be reconsidered in light of this holding, and in the light of any other relevant events that may have intervened since the injunction issued, the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SEATRAIN SHIPBUILDING CORP. et al. v. SHELL OIL CO. et al. No. 78-1651. Argued November 28, 1979 Decided February 20, 1980 BrenNan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. William E. McDaniels argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were John W. Vdrdaman, Jr., Neal M. Mayer, and Jonathan Blank. Andrew J. Levander argued the cause pro hoc vice for the federal parties as respondents under this Court's Rule 21 (4) in support of petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Daniel, Ronald R. Glancz, Michael Kimmel, and Michael J. McMorrow. Amy Loeserman Klein and Stephen N. Shulman argued the cause for respondents. With Ms. Klein on the brief for respondents Alaska Bulk Carriers, Inc., et al. were William Karas, Francis Ballard, and Alan G. Choate. With Mr. Shul-man on the brief for respondent Shell Oil Co. were Joseph A. Artabane and Mark C. Ellenberg. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1972, petitioner Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. (Seatrain) received a construction-differential subsidy (CDS) of $27.2 million pursuant to Title V of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, 49 Stat. 1995, as amended, 46 U. S. C. § 1151 et seq., to construct the 225,000-deadweight-ton supertanker Stuyvesant. As required by § 506 of the Act, 46 U. S. C. § 1156, Seatrain and its affiliate, petitioner Polk Tanker Corp., the initial owner of the Stuyvesant, agreed to operate the supertanker exclusively in the foreign trade except as otherwise authorized in that section. By the time the vessel was completed in 1977, however, petitioners wanted to operate it in the domestic trade. Accordingly, they asked the Secretary of Commerce permanently to lift all restrictions on the Stuyvesant’s operation in domestic commerce in exchange for their fully secured, 20-year interest-bearing note repaying in full the vessel’s CDS. The Secretary granted the application, accepted the promissory note, and deleted the applicable restrictions from the CDS contract. The primary question for decision is whether the Secretary of Commerce may terminate the restrictions imposed pursuant to § 506 when the owners of a vessel constructed with a CDS repay that subsidy in full. The District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that the Secretary had such authority, Shell Oil Co. v. Kreps, 445 F. Supp. 1128 (1977). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed and reversed. Alaska Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Kreps, 194 U. S. App. D. C. 7, 595 F. 2d 814 (1979). We granted certiorari. 442 U. S. 940 (1979). We reverse. I The costs of constructing ships in American shipyards and manning them with American crews are higher than comparable costs in foreign ports. Accordingly, Congress has taken a number of steps to protect and support the United States’ shipping and shipbuilding industries. The Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. § 883, has, since 1920, reserved the United States domestic trade exclusively for vessels built in this country and owned by its citizens. The Merchant Marine Act, 1936, 46 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., established a number of programs to help American vessels compete effectively in foreign trade with vessels constructed and staffed abroad. Specifically, Title V of that Act, 46 U. S. C. § 1151 et seq., authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to grant a CDS for up to 50% of the cost of constructing a ship in this country. The owners of vessels built with these subsidies are required by § 506, 46 U. S. C. § 1156, to agree that they will operate only in foreign trade unless they come within one of two explicit statutory exceptions. Neither exception may be invoked unless the owner remits to the Government an appropriate pro rata portion of the outstanding subsidy. In 1969, petitioner Seatrain began constructing a series of supertankers at the former Brooklyn Navy Yard. The venture received substantial amounts of federal aid. By its completion, the Economic Development Administration (EDA) of the Department of Commerce had advanced $5 million as a direct loan and had guaranteed 90% of $82 million in loans from other sources to help finance modernization and operation of the Navy Yard facilities and a major on-the-job training program. Moreover, the Department granted a CDS for each of the four supertankers built by Seatrain, in addition to guaranteeing various construction loans. The Stuyvesant was the third of the Seatrain tankers. In the mid-1970's, while it was under construction, demand for such vessels began to decline in the wake of the Arab oil embargo, increasing crude oil prices and the economic problems that ensued. By 1977, when the vessel was completed, there was a significant oversupply of tankers on the world market and no opportunity in foreign trade for the fledgling Stuyvesant. Foreseeing this problem, the owners had begun to explore prospects for employing the vessel in the transportation of Alaskan crude from Valdez around Cape Horn to the Eastern United States and the Caribbean. This relatively new trade required sizeable tankers, and since the Jones Act restricted it to American-flag vessels the demand remained high despite the abundance of otherwise suitable foreign vessels. In mid-1977, petitioner Polk Tanker Corp. executed an agreement with Standard Oil of Ohio (SOHIO) for a 3-year charter of the Stuyvesant for use in the Alaskan trade. The agreement was conditioned upon Polk’s obtaining from the Secretary of Commerce a release from the foreign-trade-only restriction imposed pursuant to § 506. This was obtained at the end of August in the form of letters to Polk and Queensway Tankers, Inc., the proposed operator of the vessel. Those letters recited the findings upon which the agency based its decision. These were: (1) that there were no other opportunities for employment of the Stuyvesant, (2) that the SOHIO charter would strengthen the collateral securing obligations the Government had guaranteed, (3) that the charter might prevent default on those obligations, and (4) that failure to approve the proposal would jeopardize the continued operation of Seatrain. The complex closing of several transactions necessary to finance repayment of the CDS, refinance various other obligations, and transfer the Stuyvesant to new owners and operators was scheduled for September 23, 1977. On September 22, respondents, three competitors in the Alaskan trade, brought suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia against various Department of Commerce officials. The complaints sought declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the Secretary from granting a permanent release from the § 506 foreign-trade-only requirement. They argued (1) that the Secretary lacked authority to grant such a release and (2) that, even if the Secretary had authority to do so in certain cases, that authority should not have been exercised with regard to the Stuyvesant. In addition, they alleged violations of various procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act and asserted that the Secretary was without power to accept a promissory note as repayment for the CDS. Petitioners Seatrain and Polk were permitted to intervene as defendants. On November 22, 1977, ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court held (1) that the Secretary had the authority to release vessels from trade restrictions imposed pursuant to § 506 in exchange for full CDS repayment and could accept a promissory note, (2) that releasing the Stuyvesant from such restrictions without analyzing the economic effect of that vessel’s entry into the Alaskan trade was an abuse of discretion, and (3) that there existed material issues of fact which made summary judgment on portions of the Administrative Procedure Act claim improper. The court remanded the case to the Secretary for consideration of the competitive consequences of the Stuyvesant decision. Eight days later, on the motion of the respondents, the court amended its decision by dismissing the Administrative Procedure Act claim and — relying on Rule 54 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — certifying its decision as a “final judgment.” Respondents appealed from this certified final judgment, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that by specifying two exceptions to the foreign-trade-only requirement § 506 occupied the field and impliedly prohibited the Secretary from making any other exceptions under the Act’s more general provisions. 194 U. S. App. D. C., at 15-22, 595 F. 2d, at 822-829. Judge Bazelon dissented, id., at 33, 595 F. 2d, at 840, stating that he would hold that § 506 did not limit the Secretary’s power in this regard. He observed that after full repayment of the CDS and appropriate interest the Stuyvesant would be on precisely the same footing as other vessels in the unsubsidized domestic fleet. II We are met at the outset with the contention that we lack jurisdiction to hear this case. Raised for the first time in a footnote to the federal parties’ petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeals, the argument is that the District Court’s November 30 judgment and order was not a “final decision” for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 1291 because it remanded the case to the Secretary for consideration of the economic consequences of permitting the Stuyvesant to enter the Alaskan oil trade. Respondents, the federal parties assert, sought but one form of relief — an order barring the Stuyvesant from competing with their own vessels. They advanced two legal theories to support that prayer, one general — that the Secretary has no power to grant a permanent release from restrictions imposed pursuant to § 506 — and the other particular — that even if the Secretary has the power to do so in some circumstances, the exercise of that power with regard to the Stuyvesant was an abuse of discretion. On remand, the federal parties continue, the Secretary might have concluded that the termination of § 506 restrictions was unwise. Alternatively, the Secretary might have decided to adhere to the original administrative decision and then been reversed by the courts. In either case, the federal parties argue, respondents would have obtained all the relief they sought. Accordingly, the District Court’s November 30 order did not “ 'en[d] the litigation on the merits and leav[e] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment,’ ” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 467 (1978), quoting from Catlin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229, 233 (1945), and thus was not a “final decision.” As a result, the argument concludes, the November 30, 1977, order was not appealable to the Court of Appeals and this Court is therefore without jurisdiction to hear the case. The difficulty with the federal parties’ argument is that it misapprehends the nature of at least one of the complaints which commenced this litigation — that of Alaska Bulk Carriers, Inc., and Trinidad Corp. Fairly read, that complaint seeks not only relief from competition from the Stuyvesant, but also a general declaration that the Secretary of Commerce is without power to permit any vessel constructed with the assistance of a CDS to enter the domestic trade under any circumstances save those narrow exceptions specifically mentioned in the statute itself. In this regard, the complaint alleged that the Secretary would in the future grant a Stuyvesant-like waiver to that vessel’s sister ship, the Bay Ridge, It stated that the owners of unsubsidized vessels would be harmed by competition from the Stuyvesant “and from other CDS-built vessels with respect to which . . . the agency may likewise lift operating restrictions if this action is permitted to stand.” And its prayer for relief sought (1) declaratory and injunctive relief relating to the Stuyvesant itself, (2) a declaration that the Secretary lacks authority permanently to waive § 506 restrictions under any circumstances, (3) an injunction barring the Secretary from amending CDS contracts or taking any other action to lift § 506 restrictions, and (4) such other relief as the court deemed necessary. There were, in short, two claims made and two quite different sorts of relief sought. In their reply brief, the federal parties attempt to answer the contention that respondents made two separate claims for relief by asserting that as to one of them — the request for a determination that the Secretary lacked power to grant a permanent release — the case-or-controversy requirement of Art. Ill of the Constitution has not been satisfied. Terming the question “abstract” and “hypothetical,” the federal parties maintain that this claim was in effect a request for an advisory opinion, that it could not stand alone. We disagree. In our judgment, respondents’ claim that the Merchant Marine Act does not permit the Secretary to grant a permanent release from § 506 restrictions satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement quite apart from the fate of the particular decision with respect to the Stuyvesant. First, there is at least one other vessel on the horizon as to which a similar waiver may well be sought and granted — the Bay Ridge. Built in the same yard for the same purpose, faced with a similar plight, and likely to have a similar effect on the Alaskan market if the same solution to that plight is sought, the Bay Ridge is a prime candidate for release from § 506 restrictions, and the prospect of its release is sufficient to create a live controversy. In this respect, the present case is very different from Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103, 106-107, 109-110 (1969), on which the federal parties rely. Second, the Secretary’s decision to grant a full release for the Stuyvesant is clear evidence of administrative willingness to grant such releases in appropriate cases if they are in fact lawful. Accordingly, there is nothing speculative about the assertion that, unless restrained or at least given the benefit of an authoritative ruling of law by this Court, the agency will grant such waivers in the future. Compare Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459 (1974), and id., at 476 (concurring opinion), with O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 493-498 (1974). And third, the Stuyvesant itself contributes to the concrete controversy between respondents and the agency. As a practical matter, whether that vessel operates in the Alaskan trade is likely to depend almost entirely on the outcome of this litigation. And even were it determined on review of the remand decision that under the circumstances existing at the time a waiver was improper, both the Stuyvesant and the Bay Ridge would remain in the wings as likely prospects for future waivers if circumstances were to change. Accordingly, we conclude that the respondents’ claim for relief respecting the general powers of the Secretary meets the case-or-controversy requirement of Art. III. Having determined that there were two separate claims, each within the jurisdiction of the courts below, we need only note that the appeal from the District Court decision comported fully with Rule 54 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That Rule states in relevant part that “[w]hen more than one claim for relief is presented in an action . . . the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims . . . only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.” In the present case, more than one claim for relief was presented and the District Court found there was no reason for delay prior to directing the entry of final judgment as to one of the claims. As a result, the determination that the Secretary was empowered to waive permanently the restrictions required by § 506 was a final decision certifiable under Rule 54 (b) and appealable under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. Ill Prior to 1936, Congress assisted the American maritime industry in two ways: (1) it provided substantial low-interest loans to aid the construction of vessels destined for foreign trade, and (2) it appropriated large amounts of money for oceangoing mail contracts — amounts considerably in excess of actual cost and clearly intended as a subsidy for American shipping. Neither effort was very successful. Loan repayment was difficult to secure, few ships were constructed, and the hidden mail subsidy proved unwieldy in addition to being somewhat disingenuous. In 1935, President Roosevelt proposed that Congress end the subterfuge and adopt a forthright and sensibly tailored program, to subsidize and stimulate American shipping and shipbuilding. The result was the Merchant Marine Act, 1936. Its basic goals were set forth in § 101, 46 U. S. C. § 1101. There Congress declared it to be the policy of the United States “to foster the development and encourage the maintenance” of a large and effective merchant marine capable of meeting the Nation’s future commercial and military needs. The fleet was to be modern and efficient. And Congress intended that it be supported by substantial shipbuilding and repair facilities. The Secretary of Commerce was given broad authority to oversee administration of the Act. Thus, he was called upon to undertake a survey of the merchant marine, to note its needs, and to adopt a long-range program for meeting those needs. § 210, 46 U. S. C. § 1120. He was directed to investigate and keep current records of essential routes and lines to foreign ports, bulk-cargo carrying service requirements, needs for various types of vessels in various routes, construction and operating costs here and abroad, shipyard conditions, and new designs and technologies. § 211, 46 U. S. C. § 1121. He was authorized to devise means of encouraging use of American-flag vessels and improving those vessels in collaboration with vessel owners and shipbuilders. § 212, 46 U. S. C. § 1122. And he was empowered to “enter into such contracts, upon behalf of the United States,... as may, in . . . his discretion, be necessary to carry on the activities authorized by this chapter, or to protect, preserve, or improve the collateral held by the [Federal Maritime] Commission or Secretary to secure indebtedness, in the same manner that a private corporation may contract within the scope of the authority conferred by its charter.” § 207, as set forth in 46 U. S. C. § 1117. Central to the legislative scheme was the creation of an arsenal of grant and loan programs for use in the Secretary’s efforts to stimulate domestic construction and make operation by domestic crews competitive. Included were an operating subsidy program, Title VI, 46 U. S. C. § 1171 et seq.; a program pursuant to which the Secretary could directly acquire new or reconditioned vessels and charter or sell them, Title VII, 46 U. S. C. § 1191 et seq.; a loan guarantee program, Title XI, 46 U. S. C. § 1271 et seq.; and the CDS program that lies at the core of the present litigation, Title V, 46 U. S. C. § 1151 et seq. Again, the Secretary’s discretion in administering these programs was substantial. It was recognized from the outset that substantial limits would have to be placed upon the entry of subsidized vessels into the domestic trade. Any other result would have been disastrous for the unsubsidized Jones Act fleet for which that trade was (and is) reserved. Burdened by higher construction costs, greater outstanding debt, and higher operating expenses, that fleet would simply have been unable to compete with new vessels enjoying the benefits of the 1936 Act. The congressional response to this problem as it relates to the CDS program was § 506. Basically, that section confines subsidized vessels to the foreign trade. Congress recognized, however, that an entirely rigid prohibition on entry into domestic commerce might be impractical — incidental domestic operation on one segment of a voyage in foreign trade might well be efficient, and other circumstances might also arise in which some flexibility would be desirable. Accordingly, Congress permitted subsidized vessels to carry domestic cargoes on one leg of certain foreign voyages and provided in addition that the Secretary could authorize such vessels actually to enter the domestic trade for six months or less in any year upon finding that such entry would be “necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this chapter.” In an effort to ensure that subsidized vessels operating in domestic trade pursuant to these exceptions would compete on an equal footing with unsubsidized vessels similarly employed, Congress required the repayment of that portion of the outstanding subsidy allocable to the vessel's domestic activities. The Court of Appeals was of the view that the specific exceptions in § 506 marked the limit of the Secretary’s authority to approve entry of subsidized vessels into the domestic trade. By its logic, detail, and legislative history, the panel majority reasoned, that section prohibits transactions like the one before us. In consequence, that court found the broad sweep of the Secretary’s power under the balance of the Act irrelevant, the express language giving the Secretary authority to make and amend contracts unimportant, and the policy arguments advanced by the Secretary unpersuasive. We disagree. On the face of the statute, the Secretary’s broad contracting powers and discretion to administer the Act seem to comprehend the authority urged by petitioners here. Indeed, as the Secretary found in the present case, a permanent release from the foreign-trade-only requirement may quite directly further the general goals of the Act by protecting the Government’s position as guarantor of substantial financial obligations and improving the chances that a domestic shipyard will survive. Further, we are hard pressed to find anything in § 506 that suggests that the Secretary is forbidden to approve transactions of this sort under these circumstances. Certainly nothing in the language of that section so manacles the Secretary as to require the result reached below. Rather, § 506 simply mandates that vessels enjoying the benefits of a subsidy may move in and out of domestic commerce only under narrowly circumscribed conditions. It speaks to temporary releases from the foreign-trade-only requirement, and only to such releases. Moreover, for Congress to draft a section directed to the particular problems posed by temporary entry into the domestic trade was entirely logical since such releases pose problems not present in permanent releases of the sort at issue here. Specifically, a vessel with an outstanding CDS that was completely free to enter and depart the domestic trade would be in an extraordinarily favorable competitive situation even if it was required to repay a proportionate amount of its subsidy whenever it did so. Absent some restriction on its ability to move from one market to the other, it would be a formidable force in both, capable of taking advantage of every shift in trade and profitability, skimming the cream and leaving what remains to those less mobile. It could, in a very real sense, have the best of both worlds. Section 506 responds to this problem by permitting a vessel that enjoys the benefits of a CDS to operate outside the foreign market only in narrow circumstances, generally upon a highly discretionary administrative decision, and for no more than six months a year. And we have no doubt that it would be flatly inconsistent with the congressional intent were the Secretary or this Court to conclude that a temporary release not meeting these conditions was proper. But a permanent release upon full repayment is quite different. It irrevocably locates the vessel in the unsubsidized fleet and thus poses no danger of a supercompetitor skimming the cream from each market. It creates no long-term instability. And it confers no windfall. On the contrary, at least where repayment of the CDS includes some amount reflecting capital costs which would have been incurred had no subsidy been available, such a transaction merely permits a once subsidized vessel to enter the domestic trade on a footing equal to that of vessels already in that trade. It was not the purpose of the Act to prohibit such entry, and we accordingly agree with the District Court that “nothing in section 506, [or] in any other provision of Title V, . . . either expressly or implicitly addresses the issue of permanent revocation of a CDS contract.” 445 F. Supp., at 1135 (emphasis in original). We turn now to the Court of Appeals’ arguments concerning the legislative history of § 506. The panel majority was of the view that that history demonstrates that Congress addressed the problem before us and affirmatively decided not to permit the Secretary to approve transactions like the one at issue. We disagree. At most, we find the legislative history ambiguous, even puzzling. We do not find that it demonstrates that Congress has decided the present question. We begin with the version of § 506 originally enacted as part of the 1936 Act. The first sentence of that version stated that it would be unlawful to operate any subsidized vessel other than exclusively in foreign trade or on incidental domestic portions of voyages in foreign trade, but provided that the Maritime Commission had authority to consent to operation that would otherwise be unlawful so long as the owner agreed to repay “an amount which bears the same proportion to the construction subsidy theretofore paid ... as the remaining economic life of the vessel bears to its entire economic life.” The second sentence provided that in cases of “emergency” the Commission could permit transfer of a subsidized vessel to “service other than exclusive operation in foreign trade” provided that no operating subsidy were paid during the emergency period and that period was limited to three months. And the third sentence specified that owners of a vessel operated on incidental domestic portions of voyages in foreign trade would have to make a proportionate subsidy repayment. It seems abundantly clear that this section provided for three different exceptions to the foreign-trade-only requirement: (1) subsidized vessels could also carry out incidental tasks in domestic trade (sentence one) — in which case consent of the Commission would not be required, but pro rata subsidy repayment would have to be made (sentence three), (2) such vessels could operate permanently in domestic trade upon the consent of the Commission and repayment of the unamortized portion of the subsidy (sentence one), and (3) such vessels could, upon a Commission finding of emergency, enter domestic trade for up to three months without subsidy repayment (sentence two). In 1938, § 506 was rewritten into substantially its present form. The objective consequences of that rewriting were, first, that all the language suggesting that a permanent release from trade restrictions upon full subsidy repayment would be appropriate was deleted and, second, that the provision authorizing a 3-month “emergency” release with no subsidy repayment was altered by eliminating the emergency requirement, changing the 3-month limit to 6 months and requiring proportionate subsidy repayment. In substance, the balance of the provision was left unchanged. Respondents and the Court of Appeals contend that this rewriting embodied a considered congressional judgment that permanent release upon full repayment should not be permitted. They rely to a considerable extent upon the comments of Joseph P. Kennedy, Chairman of the Maritime Commission. During hearings on the measure he stated as follows: “Section 506 has been entirely rewritten to remove ambiguities and confusion. The section now provides that the owner can only engage in foreign trade exclusively with certain enumerated excepted services, for which services the owner is required to repay part of the construction-differential subsidy. There are also provisions which appear to give owners the right to engage in services other than the excepted ones, if the Commission consents to such use and the owner repays part of the construction-differential subsidy. Whether this right is restricted to the cases of emergency and to periods of 3 months as mentioned in the section, it is difficult to determine.” The ambiguity referred to by Mr. Kennedy, the Court of Appeals concluded, was that hinted at in the final sentence of the quoted remarks — whether the “right to engage in services other than excepted ones” upon subsidy repayment was restricted to 3-month emergencies. And that ambiguity was resolved, the argument goes, by the decision to delete all language authorizing a permanent release and to rewrite the temporary release provision so that the “right” referred to by Mr. Kennedy could only be exercised for six months in any year. Accordingly, we are told, the intention of Congress to bar the transaction at issue here was “unmistakably manifested.” 194 U. S. App. D. C., at 22, 595 F. 2d, at 829. We find the contention that anything was unmistakable in these snippets of legislative history exceedingly curious. In the first place, it seems scarcely possible that Congress actually thought the original version ambiguous in the regard apparently referred to by Mr. Kennedy. As we have already noted, no reading of that provision other than one permitting permanent waiver is possible given the mechanism set forth for calculation of the amount of subsidy repayment due. Moreover, there is in fact no indication that Congress intended to make the major alterations claimed. Indeed, the House Report states that “[n]o fundamental change in the original purpose of the section has been effected,” and the Senate Report, while to some extent tracking Mr. Kennedy’s comments, seems to identify the major change effected by the amendments as the addition of language making it “perfectly clear that unless the owner operates exclusively in foreign trade, he must repay a portion of the construction-differential subsidy for any service in which the vessel is engaged which includes domestic ports. . . .” There is no language suggesting that Congress intended to rule out permanent releases of the type at issue here. We do not go so far as to assert with confidence that the deletion of the authorization contained in the second half of the first sentence of the 1936 version was inadvertent. Rather we are simply unsure of the precise significance of that deletion. What does seem clear is that it did not represent a considered congressional judgment that the permanent-release/ full-repayment transaction before us should be prohibited. IV Our conclusion that Congress did not forbid the transactions here at issue is buttressed by two additional factors. First, the agency has consistently interpreted the Act to permit full-repayment/permanent-release arrangements. Thus, in 1964 two vessels owned by Grace Line were permitted to repay the unamortized portion of subsidies in exchange for the removal of restrictions on their entry into domestic trade. And in late 1976 and early 1977 two conditional requests for permanent release were granted to the owners of vessels employed in the Virgin Islands trade. The owners were concerned with the prospect that that trade might in the future be classified as domestic and were informed that they could obtain waivers if that eventuality were to occur. While the agency’s rationale has not always been entirely persuasive, it has not wavered from its general understanding of its powers and the extent to which their exercise is consistent with the goals of the Act. More importantly, in 1971 and 1972 Congress seems clearly to have contemplated transactions of the sort challenged here. In 1972, a new § 1104 (a) (3), 86 Stat. 911, 46 U. S. C. § 1274 (a)(3), was added to the Act. As originally proposed, the section provided that the agency could aid in financing repayment of “any amount of construction-differential subsidy paid with respect to a vessel pursuant to Title V of this Act ... in order to release such vessel from all restrictions imposed as a result of the payment of [that] subsidy. . . As enacted, the section did not include the language relating to release from all restrictions. The House Committee explained the deletion as follows: “In the entire history of the administration of the 1936 Act there has been only one instance where a construction-differential subsidy repayment, authorized by the Secretary under very special circumstances, could have called into play the provisions of this paragraph. Your Committee questions the desirability of general legislation to deal with such an unusual situation, and feels that Title XI assistance should be extended to all instances of subsidy repayments under Title V, so as to include the relatively frequent situation of repayments under the first sentence of section 506 of the Act. Your Committee has therefore amended the legislation by deleting the language [relating to release from all restrictions]. This paragraph in Title XI does not in any way extend or affect the application of Title Y of the Act.” The understanding of the 92d Congress seems clear. And while the views of subsequent Congresses cannot override the unmistakable intent of the enacting one, Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 354, n. 39 (1977), such views are entitled to significant weight, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 275 (1974), and particularly so when the precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure. V In conclusion, we hold that the Act empowers the Secretary to approve full-repayment/permanent-release transactions of the type at issue here. We express no view upon respondents’ claim that if such authority exists under the Act full repayment may not be made by promissory note. This issue was not addressed by the Court of Appeals and is open for its consideration on remand. Further, we express no view upon the merits of the Secretary’s particular exercise of discretion with regard to the Stuyvesant since that issue is not before us. Reversed and remanded. Some form of prohibition on use of foreign vessels in domestic trade predates the Jones Act by more than a century. See, e. g., Act of Mar. 1, 1817, 3 Stat. 351. See generally G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 963, and nn. 34 and 35 (2d ed. 1975). Section 506 of the Act, 49 Stat. 1999, as amended, 46 U. S. C. § 1156, provides as follows: "Every owner of a vessel for which a construction-differential subsidy has been paid shall agree that the vessel shall be operated exclusively in foreign trade, or on a round-the-world voyage, or on a round voyage from the west coast of the United States to a European port or ports which includes intercoastal ports of the United States, or a round voyage from the Atlantic coast of the United States to the Orient which includes inter-coastal ports of the United States, or on a voyage in foreign trade on which the vessel may stop at the State of Hawaii, or an island possession or island territory of the United States, and that if the vessel is operated in the domestic trade on any of the above-enumerated services, he will pay annually to the Secretary of Commerce that proportion of one-twenty-fifth of the construction-differential subsidy paid for such vessel as the gross revenue derived from the domestic trade bears to the gross revenue derived from the entire voyages completed during the preceding year. The Secretary may consent in writing to the temporary transfer of such vessel to service other than the service covered by such agreement for periods not exceeding six months in any year, whenever the Secretary may determine that such transfer is necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this chapter. Such consent shall be conditioned upon the agreement by the owner to pay to the Secretary, upon such terms and conditions as he may prescribe, an amount which bears the same proportion to the construction-differential subsidy paid by the Secretary as such temporary period bears to the entire economic life of the vessel. No operating-differential subsidy shall be paid for the operation of such vessel for such temporary period.” Seatrain also invested some $38 million of its own funds in the project. The first two tankers, the Brooklyn and the Williamsburg, initially-found employment in the foreign trade and subsequently were placed in layup. App. 112. The decision in this case may have some bearing on the fate of the fourth, the Bay Ridge. See infra, at 580-582. In addition to'the $27.2 million CDS, loans of $30.2 million were guaranteed under Title XI of the Act, 46 U. S. C. § 1271 et seq., for construction of the Stuyvesant. Similar financial support was made available for the Bay Ridge, which received a CDS of $28.8 million and Title XI loan guarantees of $34.5 million. This drop in tanker demand had caused Seatrain to halt construction of both the Stuyvesant and the Bay Ridge in early 1975 — a halt that necessitated the layoff of most of the shipyard’s 2,500 employees and virtually shut the facility down. The yard reopened and construction resumed only after the EDA provided 90% guarantees for additional bank loans of $40 million. From that time on Seatrain apparently was on the lookout for prospects for employing the two supertankers in the domestic trade. See 46 U. S. C. § 883; n. 1, supra. The preceding month, Polk had sought permission to operate the Stuyvesant in coastal trade for three years in exchange for pro rata repayment of the CDS. This application was withdrawn in the face of strong protests from prospective competitors. Letter of James S. Dawson, Jr., Secretary of Maritime Administration, to Polk Tanker Corp., Aug. 31, 1977, App. 530. Two separate complaints were filed, one by Alaska Bulk Carriers, Inc., and Trinidad Corp., and the other by Shell Oil Co. They were consolidated before the District Court. The remand proceedings were completed on January 6, 1978, prior to oral argument in the Court of Appeals. The Secretary concluded that there would continue to be a shortage of tankers in the Alaskan trade for the foreseeable future and that the entry of the Stuyvesant into that trade would accordingly have little or no adverse effect on the respondents. Id., at 568-569. Thereafter, Shell filed suit in the District Court challenging these findings. Its complaint was dismissed without prejudice following the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case. Id., at 558-559. Title 28 U. S. C. § 1291 states that “[t]he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States. . . .” The Alaska Bulk Carriers complaint is reproduced at App. 45-63. Complaint ¶¶ 33 and 42, App. 57, 61-62. Id., ¶ 41, App. 61. Id., at 62-63. The Shell complaint is reproduced id., at 6-17. It focuses far more specifically on the Stuyvesant, and were it the only complaint before us there might be more force to the federal parties’ characterization of this litigation as presenting a single claim supported by two theories. In that event, we would have had to explore some of the alternative bases of jurisdiction advanced by the respondents. The clear presence of two claims in the Alaska Bulk Carriers complaint makes such an inquiry unnecessary. The two are not, of course, unrelated. In particular, a favorable disposition of respondents’ statutory claim would leave respondents with no reason to press the administrative one. The contrary proposition, however, is not true. The complaint strongly suggests that respondents would have pressed for resolution of their statutory claim even if the Secretary or the courts had concluded that under the circumstances existing at the time the administrative determination was made the Stuyvesant could not lawfully have been permitted to enter the Alaskan trade. Prior administrative practice supports this conclusion as well. See infra, at 595. See also Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 152-154 (1967). We recognize that the District Court could not by purporting to comply with Rule 54 (b) render final for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 1291 a decision that was in fact not final. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U. S. 737, 742-743 (1976); Sectas, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U. S. 427, 435 (1956). These cases make clear that Rule 54 (b) may properly be applied only to actions in which there has been a final decision on one or more but fewer than all the multiple claims raised. This condition is fully satisfied here, and the federal parties’ reliance on Liberty Mutual is thus misplaced. There the District Court had made a determination of liability but had finally disposed of none of the original plaintiff’s prayers for relief. Accordingly, Rule 54 (b) was not applicable. Here, one of the respondents’ claims for relief was actually decided against them. App. 558-559. All parties proceeded as though the November 30 order were final. Indeed, even the federal parties initially appealed from that judgment, although that appeal was later dismissed on the federal parties’ motion. Brief for Respondents Alaska Bulk Carriers, Inc., et al. 36, n. 26. See H. R. Doc. No. 118, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-3 (1935) (message from the President). In addition to these measures aimed at mating it possible for American vessels to compete in foreign trade, of course, the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. § 883, reserved the domestic trade for American vessels. See supra, at 574-575, and n. 1. H. R. Doc. No. 118, supra, at 3-19 (Report of the Postmaster General). Section 101, 49 Stat. 1985, as amended, provides in full as follows: “It is necessary for the national defense and development of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine (a) sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne commerce and a substantial portion of the water-borne export and import foreign commerce of the United States and to provide shipping service essential for maintaining the flow of such domestic and foreign water-borne commerce at all times, (b) capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, (c) owned and operated under the United States flag by citizens of the United States, insofar as may be practicable, (d) composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most suitable types of vessels, constructed in the United States and manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel, and (e) supplemented by efficient facilities for shipbuilding and ship repair. It is declared to be the policy of the United States to foster the development and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine.” 46 U. S. C. § 1101. The first section dealing with the CDS program, § 501, 46 U. S. C. § 1151, gives the Secretary considerable discretion to process, accept, and reject subsidy applications. Sections 502 and 504, 46 U. S. C. §§ 1152, 1154, authorize him to subsidize construction either by contracting directly with a shipyard for a vessel and then selling the completed ship to private parties at a cost corresponding to the cost of constructing a similar vessel abroad, or by contracting to pay only the appropriate CDS to the shipyard and letting the owner-operator remit the balance of the cost to the yard and take title directly. Those sections also set forth means of calculating foreign costs and subsidies, various limitations on such subsidies, terms of sale, and other requirements. Section 503, 46 U. S. C. § 1153, requires that subsidized vessels be documented under the laws of the United States and spells out various financial requirements. Section 505, 46 U. S. C. § 1155, requires that domestic shipyards and materials be used to construct subsidized vessels. And § 506, 46 U. S. C. § 1156, see n. 2, supra, contains the requirement that owners of subsidized vessels agree not to operate in domestic commerce except as specifically provided. H. R. Doc. No. 118, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 (1935) (Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Shipping Policy). See also H. R. Rep. No. 1277, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 (1935) (describing 1935 version of the Act and noting that the Government may in certain circumstances consent to the operation of a subsidized vessel in the domestic trade “in which case the amount of the subsidy shall be repaid to the United States proportionately. . .”). See n. 2, supra. See § 504 of the Act, 46 U. S. C. § 1154, and § 207, 46 U. S. C. § 1117. The former provision expressly authorizes the Secretary to make and amend CDS contracts. The discussion in the text demonstrates that regardless of subsidy repayment there is considerable reason to restrict the extent to which subsidized vessels may enter and exit the domestic market. The need for limits is heightened by the fact that proportionate subsidy repayment will generally fail to equalize the actual costs borne by owners of subsidized and unsubsidized vessels in domestic commerce. The problem is that the repayment formula in § 506 does not require the subsidized vessel to make any repayment to compensate for the interest it has not had to pay. To give a somewhat oversimplified example, compare two hypothetical vessels that operate for six months in domestic commerce, one unsubsidized and constructed with a $100 million, 10% loan, and the other subsidized and built with a $50 million CDS and a $50 million, 10% loan. During a given 6-month period the former vessel’s interest will be $5 million (% x 10% x $100 million). The latter will pay interest of $2.5 million (% x 10% x $50 million) and a CDS repayment of $1.25 million (6/240 (months’ useful life) x $50 million). In short, the subsidized vessel’s expenses will be $1.25 million less, and its competitive posture all the more formidable. On the importance of interest in the permanent-release/full-repayment situation, see infra, this page, and n. 31. The need for some payment reflecting avoided capital costs was highlighted by Judge Bazelon’s dissent to the opinion below. Alaska Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Kreps, 194 U. S. App. D. C. 7, 36, n. 15, 595 F. 2d 814, 843, n. 15 (1979). In their brief, the federal parties represent that, while the Secretary originally concluded that no payment for interest would be required, the agency now intends to seek a reasonable amount of interest. Brief for Federal Parties 54, n. 59. Failure to do so might raise serious questions of inconsistency with the entire thrust of the Act. As originally enacted, Section 506, 49 Stat. 1999, provided in its entirety as follows: “It shall be unlawful to operate any vessel, for the construction of which any subsidy has been paid pursuant to this title, other than exclusively in foreign trade, or on a round-the-world voyage or a round voyage from the west coast of the United States to a European port or ports or a round voyage from the Atlantic coast to the Orient which includes intercoastal ports of the United States, or on a voyage in foreign trade on which the vessel may stop at an island possession or island territory of the United States, unless the owner of such vessel shall receive the written consent of the Commission so to operate and prior to such operation shall agree to pay to the Commission, upon such terms and conditions as the Commission may prescribe, an amount which bears the same proportion to the construction subsidy theretofore paid or agreed to be paid (excluding cost of national-defense features as hereinbefore provided), as the remaining economic life of the vessel bears to its entire economic life. If an emergency arises which, in the opinion of the Commission, warrants the temporary transfer of a vessel, for the construction of which any subsidy has been paid pursuant to this title, to service other than exclusive operation in foreign trade, the Commission may permit such transfer: Provided, That no operating differential subsidy shall be paid during the duration of such temporary or emergency period, and such period shall not exceed three months. Every contractor receiving a contract for a construction-differential subsidy under the provisions of this title shall agree that if the subsidized vessel engages in domestic trade on a round-the-world voyage or a round voyage from the west coast of the United States to a European port or ports or loads or discharges cargo or passengers at an island possession or island territory as permitted by this section, that the contractor will repay annually to the Commission that proportion of one-twentieth of such construction subsidy as the gross revenue of such protected trade bears to the gross revenue derived from the entire voyages completed during the preceding year.” The Court of Appeals conceded that permanent domestic operation was permitted under this second exception, and respondents appear reluctantly to have followed suit. Further, as the Court of Appeals recognized, this reading is buttressed by the legislative history of the 1936 Act. See 194 U. S. App. D. C., at 19, n. 43, 595 F. 2d, at 826, n. 43 (citing legislative history). Moreover, the statute itself admits of no other interpretation. It provides for repayment of “an amount which bears the same proportion to the construction subsidy ... as the remaining economic life of the vessel bears to its entire economic life.” That amount necessarily would represent the entire portion of the subsidy allocable to the vessel’s remaining life — for a new vessel it would constitute the entire subsidy, for a vessel halfway through its life, half the subsidy, etc. It is hardly conceivable that Congress would have intended repayment of the entire unamortized subsidy in exchange for only a temporary release from the foreign-trade-only requirement. Thus, only permanent release could have been contemplated. Amending Merchant Marine Act, 1936: Hearings on H. R. 8532 before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 75th Cong., 2d and 3d Sess., 8 (1937-1938). See n. S3, supra. H. R. Rep. No. 2168, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 21 (1938). S. Rep. No. 1618, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 13 (1938). Similarly, the House Report stated that under the new version “the obligations of the owner to repay part of the subsidy are clearly defined.” H. R. Rep. No. 2168, supra, at 21. Petitioners argue that such language supports the contention that the ambiguity actually troubling to Congress was whether proportional subsidy repayment would be required for temporary or incidental use in domestic trade and had nothing to do with the permanent-release issue. Interestingly, one of the spokesmen for unsubsidized carriers who testified during the Senate hearings suggested that Congress should substitute for the amendments to § 506 then under discussion a new section “prohibiting subsidized vessels and vessels which have at any time been subsidized, from the intercoastal service.” Amending The Merchant Marine Act of 1936: Hearings on S. 3078 before the Senate Committee on Commerce and the Committee on Education and Labor, 75th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 44 (1937). The relevant precedents are listed in Affidavit of James S. Dawson, Jr., Secretary of Maritime Administration, App. 164-166. Comptroller General Decision B-155039, 44 Comp. Gen. 180 (1964). The Court of Appeals sought to distinguish the Grace Line precedent on grounds the subsidies there were not used in initial construction of the vessels, but rather to convert them from cargo to container. We fail to see the relevance of this distinction. App. 165. See 194 U. S. App. D. C., at 35, 595 F. 2d, at 842 (dissenting opinion of Judge Bazelon criticizing administrative rationale in the Grace Line case). H. R. 9756, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3 (1971). H. R. Rep. No. 92-688, p. 10 (1971).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LINES, INC., et al. v. LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD CO. et al. No. 797. Argued April 23-24, 1968. Decided June 17, 1968. Leonard S. Goodman and Harry C. Ames, Jr., argued the cause for appellants in all cases. With Mr. Goodman on the brief for appellant in No. 809 were Robert W. Ginnane and Fritz R. Kahn. With Mr. Ames on the brief for appellants in No. 797 were /. Raymond Clark, Robert E. Webb, and T. Randolph Buck. Peter T. Beardsley, Bryce Rea, Jr., Thomas M. Knebel, and Nuel D. Belnap filed briefs for appellants in No. 804. A. Alvis Layne and Robert L. Wright filed briefs for appellant in No. 808. Daniel M. Friedman argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Turner, and Howard E. Shapiro. Carl Helmetag, Jr., argued the cause for appel-lee railroads in all eases. With him on the brief were Stanfield Johnson, Elbert R. Leigh, James H. McGlothlin, James A. Bistline, Thormund A. Miller, William M. Moloney, Harry J. Breithaupt, Donal L. Turkal, Joseph E. Stopher, and R. Lee Blackwell. Together with No. 804, American Trucking Assns., Inc., et al. v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. et al., No. 808, American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. et al., and No. 809, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. et al., also on appeal from the same court. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The basic issue in these cases is whether the action of the Interstate Commerce Commission in disallowing a rate reduction proposed by the appellee railroads, 326 I. C. C. 77 (1965), was consistent with the provisions of § 15a (3) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 15a (3), added by 72 Stat. 572 (1958), which governs ratemaking in situations involving intermodal competition. A subsidiary but related issue is whether the Commission adequately articulated its reasons for disallowing the proposed rate. A statutory three-judge court, upon appeal of the Commission’s decision by the appellee railroads, held that the Commission’s decision was erroneous on both of the foregoing grounds. 268 F. Supp. 71 (D. C. W. D. Ky. 1967). Because of the importance of § 15a (3) as the primary guide to ICC resolution of rate controversies involving intermodal competition, we noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal taken by the Commission and the competing carriers from the decision of the District Court. 389 U. S. 1032 (1968). For the reasons detailed below, we conclude that the District Court erred in its rejection of the Commission’s decision, and the grounds on which it was based, and we reverse. I. Since 1953 the movement of ingot molds from Neville Island and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to Steelton, Kentucky, has been almost exclusively by combination barge-truck service, and since 1960 the overall charge for this service has been $5.11 per ton. In 1963 the Pennsylvania Railroad and the Louisville & Nashville Railroad lowered their joint rate for this same traffic from $11.86 to $5.11 per ton. The competing barge lines, joined by intervening trucking interests, protested to the ICC that the new railroad rate violated § 15a (3) of the Interstate Commerce Act because it impaired or destroyed the “inherent advantage” then enjoyed by the barge-truck service. The Commission thereupon undertook an investigation of the rate reduction. In the course of the administrative proceedings that followed, the ICC made the following factual findings about which there is no real dispute among the parties. The fully distributed cost to the railroads of this service was $7.59 per ton, and the “long term out-of-pocket costs” were $4.69 per ton. The fully distributed cost to the barge-truck service was $5.19 per ton. The out-of-pocket cost of the barge-truck service was not separately computed, but was estimated, without contradiction, to be approximately the same as the fully distributed cost and higher, in any event, than the out-of-pocket cost of the railroads. The uncontroverted shipper testimony was to the effect that price was virtually the sole determinant of which service would be utilized, but that, were the rates charged by the railroads and the barge-truck combination the same, all the traffic would go to the railroads. The railroads contended that they should be permitted to maintain the $5.11 rate, once it was shown to exceed the out-of-pocket cost attributable to the service, on the ground that any rate so set would enable them to make a profit on the traffic. The railroads further contended that the fact that the rate was substantially below their fully distributed cost for the service was irrelevant, since that cost in no way reflected the profitability of the traffic to them. The barge-truck interests, on the other hand, took the position that § 15a (3) required the Commission to look to the railroads' fully distributed costs in order to ascertain which of the competing modes had the inherent cost advantage on the traffic at issue. They argued that the fact that the railroads’ rate would be profitable was merely the minimum requirement under the statute. The railroads in response contended that inherent advantage should be determined by a comparison of out-of-pocket rather than fully distributed costs, and they produced several economists to testify that, from the standpoint of economic theory, the comparison of out-of-pocket, or incremental, costs was the only rational way of regulating competitive rates. The ICC rejected the railroads’ contention that out-of-pocket costs should be the basis on which inherent advantage should be determined. The Commission observed that it had in the past regularly viewed fully distributed costs as the appropriate basis for determining which of two competing modes was the lower cost mode as regards particular traffic. It further indicated that the legislative history of § 15a (3) revealed that Congress had in mind a comparison of fully distributed costs when it inserted the reference to the National Transportation Policy into that section in place of language sought by the railroads. The Commission also emphasized that there was a rulemaking proceeding pending before it in which the whole question of the proper standard of costing in situations involving intermodal competition was being examined in depth, and stated that “a radical departure from the fully distributed cost norm” would not be justified on the basis of the record before it in this case. Having decided to utilize a comparison between fully distributed costs to determine inherent advantage, the Commission then concluded that the rate set by the railroads would undercut the barge-truck combination’s ability to exploit its inherent advantage because the rate would force the competing carriers to go well below their own fully distributed costs to recapture the traffic from the railroads. Moreover, since the result sought by the railroads was general permission to set rates on an out-of-pocket basis, the Commission concluded that eventually the railroads could take all the traffic away from the barge-truck combination because the out-of-pocket costs of the former were lower than those of the latter and, therefore, in any rate war the railroads would be able to outlast their competitors. Accordingly, the Commission ordered that the railroads’ rate be canceled. The District Court read the statute and its accompanying legislative history to reflect a congressional judgment that inherent advantage should be determined in most cases by a comparison of out-of-pocket costs and that, therefore, railroads should generally be permitted to set any individual rate they choose as long as that rate is compensatory. The court also held that the Commission had failed adequately to articulate its reasons for deciding that the proper way of determining which mode of transportation was the more efficient was by comparison of fully distributed costs rather than out-of-pocket costs. Although this latter holding appears first in its opinion, it is evident that it must logically follow its ruling on the meaning of § 15a (3), since if Congress in enacting that section had already decided that inherent advantage should be determined by reference to fully distributed costs, there would be no special burden on the Commission to justify its use of them. h-l This Court has previously had occasion to consider the meaning and legislative history of § 15a (3) of the Interstate Commerce Act in ICC v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 372 U. S. 744 (1963) (“New Haven”), and both the ICC and the District Court have relied heavily on that decision as support for the conflicting results reached by them in these cases. Because the statute and its relevant legislative history were so thoroughly canvassed there, we shall not undertake any extended discussion of the same material here. Instead, we shall refer to that opinion for most of the relevant history. So far as relevant here, § 15a (3) provides that: “[r]ates of a carrier shall not be held up to a particular level to protect the traffic of any other mode of transportation, giving due consideration to the objectives of the national transportation policy declared in this Act.” The National Transportation Policy, 49 U. S. C. preceding § 1, states that it is the intention of the Congress: “to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each . . . .” The enactment of § 15a (3) in 1958 was due primarily to complaints by the railroads that the ICC had maintained rates at artificially high levels in order to protect competing modes from being driven out of business by railroad competition. The bill that eventuated in the language that is presently § 15a (3) originally provided that the ICC, in considering rate reductions, should, in a proceeding involving competition with another mode of transportation, “consider the facts and circumstances attending the movement of the traffic by railroad and not by such other mode.” (Emphasis added.) 372 U. S., at 754. This language was objected to strongly by both the ICC and representatives of those carriers with which the railroads were in competition. See Hearings on S. 3778 before the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). The basic ground of objection was that by looking only to the effect of a rate reduction on the carrier proposing it, the ICC would be unable to protect the “inherent advantages” enjoyed by competing carriers on the traffic to which a rate reduction was to be applied. Unfortunately, the meaning of the term “inherent advantage,” which is what the Commission is supposed to protect, is nowhere spelled out in the statute. The railroads argue, and the District Court held, that Congress intended by the term to refer to situations in which one carrier could transport goods at a lower incremental cost than another. The fallacy of this argument is that it renders the term “inherent advantage” essentially meaningless in the context of the language and history of § 15a (3). Since the pricing of railroad services below out-of-pocket or incremental cost would result in a net revenue loss to the railroad on the carriage, the ICC could prohibit such practices without reference to the costs of any other competing carrier. And this is precisely what the language of the bill as originally endorsed by the railroads would have provided by its use of the phrase “and not by such other mode.” See supra, at 580. This language was, however, rejected by the Congress and the alternative formulation proposed by the ICC, see Hearings, supra, at 169, was substituted for it. As this Court said in the New Haven case: “The principal reason for this reference [to the National Transportation Policy] . . . was to emphasize the power of the Commission to prevent the railroads from destroying or impairing the inherent advantages of other modes. And the precise example given to the Senate Committee, which led to the language adopted, was a case in which the railroads, by establishing on a part of their operations a compensatory rate below their fully distributed cost, forced a smaller competing lower cost mode to go below its own fully distributed cost and thus perhaps to go out of business.” 372 U. S., at 758. Since these cases are identical to the example just described, it would seem that, at the very least, the result reached by the Commission here is presumptively in accord with the language of the statute and with the intent of Congress in utilizing that language. The District Court, however, ignored the above portion of the New Haven opinion and seized on certain other language therein to the effect that: “It may be, for example, that neither a comparison of ‘out-of-pocket’ nor a comparison of ‘fully distributed’ costs, as those terms are defined by the Commission, is the appropriate method of deciding which of two competing modes has the cost advantage on a given movement.” 372 U. S., at 760. It coupled this language with its interpretation of § 15a (3) as having the purpose to promote “hard competition,” and concluded that the Commission had the burden of justifying any departure from using out-of-pocket cost as the means of determining inherent cost advantage. We think that the District Court erred in its reading both of the prior New Haven decision and of the extent to which Congress intended to foster intermodal competition. We note first that nothing in the language of the New Haven opinion indicates a preference for either out-of-pocket or fully distributed costs as a measure of inherent advantage; rather, all that is said is that the appropriate measure “may be” neither. Given the fact that the insertion of the reference to inherent advantage into § 15a (3) came about at the insistence of carriers that were demanding that fully distributed costs be the sole measure of that advantage, we think that the clear import of the foregoing statement in the New Haven opinion was that the Commission could, after due consideration, decide that some other measure of comparative costs might be more satisfactory in situations involving intermodal competition than the one it had traditionally utilized. That is a far cry from saying that it must. The District Court apparently believed that the Commission was required to exercise its judgment in the direction of using out-of-pocket costs as the rate floor because that would encourage “hard” competition. We do not deny that the competition that would result from such a decision would probably be “hard.” Indeed, from the admittedly scanty evidence in this record, one might well conclude that the competition resulting from out-of-pocket ratemaking by the railroads would be so hard as to run a considerable number of presently existing barge and truck lines out of business. We disagree, however, with the District Court’s reading of congressional intent. The language contained in § 15a (3) was the product of a bitter struggle between the railroads and their competitors. One of the specific fears of those competitors that prompted the change from the original language used in the bill was that the bill as it then read would permit essentially unregulated competition between all the various transportation modes. It was argued with considerable force that permitting the railroads to price on an out-of-pocket basis to meet competition would result in the eventual complete triumph of the railroads in inter-modal competition because of their ability to impose all their constant costs on traffic for which there was no competition. The economists who testified for the railroads in this case all stated that such an unequal allocation of constant costs among shippers on the basis of demand for railroad service, i. e., on the existence of competition for particular traffic, was economically sound and desirable. Apart from the merits of this contention as a matter of economic theory, it is quite clear that it was a contention that was not by any means wholly accepted by the Congress that enacted § 15a (3). One of the specific examples given of an undesirable practice, and accepted by the members of the Commerce Committee that drafted the statute as such, was a case in which certain railroads had engaged in day-to-day differential pricing on the carriage of citrus fruit from Florida depending on whether competitive carriage was available by ship that day. See Hearings, supra, at 153-155. Similar complaints were made about seasonal variations in rates by railroads depending on whether winter conditions interfered with the carriage of freight by water. Id., at 162-163. Yet, from an economic standpoint, such rate variations make perfect competitive sense insofar as maximization of railroad revenues is concerned. The simple fact is that § 15a (3) was not enacted, as the railroads claim, to enable them to price their services in such a way as to obtain the maximum revenue therefrom. The very words of the statute speak of “preserving]” the inherent advantages of each mode of transportation. If all that was meant by the statute was to prevent wholly noncompensatory pricing by regulated carriers, language that was a good deal clearer could easily have been used. And, as we have shown above, at least one version of such clear language was proposed by the railroads and rejected by the Congress. If the theories advanced by the economists who testified in this case are as compelling as they seem to feel they are, Congress is the body to whom they should be addressed. The courts are ill-qualified indeed to make the kind of basic judgments about economic policy sought by the railroads here. And it would be particularly inappropriate for a court to award a carrier, on economic grounds, relief denied it by the legislature. Yet this is precisely what the District Court has done in this case. We do not mean to suggest by the foregoing discussion that the Commission is similarly barred from making legislative judgments about matters of economic policy. It is precisely to permit such judgments that the task of regulating transportation rates has been entrusted to a specialized administrative agency rather than to courts of general jurisdiction. Of course, the Commission must operate within the limits set out by Congress in enacting the legislation it administers. But nothing we say here should be taken as expressing any view as to the extent that § 15a (3) constitutes a categorical command to the ICC to use fully distributed costs as the only measure of inherent advantage in intermodal rate controversies. As was stated in the New Haven case, it “may be” that after due consideration another method of costing will prove to be preferable in such situations as the present one. All we hold here is that the initial determination of that question is for the Commission. It is in this connection that the timing of this case takes on particular significance. We have already observed that the ICC has presently pending before it a broad-scale examination of the whole question of the cost standards to be used where comparisons of inter-modal cost advantages are required. Rather than await the result of that rulemaking proceeding, the railroad appellees here determined to attempt to raise precisely the same issues in a much more circumscribed proceeding by unilaterally reducing their rates on one item of traffic. The District Court totally ignored the temporary nature of the ICC’s action in this case and the pendency of the rulemaking proceeding. Instead, it went ahead and, in the guise of resolving this particular controversy over a single rate reduction, rendered a decision which, for all practical purposes, made the rulemaking proceeding moot. While there might be some justification for such a course when the applicable statute clearly requires the agency to arrive at a given result, this case is emphatically not such a situation. As this Court stated in New Haven, “ [t] hese and other similar questions should be left for initial resolution to the Commission’s informed judgment.” 372 U. S., at 761. The Commission stated here that it intended to exercise its informed judgment by considering the issues presented here in the context of a rulemaking proceeding where it could evaluate the alternatives on the basis of a consideration of the effects of a departure from a fully distributed cost standard on the transportation industry as a whole. Until that evaluation was completed, the Commission took the position that it would continue to follow the practice it had observed in the past of dealing with individual rate reductions on a fully distributed cost basis. The District Court, in effect, refused to permit the Commission to deal with the complex problems of developing a general standard of costing to use in determining inherent advantage in situations involving intermodal competition in the broad context of a rule-making proceeding. Instead, it ordered the Commission to resolve those problems in the narrow context of this individual rate reduction proceeding. We have already observed that the District Court erred in interpreting the New Haven decision to require the Commission to permit out-of-pocket pricing in most instances. Given the fact that New Haven indicated that the Commission was to exercise its informed judgment in ultimately determining what method of costing was preferable, it is clear that the District Court also erred in refusing to permit the Commission to exercise that judgment in a proceeding it reasonably believed would provide the most adequate record for the resolution of the problems involved. We can see no justification for denying the Commission reasonable latitude to decide where it will resolve these complex issues, in addition to how it will resolve them. The action by the District Court here not only deprives the Commission of the opportunity to make the initial resolution of the issues but also prevents it from doing so in a more suitable context. This Court has just recently held that the Federal Power Commission had the authority to fix rates on an area-wide basis rather than on an individual producer basis and that, in order to make such a procedure feasible, it had statutory authority to impose a moratorium upon rate increases by producers for a period of 2% years after the setting of the area rate. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747 (1968). The basis for this holding was the principle that the “legislative discretion implied in the rate making power necessarily extends to the entire legislative process, embracing the method used in reaching the legislative determination as well as that determination itself.” Id., at 776. That principle is equally applicable to rate regulation carried out by the ICC, especially where, as here, the determination made on an interim basis is in general accord with both the legislative history of the statute involved and the results in prior cases decided by the agency. Accordingly, we hold that the Commission had ample authority to decline to deal with the broad contentions advanced by the railroads in this individual rate case and that the District Court erred in failing to recognize that authority. The District Court also objected to the failure of the Commission to explain why it permitted out-of-pocket ratemaking where the competing carrier was unregulated and not where the competitor was regulated. The short answer to this is that § 15a (3) by its own terms applies only to “modes of transportation subject to this Act,” which by definition means regulated carriers. As a result any arbitrariness that may flow from the distinction recognized by the Commission between regulated and unregulated carriers in situations of intermodal competition is the creation of Congress, not of the Commission. The District Court also appears to have held that the Commission did not adequately explain how the rate set by the railroads would impair or destroy the barge-truck inherent advantage. Yet the Commission pointed out that the principle proposed by the railroads would, if recognized, permit the railroads to capture all the traffic here that is presently carried by the barge-truck combination because the railroads’ out-of-pocket costs were lower than those of the combined barge-truck service. The District Court seems to have been impressed by the fact that the railroads were merely meeting the barge-truck rate, despite the uncontroverted evidence that given equal rates all traffic would move by train. Given a service advantage, it seems somewhat unrealistic to suggest that rate parity does not result in undercutting the competitor that does not possess the service advantage. In any event, regardless of the label used, it seems self-evident that a carrier’s “inherent advantage” of being the low cost mode on a fully distributed cost basis is impaired when a competitor sets a rate that forces the carrier to lower its own rate below its fully distributed costs in order to retain the traffic. In addition, when a rate war would be likely to eventually result in pushing rates to a level at which the rates set would no longer provide a fair profit, the Commission has traditionally, and properly, taken the position that such a rate struggle should be prevented from commencing in the first place. Certainly there is no suggestion here that the rate charged by the barge-truck combination was excessive and in need of being driven down by competitive pressure. We conclude, therefore, that the Commission adequately articulated its reasons for determining that the railroads' rate would impair the inherent advantage enjoyed by the barge-truck service. The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cases are remanded to that court with directions to enter a judgment affirming the Commission’s order. It is so ordered. The United States, a statutory defendant in the District Court, supported the railroads’ position there and has participated in support of them in the proceedings before this Court. The -term “inherent advantage” comes from the National Transportation Policy, 49 U. S. C. preceding § 1, and is incorporated by reference into § 15a (3) of the Interstate Commerce Act. The meaning of the term is the central issue in these cases and will be discussed in considerable detail, infra, at 579-594. Fully distributed costs are defined broadly by the ICC as the “out-of-pocket costs plus a revenue-ton and revenue ton-mile distribution of the constant costs, including deficits, [that] indicate the revenue necessary to a fair return on the traffic, disregarding ability to pay.” New Automobiles in Interstate Commerce, 259 I. C. C. 475, 513 (1945). The long-term out-of-pocket costs were computed under an ICC-sponsored formula which generally holds that 80% of rail operating expenses, rents and taxes are out-of-pocket in that they will vary with traffic. To this is added a return element of 4% on a portion of the investment (all the equipment and 50% of the road property), which is apportioned to all traffic on a proportional basis. Compare n. 3, supra. This figure is not precisely a cost figure. Rather it is the barge fully distributed cost, plus the charge made for the truck portion of the service and the charge for barge-truck transfer. Since all parties seem willing to treat the figure as one of fully distributed cost for the barge-truck combination, no further mention will be made of its disparate elements. Because the barge-truck rate of $5.11 was below the fully distributed cost of the service, Division 2 of the ICC initially concluded that the barge-truck combination had forfeited its right to claim that its inherent advantage of lower fully distributed cost was being impaired by the railroads’ setting of a matching rate. On reconsideration, the full Commission reversed this ruling by Division 2, observing that there was no evidence that the failure of the barge-truck rate to equal fully distributed cost was due to anything but the barge lines’ ignorance of the precise amount of their fully distributed cost for this service. This determination is not challenged here by any party and we express no opinion on it. Out-of-pocket costs have been regarded generally in these cases as equivalent to what economists refer to as “incremental” or “marginal” costs. Accordingly we shall equate the terms likewise, although we have no intention of vouching for the accuracy of that equation as a matter of pure economics. Cf. n. 4, supra. Such costs are defined generally as the costs specifically incurred by the addition of each new unit of output and do not include any allocation to that unit of pre-existing overhead expenses. A rate is compensatory in the sense used by the District Court any time it is greater than the out-of-pocket cost of the service for which the rate is set. The term fully compensatory is sometimes used to describe a rate in excess of fully distributed costs. An illustration of such a case is the decision of the ICC that was reversed in the New Haven case. There the ICC had refused to permit the railroads to set a rate which was not only above their out-of-pocket cost for the service but was also above their fully distributed cost for approximately half of the movements involved. The Commission did not rely on a determination of which of the competing carriers had the inherent advantage as to costs, but instead decided broadly that the rate would eventually destroy the coastwise shipping industry and therefore should be prohibited. This Court held that, in general, the ICC was required to determine which of the competing carriers possessed the inherent advantage before a rate could be ordered cancelled in order to protect a carrier’s present rate. While the Court indicated that the Nation’s defense needs might permit protection of even a higher cost carrier in some cases, it held that the ICC had not adequately shown New Haven to be such a case. The appellees also contend, and the District Court held, that the statements in the legislative history of § 15a (3) that Congress intended to compel the Commission to return to the approach to competitive rate regulation it had utilized in the case of New Automobiles in Interstate Commerce, 259 I. C. C. 475 (1945), indicate that out-of-pocket ratemaking was intended to be the rule in such cases. However, the passage quoted from New Automobiles simply states that the rates of one mode of transportation should not be held up merely to protect competing modes. It says nothing at all about inherent advantages. The railroads argue that the basic thrust of the New Automobiles case was to compare costs on an out-of-pocket basis. And it is true that many of the comparisons there made were on that basis. However, an examination of what the Commission actually said and did in New Automobiles compels the conclusion that no flat rule of comparison of out-of-pocket costs was there laid down. For example, the Commission concluded that on the basis of a comparison with the railroads' out-of-pocket costs for shipping automobiles, the truckers were the lower cost mode only up to 120 miles. On a fully distributed cost comparison the truckers were the lower cost mode up to 230 miles. 259 I. C. C., at 528. After discussing at some length the concept of reasonable minimum rates, the Commission ultimately concluded that generally the truckers had the cost advantage at distances up to 200 miles and that the railroads should be permitted to set rates that would permit them to compete for the longer-haul trafflc. 259 I. C. C., at 539. Given the fact that the Commission was dealing with an attempt by the truckers to get it to hold up railroad rates for distances even greater than 600 miles, it is not surprising that the issue of measuring inherent advantage as between fully distributed and out-of-pocket costs did not receive detailed consideration, since by either method the truckers were the low cost mode only up to a little more than 200 miles. Thus it cannot fairly be said that New Automobiles represents a considered choice between the two methods of cost comparison. Rather what it stands for is the principle emphasized in the New Haven case that the rates of one mode should not be held up to protect the revenues of a competitor without regard to which is the low cost carrier. In any event, what matters so far as § 15a (3) is concerned is not what the Commission meant in New Automobiles but what Congress thought it meant in 1958 when the section was enacted. As we have shown in the text of the opinion above, Congress considered New Automobiles to stand for the principle that the rate structure of a competing mode should not be protected by the Commission simply to prevent it from losing business through competition. The District Court also relied on the rejection of a similar proposal by truck and barge interests that fully distributed costs be the floor for reasonable minimum rates in the course of the enactment of the National Transportation Policy in 1940. It seems clear, however, that one of the major reasons for the rejection of the so-called Miller-Wadsworth amendment by Congress was the possibility that its enactment would prevent low-value industrial and agricultural commodities from being carried at a rate low enough to make it economically feasible to ship them in interstate commerce. See generally Nelson, Rate-Making In Transportation — Congressional Intent, 1960 Duke L. J. 221, 228-238. While it is true that, for varying and sometimes unexplained reasons, the Commission has not invariably used fully distributed costs as the basis for cost comparisons in situations involving inter-modal competition, see 268 F. Supp., at 78, it is also true that it has generally declared fully distributed cost comparisons to be preferable. Thus in the hearings on the bill that was to become §15a(3), Commissioner Freas stated: “Whenever conditions permit, given transportation should return the full cost of performing carrier service. ... In many instances, however, the full cost of the low-cost form of transportation exceeds the out-of-pocket cost of another. If, then, we are required to accept the rates of the high cost carrier merely because they exceed its out-of-pocket costs, we see no way of preserving the inherent advantages of the low cost carrier.” Quoted at 372 U. S., at 755. The District Court ascertained the legislative purpose to promote “hard competition” from the following passage from the New Haven opinion: “Section 15a (3), in other words, made it clear that something more than even hard competition must be shown before a particular rate can be deemed unfair or destructive. The principal purpose of the reference to the National Transportation Policy, as we have seen, was to prevent a carrier from setting a rate which would impair or destroy the inherent advantages of a competing carrier, for example, by setting a rate, below its own fully distributed costs, which would force a competitor with a cost advantage on particular transportation to establish an unprofitable rate in order to attract traffic.” 372 U. S., at 759. Since the sentence following the term “hard competition” described an example of the competition prohibited by the National Transportation Policy that is identical to the facts of the present case, the District Court’s use of the term to reverse the ICC’s decision here seems somewhat peculiar. Constant costs are, broadly speaking, those items of expense which are incurred by a business regardless of the scale of its operations. They are essentially the equivalent to what is commonly called overhead expenses. For railroads constant costs include such items as real estate taxes, certain rents, much right-of-way maintenance expense and similar expenses. Unequal allocation of constant costs as an element of the rate charged also occurs commonly where a bulky commodity is so low valued on a per ton basis that setting a rate by reference to the fully distributed cost of carrying the commodity would make it uneconomic to ship it. See n. 11, supra. This Court is not particularly suited to pass on the merits of the economic arguments made by the railroads’ expert witnesses in these cases. Moreover, their soundness is not especially relevant to the result we reach in the present posture of this controversy. However, because the economic testimony is emphasized so heavily by both the railroads and the United States in their arguments to us, we shall venture a few observations on it. Most of the economic testimony is directed towards proving that the utilization of out-of-pocket costs in setting rates permits the railroads to maximize their profits. To the extent that out-of-pocket costs are accurately computed, that proposition appears uncontro-vertible. The economists then go on to argue, in effect, that what is good for the railroads is good for the country. This argument is developed as follows. Whenever a railroad lowers its rate, the shipper to whom that rate is available benefits. As long as the rate is above the out-of-pocket cost of the service, the railroad benefits by obtaining the profits from traffic it formerly did not carry. The fact that a competing carrier may lose the revenue it previously earned by carrying the traffic is immaterial because the railroad’s ability to make a profit by charging the lower rate shows that it is, in some sense, more efficient than its competitor. In order to evaluate the foregoing argument certain other aspects of a railroad’s operation must be kept in mind. The reason why a railroad’s fully distributed costs are substantially greater than its out-of-pocket costs on any given traffic is, inter alia, because certain constant costs, see n. 14, supra, are allocated to that traffic on a proportional basis despite the fact that those costs will be incurred by the railroad whether it carries the particular traffic or not. These constant costs must be earned if the railroad is to stay in business. They are allocated proportionally on the theory that, all other factors being equal, such an allocation will be the best way of assuring that each shipper contributes his fair share towards covering the constant costs. Obviously to the extent that any shipper pays more of the constant costs than another without any good reason for so doing that shipper is, in some sense, discriminated against. The railroad economists point out that, because constant costs by definition are not attributable to the carriage of any particular traffic, it is to some extent arbitrary to allocate them to particular traffic. They further contend that all shippers presently utilizing a railroad’s services are benefited when the railroad obtains additional traffic at a profit to it, because that profit can be used to pay a portion of the constant costs currently being charged wholly to them. The fact that charging a rate less than its fully distributed cost of carrying the traffic results in the shipper of that freight paying a disproportionally low share of the railroad’s constant costs is considered to be outweighed by the overall benefit to the other shippers of having the absolute amount borne by them of the constant costs decreased by the profit earned on the traffic. It seems apparent, however, that in a case where the sole reason that a rate below fully distributed cost is necessary to attract such additional traffic is the competition of another mode of transportation, the continued existence of that competition is also the sole economic justification for maintaining the rate at a relative level that favors one shipper over others. If the competing carrier is driven out of business because of its inability to match the railroad’s lower rates set on an out-of-pocket basis, the economic justification for permitting the continuation of those low rates would seem to disappear. Yet the railroad economists assert that in such a situation the railroad should be required by the ICC to maintain the rate at its original level. The obvious reason for this position is that permitting a railroad to raise its rates once it had effectively destroyed a competitor in one area would enable it to price on an out-of-pocket basis in competition with another carrier in a different area thereafter and, in turn, drive that carrier out of business. Eventually a railroad could eliminate all its competitors whose out-of-pocket costs were higher than its own. After this was accomplished the railroad could re-price all its services on a fully distributed cost basis thereby eliminating all discrimination between its shipper customers. Of course, the shippers formerly served by competing modes at rates profitable to them but lower than the railroad’s fully distributed costs would at that point have lost the advantage of the low cost service. The only way to perpetuate the advantage previously enjoyed by those shippers would be, as the railroad economists recognized, artificially to maintain their rates at the former level despite the absence of present economic justification for such a low rate. (It is true that were the barriers to re-entry into the transportation market low, as asserted by the railroad economists, the potential competition created by the possibility of such re-entry by a competing mode could furnish an economic justification for the continuance of the original low rate. However, there is no factual evidence in this record from which it can be concluded that barriers to re-entry are low enough to create such potential competition.) If the only justification for the maintenance of a disproportionally low rate to some shippers is the fact that competition existed once upon a time for their business, would it be irrational to conclude that it would be preferable to keep the original competition in business to serve those shippers and to require the railroad to look elsewhere for additional revenue? Would it, for example, be possible for railroads to increase their revenues instead by increasing, through selective rate decreases, the volume of traffic shipped by persons who presently pay amounts in-excess of the fully distributed cost for the service afforded them? These are only a few of the questions that come to mind when we attempt to evaluate the economic arguments made in this ease. We do not pretend to be able to answer them. We merely note their existence as evidence that we do not find the arguments made to the ICC here as compelling as did the District Court. Our discussion here should not be interpreted as a rejection of the basic economic points made by the railroads. It is merely intended to illustrate the desirability of having the initial resolution of these issues made by a tribunal, and in a proceeding, more suitable than the present one. It is, of course, true that such discriminations need have no necessary relationship to a railroad’s cost of service, whether that is computed on a fully distributed or out-of-pocket basis. On the other hand, it is also evident that what is basically at issue is a carrier’s right to price discriminatorily, either between shipments or shippers, in order to maximize revenues by competition. By contrast it can be noted that the railroads have apparently retained their prior rate of $11.86 per ton on ingot molds in areas where they have no competition from barge-truck service. The discrimination thus created is not too dissimilar from that embodied in the above examples.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CARSON, COMMISSIONER OF FINANCE & TAXATION, v. ROANE-ANDERSON COMPANY et al. NO. 186. Argued December 5, 1951. Decided January 7, 1952. Allison B. Humphreys, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Roy H. Beeler, Attorney General, and William F. Barry, Solicitor General. Oscar H..Davis argued the cause for the United States, respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Slack and Berryman Green. S. Frank Fowler submitted on brief' for respondents. Smith Troy, 'Attorney General, and C. John Newlands, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of Washington, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The Retailers’ Sales Tax Act of Tennessee, Tenn. Acts 1947, c. 3, imposes a sales tax on the sale of goods in Tennessee and a use tax on the use within the state of goods purchased elsewhere. Tennessee collected these taxes' from respondents who paid them under protest and then brought these suits to recover them and to enjoin future collections. Two of the respondents are private companies who are contractors for the Atomic Energy Commission and who paid use taxes; two are merchants who paid sales taxes on sales to those contractors and who passed the taxes on to them. The use taxes and the sales taxes were on articles used by the contractors in the performance of their contracts with the Commission. The Tennessee Supreme Court held by a divided vote (192 Tenn. 150, 239 S. W. 2d 27) that the challenged taxes, though not forbidden by the Constitution, were prohibited by § 9 (b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 765, 42 U. S. C. § 1809 (b). The cases are here on certiorari. 342 U. S. 847. Sec. 9 (b) provides in part that “The Commission, and the property, activities, and income of the Commission, are. hereby expressly exempted from taxation in any manner or form by any State, county, municipality, or . any subdivision thereof.” The constitutional power .of Congress to protect any of its agencies from state taxation (Pittman v. Home Owners’ Corporation, 308 U. S. 21; Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Co., 314 U. S. 95) has long been recognized as applying to those with whom it has made authorized contracts. See Thomson v. Pacific R. Co., 9 Wall. 579, 588-589; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 160-161. Certainly the policy behind the power of Congress to create tax immunities does not turn on the nature of the agency doing the work of the Government. The power stems from the power to preserve and protect functions validly authorized (Pittman v. Home Owners’ Corp., supra, p. 33) — the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested in the Congress. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Hence if the present contracts which the respondent contractors have with the United States, and the performance thereunder, are “activities” within the meaning of § 9 (b) of’ the Act, the immunity is clear. Our view is that they are and that the judgments below must be affirmed. Respondent Roane-Anderson manages the government-owned town of Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Carbide and Carbon Chemicals operates the Oak Ridge plants for the production of fissionable materials. Their contracts antedate the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, having been originally entered into with the Manhattan District of the Corps of Engineers. Pursuant to § 9 (a) .of the Act these contracts were transferred by Executive Order to the Commission. The question whether the Commission should be empowered to employ private contractors in performance of its functions or whether the Commission should itself be the entrepreneur was an issue of national policy much discussed and debated at the time the legislation was before "the Congress. One measure, which had the backing of the War Department, would have authorized the Commission to lean heavily on private enterprise for performance of its functions. Another measure, originating in the Senate and after extensive revisions becoming the Atomic Energy Act pi 1946, contained no provision authorizing the use of contractors to the extent here involved, required the Commission to produce its own fissionable materials in its own plants by its own employees, and directed the Commission to terminate contracts previously made for the production of fissionable materials. But that bill was materially altered so as to adopt as the national policy the use of “management contracts for the operation of Government-owned plants so as to gain the full advantage of the skill and experience of American industry:” Accordingly § 4 (c) (2) of the Act authorizes the Commission “to make, or to continue in effect, contracts with persons obligating them to produce fissionable material in facilities owned by the Commission.” And § 9 (a) authorizes the transfer to the Commission of all contracts concerning the production of fissionable material. The use of private contractors is therefore one of the ways .in which the Commission is authorized to man-, age its affairs. Its activities may, in other words, be performed by it directly or through the agencies of private enterprise. Congress uses the word “activities” in various sections of the Act, and seems each time to give it a broad sweep. The Congressional or Joint Committee constituted under § 15 is directed to study “the activities” of the Commission. The reports which the Commission is directed to submit to Congress pursuant to § 17 concern its “activities.” Section 9 (b) authorizes the Commission to make payments to state and local governments in lieu of property taxes in those areas “in which the activities of the Commission are carried on and in which the Commission has acquired property” previously subject to local taxation. In none of these sections do we find any suggestion that “activities” is used in a narrow sense to describe less than all of the functions of the Commission. The ■ meaning of “activities” as applied either to an individual or to a government agency may be broad enough to include what is done through independent contractors as well as through agents. Certainly where the pattern of conduct visualized by the Act is the use of independent contractors or agents from the field of private enterprise, the inference is strong that “activities” means all authorized methods of performing the governmental function. We find no contrary evidence from the legislative history. In view of this conclusion we find it unnecessary to reach the problems of implied constitutional immunity involved in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., supra, and Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Black took no part in'the consideration or. decision of this case. Executive Order No, 9816, Dec. 31, 1946, 12 Fed. Reg. 37. See H. R. Rep. No. 1186, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. See S. 1717 reprinted in Hearings before the Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1-9. S. Rep. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 15.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

OHIO BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES et al. v. HODORY No. 75-1707. Argued February 28, 1977 Decided May 31, 1977 Richard A. Szilagyi, Assistant Attorney General of Ohio, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was William J. Brown, Attorney General. T. Patrick Lordeon argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Robert M. Clyde, Jr., and Fred A. Culver Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Gerard C. Smetana, Jerry Kronenberg, Julian D. Schreiber, Lawrence B. Kraus, and Richard O’Brecht for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; and by Frank C. Manak for the United States Steel Corp. J. Albert Woll and Laurence Gold filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Walter J. Mackey filed a brief for the Republic Steel Corp. as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents a challenge to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.29 (D) (1) (a) (1973). That statute, at the times relevant to this suit, imposed a disqualification for unemployment benefits when the claimant’s unemployment was “due to a labor dispute other than a lockout at any factory . . . owned or operated by the employer by which he is or was last employed.” The challenge is based on the Supremacy Clause and on the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case also raises questions concerning abstention. I In November 1974 plaintiff-appellee, Leonard Paul Hodory, was employed as a millwright apprentice with United States Steel Corporation (USS) at its works in Youngstown, Ohio. The United Mine Workers at that time were out on strike at coal mines owned by USS and by Republic Steel Corporation throughout the country. These company-owned mines supplied the fuel used in the operation of manufacturing facilities of USS and Republic. As a result of the strike, the fuel supply at the Youngstown plant was reduced. The plant eventually was shut down, and appellee was furloughed on November 12, 1974. Hodory applied to appellant Ohio Bureau of Employment Services for unemployment benefits. On January 3, 1975, he was notified by the Bureau that his claim was disallowed under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.29 (D) (1) (a) (1973). That statute then provided that a worker may not receive unemployment benefits if “[h]is unemployment was due to a labor dispute other than a lockout at any factory, establishment, or other premises located in this or any other state and owned or operated by the employer by which he is or was last employed; and for so long as his unemployment is due to such labor dispute.” The written notification to appellee recited: “A labor dispute started at coal mines owned and operated by U. S. Steel Corporation and claimant is unemployed because of this labor dispute.” App. i. Other notifications to Hodory for subsequent unemployment weeks contained similar recitals. Id., at ii and iii. Appellee promptly filed a request for reconsideration. In accord with the provisions of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.28 (G) (1973), his request, along with a number of others, was referred on March 7 to the Board of Review. Meanwhile, on January 27, Hodory filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against the Bureau and its director, Albert G. Giles. The complaint was based on 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and sought declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of appellee and “all others similarly situated” who had been or in the future would be denied benefits under § 4141.29 (D) (1) (a). Record, Doc. 3, pp. 1 and 3. Hodory asserted, among other things, that the Ohio statute was in conflict with §§ 303 (a)(1) and (3) of the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 503 (a)(1) and (3), and that the statute as applied was irrational and had no valid public purpose, in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The gravamen of Hodory’s complaint was the assertion that the State may not deny benefits to those who, like him, are unemployed under circumstances where the unemployment is “not the fault of the employee.” A three-judge court was requested. Appellants in their answer asserted, among other things, that Hodory had failed to exhaust his state administrative remedies. A three-judge court was convened. The case was tried on the pleadings and interrogatories. In its opinion filed March 5, 1976, 408 F. Supp. 1016, that court concluded that abstention was not required and would not be proper; that the action was properly maintained as a class action; and that the appellants had failed to demonstrate a rational and legitimate interest in discriminating against “individuals who were unemployed through no fault of their own and neither participated in nor benefited from the labor dispute involving another union and their employer.” Id., at 1022. The court then held that §4141.29 (D)(1)(a), as applied to Hodory and the class members, violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The Bureau and its director took a direct appeal here pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253. In their jurisdictional statement appellants argued only that (1) the “labor dispute” disqualification provision is not unconstitutional as applied to appellee and the class; (2) the disqualification provision is not in conflict with the Social Security Act; (3) a state system of unemployment compensation may predicate disqualification upon any reasonable basis; and (4) USS and Republic, as employers of the class members, were denied substantive and procedural due process by the failure of the District Court to order them joined as parties defendant. Appellants made no claim therein based on abstention. We noted probable jurisdiction. 429 U. S. 814 (1976). A claim that the District Court should have abstained from deciding the case has been raised, however, in the brief amicus curiae filed by the AFL-CIO. A like claim is at least suggested. by Republic Steel. Brief as Amicus Curiae 16-17. We feel those claims merit consideration. We follow the proper course for federal courts by considering first whether abstention is required, then whether there is a statutory ground of resolution, and finally, only if the challenge persists, whether the statute violates the Constitution. II Abstention There are, of course, two primary types of federal abstention. The first, usually referred to as Pullman abstention, involves an inquiry focused on the possibility that the state courts may interpret a challenged state statute so as to eliminate, or at least to alter materially, the constitutional question presented. Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941). See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976). The second type is Younger abstention, in which the court is primarily concerned, in an equitable setting, with considerations of comity and federalism, both as they relate to the State’s interest in pursuing an ongoing state proceeding, and as they involve the ability of the state courts to consider federal constitutional claims in that context. Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592 (1975); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327 (1977); Trainor v. Hernandez, ante, at 448 (concurring opinion). A. In the present case, appellants, who in effect are the State of Ohio, argued before the District Court that appellee was free to pursue his pending administrative appeal and have his constitutional claim adjudicated in the Court of Common Pleas, and that principles of comity therefore required abstention. Although appellants in their written submission to that court cited Pullman, the argument was clearly to the effect that Younger abstention should apply. The District Court held that abstention was unwarranted. It first asserted that in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564 (1973), this Court “stated specifically that administrative remedies need not be exhausted where the federal court plaintiff states a good cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.” 408 F. Supp., at 1019. The court then stated that § 4141.29 (D)(1)(a), “on its face, would appear to except the plaintiff from unemployment benefits for the period he was laid off due to coal miners' strike,” and that “the Employment Bureau has denied benefits to plaintiff . . . solely on the basis of the challenged labor dispute disqualification.” 408 F. Supp., at 1019. The court held that exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile because the administrative appeal process would not permit a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, and the Ohio courts had held the statute to be constitutional. Id., at 1019, and n. 1. Although the court observed that Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., supra, broadened the Younger doctrine “to include a prohibition against federal court interference with certain ongoing civil proceedings in the state courts,” 408 F. Supp., at 1019-1020, the court held that Huffman “was limited to‘the enjoining of ongoing state-initiated judicial proceedings,” 408 F. Supp., at 1020 (emphasis in original), and did not apply to a challenge to administrative actions. Finally, the court held that abstention, along the Pullman line, “would not be proper in this case” because the challenged statute is not an ambiguous one “involving unsettled questions of state law which could be rendered constitutionally inoffensive by a limiting construction in the state courts.” 408 F. Supp., at 1020. The court concluded that it would be improper to require the appellee “to undertake three administrative appeals” before he could challenge the statute in state court “where, moreover, the issue as to the constitutionality of the labor dispute disqualification has apparently been settled.” Ibid. In this Court, as has been noted, appellants have not argued that Younger requires a remand with directions to the District Court to abstain, and at oral argument they resisted the suggestion of such a remand. Tr. of Oral Arg. 9-10. Instead, it is amicus Republic Steel that has made the suggestion. Younger v. Harris reflects “a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.” 401 U. S., at 44. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S., at 604; Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S., at 334; Trainor v. Hernandez, ante, at 441-443, 445-446, and id., at 448 (concurring opinion). Younger and these cited cases express equitable principles of comity and federalism. They are designed to allow the State an opportunity to “set its own house in order” when the federal issue is already before a state tribunal. It may not be argued, however, that a federal court is compelled to abstain in every such situation. If the State voluntarily chooses to submit to a federal forum, principles of comity do not demand that the federal court force the case back into the State’s own system. In the present case, Ohio either believes that the District Court was correct in its analysis of abstention or, faced with the prospect of lengthy administrative appeals followed by equally protracted state judicial proceedings, now has concluded to submit the constitutional issue to this Court for immediate resolution. In either event, under these circumstances Younger principles of equity and comity do not require this Court to refuse Ohio the immediate adjudication it seeks. B. Amicus ABL-CIO argues that Pullman abstention is proper here. The basis for the claimed applicability of Pullman is found in the facts that there were other steelworkers, at other Ohio facilities, laid off at the same time as appellee and assertedly for the same reason, and yet they were awarded unemployment compensation by the Bureau. See Brief for Appellants 3. Benefits were granted on the ground that the company-owned coal mines did not supply a sufficient amount of fuel to the plants there involved to effect a plant shutdown. Amicus argues that if appellee were to pursue his administrative appeal, he might be granted benefits on the same ground. The problems with this approach, however, are several. First, appellee did not press any such claim before the Bureau or on administrative appeal, Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, and there is no indication that a claimant may be awarded benefits on the basis of a claim not made to the Bureau or Board of Review. Second, there is no indication that the plant at which appellee worked is situated similarly to the plants as to which benefits were granted. The Bureau apparently applied a test under which the closing of a plant was held not to be “due to” the labor dispute if the plant received less than 50% of its coal from the employer’s struck mines. Id., at 7-8. There has been no claim or showing that the 50% test is unreasonable or improper and there has been no claim that appellee’s plant was not dependent on the struck mines for more than 50% of its coal. What amicus suggests is that the court abstain on the basis of speculation that the unchallenged facts may not be as the Bureau obviously saw them, or that the Board might overturn an unchallenged standard of causation, or that the Board might even come up with a hitherto unknown and unclaimed reason for awarding benefits to appellee, such as a theory that because the coal strike was nationwide it was not “ ‘at the employers’ mines.’ ” See Brief for AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae 8. None of these suggestions is based on fact or solid legal precedent. As has been noted, Pullman abstention is an equitable doctrine that comes into play when it appears that abstention may eliminate or materially alter the constitutional issue presented. There is a point, however, at which the possible benefits of abstention become too speculative to justify or require avoidance of the question presented. That point has been reached and surpassed here. We conclude that Pullman abstention is not appropriate. Ill Pre-emption Appellee argues that the Ohio statute is in conflict with, or pre-empted by, certain provisions of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 501 et seq., and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U. S. C. §§ 3301-3311. This argument was raised in the District Court but was not resolved there. It would have been preferable, of course, for that court to have dealt with this statutory issue first. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 543-545 (1974). The issue, however, entails no findings of fact and has been fully briefed here by both parties. We therefore perceive no need to remand to the District Court, and we proceed to decide the question. Appellee points to two statutes as the source of his claimed federal requirement that he be paid unemployment compensation. The first is 42 U. S. C. § 503 (a)(1), to the effect that the Secretary of Labor shall make no certification for payment of federal funds to state unemployment compensation programs unless state law provides for such methods of administration “as are found by the Secretary of Labor to be reasonably calculated to insure full payment of unemployment compensation when due.” Appellee’s argument necessarily is that payment is “due” him. Appellee cites only a single page of the voluminous legislative history of the Social Security Act in support of his assertion that the Act forbids disqualification of persons laid off due to a labor dispute at a related plant. That page contains the sentence: “To serve its purposes, unemployment compensation must be paid only to workers involuntarily unemployed.” Report of the Committee on Economic Security, as reprinted in Hearings on S. 1130 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1311, 1328 (1935). The cited Report was one to the President of the United States and became the cornerstone of the Social Security Act. On its face, the quoted sentence may be said to give some support to appellee’s claim that “involuntariness” was intended to be the key to eligibility. A reading of the entire Report and consideration of the sentence in context, however, show that Congress did not intend to require that the States give coverage to every person involuntarily unemployed. The Report recognized that federal definition of the scope of coverage would probably prove easier to administer than individualized state plans, id., at 1323, but it nonetheless recommended the form of unemployment compensation scheme that exists today, namely, federal involvement primarily through tax incentives to encourage state-run programs. The Report’s section entitled “Outline of Federal Act” concludes with the statement: “The plan for unemployment compensation that we suggest contemplates that the States shall have broad freedom to set up the type of unemployment compensation they wish. We believe that all matters in which uniformity is not absolutely essential should be left to the States. The Federal Government, however, should assist the States in setting up their administrations and in the solution of the problems they will encounter.” Id., at 1326. See also id., at 1314. Following this statement, the Report contains a section entitled “Suggestions for State Legislation.” It reads: “Benefits. — The States should have freedom in determining their own waiting periods, benefit rates, maximum-benefit periods, etc. We suggest caution lest they insert benefit provisions in excess of collections in their laws. To arouse hopes of benefits which cannot be fulfilled is invariably bad social and governmental policy.” Id., at 1327. This statement reflects two things. First, it reflects the understanding that unemployment compensation schemes generally do not grant full benefits immediately and indefinitely, even to those involuntarily unemployed. The States were expected to create waiting periods, benefit rates, and maximum-benefit periods, so as to bring the amount paid out in line with receipts. Second, the statement reflects concern that the States might grant eligibility greater than their funds could handle. By way of advice on particular statutes, the Report’s “Suggestions” contains the following: “Willingness-to-work test. — To serve its purposes, unemployment compensation must be paid only to workers involuntarily unemployed. The employees compensated must be both able and willing to work and must be denied benefits if they refuse to accept other suitable employment. Workers, however, should not be required to accept positions with wage, hour, or working conditions below the usual standard for the occupation or the particular region, or outside of the State, or where their rights of self-organization and collective bargaining would be interfered with.” Id., at 1328. c This, as has been noted, is the origin of appellee’s argument that all persons involuntarily unemployed were intended to be compensated. Placed in context, however, it is clear that the single sentence is only an expression of caution that funds should not be dispensed too freely, and is not a direction that funds must be dispensed. Appellee’s claim of support in the legislative history accordingly fails. Indeed, that history shows, rather, that Congress did not intend to restrict the ability of the States to legislate with respect to persons in appellee’s position. See also H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-9 (1935); S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 12-13 (1935). Appellee would find support in the “labor dispute disqualification” contained in § 5 (d) of draft bills issued by the Social Security Board shortly after passage of the Social Security Act. Social Security Board, Draft Bills for State Unemployment Compensation of Pooled Fund and Employer Reserve Account Types (1936). Appellee argues that this proposed section evinced an intention that “innocent” persons not be disqualified from unemployment compensation. The Social Security Board, however, on the cover page of the draft bills booklet explicitly stated: “These drafts are merely suggestive .... Therefore, they cannot properly be termed ‘model’ bills or even recommended bills. This is in keeping with the policy of the Social Security Board of recognizing that it is the final responsibility and the right of each state to determine for itself just what type of legislation it desires and how it shall be drafted.” We therefore are most reluctant to read implications of the draft bills into the Social Security Act. More important, however, appellee’s argument fails on its face. The draft bills themselves denied “innocents” certain compensation. They did so not only in the various provisions as to minimum time spent at the job, waiting periods, and maximum benefits, but also in the labor dispute disqualification itself. The labor dispute provisions are triggered by a dispute at the same “establishment” and they disqualify any member of a “grade or class of workers” any of whose members were interested in the dispute. As the commentary and case law in jurisdictions that adopted versions of the draft bills immediately recognized, this division could serve to disqualify even a person who actively opposed a. strike and could extend to persons laid off because of a dispute at another plant owned by the same employer. The law that appellee challenges is different in form from the draft bills, but we cannot say that it is qualitatively different. We do not find in the draft bills any significant support for appellee’s argument that the Social Security Act forbids his disqualification from benefits. Appellee also claims support from this Court’s decision in California Human Resources Dept. v. Java, 402 U. S. 121 (1971). In that case the Court held that the requirement of 42 U. S. C. § 503 (a)(1) that payments be made “when due” forbids suspension of payments during an appeal subsequent to a full consideration on the merits. Appellee relies on the Court’s statement: “The objective of Congress was to provide a substitute for wages lost during a period of unemployment not the fault of the employee.” 402 U. S., at 130. Appellee argues that this statement is a holding that the Act forbids disqualification of persons in his position. We do not agree. Nothing in Java purported to define the class of persons eligible for benefits. The Court’s sole concern there was with the treatment of those who already had been determined under state law to be eligible. Finally, appellee argues that statements in the legislative history of the Employment Security Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 695, indicate a congressional understanding that persons in his position must not be disqualified. These statements (identical in both House and Senate Reports) relate to the amendment prohibiting States from canceling accumulated wage credits on grounds such as an employee’s change of jobs. The statements are concerned with a situation unrelated to the one in which appellee finds himself. To the extent that they might be seen as shedding light on the area, they are far from persuasive authority in appellee’s favor, since they recognize that the States continue to be free to disqualify a claimant whose unemployment is due to a labor dispute “in the worker’s plant, etc.” As an alternative or addition to his argument based on the Social Security Act, appellee urges that the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U. S. C. §§ 3301-3311, as amended, shows “congressional intent to pre-empt the state, particularly with respect to the scope of inclusiveness in the unemployment program.” Brief for Appellee 13. We do not understand appellee to argue that the States are pre-empted by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act from imposing any sort of labor dispute disqualification. If total pre-emption is not claimed, we find nothing in any of appellee's citations that would show pre-emption in the particular area of concern to him. Indeed, study of the various provisions cited shows that when Congress wished to impose or forbid a condition for compensation, it was able to do so in explicit terms. There are numerous examples, in addition to the one set forth in n. 16, less related to labor disputes but showing congressional ability to deal with specific aspects of state plans. The fact that Congress has chosen not to legislate on the subject of labor dispute disqualifications confirms our belief that neither the Social Security Act nor the Federal Unemployment Tax Act was intended to restrict the States’ freedom to legislate in this area. IV Constitutionality We come, then, to the question whether the Ohio labor dispute disqualification provision is constitutional. The statute does not involve any discernible fundamental interest or affect with particularity any protected class. Appellee concedes that the test of constitutionality, therefore, is whether the statute has a rational relation to a legitimate state interest. Brief for Appellee 29. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297 (1976). Our statement last Term in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307 (1976), explains the analysis: “We turn then to examine this state classification under the rational-basis standard. This inquiry employs a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court’s awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfection in making the necessary classifications is neither possible nor necessary. Dandridge v. Williams, [397 U. S. 471,] 485 [(1970)]. Such action by a legislature is presumed to be valid.” Id., at 314. Appellee challenges the statute only in its application to persons in his situation. We find it difficult, however, to discern the precise nature of the situation that appellee claims may not be the subject of disqualification. His discussion focuses to a great extent on his claim that he is “involuntarily unemployed,” but he cannot be arguing that no person involuntarily unemployed may be disqualified, for he approves the draft bills’ labor dispute provision. Brief for Appellee 53. That provision, as discussed above, would disqualify an involuntarily unemployed nonunion worker who opposed a strike but whose grade or class of workers nevertheless went out on shrike. Appellee’s claim of irrationality appears to be based, rather, on his view of the statute’s broad sweep, in that it disqualifies an individual “regardless of the geographical remoteness of the location of the dispute, and regardless of any arguable actual, or imputable, participation or direct interest in the dispute on the part of the disqualified person.” Id., at 34. Appellee thus focuses on the interests of the recipient of unemployment compensation. The unemployment compensation statute, however, touches upon more than just the recipient. It provides for the creation of a fund produced by contributions from private employers. The rate of an employer’s contribution to the fund varies according to benefits paid to that employer’s eligible employees. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.25 (1973). Any action with regard to disbursements from the unemployment compensation fund thus will affect both the employer and the fiscal integrity of the fund. Appellee in effect urges that the Court consider only the needs of the employee seeking compensation. The decision of the weight-to be given the various effects of the statute, however, is a legislative decision, and appellee’s position is contrary to the principle that “the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the States their views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy.” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 486 (1970). In considering the constitutionality of the -statute, therefore, the Court must view its consequences, not only for the recipient of benefits, but also for the contributors to the fund and for the fiscal integrity of the fund. Looking only at the face of the statute, an acceptable rationale immediately appears. The disqualification is triggered by “a labor dispute other than a lockout.” In other words, if a union goes on strike, the employer’s contributions are not increased, but if the employer locks employees out, all his employees thus put out of work are compensated and the employer’s contributions accordingly are increased. Although one might say that this system provides only “rough justice,” its treatment of the employer is far from irrational. “If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78.” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. at 485. The rationality of this treatment is, of course, independent of any “innocence” of the workers collecting compensation. Appellants assert three additional rationales for the disqualification provision. First, they argue that granting benefits to workers laid off due to a strike at a parent company’s subsidiary plant in effect would be subsidizing the union members. Brief for Appellants 12. The District Court correctly rejected this rationale, as applied to appellee and his class, because payments to appellee would in no way directly subsidize the striking coal miners, and the fact that appellee happened to be a member of a union (other than the striking union) is not a legitimate reason, standing alone, to deny him benefits. 408 F. Supp., at 1022. The court continued: “Moreover, close scrutiny of the reasons for the State’s classification reveals that what the state is actually intending to prevent is not the 'subsidizing’ of unemployed union members per se, but the subsidizing of union-initiated work stoppages” (emphasis in original). Ibid. This statement of the State’s purpose reflects its second proffered justification, namely, that the granting of benefits would place the employer at an unfair disadvantage in negotiations with the unions. The District Court rejected this justification on the grounds that payments of funds to the steelworkers “could hardly be deemed to put the coal miners in a position to refuse to negotiate with the steel companies until the companies reached a financial crisis, thereby causing the companies to yield to the unreasonable and economically unsound demands of the coal miners to prevent bankruptcy.” Ibid. Although the District Court was reacting to appellants’ own hyperbole in speaking of financial crises and bankruptcy, it must be recognized that effects less than pushing the employer to bankruptcy may be rationally viewed as undesirable. The employer’s costs go up with every laid-off worker who is qualified to collect unemployment. The only way for the employer to stop these rising costs is to settle the strike so as to return the employees to work. Qualification for unemployment compensation thus acts as a lever increasing the pressures on an employer to settle a strike. The State has chosen to leave this lever in existence for situations in which the employer has locked out his employees, but to eliminate it if the union has made the strike move. Regardless of our views of the wisdom or lack of wisdom of this form of state “neutrality” in labor disputes, we cannot say that the approach taken by Ohio is irrational. The third rationale offered by the State is its interest in protecting the fiscal integrity of its compensation fund. This has been a continuing concern of Congress and the States with regard to unemployment compensation systems. See Report of the Committee on Economic Security, cited supra, at 482; Hearing on H. R. 6900 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). It is clear that protection of the fiscal integrity of the fund is a legitimate concern of the State. We need not consider whether it would be “rational” for the State to protect the fund through a random means, such as elimination from coverage of all persons with an odd number of letters in their surnames. Here, the limitation of liability tracks the reasons found rational above, and the need for such limitation unquestionably provides the legitimate state interest required by the equal protection equation. The District Court's opinion contains a paragraph declaring that, in addition to violating the Equal Protection Clause, the disqualification denied appellee due process. 408 F. Supp., at 1022. There is, however, no claim of denial of procedural due process, cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976), and we are unable to discern the basis for a claim that appellee has been denied substantive due process. The judgment of the District Court is reversed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. In December 1975, § 4141.29 (D) (1) (a) (1973), was amended to read: “(D) Notwithstanding division (A) of this section, no individual may-serve a waiting period or be paid benefits under the following conditions: “(1) Eor any week with respect to which the administrator finds that: “(a) His unemployment was due to a labor dispute other than a lockout at any factory, establishment, or other premises located in this or any other state and owned or operated by the employer by which he is or was last employed; and for so long as his unemployment is due to such labor dispute. No individual shall be disqualified under this provision if: (i) his employment was with such employer at any factory, establishment, or premises located in this state, owned or operated by such employer, other than the factory, establishment, or premises at which the labor dispute exists, if it is shown that he is not financing, participating in, or directly interested in such labor dispute, or, (ii) his employment was with an employer not involved in the labor dispute but whose place of business was located within the same premises as the employer engaged in the dispute, unless his employer is a wholly owned subsidiary of the employer engaged in the dispute, or unless he actively participates in or voluntarily stops work because of such dispute. If it is established that the claimant was laid off for an indefinite period and not recalled to work prior to the dispute, or was separated by the employer prior to the dispute for reasons other than the labor dispute, or that he obtained a bona fide job with another employer while the dispute was still in progress, such labor dispute shall not render the employee ineligible for benefits.” Act (amended substitute Senate bill 173) effective Dec. 2,1975. The amendment added subdivision (i). Thus it is possible that if appellee’s furlough had been effected after December 2, 1975, he would qualify for benefits. We are advised, however, that the amendment is not retroactive. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. Appellants state that these referrals are still before the Board of Review but are stayed pending decision in this case. Brief for Appellants 4. At no point in this litigation has appellee claimed that § 4141.29 (D) (1) (a) conflicts with or is pre-empted by any provision of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. We do not today consider or decide the relationship between that Act and a statute such as §4141.29 (D)(1)(a). The District Court determined, however, that the class as defined by appellee in his complaint was overbroad. The court in its turn defined the class as “Hodory and approximately 1250 members of the United Steelworlaers in Ohio, who became unemployed through no fault of their own, [and] were denied unemployment benefits by defendants for a specific period of time because of the labor dispute disqualification clause in § 4141.29 (D) (1) (a), despite the fact that they may have been qualified in all other respects to receive the benefits.” 408 F. Supp., at 1020. Members of this class included Hodory’s fellow workers at USS and also employees of Republic Steel who were furloughed as a result of the strike at Republic’s coal mines. In view of our disposition of the case, we have no reason to reach this constitutional claim. USS and Republic each sought to intervene for purposes of taking an appeal here, and as parties in this Court. These motions were denied. See 429 U. S. 814 (1976). Brief in Opposition to Jurisdiction (of the District Court), Record, Doc. 8. The defendants-appellants explicitly stated that an appeal would lie to the Court of Common Pleas. Id,., at 2. It appears that the Board might give appellee’s class claim special treatment so as to render the Board’s decision eligible for direct review by the Supreme Court of Ohm. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §4141.28 (N) (1973) (claims involving more than 500 persons). Neither appellee nor appellants suggest, however, that the Board is considering such action. This is confirmed by the fact that Younger abstention was the sole abstention principle argued orally before the District Court. Record, Doc. 35, pp. 5-12, 27-29, and 47-49. In Gibson v. Berryhill this Court actually held, however, that the Younger rule “or the principles of equity, comity, and federalism” for which it stands, 411 U. S., at 575, did not require the dismissal of that § 1983 suit in view of a proceeding then pending before a state Board of Optometry, since it was alleged, and the District Court there had concluded, that the Board’s bias rendered it incompetent to adjudicate the issues. 411 U. S., at 575-577. The nature of the three appeals is not made clear. It is possible that a more expeditious route was available. See n. 6, supra. In view of this conclusion, we need not and do not express any view on whether the District Court erred in refusing to abstain on Younger grounds. Pullman abstention, where deference to the state process may result in elimination or material alteration of the constitutional issue, surely does not require that this Court defer to the wishes of the parties concerning adjudication. See Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941). It appears that the steel companies have taken an appeal from that ruling by the Bureau to the Board of Review, but decision of that appeal has been withheld pending resolution of the instant case. See Brief for AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae 5 n. 3. Section 5 (d) of those bills provided that a claimant is disqualified: “For any week in which it is found by the commission that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment or other premises at which he is or was last employed, provided that this subsection shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the commission that: “1. He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work; and “2. He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute; “and provided further that if in any case separate branches of work, which are commonly conducted as separate businesses in separate premises, are conducted in separate departments of the same premises, each such department shall for the purposes of this subsection be deemed to be a separate factory, establishment or other premises.” See Fierst & Spector, Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes, 49 Yale L. J. 461 (1940); Haggart, Unemployment Compensation During Labor Disputes, 37 Neb. L. Rev. 668 (1958); Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and the “Labor Dispute” Disqualification, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 294 (1950); Comment, Labor Dispute Disqualification Under the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Act, 10 Ohio St. L. J. 238 (1949), and cases cited therein. See generally Annot., 63 A. L. R. 3d 88 (1975). The statements read: “The provision [forbidding cancellation] would not restrict State authority to prescribe the conditions under which a claimant would be 'otherwise eligible.’ For example, benefits are not now — and would not under the proposal be — paid for a week of unemployment unless the claimant were available for work. It would not prevent a State from specifying the conditions for disqualification such as, for refusing suitable work, for voluntary quitting, for unemployment due to a labor dispute in the worker’s plant, etc. . . . “Your [in the Senate report this word is 'the’] committee believes that the disqualification provisions of State unemployment compensation laws should be devised so as to prevent benefit payments to those responsible for their own unemployment, without undermining the basic objective of the unemployment insurance system — to provide an income floor to those whose unemployment is beyond their control. Severe disqualifications, particularly those which cancel earned monetary entitlement, are not in harmony with the basic purposes of an unemployment insurance system.” H. R. Rep. No. 91-612, pp. 18-19 (1969); S. Rep. No. 91-752, pp. 23-24 (1970). See, for example, 26 U. S. C. § 3304 (a) (5), which from the start has provided: “(5) compensation shall not be denied in such State to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the following conditions: “(A) if the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute; “(B) if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality; “(C) if as a condition of being employed the individual would be required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor organization.” See Employment Security Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 695; Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1971, 85 Stat. 811; Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1869; Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, 90 Stat. 2667. Appellee also claims that § 4141.29 (D) (1) (a) creates an impermissible “irrebuttable presumption.” This argument requires two assumptions. First, appellee must assume that the only purpose of the statute is to measure “innocence.” Then he must assume that the disqualification provision represents a presumption that any person laid off due to a strike is not innocent. If the statute is designed to serve any purpose other than measuring innocence, appellee’s implication of an irrebuttable presumption fails. As we discuss below, the statute clearly has purposes other than measuring the innocence of the disqualified worker.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TRINOVA CORP. v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY No. 89-1106. Argued October 1, 1990 Decided February 19, 1991 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, MARSHALL, and O’ConnoR, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 387. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 388. SouteR, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Peter S. Sheldon argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Thomas D. Hammer schmidt, Jr., Jeffery V.'Stuckey, Benjamin 0. Schwendener, Jr., William F. Sheehan, Collette C. Goodman, and Walter Hellerstein. Richard R. Roesch, Assistant Attorney General of Michigan, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Gay Secor Hardy, Solicitor General, and Thomas L. Casey, Assistant Solicitor General. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Alcan Aluminum Corp. et al. by Patrick R. Van Tifiin, Myra L. Willis, and James H. Geary; and for Caterpillar Inc. by Don S. Hamack and Richard A. Hanson. Benna Ruth Solomon and Charles Rothfeld filed a brief for the Council of State Governments et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. The principal question before us is whether the three-factor apportionment formula of the Michigan single business tax (SBT), Mich. Comp. Laws §208.1 et seq. (1979), violates either the Due Process Clause or the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. The applicability of a three-factor formula to a state income tax is well settled, but we have not considered whether a similar apportionment formula may be applied to a value added tax (VAT). We granted certiorari to consider this question and to determine whether the Michigan SBT discriminates against out-of-state businesses. r — < Although in Europe and Latin America VAT s are common, see Lindholm, The Origin of the Value-Added Tax, 6 J. Corp. L. 11 (1980); Due, Economics of the Value Added Tax, 6 J. Corp. L. 61 (1980), in the United States they are much studied but little used. Michigan is the first and, the parties tell us, the only State to have enacted a VAT as a tax on business activity. We begin with a description of value added and VAT’s in general, and then discuss the Michigan SBT. A Value added is an economic concept. “Value added is defined as the increase in the value of goods and services brought about by whatever a business does to them between the time of purchase and the time of sale.” Haughey, The Economic Logic of the Single Business Tax, 22 Wayne L. Rev. 1017, 1018 (1976) (hereinafter Haughey). The value a business adds to a single product is “the difference between the value of the product at sale and the cost of goods purchased from other businesses that went into the product.” Taxation and Economic Policy Office, Michigan Department of Treasury, Analysis of the Michigan Single Business Tax 20-21 (1985) (hereinafter SBT Analysis). It follows that the sale price of a product is the total of all value added by each step of the production process to that point. “The value added of a loaf of bread is the sum of the value contributed at each stage of the production and distribution process. Among others, it includes the contribution of the farmer, miller, baker, wholesaler and retailer.” Haughey 1019. A business “adds value by handling or processing these [goods] with its labor force, machinery, buildings and capital.” R. Kleine, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Michigan Single Business Tax: A Different Approach to State Business Taxation 1 (1978) (hereinafter Kleine). In this litigation, value added usually refers to the activities of a single business enterprise. The term can, however, be used with regard to a single product, or even an entire economy. “[Value added] is a means of consistently measuring the size of business firms and other economic enterprises comprising the total economy .... Gross National Product is virtually equivalent to national value added.” Haughey 1017. One of the acknowledged advantages of value added as a measure of taxation is its neutrality. A VAT is neutral in the sense that it taxes all business activity alike: Under a pure VAT, all forms of business organization (corporation, partnership, proprietorship), all types of financing (debt, equity) and all methods of production (capital intensive, labor intensive) bear the same tax burden. “[T]ax factors are minimized in business decisions; inherent advantages and relative efficiencies are allowed to operate in the market economy with minimum tax distortions. “This neutrality of a value-added tax is in notable contrast to the effects of both the corporation income tax and the payroll taxes. The former, by definition, is applied only to corporations and varies with their reliance on equity rather than debt capital and the efficiency with which they use equity capital — that is, their net profits.” Smith, Value-added tax: the case for, 48 Harv. Bus. Rev. 77, 79 (Nov.-Dec. 1970). Though neutral in theory, VAT’s often depart in practice from the pure value added model because of special exemptions, deductions, and other adjustments. These features can eliminate much of the claim to neutrality. See generally The Value-Added Tax: Lessons from Europe (H. Aaron ed. 1981). A VAT differs in important respects from a corporate income tax. A corporate income tax is based on the philosophy of ability to pay, as it consists of some portion of the profit remaining after a company has provided for its workers, suppliers, and other creditors. A VAT, on the other hand, is a much broader measure of a firm’s total business activity. Even if a business entity is unprofitable, under normal circumstances it adds value to its products and, as a consequence, will owe some VAT. Because value added is a measure of actual business activity, a VAT correlates more closely to the volume of governmental services received by the taxpayer than does an income tax. Further, because value added does not fluctuate as widely as net income, a VAT provides a more stable source of revenue than the corporate income tax. See generally Kleine 3, figure 1. “‘The logic or rationale of the [VAT] rests squarely on the benefits received principle of taxation — government services are essential to the operation of any business enterprise . . . and a part of these public service costs should properly be included in the cost of doing business.’” Id., at 4 (citation omitted). The SBT Analysis, at 20-21, provides us with the following simplified example of how value added is determined. Assume a bakery’s sole revenue comes from the sale of bread. The bakery’s costs consist of materials (flour, sugar, spices, utilities), labor (baker, sales clerk), capital (building, mixer, utensils, oven), and credit (interest paid on loans). Any excess of revenues over costs represents profit. Thus: Revenues = Cost of Labor + Cost of Materials + Depreciation + Interest + Profit. Because value added is defined as the difference between the value of products sold (revenues), and the cost of materials going into the products, we can represent value added (for the entire firm) by a second simple equation: Value added = Revenues — Cost of Materials. The same result is reached by another common method. If we subtract Cost of Materials from each side of the first equation above, we have: Revenues - Cost of Materials = Cost of Labor + Depreciation + Interest + Profit. So in practice value added can be calculated as either Revenues - Cost of Materials; or Cost of Labor + Depreciation + Interest + Profit. Not surprisingly, these are referred to as the “subtraction” and the “addition” methods. Each provides an identical measurement of a taxpayer’s value added. Once value added is determined, the VAT is assessed as a percentage of the value added for the relevant fiscal period. B The Michigan SBT went into effect on January 1, 1976. 1975 Mich. Pub. Acts 228. The SBT replaced seven different business taxes. Kleine 22; Brief for Respondent 8. Before 1976, a typical manufacturer with business activity in Michigan would have been subject to a franchise tax, an income tax, an intangible property tax, and an ad valorem property tax upon inventories. Mitchell, Taxes Repealed and Amended, 22 Wayne L. Rev. 1029 (1976); Brief for Respondent 8-9. After enactment of the SBT, the same manufacturer would pay only one tax. The Michigan SBT is an addition method VAT, although it inevitably permits various exclusions, exemptions, and adjustments that depart from the simple value added examples described above. Subject to exemptions contained at Mich. Comp. Laws §208.35 (1979), the Michigan SBT is levied against any person with “business activity” within the State of Michigan. §208.31(1). In order to calculate the amount of a taxpayer’s SBT the taxpayer must, first, determine its total tax base. The total tax base consists of the taxpayer’s value added, calculated by the addition method: Cost of Labor + Depreciation + Interest + Profit. Under §208.9, the taxpayer begins with federal taxable income (representing profit), adds other elements that reflect consumption of labor and capital including compensation, depreciation, dividends, and interest paid by the taxpayer, and makes other detailed adjustments. Second, if a taxpayer does business both within and without Michigan, it must determine the portion of its total value added attributable to Michigan. That portion, the crux of this case, is the average of three ratios: (1) Michigan payroll to total payroll, (2) Michigan property to total property, and (3) Michigan sales to total sales. §§208.45, 208.46, 208.49, 208.51. The total tax base is multiplied by the portion of business activity attributable to Michigan (under the three-factor formula), and the result, subject to several further adjustments, is the taxpayer’s “adjusted tax base.” §208.31(2). Two further adjustments are relevant here: § 208.23(a), which permits a taxpayer to deduct a portion of its capital acquisitions, and §208.31(5), which permits a labor-intensive taxpayer to reduce its adjusted tax base by a percentage equal to the percentage by which compensation exceeds 63% of the total tax base, but with such reduction not to exceed a maximum of 37%. Actual tax liability equals the adjusted tax base multiplied by a tax rate of 2.35%. II Trinova, an Ohio corporation, manufactures automobile components. Its principal office is located in Maumee, Ohio, a suburb of Toledo located near the Michigan border. During 1980, the tax year in question, Trinova maintained a fixed presence in Michigan: a sales office of 14 employees who solicited orders, maintained contact with Trinova’s Michigan customers, and performed clerical work. Michigan, with its automobile industry, was a major market for Trinova’s products. Indeed, Trinova made $103,981,354 worth of sales to Michigan during 1980, 26.5892% of its total sales of $391,065,866. Trinova calculated its 1980 SBT adjusted tax base as follows: U. S. taxable income (loss) ($42,466,114) Add: Compensation $226,356,271 Depreciation $23,262,909 Dividends, interest, and royalties paid $22,908,950 Other $549,526 Subtotal $230,611,542 Subtract: Dividends, interest, and royalties received ($9,486,223) Total Tax Base $221,125,319 Apportionment: Payroll Factor 0.2328% Property Factor 0.0930% Sales Factor 26.5892% Average Factor 8.9717% Apportioned Tax Base: $221,125,319 x 8.9717% = $19,838,700 See 433 Mich. 141, 150-152, 445 N. W. 2d 428, 431-433 (1989). Trinova further adjusted its tax base by subtracting a capital acquisition deduction ($9,063) and by taking the maximum (37%) reduction for labor-intensive taxpayers. These adjustments resulted in a 1980 adjusted tax base of $12,492,671. When multiplied by the tax rate of 2.35%, Trinova’s tax liability amounted to $293,578 ($12,492,671 x 2.35%). Trinova timely filed its return and paid its tax liability. In 1985, a Michigan intermediate Court of Appeals ruled that taxpayers similarly situated to Trinova were entitled to “relief” under Mich. Comp. Laws §208.69 (1979), a provision of the SBT. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Department of Treasury, 145 Mich. App. 405, 377 N. W. 2d 397, leave to appeal and reconsideration denied, 424 Mich. 895 (1986). At the time, §208.69 provided that if the apportionment provisions of the SBT did not “fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer’s business activity” in Michigan, the taxpayer could, among other alternatives, petition for the employment of “any other method to effectuate an equitable allocation and apportionment of the taxpayer’s tax base.” Soon after the decision in Jones & Laughlin, Trinova filed an amended return and refund claim for the 1980 tax year. Based on the relief granted in Jones & Laughlin, Trinova proposed that despite admitted company-wide value added of $221 million and Michigan sales of over $100 million, for purposes of the Michigan SBT it should be treated as if it had negative total value added. Value added apportioned to Michigan would also have been negative, and Trinova would have been entitled to a refund for its entire 1980 SBT payment. Upon denial of relief by the Michigan Department of Treasury, Trinova sued for a refund in the Michigan Court of Claims, which ruled in Trinova’s favor on the authority of Jones & Laughlin. No. 86-10430-CM (May 5, 1987); App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a-51a. While the Department of Treasury’s appeal was pending in the Michigan Court of Appeals, the legislature amended §208.69. 1987 Mich. Pub. Acts 39. The amended §208.69 creates a presumption that the statutory apportionment formula fairly represents the taxpayer’s business activity in Michigan unless the adjusted tax base meets one of two tests, neither of which Trinova could satisfy, and which do not merit discussion here. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §208.69(3) (West Supp. 1990). The Court of Appeals referred to the legislature’s statement that its Act was intended to be “curative, expressing the original intent of the legislature that the single business tax ... is an indivisible value added type of tax and not a combination or series of several smaller taxes and that relief from formulary apportionment should be granted only under extraordinary circumstances.” 1987 Mich. Pub. Acts 39, §2. Relying upon this language, the Court of Appeals determined that the amendment was to be given retroactive effect as a “remedial and procedural” statute and that Trinova was not entitled to statutory relief. 166 Mich. App. 656, 666, 421 N. W. 2d 258, 262 (1988). The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. 433 Mich. 141, 445 N. W. 2d 428 (1989). Without addressing retroactive application of the amendments to §208.69, it construed §208.69 as a “constitutional ‘circuit breaker’ ” to be applied only if required in order to save the SBT against unconstitutional application. Id., at 156, 445 N. W. 2d, at 434. The court then upheld the SBT against Trinova’s federal constitutional challenges. The Michigan Supreme Court noted that formulary apportionment of income taxes is uncontroversial and that it did “not believe that ‘business activity’ as defined under the [SBT] is susceptible to accurate analysis when only one component of the total business effort is examined.” Id., at 163, 445 N. W. 2d, at 438. The court concluded that Trinova’s averaged ratios of payroll, property, and sales are a fair representation of the extent of its business activity in Michigan, making it ineligible for relief on statutory or constitutional grounds. Id., at 163-166, 445 N. W. 2d, at 438-439. We granted Trinova’s petition for a writ of certiorari. 494 U. S. 1015 (1990). 1 — i I — 1 I — I The principles which govern the validity of state taxes levied upon multistate businesses seek to accommodate the necessary abstractions of tax theory to the realities of the marketplace. Under the test stated in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 279 (1977), we will sustain a tax against Commerce Clause challenge so long as “the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided. by the State.” We applied this four-part test in later cases addressing a wide variety of taxes. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U. S. 252, 260, n. 12 (1989) (citing applications in cases involving sales, severance, use, corporate income, and business and occupation taxes). In Complete Auto, we renounced the formalistic approach of Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602 (1951), which had prohibited a State from taxing the privilege of doing business in the State, treating it as a tax upon interstate commerce and so beyond the authority of the State. We seek to avoid formalism and to rely upon a “consistent and rational method of inquiry [focusing ón] the practical effect of a challenged tax.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt., 445 U. S. 425, 443 (1980). The Complete Auto test, while responsive to Commerce Clause dictates, encompasses as well the due process requirement that there be “a ‘minimal connection’ between the interstate activities and the taxing State, and a rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise.” Mobil Oil Corp., supra, at 436- 437; see also Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, N. J. Dept. of Treasury, 490 U. S. 66, 80 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). In this Court, Trinova does not dispute that its business activities have a substantial nexus with Michigan and subject it to the State’s taxing authority. Nor does Trinova argue that the amount of tax it is required to pay bears no fair relation to the services provided by the State. Complete Auto, supra, at 279. Trinova instead contends that Michigan’s SBT fails the other two prongs of the Complete Auto test: that the SBT is not fairly apportioned as applied to Trinova and that the tax discriminates against interstate commerce. We consider these claims and begin with the matter of apportionment. A Trinova’s claim that apportionment of the tax is unconstitutional concentrates on the elements of the apportionment formula. The original rationale for apportionment of income was the difficulty of identifying the geographic source of the income earned by a multistate enterprise. See Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 120-121 (1920) (legislature “faced with the impossibility of allocating specifically the profits earned by the [taxpayer’s] processes conducted within its borders”). As we stated the problem in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U. S. 159, 192 (1983): “Allocating income among various taxing jurisdictions bears some resemblance ... to slicing a shadow.” Trinova argues that because its SBT tax base is composed in large part of compensation and depreciation, elements which can be assigned to a geographic source, we must reject apportionment altogether. We can accept the premise that apportionment is permitted only when precise geographic measurement is not feasible, for to allow apportionment where there is no practical or theoretical justification could provide the opportunity for a State to export tax burdens and import tax revenues. The Commerce Clause prohibits this competitive mischief. The issue becomes whether, without an apportionment formula, Michigan can assign the SBT tax base and its principal components to separate geographic locations and to separate accounts in each State. Michigan has decided it cannot do so without serious theoretical and practical difficulty, and upon review of the case we accept that determination. We reject at the outset, however, arguments by Michigan and some amici curiae that the Michigan SBT can be analyzed as a tax upon “business activity.” Brief for Council of State Governments et al. as Amici Curiae 11. The statute does not say that the SBT is a tax upon business activity, but rather that it is a “tax of 2.35% upon the adjusted tax base of every person with business activity in this state which is allocated or apportioned to this state.” Mich. Comp. Laws §208.31(1) (1979) (emphasis added). While Michigan business activity is a threshold requirement for the tax, and value added is its measure, labeling the SBT a tax on “business activity” does not permit us to forgo examination of the actual tax base and apportionment provisions. “A tax on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes.” Jenkins, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 Tenn. L. Rev. 239, 242 (1960). Trinova errs in the opposite direction. It would dissect the tax base as if the SBT were three separate and independent taxes: a tax on compensation, a tax on depreciation, and a tax on income, each apportioned. Trinova insists that compensation and depreciation can be located and can be separated from the total value added calculation. As a result, Trinova would be taxed upon its Michigan compensation and Michigan depreciation. It would owe no additional tax upon income apportionable to Michigan, because it had no income during the relevant tax year. This characterization, and with it Trinova’s constitutional argument, fails. Doubtless Trinova can identify the location of its plant and equipment and much of its compensation. The Michigan SBT, however, is not three separate and independent taxes, and Trinova cannot purport to identify the geographic source of value added by assuming that two elements can be located in a single State while the third cannot. Trinova’s proposed apportionment for the 1980 tax year, n. 8, supra, provides a good example of the problems that accompany its argument. In 1980, Trinova’s company-wide value added amounted to much less than its compensation plus depreciation. In short, Trinova was unprofitable. Under a VAT, however, tax becomes due in any event. Trinova’s approach would require us to conclude that Trinova added value at the factory through the consumption of capital and labor, but that its products somehow lost value outside of this process, perhaps between the time they left the factory and the time they were delivered to customers in Michigan. This approach is incompatible with the rationale of a VAT and is unsupported in the record. For all this record shows, Trinova’s production operations might have added little value and its sales offices might have added significant value, through superior marketing skill, liaison between the company and its customers, or mere fortuity. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267, 272 (1978) (record lacked analysis of what portion of profits was apportionable to sales, to manufacturing, or to other phase of company’s operations). But we need not rely upon Trinova’s 14 Michigan sales personnel as the source of all the value added that can be apportioned fairly to Michigan. In a unitary enterprise, compensation, depreciation, and profit are not independent variables to be adjusted without reference to each other. If Trinova had paid an additional $100 million in compensation during 1980, there is no way of knowing whether, or to what extent, value added would have increased. In fact, value added would not have increased so long as revenues did not increase. These elements of value added are inextricable, codependent variables. Without Trinova’s $100 million in 1980 Michigan sales, the company’s value added would have been lower to a remarkable degree. The market demand that sustained those sales did not arise solely, perhaps not even substantially, from the activities of Trinova’s 14 Michigan sales personnel. But there can be little doubt that requirements of the Michigan market determined the direction of Trinova’s design, production, and distribution process. By serving that market and meeting its demands, Trinova generated value added in the sums that it did. We can and must assume that Michigan sales were a part of the company’s essential economic strategies and were an integral part of company-wide value added. It distorts the tax both in application and theory to confine value added consequences of the Michigan market solely to the labor and capital expended by the resident sales force. Trinova’s attempted characterization is arguable only because Michigan calculates value added by the addition method. The addition and subtraction methods of calculating value, however, are but two different paths to the same result. See n. 2, supra. Had Michigan calculated the SBT tax base by the subtraction method, reporting total revenues minus total cost of materials, Trinova’s characterization would collapse of its own weight. Trinova could geographically locate its revenues and even determine where it purchased its materials. The Michigan apportionment formula assumes as much. But were Trinova to calculate value added based upon the location of its revenues, it would apportion a much greater share of its value added to Michigan (26.5892%) than was apportioned under Michigan’s three-factor formula (8.9717%). An apportionment of value added based solely on the source of revenues is no less justifiable than an apportionment based solely upon the location of compensation or depreciation. The difference between the addition and subtraction methods is one of form and lacks constitutional significance. Michigan chose the addition method of calculating value added as a convenience to taxpayers, for whom federal taxable income provided an easy starting point. Kleine 6-7 (discussing advantages of addition method); SBT Analysis 21 (same). The Constitution does not require a formalistic analysis resulting in a penalty for Michigan’s selection of an easier calculation method for its taxpayers. Both methods of calculation, moreover, illustrate the justification for the State’s adoption of an apportionment formula. Under either method, value added includes a remainder or residual that cannot be located with economic precision. Under the addition method, value added contains the element of income, one calculated by and dependent upon factors (revenues minus total costs) not included in the addition method equation; under the subtraction method, value added is itself a remainder, no more assignable than income. It would be impractical to locate value added by a geographic test. We thus agree with the Michigan Legislature’s statement that the SBT is not, for apportionment purposes, “a combination or series of several smaller taxes,” 1987 Mich. Pub. Acts 39, § 2, but an “indivisible,” ibid., tax upon a different, bona fide measure of business activity, the value added. This conclusion is no different from the one we have reached in upholding the validity of state apportionment of income taxes. As with a VAT, the discrete components of a state income tax may appear in isolation susceptible of geographic designation. Nevertheless, since Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920), we have recognized the impracticability of assuming that all income can be assigned to a single source. In this respect, Trinova’s argument becomes a familiar and often rejected genre of taxpayer challenge: “[A]pportionability often has been challenged by the contention that. . . the source of [particular] income may be ascertained by separate geographical accounting. The Court has rejected that contention so long as the intrastate and extrastate activities formed part of a single unitary business. See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501, 506-508 (1942); Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U. S. 331, 336 (1939); cf. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S., at 272. In these circumstances, the Court has noted that separate accounting, while it purports to isolate portions of income received in various States, may fail to account for contributions to income resulting from functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U. S., at 508-509. Because these factors of profitability arise from the operation of the business as a whole, it becomes misleading to characterize the income of the business as having a single identifiable ‘source.’ Although separate geographical accounting may be useful for internal auditing, for purposes of state taxation it is not constitutionally required.” Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U. S., at 438. In a recent challenge to this unitary business principle, we rejected the argument that particular assignable costs of a business should be excluded from a broader tax base. Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, N. J. Dept. of Treasury, 490 U. S. 66 (1989). We considered the New Jersey corporate income tax, which used federal taxable income as a benchmark and required certain adjustments (as does the Michigan SBT). New Jersey required oil companies to add back into income any deduction taken for taxes paid under the federal windfall profits tax. The taxpayers objected that the windfall profits tax is “an exclusively out-of-state expense because it is associated with the production of oil outside New Jersey.” Id., at 74. In like manner, Trinova objects to the SBT’s requirement that it add compensation and depreciation to federal taxable income on the grounds that these are, with limited exception, out-of-state expenses. In Amerada Hess Corp. we rejected outright the idea that geographically assignable costs of production must be excluded from an apportionment of income: “[J]ust as each [taxpayer’s] oil-producing revenue — as part of a unitary business — is not confined to a single State, Exxon Corp., 447 U. S., at 226, ... so too the costs of producing this revenue are unitary in nature. See Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 182 (the costs of a unitary business cannot be deemed confined to the locality in which they are incurred).” Ibid. The reasoning of Amerada Hess Corp. applies with equal force to the case here. The same factors that prevent determination of the geographic location where income is generated, factors such as functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale, make it impossible to determine the location of value added with exact precision. In concluding that Michigan can apportion the SBT, we merely reaffirm what we have written before: “In the case of a more-or-less integrated business enterprise operating in more than one State, . . . arriving at precise territorial allocations of ‘value’ is often an elusive goal, both in theory and in practice.” Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 164. B Having determined that Michigan’s SBT attempts to tax a base that cannot be assigned to one location with any precision, and that apportionment is proper, we must next consider whether Michigan’s apportionment formula for Trinova’s value added is fair. Container Corp. states our test for fair income apportionment: “The first, and again obvious, component of fairness in an apportionment formula is what might be called internal consistency — that is, the formula must be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction, it would result in no more than all of the unitary business’ income being taxed. The second and more difficult requirement is what might be called external consistency — the factor or factors used in the apportionment formula must actually reflect a reasonable sense of how income is generated.” Id., at 169. Trinova does not contest the internal consistency of the SBT’s apportionment formula, and we need not consider that question. Instead, Trinova argues that the SBT apportionment formula fails the external consistency test. In order to prevail on such a challenge, an income taxpayer must prove “by ‘clear and cogent evidence’ that the income attributed to the State is in fact ‘out of all appropriate proportions to the business transacted ... in that State,’ [Hans Rees’ Sons, Inc.,] 283 U. S., at 135, or has ‘led to a grossly distorted result,’ [Norfolk & Western R. Co.,] 390 U. S., at 326.” Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U. S., at 274. We conclude that the same test applies to apportionment of a VAT. Trinova must demonstrate that, in the context of a VAT, there is no rational relationship between the tax base measure attributed to the State and the contribution of Michigan business activity to the entire value added process. See Container Corp., supra, at 180-181. The Michigan SBT uses the same three-factor apportionment formula we first approved for apportionment of income in Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501 (1942). This standard has become “something of a benchmark against which other apportionment formulas are judged.” Container Corp., supra, at 170; see also Moorman Mfg. Co., supra, at 282 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id., at 283-284 (Powell, J., dissenting). Although the one-third weight given to each of the three factors — payroll, property, and sales — is not a precise apportionment for every case, the formula “has gained wide approval precisely because payroll, property, and sales appear in combination to reflect a very large share of the activities by which value is generated.” Container Corp., supra, at 183 (emphasis added). The three-factor formula is widely used and is included in the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, 7A U. L. A. 331 (1990 Cum. Supp.) (approved in 1957 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association). Trinova argues that on the facts of this case, the three-factor formula leads to a distorted result, out of all proportion to the business done by Trinova in Michigan. Trinova’s Michigan payroll constituted 0.2328% of total payroll, its Michigan property constituted 0.0930% of total property, and its Michigan sales constituted 26.5892% of total sales. The three-factor formula averages these ratios, with the result that 8.9717% of Trinova’s value added, or $19,838,700, is assigned to Michigan. Because Trinova is a labor-intensive taxpayer, and can deduct capital acquisitions, the tax base is further reduced to $12,492,671. In this Court, Trinova proposes an alternative two-factor apportionment, excluding the sales factor. Under the two-factor formula, only 0.1629% of Trinova’s value added, or $360,213, would be assigned to Michigan. Brief for Petitioner 33-34. Although the three-factor formula “can be justified as a rough, practical approximation of the distribution of either a corporation’s sources of income or the social costs which it generates,” General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U. S. 553, 561 (1965), Trinova argues that the formula does not reflect how the value added tax base is generated. The principal flaw, it contends, is that the formula includes a sales factor. “Sales have no relationship to, and add nothing to, the value that [compensation and depreciable plant] contribute to the tax base in Michigan.” Brief for Petitioner 31. Trinova’s position finds some support among economists. See Barlow & Connell, The Single Business Tax, in Michigan’s Fiscal and Economic Structure 673, 704 (H. Brazer ed. 1982); Kleine 7, 14, n. 5. We have, supra, at 376, already concluded that sales (as a measure of market demand) do have a profound impact upon the amount of an enterprise’s value added, and therefore reject the complete exclusion of sales as somehow resulting in more accurate apportionment. We further reject this critique because it cannot distinguish application of the three-factor formula to a VAT from application to an income tax. In fact, nearly identical criticisms were levied against the three-factor formula as a method for apportioning income by economists who theorize that income (like value added) is the product of labor and capital, and that the marketplace contributes nothing to production of income. See Studenski, The Need for Federal Curbs on State Taxes on Interstate Commerce: An Economist’s Viewpoint, 46 Va. L. Rev. 1121, 1131-1132 (1960); Harriss, Economic Aspects of Interstate Apportionment of Business Income, 37 Taxes 327, 362-363 (1959); Harriss, Interstate Apportionment of Business Income, 49 Am. Econ. Rev. 398, 400 (1959). If it were not for their age, these criticisms could have been taken almost verbatim from Trinova’s brief: “[S]ales-by-destination are not a proper allocation factor ... . Taken by themselves, they do not necessarily represent the location of the company’s productive income-creating effort. Only the location of the company’s capital and labor, which may be wholly different from the destination of the sales, identifies the location of that effort and hence the situs for the imposition of a state income tax upon it.” Studenski, supra, at 1131— 1132. Despite such criticism, the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act decided upon an income apportionment formula that included sales, and the importance of sales in generating value has been acknowledged by this Court. Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 183. Thus, as we responded to a similar argument in Moorman Mfg. Co., whatever the merit of Trinova’s argument that sales do not contribute to value added “from the standpoint of economic theory or legislative policy, it cannot support a claim in this litigation that [the State] in fact taxed profits not attributable to activities within the State during the yea[r 1980].” 437 U. S., at 272. Trinova gives no basis for distinguishing the same arguments that were pressed, and rejected, with regard to the apportionment of income. We could not accept Trinova’s argument that the sales factor distorts Michigan’s apportionment formula without rejecting our precedents which approve the use of the same formula to apportion income. As we find no distortion caused by the three-factor formula, it follows that the Michigan SBT does not tax “value earned outside [Michigan’s] borders.” ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho Tax Comm’n, 458 U. S. 307, 315 (1982). The argument that the value was added in Ohio, by labor and capital, and that no value has been added in Michigan assumes that value added is subject to geographic ascertainment and assumes further the inappropriateness of a sales factor in apportionment. For the reasons we have given, we reject both arguments. We need not say for certain which method — unadjusted apportionment by the three-factor formula ($19,838,700), apportionment by Trinova’s alternative two-factor formula ($360,213), Trinova’s Jones & Laughlin apportionment urged in state court (-$2,042,458), or the adjusted tax base as calculated in Trinova’s original 1980 return ($12,492,671)— gives the most accurate calculation of Trinova’s value added in Michigan. Trinova has not convincingly demonstrated which figure is most accurate. Trinova gives no estimate of the value added that would take account of both its Michigan sales activity and Michigan market demand for its products. Michigan, on the other hand, has consistently applied a formula, the elements of which appear to reflect a very large share of the activities by which value is generated, with further relief for labor-intensive taxpayers such as Trinova. Trinova has failed to meet its burden of proving “by ‘clear and cogent evidence,’” Moorman Mfg. Co., supra, at 274, that the State of Michigan’s apportionment provides a distorted result. C Trinova also urges that the Michigan SBT should be struck down because it discriminates against out-of-state businesses in violation of the Commerce Clause. Trinova cannot point to any treatment of in-state and out-of-state firms that is discriminatory on its face, as in the cases it cites. See, e. g., Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U. S. 388, 393 (1984) (tax credit was limited to gross receipts from export products shipped from a regular place of business of the taxpayer within New York); Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U. S. 318, 324-328 (1977) (tax facially discriminated against transactions on securities exchanges located outside of New York and had been enacted in an effort to discourage growth of such exchanges); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64 (1963) (sales tax exempted isolated sales within State, but use tax lacked a similar exemption for similar isolated sales outside of the State). In the absence of any facial discrimination, Trinova recalls our statement in American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266, 281 (1987), that “the Commerce Clause has a deeper meaning that may be implicated even though state provisions ... do not allocate tax burdens between insiders and outsiders in a manner that is facially discriminatory.” The Commerce Clause requires more than mere facial neutrality. The content of that requirement is fair apportionment. The “deeper meaning” to which American Trucking refers is embodied in the requirement of fair apportionment, as expressed in the tests of internal and external consistency. Other than the vague accusation of discrimination, Trinova presents no other standard by which we might consider the constitutionality of the Michigan SBT. In further support of its discrimination argument, Trinova relies upon the 1987 statement of Michigan’s Governor that the SBT was enacted “‘to promote the development and investment of business within Michigan.’” Executive Message of Governor James J. Blanchard to the Michigan Supreme Court, Nov. 6, 1987, App. to Pet. for Cert. 73a. This statement helps Trinova not at all. It is a laudatory goal in the design of a tax system to promote investment that will provide jobs and prosperity to the citizens of the taxing State. States are free to “structur[e] their tax systems to encourage the growth and development of intrastate commerce and industry.” Boston Stock Exchange, swpra, at 336. Although Trinova repeats the Governor’s statement in an attempt to demonstrate an impermissible motive on the part of the State, all the contemporaneous evidence concerning passage of the SBT suggests a benign motivation, combined with a practical need to increase revenues. Neither Trinova nor the secondary sources it relies upon present any evidence that the SBT was inspired as a way to export tax burdens or import tax revenues. M <1 In reviewing state taxation schemes under the Commerce Clause, we attempt “to ensure that each State taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction.” Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U. S. 252, 260-261 (1989). We act as a defense against state taxes which, whether by design or inadvertence, either give rise to serious concerns of double taxation, or attempt to capture tax revenues that, under the theory of the tax, belong of right to other jurisdictions. We have always “declined to undertake the essentially legislative task of establishing a ‘single constitutionally mandated method of taxation.’” Id., at 261, quoting Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 171. We do not say today whether other States should adopt a VAT, or whether Michigan’s three-factor formula is the only acceptable method of apportionment. We do hold that, as applied to Trinova during the tax year at issue, the Michigan SBT does not violate the Due Process or Commerce Clauses of the Constitution. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan is Affirmed. Justice Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. In calculating value added, a firm’s use of capital is represented by depreciation. Depreciation is the reduction in value of a firm’s assets, through wear and tear, obsolescence, or other factors, and thus roughly measures consumption of capital. See McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Modern Economics 130 (3d ed. 1983); P. Samuelson & W. Nordhaus, Economics 902 (12th ed. 1985). See, e. g., Aaron, Introduction and Summary, in The Value-Added Tax: Lessons from Europe 1, 2 (H. Aaron ed. 1981) (hereinafter Aaron); Haughey 1018; Special Committee on the Value-Added Tax of the Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, The Choice Between Value-Added and Sales Taxation at Federal and State Levels in the United States, 29 Tax Lawyer 457, 459 (1976) (addition and subtraction methods “reacfh] the same result by the opposite means”); SBT Analysis 20 (addition and subtraction are “two alternative, but equivalent ways of calculating value added. . . . The important point is that, conceptually, these two calculations are equal”). The nations of the European Economic Community (EEC) each levy a VAT under yet a third method, as a multistage sales tax. See generally Aaron. Under the EEC system, the bakery in our example would be taxed on each sale of bread and would receive a credit for each purchase of materials going into production of the bread. Similarly, at each other link in the chain of production and distribution, tax is assessed on sales, but credit is provided on purchases. This multistage sales tax system places the burden on the taxpayer to demonstrate that it did, in fact, purchase goods for which it requests a credit. The multistage sales tax version of the VAT has been advocated as promoting tax compliance, though the evidence does not necessarily support this view. See Oldman & Woods, Would a Value-Added Tax System Relieve Tax Compliance Problems, in Income Tax Compliance: A Report of the ABA Section of Taxation Invitational Conference on Income Tax Compliance 317 (1983) (multistage consumption VAT has traditionally been regarded as self-enforcing because the tax credit mechanism is said to induce firms to report transactions accurately). The requirement of “fiscal frontiers” to record and tax interstate transactions makes the multistage sales tax approach impracticable for an individual State. McLure, State and Federal Relations in the Taxation of Value Added, 6 J. Corp. L. 127, 130-131 (1980); see also Haughey 1025 (“invoice credit method is not workable in a subeconomy without the legal authority and means to control the flow of imports and exports”). On international transactions, the EEC’s VAT’s are assessed in the jurisdiction of destination. As a result, no tax is applied on exports, while full tax is applied to imports. See id., at 1024-1025; Aaron 4. The destination principle does not, however, purport to determine whether value was added in the jurisdiction of destination, or the jurisdiction of origin. The SBT was not Michigan’s first experiment with a VAT. Between 1953 and 1967, Michigan had utilized a Business Activities Tax (BAT) similar to the Michigan SBT. Although the BAT was a subtraction method VAT, and permitted different adjustments than the SBT, the BAT tax base included “a company’s payroll, profits, and capital outlay less depreciation allowed,” Lock, Rau, & Hamilton, The Michigan Value-Added Tax, 8 Nat. Tax J. 357, 363 (1955), and was apportioned among States by the same three-factor formula that is challenged here. See Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 7.557(l)-7.557(24) (Supp. 1955), repealed, 1967 Mich. Pub. Acts 281. The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the BAT against a challenge on facts remarkably similar to those presented here by Trinova. Armco Steel Corp. v. State, 359 Mich. 430, 102 N. W. 2d 552, 555-556 (1960) (Ohio corporation had nominal Michigan property and payroll, but substantial Michigan sales). We dismissed an appeal of the judgment in Armco for want of a substantial federal question. Armco Steel Corp. v. Michigan, 364 U. S. 337 (1960). The arguments in that case focused on whether the BAT was best characterized as a tax on income or a tax on gross receipts, with the concern that under our jurisprudence of the time a “direct” tax on gross receipts from interstate commerce would be unconstitutional. “Business activity” is broadly defined as “a transfer of legal or equitable title to or rental of property, whether real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible, or the performance of services, or a combination thereof, made or engaged in, or caused to be made or engaged in, within this state, whether in intrastate, interstate, or foreign commerce, with the object of gain, benefit, or advantage, whether direct or indirect, to the taxpayer or to others, but shall not include the services rendered by an employee to his employer, services as a director of a corporation, or a casual transaction. . . .” Mich. Comp. Laws § 208.3 (1979). Any taxpayer can, in the alternative, calculate its adjusted tax base as total gross receipts multiplied by the apportionment figure (derived using the three-factor formula) divided by two. This figure is then multiplied by the 2.35% tax rate to give actual tax liability. § 208.31(2). Under this alternative calculation, no firm’s Michigan SBT liability will ever exceed 1.175% of apportioned gross receipts. Trinova could have calculated its tax liability under the alternative gross receipts method, Mich. Comp. Laws § 208.31(2) (1979), as follows: Total gross receipts ($391,065,866) multiplied by Michigan apportionment factor (8.9717%) divided by two (equals $17,542,628) multiplied by 2.35% equals tax liability of $412,251. This figure amounts to less than 0.4% of Trinova’s Michigan sales. Of course, Trinova did not use this method, as it was required to pay only $293,578 (or 0.28% of Michigan sales) under the apportionment method challenged here. The amended return proposed that Trinova’s company-wide compensation and depreciation be excluded from the preapportionment tax base, and actual Michigan compensation and depreciation be added back into the apportioned tax base, as follows: Total Tax Base — statutory formula: $221,125,319 Deduct Compensation ($226,356,271) Deduct Depreciation ($23,262,909) Trinova’s Proposed Total Tax Base: ($28,493,861) Apportionment (8.9717%) ($2,556,384) Add Michigan Compensation $511,774 Add Michigan Depreciation $2,152 Apportioned Tax Base: ($2,042,458) 433 Mich. 141, 147, n. 4, 445 N. W. 428, 431, n. 4 (1989). Trinova’s proposed two-factor apportionment differs drastically from the apportionment Trinova requested in the Michigan state courts. Under the approach Trinova took in state court, following Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Department of Treasury, 145 Mich. App. 405, 377 N. W. 2d 397 (1985), Trinova's apportioned tax base would be -$2,042,458. See n. 8, supra. Under the two-factor formula that Trinova now urges upon us, it is $360,213. As an alternative ground for upholding the tax, Michigan reminds us that, instead of taxing value added, it could have taxed gross receipts of sales into Michigan. We have repeatedly upheld such taxes. Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington Revenue Dept., 419 U. S. 560, 564 (1975); General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U. S. 436, 448 (1964); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33, 58 (1940). While we accept the analogy Michigan has drawn between a VAT and an income tax, we recognize that the SBT also bears some similarities to a gross-receipts tax. Further, the SBT’s alternative method of taxation (based upon gross receipts) might provide an additional limit on any distortion or possibility that out-of-state values might be taxed. See n. 6, supra. In light of our disposition, we need not address these arguments. According to Kleine, proponents of the SBT argued as follows: (1) because of Michigan’s volatile economy, the State’s corporate income tax had proven unpredictably cyclical, and therefore a poor source of revenue. The SBT would provide a much broader tax base, and thus prove a more stable revenue source; (2) the SBT would lessen the tax burden on capital, thereby encouraging new investment; (3) the SBT would replace numerous taxes, resulting in less paperwork for both the taxpayer and the tax collector; (4) the SBT would not discriminate against businesses on the basis of their forms of organization; and (5) the SBT would tax inefficient and efficient firms equally for their use of government services, whereas an income tax would burden more heavily efficient, highly profitable firms. In addition, at the time of the SBT’s enactment, Michigan faced a fiscal crisis. The legislature provided that the new SBT would overlap with the old corporate franchise tax, resulting in additional cash flow of $180 million. Kleine 20-23. The argument that a VAT would permit “exporting” the tax to taxpayers outside the State “was not used to any great extent by the proponents of the Michigan [SBT].” Id., at 23.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GREETING CARD PUBLISHERS v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE et al. No. 81-1304. Argued December 1, 1982 Decided June 22, 1983 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Matthew S. Perlman argued the cause for petitioner in No. 81-1304. With him on the briefs was Richard J. Webber. Bernard G. Segal argued the cause for petitioner in No. 81-1381. With him on the briefs were Robert L. Kendall, Jr., James D. Crawford, and John E. McKeever. John H. Garvey argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief for the United States Postal Service were Solicitor General Lee and Deputy Solicitor General Getter. Robert A. Saltzstein, Stephen M. Feldman, and Joseph J. Saunders filed a brief for respondent American Business Press. Dana T. Ackerly and Charles Lister filed briefs for respondent Direct Mail/Marketing Association, Inc. Raymond N. Shibley, Michael F. McBride, and W. Gilbert Faulk, Jr., filed a brief for respondent Dow Jones & Co., Inc. David C. Todd and Timothy J. May filed a brief for respondents Mail Order Association of America et al. David Minton filed a brief for respondent Magazine Publishers Association, Inc. Alan R. Swendiman and William J. Olson filed a brief for respondents March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation et al. Toni K. Allen, Robert M. Lichtman, and John M. Burzio filed a brief for respondents Newsweek, Inc., et al. IanD. Volner, Richard M. Schmidt, Jr., and Mark L. Pelesh filed a brief for respondents Recording Industry Association of America et al. Together with No. 81-1381, United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. United States Postal Service et al., also on certiorari to the same court. W. Terry Maguire, Pamela Riley, and Arthur B. Sackler filed a brief for the American Newspaper Publishers Association et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases arise out of the most recent general postal ratemaking proceeding, the fifth under the Postal Reorganization Act. At issue is the extent to which the Act requires the responsible federal agencies to base postal rates on cost-of-service principles. I — I A When, in 1970, Congress enacted the Postal Reorganization Act (Act), 39 U. S. C. § 101 et seq., it divested itself of the control it theretofore had exercised over the setting of postal rates and fees. The Act abolished the Post Office Department, which since 1789 had administered the Nation’s mails. See Act of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 16, 1 Stat. 70. In its place, the Act established the United States Postal Service as an independent agency under the direction of an 11-member Board of Governors. 39 U. S. C. §§201, 202. The Act also established a five-member Postal Rate Commission (Rate Commission) as an agency independent of the Postal Service. § 3601. Basic to the Act is the principle that, to the extent “practicable,” the Postal Service’s total revenue must equal its costs. § 3621. Guided by this principle, the Board of Governors, when it deems it in the public interest, may request the Rate Commission to recommend a new rate schedule. § 3622. After receiving the request, the Rate Commission holds hearings, § 3624(a), and formulates a schedule, §3624 (d). Section 3622(b) provides that the Rate Commission shall recommend rates for the classes of mail in accordance with nine factors, the third of which is “the requirement that each class of mail or type of mail service bear the direct and indirect postal costs attributable to that class or type plus that portion of all other costs of the Postal Service reasonably assignable to such class or type.” The Governors may approve the recommended rate schedule, may allow it under protest, may reject it, or, in limited circumstances, may modify it. §3625. The Governors’ decision to order new rates into effect may be appealed to any United States court of appeals. § 3628. Questions confronting us in these cases are whether the Rate Commission must follow a two-tier or a three-tier process in setting rates, and the extent to which the Rate Commission must base rates on estimates of the costs caused by providing each class of mail service. B In its first two ratemaking proceedings under the Act, the Rate Commission determined that § 3622(b) establishes a two-tier approach to allocating the Postal Service’s total revenue requirement. See Postal Rate Commission, Opinion and Recommended Decision, Docket No. R74-1, pp. 4, 91-93 (1975); PRC Op. R71-1, pp. 39-41 (1972). Under this approach, the Rate Commission first must determine the costs caused by (“attributable to”) each class of mail, § 3622(b)(3), and on that basis establish a rate floor for each class. PRC Op. R74-1, pp. 92,93,110. The Rate Commission then must “reasonably assign,” see § 3622(b)(3), the remaining costs to the various classes of mail on the basis of the other factors set forth in § 3622(b). See PRC Op. R74-1, pp. 91-94. In the first proceeding, the Rate Commission concluded that the Act does not dictate the use of any particular method of identifying the costs caused by each class. PRC Op. R71-1, pp. 42-47. Without committing itself to any theory for the future, it chose to attribute those costs shown to vary with the volume of mail in each class over the “short term” — the period of a single year. Although it considered other methods, it found the short-term approach to be the only feasible one, given the limited data developed by the Postal Service. Id., at 47-62. In the second proceeding, the Rate Commission again viewed the choice of a costing system as within its discretion. PRC Op. R74-1, pp. 92-93, 127. Although the Postal Service contended that short-term costs should again control attribution, the Rate Commission determined that it could reliably attribute more costs through a long-term variable costing analysis. That method attributes costs by identifying cost variations associated with shifts in mail volume and with shifts in the Postal Service’s capacity to handle mail over periods of time longer than one year. Id., at 111-112, 126-127. The Rate Commission did not go beyond attributing long-run variable costs, because the statute forbids attribution based on guesswork, see id., at 110-111, and because the Rate Commission was unable to find “any other reliable principle of causality on [the] record,” id., at 94. The Rate Commission urged the development of improved data for future proceedings, so that it could identify more causal relationships, and thereby attribute more costs. Id., at 110-111. C Reviewing the second proceeding, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the Rate Commission’s approach. National Assn. of Greeting Card Publishers v. USPS, 186 U. S. App. D. C. 331, 569 F. 2d 570 (1976) (NAGCP I), vacated on other grounds, 434 U. S. 884 (1977). The court held that the Act’s principal goals of eliminating price discrimination among classes of mail and curtailing discretion in ratesetting, 186 U. S. App. D. C., at 348-350, 569 F. 2d, at 587-589, require the Rate Commission “to employ cost-of-service principles to the fullest extent possible.” Id. at 354, 569 F. 2d, at 593; see id., at 348, 569 F. 2d, at 587. Therefore, the court stated, the Act mandates not only attribution of variable costs, but also “extended attribution” of costs that, “although not measurably variable,” can reasonably be determined to result from handling each class of mail. Id., at 347, 569 F. 2d, at 586. The court required the Rate Commission to allocate some costs on the basis of “cost accounting principles.” Id., at 344, 569 F. 2d, at 583; see id., at 347, 352, 569 F. 2d, at 586, 591. This involves apportioning costs on the basis of “distribution keys,” such as the weight or cubic volume of mail, notwithstanding the lack of proof that such factors play a causative role. Id., at 344, 352, 569 F. 2d, at 583, 591. The Court of Appeals, citing the language and purposes of the statute, also required the Rate Commission to follow a three-tier, rather than a two-tier, procedure in setting rates. In the court’s view, the first two tiers — attribution and assignment — are to proceed on a cost-of-service basis. Id., at 347, and n. 59, 353-354, 569 F. 2d, at 586, and n. 59, 592-593. Only those “residual costs” that cannot be attributed or assigned on the basis of reasonable inferences of causation may be distributed, in the third tier, among the classes of mail on the basis of § 3622(b)’s noncost, discretionary factors. Id., at 348, 569 F. 2d, at 587. Despite its doubts about NAGCP I, PRC Op. R77-1, p. 9 (1978), the Rate Commission attempted to comply in the fourth ratemaking proceeding. It adhered to its view that variability is the key to attribution, because only with “some showing of volume variability over the long run” could it have reasonable confidence that particular costs were the consequence of providing the service. Id., at 84. Because the data on long-run costs had improved, the Rate Commission found that its long-run analysis satisfied NAGCP 7’s requirement of “extended attribution” without resort to mere “inferences of causation.” PRC Op. R77-1, at 10, 85. Turning to the intermediate assignment tier created by NAGCP 7, the Rate Commission found a group of nonvariable “Service Related Costs” to be reasonably assignable to first-class and certain categories of second-class mail. Service Related Costs were defined as the fixed delivery costs incurred in maintaining the current 6-day-a-week delivery schedule for those classes, rather than a hypothetical 3-day-a-week schedule. See PRC Op. R77-1, at 87-124. D The current controversy began on April 21, 1980, when the Postal Service requested from the Rate Commission a fifth increase in postal rates. Following extensive hearings, the Rate Commission recommended continued assignment of Service Related Costs in order to comply with the Court of Appeals’ three-tier approach, see PRC Op. R80-1, pp. 145-156, despite the Postal Service’s rejection of the concept, see Decision of the Governors of the United States Postal Service on Rates of Postage and Fees for Postal Services, March 10,1981, App. to Pet. for Cert. 13b-14b (Decision of the Governors). The Rate Commission also made clear that while it did not consider variability analysis to be the sole statutory basis for attribution, only long-run variability analysis had been shown to be accurate enough to permit attribution. PRC Op. R80-1, pp. 129-131, 140, and n. 2. The Governors, under protest, permitted these rates to go into effect. On petitions for review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Congress had not intended to require the maximum possible use of cost-of-service principles in postal ratesetting. Newsweek, Inc. v. USPS, 663 F. 2d 1186 (1981). The Second Circuit stated that although the Rate Commission is free to use the approach the District of Columbia Circuit had required, the Act permits the use of other approaches as well, including the Rate Commission’s original two-tier approach to ratesetting. Under the Second Circuit’s construction, § 3622(b)(3) requires that the rate floor for each class consist of attributable costs based, at a minimum, on short-term variability; reasonable assignment may proceed on the basis of the other factors set forth in § 3622(b). The court remanded to the agencies for reconsideration. Because of the inconsistencies in the holdings of the Second and District of Columbia Circuits, we granted certiorari. 456 U. S. 925 (1982). II As a threshold matter, it is useful to set forth what is, and what is not, at issue in this litigation. Of the factors set forth in § 3622(b), only subsection (b)(3) is styled a “requirement.” With the approval of both Courts of Appeals, the Rate Commission has concluded that notwithstanding its placement as the third of nine factors, this distinction dictates that “attribution” and “assignment” define the framework for ratesetting. In addition, the Rate Commission takes the view that “causation is both the statutory and the logical basis for attribution.” PRC Op. R74-1, p. 110. The parties do not dispute these premises, and we see no reason to question them. At issue is the Rate Commission’s consistent position that the Act establishes a two-tier structure for ratesetting, and that the Act does not dictate or exclude the use of any method of attributing costs, but requires that all costs reliably identifiable with a given class, by whatever method, be attributed to that class. An agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute must be upheld unless the interpretation is contrary to the statutory mandate or frustrates Congress’ policy objectives. FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U. S. 27, 32 (1981). Although the Postal Reorganization Act divides ratemaking responsibility between two agencies, the legislative history demonstrates “that ratemaking . . . authority [was] vested primarily in [the] Postal Rate Commission.” S. Rep. No. 91-912, p. 4 (1970) (Senate Report); see Time, Inc. v. USPS, 685 F. 2d 760, 771 (CA2 1982); Newsweek, Inc. v. USPS, 663 F. 2d, at 1200-1201; NAGCP III, 197 U. S. App. D. C., at 87, 607 F. 2d, at 401. The structure of the Act supports this view. While the Postal Service has final responsibility for guaranteeing that total revenues equal total costs, the Rate Commission determines the proportion of the revenue that should be raised by each class of mail. In so doing, the Rate Commission applies the factors listed in § 3622(b). Its interpretation of that statute is due deference. See Time, Inc. v. USPS, 685 F. 2d, at 771; United Parcel Service, Inc. v. USPS, 604 F. 2d 1370, 1381 (CA3 1979), cert. denied, 446 U. S. 957 (1980). Ill In NAGCP I, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit discerned in the Act an overriding purpose to minimize the Rate Commission’s discretion by maximizing the use of cost-of-service principles. According to the Court of Appeals, the Rate Commission’s failure to use “cost accounting principles” to attribute costs, and its failure to “assign” costs on the basis of extended inferences of causation as a middle ratesetting tier, frustrated these congressional goals. Animating the court’s view was the fact that Congress, in passing the Act, was disturbed about the influence of lobbyists on Congress’ discretionary ratemaking and the resulting discrimination in rates among classes of postal service; in the Act, Congress sought to “get ‘politics out of the Post Office.’” 186 U. S. App. D. C., at 349, 569 F. 2d, at 588 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 91-1104, p. 6 (1970) (House Report)). Without doubt, Congress did have these problems in mind, but we agree with the Second Circuit that the District of Columbia Circuit misunderstood Congress’ solution. See 663 F. 2d, at 1198. Congress did not eliminate the rate-setter’s discretion; it simply removed the ratesetting function from the political arena by removing postal funding from the budgetary process, see § 3621 (Postal Service is to be self-supporting), and by removing the Postal Service’s principal officers from the President’s direct control. House Report, at 6, 12, 13, 18-19; Senate Report, at 8. In addition, Congress recognized that the increasing economic, accounting, and engineering complexity of ratemaking issues had caused Members of Congress, “lacking the time, training, and staff support for thorough analysis,” to place too much reliance on lobbyists. House Report, at 18. Consequently, it attempted to remove undue price discrimination and political influence by placing ratesetting in the hands of a Rate Commission, composed of “professional economists, trained rate analysts, and the like,” id., at 5, independent of Postal Service management, id., at 13, and subject only to Congress’ “broad policy guidelines,” id., at 12. Congress sought to ensure that the Postal Service would be managed “in a businesslike way.” Id., at 5; see id., at 11-12. There is no suggestion in the legislative history that Congress viewed the exercise of discretion as an evil in itself. Congress simply wished to substitute the educated and politically insulated discretion of experts for its own. I — I < We turn now to the narrower contentions about the meaning of § 3622(b)(3). In determining whether the Rate Commission’s two-tier approach to ratesetting is contrary to the mandate of the Act or frustrates its policies, we begin with the statute’s language. See North Dakota v. United States, 460 U. S. 300, 312 (1983); Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U. S. 103, 110 (1983). Once the Rate Commission has allocated all attributable costs, § 3622(b)(3) directs that each class must bear, in addition, “that portion of all other costs . . . reasonably assignable” to it. While the verb “attribute” primarily connotes causation, the verb “assign” connotes distribution on any basis. On its face, therefore, the section suggests one ratemaking tier based on causation, and a second based on other factors. We see no justification for the interposition of an intermediate causation-based assignment tier. The Rate Commission’s two-tier approach is consistent with the statutory language. Moreover, the legislative history supports the Rate Commission’s approach. The report of the President’s Commission on Postal Organization (Kappel Commission) found that it would be unfair to require the users of one class of service to pay for expenditures demonstrably related to another class. See Kappel Commission, Towards Postal Excellence: The Report of the President’s Commission on Postal Organization 130 (1968) (Kappel Commission Report). But, on the basis of detailed studies of the Post Office, the report concluded that “[a] large segment of postal costs . . . does not result from handling a particular class of mail but is the cost of maintaining the postal system itself.” Id., at 30. The Kappel Commission proposed a two-tier ratemaking process, very similar to the Rate Commission’s approach, to allocate among the classes of mail these two groups of costs. The House version of § 3622(b)(3) closely followed the Kappel Commission’s proposal, see House Report, at 6, directing the establishment of rates “so that at least those costs demonstrably related to the class of service in question will be borne by each such class and not by other classes of users of postal services or by the mails generally.” H. R. 17070, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 1201(c) (1970). Although the House bill did not address the criteria that would govern distribution of the remaining costs among the various classes of mail, there was no suggestion of a second, more attenuated, causation-based tier as required by the District of Columbia Circuit. The Senate bill, although not expressly calling for a rate floor for each class, required the Rate Commission to consider among other factors “operating costs, the amount of overhead, and other institutional costs of the Postal Service properly assignable to each class of mail.” S. 3842, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., §3704(g)(3) (1970). The Senate bill’s use of the word “assignable,” which the District of Columbia Circuit believed mandated a causation-based “assignment” tier, see NAGCP I, 186 U. S. App. D. C., at 347, n. 59, 569 F. 2d, at 586, n. 59, does not undercut the reasonableness of the Rate Commission’s construction. There is no suggestion either in this language or elsewhere in the legislative history that the Senate envisioned a three-tier approach. In fact, the Senate Report accompanying the bill suggested a two-tier approach, allocating some costs on cost-of-service principles, and allocating other costs through consideration of the overall value of the service provided and other factors. See Senate Report, at 11. As discussed above, the language of the compromise bill enacted into law is fully consistent with a two-tier structure, and there is no legislative history to the contrary. We conclude that the Rate Commission’s two-tier approach is a reasonable construction of § 3622(b)(3). V We now turn to the nature of the first tier, the statutory requirement of attribution. A The Court has observed: “Allocation of costs is not a matter for the slide-rule. It involves judgment on a myriad of facts. It has no claim to an exact science.” Colorado Interstate Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S. 581, 589 (1945). Generally, the legislature leaves to the ratesetting agency the choice of methods by which to perform this allocation, see, e. g., American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 392 U. S. 571, 590-593 (1968); Colorado Interstate Co., 324 U. S., at 589, although if the statute provides a formula, the agency is bound to follow it. Ibid. We agree with the Rate Commission’s consistent position that Congress did not dictate a specific method for identifying causal relationships between costs and classes of mail, but that the Act “envisions consideration of all appropriate costing approaches.” PRC Op. R71-1, p. 46; see PRC Op. R74-1, pp. 92, 127; PRC Op. R80-1, pp. 129-133. The Rate Commission has held that, regardless of method, the Act requires the establishment of a sufficient causal nexus before costs may be attributed. The Rate Commission has variously described that requirement as demanding a “reliable principle of causality,” PRC Op. R74-1, p. 94, or “reasonable confidence” that costs are the consequence of providing a particular service, PRC Op. 77-1, p. 84, or a “reasoned analysis of cost causation.” PRC Op. R80-1, p. 131. Accordingly, despite the District of Columbia Circuit’s interpretation, the Rate Commission has refused to use general “accounting principles” based on distribution keys without an established causal basis. But the Rate Commission has gone beyond short-term costs in each rate proceeding since the first. B Section 3622(b)(3) requires that all “attributable costs” be borne by the responsible class. In determining what costs are “attributable,” the Rate Commission is directed to look to all costs of the Postal Service, both “direct” and “indirect.” In selecting the phrase “attributable costs,” Congress avoided the use of any term of art in law or accounting. In the normal sense of the word, an “attributable” cost is a cost that may be considered to result from providing a particular class of service. On its face, there is no reason to suppose that § 3622(b)(3) denies to the expert ratesetting agency, exercising its reasonable judgment, the authority to decide which methods sufficiently identify the requisite causal connection between particular services and particular costs. The legislative history supports the Rate Commission’s view that when causal analysis is limited by insufficient data, the statute envisions that the Rate Commission will “press for . . . better data,” rather than “construct an ‘attribution’” based on unsupported inferences of causation. PRC Op. R74-1, pp. 110-111. Before passage of the Act, Congress had set rates based on the Post Office’s ungainly “Cost Ascertainment System,” which allocated — on the basis of “distribution keys” like those advocated by the District of Columbia Circuit — all postal expenses to one or another class of mail. The Kappel Commission determined that this approach was “arbitrary [and] uninformative.” Kappel Commission Report, at 30; see id., at 131. Many costs are institutional, and the inferences of causation supporting the Post Office’s allocation of costs to the different classes were simply unsupported by the data. Id., at 29-31, 132-135. In proposing the two-tier approach, therefore, the Kappel Commission stated that each class of service would recover all costs “demonstrably related” to it in order to avoid the inequity of users of one class subsidizing users of another class; however, the “[r]emaining institutional costs would not be apportioned to the several classes of mail by rigid accounting formulas.” Id., at 61-62. The House bill tracked these recommendations, see generally House Report, at 6, and adopted a rate floor consisting of “demonstrably related” costs, H. R. 17070, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 1201(c) (1970), which it described as “identifiable costs.” House Report, at 10. The Senate bill did not explicitly include a causally based rate floor. See 116 Cong. Rec. 22053 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Fannin). But the Senate plainly rejected the notion of binding ratesetters to “accounting principles” akin to those used in the Cost Ascertainment System. The Senate Report stated that “no particular cost accounting system is recommended and no particular classification of mail is required to recover a designated portion of its cost beyond its incremental cost.” Senate Report, at 17. The conference bill enacted into law incorporated the rate floor contained in the House version, but replaced the phrase “demonstrably related” costs with “attributable” costs. Debate on the ratemaking aspects of the conference bill was sparse. On the floor of the House, one conferee defined “attributable” costs as “capable of objective determination and proof either by empirical observation or deductive analysis.” 116 Cong. Rec. 27606 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Udall). On the Senate floor, the Act’s sponsor explained that attributable costs were “actual postal costs.” Id., at 26954 (remarks of Sen. McGee). Neither explanation suggests that the conference bill resurrected accounting principles like those used in the discredited Cost Ascertainment System. The Rate Commission, therefore, acted consistently with the statutory mandate and Congress’ policy objectives in refusing to use distribution keys or other accounting principles lacking an established causal basis. C The Postal Service contends that Congress intended long-term and short-term variable costs to be attributed, but that Congress did not direct attribution of costs, apart from fixed costs incurred by a particular class, that do not vary directly or indirectly with volume. We agree that, because the Rate Commission has decided that these methods reliably indicate causal connections between classes of mail and postal rates, the Act requires that they be employed. But the Act’s language and legislative history support the Rate Commission’s position that Congress did not intend to bar the use of any reliable method of attributing costs. See PRC Op. R71-1, pp. 42-46. The record before Congress in 1970 indicated that identifying which classes cause specific costs was a “most difficult” task, Foster Associates Study, at 1-5, and that a long-run variable cost approach was “the best available measure” of cost causation. Id., at 1-6. The Kappel Commission consequently recommended that each class bear, “as a minimum,” all “demonstrably related” capital and operating costs — “[i]n economic terms . . . the long-run variable costs ascribable to it.” Kappel Commission Report, at 131. Although the House bill adopted the Kappel Commission’s requirement that each class bear its “demonstrably related costs,” we do not believe that in so doing it intended to limit attribution to the long-run variable approach. The Kappel Commission did not emphasize technical matters, focusing instead on the need for nonarbitrary demonstrations of causation. Postmaster General Blount informed the House that the phrase “demonstrably related costs” was employed to avoid the confusion generated by the use of terms of art such as “marginal” or “incremental” costs. “Demonstrably related costs,” he explained, “are those costs which can be traced directly to the class of service in question .... [W]e believe that the legislative history has made amply clear what the term means, without shackling future generations to any particular economic theory.” Hearings on Post Office Reorganization before the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1273 (1969) (Post Office Response to Memoranda Submitted by J. Edward Day). The House Report did not mention any particular costing technique. In defining the rate floor established by the House bill, it explained only that each class would be required to bear “at least its own identifiable costs.” House Report, at 10. Given the House Report’s repeated statements that Members of Congress are ill-equipped to deal with the highly technical economic, accounting, and engineering questions lying at the heart of the ratemaking process, it is implausible to suppose that the House intended to prescribe for the experts appointed to resolve this problem a formula for identifying causal relationships. It is also unlikely that the House intended to limit the Postal Service forever to accounting methods current at the time the bill was enacted. The Conference Committee abandoned the phrase “demonstrably related costs” in favor of “attributable” costs, a phrase that connotes the use of judgment and has no technical meaning or significant antecedent legislative history. It also retained the House bill’s explicit requirement of a rate floor. In so doing, the conferees ensured that identification of causal relationships would not be limited to those methods discussed in the Kappel Commission Report, but would encompass all postal costs, whether “direct or indirect,” that the experts, on whatever reasoned basis, found to be attributable to a particular class of mail. D The Second Circuit found controlling the definition of “attributable” costs contained in the Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House, appended to the Conference Report on the Act, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1363, pp. 79-90 (1970). Newsweek, Inc. v. USPS, 663 F. 2d, at 1199-1200. The House Managers stated that the conference substitute established a rate floor for each class of mail “equal to costs . . . that vary over the short term in response to changes in volume of a particular class or, even though fixed rather than variable, are the consequence of providing the specific service involved.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1363, at 87 (emphasis supplied). The Rate Commission specifically addressed and rejected this argument when it was advanced by the Postal Service in the first two ratemaking proceedings, see PRC Op. R74-1, pp. 101-102, 126-127; PRC Op. R71-1, pp. 42-46, and even the Postal Service since has abandoned it. The statute’s plain language and prior legislative history, discussed above, indicate that Congress’ broad policy was to mandate a rate floor consisting of all costs that could be identified, in the view of the expert Rate Commission, as causally linked to a class of postal service. We cannot say that the House Managers’ Statement alone demonstrates that the Rate Commission’s view is “inconsistent with the statutory mandate or . . . frustrate[s] the policy that Congress sought to implement.” FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U. S., at 32. h — H > We hold that the Rate Commission has reasonably construed the Act as establishing a two-tier ratesetting structure. First, all costs that in the judgment of the Rate Commission are the consequence of providing a particular class of service must be borne by that class. The statute requires attribution of any cost for which the source can be identified, but leaves it to the Commissioners, in the first instance, to decide which methods provide reasonable assurance that costs are the result of providing one class of service. For this function to be performed, the Postal Service must seek to improve the data on which causal relationships may be identified as the Rate Commission remains open to the use of any method that reliably identifies causal relationships. In our view, the Rate Commission conscientiously has attempted to find causal connections between classes of service and all postal costs — both operating costs and “overhead” or “capacity” costs — where the data are sufficient. PRC Op. R74-1, pp. 126-127; see PRC Op. R80-1, pp. 129-131. The Rate Commission is to assign remaining costs reasonably on the basis of the other eight factors set forth by § 3622(b). Inasmuch as the rates at issue were established according to the District of Columbia Circuit’s erroneous view of the Act, we agree with the Second Circuit that this matter must be remanded to the agencies. While we do not agree with all that the Second Circuit said in its opinion, we affirm its judgment in remanding the cases. The remand will be for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. All citations to statutes herein refer to provisions of Title 39 of the United States Code. The Postal Service and Rate Commission classify the various types of mail through a process similar to that governing ratesetting. See §§ 3623, 3625. Presently, the four broad classes of mail are first class (letters, post cards, and small sealed parcels), second class (newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals), third class (single piece service for small parcels, cata-logues, and other items, and certain bulk mail services), and fourth class (primarily parcel post). See Brief for United States Postal Service 4, n. 4. Section 8622(b) provides in relevant part: “(b) Upon receiving a request [from the Postal Service], the [Rate] Commission shall make a recommended decision ... in accordance with the policies of this title and the following factors: “(1) the establishment and maintenance of a fair and equitable schedule; “(2) the value of the mail service actually provided each class or type of mail service to both the sender and the recipient, including but not limited to the collection, mode of transportation, and priority of delivery; “(3) the requirement that each class of mail or type of mail service bear the direct and indirect postal costs attributable to that class or type plus that portion of all other costs of the Postal Service reasonably assignable to such class or type; “(4) the effect of rate increases upon the general public, business mail users, and enterprises in the private sector of the economy engaged in the delivery of mail matter other than letters; “(5) the available alternative means of sending and receiving letters and other mail matter at reasonable costs; “(6) the degree of preparation of mail for delivery into the postal system performed by the mailer and its effect upon reducing costs to the Postal Service; “(7) simplicity of structure for the entire schedule and simple, identifiable relationships between the rates or fees charged the various classes of mail for postal services; “(8) the educational, cultural, scientific, and informational value to the recipient of mail matter; and “(9) such other factors as the Commission deems appropriate.” Opinions and Recommended Decisions of the Rate Commission are cited herein as “PRC Op.,” followed by the docket number. In addition to variable costs, the Rate Commission consistently has attributed fixed costs incurred for the benefit of a single class. See PRC Op. R74-1, p. 76; PRC Op. R80-1, App. B, p. 52 (1981). These “specific fixed costs” constitute a small percentage of all costs. See Brief for United States Postal Service 6. n. 9. The Rate Commission attributed 60% of the Postal Service's total revenue requirement in the first proceeding, see App. 239a, and in the second the data provided by the Postal Service had improved enough to support a rate floor consisting of 52.5% of total postal costs. See PRC Op. R80-1, App. B, p. 28. Such accounting principles are used in utility ratemaking proceedings that employ “fully allocated costing” systems. Under such systems, a specific cause is assigned to every cost incurred by a utility. The Post Office employed such a system prior to the Act. See infra, at 827, and n. 22. The court said that attributable and assignable costs are distinguishable in that “the latter concept permits a greater degree of estimation and connotes somewhat more judgment and discretion than the former.” 186 U. S. App. D. C., at 348, n. 59, 569 F. 2d, at 588, n. 59. Challenges to the third ratemaking proceeding, Docket No. R76-1, which was completed prior to the Court of Appeals’ decision in NAGCP I, see 186 U. S. App. D. C., at 339, n. 21, 569 F. 2d, at 578, n. 21, were dismissed as moot because they still were pending when the administrative decisions in the fourth ratemaking proceeding were complete. National Assn. of Greeting Card Publishers v. USPS, No. 76-1611 (CADC June 27, 1978) (NAGCP II) (order). By this method, the Rate Commission attributed almost 65% of total costs. PRC Op. R77-1, p. 156 (table). The Rate Commission concluded that these nonvariable costs constituted slightly over 7% of the Postal Service’s total revenue requirement. On the assumption that the Postal Service and the Rate Commission would continue to improve and extend their attribution and assignment techniques, the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the Governors’ decision to put into effect the Rate Commission’s recommendations. See National Assn. of Greeting Card Publishers v. USPS, 197 U. S. App. D. C. 78, 82-104, 607 F. 2d 392, 396-418 (1979) (opinion of Leventhal, J.) (NAGCP III), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1025 (1980). More than 64% of total costs were attributed by this method. PRC Op. R80-1, p. 222 (table). Decision of the Governors, App. to Pet. for Cert. lb. The Governors also returned the matter to the Rate Commission for reconsideration. After the Rate Commission twice substantially reaffirmed its recommendations, the Governors exercised their statutory authority to modify the decision, § 3625(d), by, among other changes, abandoning the Service Related Costs concept. See Decision of the Governors Under 39 U. S. C. Section 3625 in the Matter of Proposed Changes in Postal Rates and Fees, Docket No. R80-1 Before the Postal Rate Commission (Sept. 29, 1981). This modification was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which remanded to the Governors for further explanation of their reasoning. Time, Inc. v. USPS, 685 F. 2d 760 (1982). The Governors complied with the remand, Further Explanation and Justification Supporting the September 29, 1981 Decision of the Governors of the United States Postal Service on Rates of Postage and Fees for Postal Services (Dec. 20, 1982), and the Second Circuit recently denied petitions for review. Time, Inc. v. USPS, Nos. 81-4183, 81-4185, 81-4203, 81-4205, and 81-6216 (June 8, 1983). These matters are not before us. The Governors’ subsequent decision to modify the rates at issue, see n. 13, supra, has not mooted the controversy. Postal rates frequently are in effect too briefly for litigation concerning them to be completed before they are superseded. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429, 434, n. 5 (1980). Before judicial review of the second and third ratemaking proceedings could be concluded, for example, new rates resulting from the third and fourth ratemaking proceedings had gone into effect. See NAGCP I, 186 U. S. App. D. C., at 339, n. 21, 569 F. 2d, at 578, n. 21; NAGCP III, 197 U. S. App. D. C., at 82, n. 3, 607 F. 2d, at 396, n. 3. The questions before the Court are certain to be central to future proceedings, and there is more than a “reasonable expectation” that petitioners, who have taken part in most or all of the challenges to prior rate schedules, will be affected by these future proceedings. See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147, 149 (1975); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S., at 434, n. 5; Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U. S. 478, 482 (1982). The Rate Commission is not a party to this action. We are informed that the Rate Commission agrees with the Postal Service that the decision of the Second Circuit is correct and should be affirmed. Brief for United States Postal Service 49, n. 46. We do not understand this statement to indicate that the Rate Commission agrees with all the reasoning in the Postal Service’s brief, or that it has abandoned the consistent reading it has given the Act in the first five ratemaking proceedings. It is the Rate Commission, not the Postal Service, that conducts extensive hearings, § 3624, and applies the ratemaking factors enumerated in § 3622(b). The Postal Service may modify a Rate Commission recommendation only if the recommended rates will not produce revenues equal to the Postal Service’s estimated costs. § 3625(d)(2). The District of Columbia Circuit read the statute to require an intermediate “assignment” tier that, like attribution, must be based on causation principles. The court believed that “Congress did not intend that all postal costs be either attributed or assigned,” because some unattributable postal costs “will exist but will not be ‘reasonably assignable’ to any particular class or type.” NAGCP I, 186 U. S. App. D. C., at 348, 569 F. 2d, at 587 (emphasis in original). This followed, the court believed, from the section’s requirement that each class bear “only ‘that portion of all other costs . . . reasonably assignable.’” Ibid., quoting §3622(b)(3) (the District of Columbia Circuit’s emphasis deleted). But § 3622(b)(3) does not provide that only a portion of all other costs is to be assigned. It says, instead, that through the process of assignment each class of service will receive its reasonable portion of all other costs. First, rates for each class of mail “would cover the costs demonstrably related to that class of service.” Second, “Remaining institutional costs” would be apportioned to the various classes on the basis of market factors, not causation. Kappel Commission Report, at 61-62; see id., at 130-132. Petitioner National Association of Greeting Card Publishers and inter-venor Direct Mail/Marketing Association question the legality of assigning — or attributing — Service Related Costs. We do not rule on this issue. The Rate Commission developed the concept of Service Related Costs only to conform to the District of Columbia Circuit’s erroneous view that “assignment” is an intermediate tier requiring attenuated inferences of causation. “When an administrative agency has made an error of law, the duty of the Court is to ‘correct the error . . . , and after doing so to remand the case to the [agency] so as to afford it the opportunity of examining the evidence and finding the facts as required by law.’ ” NLRB v. Pipefitters, 429 U. S. 507, 522, n. 9 (1977), quoting ICC v. Clyde S.S. Co., 181 U. S. 29, 32-33 (1901). The Rate Commission also should assess the impact on the Service Related Costs concept of Congress’ recent prohibition of any deviation from the present 6-day delivery schedule. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, § 1722, 95 Stat. 759. In the first ratemaking proceeding, the Rate Commission used short-run variable costs “because that approach [was] the only viable costing presentation before us.” PRC Op. R71-1, p. 56. It stated that “long-run incremental costing (for example) ‘remains theoretical and is unproven’ on this record.” Id., at 56-57. Once long-run costing became feasible, the Rate Commission adopted it. The study of postal ratesetting on which the Kappel Commission based its recommendations defined direct costs as “[t]hose elements of cost which can be unequivocally related to a particular product or output,” and indirect costs as “[tjhose elements of cost which cannot unequivocally be associated with a particular output or product.” Foster Associates, Inc., Rates and Ratemaking: A Report to the President’s Commission on Postal Organization, App. A, pp. iii, iv, reprinted in Kappel Commission Report Annex (1968) (Foster Associates Study). See generally id., at 1-8 to 1-11, 2-8 to 2-12, 4-8 to 4-24; id., at App. B; Report on Post Office Department Relating to Survey of Postal Rates Structure, Letter from Postmaster General Transmitting a Report on his Survey of Postal Rates, H. R. Doc. No. 91-97 (1969). The House was aware of the deficiencies of the Cost Ascertainment System since it had held hearings on the subject. See Hearings on Post Office Cost Ascertainment System before the Subcommittee on Postal Rates of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 72 (1969) (testimony of James W. Hargrove, Assistant Postmaster General). The following year, the Subcommittee, through its Chairman, expressed its approval of the Post Office’s recent decision “to abolish the cost ascertainment system and supply postal figures based on demonstrably related costs.” Hearings on Postal Rates and Revenue and Cost Analysis before the Subcommittee on Postal Rates of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Olsen). Petitioner United Parcel Service argues that extended use of cost-of-service principles is necessary to avoid subsidization of those classes of mail for which the Postal Service has competition, such as parcel post, by other classes of mail for which the Postal Service enjoys a statutory monopoly, such as first class. Brief for Petitioner United Parcel Service of America, Inc., 39-42. Congress’ concern about such cross-subsidies, of course, was one motive for including the rate floor established in § 3622(b)(3). But Congress adopted the Kappel Commission’s conclusion that, unless a reliable connection is established between a class of service and a cost, allocation of costs on cost-of-service principles is entirely arbitrary. Beyond requiring the attribution of all costs for which a reliable connection can be established, Congress intended to prevent undue imposition on users of monopolized classes, and to prevent unfair competition, in two ways. First, by making the Rate Commission independent of operating management, Congress meant to minimize the temptation to solve fiscal problems by concentrating rate increases on first-class mail, which is by far the major source of postal revenue. Senate Report, at 13. Second, § 3622(b) requires the Rate Commission to consider, in “assigning” costs remaining above the rate floor, “the effect of rate increases upon the general public . . . and enterprises in the private sector of the economy engaged in the delivery of mail matter other than letters,” § 3622(b)(4), and “the available alternative means of sending and receiving letters and other mail matter at reasonable costs,” § 3622(b)(5). The study underlying the Kappel Commission Report rejected a short-term approach as likely to generate widely fluctuating rates. Foster Associates Study, at 1-5 to 1-6. It recommended measuring variability not just with respect to units of output, but with respect to other variables as well, such as the capacity necessary to produce that output. Id., at 3-33 to 3-34. The Kappel Commission explained the rate floor in these terms: “[T]o avoid undue discrimination every class of service should, as a minimum, pay for all of those costs which it alone causes. Thus . . . each . . . class of mail should pay for those added costs of processing and delivery which it causes the Post Office to incur. It makes no difference whether these costs are capital costs or operating costs, nor should the inquiry be confined to what costs the class has generated historically, but should extend to include what costs it will cause in the foreseeable future.” Kappel Commission Report, at 131 (emphasis in original); see id., at 61-62. At one point, the Senate Report states, without elaboration, that “no particular cost accounting system is recommended and no particular classification of mail is required to recover a designated portion of its cost beyond its incremental cost.” Senate Report, at 17. Arguably, this statement suggests, as a minimum, the use of some form of variability analysis. As the Foster Associates Study explained, “incremental costs” may mean short-run costs, excluding overhead, or may mean long-run costs, including capacity costs and other overhead. Foster Associates Study, App. A, at iv, and n. 1. Whatever the Senate Report meant by “incremental costs,” the quoted passage itself leaves open the possibility that the Rate Commission may find that other “accounting methods” are appropriate. Like the House, the Senate believed that Congress should be taken out of the ratemaking process and the task put in the hands of an “expert commission,” which would allocate costs “on a scientific or quasi-scientific basis.” Senate Report, at 11. The bill initially passed by the Senate spoke of assigning any type of postal cost, including overhead costs, wherever proper. S. 3842, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., §3704(g)(3) (1970). The Second Circuit apparently believed that the Managers’ Statement was the Report of the entire Conference Committee. 663 F. 2d, at 1200. Were this the case, its definition would be due great weight. The Conference Report, however, contained only the text of the Act. There is no dispute that the House Managers’ Statement became available only after the Senate had completed its consideration of the Conference Report. See PRC Op. R80-1, App. B, p. 11. Thus, while certainly significant, this statement does not have the status of a conference report, or even a report of a single House available to both Houses. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 173 U. S. App. D. C. 187, 193, 623 F. 2d 1136, 1142 (1975); K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §3A.31, p. 175 (1970 Supp.). The Rate Commission constantly has stressed the importance to its ratesetting function of receiving more comprehensive and more detailed data from the Postal Service. See PRC Op. R80-1, pp. 107, 111-112, 209-211; PRC Op. R77-1, pp. 85-87; PRC Op. R76-1, pp. 83-87, and App. E; PRC Op. R74-1, pp. 110-111, 123-127; PRC Op. R71-1, pp. 48-57. The importance of a detailed data base was emphasized in the Foster Associates Study, at 5-21, and in the Kappel Commission Report, at 62. The Senate Report recognized that achievement of the Act’s ambitious goals would depend on cooperation between the two agencies. Senate Report, at 13. The Postal Service, which “alone takes in the full scope of Postal Service operations . . . [and] alone is in a position to influence the Postal Service’s day-to-day accounting procedures and record keeping,” Association of American Publishers, Inc. v. Governors of United States Postal Service, 157 U. S. App. D. C. 397, 408, 485 F. 2d 768, 779 (1973) (concurring opinion), must constantly seek to aid the Commission in fulfilling § 3622(b)’s requirement that all costs capable of being considered the result of providing a particular class of service are identified, and borne by that class.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

McCLANAHAN v. ARIZONA STATE TAX COMMISSION No. 71-834. Argued December 12, 1972 Decided March 27, 1973 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Richard B. Collins argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Donald Juneau and Theodore R. Mitchell. James D. Winter, Assistant Attorney General of Arizona, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Gary K. Nelson, Attorney General. Harry R. Sachse argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Frizzell, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Edmund B. Clarke, and Carl Strass. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Charles A. Hobbs for the National Congress of American Indians; by David H. Getches for the Native American Rights Fund; and by Samuel W. Murphy, Jr., and William C. Pelster for Montana Inter-Tribal Policy Board. William D. Dexter, Assistant Attorney General of Washington, and Eugene F. Corrigan filed a brief for Multistate Tax Commission as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Hobbs, Pierre J. LaForce, and R. Don Mahan filed a brief for the Estate of Rose Mason as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. This case requires us once again to reconcile the plenary-power of the States over residents within their borders with the semi-autonomous status of Indians living on tribal reservations. In this instance, the problem arises in the context of Arizona’s efforts to impose its personal income tax on a reservation Indian whose entire income derives from reservation sources. Although we have repeatedly addressed the question of state taxation of reservation Indians, the problems posed by a state income tax are apparently of first impression in this Court. The Arizona courts have held that such state taxation is permissible. 14 Ariz. App. 452, 484 P. 2d 221 (1971). We noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U. S. 916 (1972), and now reverse. We hold that by imposing the tax in question on this appellant, the State has interfered with matters which the relevant treaty and statutes leave to the exclusive province of the Federal Government and the Indians themselves. The tax is therefore unlawful as applied to reservation Indians with income derived wholly from reservation sources. I Appellant is an enrolled member of the Navajo tribe who lives on that, portion of the Navajo Reservation located within the State of Arizona. Her complaint alleges that all her income earned during 1967 was derived from within the Navajo Reservation. Pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §43-188 (f) (Supp. 1972-1973), $16.20 was withheld from her wages for that year to cover her state income tax liability. At the conclusion of the tax year, appellant filed a protest against the collection of any taxes on her income and a claim for a refund of the entire amount withheld from her wages. When no action was taken on her claim, she instituted this action in Arizona Superior Court on behalf of herself and those similarly situated, demanding a return of the money withheld and a declaration that the state tax was unlawful as applied to reservation Indians. The trial court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. Citing this Court’s decision in Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959), the Court of Appeals held that the test “is not whether the Arizona state income tax infringes on plaintiff’s rights as an individual Navajo Indian, but whether such a tax infringes on the rights of the Navajo tribe of Indians to be self-governing.” 14 Ariz. App., at 454, 484 P. 2d, at 223. The court thus distinguished cases dealing with state taxes on Indian real property on the ground that these taxes, unlike the personal income tax, infringed tribal autonomy. The court .then pointed to cases holding that state employees could be required to pay federal income taxes and that the State had a concomitant right to tax federal employees. See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938); Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U. S. 466 (1939). Reasoning by analogy from these cases, the court argued that Arizona’s income tax on individual Navajo Indians did not “[cause] an impairment of the right of the Navajo tribe to be self governing.” 14 Ariz. App., at 455, 484 P. 2d, at 224. Nor did the court find anything in the Arizona Enabling Act, 36 Stat. 557, to prevent the State from taxing reservation Indians. That Act, the relevant language of which is duplicated in the Arizona Constitution, disclaims state title over Indian lands and requires that such lands shall remain “under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States.” 36 Stat. 569. But the Arizona court, relying on this Court’s decision in Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60 (1962), held that the Enabling Act nonetheless permitted concurrent state jurisdiction so long as tribal self-government remained intact. Since an individual income tax did not interfere with tribal self-government, it followed that appellant had failed to state a claim. The Arizona Supreme Court denied a petition for review of this decision, and the case came here on appeal. See 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). II It may be helpful to begin our discussion of the law applicable to this complex area with a brief statement of what this case does not involve. We are not here dealing with Indians who have left or never inhabited reservations set aside for their exclusive use or who do not possess the usual accoutrements of tribal self-government. See, e. g., Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, supra; Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U. S. 45 (1962); Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 U. S. 598 (1943). Nor are we concerned with exertions of state sovereignty over non-Indians who undertake activity on Indian reservations. See, e. g., Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264 (1898); Utah & Northern R. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U. S. 28 (1885). Cf. Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647, 651 (1930). Nor, finally, is this a case where the State seeks to reach activity undertaken by reservation Indians on nonreservation lands. See, e. g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, ante, p. 145. Rather, this case involves the narrow question whether the State may tax a reservation Indian for income earned exclusively on the reservation. The principles governing the resolution of this question are not new. On the contrary, “[t]he policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation’s history.” Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786, 789 (1945). This policy was first articulated by this Court 141 years ago when Mr. Chief Justice Marshall held that Indian nations were “distinct political coriimunities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States.” Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 557 (1832). It followed from this concept of Indian reservations as separate, although dependent nations, that state law could have no role to plav within the reservation boundaries, “The Cherokee nation ... is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States.” Id., at 561. See also United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375 (1886); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S. 556 (1883). Although Worcester on its facts dealt with a State’s efforts to extend its criminal jurisdiction to reservation lands, the rationale of the case plainly extended to state taxation within the reservation as well. Thus, in The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (1867), the Court unambiguously rejected state efforts to impose a land tax on reservation Indians. “If the tribal organization of the Shawnees is preserved intact, and recognized by the political department of the government as existing, then they are a 'people distinct from others,’ capable of making treaties, separated from the jurisdiction of Kansas, and to be governed exclusively by the government of the Union. If under the control of Congress, from necessity there can be no divided authority.” Id., at 755. See also The New York Indians, 5 Wall. 761 (1867). It is true, as the State asserts, that some of the later Indian tax cases turn, not on the Indian sovereignty doctrine, but on whether or not the State can be said to have imposed a forbidden tax on a federal instrumentality. See, e. g., Leahy v. State Treasurer of Oklahoma, 297 U. S. 420 (1936); United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432 (1903). To the extent that the tax exemption rests on federal immunity from state taxation, it may well be inapplicable in a case such as this involving an individual income tax. But it would vastly oversimplify the problem to say that nothing remains of the notion that reservation Indians are a separate people to whom state jurisdiction, and therefore state tax legislation, may not extend. Thus, only a few years ago, this Court struck down Arizona’s attempt to tax the proceeds of a trading company doing business within the confines of the very reservation involved in this case. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U. S. 685 (1965). The tax in no way interfered with federal land or with the National Government’s proprietary interests. But it was invalidated nonetheless because “from the very first days of our Government, the Federal Government had been permitting the Indians largely to govern themselves, free from state interference.” Id., at 686-687. As a leading text on Indian problems summarizes the relevant law: “State laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply. It follows that Indians and Indian property on an Indian reservation are not subject to State taxation except by virtue of express authority conferred upon the State by act of Congress.” U. S. Dept, of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 845 (1958) (hereafter Federal Indian Law). This is not to say that the Indian sovereignty doctrine, with its concomitant jurisdictional limit on the reach of state law, has remained static during the 141 years since Worcester was decided. Not surprisingly, the doctrine has undergone considerable evolution in response to changed circumstances. As noted above, the doctrine has not been rigidly applied in cases where Indians have left the reservation and become assimilated into the general community. See, e. g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 U. S. 598 (1943). Similarly, notions of Indian sovereignty have been adjusted to take account of the State’s legitimate interests in regulating the affairs of non-Indians. See, e. g., New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U. S. 496 (1946); Draper v. United States, 164 U. S. 240 (1896); Utah & Northern R. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U. S. 28 (1885). This line of cases was summarized in this Court’s landmark decision in Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959): “Over the years this Court has modified [the Worcester principle] in cases where essential tribal relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized .... Thus, suits by Indians against outsiders in state courts have been sanctioned. . . . And state courts have been allowed to try non-Indians who committed crimes against each other on a reservation. . . . But if the crime was by or against an Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that expressly conferred on other courts by Congress has remained exclusive. . . . Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.” Id., at 219-220 (footnote omitted). Finally, the trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption. See Mescolero Apache Tribe v. Jones, ante, p. 145. The modern cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state power. Compare, e. g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375 (1886), with Kennedy v. District Court, 400 U. S. 423 (1971). The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read. It must always be remembered that the various Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and that their claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own Government. Indians today are American citizens. They have the right to vote, ’ to use state courts, and they receive some state services. But it is nonetheless still true, as it was in the last century, that “[t]he relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States ... [is] an anomalous one and of a complex character. . . . They were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided.” United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S., at 381-382. III When the relevant treaty and statutes are read with this tradition of sovereignty in mind, we think it clear that Arizona has exceeded its lawful authority by attempting to tax appellant. The beginning of our analysis must be with the treaty which the United States Gov-eminent entered with the Navajo Nation in 1868. The agreement provided, in relevant part, that a prescribed reservation would be set aside “for the use and occupation of the Navajo tribe of Indians” and that “no persons except those herein so authorized to do, and except such officers, soldiers, agents, and employes of the government, or of the Indians, as may be authorized to enter upon Indian reservations in discharge of duties imposed by law, or the orders of the President, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in, the territory described in this article.” 15 Stat. 668. The treaty nowhere explicitly states that the Navajos were to be free from state law or exempt from state taxes. But the document is not to be read as an ordinary contract agreed upon by parties dealing at arm’s length with equal bargaining positions. We have had occasion in the past to describe the circumstances under which the agreement was reached. “At the time this document was signed the Navajos were an exiled people, forced by the United States to live crowded together on a small piece of land on the Pecos River in eastern New Mexico, some 300 miles east of the area they had occupied before the coming of the white man. In return for their promises to keep peace, this treaty 'set apart’ for 'their permanent home’ a portion of what had been their native country.” Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S., at 221. It is circumstances such as these which have led this Court in interpreting Indian treaties, to adopt the general rule that “[djoubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith.” Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 367 (1930). When this canon of construction is taken together with the tradition of Indian independence described above, it cannot be doubted that the reservation of certain lands for the exclusive use and occupancy of the Navajos and the exclusion of non-Navajos from the prescribed area was meant to establish the lands as within the exclusive sovereignty of the Navajos under general federal supervision. It is thus unsurprising that this Court has interpreted the Navajo treaty to preclude extension of state law- — including state tax law — to Indians on the Navajo Reservation. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U. S., at 687, 690; Williams v. Lee, supra, at 221-222. Moreover, since the signing of the Navajo treaty, Congress has consistently acted upon the assumption that the States lacked jurisdiction over Navajos living on the reservation. Thus, when Arizona entered the Union, its entry was expressly conditioned on the promise that the State would “forever disclaim all right and title to . . . all lands lying within said boundaries owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, the right or title to which shall have been acquired through or from the United States or any prior sovereignty, and that until the title of such Indian or Indian tribes shall have been extinguished the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States.” Arizona Enabling Act, 36 Stat. 569. Nor is the Arizona Enabling Act silent on the specific question of tax immunity. The Act expressly provides that “nothing herein, or in the ordinance herein provided for, shall preclude the said State from taxing as other lands and other property are taxed any lands and other property outside of an Indian reservation owned or held by any Indian.” Id., at 570 (emphasis added). It is true, of course, that exemptions from tax laws should, as a general rule, be clearly expressed. But we have in the past construed language far more ambiguous than this as providing a tax exemption for Indians. See, e. g., Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U. S. 1, 6 (1956), and we see no reason to give this language an especially crabbed or restrictive meaning. Indeed, Congress’ intent to maintain the tax-exempt status of reservation Indians is especially clear in light of the Buck Act, 4 U. S. C. § 105 et seq., which provides comprehensive federal guidance for state taxation of those living within federal areas. Section 106 (a) of Title 4 U. S. C. grants to the States general authority to impose an income tax on residents of federal areas, but § 109 expressly provides that “[n]othing in sections 105 and 106 of this title shall be deemed to authorize the levy or collection of any tax on or from any Indian not otherwise taxed.” To be sure, the language of the statute itself does not make clear whether the reference to “any Indian not otherwise taxed” was intended to apply to reservation Indians earning their income on the reservation. But the legislative history makes plain that this proviso was meant to except reservation Indians from coverage of the Buck Act, see S. Rep. No. 1625, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 2, 4 (1940); 84 Cong. Rec. 10685, and this Court has so interpreted it. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U. S., at 691 n. 18. While the Buck Act itself cannot be read as an affirmative grant of tax-exempt status to reservation Indians, it should be obvious that Congress would not have jealously protected the immunity of reservation Indians from state income taxes had it thought that the States had residual power to impose such taxes in any event. Similarly, narrower statutes authorizing States to assert tax jurisdiction over reservations in special situations are explicable only if Congress assumed that the States lacked the power to impose the taxes without special authorization. Finally, it should be noted that Congress has now provided a method whereby States may assume jurisdiction over reservation Indians. Title 25 U. S. C. § 1322 (a) grants the consent of the United States to States wishing to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over reservation Indians, and 25 U. S. C. § 1324 confers upon the States the right to disregard enabling acts which limit their authority over such Indians. But the Act expressly provides that the State must act “with the consent of the tribe occupying the particular Indian country,” 25 U. S. C. § 1322 (a), and must “appropriately [amend its] constitution or statutes.” 25 U. S. C. § 1324. Once again, the Act cannot be read as expressly conferring tax immunity upon Indians. But we cannot believe that Congress would have required the consent of the Indians affected and the amendment of those state constitutions which prohibit the assumption of jurisdiction if the States were free to accomplish the same goal unilaterally by simple legislative enactment. See Kennedy v. District Court, 400 U. S. 423 (1971). Arizona, of course, has neither amended its constitution to permit taxation of the Navajos nor secured the consent of the Indians affected. Indeed, a startling aspect of this case is that appellee apparently concedes that, in the absence of compliance with 25 U. S. C. § 1322 (a), the Arizona courts can exercise neither civil nor criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians. See Brief for Appellee 24-26. But the appellee nowhere explains how, without such jurisdiction, the State’s tax may either be imposed or collected. Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38-39. Unless the State is willing to defend the position that it may constitutionally administer its tax system altogether without judicial intervention, cf. Ward v. Board of County Comm’rs, 253 U. S. 17 (1920), the admitted absence of either civil or criminal jurisdiction would seem to dispose of the case. IV When Arizona’s contentions are measured against these statutory imperatives, they are simply untenable. The State relies primarily upon language in Williams v. Lee stating that the test for determining the validity of state action is “whether [it] infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.” 358 U. S., at 220. Since Arizona has attempted to tax individual Indians and not the tribe or reservation as such, it argues that it has not infringed on Indian rights of self-government. In fact, we are far from convinced that when a State imposes taxes upon reservation members without their consent, its action can be reconciled with tribal self-determination. But even if the State’s premise were accepted, we reject the suggestion that the Williams test was meant to apply in this situation. It must be remembered that cases applying the Williams test have dealt principally with situations involving non-Indians. See also Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S., at 75-76. In these situations, both the tribe and the State could fairly claim an interest in asserting their respective jurisdictions. The Williams test was designed to resolve this conflict by providing that the State could protect its interest up to the point where tribal self-government would be affected. The problem posed by this case is completely different. Since appellant is an Indian and since her income is derived wholly from reservation sources, her activity is totally within the sphere which the relevant treaty and statutes leave for the Federal Government and for the Indians themselves. Appellee cites us to no cases holding that this legislation may be ignored simply because tribal self-government has not been infringed. On the contrary, this Court expressly rejected such a position only two years ago. In Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U. S. 423 (1971), the Blackfoot Indian Tribe had voted to make state jurisdiction concurrent within the reservation. Although the State had not complied with the procedural prerequisites for the assumption of jurisdiction, it argued that it was nonetheless entitled to extend its laws to the reservation since such action was obviously consistent with the wishes of the Tribe and, therefore, with tribal self-government. But we'held that the Williams rule was inapplicable and that “[t]he unilateral action of the Tribal Council was insufficient to vest Montana with jurisdiction.” Id., at 427. If Montana may not assume jurisdiction over the Blackfeet by simple legislation even when the Tribe itself agrees to be bound by state law, it surely follows that Arizona may not assume such jurisdiction in the absence of tribal agreement. Nor is the State’s attempted distinction between taxes on land and on income availing. Indeed, it is somewhat surprising that the State adheres to this distinction in light of our decision in Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, supra, wherein we invalidated an income tax which Arizona had attempted to impose within the Navajo Reservation. However relevant the land-income distinction may be in other contexts, it is plainly irrelevant when, as here, the tax is resisted because the State is totally lacking in jurisdiction over both the people and the lands it seeks to tax. In such a situation, the State has no more jurisdiction to reach income generated on reservation lands than to tax the land itself. Finally, we cannot accept the notion that it is irrelevant “whether the . . . state income tax infringes on [appellant’s] rights as an individual Navajo Indian,” as the State Court of Appeals maintained. 14 Ariz. App., at 454, 484 P. 2d, at 223. To be sure, when Congress has legislated on Indian matters, it has, most often, dealt with the tribes as collective entities. But those entities are, after all, composed of individual Indians, and the legislation confers individual rights. This Court has therefore held that “the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.” Williams v. Lee, supra, at 220 (emphasis added). In this case, appellant’s rights as a reservation Indian were violated when the state collected a tax from her which it had no jurisdiction to impose. Accordingly, the judgment of the court below must be Reversed. See, e. g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 U. S. 598 (1943); Childers v. Beaver, 270 U. S. 555 (1926); United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432 (1903); The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (1867). Cf. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U. S. 1 (1956). State courts have disagreed on the question. Compare Ghahate v. Bureau of Revenue, 80 N. M. 98, 451 P. 2d 1002 (1969), with Commissioner of Taxation v. Brun, 286 Minn. 43, 174 N. W. 2d 120 (1970). See Powless v. State Tax Comm’n, 22 App. Div. 2d 746, 253 N. Y. S. 2d 438 (1964); State Tax Comm’n v. Barnes, 14 Misc. 2d 311, 178 N. Y. S. 2d 932 (1958). The liability was created by Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43-102 (a) (Supp. 1972-1973) which, in relevant part, provides: “There shall be levied, collected, and paid for each taxable year upon the entire net income of every estate or trust taxable under this title and of every resident of this state and upon the entire net income of every nonresident which is derived from sources within this state, taxes in the following amounts and at the following rates upon the amount of net income in excess of credits against net income provided in §§ 43-127 and 43-128.” Appellant conceded below that she was a “resident” within the meaning of the statute, and that question, which in any event poses an issue of state law, is not now before us. See also Williams v. United States, 327 U. S. 711 (1946); United States v. Chavez, 290 U. S. 357 (1933); United States v. Ramsey, 271 U. S. 467 (1926). The federal-instrumentality doctrine does not prohibit state taxation of individuals deriving their income from federal sources. See Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U. S. 466 (1939). Cf. Leahy v. State Treasurer of Oklahoma, 297 U. S. 420 (1936). The doctrine has, in any event, been sharply limited with respect to Indians. See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 U. S. 598 (1943). The court below distinguished Warren Trading Post as limited to cases where the Federal Government has pre-empted state law by regulating Indian traders in a manner inconsistent with state taxation. 14 Ariz. App. 452, 455, 484 P. 2d 221, 224. But although the Court was, no doubt, influenced by the federal licensing requirements, the reasoning of Warren Trading Post cannot be so restricted. The Court invalidated Arizona’s tax in part because “Congress has, since the creation of the Navajo Reservation nearly a century ago, left the Indians on it largely free to run the reservation and its affairs without state control, a policy which has automatically relieved Arizona of all burdens for carrying on those same responsibilities.” Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U. S. 685, 690 (1965). The source of federal authority over Indian matters has been the subject of some confusion, but it is now generally recognized that the power derives from federal responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and for treaty making. See U. S. Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 3; Art. II, §2, cl. 2. See also Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 219 n. 4 (1959); Perrin v. United States, 232 U. S. 478, 482 (1914); Federal Indian Law 3. The extent of federal pre-emption and residual Indian sovereignty in the total absence of federal treaty obligations or legislation is therefore now something of a moot question. Cf. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60, 62 (1962); Federal Indian Law 846. The question is generally of little more than theoretical importance, however, since in almost all cases federal treaties and statutes define the boundaries of federal and state jurisdiction. See 8 U. S. C. § 1401 (a)(2). See, e. g., Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P. 2d 456 (1948). See, e. g., Felix v. Patrick, 145 U. S. 317, 332 (1892). The court below pointed out that Arizona was expending tax monies for education and welfare within the confines of the Navajo Reservation. 14 Ariz, App., at 456-457, 484 P. 2d, at 225-226. It should be noted, however, that the Federal Government defrays 80% of Arizona’s ordinary social security payments to reservation Indians, see 25 U. S. C. § 639, and has authorized the expenditure of more than $88 million for rehabilitation programs for Navajos and Hopis living on reservations. See also 25 U. S. C. §§ 13, 309, 309a. Moreover, “[c]onferring rights and privileges on these Indians cannot affect their situation, which can only be changed by treaty stipulation, or a voluntary abandonment of their tribal organization.” The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall., at 757. “Congress has . . . acted consistently upon the assumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation. . . . Significantly, when Congress has wished the States to exercise this power it has expressly granted them the jurisdiction which Worcester v. Georgia has denied.” Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S., at 220-221 (footnote omitted). This language is duplicated in Arizona’s own constitution. See Ariz. Const., Art. 20, ¶ 4. It is also contained in the Enabling Acts of New Mexico and Utah, the other States in which the Navajo Reservation is located. See New Mexico Enabling Act, 36 Stat. 558-559; Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 108. There is nothing in Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60 (1962), to the contrary. In Egan, we held that “‘absolute’ federal jurisdiction is not invariably exclusive jurisdiction,” and that this language in federal legislation did not preclude the exercise of residual state authority. See id., at 68. But that holding came in the context of a decision concerning the fishing rights of non-reservation Indians. See id., at 62. It did not purport to provide guidelines for the exercise of state authority in areas set aside by treaty for the exclusive use and control of Indians. See, e. g., 25 U. S. C. § 398 (congressional authorization for States to tax mineral production on unallotted tribal lahds). Cf. 18 U. S. C. § 1161 (state liquor laws may be applicable within reservations) ; 25 U. S. C. § 231 (state health and education laws may be applicable within reservations). As passed in 1953, Pub. L. 280, 67 Stat. 588, delegated civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations to certain States, although not to Arizona. 18 U. S. C. § 1162; 28 U. S. C. § 1360. The original Act also provided a means whereby other States could assume jurisdiction over Indian reservations without the consent of the tribe affected. 67 Stat. 590. However, in 1968, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act which changed the prior procedure to require the consent of the Indians involved before a State was permitted to assume jurisdiction. 25 U. S. C. § 1322 (a). Thus, had it wished to do so, Arizona could have unilaterally assumed jurisdiction over its portion of the Navajo Reservation at any point during the 15 years between 1953 and 1968. But although the State did pass narrow legislation purporting to require the enforcement of air and water pollution standards within reservations, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 36-1801, 36-1865 (Supp. 1972), it declined to assume full responsibility for the Indians during the period when it had the opportunity to do so. We do not suggest that Arizona would necessarily be empowered to impose this tax had it followed the procedures outlined in 25 U. S. C. § 1322 et seq. Cf. 25 U. S. C. § 1322 (b). That question is not presently before us, and we express no views on it. In light of our prior cases, appellee has no choice but to make this concession. See, e. g., Kennedy v. District Court, 400 U. S. 423 (1971); States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375 (1886). Organized, Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60 (1962), is not such a case. See n. 15, supra. Indeed, the position was expressly rejected in Williams itself, upon which appellee so heavily relies. Williams held that “absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.” 358 U. S., at 220 (emphasis added).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION v. UNITED GAS PIPE LINE CO. et al. No. 127. Argued January 11, 1967. Decided March 13, 1967. Howard E. Wahrenbrock argued the cause for petitioner in No. 127. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Ralph S. Spritzer, Richard A. Posner and Richard A. Solomon. Reuben Goldberg argued the cause for petitioner in No. 128-i With him on the brief was George E. Morrow. Thomas Fletcher argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent United Gas Pipe Line Co. in both cases. William W. Brackett argued the cause for respondents Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. et al. in both cases. With him on the brief were Charles C. McDugald and Joseph F. Weiler. , Conrad C. Mount, Jack Werner and Melvin Richter filed a brief for the Independent Natural Gas Association of America, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Together with No. 128, Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. United Gas Pipe Line Co. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The question here is whether the Federal Power Commission, in the course of determining just and reasonable rates for United Gas Pipé Line Company (United) under .§ 4 (e) of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 822, 15 U. S. C. § 717c (e), made a proper allowance for federal income taxes in calculating the company’s cost of service. United claimed that in determining the cost of service its al-lowánce for federal income taxes should be at the full 52% rate, or $12,751,454, for the test year. The Commission disagreed because United w;as a member of an affiliated group which during the five-year period of 1957-1961 had elected to file consolidated returns for federal income tax purposes, a fact which in the Commission’s view required a reduced tax allowance in the company’s cost of service. Had consolidated returns not been filed during the .five-year period and had each company in the affiliated group instead filed separate returns, the total tax for the group would have been several million dollars more than was paid on a consolidated basis. This was so because on a consolidated basis consolidated losses serve to reduce consolidated income and because two members of the group, Union and Overseas, had net losses over the five-year period, thereby reducing taxes by $2,092,038 over those years. To determine what the Commission considered the proper tax allowance for United’s rate base, it allocated the actual, consolidated taxes paid during the five-year period among the members of the group in accordance with a formula it had developed in Cities Service Gas Co., 30 F. P. C. 158, the order in which was set aside after issuance of the order in the instant case, 337 F. 2d 97. As so allocated, United’s annual share of the consolidated tax was 50.04% of its taxable income. Using this rate, the Commission allowed United $9,940,892 for federal income taxes instead of the $12,751,454 claimed by United. 31 F. P. C. 1180, 1191. The Court of Appeals, relying on the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. in Cities Service Gas Co. v. FPC, 337 F. 2d 97, held “the tax allocation as made by the Commission’s order was contrary to the requirements which Congress had imposed,” 357 F. 2d 230, 231, and hence vacated and set áside the order. We reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. I. In the Cities Service case the affiliated group filing the consolidated return was composed of both regulated and unregulated companies. Some of the unregulated companies had taxable income, others had even larger losses, and, therefore, as a group the unregulated companies showed a net loss over the representative years used by the Commission to forecast the future federal'income tax element of cost of service. The regulated companies as a group, on the other hand, had taxable income in the same period. On an unconsolidated basis the individual members of the affiliated group would have paid a considerably larger total tax than was actually paid on the consolidated basis. The gas company whose tax allowance for rate purposes was being determined claimed that it was entitled to the full 52% of its own taxable income. Its position was that the Commission had no power at all to apply any of the losses of unregulated companies to reduce its tax allowance and hence its rates. The tax allowance was thus to be figured at 52% without regard to the taxes actually paid by the affiliated group on a consolidated basis, seemingly even if the group paid no tax at all. For the Commission, however, the only real cost to the regulated company was related to the consolidated tax actually paid and incurred in connection'with the other companies in the group. In the. Commission’s view, it was unacceptable to determine the cost of service on a hypothetical figure — to -fix jurisdictional'rates “on the basis of converting a hypothetical tax payment into a prudent operating expense.” 30 F. P. C., at 162. It refused to accept the argument that “Gas Company ratepayers should make Cities Service stockholders whole for the tax losses of nonregulated enterprises even though this means an allowance for taxes over and beyond that which the consolidated system as a whole actually paid.” Ibid. The Commission’s function, it said, was to fix just and reasonable rates, not to insure that other affiliates would be made whole for their tax losses out of income from regulated enterprises. Thus the task was “to. determine the proportion of the consolidated tax which is reasonably attributable to the Gas Company vis-a-vis the other Cities Service affiliates.” Ibid. To make this determination, the Commission devised a formula which in effect applied the losses of unregulated companies first to the gains of other unregulated companies. If a net taxable income remained in the unregulated group, the regulated companies would not share .in the savings from the consolidated return and would be deemed to have paid a tax at the full 52% rate. But if losses of the unregulated companies exceeded their net income and hence reduced the taxes of the regulated group below what they would have paid had they filed separate returns, the consolidated tax paid would be allocated among the regulated companies in proportion to their taxable incomes. As applied to the facts in the Cities Service case, the formula resulted in a tax allowance of $5,866,847 rather than the $7,055,981 claimed by the Cities Service Gas Company. The Court of Appeals set aside the Commission’s order. In its view, the addition of the gas company’s income to the consolidated return cost the affiliated group exactly 52% of the taxable income of the gas company, either in taxes paid or in. a reduction of loss carry-forwards or carrybacks. The Commission’s, formula as applied was therefore held to appropriate losses of unregulated companies and to exceed the Commission’s “jurisdictional limits which require an effective separation of regulated and nonregulated activities for the determination of the ingredients of the rate base . . . mean[ingj a separation of profits and losses between regulated and nonregulated businesses in determining the tax allowance includible in the cost of service of the regulated company.” 337 F. 2d 97, 101. Hence the court, relying on Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S. 581, and Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S. 635, set aside the Commission’s order. i — i HH In our view ^hat the Commission did here did not exceed the powers granted to it by Congress. One of its statutory duties is to determine just and reasonable rates which will be sufficient to permit the company to recover its costs of service and a reasonable return on its investment. Cost of service is therefore a major focus of inquiry. Normally included as a cost of service is a proper allowance for taxes, including federal income taxes. The determination of this allowance, as a general proposition, is obviously within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Ratemaking is, of course, subject to the. rule that the income and expense of unregulated and regulated activities should be segregated. But there is no suggestion in these cases that in arriving at the net taxable income of United the Commission violated this rule. Nor did it in our view in determining the tax allowance. United had not filed its own separate tax return. Instead it had joined with others in the filing of a consolidated return which resulted in the affiliated group’s paying a lower total tax than would have been due had the affiliates filed on a separate-return basis. The question for the Commission was what portion of the singlé consolidated tax liability belonged to United. Other members of the _group should not be required to pay any part of United’s tax, but neither should United pay the tax of others. A proper allocation had to be made by the Commission. Respondents insist that in making the allocation the Commission would violate the statute unless in every conceivable circumstance, including this one, United is' allowed an amount for taxes equal to what it would have paid had it filed a separate return. In their view United should never share in the tax savings inherent in a consolidated return, even if on a consolidated basis system losses exceed system gains and neither the affiliated group nor any member in it has any tax liability. This is an untenable position and we reject it. Rates fixed on this basis would give the pipeline company and its stockholders not only the fair return to which they are entitled but also the full amount of an expense never in fact incurred. In such circumstances, the Commission could properly disallow the hypothetical tax expense and hold that rates based on such an unreal cost of service would not be just and reasonable. It is true that the avoidance of tax and the reduction of the tax alíbwance are accomplished only by applying losses of unregulated companies to the income of the regulated entity.. But the Commission is not responsible for the use of consolidated returns. It is the tax law which permits an election by an appropriate group to file on a consolidated basis. The members of a group, as in these cases, themselves chose not to file separate returns and hence, for tax purposes, to mingle profits and losses of both regulated and unregulated concerns, apparently deeming it more desirable to attempt to turn the losses óf some companies into immediate cash through tax savings rather than to count on the loss companies themselves having future profits against which prior losses could be applied,- Such a private decision made by the affiliates, including the regulated member, has the practical and.intended consequence of reducing the group’s federal income taxes, perhaps to zero, as was true of one of the years ¡involved in the Cities Service case. But when the out-of-pocket tax cost of the regulated affiliate is reduced, there is an immediate confrontation with the ratemaking principle that limits cost of service to expenses actually incurred. Nothing in Colorado Interstate or Panhandle forbids the Commission to recognize the actual tax saving impact of a private election to file consolidated returns. On the contrary, both cases support the power and the duty of the Commission to limit cost of service to real expenses. We think that in the proper circumstances the Commission has the power to reduce cost of service, and hence rates, based on the application of non jurisdictional losses to jurisdictional income. Hence, the question becomes one of when and to what extent the tax savings flowing from the filing of a consolidated return are to be shared by the regulated'company. Or, to put it in the Commission's words the issue is one of determining “the proportion of the consolidated tax which is reasonably attributable to the gas company vis-a-vis [its] other . . . affiliates.” 30 F. P. C., at 162. Viewing these cases in this light, we cannot say that the method the Commission chose to allocate the tax liability among the group members was erroneous or contrary to its statutory authority. Under its formula, the net losses and net income of unregulated companies are first set off one against the other, and the tax savings made possible by losses of unregulated enterprises are thus first allocated to the unregulated companies. Only if “unregulated” losses exceed “unregulated” income is the regulated company deemed to have enjoyed a reduction in its taxes as a result of the consolidated return. If there is more than one regulated company in the group, they will share the tax liability or tax saving in proportion to their taxable income. It is true that the Commission includes in the regulated group companies which are regulated not by it but by state or local authorities and that under the Commission’s formula enterprises not subject to its jurisdiction may be required to share the tax saving with the federally regulated concern. But we know of nothing in the decisions or the statutes governing the ratemaking activities of the Commission which dictates priority for the state-regulated company or which provides that the jurisdictional company may share in the tax saving only if the saving exceeds the separate-return tax liability of the state-regulated company. One could as well argue-that for ratemaking purposes the company subject to federal regulation should have the first benefit of the tax saving. The Commission’s formula, of course, prefers neither concern but allocates the tax liability equitably between each regulated member, without regard to the source of the regulation. “When Congress, as here, fails to provide a formula for the Commission to follow, courts are not warranted in rejecting the one which the Commission employs unless it plainly contravenes the statutory scheme of regulation.” Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S. 581, 589. “If the total effect of -the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end. The fact that'the method employed to reach that result may contain infirmities is not then important.” FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 602. There is no frustration of the tax laws inherent in the Commission’s action. The affiliated group may continue to file consolidated returns and through this mechanism set off system losses against system income, including United’s fair return income. The tax law permits this, but it does not seek to control the amount of income which any affiliate will have. Nor does it attempt to set United’s rates. This is the function of the Commission, a function performed here by rejecting that part of the claimed tax expense which was no expense at all, by reducing cost of service and therefore rates, and by allowing United only a: fair return on its investment. Nor did the Commission “appropriate” or extinguish the losses of any member of the affiliated group, regulated or unregulated. Those losses may still be applied to system gains and thereby be turned into instant cash. United may, of course, have less income than it did. If so, this will correspondingly reduce the opportunity of the affiliated group to use the losses of unregulated companies to appropriate United’s income for the benefit of non-jurisdictional activities because United’s income will no longer offset the same amount of losses which it once did. But the losses of unregulated companies are in no way destroyed. They remain with the system, readily available to reduce the taxes of the profitable affiliates to the maximum extent allowed by the tax law. Another matter deserves some comment. It is said here that the Commission, in applying its tax allowance formula, erroneously failed to recognize and to take account of the fact that United has both jurisdictional and non jurisdictional activities and income. Although this is a matter which might affect the results achieved in application of the Commission’s formula, it is one to which the Court of Appeals has not addressed itself, and we think it appropriate for the issue to be raised there if the parties are so inclined. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cases remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. The election was pursuant to the privilege granted in § 1501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 1501. The other members of the affiliated group are United Gas Corporation, which wholly owns United and which is a gas distribution company subject to state and local regulation, and-two other wholly owned subsidiaries of United Gas Corporation — Union Producing Company (Union), a domestic oil and gas producer whose interstate sales of gas are subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission, and United Overseas Production Company (Overseas) which engaged in oil exploration in foreign countries. “[T]he proper method to be applied in computing the Federal income taxes to be, included in the cost of service of a regulated company where that company has joined in a consolidated tax return with affiliates is (1) separate the companies into regulated and unregulated groups, (2) determine the net aggregate taxable income of each group, and (3) apportion the net total consolidated tax liability over a representative period of time between the two groups, and among the companies in the regulated group, on the'basis of their respective taxable incomes; provided that the allowance so computed for the regulated company shall not exceed what its tax liability would be for rate making purposes, if computed on a separate return basis.” 30 F. P. C. 158, 164. As the Commission noted, id., at 162, it could draw little from the experience of state and local regulatory bodies dealing with the question whether the losses of affiliates should be taken into account in determining the tax allowance for regulated enterprises since the state and local solutions had not been consistent. It does not appear that the Commission drew on its own experience, although with a single exception the Commission seems to have accounted for consolidated tax' savings in past ratemaking proceedings. See Penn-York Natural Gas Corp., 5 F. P. C. 33, 39 (1946); Hope Natural Gas Co., 10 F. P. C. 583, 612, aff’d, 10 F. P. C. 625 (1951); Atlantic Seaboard Corp., 11 F. P. C. 486, 515, aff’d, 11 F. P. C. 43, remanded on other grounds, 200 F. 2d 108 (1952); United Fuel Gas Co., 12 F. P. C. 251 (1953); Hope Natural Gas Co., 12 F. P. C. 342, 347 (1953); Home Gas Co., 13 F. P. C. 241, 246 (1954); United Fuel Gas Co., 23 F. P. C. 127, 134 (1960). But see Olin Gas Transmission Corp., 17 F. P. C. 685 (1956). See Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S. 581, 604-605; Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S. 635, 648-649; El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 281 F. 2d 567, 573, cert. denied sub nom. California v. FPC, 366 U. S. 912; Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359 F. 2d 318, 331, cert. denied, 385 U. S. 847. That some sharing of the tax savings with nonfederally regulated companies was in order seems to have been recognized by the members of the affiliated group. Under the internal allocation formula employed by the group, the tax liability assigned to United represented an effective tax rate of 48.8%.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MEMPHIS STEAM LAUNDRY CLEANER, INC. v. STONE, CHAIRMAN, STATE TAX COMMISSION. No. 253. Argued December 3, 1951. Decided March 3, 1952. C. E. Clifton argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were W. H. Watkins, Sr., P. H. Eager, Jr. and Thomas H. Watkins. J. H.'Sumrall submitted on brief for appellee. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson delivered the opinion of the Court. The question before us is whether a Mississippi tax laid upon the privilege of soliciting business for a laundry not licensed in. that State infringes the Commerce Clause. Appellant operates a laundry and cleaning establishment in Memphis, Tennessee. In serving the area sur rounding Memphis, appellant sends ten of its trucks into eight Mississippi counties where its drivers pick up, deliver and collect for laundry and cleaning and seek to acquire new customers. Appellee, who is Chairman of the' State Tax Commission of the State of Mississippi, demanded that appellant pay $500 under the following provisions of the Mississippi “state-wide privilege tax law of 1944”: “Sec. 3. Every person desiring to engage in any business, or exercise any privilege hereafter specified shall first, before commencing same, apply for, pay for, and procure from the state tax commissioner or commissioner of insurance,, a privilege license authorizing him to engage in the business or exercise the privilege specified therein, and the amount of tax shown in the following sections is hereby imposed for the privilege of engaging or continuing in the business set out therein.” “Sec..45. Upon each person doing business as a transient vendor, or dealer, as defined in this section, and upon which a privilege tax is not specifically imposed by another section of this act, a tax for each county according to the following schedules: “(t) Upon each person soliciting business for a laundry not licensed in this state as such, in each county..........$50.00 “(y) Provided however, that where any person subject to the payment of the tax imposed in this section, makes use of more than one vehicle in carrying on such business, the tax herein imposed shall be paid on each vehicle used in carrying on such business.” After paying the $500 tax as demanded to prevent arrest of its drivers and seizure of its ten trucks, appellant sued for refund in a state court, claiming that the Mississippi tax act was not applicable to its operations and that, if so applied, the tax would violate the Commerce Clause. Judgment was entered for appellant in the trial court but the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, holding that appellant’s drivers were “transient vendors or dealers”, within the meaning of the statute and that application of the tax to appellant did not conflict with the Commerce Clause. The case is here on appeal. 28 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 1257 (2). In passing upon the validity of a state tax challenged under the Commerce Clause, we first look to the “operating incidence” of the tax. The Mississippi Act requires a “privilege license” and imposes a “privilege tax” upon appellant’s employees “soliciting business.” The Mississippi Supreme Court described the tax as follows: “. . . The tax involved here is not a tax on interstate commerce, but a tax on a person soliciting business for a laundry not licensed in this state, a local activity which applies to residents and non-residents alike.” The State may determine for itself the operating incidence of its tax. But it is for this Court to determine whether the tax, as construed by the highest court of the State, is or is not “a tax on interstate commerce.” It would appear from portions of the opinion of the court below that the tax is laid upon the privilege of soliciting interstate business on the theory that solicitation of customers for interstate commerce is a local activity subject to state taxation. However, the opinion below may also be read as construing the statutory term “soliciting” more broadly, thereby resting the tax upon appellant’s activities apart' from soliciting new customers in Mississippi, namely the pick up and delivery of laundry and cleaning on regular routes within the State. Each construction of the statute raises different considerations. But clarification of the operating incidence of the tax is not required for disposition of this case since we find that the tax violates the Commerce Clause under either reading of the statute. I. In the long line of “drummer” cases, beginning with Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489 (1887), this Court has held that a tax imposed upon the solicitation of interstate business is a tax upon interstate commerce itself. Whether or not solicitation of interstate business may be regarded as a local incident of interstate commerce, the Court has not permitted state taxation to carve out this incident from the integral economic process of interstate commerce. As the Court noted last term in a case' involving door-to-door solicitation of interstate business,- “Interstate commerce itself knocks on the local door.” If the Mississippi tax is imposed upon the privilege of soliciting interstate business, the tax stands on no better footing than á tax upon the privilege of doing interstate business. A tax so imposed cannot stand under the Commerce Clause. Spector Motor Service v. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602, 608-609 (1951), and cases cited therein. II. On the assumption that the tax is imposed upon, appellant’s Mississippi activities of picking up and delivering laundry and cleaning, the “peddler” cases are invoked in support of the tax. Under that line of decisions, this Court has sustained state taxation upon itinerant hawkers and peddlers on the ground that the local sale and delivery of goods is an essentially intrastate process whether a retailer operates from'a fixed location or from a wagon. However, assuming for the purposes of this case that Mississippi imposes its $50 pér truck tax only upon the privilege of conducting intrastate activities, the tax must be held, invalid as one discriminating against interstate commerce. The $50 per truck tax is applicable only to vehicles used by a person “soliciting business for a laundry not licensed in this state as such.” (Emphasis supplied.) Laundries licensed in Mississippi pay a fixed fee to the municipality in which located, plus a tax of $8 per truck upon each truck used in other municipalities. As a result, if appellant “solicits” business in a Mississippi municipality, it must pay a tax of $50 per truck while a competitor located in another Mississippi locality must pay a tax of only $8 per truck. The “peddler” cases are inapposite under such a showing of discrimination since they support state taxation only where no discrimination against interstate commerce appears either upon the face of the tax laws or in their practical operation. To sum up, we hold that the tax before us infringes the Commerce Clause under either interpretation of the operating incidence of the tax. The Commerce Clause created the nation-wide area of free trade essential to this, country’s economic welfare- by removing state lines as impediments to intercourse between the states. The tax imposed in this case made the Mississippi state line into a local obstruction to the flow of interstate commerce that cannot stand under the Commerce Clause. Reversed. Mr. Justice Black dissents. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8. Laws of Mississippi, 1944, c. 138, §§ 3, 45. 53 So. 2d 89 (1951). The Mississippi Supreme Court also rejected appellant’s claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. We do not reach these issues under our disposition of the case. Spector Motor Service v. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602 (1951). 53 So. 2d at 90. McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327 (1944); Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 389, 400-401 (1913). Cases in this Court following the Robbins decision include: Corson v. Maryland, 120 U. S. 502 (1887); Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129 (1888); Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141 (1889); Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289 (1894); Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U. S. 27 (1902); Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622 (1903); Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507 (1906); International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91 (1910); Dozier v. Alabama, 218 U. S. 124 (1910); Crenshaw v. Arkansas, note 6, supra; Rogers v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 401 (1913); Stewart v. Michigan, 232 U. S. 665 (1914); Davis v. Virginia, 236 U. S. 697 (1915); Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 147 (1918); Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U. S. 325 (1925); Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454 (1940); Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946). “The negotiation of sales of goods which are in another state, for the purpose of introducing them into the state in which the negotiation is made, is interstate commerce.” 120 U. S. at 497; Real Silk Hodery Mills v. Portland, note 7, supra, at 335. Nippert v. Richmond, note 7, supra, at 422-423. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622, 636 (1951). In sustaining the ordinance before it as one that was neither an added financial burden on sales in commerce nor an exaction for the privilege of doing interstate commerce, the Court made the following statement pertinent to the instant case: “While taxation and licensing of hawking or peddling, defined as selling and delivering in the state, has long been thought to show no violation of the Commerce Clause, solicitation of orders with subsequent interstate shipment has been immune from such an exaction.” 341 U. S. at 638. In McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U. S. 33, 58 (1940), the Court sustained a tax “conditioned upon a local activity, delivery of goods within the state upon their purchase for consumption.” It was in that context that Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, supra, was referred to as resting upon discrimination inherent in fixed-sum license taxes. 309 U. S. at 56-57; Best & Co. v. Maxwell, note 7, supra, at 455-456; Nippert v. Richmond, note 7, supra, at 424 — 425. Compare Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 257-258 (1946). In the leading opinion, Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296 (1895), the Court reaffirmed Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676 (1880), and other earlier cases. Subsequent additions to the line of “peddler cases” include: Baccus v. Louisiana, 232 U. S. 334 (1914); Wagner v. Covington, 251 U. S. 95 (1919); Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U. S. 117 (1941). Nippert v. Richmond, note 7, supra; Best & Co. v. Maxwell, note 7, supra; Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U. S. 375 (1939); Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, 460-461 (1886); Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344 (1881); Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434 (1880); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1876). Laws of Mississippi, 1944, c. 137, § 110, imposes the following tax: “Upon each person operating a laundry other than a hand laundry, as follows: In municipalities of class 1...................... $120.00 In municipalities-of class 2.............-......... 80.00 In municipalities of classes 3 and 4.............. 60.00 In municipalities of classes 5, 6, 7 and elsewhere in the county..................................' 32.00 Upon each truck or other vehicle for such laundry in a municipality other than where the laundry is located .................................... -8.00” Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, note 12, supra, at 119-120; Wagner v. Covington, note 12, supra, at 102; Emert v. Missouri, note 12, supra, at 311; Machine Co. v. Gage, note 12, supra, at 679. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189 (1824); Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U. S. 525, 533-535, 538-539 (1949).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

INTERSTATE OIL PIPE LINE CO. v. STONE, CHAIRMAN STATE TAX COMMISSION. No. 287. Argued January 13, 1949. Decided June 20, 1949. Phelan H. Hunter argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Villard Martin and Garrett Logan. J. H. Sumrall argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee, Mr. Justice Rutledge announced the judgment of the Court and the following opinion, in which Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Murphy join. This appeal questions the power of Mississippi, as affected by the commerce clause, to impose a tax measured by gross receipts from the operation of a pipe line wholly within the state. Appellant is a Delaware corporation which has qualified to do business in Mississippi as a foreign corporation. It owns and operates pipe lines which are used to transport oil from lease tanks in various oil fields in Mississippi to loading racks adjacent to railroads elsewhere in the state. From these racks the oil is pumped into railroad tank cars for shipment outside the state. If there are no tank cars available the oil is stored in tanks near the racks. But such delays in loading are usually of short duration and never exceed a week, according to appellant’s uncontradicted statement. ' When delivered to appellant the oil is accompanied by shipping orders from the producer or owner directing that the oil be transported to out-of-state destinations. There are no refineries in Mississippi. There is no through bill of lading from the point of origin at the fields to the destination outside the state. Appellant ships the oil by rail as agent of the owner on bills of lading showing the owner as shipper, the appellant as agent of the shipper, and indicating-the destination specified in the shipping orders issued to appellant. Appellant is paid by the producer at the rate per barrel specified in its tariff for transporting the oil from the gathering point to the rack, and is paid an additional- charge for loading the oil in the tank cars. The chairman of the Mississippi State Tax Commission, appellee, levied a tax against appellant for the years 1944, 1945 and the first half of 1946, in the sum of $20,296.36, measured by appellant's receipts for transporting oil from the lease tanks to the railroad loading platforms, pursuant to the following sections of the Mississippi Code, Miss. Code, 1942, Ann., tit. 40, c. 3, § 10105, and § 10109 (1948 Cum. Supp.), which provide:- “10105. . . . There is hereby levied and shall be collected annual privilege taxes, measured by the amount or volume of business done, against the persons, on account of the business activities, and in the amounts to be determined by the application of rates against values, or gross income, or gross proceeds of sales, as the case may be, as follows [see sections following]:'' “10109. . . . Upon every person engaging or continuing within-this state in the business of operating a pipe line for transporting for compensation or hire from one point to another in this state oil or natural gas or artificial gas through pipes or conduits in this state, there is likewise hereby levied and shall be collected a tax, on account of the business engaged in,- equal tó two per cent of the gross income of the business. “There shall-be excepted from the gross income used in determining the measure- of the tax imposed in this section so much thereof as is derived from the business conducted in commerce between this state and other states of the United States, or between this state and foreign countries which the state of Mississippi is prohibited from taxing under the constitution of the United States of America. . . The State Tax Commission sustained the assessment. The trial court dismissed a declaration seeking review of the Commission’s action. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed that judgment, overruling appellant’s contention that because the tax was levied on the privilege of conducting an interstate business and measured by gross receipts therefrom the tax could not be imposed without offending the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. 203 Miss. 715, 35 So. 2d 73. The state supreme court held that the operation of these pipe lines between points within the state was intrastate rather than interstate commerce, and that the tax was therefore “merely on the privilege of operating a pipe line wholly within this State as a local activity. ... a tax on the privilege of doing an intrastate business, and-measured by a percent of gross income as a matter of convenience.” 203 Miss, at 732, 35 So. 2d at 81. Appellant contends that operation of the pipe lines between points in Mississippi was in fact interstate commerce, and that the tax was construed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi to be a tax on the privilege of operating the pipe lines. From these premises, together with the major premise that no state can tax the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, appellant concludes that the tax may not constitutionally be imposed. We do not pause to consider whether the business of operating the intrastate pipe lines is interstate commerce, for, even if we assume that it is, Mississippi has power to impose the tax involved in this case. Further, we do not find it necessary to dispute that the Supreme Court of Mississippi construed the statute as imposing a tax on the privilege of operating a pipe line wholly within the state, and not a tax solely upon the “local activities of ‘maintaining, keeping in repair, and otherwise in manning the facilities’ ” situated in Mississippi, Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 92-93, or upon the gross receipts themselves, Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U. S. 653. While we are of course bound by the construction given a state statute by the highest court of the State, we are concerned with the practical operation of challenged state tax statutes, not with their descriptive labels. The statute is not invalidated by the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution merely because, unlike the statute attacked in Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, supra, it imposes a “direct” tax on the “privilege” of engaging in interstate commerce. Any notions to the contrary should not have survived Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 142 U. S. 217, which flatly rules the case at bar. That case sustained a state statute which imposed upon an interstate railroad corporation “an annual excise tax [measured by,apportioned gross receipts], for the privilege of exercising its franchises in this State.” The Grand Trunk decision has been approved by this Court as recently as the other controlling case of Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, supra at 658, 663, in which the Court permitted New York to impose a tax on the gross receipts from the operation of an interstate bus line, provided that tax was apportioned according to mileage traveled within the state. The Mealey case is not distinguished by saying that it involved only a tax on gross receipts and not a tax on interstate commerce itself, for gross receipts táxes have long been regarded as “direct” in cases which are supposed to support the proposition that “direct” taxes on interstate commerce are invalid under the commerce clause. Since all the activities upon which the tax is imposed are carried on in Mississippi, there is no due process objection to the tax. The tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of competing intrastate commerce of like character. The nature of the. subject of taxation makes apportionment unnecessary; there is no attempt to tax interstate' activity carried on outside Mississippi’s borders. No other state can repeat the tax. For these reasons the commerce clause does not invalidate this tax. The judgment is Affirmed. Appellant also gathers oil which is transported through the Mississippi pipe lines directly into interstate trunk lines, through which the oil is carried outside the state. Mississippi has not attempted to tax the receipts attributable to shipments of this kind. All appellant’s transportation of oil in Mississippi is covered by-tariffs which are published and filed with the Interstate. Commerce Commission as required by the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, 49U.S.C. §§1 (1), 1 (3), and 6. Other provisions of the Mississippi Code not here involved impose franchise, net income and ad valorem property tdxes, all of which appellant paid for the years involved. This fact does not of course preclude Mississippi from exacting a different tax for the protection upon which one or moré of these taxes is based'. E. g., Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 85. Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309 U. S. 270, 273; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 287 U. S. 509, 513. International Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 346, 347; Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U. S. 359, 363. See concurring opinion in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 259. Nothing in the Grand Trunk opinion suggests the explanation hazarded by Mr. Justice Holmes in Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 226, that the tax in the Grand Trunk case was sustained on the ground that it was imposed in lieu of ad valorem taxes. A copy of the statute reprinted in the margin of the Reports discloses that the tax was “in lieu of all taxes upon such railroad, its property and stock,” except that cities and towns were permitted to tax not only all buildings owned by the railroad but also railroad-., owned “lands and fixtures” outside the right of way. 142 U. S. 217-218, n. 1. See the cases discussed in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 255-257; concurring opinion in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 264 — 266. As the cited discussions point out, most of the cases invalidating ■ “direct” taxes on interstate commerce are explicable on the ground that the taxes were not fairly apportioned. But cf. the following cases, which involve apportioned franchise or privilege taxes measured by a standard other than gross receipts: Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555; Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203; cf. Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U. S. 218. Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 423-424; Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444-445; separate opinion in International Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 352-353; concurring opinion in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 271; concurring opinion in Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 96. Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454; Hale v. Bimco Trading Co., 306 U. S. 375; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434. Cf. Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 439-440; Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 311-312; Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 255-257.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION et al. v. VON RAAB, COMMISSIONER, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE No. 86-1879. Argued November 2, 1988 Decided March 21, 1989 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 679. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SteVens, J., joined, post, p. 680. Lois G. Williams argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs was Elaine D. Kaplan. Solicitor General Fried argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Bolton, Deputy Solicitor General Merrill, Deputy Assistant Attorneys General Spears and Cynkar, Lawrence S. Rob bins, Leonard Schaitman, Robert V. Zener, and James H. Anderson Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Stephen H. Sachs, Carl Willner, John A. Powell, Steven R. Shapiro, Arthur B. Spitzer, and Elizabeth Symonds; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. by Joe Goldberg, David Silberman, Laurence Gold, Edward J. Hickey, Jr., Thomas A. Woodley, and Richard Kirschner; for the Coalition of California Utility Workers by Glenn Rothner; for the Fraternal Order of Police, Grand Lodge, by James E. Phillips and John R. Fisher; and for the New Jersey State Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police, by Jay Ruben-stein, Janemary S. Belsole, and Stuart Reiser. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the California Employment Law Council by Paul Grossman; for the College of American Pathologists by Jack R. Bierig; for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, Stephen C. Yohay, and Garen E. Dodge; for Pharmchem Laboratories, Inc., et al. by Nelson G. Dong; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, and Vicki S. Marani. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Paul R. Friedman and Stephen A. Bokat; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zumbrun and Anthony T. Caso. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to decide whether it violates the Fourth Amendment for the United States Customs Service to require a urinalysis test from employees who seek transfer or promotion to certain positions. I A The United States Customs Service, a bureau of the Department of the Treasury, is the federal agency responsible for processing persons, carriers, cargo, and mail into the United States, collecting revenue from imports, and enforcing customs and related laws. See United States Customs Service, Customs U. S. A., Fiscal Year 1985, p. 4. An important responsibility of the Service is the interdiction and seizure of contraband, including illegal drugs. Ibid. In 1987 alone, Customs agents seized drugs with a retail value of nearly $9 billion. See United States Customs Service, Customs U. S. A., Fiscal Year 1987, p. 40. In the routine discharge of their duties, many Customs employees have direct contact with those who traffic in drugs for profit. Drug import operations, often directed by sophisticated criminal syndicates, United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 561-562 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring), may be effected by violence or its threat. As a necessary response, many Customs operatives carry and use firearms in connection with their official duties. App. 109. In December 1985, respondent, the Commissioner of Customs, established a Drug Screening Task Force to explore the possibility of implementing a drug-screening program within the Service. Id., at 11. After extensive research and consultation with experts in the field, the task force concluded that “drug screening through urinalysis is technologically reliable, valid and accurate.” Ibid. Citing this conclusion, the Commissioner announced his intention to require drug tests of employees who applied for, or occupied, certain positions within the Service. Id., at 10-11. The Commissioner stated his belief that “Customs is largely drug-free,” but noted also that “unfortunately no segment of society is immune from the threat of illegal drug use.” Id., at 10. Drug interdiction has become the agency’s primary enforcement mission, and the Commissioner stressed that “there is no room in the Customs Service for those who break the laws prohibiting the possession and use of illegal drugs.” Ibid. In May 1986, the Commissioner announced implementation of the drug-testing program. Drug tests were made a condition of placement or employment for positions that meet one or more of three criteria. The first is direct involvement in drug interdiction or enforcement of related laws, an activity the Commissioner deemed fraught with obvious dangers to the mission of the agency and the lives of Customs agents. Id., at 17, 113. The second criterion is a requirement that the incumbent carry firearms, as the Commissioner concluded that “[pjublic safety demands that employees who carry deadly arms and are prepared to make instant life or death decisions be drug free.” Id., at 113. The third criterion is a requirement for the incumbent to handle “classified” material, which the Commissioner determined might fall into the hands of smugglers if accessible to employees who, by reason of their own illegal drug use, are susceptible to bribery or blackmail. Id., at 114. After an employee qualifies for a position covered by the Customs testing program, the Service advises him by letter that his final selection is contingent upon successful completion of drug screening. An independent contractor contacts the employee to fix the time and place for collecting the sample. On reporting for the test, the employee must produce photographic identification and remove any outer garments, such as a coat or a jacket, and personal belongings. The employee may produce the sample behind a partition, or in the privacy of a bathroom stall if he so chooses. To ensure against adulteration of the specimen, or substitution of a sample from another person, a monitor of the same sex as the employee remains close at hand to listen for the normal sounds of urination. Dye is added to the toilet water to prevent the employee from using the water to adulterate the sample. Upon receiving the specimen, the monitor inspects it to ensure its proper temperature and color, places a tamper-proof custody seal over the container, and affixes an identification label indicating the date and the individual’s specimen number. The employee signs a chain-of-custody form, which is initialed by the monitor, and the urine sample is placed in a plastic bag, sealed, and submitted to a laboratory. The laboratory tests the sample for the presence of marijuana, cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, and phencyclidine. Two tests are used. An initial screening test uses the enzyme-multiplied-immunoassay technique (EMIT). Any specimen that is identified as positive on this initial test must then be confirmed using gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS). Confirmed positive results are reported to a “Medical Review Officer,” “[a] licensed physician. . . who has knowledge of substance abuse disorders and has appropriate medical training to interpret and evaluate an individual’s positive test result together with his or her medical history and any other relevant biomedical information.” HHS Reg. § 1.2, 53 Fed. Reg. 11980 (1988); HHS Reg. §2.4(g), 53 Fed. Reg., at 11983. 'After verifying the positive result, the Medical Review Officer transmits it to the agency. Customs employees.who test positive for drugs and who can offer no satisfactory explanation are subject to dismissal from the Service. Test results may not, however, be turned over to any other agency, including criminal prosecutors, without the employee’s written consent. B Petitioners, a union of federal employees and a union official, commenced this suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of current Customs Service employees who seek covered positions. Petitioners alleged that the Custom Service drug-testing program violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment. The District Court agreed. 649 F. Supp. 380 (1986). The court acknowledged “the legitimate governmental interest in a drug-free work place and work force,” but concluded that “the drug testing plan constitutes an overly intrusive policy of searches and seizures without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, in violation of legitimate expectations of privacy.” Id., at 387. The court enjoined the drug-testing program, and ordered the Customs Service not to require drug tests of any applicants for covered positions. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction. 816 F. 2d 170 (1987). The court agreed with petitioners that the drug-screening program, by requiring an employee to produce a urine sample for chemical testing, effects a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The court held further that the searches required by the Commissioner’s directive are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It first noted that “[t]he Service has attempted to minimize the intrusiveness of the search” by not requiring visual observation of the act of urination and by affording notice to the employee that he will be tested. Id., at 177. The court also considered it significant that the program limits discretion in determining which employees are to be tested, ibid., and noted that the tests are an aspect of the employment relationship, id., at 178. The court further found that the Government has a strong interest in detecting drug use among employees who meet the criteria of the Customs program. It reasoned that drug use by covered employees casts substantial doubt on their ability to discharge their duties honestly and vigorously, undermining public confidence in the integrity of the Service and concomitantly impairing the Service’s efforts to enforce the drug laws. Ibid. Illicit drug users, the court found, are susceptible to bribery and blackmail, may be tempted to divert for their own use portions of any drug shipments they interdict, and may, if required to carry firearms, “endanger the safety of their fellow agents, as well as their own, when their performance is impaired by drug use.” Ibid. “Considering the nature and responsibilities of the jobs for which applicants are being considered at Customs and the limited scope of the search,” the court stated, “the exaction of consent as a condition of assignment to the new job is not unreasonable.” Id., at 179. The dissenting judge concluded that the Customs program is not an effective method for achieving the Service’s goals. He argued principally that an employee “given a five day notification of a test date need only abstain from drug use to prevent being identified as a user.” Id., at 184. He noted also that persons already employed in sensitive positions are not subject to the test. Ibid. Because he did not believe the Customs program can achieve its purposes, the dissenting judge found it unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. We granted certiorari. 485 U. S. 903 (1988). We now affirm so much of the judgment of the Court of Appeals as upheld the testing of employees directly involved in drug interdiction or required to carry firearms. We vacate the judgment to the extent it upheld the testing of applicants for positions requiring the incumbent to handle classified materials, and remand for further proceedings. II hH In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., ante, at 616-618, decided today, we held that federal regulations requiring employees of private railroads to produce urine samples for chemical testing implicate the Fourth Amendment, as those tests invade reasonable expectations of privacy. Our earlier cases have settled that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches conducted by the Government, even when the Government acts as an employer, O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709, 717 (1987) (plurality opinion); see id., at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment), and, in view of our holding in Railway Labor Executives that urine tests are searches, it follows that the Customs Service’s drug-testing program must meet the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. While we have often emphasized, and reiterate today, that a search must be supported, as a general matter, by a warrant issued upon probable cause, see, e. g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868, 873 (1987); United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705, 717 (1984), our decision in Railway Labor Executives reaffirms the longstanding principle that neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance. Ante, at 618-624. See also New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 342, n. 8 (1985); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 556-661 (1976). As we note in Railway Labor Executives, our cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual’s privacy expectations against the Government’s interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context. Ante, at 619-620. It is clear that the Customs Service’s drug-testing program is not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement. Test results may not be used in a criminal prosecution of the employee without the employee’s consent. The purposes of the program are to deter drug use among those eligible for promotion to sensitive positions within the Service and to prevent the promotion of drug users to those positions. These substantial interests, no less than the Government’s concern for safe rail transportation at issue in Railway Labor Executives, present a special need that may justify departure from the ordinary warrant and probable-cause requirements. A Petitioners do not contend that a warrant is required by the balance of privacy and governmental interests in this context, nor could any such contention withstand scrutiny. We have recognized before that requiring the Government to procure a warrant for every work-related intrusion “would conflict with ‘the common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.’” O’Connor v. Ortega, supra, at 722, quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 143 (1983). See also 480 U. S., at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); New Jersey v. T. L. O., supra, at 340 (noting that “[t]he warrant requirement ... is unsuited to the school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools”). Even if Customs Service employees are more likely to be familiar with the procedures required to obtain a warrant than most other Government workers, requiring a warrant in this context would serve only to divert valuable agency resources from the Service’s primary mission. The Customs Service has been entrusted with pressing responsibilities, and its mission would be compromised if it were required to seek search warrants in connection with routine, yet sensitive, employment decisions. Furthermore, a warrant would provide little or nothing in the way of additional protection of personal privacy. A warrant serves primarily to advise the citizen that an intrusion is authorized by law and limited in its permissible scope and to interpose a neutral magistrate between the citizen and the law enforcement officer “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). But in the present context, “the circumstances justifying toxicological testing and the permissible limits of such intrusions are defined narrowly and specifically . . . , and doubtless are well known to covered employees.” Ante, at 622. Under the Customs program, every employee who seeks a transfer to a covered position knows that he must take a drug test, and is likewise aware of the procedures the Service must follow in administering the test. A covered employee is simply not subject “to the discretion of the official in the field.” Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523, 532 (1967). The process becomes automatic when the employee elects to apply for, and thereafter pursue, a covered position. Because the Service does not make a discretionary determination to search based on a judgment that certain conditions are present, there are simply “no special facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 383 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). B Even where it is reasonable to dispense with the warrant requirement in the particular circumstances, a search ordinarily must be based on probable cause. Ante, at 624. Our cases teach, however, that the probable-cause standard “ ‘is peculiarly related to criminal investigations.’” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U. S. 367, 371 (1987), quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, at 370, n. 5. In particular, the traditional probable-cause standard may be unhelpful in analyzing the reasonableness of routine administrative functions, Colorado v. Bertine, supra, at 371; see also O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S., at 723, especially where the Government seeks to prevent the development of hazardous conditions or to detect violations that rarely generate articulable grounds for searching any particular place or person. Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, supra, at 535-536 (noting that building code inspections, unlike searches conducted pursuant to a criminal investigation, are designed “to prevent even the unintentional development of conditions which are hazardous to public health and safety”); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S., at 557 (noting that requiring particularized suspicion before routine stops on major highways near the Mexican border “would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens”). Our precedents have settled that, in certain limited circumstances, the Government’s need to discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development, is sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such searches without any measure of individualized suspicion. E. g., ante, at 624. We think the Government’s need to conduct the suspicionless searches required by the Customs program outweighs the privacy interests of employees engaged directly in drug interdiction, and of those who otherwise are required to carry firearms. The Customs Service is our Nation’s first line of defense against one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our population. We have adverted before to “the veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U. S. 531, 538 (1985). See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 513 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Our cases also reflect the traffickers’ seemingly inexhaustible repertoire of deceptive practices and elaborate schemes for importing narcotics, e. g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, supra, at 538-539; United States v. Ramsey, 431 U. S. 606, 608-609 (1977). The record in this case confirms that, through the adroit selection of source locations, smuggling routes, and increasingly elaborate methods of concealment, drug traffickers have managed to bring into this country increasingly large quantities of illegal drugs. App. 111. The record also indicates, and it is well known, that drug smugglers do not hesitate to use violence to protect their lucrative trade and avoid apprehension. Id., at 109. Many of the Service’s employees are often exposed to this criminal element and to the controlled substances it seeks to smuggle into the country. Ibid. Cf. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, supra, at 543. The physical safety of these employees may be threatened, and many may be tempted not only by bribes from the traffickers with whom they deal, but also by their own access to vast sources of valuable contraband seized and controlled by the Service. The Commissioner indicated below that “Customs [officers have been shot, stabbed, run over, dragged by automobiles, and assaulted with blunt objects while performing their duties.” App. at 109-110. At least nine officers have died in the line of duty since 1974. He also noted that Customs officers have been the targets of bribery by drug smugglers on numerous occasions, and several have been removed from the Service for accepting bribes and for other integrity violations. Id., at 114. See also United States Customs Service, Customs U. S. A., Fiscal Year 1987, p. 31 (reporting internal investigations that resulted in the arrest of 24 employees and 54 civilians); United States Customs Service, Customs U. S. A., Fiscal Year 1986, p. 32 (reporting that 334 criminal and serious integrity investigations were conducted during the fiscal year, resulting in the arrest of 37 employees and 17 civilians); United States Customs Service, Customs U. S. A., Fiscal Year 1985, p. 32 (reporting that 284 criminal and serious integrity investigations were conducted during the 1985 fiscal year, resulting in the arrest of 15 employees and 51 civilians). It is readily apparent that the Government has a compelling interest in ensuring that front-line interdiction personnel are physically fit, and have unimpeachable integrity and judgment. Indeed, the Government’s interest here is at least as important as its interest in searching travelers entering the country. We have long held that travelers seeking to enter the country may be stopped and required to submit to a routine search without probable cause, or even founded suspicion, “because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 154 (1925). See also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, supra, at 538; United States v. Ramsey, supra, at 617-619. This national interest in self-protection could be irreparably damaged if those charged with safeguarding it were, because of their own drug use, unsympathetic to their mission of interdicting narcotics. A drug user’s indifference to the Service’s basic mission or, even worse, his active complicity with the malefactors, can facilitate importation of sizable drug shipments or block apprehension of dangerous criminals. The public interest demands effective measures to bar drug users from positions directly involving the interdiction of illegal drugs. The public interest likewise demands effective measures to prevent the promotion of drug users to positions that require the incumbent to carry a firearm, even if the incumbent is not engaged directly in the interdiction of drugs. Customs employees who may use deadly force plainly “discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences.” Ante, at 628. We agree with the Government that the public should not bear the risk that employees who may suffer from impaired perception and judgment will be promoted to positions where they may need to employ deadly force. Indeed, ensuring against the creation of this dangerous risk will itself further Fourth Amendment values, as the use of deadly force may violate the Fourth Amendment in certain circumstances. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1, 7-12 (1985). Against these valid public interests we must weigh the interference with individual liberty that results from requiring these classes of employees to undergo a urine test. The interference with individual privacy that results from the collection of a urine sample for subsequent chemical analysis could be substantial in some circumstances. Ante, at 626. We have recognized, however, that the “operational realities of the workplace” may render entirely reasonable certain work-related intrusions by supervisors and co-workers that might be viewed as unreasonable in other contexts. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S., at 717; id., at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). While these operational realities will rarely affect an employee’s expectations of privacy with respect to searches of his person, or of personal effects that the employee may bring to the workplace, id., at 716, 725, it is plain that certain forms of public employment may diminish privacy expectations even with respect to such personal searches. Employees of the United States Mint, for example, should expect to be subject to certain routine personal searches when they leave the workplace every day. Similarly, those who join our military or intelligence services may not only be required to give what in other contexts might be viewed as extraordinary assurances of trustworthiness and probity, but also may expect intrusive inquiries into their physical fitness for those special positions. Cf. Snepp v. United States, 444 U. S. 507, 509, n. 3 (1980); Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 758 (1974); Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 171 U. S. App. D. C. 73, 84, 518 F. 2d 466, 477 (1975). We think Customs employees who are directly involved in the interdiction of illegal drugs or who are required to carry firearms in the line of duty likewise have a diminished expectation of privacy in respect to the intrusions occasioned by a urine test. Unlike most private citizens or government employees in general, employees involved in drug interdiction reasonably should expect effective inquiry into their fitness and probity. Much the same is true of employees who are required to carry firearms. Because successful performance of their duties depends uniquely on their judgment and dexterity, these employees cannot reasonably expect to keep from the Service personal information that bears directly on their fitness. Cf. In re Caruso v. Ward, 72 N. Y. 2d 433, 441, 530 N. E. 2d 850, 854-855 (1988). While reasonable tests designed to elicit this information doubtless infringe some privacy expectations, we do not believe these expectations outweigh the Government’s compelling interests in safety and in the integrity of our borders. Without disparaging the importance of the governmental interests that support the suspicionless searches of these employees, petitioners nevertheless contend that the Service’s drug-testing program is unreasonable in two particulars. First, petitioners argue that the program is unjustified because it is not based on a belief that testing will reveal any drug use by covered employees. In pressing this argument, petitioners point out that the Service’s testing scheme was not implemented in response to any perceived drug problem among Customs employees, and that the program actually has not led to the discovery of a significant number of drug users. Brief for Petitioners 37, 44; Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12, 20-21. Counsel for petitioners informed us at oral argument that no more than 5 employees out of 3,600 have tested positive for drugs. Id., at 11. Second, petitioners contend that the Service’s scheme is not a “sufficiently productive mechanism to justify [its] intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests,” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 658-659 (1979), because illegal drug users can avoid detection with ease by temporary abstinence or by surreptitious adulteration of their urine specimens. Brief for Petitioners 46-47. These contentions are unpersuasive. Petitioners’ first contention evinces an unduly narrow view of the context in which the Service’s testing program was implemented. Petitioners do not dispute, nor can there be doubt, that drug abuse is one of the most serious problems confronting our society today. There is little reason to believe that American workplaces are immune from this pervasive social problem, as is amply illustrated by our decision in Railway Labor Executives. See also Masino v. United States, 589 P. 2d 1048, 1050 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (describing marijuana use by two Customs inspectors). Detecting drug impairment on the part of employees can be a difficult task, especially where, as here, it is not feasible to subject employees and their work product to the kind of day-to-day scrutiny that is the norm in more traditional office environments. Indeed, the almost unique mission of the Service gives the Government a compelling interest in ensuring that many of these covered employees do not use drugs even off duty, for such use creates risks of bribery and blackmail against which the Government is entitled to guard. In light of the extraordinary safety and national security hazards that would attend the promotion of drug users to positions that require the carrying of firearms or the interdiction of controlled substances, the Service’s policy of deterring drug users from seeking such promotions cannot be deemed unreasonable. The mere circumstance that all but a few of the employees tested are entirely innocent of wrongdoing does not impugn the program’s validity. The same is likely to be true of householders who are required to submit to suspicionless housing code inspections, see Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), and of motorists who are stopped at the checkpoints we approved in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976). The Service’s program is designed to prevent the promotion of drug users to sensitive positions as much as it is designed to detect those employees who use drugs. Where, as here, the possible harm against which the Government seeks to guard is substantial, the need to prevent its occurrence furnishes an ample justification for reasonable searches calculated to advance the Government’s goal. We think petitioners’ second argument — that the Service’s testing program is ineffective because employees may attempt to deceive the test by a brief abstention before the test date, or by adulterating their urine specimens — overstates the case. As the Court of Appeals noted, addicts may be unable to abstain even for a limited period of time, or may be unaware of the “fade-away effect” of certain drugs. 816 F. 2d, at 180. More importantly, the avoidance techniques suggested by petitioners are fraught with uncertainty and risks for those employees who venture to attempt them. A particular employee’s pattern of elimination for a given drug cannot be predicted with perfect accuracy, and, in any event, this information is not likely to be known or available to the employee. Petitioners’ own expert indicated below that the time it takes for particular drugs to become undetectable in urine can vary widely depending on the individual, and may extend for as long as 22 days. App. 66. See also ante, at 631 (noting Court of Appeals’ reliance on certain academic literature that indicates that the testing of urine can discover drug use “ ‘for. . . weeks after the ingestion of the drug’ ”). Thus, contrary to petitioners’ suggestion, no employee reasonably can expect to deceive the test by the simple expedient of abstaining after the test date is assigned. Nor can he expect attempts at adulteration to succeed, in view of the precautions taken by the sample collector to ensure the integrity of the sample. In all the circumstances, we are persuaded that the program bears a close and substantial relation to the Service’s goal of deterring drug users from seeking promotion to sensitive positions. In sum, we believe the Government has demonstrated that its compelling interests in safeguarding our borders and the public safety outweigh the privacy expectations of employees who seek to be promoted to positions that directly involve the interdiction of illegal drugs or that require the incumbent to carry a firearm. We hold that the testing of these employees is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. C We are unable, on the present record, to assess the reasonableness of the Government’s testing program insofar as it covers employees who are required “to handle classified material.” App. 17. We readily agree that the Government has a compelling interest in protecting truly sensitive information from those who, “under compulsion of circumstances or for other reasons, . . . might compromise [such] information.” Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U. S. 518, 528 (1988). See also United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 267 (1967) (“We have recognized that, while the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it does not withdraw from the Government the power to safeguard its vital interests. . . . The Government can deny access to its secrets to those who would use such information to harm the Nation”). We also agree that employees who seek promotions to positions where they would handle sensitive information can be required to submit to a urine test under the Service’s screening program, especially if the positions covered under this category require background investigations, medical examinations, or other intrusions that may be expected to diminish their expectations of privacy in respect of a urinalysis test. Cf. Department of Navy v. Egan, supra, at 528 (noting that the Executive Branch generally subjects those desiring a security clearance to “a background investigation that varies according to the degree of adverse effect the applicant could have on the national security”). It is not clear, however, whether the category defined by the Service’s testing directive encompasses only those Customs employees likely to gain access to sensitive information. Employees who are tested under the Service’s scheme include those holding such diverse positions as “Accountant,” “Accounting Technician,” “Animal Caretaker,” “Attorney (All),” “Baggage Clerk,” “Co-op Student (All),” “Electric Equipment Repairer,” “Mail Clerk/Assistant,” and “Messenger.” App. 42-43. We assume these positions were selected for coverage under the Service’s testing program by reason of the incumbent’s access to “classified” information, as it is not clear that they would fall under either of the two categories we have already considered. Yet it is not evident that those occupying these positions are likely to gain access to sensitive information, and this apparent discrepancy raises in our minds the question whether the Service has defined this category of employees more broadly than is necessary to meet the purposes of the Commissioner’s directive. We cannot resolve this ambiguity on the basis of the record before us, and we think it is appropriate to remand the case to the Court of Appeals for such proceedings as may be necessary to clarify the scope of this category of employees subject to testing. Upon remand the Court of Appeals should examine the criteria used by the Service in determining what materials are classified and in deciding whom to test under this rubric. In assessing the reasonableness of requiring tests of these employees, the court should also consider pertinent information bearing upon the employees’ privacy expectations, as well as the supervision to which these employees are already subject. Ill Where the Government requires its employees to produce urine samples to be analyzed for evidence of illegal drug use, the collection and subsequent chemical analysis of such samples are searches that must meet the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Because the testing program adopted by the Customs Service is not designed to serve the ordinary' needs of law enforcement, we have balanced the public interest in the Service’s testing program against the privacy concerns implicated by the tests, without reference to our usual presumption in favor of the procedures specified in the Warrant Clause, to assess whether the tests required by Customs are reasonable. We hold that the suspicionless testing of employees who apply for promotion to positions directly involving the interdiction of illegal drugs, or to positions that require the incumbent to carry a firearm, is reasonable. The Government’s compelling interests in preventing the promotion of drug users to positions where they might endanger the integrity of our Nation’s borders or the life of the citizenry outweigh the privacy interests of those who seek promotion to these positions, who enjoy a diminished expectation of privacy by virtue of the special, and obvious, physical and ethical demands of those positions. We do not decide whether testing those who apply for promotion to positions where they would handle “classified” information is reasonable because we find the record inadequate for this purpose. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. After this case was decided by .the Court of Appeals, 816 F. 2d 170 (CA5 1987), the United States Department of Health and Human Services, in accordance with recently enacted legislation, Pub. L. 100-71, § 503, 101 Stat. 468-471, promulgated regulations (hereinafter HHS Regulations or HHS Reg.) governing certain federal employee drug-testing programs. 53 Fed. Reg. 11979 (1988). To the extent the HHS Regulations add to, or depart from, the procedures adopted as part of a federal drug-screening program covered by Pub. L. 100-71, the HHS Regulations control. Pub. L. 100-71, § 503(b)(2)(B), 101 Stat. 470. Both parties agree that the Customs Service’s drug-testing program must conform to the HHS Regulations. See Brief for Petitioners 6, n. 8; Brief for Respondent 4-5, and n. 4. We therefore consider the HHS Regulations to the extent they supplement or displace the Commissioner’s original directive. See California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 53 (1974); Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U. S. 268, 281-282 (1969). One respect in which the original Customs directive differs from the now-prevailing regime concerns the extent to which the employee may be required to disclose personal medical information. Under the Service’s original plan, each tested employee was asked to disclose, at the time the urine sample was collected, any medications taken within the last 30 days, and to explain any circumstances under which he may have been in legitimate contact with illegal substances within the last 30 days. Failure to provide this information at this time could result in the agency not considering the effect of medications or other licit contacts with drugs on a positive test result. Under the HHS Regulations, an employee need not provide information concerning medications when he produces the sample for testing. He may instead present such information only, after he is notified that his specimen tested positive for illicit drugs, at which time the Medical Review Officer reviews all records made available by the employee to determine whether the positive indication could have been caused by lawful use of drugs. See HHS Reg. § 2.7, 53 Fed. Reg. 11985-11986 (1988). The procedures prescribed by the Customs Service for the collection and analysis of the requisite samples do not carry the grave potential for “arbitrary and oppressive interference with the privacy and personal security of individuals,” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 554, (1976), that the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent. Indeed, these procedures significantly minimize the program’s intrusion on privacy interests. Only employees who have been tentatively accepted for promotion or transfer to one of the three categories of covered positions are tested, and applicants know at the outset that a drug test is a requirement of those positions. Employees are also notified in advance of the scheduled sample collection, thus reducing to a minimum any “unsettling show of authority,” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 657 (1979), that may be associated with unexpected intrusions on privacy. Cf. United States v. Martinez-FueHe, supra, at 559 (noting that the intrusion on privacy occasioned by routine highway checkpoints is minimized by the fact that motorists “are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere”); Wyman v. James, 400 U. S. 309, 320-321 (1971) (providing a welfare re-eipient with advance notice that she would be visited by a welfare caseworker minimized the intrusion on privacy occasioned by the visit). There is no direct observation of the act of urination, as the employee may provide a specimen in the privacy of a stall. Further, urine samples may be examined only for the specified drugs. The use of samples to test for any other substances is prohibited. See HHS Reg. § 2.1(c), 53 Fed. Reg. 11980 (1988). And, as the Court of Appeals noted, the combination of EMIT and GC/MS tests required by the Service is highly accurate, assuming proper storage, handling, and measurement techniques. 816 F. 2d, at 181. Finally, an employee need not disclose personal medical information to the Government unless his test result is positive, and even then any such information is reported to a licensed physician. Taken together, these procedures significantly minimize the intrusiveness of the Service’s drug-screening program. The point is well illustrated also by the Federal Government’s practice of requiring the search of all passengers seeking to board commercial airliners, as well as the search of their carry-on luggage, without any basis for suspecting any particular passenger of an untoward motive. Applying our precedents dealing with administrative searches, see, e. g., Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), the lower courts that have considered the question have consistently concluded that such searches are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. As Judge Friendly explained in a leading case upholding such searches: “When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, that danger alone meets the test of reasonableness, so long as the search is conducted in good faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking or like damage and with reasonable scope and the passenger has been given advance notice of his liability to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air.” United States v. Edwards, 498 F. 2d 496, 500 (CA2 1974) (emphasis in original). See also United States v. Skipwith, 482 F. 2d 1272, 1275-1276 (CA5 1973); United States v. Davis, 482 F. 2d 893, 907-912 (CA9 1973). It is true, as counsel for petitioners pointed out at oral argument, that these air piracy precautions were adopted in response to an observable national and international hijacking crisis. Tr. of Oral Arg. 13. Yet we would not suppose that, if the validity of these searches be conceded, the Government would be precluded from conducting them absent a demonstration of danger as to any particular airport or airline. It is sufficient that the Government have a compelling interest in preventing an otherwise pervasive societal problem from spreading to the particular context. Nor would we think, in view of the obvious deterrent purpose of these searches, that the validity of the Government’s airport screening program necessarily turns on whether significant numbers of putative air pirates are actually discovered by the searches conducted under the program. In the 15 years the program has been in effect, more than 9.5 billion persons have been screened, and over 10 billion pieces of luggage have been inspected. See Federal Aviation Administration, Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of The Civil Aviation Program (Nov. 1988) (Exhibit 6). By far the overwhelming majority of those persons who have been searched, like Customs employees who have been tested under the Service’s drug-screening scheme, have proved entirely innocent — only 42,000 firearms have been detected during the same period. Ibid. When the Government’s interest lies in deterring highly hazardous conduct, a low incidence of such conduct, far from impugning the validity of the scheme for implementing this interest, is more logically viewed as a hallmark of success. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 559 (1979). Indeed, petitioners’ objection is based on those features of the Service's program — the provision of advance notice and the failure of the sample collector to observe directly the act of urination — that contribute sig-nifieantly to diminish the program’s intrusion on privacy. See supra, at 672-673, n. 2. Thus, under petitioners’ view, “the testing program would be more likely to be constitutional if it were more pervasive and more invasive of privacy.” 816 F. 2d, at 180.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. HENDRICKS COUNTY RURAL ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORP. No. 80-885. Argued October 5, 1981 Decided December 2, 1981 BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J. filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 192. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for petitioner in No. 80-885 and respondent in No. 80-1103. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, former Solicitor General McCree, Barry Sullivan, Norton J. Come, and Linda Sher. Warren D. Krebs argued the cause and filed a brief for Hendricks Rural Electric Membership Corp., respondent in No. 80-885 and petitioner in No. 80-1103. Russ R. Mueller argued the cause and filed a brief for Malleable Iron Range Co., respondent in No. 80-885. Together with National Labor Relations Board v. Malleable Iron Range Co. (see this Court’s Rule 19.4), and No. 80-1103, Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both No. 80-885 and No. 80-1103 were filed by J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and George Kauf-mann for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; and by John A. Fillion for United Auto Workers. Joseph E. Finley filed a brief for the Office and Professional Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, urging reversal in No. 80-885. David Crump filed a brief for the Legal Foundation of America as ami-cus curiae urging affirmance in both No. 80-885 and No. 80-1103. Stephen A. Bokat filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae in both No. 80-885 and No. 80-1103. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether an employee who, in the course of his employment, may have access to information considered confidential by his employer is impliedly ex-eluded from the definition of “employee” in §2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act and denied all protections under the Act. I We have before us two cases under the same docket number. We shall first state separately the factual and procedural background of each. The Hendricks case Mary Weatherman was the personal secretary to the general manager and chief executive officer of respondent Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp. (Hendricks), a rural electric membership cooperative. She had been employed by the cooperative for nine years. In May 1977 she signed a petition seeking reinstatement of a close friend and fellow employee, who had lost his arm in the course of employment with Hendricks, and had been dismissed. Several days later she was discharged. Weatherman filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), alleging that the discharge violated § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(1). Hendricks’ defense, inter alia, was that Weatherman was denied the Act’s protection because as a “confidential” secretary she was impliedly excluded from the Act’s definition of “employee” in § 2(3). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected this argument. He noted that the Board’s decisions had excluded from bargaining units only those “confidential employees . . . [‘]who assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations.’” 236 N. L. R. B. 1616, 1619 (1978), quoting B. F. Goodrich Co., 115 N. L. R. B. 722, 724 (1956). Applying this “labor nexus” test, the ALJ found that Weatherman was not in any event such a “confidential employee.” He also determined that Hendricks had discharged Weatherman for activity — signing the petition — protected by §7 of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §157. The ALJ thus sustained Weatherman’s unfair labor practice charge. The Board affirmed “the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge,” and ordered that Weatherman be reinstated with backpay. 236 N. L. R. B., at 1616. Hendricks sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the Board cross-petitioned for enforcement. A divided panel of the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 603 F. 2d 25 (1979). Although the majority agreed with the Board’s factual finding that Weatherman did not “assist in a confidential capacity with respect to labor relations policies,” id., at 28, the majority, relying on language in a footnote to NLRB v. Bell Aero- space Co., 416 U. S. 267, 284, n. 12 (1974), held that “all secretaries working in a confidential capacity, without regard to labor relations, [must] be excluded from the Act.” 603 F. 2d, at 30. The Court of Appeals therefore remanded for a determination whether Weatherman came within this substantially broader definition of confidential secretary. On remand, the Board found that Weatherman was not privy to the Confidences of her employer and thus concluded that she did not fall within the broader definition of confidential secretary that the Court of Appeals had directed the Board to apply. 247 N. L. R. B. 498 (1980). Hendricks again petitioned for review and the Board cross-petitioned for enforcement. The Court of Appeals, by a divided panel, denied enforcement. 627 F. 2d 766 (1980). The majority held that the Board had “actually reapplie[d] the old standard incorporating the labor nexus,” and that the evidence in the record failed to support a finding that Weatherman did not come within the court’s broader definition of confidential secretary. Id., at 770. The Malleable case This case grew out of efforts of the Office and Professional Employees International Union (Union) to represent, as collective-bargaining agent, various employees of respondent Malleable Iron Range Co. (Malleable). In December 1978 the Union sought certification as the collective-bargaining representative for a unit of office clerical, technical, and professional personnel employed at the respondent’s facility in Beaver Dam, Wis. At the subsequent representation hearing, Malleable challenged the inclusion of 18 employees in the unit on the ground that they had access to confidential business information. The Regional Director of the NLRB rejected Malleable’s objection, concluding that none of the challenged 18 employees was a confidential employee under the Board’s “labor nexus” test. App. to Pet. for Cert. 76a-94a. The Union prevailed in a later representation election, and was accordingly certified as the bargaining agent for the unit. Malleable nevertheless refused to bargain with the Union. Seeking relief, the Union filed unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB. The Board found that Malleable’s refusal to bargain violated §§ 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(a)(5) and (1), and issued a bargaining order. 244 N. L. R. B. 485 (1979). Malleable petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for review of the order and the Board cross-petitioned for enforcement. In an unreported opinion, a divided panel of the court denied enforcement. App. to Pet. for Cert. 56a-60a. Order denying enforcement, 681 F. 2d 734 (1980). The majority noted that the Regional Director, in determining that none of the 18 individuals was a confidential employee, had applied the Board’s labor-nexus test which the Seventh Circuit had rejected in the earlier decisions involving Hendricks. The court remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration consistent “with the Hendricks case.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 56a, 59a. We granted the Board’s petition for certiorari in both cases to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals respecting the propriety of the Board’s practice of excluding from collective-bargaining units only those confidential employees with a “labor nexus,” while rejecting any claim that all employees with access to confidential information are beyond the reach of §2(3)’s definition of “employee.” 450 U. S. 964 (1981). We hold that there is a reasonable basis in law for the Board’s use of the “labor nexus” test. We therefore reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals, with directions in the Hendricks case to enforce the Board’s order, and with directions in the Malleable case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. II Section 2(3) of the NLRA provides that the “term ‘employee’ shall include any employee ...” (emphasis added), with certain stated exceptions such as “agricultural laborers,” “supervisors” as defined in §2(11), and “independent contractors.” Under a literal reading of the phrase “any employee,” then, the workers in question are “employees.” But for over 40 years, the NLRB, while rejecting any claim that the definition of “employee” in § 2(3) excludes confidential employees, has excluded from the collective-bargaining units determined under the Act those confidential employees satisfying the Board’s labor-nexus test. Respondents Hendricks and Malleable (hereafter respondents) argue that contrary to the Board’s practice, all employees who may have access to confidential business information are impliedly excluded from the definition of employee in § 2(3). In assessing the respondents’ argument, we must be mindful of the canon that “the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong, especially where Congress has refused to alter the administrative construction.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 381 (1969) (footnote omitted); see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S., at 274-275; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1965). We therefore proceed to review the Board’s determinations from 1940 to 1946 whether confidential employees were “employees” within § 2(3) of the NLRA (Wagner Act), and then determine whether Congress, when it considered those determinations in enacting the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), intended to alter the Board’s practice. A In 1935 the Wagner Act became law. 49 Stat. 449. The Act’s broad objectives were to “encourag[e] the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and . . . protec[t] the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.” Id., at 449-450. The employees covered by the Act were defined in §2(3): “The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee . . . but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse.” Although the Act’s express exclusions did not embrace confidential employees, the Board was soon faced with the argument that all individuals who had access to confidential information of their employers should be excluded, as a policy matter, from the definition of “employee.” The Board rejected such an implied exclusion, finding it to have “no warrant under the Act.” Bull Dog Electric Products Co., 22 N. L. R. B. 1043, 1046 (1940). See also Creamery Package Manufacturing Co., 34 N. L. R. B. 108, 111 (1941). But in fulfilling its statutory obligation to determine appropriate bargaining units under §9 of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §159, for which broad discretion has been vested in the Board, see Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 491-492 (1947); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 146 (1941), the Board adopted special treatment for the narrow group of employees with access to confidential, labor-relations information of the employer. The Board excluded these individuals from bargaining units composed of rank- and-file workers. See, e. g., Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 13 N. L. R. B. 974, 986 (1939); Creamery Package Manufacturing Co., supra, at 110. The Board’s rationale was that “management should not be required to handle labor relations matters through employees who are represented by the union with which the [c]ompany is required to deal and who in the normal performance of their duties may obtain advance information of the [cjompany’s position with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, and other labor relations matters.” Hoover Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1321, 1323 (1944). Following its formulation, through 1946, the Board routinely applied the labor-nexus test in numerous decisions to identify those individuals who were to be excluded from bargaining units because of their access to confidential information. And in at least one instance in which a Court of Appeals had occasion to review the Board’s application of a labor-nexus test under the Wagner Act, the test was upheld. NLRB v. Poultrymen’s Service Corp., 138 F. 2d 204, 210-211 (CA3 1943). See also NLRB v. Armour & Co., 154 F. 2d 570, 573-574 (CA10 1945); Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 136 F. 2d 175, 180 (CA7 1943), aff’d, 322 U. S. 643 (1944). In 1946, in Ford Motor Co., 66 N. L. R. B. 1317, 1322, the Board refined slightly the labor-nexus test because in its view the “definition [was] too inclusive and needlessly preclude[d] many employees from bargaining collectively together with other workers having common interests.” Henceforth, the Board announced, it intended “to limit the term ‘confidential’ so as to embrace only those employees who assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who exercise ‘managerial’ functions in the field of labor relations.” This was the state of the law in 1947 when Congress amended the NLRA through the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act. 61 Stat. 136. B Although the text of the Taft-Hartley Act also makes no explicit reference to confidential employees, when Congress addressed the scope of the NLRA’s coverage, the status of confidential employees was discussed. But nothing in that legislative discussion supports any inference, let alone conclusion, that Congress intended to alter the Board’s pre-1947 determinations that only confidential employees with a “labor nexus” should be excluded from bargaining units. Indeed, the contrary appears. The Taft-Hartley Act was in part a response to the Court’s decision in Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485 (1947), which upheld the Board’s certification of a bargaining unit composed of plant foremen. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S., at 279. Although the House and Senate initially passed differing bills, both Houses explicitly excluded “supervisors” from the definition of “employee” in the NLRA. H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(3) (1947); S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., §2(3) (1947). In defining the term “supervisor,” however, the bills differed substantially. The House bill defined “supervisor” to include within its scope the confidential employee, broadly defined as one “who by the nature of his duties is given by the employer information that is of a confidential nature, and that is not available to the public, to competitors, or to employees generally, for use in the interest of the employer.” The Senate, on the other hand, did not include the confidential employee within its definition of “supervisor.” The differing House and Senate bills were submitted to a Conference Committee. In Committee, the Senate definition of “supervisor,” with no reference to confidential employees, prevailed. As described in the statement of the House Managers, appended to the Conference Report: “The conference agreement, in the definition of ‘supervisor,’ limits such term to those individuals treated as supervisors under the Senate amendment. In the case of persons working in the labor relations, personnel and employment departments, it was not thought necessary to make specific provision, as was done in the House bill, since the Board has treated, and presumably will continue to treat, such persons as outside the scope of the act. This is the prevailing Board practice with respect to such people as confidential secretaries as well, and it was not the intention of the conferees to alter this practice in any respect.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 35 (1947). With this understanding, both Houses adopted the Conference Report, 93 Cong. Rec. 6393 (1947) (House); id., at 6536 (Senate). Although President Truman vetoed the Taft-Hartley bill, see id., at 7485-7488 (veto message), the bill nevertheless became law when Congress successfully overrode the veto, id., at 7489 (House); id., at 7538 (Senate). The Court of Appeals interpreted the legislative history of Congress’ exclusion of “supervisors” from the definition of “employees” as warranting an implied exclusion for all workers who may have access to confidential business information of their employer. That interpretation must be rejected. It is flatly belied by the Conference Committee’s rejection of the House proposal of an exclusion of all confidential employees — for obviously the House conceded on this issue to the Senate. Indeed, the Taft-Hartley Act’s express inclusion of “professional employees” under the Act’s coverage negates any reading of the legislative history as excluding confidential employees generally from the definition of employee in § 2(3). The definition of professional employees was intended to cover “such persons as legal, engineering, scientific and medical personnel together with their junior professional assistants.” H. R. Conf. Rep..No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 36 (1947). But surely almost all such persons would likely be privy to confidential business information and thus would fall within the broad definition of confidential employee excluded under the House bill. It would therefore be extraordinary to read an implied exclusion for confidential employees into the statute that would swallow up and displace almost the entirety of the professional-employee inclusion. Plainly, too, nothing in the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act provides any support for the argument that Congress disapproved the Board’s prior practice of applying a labor-nexus test to identify confidential employees whom the Board excluded from bargaining units. To the contrary, the House Managers’ statement accompanying the Conference Committee Report indicates that Congress intended to leave the Board’s historic practice undisturbed. HH h-4 h-( The Court of Appeals, and the respondents here, rely on dictum in a footnote to NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267 (1974), to suggest that the 80th Congress believed that all employees with access to confidential business information of their employers had been excluded from the Wagner Act by prior NLRB decisions and that Congress intended to freeze that interpretation of the Wagner Act into law. The Bell Aerospace dictum is: “In 1946 in Ford Motor Co., 66 N. L. R. B. 1317, 1322, the Board had narrowed its definition of ‘confidential employees’ to embrace only those who exercised ‘“managerial” functions in the field of labor relations.’ The discussion of ‘confidential employees’ in both the House and Conference Committee Reports, however, unmistakably refers to that term as defined in the House bill, which was not limited just to those in ‘labor relations.’ Thus, although Congress may have misconstrued recent Board practice, it clearly thought that the Act did not cover ‘confidential employees’ even under a broad definition of that term.” Id,., at 284, n. 12. Obviously this statement was unnecessary to the determination whether managerial employees are excluded from the Act, which was the question decided in Bell Aerospace. In any event, the statement that Congress “clearly thought that the Act did not cover ‘confidential employees,’ even under a broad definition of that term,” is error. The error is clear in light of our analysis above of the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act pertinent to the question. Moreover, the footnote erroneously implies that Ford Motor Co., 66 N. L. R. B. 1317 (1946), marked a major departure from the Board’s prior practice. To the contrary, that Board decision introduced only a slight refinement of the labor-nexus test which the Board had applied in numerous decisions from 1941 to 1946. See n. 11, supra. Certainly the Conference Committee, in approving the Board’s “prevailing practice,” was aware of the Board’s line of decisions. Cf. Cannon v. Uni versity of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 696-699 (1979). Thus the only plausible interpretation of the Report is that, in describing the Board’s prevailing practice of denying certain employees the full benefits of the Wagner Act, the Report referred only to employees involved in labor relations, personnel and employment functions, and confidential secretaries to such persons. For that, in essence, is where the Board law as of 1947 stood. It follows that the dictum in Bell Aerospace, and the Court of Appeals’ reliance upon it, cannot be squared with congressional intent, and should be “recede[d] from” now that the issue of the status of confidential employees is “squarely presented.” NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U. S. 67, 72 (1973). We also find no merit in the respondents’ argument that the Board has applied the labor-nexus test inconsistently. As noted earlier, supra, at 178-181, the Board, in excluding “confidential employees” from bargaining units, routinely applied such a test in the six years preceding the enactment of Taft-Hartley. In the years following the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board continued to apply the labor-nexus criterion in determining whether individuals were to be excluded from bargaining units as confidential employees. In B. F. Goodrich Co., 115 N. L. R. B. 722 (1956), the Board reaffirmed its previous ruling in Ford Motor and underscored its intention “in future cases ... to limit the term ‘confidential’ so as to embrace only those employees who assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations.” 115 N. L. R. B., at 724 (footnote omitted) (emphasis deleted). In succeeding years, while continuing to apply the labor-nexus test, the Board has deviated from that stated intention in only one major respect: it has also, on occasion, consistent with the underlying purpose of the labor-nexus test, see supra, at 179, designated as confidential employees persons who, although not assisting persons exercising managerial functions in the labor-relations area, “regularly have access to confidential information concerning anticipated changes which may result from collective-bargaining negotiations.” Pullman Standard Division of Pullman, Inc., 214 N. L. R. B. 762, 762-763 (1974); see Triangle Publications, Inc., 118 N. L. R. B. 595, 596, and nn. 3-4 (1957). In sum, our review of the Board’s decisions indicates that the Board has never followed a practice of depriving all employees who have access to confidential business information from the full panoply of rights afforded by the Act. Rather, for over 40 years, the Board, while declining to create any implied exclusion from the definition of “employee” for confidential employees, has applied a labor-nexus test in identifying those employees who should be excluded from bargaining units because of access to confidential business information. We cannot ignore this consistent, longstanding interpretation of the NLRA by the Board. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U. S., at 275; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S., at 381. IV The Court’s ultimate task here is, of course, to determine whether the Board’s “labor nexus” limitation on the class of confidential employees who, although within the definition of “employee” under § 2(3), may be denied inclusion in bargaining units has “a reasonable basis in law.” See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U. S. 488, 497 (1979); Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U. S. 157, 166 (1971); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111, 131 (1944). Clearly the NLRB’s longstanding practice of excluding from bargaining units only those confidential employees satisfying the Board’s labor-nexus test, rooted firmly in the Board’s understanding of the nature of the collective-bargaining process, and Congress’ acceptance of that practice, fairly demonstrates that the Board’s treatment of confidential employees does indeed have “a reasonable basis in law.” We therefore return finally to the disposition of the cases before us. Hendricks In Hendricks, the Board determined that the personal secretary, Mary Weatherman, was not a confidential secretary because she “did not act ‘in a confidential capacity’ ” with respect to labor-relations matters. 236 N. L. R. B., at 1619. While the Court of Appeals affirmed this finding, it denied enforcement of the Board’s order on the basis that the evidence failed to support the Board’s additional finding, required by the Court of Appeals, that Weatherman had no access to confidential wow-labor-related information. In approving the Board’s limited labor-nexus exclusion, we have held that such a finding is irrelevant to the determination of whether the secretary was a confidential employee. In this Court respondent Hendricks does not argue that Weatherman came within the labor-nexus test as formulated by the Board, but rather concedes that Weatherman did not have “confidential duties ‘with respect to labor policies.’” Brief for Respondent Hendricks 43. Because there is thus no dispute in this respect, and in any event no suggestion that the Board’s finding regarding labor nexus was not supported by substantial evidence, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the record did not support the Board’s determination that Weatherman was not a confidential employee with a labor nexus. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Hendricks insofar as enforcement of the Board’s order was denied, and remand with directions to enter an order enforcing the Board’s order. Malleable In Malleable, as well, the respondent makes no argument that the 18 employees in question satisfy the labor-nexus test of the Board. Rather, Malleable argues, and the Court of Appeals held, that the Board should have applied a broader definition of confidential employee to include all employees in possession of confidential business information. Having rejected the broad exclusion on which the Court of Appeals’ judgment relies, we reverse that judgment. But because the Court of Appeals has not yet addressed Malleable’s contentions that some of the 18 employees should have been excluded from the bargaining unit for reasons entirely unrelated to whether they are confidential employees, we remand Malleable for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Section 2(3), 61 Stat. 137, as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 152(3), provides: “The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.” The ALJ held that although the Board excluded confidential employees with a labor nexus from bargaining units, it afforded them the other protections of the NLRA. Therefore, the ALJ held, even if Weatherman were a confidential employee excludable from a bargaining unit, § 8(a)(1) barred Hendricks from discharging Weatherman for engaging in protected concerted activity. The Board has held that circulation of a petition on behalf of a discharged employee is protected activity under §7. Youngstown Osteopathic Hospital Assn., 224 N. L. R. B. 574 (1976). Judge Bonsai, sitting by designation, dissented, being of the view that the record established that Weatherman was not a confidential employee. The Board stated in part: “Although Weatherman typed all of [general manager] Dillon’s letters, this correspondence apparently did not relate to labor relations or personnel matters other than occasional letters referring to the dates of negotiating meetings with a union. Nor is there any evidence that it concerned confidential matters of any description. Weatherman generally did not place Dillon’s telephone calls, nor did she keep a record of his appointments. Weatherman did share a partitioned office with Dillon, but no personnel records or confidential records of any type were kept there, excluding Dillon’s testimony that he kept some papers concerning labor negotiations in a file behind his desk. Weatherman did not attend meetings of Respondent’s board of directors or other management meetings. However, she did type minutes of meetings of the board of directors and the agenda for such meetings. While these meetings apparently occasionally involved personnel matters, there is no indication that such matters, or any other issues discussed during them, were confidential. Weatherman did not type internal memoranda regarding labor relations or personnel or employment matters. Finally, and most significantly, Dillon conceded at the hearing that the Respondent did not maintain secret or classified papers or documents.” 247 N. L. R. B., at 498-499 (footnotes omitted). Judge Cudahy dissented. He suggested, inter alia, that there “is abundant evidence in the record to support the Board’s conclusion that Weatherman is not properly classified as a confidential secretary.” 627 F. 2d, at 771. Cf. Union Oil of California, Inc. v. NLRB, 607 F. 2d 852, 853-854 (CA9 1979); NLRB v. Allied Products Corp., 548 F. 2d 644, 648 (CA6 1977); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB, 398 F. 2d 669, 670 (CA6 1968); NLRB v. Quaker City Life Ins. Co., 319 F. 2d 690, 694 (CA4 1963); NLRB v. Armour & Co., 154 F. 2d 570, 573-574 (CA10 1945); NLRB v. Pouttrymen’s Service Corp., 138 F. 2d 204, 210-211 (CA3 1943). We also granted Hendricks’ cross-petition in No. 80-1103, which presented the question whether the Court of Appeals properly rejected Hendricks’ claim that Weatherman was the functional equivalent of a personnel department employee and therefore excluded from coverage of the Act on that basis as well. After briefing and argument, however, we are persuaded that our grant of certiorari on the cross-petition was improvident. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence in the record supported the Board’s finding that Weatherman was not the functional equivalent of a personnel department employee. As such, we are presented primarily with a question of fact, which does not merit Court review. The writ of certiorari in No. 80-1103 is therefore dismissed as improvidently granted. See Rudolph v. United States, 370 U. S. 269 (1962) (per curiam); Southern Power Co. v. North Carolina Public Service Co., 263 U. S. 508 (1924). For the full text of the current definition, see n. 1, supra. Although the early decisions did not explicitly preclude the Board from certifying a bargaining unit composed solely of confidential employees, that possibility was apparently foreclosed in Hoover Co., 55 N. L. R. B. 1321, 1322-1323 (1944), and Electric Boat Co., 57 N. L. R. B. 1348, 1349 (1944), thereby excluding confidential employees, as defined by the Board, from collective-bargaining units. See Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc., 35 N.L.R.B. 739, 744 (1941); Chrysler Corp., 36 N. L. R. B. 157, 161-162 (1941); Western Union Telegraph Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 1066, 1069 (1941); General Motors Corp., 37 N. L. R. B. 441, 446-447 (1941); Montgomery Ward & Co., 38 N. L. R. B. 297, 300 (1942); Chrysler Detroit Co., 38 N. L. R. B. 313, 321 (1942); Cin cinnati Times-Star Co., 39 N. L. R. B. 39, 42 (1942); Poultrymen’s Service Corp., 41 N. L. R. B. 444, 448 (1942), enf’d, 138 F. 2d 204 (CA3 1943); Polish National Alliance, 42 N. L. R. B. 1375, 1381-1382 (1942), enf'd as modified, 136 F. 2d 175 (CA7 1943), aff’d, 322 U. S. 643 (1944); Bendix Products Division, 43 N. L. R. B. 912, 915-916 (1942); Paramount Pic tures, Inc., 45 N.L.R.B. 116, 122-123 (1942); Murray Corp., 45 N. L. R. B. 854, 856-857 (1942); Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., 46 N.L.R.B. 1071, 1074 (1943); Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp., 47 N. L. R. B. 1229, 1231 (1943); Armour & Co., 49 N. L. R. B. 688, 690 (1943); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 50 N. L. R. B. 679, 682 (1943); Boston Edison Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 118, 123 (1943); Republic Steel Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 1228, 1230 (1943); St. Johns River Shipbuilding Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 12, 17 (1943); General Motors Corp., 52 N.L.R.B. 649, 653-655 (1943); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 52 N. L. R. B. 900, 903 (1943); U. S. Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 53 N. L. R. B. 84, 86 (1943); New York Telephone Co., 53 N. L. R. B. 307, 310 (1943); Potash Co., 53 N. L. R. B. 441, 444 (1943); Coolerator Co., 53 N. L. R. B. 461, 462-464 (1943); Colonial Broach Co., 53 N. L. R. B. 846, 848 (1943); General Motors Corp., 53 N. L. R. B. 1096, 1100 (1943); Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp., 54 N. L. R. B. 103, 112-114 (1943); Armour & Co., 54 N. L. R. B. 1005, 1013 (1944), enf’d as modified, 154 F. 2d 570 (CA10 1945); Armour & Co., 54 N. L. R. B. 1462, 1465 (1944); General Cable Corp., 55 N. L. R. B. 1143, 1145-1146 (1944); Hoover Co., 55 N. L. R. B. 1321, 1322-1323 (1944); West Penn Power Co., 55 N. L. R. B. 1356, 1358 (1944); Spicer Manufacturing Corp., 55 N. L. R. B. 1491, 1503 (1944); Bell Aircraft Corp., 56 N. L. R. B. 1356, 1359 (1944); General Motors Corp., 56 N. L. R. B. 1547, 1549-1550 (1944); Utah Copper Co., 57 N. L. R. B. 308, 315-318 (1944); Electric Boat Co., 57 N. L. R. B. 1348, 1349 (1944); Chrysler Corp., 58 N. L. R. B. 239, 243-246 (1944); American Steel & Wire Co., 58 N. L. R. B. 253, 255 (1944); U. S. Automatic Corp., 58 N. L. R. B. 662, 664 (1944); South Bend Lathe Works, 59 N. L. R. B. 562, 564 (1944); Houdaille-Hershey Corp., 59 N. L. R. B. 1292, 1295 (1944); Aluminum Co. of America, 60 N. L. R. B. 388, 391 (1945); Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp., 60 N. L. R. B. 525, 527 (1945); Continental Steel Corp., 61 N. L. R. B. 97, 99-102 (1945); American Smelting and Refining Co., 61 N. L. R. B. 506, 608-509 (1945); Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 61 N. L. R. B. 564, 568 (1945); Magnolia Pipe Line Co., 61 N. L. R. B. 723, 726-728 (1945); Bethlehem Steel Co., 63 N. L. R. B. 1230, 1234-1236 (1945). The Ford Motor approach was followed in three decisions in 1946. St. Louis Independent Packing Co., 67 N. L. R. B. 543, 547; Tennessee Gas & Transmission Co., 67 N. L. R. B. 1376, 1379; Brawn & Sharpe Manufacturing Co., 68 N. L. R. B. 487, 489. Section 2(12) of the House bill read in its entirety: “The term ‘supervisor’ means any individual— “(A) who has authority, in the interest of the employer— “(i) to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, demote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline any individuals employed by the employer, or to adjust their grievances, or to effectively recommend any such action; or “(ii) to determine, or make effective recommendations with respect to, the amount of wages earned by any individuals employed by the employer, or to apply, or to make effective recommendations with respect to the application of, the factors upon the basis of which the wages of any individuals employed by the employer are determined, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the exercise of independent judgment; “(B) who is employed in labor relations, personnel, employment, police, or time-study matters or in connection with claims matters of employees against employers, or who is employed to act in other respects for the employer in dealing with other individuals employed by the employer, or who is employed to secure and furnish to the employer information to be used by the employer in connection with any of the foregoing; or “(C) who by the nature of his duties is given by the employer information that is of a confidential nature, and that is not available to the public, to competitors, or to employees generally, for use in the interest of the employer.” The Senate bill defined “supervisor” in §2(11) in the following terms: “The term ‘supervisor’ means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.” The Senate Committee that reported the bill out apparently considered but rejected a more expansive definition. See S.-, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., §2(12) (1947) (Act amending NLRA; Comm. Print, Mar. 19, 1947); S.-, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(12) (1947) (Act amending NLRA; Comm. Print, Mar. 21, 1947). Senator Taft similarly described the Conference Committee’s action in a written summary inserted in the Congressional Record: “Supervisors: Both the House bill and the Senate amendment excluded supervisors from the individuals deemed to be employees for the purposes of the act. There was a sharp divergence between the House and Senate, however, with respect to the occupational groups which fell within this definition. The Senate amendment, which the conference ultimately adopted, is limited to bona fide supervisors. The House had included numerous other classes. There were generally (A) certain personnel who fix the amount of wages earned by other employees, such as inspectors, checkers, weighmasters, and time-study personnel, (B) labor relations personnel, police, and claims personnel, and (C) confidential employees. The Senate amendment confined the definition of supervisor to individuals generally regarded as foremen and employees of like or higher rank.” 93 Cong. Rec. 6442 (1947) (emphasis added). This concession is clear in the comments made by Representative Hartley, sponsor of the House bill, in explaining to the full House the results of the House-Senate Conference: “Entirely too much emphasis has been placed on the so-called concessions that the House conferees made during the conference. I will be very frank and say that I agreed to some of these concessions very reluctantly. I would much rather have seen the House billas it originally passed enacted into law, but I want to see a bill that can be enacted into law passed by this Congress. . . . “I also want to make it perfectly clear that there was no concession made except upon the assurance that it would provide us votes in another body to be certain that the legislation would be enacted into law.” Id., at 6383-6384. See § 9(b) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 159(b) (providing that the Board may not approve a bargaining unit “if such unit includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit”); § 2(12), 29 U. S. C. § 152(12) (defining “professional employee”). The House bill did not define “professional employees,” but did explicitly give “any craft, department, plant, trade, calling, profession or other distinguishable group within a proposed bargaining unit” the opportunity to exclude itself from the bargaining unit. H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 9(f)(2) (1947) (emphasis added). The Senate bill similarly allowed groups of professional employees to exclude themselves from bargaining units, § 9(b)(1), but in addition defined the term “professional employee.” The version that ultimately was adopted by both Houses incorporated the Senate’s definition of professional employee and permitted groups of professional employees to exclude themselves from proposed bargaining units in which nonprofessional employees were to be included. See n. 17, supra. It is true that the Conference Committee Report, in stating that the Board had treated confidential employees as “outside the scope of” the Wagner Act, could suggest that Congress failed to discern the Board’s actual practice of excluding confidential employees, as defined by the labor-nexus test, from bargaining units, but still affording them the other protections of the Act. See, e. g., Bethlehem. Steel Co., 63 N. L. R. B. 1230, 1232, and n. 2 (1945); Southern Colorado Power Co., 13 N. L. R. B. 699, 710 (1939), enf’d, 111 F. 2d 539 (CA10 1940). Whether Congress’ use of that phrase indicates that it misperceived the state of the law in this respect is not clear since the Board itself, in several instances, had used a similarly imprecise shorthand description of its practice with respect to confidential employees. See General Motors Corp., 53 N. L. R. B., at 1098; Armour & Co., 49 N. L. R. B., at 690; Armour & Co., 54 N. L. R. B., at 1465. Justice Powell, in dissent, relying in part on the conferees’ use of the phrase “outside the scope of,” criticizes the Board’s practice of allowing “labor nexus” employees some protections under the Act. Because we hold that the Board properly determined that neither the secretary in Hendricks nor the 18 workers in Malleable were “labor nexus” employees, we have no occasion in this case to decide the propriety of this aspect of the Board’s practice. That question will be more properly addressed in a case that presents it. Whether Congress intended to leave the Board free to depart from a labor-nexus test is not entirely clear from the House Managers’ statement. The statement may be read as indicating that Congress embraced the “prevailing Board practice with respect to” confidential employees. And as previously discussed, supra, at 178-181, the Board had consistently applied a labor-nexus test in defining confidential employees under the Wagner Act. But the declaration by the House Managers that the conferees did not intend “to alter” the Board’s practice “in any respect” may alternatively be read as suggesting that Congress recognized this area as one for the exercise of Board expertise and judgment. The House Managers’ suggestion that “presumably” the Board would continue its prevailing practice with respect to certain classes of employees is consistent with such a deferential reading. Because neither reading of the legislative history affords any comfort to respondents, we need not decide which is proper. Indeed, the Board’s labor-nexus test had been brought to the attention of the Congress through the NLRB’s annual reports. See, e. g., 10 NLRB Ann. Rep. 34, and n. 92 (1946). Significantly, the NLRB’s report submitted to Congress on January 3, 1947, five months before the Conference Committee Report was issued, described the Board’s refinement of the labor-nexus test in Ford Motor. See 11 NLRB Ann. Rep. 32, and nn. 18-21 (1947). Citing two 19141 NLRB decisions, E. P. Dutton & Co., 33 N. L. R. B. 761; Montgomery Ward & Co., 36 N. L. R. B. 69, Justice Powell finds “support in the case law” for his assertion that it was Congress’ understanding that the Board had previously excluded from the Act all secretaries with access to confidential information, without regard to labor nexus. Post, at 196, n. 7. The significance he would give these two cases is clearly unwarranted. E. P. Dutton rested explicitly on the seminal labor-nexus decision in Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 13 N. L. R. B. 974 (1939), to exclude three secretaries from a bargaining unit. 33 N. L. R. B., at 767-768, n. 8. And in Montgomery Ward & Co., supra, the Board relied in turn on E. P. Dutton. See Montgomery Ward & Co., supra, at 73, n. 6, citing E. P. Dutton. But whatever support Justice Powell may find in these two decisions for his understanding of Board law in 194.1, his reading of congressional awareness is plainly erroneous; it entirely ignores congressional acceptance of the countless Board decisions between 1941 and 1947 in which the NLRB, in determining whether individuals were confidential employees excludable from bargaining units, consistently and explicitly required a labor nexus. See n. 11, supra. The B. F. Goodrich decision was apparently prompted by the fact that the Board, on several occasions following the Ford Motor decision, had returned to its prior practice of designating as “confidential employees” those with mere access to confidential, labor-relations information. See Bond Stores, Inc., 99 N. L. R. B. 1029, 1031, n. 4 (1962); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 107 N. L. R. B. 1191, 1192 (1964). Indeed, while it may be true that the Board’s formulation of the labor-nexus test has deviated in minor respects over the years, the refinements are of the sort that are to be expected — if not required — in the process of case-by-case adjudication by an administrative agency. We do not suggest that personal secretaries to the chief executive officers of corporations will ordinarily not constitute confidential employees. Hendricks is an unusual case, inasmuch as Weatherman’s tasks were “deliberately restricted so as to preclude her from” gaining access to confidential information concerning labor relations. 236 N. L. R. B. 1616, 1619 (1978). Whether Hendricks imposed such constraints on Weatherman out of specific distrust or merely a sense of caution, it is unlikely that Weatherman’s position mirrored that of executive secretaries in general. Malleable apparently seeks to argue that 13 of the challenged persons should be excluded as “managerial” employees, and that another 4 should be excluded as “supervisors.” Brief for Malleable in Opposition 2, n. 1.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NOLLAN et ux. v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION No. 86-133. Argued March 30, 1987 Decided June 26, 1987 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Powell, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 842. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 865. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 866. Robert K. Best argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Ronald A. Zumbrun and Timothy A. Bittle. Andrea Sheridan Ordin, Chief Assistant Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, N. Gregory Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Anthony M. Summers, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Jamee Jordan Patterson. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Habicht, Deputy Solicitor General Ayer, Deputy Assistant Attorneys General Marzulla, Hookano, and Kmiec, Richard J. Lazarus, and Peter R. Steenland, Jr.; and for the Breezy Point Cooperative by Walter Pozen. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. by James M. Shannon, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Lee P. Breckenridge and Nathaniel S. W. Lawrence, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for- their respective States as follows: Don Siegelman of Alabama, John Steven Clark of Arkansas, Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly of Delaware, Robert Butterworth of Florida, Warren Price III of Hawaii, Neil F. Hartigan of Illinois, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, James E. Tierney of Maine, /. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, William L. Webster of Missouri, Robert M. Spire of Nebraska, Stephen E. Merrill of New Hampshire, W. Cary Edwards of New Jersey, Robert Abrams of New York, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina, Nicholas Spaeth of North Dakota, Dave Frohnmayer of Oregon, James E. O’Neil of Rhode Island, W. J. Michael Cody of Tennessee, Jim Mattox of Texas, Jeffrey Amestoy of Vermont, Kenneth O. Eikenberry of Washington, Charles G. Brown of West Virginia, and Donald J. Hanaway of Wisconsin; for the Council of State Governments et al. by Berma, Ruth Solomon and Joyce Holmes Benjamin; for Designated California Cities and Counties by E. Clement Shute, Jr.; and for the Natural Resources Defense Council et al. by Fredric D. Woocher. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the California Association of Realtors by William M. Pfeiffer; and for the National Association of Home Builders et al. by Jerrold A. Fadem, Michael M. Berger, and Gus Bauman. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. James and Marilyn Nollan appeal from a decision of the California Court of Appeal ruling that the California Coastal Commission could condition its grant of permission to rebuild their house on their transfer to the public of an easement across their beachfront property. 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1986). The California court rejected their claim that imposition of that condition violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Ibid. We noted probable jurisdiction. 479 U. S. 913 (1986). I The Nollans own a beachfront lot in Ventura County, California. A quarter-mile north of their property is Faria County Park, an oceanside public park with a public beach and recreation area. Another public beach area, known locally as “the Cove,” lies 1,800 feet south of their lot. A concrete seawall approximately eight feet high separates the beach portion of the Nollans’ property from the rest of the lot. The historic mean high tide line determines the lot’s oceanside boundary. The Nollans originally leased their property with an option to buy. The building on the lot was a small bungalow, totaling 504 square feet, which for a time they rented to summer vacationers. After years of rental use, however, the building had fallen into disrepair, and could no longer be rented out. The Nollans’ option to purchase was conditioned on their promise to demolish the bungalow and replace it. In order to do so, under Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. §§ 30106, 30212, and 30600 (West 1986), they were required to obtain a coastal development permit from the California Coastal Commission. On February 25,1982, they submitted a permit application to the Commission in which they proposed to demolish the existing structure and replace it with a three-bedroom house in keeping with the rest of the neighborhood. The Nollans were informed that their application had been placed on the administrative calendar, and that the Commission staff had recommended that the permit be granted subject to the condition that they allow the public an easement to pass across a portion of their property bounded by the mean high tide line on one side, and their seawall on the other side. This would make it easier for the public to get to Faria County Park and the Cove. The Nollans protested imposition of the condition, but the Commission overruled their objections and granted the permit subject to their recordation of a deed restriction granting the easement. App. 31, 34. On June 3, 1982, the Nollans filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus asking the Ventura County Superior Court to invalidate the access condition. They argued that the condition could not be imposed absent evidence that their proposed development would have a direct adverse impact on public access to the beach. The court agreed, and remanded the case to the Commission for a full evidentiary hearing on that issue. Id., at 36. On remand, the Commission held a public hearing, after which it made further factual findings and reaffirmed its imposition of the condition. It found that the new house would increase blockage of the view of the ocean, thus contributing to the development of “a ‘wall’ of residential structures” that would prevent the public “psychologically . . . from realizing a stretch of coastline exists nearby that they have every right to visit.” Id., at 58. The new house would also increase private use of the shorefront. Id., at 59. These effects of construction of the house, along with other area development, would cumulatively “burden the public’s ability to traverse to and along the shorefront.” Id., at 65-66. Therefore the Commission could properly require the Nollans to offset that burden by providing additional lateral access to the public beaches in the form of an easement across their property. The Commission also noted that it had similarly conditioned 43 out of 60 coastal development permits along the same tract of land, and that of the 17 not so conditioned, 14 had been approved when the Commission did not have administrative regulations in place allowing imposition of the condition, and the remaining 3 had not involved shorefront property. Id., at 47-48. The Nollans filed a supplemental petition for a writ of administrative mandamus with the Superior Court, in which they argued that imposition of the access condition violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Superior Court ruled in their favor on statutory grounds, finding, in part to avoid “issues of constitutionality,” that the California Coastal Act of 1976, Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. § 30000 et seq. (West 1986), authorized the Commission to impose public access conditions on coastal development permits for the replacement of an existing single-family home with a new one only where the proposed development would have an adverse impact on public access to the sea. App. 419. In the court’s view, the administrative record did not provide an adequate factual basis for concluding that replacement of the bungalow with the house would create a direct or cumulative burden on public access to the sea. Id., at 416-417. Accordingly, the Superior Court granted the writ of mandamus and directed that the permit condition be struck. The Commission appealed to the California Court of Appeal. While that appeal was pending, the Nollans satisfied the condition on their option to purchase by tearing down the bungalow and building the new house, and bought the property. They did not notify the Commission that they were taking that action. The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court. 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1986). It disagreed with the Superior Court’s interpretation of the Coastal Act, finding that it required that a coastal permit for the construction of a new house whose floor area, height or bulk was more than 10% larger than that of the house it was replacing be conditioned on a grant of access. Id., at 723-724, 223 Cal. Rptr., at 31; see Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. § 30212. It also ruled that that requirement did not violate the Constitution under the reasoning of an earlier case of the Court of Appeal;, Grupe v. California Coastal Comm’n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985). In that case, the court had found that so long as a project contributed to the need for public access, even if the project standing alone had not created the need for access, and even if there was only an indirect relationship between the access exacted and the need to which the project contributed, imposition of an access condition on a development permit was sufficiently related to burdens created by the project to be constitutional. 177 Cal. App. 3d, at 723, 223 Cal. Rptr., at 30-31; see Grupe, supra, at 165-168, 212 Cal. Rptr., at 587-590; see also Remmenga v. California Coastal Comm’n, 163 Cal. App. 3d 623, 628, 209 Cal. Rptr. 628, 631, appeal dism’d, 474 U. S. 915 (1985). The Court of Appeal ruled that the record established that that was the situation with respect to the Nollans’ house. 177 Cal. App. 3d, at 722-723, 223 Cal. Rptr., at 30-31. It ruled that the Nollans’ taking claim also failed because, although the condition diminished the value of the Nollans’ lot, it did not deprive them of all reasonable use of their property. Id., at 723, 223 Cal. Rptr., at 30; see Grupe, supra, at 175-176, 212 Cal. Rptr., at 595-596. Since, in the Court of Appeal’s view, there was no statutory or constitutional obstacle to imposition of the access condition, the Superior Court erred in granting the writ of mandamus. The Nollans appealed to this- Court, raising only the constitutional question. II Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase public access to the beach, rather than conditioning their permit to rebuild their house on their agreeing to do so, we have no doubt there would have been a taking. To say that the appropriation of a public easement across a landowner’s premises does not constitute the taking of a property interest but rather (as Justice Brennan contends) “a mere restriction on its use,” post, at 848-849, n. 3, is to use words in a manner that deprives them of all their ordinary meaning. Indeed, one of the principal uses of the eminent domain power is to assure that the government be able to require conveyance of just such interests, so long as it pays for them. J. Sackman, 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain §2.1[1] (Rev. 3d ed. 1985), 2 id., § 5.01[5]; see 1 id., §1.42[9], 2 id., § 6.14. Perhaps because the point is so obvious, we have never been confronted with a controversy that required us to rule upon it, but our cases’ analysis of the effect of other governmental action leads to the same conclusion. We have repeatedly held that, as to property reserved by its owner for private use, “the right to exclude [others is] ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.’” Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 433 (1982), quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 176 (1979). In Loretto we observed that where governmental action results in “[a] permanent physical occupation” of the property, by the government itself or by others, see 458 U. S., at 432-433, n. 9, “our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner,” id., at 434-435. We think a “permanent physical occupation” has occurred, for purposes of that rule, where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises. Justice Brennan argues that while this might ordinarily be the case, the California Constitution’s prohibition on any individual’s “excluding] the right of way to [any navigable] water whenever it is required for any public purpose,” Art. X, §4, produces a different result here. Post, at 847-848, see also post, at 855, 857. There are a number of difficulties with that argument. Most obviously, the right of way sought here is not naturally described as one to navigable water (from the street to the sea) but along it; it is at least highly questionable whether the text of the California Constitution has any prima facie application to the situation before us. Even if it does, however, several California cases suggest that Justice Brennan’s interpretation of the effect of the clause is erroneous, and that to obtain easements of access across private property the State must proceed through its eminent domain power. See Bolsa Land Co. v. Burdick, 151 Cal. 254, 260, 90 P. 532, 534-535 (1907); Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160, 185, 50 P. 277, 286 (1897); Heist v. County of Colusa, 163 Cal. App. 3d 841, 851, 213 Cal. Rptr. 278, 285 (1984); Aptos Seascape Corp. v. Santa Cruz, 138 Cal. App. 3d 484, 505-506, 188 Cal. Rptr. 191, 204-205 (1982). (None of these cases specifically addressed the argument that Art. X, § 4, allowed the public to cross private property to get to navigable water, but if that provision meant what Justice Brennan believes, it is hard to see why it was not invoked.) See also 41 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 39, 41 (1963) (“In spite of the sweeping provisions of [Art. X, § 4], and the injunction therein to the Legislature to give its provisions the most liberal interpretation, the few reported cases in California have adopted the general rule that one may not trespass on private land to get to navigable tidewaters for the purpose of commerce, navigation or fishing”). In light of these uncertainties, and given the fact that, as Justice Blackmun notes, the Court of Appeal did not rest its decision on Art. X, § 4, post, at 865, we should assuredly not take it upon ourselves to resolve this question of California constitutional law in the first instance. See, e. g., Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U. S. 231, 234, n. 1 (1980). That would be doubly inappropriate since the Commission did not advance this argument in the Court of Appeal, and the Nollans argued in the Superior Court that any claim that there was a pre-existing public right of access had to be asserted through a quiet title action, see Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Writ of Administrative Mandamus, No. SP50805 (Super. Ct. Cal.), p. 20, which the Commission, possessing, no claim to the easement itself, probably would not have had standing under California law to bring. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. § 738 (West 1980). Given, then, that requiring uncompensated conveyance of the easement outright would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the question becomes whether requiring it to be conveyed as a condition for issuing a land-use permit alters the outcome. We have long recognized that land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it “substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests” and does not “den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land,” Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980). See also Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 127 (1978) (“[A] use restriction may constitute a 'taking’ if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose”). Our cases have not elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a “legitimate state interest” or what type of connection between the regulation and the state interest satisfies the requirement that the former “substantially advance” the latter. They have made clear, however, that a broad range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfies these requirements. See Agins v. Tiburon, supra, at 260-262 (scenic zoning); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, supra (landmark preservation); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926) (residential zoning); Laitos & Westfall, Government Interference with Private Interests in Public Resources, 11 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 66 (1987). The Commission argues that among these permissible purposes are protecting the public’s ability to see the beach, assisting the public in overcoming the “psychological barrier” to using the beach created by a developed shore-front, and preventing congestion on the public beaches. We assume, without deciding, that this is so — in which case the Commission unquestionably would be able to deny the Nollans their permit outright if their new house (alone, or by reason of the cumulative impact produced in conjunction with other construction) would substantially impede these purposes, unless the denial would interfere so drastically with the Nollans’ use of their property as to constitute a taking. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, supra. The Commission argues that a permit condition that serves the same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the permit would not constitute a taking. We agree. Thus, if the Commission attached to the permit some condition that would have protected the public’s ability to see the beach notwithstanding construction of the new house — for example, a height limitation, a width restriction, or a ban on fences — so long as the Commission could have exercised its police power (as we have assumed it could) to forbid construction of the house altogether, imposition of the condition would also be constitutional. Moreover (and here we come closer to the facts of the present case), the condition would be constitutional even if it consisted of the requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere. Although such a requirement, constituting a permanent grant of continuous access to the property, would have to be considered a taking if it were not attached to a development permit, the Commission’s assumed power to forbid construction of the house in order to protect the public’s view of the beach must surely include the power to condition construction upon some concession by the owner, even a concession of property rights, that serves the same end. If a prohibition designed to accomplish that purpose would be a legitimate exercise of the police power rather than a taking, it would be strange to conclude that providing the owner an alternative to that prohibition which accomplishes the same purpose is not. The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition. When that essential nexus is eliminated, the situation becomes the same as if California law forbade shouting fire in a crowded theater, but granted dispensations to those willing to contribute $100 to the state treasury. While a ban on shouting fire can be a core exercise of the State’s police power to protect the public safety, and can thus meet even our stringent standards for regulation of speech, adding the unrelated condition alters the purpose to one which, while it may be legitimate, is inadequate to sustain the ban.' Therefore, even though, in a sense, requiring a $100 tax contribution in order to shout fire is a lesser restriction on speech than an outright ban, it would not pass constitutional muster. Similarly here, the lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the building restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid governmental purpose, but without payment of compensation. Whatever may be the outer limits of “legitimate state interests” in the takings and land-use context, this is not one of them. In short, unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but “an out-and-out plan of extortion.” J. E. D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N. H. 581, 584, 432 A. 2d 12, 14-15 (1981); see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22, and n. 20. See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S., at 439, n. 17. Ill The Commission claims that it concedes as much, and that we may sustain the condition at issue here by finding that it is reasonably related to the public need or burden that the Nollans’ new house creates or to which it contributes. We can accept, for purposes of discussion, the Commission’s proposed test as to how close a “fit” between the condition and the burden is required, because we find that this case does not meet even the most untailored standards. The Commission’s principal contention to the contrary essentially turns on a play on the word “access.” The Nollans’ new house, the Commission found, will interfere with “visual access” to the beach. That in turn (along with other shorefront development) will interfere with the desire of people who drive past the Nollans’ house to use the beach, thus creating a “psychological barrier” to “access.” The Nollans’ new house will also, by a process not altogether clear from the Commission’s opinion but presumably potent enough to more than offset the effects of the psychological barrier, increase the use of the public beaches, thus creating the need for more “access.” These burdens on “access” would be alleviated by a requirement that the Nollans provide “lateral access” to the beach. Rewriting the argument to eliminate the play on words makes clear that there is nothing to it. It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans’ property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house. It is also impossible to understand how it lowers any “psychological barrier” to using the public beaches, or how it helps to remedy any additional congestion on them caused by construction of the Nollans’ new house. We therefore find that the Commission’s imposition of the permit condition cannot be treated as an exercise of its land-use power for any of these purposes. Our conclusion on this point is consistent with the approach taken by every other court that has considered the question, with the exception of the California state courts. See Parks v. Watson, 716 F. 2d 646, 651-653 (CA9 1983); Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Lakewood, 626 P. 2d 668, 671-674 (Colo. 1981); Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm’n, 160 Conn. 109, 117-120, 273 A. 2d 880, 885 (1970); Longboat Key v. Lands End, Ltd., 433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. App. 1983); Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 380, 176 N. E. 2d 799, 802 (1961); Lampton v. Pinaire, 610 S. W. 2d 915, 918-919 (Ky. App. 1980); Schwing v. Baton Rouge, 249 So. 2d 304 (La. App.), application denied, 259 La. 770, 252 So. 2d 667 (1971); Howard County v. JJM, Inc., 301 Md. 256, 280-282, 482 A. 2d 908, 920-921 (1984); Collis v. Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N. W. 2d 19 (1976); State ex rel. Noland v. St. Louis County, 478 S. W. 2d 363 (Mo. 1972); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 33-36, 394 P. 2d 182, 187-188 (1964); Simpson v. North Platte, 206 Neb. 240, 292 N. W. 2d 297 (1980); Briar West, Inc. v. Lincoln, 206 Neb. 172, 291 N. W. 2d 730 (1980); J. E. D. Associates v. Atkinson, 121 N. H. 581, 432 A. 2d 12 (1981); Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Princeton, 52 N. J. 348, 350-351, 245 A. 2d 336, 337-338 (1968); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 18 N. Y. 2d 78, 218 N. E. 2d 673 (1966); MacKall v. White, 85 App. Div. 2d 696, 445 N. Y. S. 2d 486 (1981), appeal denied, 56 N. Y. 2d 503, 435 N. E. 2d 1100 (1982); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. Cranston, 107 R. I. 63, 68-69, 71, 264 A. 2d 910, 913, 914 (1970); College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S. W. 2d 802, 807 (Tex. 1984); Call v. West Jordan, 614 P. 2d 1257, 1258-1259 (Utah 1980); Board of Supervisors of James City County v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 136-139, 216 S. E. 2d 199, 207-209 (1975); Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 617-618, 137 N. W. 2d 442, 447-449 (1965), appeal dism’d, 385 U. S. 4 (1966). See also Littlefield v. Afton, 785 F. 2d 596, 607 (CA8 1986); Brief for National Association of Home Builders et al. as Amici Curiae 9-16. Justice Brennan argues that imposition of the access requirement is not irrational. In his version of the Commission’s argument, the reason for the requirement is that in its absence, a person looking toward the beach from the road will see a street of residential structures including the Nollans’ new home and conclude that there is no public beach nearby. If, however, that person sees people passing and repassing along the dry sand behind the Nollans’ home, he will realize that there is a public beach somewhere in the vicinity. Post, at 849-850. The Commission’s action, however, was based on the opposite factual finding that the wall of houses completely blocked the view of the beach and that a person looking from the road would not be able to see it at all. App. 57-59. Even if the Commission had made the finding that Justice Brennan proposes, however, it is not certain that it would suffice. We do not share Justice Brennan’s confidence that the Commission “should have little difficulty in the future in utilizing its expertise to demonstrate a specific connection between provisions for access and burdens on access,” post, at 862, that will avoid the effect of today’s decision. We view the Fifth Amendment’s Property Clause to be more than a pleading requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an exercise in cleverness and imagination. As indicated earlier, our cases describe the condition for abridgment of property rights through the police power as a “substantial advancing]” of a legitimate state interest. We are inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective where the actual conveyance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a land-use restriction, since in that context there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective. We are left, then, with the Commission’s justification for the access requirement unrelated to land-use regulation: “Finally, the Commission notes that there are several existing provisions of pass and repass lateral access benefits already given by past Faria Beach Tract applicants as a result of prior coastal permit decisions. The access required as a condition of this permit is part of a comprehensive program to provide continuous public access along Faria Beach as the lots undergo development or redevelopment.” App. 68. That is simply an expression of the Commission’s belief that the public interest will be served by a continuous strip of publicly accessible beach along the coast. The Commission may well be right that it is a good idea, but that does not establish that the Nollans (and other coastal residents) alone can be compelled to contribute to its realization. Rather, California is free to advance its “comprehensive program,” if it wishes, by using its power of eminent domain for this “public purpose,” see U. S. Const., Amdt. 5; but if it wants an easement across the Nollans’ property, it must pay for it. Reversed. The holding of PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74 (1980), is not inconsistent with this analysis, since there the owner had already opened his property to the general public, and in addition permanent access was not required. The analysis of Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164 (1979), is not inconsistent because it was affected by traditional doctrines regarding navigational servitudes. Of course neither of those cases involved, as this one does, a classic right-of-way easement. Justice Brennan also suggests that the Commission’s public announcement of its intention to condition the rebuilding of houses on the transfer of easements of access caused the Nollans to have “no reasonable claim to any expectation of being able to exclude members of the public” from walking across their beach. Post, at 857-860. He cites our opinion in Ruekelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986 (1984), as support for the peculiar proposition that a unilateral claim of entitlement by the government can alter property rights. In Monsanto, however, we found merely that the Takings Clause was not violated by giving effect to the Government’s announcement that application for “the right to [the] valuable Government benefit,” id., at 1007 (emphasis added), of obtaining registration of an insecticide would confer upon the Government a license to use and disclose the trade secrets contained in the application. Id., at 1007-1008. See also Bowen v. Gilliard, ante, at 605. But the right to build on one’s own property — even though its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements — cannot remotely be described as a “governmental benefit.” And thus the announcement that the application for (or granting of) the permit will entail the yielding of a property interest cannot be regarded as establishing the voluntary “exchange,” 467 U. S., at 1007, that we found to have occurred in Monsanto. Nor are the Nollans’ rights altered because they acquired the land well after the Commission had begun to implement its policy. So long as the Commission could not have deprived the prior owners of the easement without compensating them, the prior owners must be understood to have transferred their full property rights in conveying the lot. Contrary to Justice Brennan’s claim, post, at 843, our opinions do not establish that these standards are the same as those applied to due process or equal protection claims. To the contrary, our verbal formulations in the takings field have generally been quite different. We have required that the regulation “substantially advance” the “legitimate state interest” sought to be achieved, Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980), not that “the State ‘could rationally have decided? that the measure adopted might achieve the State’s objective.” Post, at 843, quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456, 466 (1981). Justice Brennan relies principally on an equal protection case, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., supra, and two substantive due process eases, Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 487-488 (1955), and Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, 423 (1952), in support of the standards he would adopt. But there is no reason to believe (and the language of our cases gives some reason to disbelieve) that so long as the regulation of property is at issue the standards for takings challenges, due process challenges, and equal protection challenges are identical; any more than there is any reason to believe that so long as the regulation of speech is at issue the standards for due process challenges, equal protection challenges, and First Amendment challenges are identical. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590 (1962), does appear to assume that the inquiries are the same, but that assumption is inconsistent with the formulations of our later eases. If the Nollans were being singled out to bear the burden of California’s attempt to remedy these problems, although they had not contributed to it more than other coastal landowners, the State’s action, even if otherwise valid, might violate either the incorporated Takings Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. One of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause is “to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960); see also San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S. 621, 656 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 123 (1978). But that is not the basis of the Nollans’ challenge here. One would expect that a regime in which this kind of leveraging of the police power is allowed would produce stringent land-use regulation which the State then waives to accomplish other purposes, leading to lesser realization of the land-use goals purportedly sought to be served than would result from more lenient (but nontradeable) development restrictions. Thus, the importance of the purpose underlying the prohibition not only does not justify the imposition of unrelated conditions for eliminating the prohibition, but positively militates against the practice. As Justice Brennan notes, the Commission also argued that the construction of the new house would “ ‘increase private use immediately adjacent to public tidelands,’” which in turn might result in more disputes between the Nollans and the public as to the location of the boundary. Post, 851, quoting App. 62. That risk of boundary disputes, however, is inherent in the right to exclude others from one’s property, and the construction here can no more justify mandatory dedication of a sort of “buffer zone” in order to avoid boundary disputes than can the construction of an addition to a single-family house near a public street. Moreover, a buffer zone has a boundary as well, and unless that zone is a “no-man’s land” that is off limits for both neighbors (which is of course not the case here) its creation achieves nothing except to shift the location of the boundary dispute further on to the private owner’s land. It is true that in the distinctive situation of the Nollans’ property the seawall could be established as a clear demarcation of the public easement. But since not all of the lands to which this land-use condition applies have such a convenient reference point, the avoidance of boundary disputes is, even more obviously than the others, a made-up purpose of the regulation.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

OESTEREICH v. SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM LOCAL BOARD NO. 11, CHEYENNE, WYOMING, et al. No. 46. Argued October 24, 1968. Decided December 16, 1968. Melvin L. Wulf argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Alan H. Levine, John Griffiths, Marvin M. Karpatkin, Eleanor Holmes Norton, and William F. Reynard. Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Weisl, Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., Morton Hollander, and Robert V. Zener. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner is enrolled as a student at a theological school preparing for the ministry and was accordingly classified as IV-D by the Selective Service Board. Section 6 (g) of the Selective Service Act, 62 Stat. 611, as amended, now § 6 (g) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 (see 81 Stat. 100, § 1 (a)), 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (g), gives such students exemption from training and service under the Act. He returned his registration certificate to the Government, according to the complaint in the present action, “for the sole purpose of expressing dissent from the participation by the United States in the war in Vietnam.” Shortly thereafter his Board declared him delinquent (1) for failure to have the registration certificate in his possession, and (2) for failure to provide the Board with notice of his local status. The Board thereupon changed his IV-D classification to I-A. He took an administrative appeal and lost and was ordered to report for induction. At that point he brought suit to restrain his induction. The District Court dismissed the complaint, 280 F. Supp. 78, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 390 F. 2d 100. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted. 391 U. S. 912. As noted, § 6 (g) of the Act states that “students preparing for the ministry” in qualified schools “shall be exempt from training and service” under the Act. Equally unambiguous is § 10 (b) (3) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 104, which provides that there shall be no pre-induction judicial review “of the classification or processing of any registrant,” judicial review being limited to a defense in a criminal prosecution or, as the Government concedes, to habeas corpus after induction. See Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 123-125; Eagles v. Samuels, 329 U. S. 304; Witmer v. United States, 348 U. S. 375, 377. If we assume, as we must for present purposes, that petitioner is entitled to a statutory exemption as a divinity student, by what authority can the Board withhold it or withdraw it and make him a delinquent? In 1967 Congress added a provision concerning the immediate service of members of a “prime age group” after expiration of their deferment, stating that they were the first to be inducted “after delinquents and volunteers.” 50 U. S. C. App. §456 (h)(1) (1964 ed., Supp. III). Congress has also made criminal the knowing failure or neglect to perform any duty prescribed by the rules or regulations of the Selective Service System. 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. III). But Congress did not define delinquency; nor did it provide any standards for its definition by the Selective Service System. Yet Selective Service, as we have noted, has promulgated regulations governing delinquency and uses them to deprive registrants of their statutory exemption, because of various activities and conduct and without any regard to the exemptions provided by law. We can find no authorization for that use of delinquency. Even if Congress had authorized the Boards to revoke statutory exemptions by means of delinquency classifications, serious questions would arise if Congress were silent and did not prescribe standards to govern the Boards' actions. There is no suggestion in the legislative history that, when Congress has granted an exemption and a registrant meets its terms and conditions, a Board can nonetheless withhold it from him for activities or conduct not material to the grant or withdrawal of the exemption. So to hold would make the Boards freewheeling agencies meting out their brand of justice in a vindictive manner. Once a person registers and qualifies for a statutory exemption, we find no legislative authority to deprive him of that exemption because of conduct or activities unrelated to the merits of granting or continuing that exemption. The Solicitor General confesses error on the use by Selective Service of delinquency proceedings for that purpose. We deal with conduct of a local Board that is basically lawless. It is no different in constitutional implications from a case where induction of-an ordained minister or other clearly exempt person is ordered (a) to retaliate against the person because of his political views or (b) to bear down on him for his religious views or his racial attitudes or (c) to get him out of town so that the amorous interests of a Board member might be better served. See Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F. 2d 376. In such instances, as in the present one, there is no exercise of discretion by a Board in evaluating evidence and in determining whether a claimed exemption is deserved. The case we decide today involves a clear departure by the Board from its statutory mandate. To hold that a person deprived of his statutory exemption in such a blatantly lawless manner must either be inducted and raise his protest through habeas corpus or defy induction and defend his refusal in a criminal prosecution is to construe the Act with unnecessary harshness. As the Solicitor General suggests, such literalness does violence to the clear mandate of § 6 (g) governing the exemption. Our construction leaves § 10 (b)(3) unimpaired in the normal operations of the Act. No one, we believe, suggests that § 10 (b)(3) can sustain a literal reading. For while it purports on its face to suspend the writ of habeas corpus as a vehicle for reviewing a criminal conviction under the Act, everyone agrees that such was not its intent. Examples are legion where literalness in statutory language is out of harmony either with constitutional requirements, United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, or with an Act taken as an organic whole. Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., 332 U. S. 480, 488-489. We think § 10 (b) (3) and § 6 (g) are another illustration; and the Solicitor General agrees. Since the exemption granted divinity students is plain and unequivocal and in no way contested here, and since the scope of the statutory delinquency concept is not broad enough to sustain a revocation of what Congress has granted as a statutory right, or sufficiently buttressed by legislative standards, we conclude that pre-induction judicial review is not precluded in cases of this type. We accordingly reverse the judgment and remand the case to the District Court where petitioner must have the opportunity to prove the facts alleged and also to demonstrate that he meets the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 1331. Reversed. Section 6 (g) reads as follows: “Regular or duly ordained ministers of religion, as defined in this title, and students preparing for the ministry under the direction of recognized churches or religious organizations, who are satisfactorily pursuing full-time courses of instruction in recognized theological or divinity schools, or who are satisfactorily pursuing full-time courses of instruction leading to their entrance into recognized theological or divinity schools in which they have been pre-enrolled, shall be exempt from training and service (but not from registration) under this title.” Section 1617.1 of the Selective Service System Regulations requires a registrant to have the certificate in his personal possession at all times (32 CFR § 1617.1), and § 1642.4, 32 CFR § 1642.4 (a), provides that whenever a registrant fails to perform “any duty” required of him (apart from the duty to obey an order to report for induction) the Board may declare him to be “a delinquent.” The United States admits for purposes of the present proceeding by its motion to dismiss that petitioner satisfies the requirements of the exemption provided by § 6 (g). Section 10 (b) (3) reads in pertinent part as follows: “No judicial review shall be made of the classification or processing of any registrant by local boards, appeal boards, or the President, except as a defense to a criminal prosecution instituted under section 12 of this title, after the registrant has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report for induction, or for civilian work in the case of a registrant determined to be opposed to participation in war in any form: Provided, That such review shall go to the question of the jurisdiction herein reserved to local boards, appeal boards, and the President only when there is no basis in fact for the classification assigned to such registrant.” See S. Rep. No. 209, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 10, where it is stated: “A registrant who presents himself for induction may challenge his classification by seeking a writ of habeas corpus after his induction. If the registrant does not submit to induction, he may raise as a defense to a criminal prosecution the issue of the legality of the classification.” In Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549, a Jehovah’s Witness had been given conscientious objector status and ordered to report to a domestic camp for civilian work in lieu of military service. In defense to a criminal prosecution for disobeying that order, he argued that his local board had wrongly classified him by denying him an exemption as a minister. Without deciding whether Congress envisaged judicial review of such classifications, we held that a registrant could not challenge his classification without first exhausting his administrative remedies by reporting, and being accepted, for induction. Because he might still have been rejected at the civilian camp for mental or physical disabilities, Falbo had omitted a “necessary intermediate step in a united and continuous process designed to raise an army speedily and efficiently.” Id., at 553. In Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, petitioners were Jehovah’s Witnesses like Falbo who had been denied ministerial exemptions and who challenged that classification in defense to a criminal prosecution for refusing induction. In their case, however, they had exhausted their administrative remedies by reporting, and being accepted, for service, before then refusing to submit to induction. We found nothing in the 1940 Act to preclude judicial review of selective service classifications in defense to a criminal prosecution for refusing induction. Supra, at n. 2. We would have a somewhat different problem were the contest over, say, the quantum of evidence necessary to sustain a Board's classification. Then we would not be able to say that it was plain on the record and on the face of the Act that an exemption had been granted and there would therefore be no clash between § 10 (b) (3) and another explicit provision of the Act.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. KEYSTONE CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIES, INC. No. 91-1677. Argued February 22, 1993 — Decided May 24, 1993 Christopher J. Wright argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Bruton, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, and Steven W. Parks. Raymond P. Wexler argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Todd F. Maynes and Ralph P. End. Carol Connor Flowe, William G. Beyer, and James J. Armbruster filed a brief for the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation as amicus curiae urging reversal. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, we are concerned with the legality of an employer’s contributions of unencumbered property to a defined benefit pension plan. Specifically, we must address the question whether such a contribution, when applied to the employer’s funding obligation, is a prohibited “sale or exchange” under 26 U. S. C. §4975 so that the employer thereby incurs the substantial excise taxes imposed by the statute. I A “defined benefit pension plan,” as its name implies, is one where the employee, upon retirement, is entitled to a fixed periodic payment. The size of that payment usually depends upon prior salary and years of service. The more common “defined contribution pension plan,” in contrast, is typically one where the employer contributes a percentage of payroll or profits to individual employee accounts. Upon retirement, the employee is entitled to the funds in his account. See 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(34) and (35). If either type of plan qualifies for favorable tax treatment, the employer, for income tax purposes, may deduct its current contributions to the plan; the retiree, however, is not taxed until he receives payment from the plan. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 402(a)(1) and 404(a)(1). II The facts that are pertinent for resolving the present litigation are not in dispute. During its taxable years ended June 30, 1983, through June 30, 1988, inclusive, respondent Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc., a Delaware corporation with principal place of business in Dallas, Tex., maintained several tax-qualified defined benefit pension plans. These were subject to the minimum funding requirements prescribed by §302 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. 93-406, §302, 88 Stat. 869, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1082. See also 26 U. S. C. § 412. Respondent funded the plans by contributions to the Keystone Consolidated Master Pension Trust. On March 8, 1983, respondent contributed to the Pension Trust five truck terminals having a stated fair market value of $9,655,454 at that time. Respondent credited that value against its minimum funding obligation to its defined benefit pension plans for its fiscal years 1982 and 1983. On March 13, 1984, respondent contributed to the Pension Trust certain Key West, Fla., real property having a stated fair market value of $5,336,751 at that time. Respondent credited that value against its minimum funding obligation for its fiscal year 1984. The truck terminals were not encumbered at the times of their transfers. Neither was the Key West property. Their respective stated fair market values are not challenged here. Respondent claimed deductions on its federal income tax returns for the fair market values of the five truck terminals and the Key West property. It also reported as taxable capital gain the difference between its income tax basis in each property and that property’s stated fair market value. Thus, for income tax purposes, respondent treated the disposal of each property as a “sale or exchange” of a capital asset. See 26 U.S.C. §1222. Section 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. §4975, was added by § 2003(a) of ERISA. See 88 Stat. 971. It imposes a two-tier excise tax on specified “prohibited transactions” between a pension plan and a “disqualified person.” Among the “disqualified persons” listed in the statute is the employer of employees covered by the pension plan. See § 4975(e)(2)(C). Among the transactions prohibited is “any direct or indirect . . . sale or exchange ... of any property between a plan and a disqualified person.” See § 4975(c)(1)(A). The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who is the petitioner here, ruled that respondent’s transfers to the Pension Trust of the five truck terminals and the Key West property were sales or exchanges prohibited under § 4975(c)(1)(A). This ruling resulted in determined deficiencies in respondent’s first-tier excise tax liability of $749,610 for its fiscal year 1984 and of $482,773 for each of its fiscal years 1983 and 1985-1988, inclusive. The Commissioner also determined that respondent incurred second-tier excise tax liability in the amount of $9,655,454 for its fiscal year 1988. Respondent timely filed a petition for redetermination with the United States Tax Court. That court, with an unreviewed opinion on cross-motions for summary judgment, ruled in respondent’s favor. 60 TCM 1423 (1990), ¶ 90,628 P-H Memo TC. The Tax Court acknowledged that “there is a potential for abuse by allowing unencumbered property transfers to plans in satisfaction of minimum funding requirements.” Id., at 1424, ¶ 90,628 P-H Memo TC, p. 90-3071. Nonetheless, it did not agree that the transfers in this case constituted sales or exchanges under §4975. It rejected the Commissioner’s attempt to analogize the property transfers to the recognition of income for income tax purposes, for it considered the issue whether a transfer is a prohibited transaction under §4975 to be “separate and distinct from income tax recognition.” Id., at 1425, ¶ 90,628 P-H Memo TC, p. 90-3071. In drawing this distinction, the Tax Court cited 26 U. S. C. § 4975(f)(3). That section specifically states that a transfer of property “by a disqualified person to a plan shall be treated as a sale or exchange if the property is subject to a mortgage or similar lien.” The court observed: “Since section 4975(f)(3) specifically describes certain transfers of real or personal property to a plan by a disqualified person as a sale or exchange for purposes of section 4975, the definitional concerns of ‘sale or exchange’ are removed from the general definitions found in other areas of the tax law.” 60 TCM, at 1425, ¶ 90,628 P-H Memo TC, p. 90-3071. The Tax Court thus seemed to say that § 4975(f)(3) limits the reach of § 4975(c)(1)(A), so that only transfers of encumbered property-are prohibited. The Tax Court also rejected the Commissioner’s argument that by contributing noncash property to its plan, the employer was in a position to exert unwarranted influence over the Pension Trust’s investment policy. The court’s answer was that the trustee “can dispose of” the property. Id., at 1425, ¶ 90,628 P-H Memo TC, p. 90-3072. The court noted that it earlier had rejected the Commissioner’s distinction between transfers of property that satisfy a funding obligation and transfers of encumbered property, whether or not the latter transfers fulfill a funding obligation, in Wood v. Commissioner, 95 T. C. 364 (1990) (unreviewed), rev’d, 955 F. 2d 908 (CA4), cert. granted, 504 U. S. 972, dism’d, 505 U. S. 1231 (1992). See 60 TCM, at 1425, ¶ 90,628 P-H Memo TC, p. 90-3072. The United States. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 951 F. 2d 76 (1992). It read § 4975(f)(3) as “implying that unless it is encumbered by a mortgage or lien, a transfer of property is not to be treated as if it were a sale or exchange.” Id., at 78. It rejected the Commissioner’s argument that § 4975(f)(3) was intended to expand the definition of “sale or exchange” to include transfers of encumbered property that do not fulfill funding obligations; in the court’s view, “there is no basis for this distinction between involuntary and voluntary transfers anywhere in the Code.” Ibid. The court reasoned: “If all transfers of property to a plan were to be treated as a sale or exchange” under § 4975(c)(1)(A), then § 4975(f)(3) “would be superfluous.” Ibid. That a transfer of property in satisfaction of an obligation is treated as a “sale or exchange” of property for income tax purposes is “irrelevant,” because “[s]eetion 4975 was not enacted to measure economic income.” Id., at 79. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Commissioner’s views were not entitled to deference, despite the fact that both the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Labor administer ERISA’s prohibited-transaetion provisions. This was because the Commissioner’s views had not been set out in a formal regulation, and because the Department of Labor’s views were set out in an advisory opinion that was binding only “on the parties thereto, and has no precedential effect.” Ibid. In view of the acknowledged conflict between the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Wood, see 955 F. 2d, at 913, and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in the present litigation, cases decided within two weeks of each other, we granted certiorari. 506 U. S. 813 (1992). Ill The statute with which we are concerned is a complicated one. But when much of its language, not applicable to the present case, is set to one side, the issue before us comes into better focus. Respondent acknowledges that it is a “disqualified person” with respect to the Pension Trust. It also acknowledges that the trust qualifies as a plan under §4975. Our task, then, is only to determine whether the transfers of the terminals and of the Key West property were sales or exchanges within the reach of § 4975(c)(1)(A) and therefore were prohibited transactions. A It is well established for income tax purposes that the transfer of property in satisfaction of a monetary obligation is usually a “sale or exchange” of the property. See, e. g., Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U. S. 504 (1941). See also 2 B. Bittker & L. Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts ¶ 40.4, p. 40-11 (2d ed. 1990). It seems clear, therefore, that respondent’s contribution of the truck terminals and the Key West property constituted, under the income tax laws, sales of those properties to the Pension Trust. The Fourth Circuit, in Wood, supra, observed: “[W]e are aware of no instance when the term ‘sale or exchange’ has been used or interpreted not to include transfers of property in satisfaction of indebtedness.” 955 F. 2d, at 913. This logic applied in income tax cases is equally applicable under § 4975(c)(1)(A). The phrase “sale or exchange” had acquired a settled judicial and administrative interpretation over the course of a half century before Congress enacted in § 4975 the even broader statutory language of “any direct or indirect... sale or exchange.” Congress presumptively was aware when it enacted §4975 that the phrase “sale or exchange” consistently had been construed to include the transfer of property in satisfaction of a monetary obligation. See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U. S. 333, 340-343 (1981). It is a “normal rule of statutory construction,” Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U. S. 851, 860 (1986), that “identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning,” Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932). Further, “the Code must be given ‘as great an internal symmetry and consistency as its words permit.’ ” Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U. S. 299, 304 (1961). Accordingly, when we construe § 4975(c)(1)(A), it is proper to accept the already settled meaning of the phrase “sale or exchange.” Even if this phrase had not possessed a settled meaning, it still would be clear that § 4975(c)(1)(A) prohibits the transfer of property in satisfaction of a debt. Congress barred not merely a “sale or exchange.” It prohibited something more, namely, “any direct or indirect... sale or exchange.” The contribution of property in satisfaction of a funding obligation is at least both an indirect type of sale and a form of exchange, since the property is exchanged for diminution of the employer’s funding obligation. B We note, too, that this construction of the statute’s broad language is necessary to accomplish Congress’ goal. Before ERISA’s enactment in 1974, the measure that governed a transaction between a pension plan and its sponsor was the customary arm’s-length standard of conduct. This provided an open door for abuses such as the sponsor’s sale of property to the plan at an inflated price or the sponsor’s satisfaction of a funding obligation by contribution of property that was overvalued or nonliquid. Congress’ response to these abuses included the enactment of ERISA’s § 406(a)(1)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 1106(a)(1)(A), and the addition of §4975 to the Internal Revenue Code. Congress’ goal was to bar categorically a transaction that was likely to injure the pension plan. S. Rep. No. 93-383, pp. 95-96 (1973). The transfer of encumbered property may jeopardize the ability of the plan to pay promised benefits. See Wood v. Commissioner, supra. Such a transfer imposes upon the trust the primary obligation to pay the encumbrance, and thus frees cash for the employer by restricting the use of cash by the trust. Overvaluation, the burden of disposing of the property, and the employer’s substitution of its own judgment as to investment policy, are other obvious considerations. Although the burden of an encumbrance is unique to the contribution of encumbered property, concerns about overvaluation, disposal of property, and the need to maintain an independent investment policy animate any contribution of property that satisfies a funding obligation, regardless of whether or not the property is encumbered. This is because as long as a pension fund is giving up an account receivable in exchange for property, the fund runs the risk of giving up more than it is getting in return if the property is either less valuable or more burdensome than a cash contribution would have been. These potential harmful effects are illustrated by the facts of the present case, even though the properties at issue were unencumbered and not overvalued at the times of their respective transfers. There were exclusive sales-listing agreements respondent had made with respect to two of the truck terminals; these agreements called for sales commissions. The presence of this requirement demonstrates that it is neither easy nor costless to-dispose of such properties. The Chicago truck terminal, for example, was not sold for SVz years after it was listed for sale by the Pension Trust. These problems are not solved, as the Court of Appeals suggested, by the mere imposition of excise taxes by §4971. It is §4975 that prevents the abuses. C We do not agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that § 4975(f)(3) limits the meaning of “sale or exchange,” as that phrase appears in § 4975(e)(1)(A). Section 4975(f)(3) states that a transfer of property “by a disqualified person to a plan shall be treated as a sale or exchange if the property is subject to a mortgage or similar lien.” The Court of Appeals read this language as implying that unless property “is encumbered by a mortgage or lien, a transfer of property is not to be treated as if it were a sale or exchange.” 951 F. 2d, at 78. We feel that by this language Congress intended § 4975(f)(3) to expand, not limit, the scope of the prohibited-transaction provision. It extends the reach of “sale or exchange” in § 4975(e)(1)(A) to include contributions of encumbered property that do not satisfy funding obligations. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 307 (1974). Congress intended by § 4975(f)(3) to provide additional protection, not to limit the protection already provided by § 4975(c)(1)(A). We feel that the Commissioner’s construction of §4975 is a sensible one. A transfer of encumbered property, like the transfer of unencumbered property to satisfy an obligation, has the potential to burden a plan, while a transfer of property that is neither encumbered nor satisfies a debt presents far less potential for causing loss to the plan. IV The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia joins all but Part III-B of this opinion. The first-tier tax is “5 percent of the amount involved.” 26 U. S. C. § 4975(a). The second-tier tax is ‘TOO percent of the amount involved.” § 4975(b). The “amount involved” is the greater of the amount of money and the fair market value of the other property given or the amount of money and the fair market value of the other properly received. § 4975(f)(4). The second-tier tax usually may be avoided by timely correction of the prohibited transaction upon completion of the litigation concerning the taxpayer’s liability for the tax. See §§ 4961(a), 4963(b) and (e), 6213(a), and 7481(a). Such expanded coverage is illustrated by the following example. An employer with no outstanding funding obligations wishes to contribute property to a pension fund to reward its employees for an especially productive year of service. Under our analysis, the property contribution is permissible if the property is unencumbered, because it will not be “exr changed” for a diminution in funding obligations and therefore does not fall within the prohibition of § 4975(c)(1)(A). On the other hand, the property contribution is impermissible if the property is encumbered, because § 4975(f)(3) specifically prohibits all contributions of encumbered property. We note, in passing, that the parties and the amicus have argued strenuously the issue whether we should afford deference to the interpretation of the statute by the two agencies charged with administering it. See Brief for Petitioner 29-32; Brief for Respondent 39-42; Reply Brief for Petitioner 18-20; Brief for Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation as Amicus Curiae 10-13. It does appear that the Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service consistently have taken the position that a sponsoring employer’s transfer of unencumbered properly to a pension plan to satisfy its funding obligation is a prohibited sale or exchange. See Department of Labor Advisory Opinion 81-69A, issued July 28, 1981; Department of Labor Advisory Opinion 90-05A, issued March 29, 1990; Rev. Rule 81-40, 1981-1 Cum. Bull. 508; Rev. Rule 77-379, 1977-2 Cum. Bull. 387. We reach our result in this case without reliance on any rule of deference. Because of the nature and limitations of these rulings, we express no view as to whether they are or are not entitled to deference. The resolution of that issue is deferred to another day.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES et al. v. STUDENTS CHALLENGING REGULATORY AGENCY PROCEDURES (SCRAP) et al. No. 72-535. Argued February 28, 1973 Decided June 18, 1973 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BreNNAn and BlacKMUn, JJ., joined; in Parts I and II of which Douglas and Marshall, JJ., joined; and in Parts I and III of which Burger, C. J., and White and RehNquist, JJ., joined. BlacKmuN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BreNNAN, J., joined, post, p. 699. Douglas, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, post, p. 699. White, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 722. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 724. Powell, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the United States et al. in No. 72-535. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Frizzell, Edward R. Korman, Fritz R. Kahn, Betty Jo Christian, and James F. Tao. Hugh B. Cox argued the cause for appellants in No. 72-562. With him on the briefs were Charles A. Horsky, Michael Boudin, and Edward A. Kaier. Peter H. Meyers argued the cause pro hac vice for Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, ap-pellee in both cases. With him on the brief was John F. Banzhaf III. John F. Dienelt argued the cause pro hac vice for Environmental Defense Fund et ah, appellees in both cases. With him on the brief was Dennis M. Flannery. Together with No. 72-562, Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Co. et al. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) et al., also on appeal from the same court. Jerome J. McGrath filed a brief for Independent Natural Gas Association of America as amicus curiae urging reversal. Echuard L. Merrigan filed a brief for National Association of Secondary Material Industries, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the initiative for rate increases remains with the railroads. But in the absence of special permission from the Interstate Commerce Commission, a railroad seeking an increase must provide at least 30 days’ notice to the Commission and the public before putting the new rate into effect. 49 U. S. C. § 6 (3). During that 30-day period, the Commission may suspend the operation of the proposed rate for a maximum of seven months pending an investigation and decision on the lawfulness of the new rates. 49 XL S. C. § 15 (7). At the end of the seven-month period, the carrier may put the suspended rate into effect unless the Commission has earlier completed its investigation and found the rate unlawful. Proceeding under this regulatory scheme, on December 13, 1971, substantially all of the railroads in the United States requested Commission authorization to file on 5 days’ notice a 2.5% surcharge on nearly all freight rates. The railroads sought a January 1, 1972, effective date for the new rates. The surcharge was proposed as an interim emergency measure designed to produce some $246 million annually in increased revenues pending adoption of selective rate increases on a permanent basis. As justification for the proposed surcharge, the railroads alleged increasing costs and severely inadequate revenues. In its last general revenue increase case, less than two years earlier, the Commission had found: “[T]he financial condition of the railroad industry as a whole, and the financial status of many individual carriers by rail, must be found to be at a dangerously low level. The precipitous decline in working capital and serious loss of liquidity has reduced many carriers to a truly marginal operation. This has been most clearly demonstrated by the recent bankruptcy application of the Penn Central. We think it undeniable that a number of other roads are approaching a similar financial crisis.” Ex parte Nos. 265/267, Increased Freight Rates, 1970 and 1971, 339 I. C. C. 125, 173. The railroads alleged that, since the close of that proceeding, their costs had increased by over $1 billion on an annual basis, including $305 million in increased wages, while economic indicators such as decreased working capital and increased debt obligations pointed toward an ever-worsening financial condition. In an order dated December 21, 1971, the Commission acknowledged the need, particularly of some carriers, for increased revenues, but it concluded that five days’ notice and a January 1, 1972, effective date “would preclude the public from effective participation.” Ex parte No. 281, Increased Freight Rates and Charges, 1972, 340 I. C. C. 358, 361. The Commission authorized the railroads to refile the 2.5% surcharge with not less than 30 days’ notice, and an effective date no earlier than February 5, 1972. On January 5, 1972, the railroads refiled the surcharge, to become effective on February 5, 1972. Shippers, competing carriers, and other interested persons requested the Commission to suspend the tariff for the statutory seven-month period. Various environmental groups, including Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), two of the appellees here, protested that failure to suspend the surcharge would cause their members “economic, recreational and aesthetic harm.” Specifically, they claimed that the rate structure would discourage the use of “recyclable” materials, and promote the use of new raw materials that compete with scrap, thereby adversely affecting the environment by encouraging unwarranted mining, lumbering, and other extractive activities. The members of these environmental groups were allegedly forced to pay more for finished products, and their use of forests and streams was allegedly impaired because of unnecessary destruction of timber and extraction of raw materials, and the accumulation of otherwise recyclable solid and liquid waste materials. The railroads replied that since this was a general rate increase, recyclable materials would not be made any less competitive relative to other commodities, and that in the past general rate increases had not discouraged the movement of scrap materials. The Commission issued an order on February 1, 1972, shortly before the surcharge would have automatically become effective. It recognized that “the railroads have a critical need for additional revenue from their interstate freight rates and charges to offset, in part, recently incurred increased operating costs,” and announced its decision not to suspend the 2.5% surcharge for the seven-month statutory period. In anticipation of the proposed permanent selective increases to be filed by the railroads and to avoid further complication of the tariff rates, the Commission specified that its refusal to suspend was conditioned upon the carriers’ setting an expiration date for the surcharge of no later than June 5, 1972. The Commission ordered the investigation into the railroads’ rates which had been instituted by its December 21 order to be held in abeyance until the carriers requested permission to file the indicated permanent rate increases on a selective basis. With respect to the ap-pellees’ environmental arguments, the Commission found that “the involved general increase will have no significant adverse effect on the movement of traffic by railway or on the quality of the human environment within the meaning of the [National] Environmental Policy Act of 1969.” The proposed permanent selective increases, averaging 4.1%, were subsequently filed with the Commission, and various parties again requested that these proposed rates also be suspended. By order served March 6, 1972, the Commission did not grant the railroads’ request to have the selective increases go into effect on April 1, 1972, as they had sought but it allowed the carriers to republish their rates to become effective on May 1, 1972, upon not less than 45 days’ notice to the public. The carriers did republish the rates, and on April 24, 1972, the Commission entered an order suspending the proposed selective increase for the full seven-month period allowed by statute, or to and including November 30, 1972. The investigation into the increased rates was continued. Since the selective increases were to supplant the temporary surcharge, and since they had been suspended, the Commission modified its February 1 order and authorized the railroads to eliminate the June 5 expiration date for the surcharge and to continue collecting the surcharge until November 30, 1972. I On May 12, 1972, SCRAP filed the present suit against the United States and the Commission in the District Court for the District of Columbia seeking, along with other relief, a preliminary injunction to restrain enforcement of the Commission’s February 1 and April 24 orders allowing the railroads to collect the 2.5% surcharge. SCRAP stated in its amended complaint that it was “an unincorporated association formed by five law students, ... in September, 1971. Its primary purpose is to enhance the quality of the human environment for its members, and for all citizens . . . .” To establish standing to bring this suit, SCRAP repeated many of the allegations it had made before the Commission in Ex parte 281. It claimed that each of its members “suffered economic, recreational and aesthetic harm directly as a result of the adverse environmental impact of the railroad freight structure, as modified by the Commission’s actions to date in Ex Parte 281.” Specifically, SCRAP alleged that each of its members was caused to pay more for finished products, that each of its members “[u]ses the forests, rivers, streams, mountains, and other natural resources surrounding the Washington Metropolitan area and at his legal residence, for camping, hiking, fishing, sightseeing, and other recreational [and] aesthetic purposes,” and that these uses have been adversely affected by the increased freight rates, that each of its members breathes the air within the Washington metropolitan area and the area of his legal residence and that this air has suffered increased pollution caused by the modified rate structure, and that each member has been forced to pay increased taxes because of the sums which must be expended to dispose of otherwise reusable waste materials. The main thrust of SCRAP'S complaint was that the Commission's decisions of February 1 and April 24, insofar as they declined to suspend the 2.5% surcharge, were unlawful because the Commission had failed to include a detailed environmental impact statement as required by § 102 (2) (C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (C). NEPA requires such a statement in “every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment Ibid. SCRAP contended that because of its alleged adverse impact upon recycling, the Commission’s action with respect to the surcharge constituted a major federal action significantly affecting the environment. Three additional environmental groups, also appellees here, were allowed to intervene as plaintiffs, and a group of railroads, appellants here, intervened as defendants to support the 2.5% surcharge. After a single district judge had denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and SCRAP’S motion for a temporary restraining order, a statutory three-judge district court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2284, 2325, to decide the motion for a preliminary injunction and the cross-motion to dismiss the complaint. On July 10, 1972, the District Court filed an opinion, 346 F. Supp. 189, and entered an injunction prohibiting the Commission “from permitting,” and the railroads “from collecting” the 2.5% surcharge “insofar as that surcharge relates to goods being transported for purposes of recycling, pending further order of this court.” The court first rejected the contention that the appel-lees were without standing to sue because they allegedly had no more than “a general interest in seeing that the law is enforced,” id., at 195, and distinguished our recent decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, on the basis that, unlike the petitioner in Sierra Club, the environmental groups here had alleged that their members used the forests, streams, mountains and other resources in the Washington area and that this use was disturbed by the environmental impact caused by nonuse of recyclable goods. Second, the court found that its power to grant an injunction was not barred by our decision in Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., 372 U. S. 658, 667, where we held that in enacting 49 U. S. C. § 15 (7), Congress had intentionally vested “in the Commission the sole and exclusive power to suspend” and withdrew “from the judiciary any pre-existing power to grant injunctive relief.” The court reasoned that NEPA “implicitly confers authority on the federal courts to enjoin any federal action taken in violation of NEPA's procedural requirements” “so long as the review is confined to a determination as to whether the procedural requisites of NEPA have been followed.” 346 F. Supp., at 197 and n. 11. Finally, turning to the merits, the court concluded that the Commission’s April 24 decision not to suspend the surcharge for the statutory seven-month period was a “ ‘major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.’ ” Id., at 199. On the premise that an environmental impact statement is required “whenever the action arguably will have an adverse environmental impact,” id., at 201, the court held that “the danger of an adverse impact is sufficiently real to require a statement in this case.” Ibid. The District Court declined to stay its injunctive order pending appeal to this Court, and on July 19, 1972, The Chief Justice, as Circuit Justice for the District of Columbia Circuit, denied applications to stay the preliminary injunction. 409 U. S. 1207. On December 18, 1972, we noted probable jurisdiction of the appeals filed by the United States, the Commission, and the railroads. 409 U. S. 1073. II The appellants challenge the appellees’ standing to sue, arguing that the allegations in the pleadings as to standing were vague, unsubstantiated, and insufficient under our recent decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, supra. The appellees respond that unlike the petitioner in Sierra Club, their pleadings sufficiently alleged that they were “adversely affected” or “aggrieved” within the meaning of § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 702, and they point specifically to the allegations that their members used the forests, streams, mountains, and other resources in the Washington metropolitan area for camping, hiking, fishing, and sightseeing, and that this use was disturbed by the adverse environmental impact caused by the nonuse of recyclable goods brought about by a rate increase on those commodities. The District Court found these allegations sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. We agree. The petitioner in Sierra Club, “a large and long-established organization, with a historic commitment to the cause of protecting our Nation's natural heritage from man's depredations,” 405 U. S., at 739, sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to restrain federal officials from approving the creation of an extensive ski-resort development in the scenic Mineral King Valley of the Sequoia National Forest. The Sierra Club claimed standing to maintain its “public interest” lawsuit because it had “ ‘a special interest in the conservation and the sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and forests of the country ....’” Id., at 730. We held those allegations insufficient. Relying upon our prior decisions in Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U. S. 159, we held that § 10 of the APA conferred standing to obtain judicial review of agency action only upon those who could show “that the challenged action had caused them 'injury in fact/ and where the alleged injury was to an interest 'arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated’ by the statutes that the agencies were claimed to have violated.” 405 U. S., at 733. In interpreting “injury in fact” we made it clear that standing was not confined to those who could show “economic harm,” although both Data Processing and Barlow had involved that kind of injury. Nor, we said, could the fact that many persons shared the same injury be sufficient reason to disqualify from seeking review of an agency’s action any person who had in fact suffered injury. Rather, we explained: “Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.” Id,, at 734. Consequently, neither the fact that the appellees here claimed only a harm to their use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the Washington area, nor the fact that all those who use those resources suffered the same harm, deprives them of standing. In Sierra Club, though, we went on to stress the importance of demonstrating that the party seeking review be himself among the injured, for it is this requirement that gives a litigant a direct stake in the controversy and prevents the judicial process from becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders. No such specific injury was alleged in Sierra Club. In that case the asserted harm “will be felt directly only by those who use Mineral King and Sequoia National Park, and for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened by the highway and ski resort,” id.,, at 735, yet “[tjhe Sierra Club failed to allege that it or its members would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes by the . . . development.” Ibid. Here, by contrast, the appellees claimed that the specific and allegedly illegal action of the Commission would directly harm them in their use of the natural resources of the Washington Metropolitan Area. Unlike the specific and geographically limited federal action of which the petitioner complained in Sierra Club, the challenged agency action in this case is applicable to substantially all of the Nation’s railroads, and thus allegedly has an adverse environmental impact on all the natural resources of the country. Rather than a limited group of persons who used a picturesque valley in California, all persons who utilize the scenic resources of the country, and indeed all who breathe its air, could claim harm similar to that alleged by the environmental groups here. But we have already made it clear that standing is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury. Indeed some of the cases on which we relied in Sierra Club demonstrated the patent fact that persons across the Nation could be adversely affected by major governmental actions. See, e. g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F. 2d 1093, 1097 (interests of consumers affected by decision of Secretary of Agriculture refusing to suspend registration of certain pesticides containing DDT); Reade v. Ewing, 205 F. 2d 630, 631-632 (interests of consumers of oleomargarine in fair labeling of product regulated by Federal Security Administration). To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion. But the injury alleged here is also very different from that at issue in Sierra Club because here the alleged injury to the environment is far less direct and perceptible. The petitioner there complained about the construction of a specific project that would directly affect the Mineral King Valley. Here, the Court was asked to follow a far more attenuated line of causation to the eventual injury of which the appellees complained — a general rate increase would allegedly cause increased use of nonre-cyclable commodities as compared to recyclable goods, thus resulting in the need to use more natural resources to produce such goods, some of which resources might be taken from the Washington area, and resulting in more refuse that might be discarded in national parks in the Washington area. The railroads protest that the appel-lees could never prove that a general increase in rates would have this effect, and they contend that these allegations were a ploy to avoid the need to show some injury in fact. Of course, pleadings must be something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable. A plaintiff must allege that he has been or will in fact be perceptibly harmed by the challenged agency action, not that he can imagine circumstances in which he could be affected by the agency’s action. And it is equally clear that the allegations must be true and capable of proof at trial. But we deal here simply with the pleadings in which the appellees alleged a specific and perceptible harm that distinguished them from other citizens who had not used the natural resources that were claimed to be affected. If, as the railroads now assert, these allegations were in fact untrue, then the appellants should have moved for summary judgment on the standing issue and demonstrated to the District Court that the allegations were sham and raised no genuine issue of fact. We cannot say on these pleadings that the ap-pellees could not prove their allegations which, if proved, would place them squarely among those persons injured in fact by the Commission’s action, and entitled under the clear import of Sierra Club to seek review. The District Court was correct in denying the appellants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to allege sufficient standing to bring this lawsuit. Ill We need not reach the issue whether, under conventional standards of equity, the District Court was justified in issuing a preliminary injunction, because we have concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter an injunction in any event. The District Court enjoined the Commission from “permitting,” and the railroads from “collecting,” the 2.5%' interim surcharge on recyclable commodities. Finding that NEPA implicitly conferred authority “on the federal courts to enjoin any federal action taken in violation of NEPA’s procedural requirements,” 346 F. Supp., at 197, it concluded that our decision in Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., 372 U. S. 658, did not affect judicial power to issue an injunction in the circumstances of this case. We cannot agree. In Arrow, the Commission had suspended a railroad’s proposed rates for the statutory seven-month period, and the railroad had voluntarily deferred the proposed rate for an additional five months. When the Commission had not reached a final decision within that period, the railroad announced its intent to adopt the new rates. In a suit brought to enjoin the railroad from effectuating that change, we held that the courts were without power to issue such an injunction. From the language and history of § 15 (7) of the Interstate Commerce Act, we concluded that Congress had vested exclusive power in the Commission to suspend rates pending its final decision on their lawfulness, and had deliberately extinguished judicial power to grant such relief. The factual distinctions between the present cases and Arrow are inconsequential. It is true that the injunction in Arrow was sought after the statutory seven-month period had expired and thus represented an attempt to extend judicially the suspension period, while here the injunction was issued during the suspension period. But Arrow was grounded on the lack of power in the courts to grant any injunction before the Commission had finally determined the lawfulness of the rates, and that holding did not depend on the fact that the availability of the Commission’s power of suspension had passed. Indeed, the federal court decisions cited and approved in Arrow involved instances where the courts had been asked to enjoin rates during the statutory sevenmonth period. See, e. g., M. C. Kiser Co. v. Central of Georgia R. Co., 236 F. 573, aff’d, 239 F. 718; Freeport Sulphur Co. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 913; Bison S. S. Corp. v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 63; Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 605, 609—610, acated in part as moot, 364 U. S. 280; Carlsen v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 398. Similarly, there is no significance in the fact that, unlike Arrow, the injunction in this litigation ran against the Commission as well as the railroads. The only way in which the Commission could comply with the court’s order would be to exercise its power of suspension and suspend the surcharge. The injunction constitutes a direct interference with the Commission’s discretionary decision whether or not to suspend the rates. It would turn Arrow into a sheer formality and effectively amend § 15 (7) if a federal court could accomplish by injunction against the Commission what it could not accomplish by injunction directly against the railroads. And, again, the federal court decisions on which Arrow relied were for the most part cases in which the courts had held that they were without power to compel the Commission to grant a rate suspension. See, e. g., Bison S. S. Corp. v. United States, supra; Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. United States, supra; Carlsen v. United States, supra; cf. Freeport Sulphur Co. v. United States, supra. Thus, the only arguably significant distinction between the present litigation and Arrow is that here the Commission allegedly failed to comply with NEPA. However, we cannot agree with the District Court that NEPA has amended § 15 (7) sub silentio and created an implicit exception to Arrow so that judicial power to grant in-junctive relief in this case has been revived. NEPA, one of the recent major federal efforts at reversing the deterioration of the country’s environment, declares "that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government ... to use all practicable means and measures . . . in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.” 42 U. S. C. § 4331. To implement these lofty purposes, Congress imposed a number of responsibilities upon federal agencies, most notably the requirement of producing a detailed environmental impact statement for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (C). But nowhere, either in the legislative history or the statutory language, is there any indication that Congress intended to restore to the federal courts the power temporarily to suspend railroad rates, a power that had been clearly taken away by § 15 (7) of the Interstate Commerce Act. The statutory language, in fact, indicates that NEPA was not intended to repeal by implication any other statute. Thus, 42 U. S. C. §4335 specifies that “[t]he policies and goals set forth in [NEPA] are supplementary to those set forth in existing authorizations of Federal agencies,” and 42 U. S. C. § 4334 instructs that the Act “shall [not] in any way affect the specific statutory obligations of any Federal agency . . . .” Rather than providing for any wholesale overruling of prior law, NEPA requires all federal agencies to review their “present statutory authority, administrative regulations, and current policies and procedures for the purpose of determining whether there are any deficiencies or inconsistencies therein which prohibit full compliance with the purposes and provisions of [NEPA] • and shall propose to the President . . . such measures as may be necessary to bring their authority and policies into conformity with the intent, purposes, and procedures set forth in [NEPA].” 42 U. S. C. §4333. It would be anomalous if Congress had provided at one and the same time that federal agencies, which have the primary responsibility for the implementation of NEPA, must comply with present law and ask for any necessary new legislation, but that the courts may simply ignore what we described in Arrow as “a clear congressional purpose to oust judicial power . . . 372 U. S., at 671 n. 22. The District Court pointed to nothing either in the language or history of NEPA that suggests a restoration of previously eliminated judicial power. While it relied primarily on the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 146 U. S. App. D. C. 33, 449 F. 2d 1109, and Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 149 U. S. App. D. C. 380, 463 F. 2d 783, neither case supports an injunction under the circumstances of this case. Calvert Cliffs’ held that a federal court had power to review rules promulgated by the Atomic Energy Commission, and there the court ordered further consideration of the rules on the ground that there had not been compliance with NEPA. In Committee for Nuclear Responsibility it was held that federal courts had jurisdiction to consider whether an executive decision to conduct a nuclear test had satisfied the procedural requirements of NEPA. The question here, however, is not whether there is general judicial power to determine if an agency has complied with NEPA, and to grant equitable relief if it has not, cf. Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., supra, at 671 n. 22; Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4, but rather whether in a specific context NEPA sub silentio revived judicial power that had been explicitly eliminated by Congress. Calvert Cliffs’ and Committee for Nuclear Responsibility have nothing to say on this issue, for neither was concerned with a specific statute that restricts the power of the federal courts to grant injunctions. Our conclusion that the District Court lacked the power to grant the present injunction is confirmed by the fact that each of the policies that we identified in Arrow as the basis for § 15 (7) would be substantially undermined if the courts were found to have suspension powers simply because noncompliance with NEPA was alleged. First, Arrow found that the Commission had been granted exclusive suspension powers in order to avoid the diverse results that had previously been reached by the courts. District courts had differed as to the existence and scope of any power to grant interim relief, with the consequence that the uniformity of rates had been jeopardized, and different shippers, carriers, and areas of the country had been subjected to disparate treatment. Similarly, since a suit to enjoin a national rate increase on NEPA grounds could be brought in any federal district court in the country, see 28 U. S. C. §§ 2284, 2321-2325, the result might easily be that the courts would "[reach] diverse results, . . . [engendering] confusion and [producing] competitive inequities.” 372 U. S., at 663. In short, a rate increase allowed in New York might be disallowed in New Jersey. Second, we stressed in Arrow that § 15 (7) represents a careful accommodation of the various interests involved. The suspension period was limited as to time to prevent excessive harm to the carriers, for the revenues lost during that period could not be recouped from the shippers. On the other hand, Congress was aware that if the Commission did not act within the suspension period, then the new rates would automatically go into effect and the shippers would have to pay increased rates that might eventually be found unlawful. To mitigate this loss, Congress authorized the Commission to require the carriers to keep detailed accounts and eventually to repay the increased rates if found unlawful. To allow judicial suspension for noncompliance with NEPA, would disturb this careful balance of interests. A railroad may depend for its very financial life on an increased rate, and the rate may be perfectly just and reasonable. Granting an injunction against that rate based on the Commission’s alleged noncompliance with NEPA, although the Commission had determined not to suspend the rate, would deprive the railroad of vitally needed revenues and result in an unjustified windfall to shippers. Finally, we found in Arrow that any survival of a judicial power to grant interim injunctive relief would represent an undesirable interference with the orderly exercise of the Commission’s power of suspension. Similarly, to grant an injunction in the present context, even though not based upon a substantive consideration of the rates, would directly interfere with the Commission’s decision as to when the rates were to go into effect, and would ignore our conclusion in Arrow that “Congress meant to foreclose a judicial power to interfere with the timing of rate changes which would be out of harmony with the uniformity of rate levels fostered by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.” 372 U. S., at 668. As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained in Port of New York Authority v. United States, 451 F. 2d 783, 788, where, on the basis of alleged noncompliance with NEPA, an injunction was sought against a Commission order refusing to suspend rates: “The basis of the decision in Arrow — that to permit judicial interference with the Commission’s suspension procedures would invite the very disruption in the orderly review of the lawfulness of proposed tariffs that Congress meant to preclude — applies with equal force to the issue now before us.” Accordingly, because the District Court granted a preliminary injunction suspending railroad rates when it lacked the power to do so, its judgment must be reversed and the cases remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Title 49 U. S. C. § 6 (3) provides: “No change shall be made in the rates, fares, and charges or joint rates, fares, and charges which have been filed and published by any common carrier in compliance with the requirements of this section, except after thirty days’ notice to the Commission and to the public published as aforesaid, which shall plainty state the changes proposed to be made in the schedule then in force and the time when the changed rates, fares, or charges will go into effect; and the proposed changes shall be shown by printing new schedules, or shall be plainly indicated upon the schedules in force at the time and kept open to public inspection: Provided, That the Commission may, in its discretion and for good cause shown, allow' changes upon less than the notice herein specified, or modify the requirements of this section in respect to publishing, posting, and filing of tariffs, either in particular instances or by a general order applicable to special or peculiar circumstances or conditions: Provided further, That the Commission is authorized to make suitable rules and regulations for the simplification of schedules of rates, fares, charges, and classifications and to permit in such rules and regulations the filing of an amendment of or change in any rate, fare, charge, or classification without filing complete schedules covering rates, fares, charges, or classifications not changed if, in its judgment, not inconsistent with the public interest.” Title 49 U. S. C. § 15 (7) provides in pertinent part: “Whenever there shall be filed with the Commission any schedule stating a new . . . rate, fare, or charge, . . . the Commission shall have . . . authority, either upon complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, and if it so orders without answer or other formal pleading by the interested carrier or carriers, but upon reasonable notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, fare, [or] charge . . . ; and pending such hearing and the decision thereon the Commission, upon filing with such schedule and delivering to the carrier or carriers affected thereby a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension, may from time to time suspend the operation of such schedule and defer the use of such rate, fare, [or] charge . . . , but not for a longer period than seven months beyond the time when it would otherwise go into effect; and after full hearing, whether completed before or after the rate, fare, [or] charge . . . goes into effect, the Commission may make such order with reference thereto as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after it had become effective. If the proceeding has not been concluded and an order made within the period of suspension, the proposed change of rate, fare, [or] charge . . . shall go into effect at the end of such period; but in case of a proposed increased rate or charge for or in respect to the transportation of property, the Commission may by order require the interested carrier or carriers to keep accurate account in detail of all amounts received by reason of such increase, specifying by whom and in whose behalf such amounts are paid, and upon completion of the hearing and decision may by further order require the interested carrier or carriers to refund, with interest, to the persons in whose behalf such amounts were paid, such portion of such increased rates or charges as by its decision shall be found not justified. At any hearing involving a change in a rate, fare, [or] charge . . . after September 18, 1940, the burden of proof shall be upon the carrier to show that the proposed changed rate, fare, [or] charge . . . is just and reasonable, and the Commission shall give to the hearing and decision of such questions preference over all other questions pending before it and decide the same as speedily as possible.” Other statutory provisions giving suspension powers to the Commission include 49 U. S. C. §§ 316 (g), 318 (c) (Motor Carrier Act); 49 U. S. C. §§907 (g), (i) (Water Carrier Act); 49 U. S. C. § 1006 (e) (Freight Forwarders Act). Figures reported to the Commission indicated that the net working capital of the Class I railroads for the 12 months ending September 30, 1971, was only $75.4 million, approximately $33.7 million less than the year-end 1970 figure. Long-term debt maturing within one year from September 30, 1971, was $43.6 million higher than on December 31, 1970. Equipment obligations at the end of 1970 were $4,448 million, or almost twice the total in 1960. The order of the ICC is unreported. The Commission also imposed as a condition on its refusal to suspend the exclusion of increased rates "on freight in trailer bodies, semi-trailers, vehicles or containers on flat cars, on export and import traffic.” Since such increases had been proposed only by the western and southern carriers and not by the eastern carriers, such increases would, in the Commission’s view, have disrupted existing port relationships. Finally, the Commission conditioned its action on the provision that the proposed surcharge would not apply to shipments originating prior to February 5,1972, and moving under transit arrangements. The March 6 and April 24 orders of the ICC are unreported. Section 102, 42 U. S. C. §4332, provides in pertinent part: “The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall— “(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on— “(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, “(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, “ (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, “(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and “(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. “Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public . . . and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes.” The Environmental Defense Fund, National Parks and Conservation Association, and Izaak Walton League of America intervened as plaintiffs. The allegations as to standing made by each of these groups were similar to those made by SCRAP. EDF, for example, alleged as follows: “EDF has a nationwide membership of over 32,000 persons composed of scientists, educators, lawyers and other citizens dedicated to the protection of our environment and the wise use of our natural resources. Each of EDF’s members has a personal interest in the maintenance of a safe, healthful, productive environment as free from waste substances as is possible. EDF's members have contributed financially to EDF in part so that they may obtain adequate representation of their legally protected environmental interests, which representation they could not otherwise individually afford. Each of EDF’s members has under § 101 (c) of NEPA, ‘a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment,’ which responsibility they fulfill in part by becoming a member of and contributing to EDF. “The increased freight rates and charges in Ex Parte 281 and the continuance of the underlying rate structure, which discriminate against movement of secondary (recyclable) materials, will cause EDF members individualized injury and adversely affect them in one or more of their activities and pastimes. Specifically, each EDF member: (i) has been or will be caused to pay more for products in the market place, made more expensive by both the non-use of recycled materials in their manufacture, and the need to use comparatively more energy in processing primary raw materials as opposed to secondary (recyclable) materials; (ii) uses the nation’s forests, rivers, streams, mountains, and other natural resources for camping, hiking, fishing, sightseeing, and other recreational and aesthetic purposes. These uses have been and will continue to be adversely affected to the extent that the freight rate structure, as modified thus far in Ex Parte 281, encourages destruction of virgin timber, the unnecessary extraction of nonrenewable resources, and the discharge and accumulation of otherwise recyclable materials.” The court dismissed as moot that part of the complaint relating to the Commission’s February 1 order because that order had expired by its own terms on June 5. Since the environmental groups have not appealed from the judgment below, we have before us for review only the District Court’s action with regard to the Commission’s April 24 order that allowed the surcharge to continue until November 30, 1972. The court also concluded that since the Commission had taken no final action with respect to the 4.1% selective increase, the lawfulness of that tariff was not ripe for review. The court did, however, retain jurisdiction over the case to review the final order of the Commission. While subsequent events do not bear directly on the validity of the District Court’s action in granting the preliminary injunction, they do highlight the problems that hover in the background of this litigation. On October 4, 1972, the Commission served its report and order in Ex parte 281 approving, with some exceptions, the general increases filed by the railroads. Increased Freight Rates and Charges, 1972, 341 I. C. C. 290. In that report, although the Commission gave extensive consideration to environmental aspects of the rate increases, it declined to include a formal environmental impact statement because it concluded that its actions “will neither actually nor potentially significantly affect the quality of the human environment Id., at 314. The selective increases were to become effective on October 23, 1972, but the Commission delayed until November 12 the effective date for rate increases on recyclable commodities in order to allow the submission of comments by interested parties. Upon the submission of critical comments, the Commission, in an unreported order served on November 8, reopened the rate proceeding in Ex parte 281 for further evaluation of the rates on recyclable commodities, and ordered the proposed selective tariff increases on those commodities suspended for the full seven-month period authorized by statute — until June 10, 1973. Accordingly, with respect to recyclable commodities on which the proposed selective increase had been suspended, the Commission extended the expiration date of the 2.5% surcharge until June 10, 1973, the expiration date for the suspension of the selective increases. But the Commission acknowledged that the power to collect the surcharge on these recyclable commodities was barred by the preliminary injunction issued by the District Court in the present case and which is the subject of the present appeals. In short, the temporary 2.5% surcharge would have been in effect throughout this period on recyclable commodities but for the District Court’s resilient preliminary injunction. Whether the Commission deliberately continued the surcharge beyond the time it would have been supplanted by the selective increases in order to give the surcharge and the District Court’s injunction continuing effect and thus avoid mooting this litigation, and whether the Commission acted beyond its powers under 49 U. S. C. § 15 (7) by suspending the selective increases for a second seven-month period and by treating the District Court’s injunction as having continuing effect, are questions not raised here. No party now maintains that these cases are moot. Cf. Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515. Both sets of appellees filed motions in the District Court: SCRAP sought a preliminary injunction against the Commission’s October 4 order, and EDF and the other intervening plaintiffs ■sought leave to file an amended and supplemental complaint and requested other relief. On January 9, 1973, the court deferred consideration of the EDF motions and denied SCRAP’S request for a preliminary injunction. The court found that as a result of the Commission’s November 8 order, neither the selective rate increases nor the temporary surcharge could be assessed on recyclable commodities. Consequently, the court found, no injunctive relief was justified as to those materials. While the permanent rate increase approved by the Commission in Ex parte 281 was then being collected on shipments of all other commodities, and although the Commission had concededly failed to file an impact statement, the court concluded that “the danger of an adverse impact appears to be sufficiently speculative . . . that it would be unsound to grant preliminary relief.” The court continued: “The record indicates that many railroads are in dire financial straits — some on the verge of bankruptcy — and badly need the revenues now being obtained under the Commission’s rate increase. The increase amounts to some $340 million per year, and were this revenue flow halted it could not easily be recouped should it later appear that no NEPA statement was necessary.” The merits of neither the Commission’s October 4 order nor the District Court’s January 9 decision are before us, and we therefore express no opinion on them. On May 7, 1973, the Commission served its final environmental impact statement relating to the selective rate increases on recyclable commodities. It concluded that the proposed increases would have no significant adverse effect on the environment. Contending that the impact statement was inadequate, EDF and SCRAP sought to enjoin collection of the selective rate increases. On June 7, 1973, the District Court temporarily enjoined the railroads from collecting the selective increases on recyclable commodities. On June 8, 1973, The Chief Justice, as Circuit Justice for the District of Columbia Circuit, stayed the District Court’s injunction pending further order of this Court. Like the petitioner in Sierra Chib, the appellees here base their standing to sue upon the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 702, which provides: “A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof;” As in Sierra Club, it is unnecessary to reach any question concerning the scope of the “zone of interests” test or its application to this ease. It is undisputed that the “environmental interest” that the appellees seek to protect is within the interests to be protected by NEPA, and it is unnecessary to consider the various allegations of economic harm on which the appellees also relied in their pleadings and which the Government contends are outside the intended purposes of NEPA. The Government urges us to limit standing to those who have been “significantly” affected by agency action. But, even if we could begin to define what such a test would mean, we think it fundamentally misconceived. “Injury in fact” reflects the statutory requirement that a person be “adversely affected” or “aggrieved,” and it serves to distinguish a person with a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation' — even though small — from a person with a mere interest in the problem. We have allowed important interests to be vindicated by plaintiffs with no more at stake in the outcome of an action than a fraction of a vote, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186; a $5 fine and costs, see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420; and a $1.50 poll tax, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663. While these cases were not dealing specifically with § 10 of the APA, we see no reason to adopt a more restrictive interpretation of “adversely affected” or “aggrieved.” As Professor Davis has put it: “The basic idea that comes out in numerous cases is that an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of principle; the trifle is the basis for standing and the principle supplies the motivation.” Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 613. See also K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§22.09-5, 22.09-6 (Supp. 1970). The railroads object to the fact that the allegations were not more precise — that no specific “forest” was named, that there was no assertion of the existence of any lumbering camp or other extractive facility in the area. They claim that they had no way to answer such allegations which were wholly barren of specifics. But, if that were really a problem, the railroads could have moved for a more definite statement, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12 (e), and certainly normal civil discovery devices were available to the railroads. Similarly, the District Court cannot be faulted for failing to take evidence on the issue of standing. This case came before the court on motions to dismiss and for a preliminary injunction. If the railroads thought that it was necessary to take evidence, or if they believed summary judgment was appropriate, they could have moved for such relief. EDF suggests that the April 24 order of the Commission was in fact a final order finding the surcharge "just and reasonable,” not simply a refusal to suspend the surcharge. But the Commission’s reference to the “just and reasonable” nature of the surcharge was a preliminary assessment commonly made in suspension orders. See, e. g., the suspension orders quoted in Naph-Sol Refining Co. v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 530, 531; Oscar Mayer & Co. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 977, 978-979. It did not represent a final determination by the Commission that any particular rate was just and reasonable. Indeed the Commission made it clear in its February 1 order that the surcharge was not considered a prescribed rate within the meaning of Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 284 U. S. 370, and was subject to complaint and investigation under the Act. An alternative ground for avoiding the Arrow decision, which was suggested but not relied on by the District Court, was that the surcharge here was an "agency-made” rate, not a “carrier-made” rate. Moss v. CAB, 430 F. 2d 891, which was cited by the court is, however, plainly inapposite. There the CAB suspended the rates proposed by the carriers, but suggested in their place “a complete and innovative scheme for setting all passenger rates for the continental United States.” Id., at 899. It was clear that when the carriers filed the rates suggested by the Board they would not be suspended. “Even a cursory reading of the order makes it clear that the Board told the carriers what rates to file; it set forth a step-by-step formula requiring major changes in rate-making practices and in rates which it expected the carriers to adopt.” Id., at 899-900. Here, by contrast, the level and structure of the rates were proposed entirely by the carriers. While the Commission suggested an expiration date for the surcharge, this was simply to make the surcharge expire when the general selective increases went into effect. This expiration date and the other standard conditions attached to the Commission’s refusal to suspend the surcharge did not, in any meaningful sense, transform the carrier-made rate into a Commission-made rate. See n. 8, supra. See Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 455 F. 2d 412, 420; Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 146 U. S. App. D. C. 33, 43, 449 F. 2d 1109, 1119; City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 160; Cohen v. Price Comm’n, 337 F. Supp. 1236, 1241. The argument that NEPA implicitly restored to the courts the injunctive power that § 15 (7) had divested is similar to a contention rejected in Arrow itself. There the petitioners claimed that congressional adoption of the National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899, had implicitly altered §15 (7). They claimed that the proposed new railroad rates would drive the barge lines out of existence, contrary to the congressional declaration of concern for the protection of water carriers threatened by rail competition. The Court concluded that “nothing in the National Transportation Policy, enacted many years after . . . §15(7), indicates that Congress intended to revive a judicial power which . . . was extinguished when the suspension power was vested in the Commission.” Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., 372 U. S. 658, 673. In addition, the Court noted that, as is also true with NEPA, the mandate was directed not to the courts but to the Commission. There is nothing about NEPA that makes it any more amenable for finding an implicit amendment of § 15 (7), than the National Transportation Policy was. Indeed Calvert Cliffs' indicated that the requirements of § 102 of NEPA, see n. 8, supra, did not have to be complied with, if such compliance was precluded by another statutory provision. 146 U. S. App. D. C., at 39, 449 F. 2d, at 1115. And Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, in another context, endorsed a principle, equally applicable here, that “repeal by implication is disfavored.” 149 U. S. App. D. C. 380, 382, 463 F. 2d 783, 785. In view of our conclusion that there was no power to grant the preliminary injunction, it is unnecessary for us to reach the other questions posed by the parties. For example, the Government and the railroads urge that, because of the pressures of time, an environmental impact statement is not required at the suspension stage of a rate proceeding, and, in any event, a decision by the Commission whether or not to suspend rates is not subject to judicial review. See Port of New York Authority v. United States, 451 F. 2d 783; Oscar Mayer & Co. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 977; M. C. Kiser Co. v. Central of Georgia R. Co., 236 F. 573; Freeport Sulphur Co. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 913; Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 605; Carlsen v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 398. The appellees in turn contend that some compliance -with NEPA is possible at the suspension stage, and that such compliance is required if the statute is to be enforced “to the fullest extent possible.” See 42 U. S. C. §4332. And they urge that there is, or should be, an exception to the general principle of nonreviewability of suspension decisions for those cases where the Commission has acted beyond its statutory authority, or in violation of a clear statutory command or a procedural requirement, a standard that the appellees view as broad enough to encompass alleged noncompliance with NEPA. See Naph-Sol Refining Co. v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 530, 532; Oscar Mayer & Co. v. United States, supra, at 982 (Doyle, J., concurring); Long Island R. Co. v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 795. We express no view on any of these issues.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ENERGY RESERVES GROUP, INC. v. KANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO. No. 81-1370. Argued November 9, 1982 Decided January 24, 1983 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, White, Marshall, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, and in all but Part II-C of which Burger, C. J., and Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 421. Gary W. Davis argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Martin W. Bauer, Clark Mandigo, Edwin W. Parker II, I. Michael Greenberger, and Nancy J. Bregstein. Basil W. Kelsey argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jerome T. Wolf, Terry W. Schackmann, and David S. Black. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Brian J. Moline, Special Assistant Attorney General of Kansas, for the State Corporation Commission of the State of Kansas; by William E. Metcalf and Patrick H. Donahue for Kansas Legal Services, Inc.; by Jan Eric Cart wright, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Robert D. Stewart, Jr., and Eddie M. Pope for the Oklahoma Corporation Commission; and by Dennis G. Lyons, Mark J. Spooner, John L. Arrington, Jr., Curtis M. Long, Jay M. Galt, and Harry W. Birdwell for Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. et al. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the regulation by the State of Kansas of the price of natural gas sold at wellhead in the intrastate market. It presents a federal Contract Clause issue and a statutory issue. I On September 27, 1975, The Kansas Power & Light Company (KPL), a public utility and appellee here, entered into two intrastate natural gas supply contracts with Clinton Oil Company, the predecessor-in-interest of appellant Energy Reserves Group, Inc. (ERG). Under the first contract, KPL agrees to purchase gas directly at the wellhead on the Spivey-Grabs Field in Kingman and Harper Counties in southern Kansas. The second contract obligates KPL to purchase from the same field residue gas, that is, gas remaining after certain recovery and processing steps are completed. The original contract price was $1.50 per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) of gas. The contracts continue in effect for the life of the field or for the life of the processing plants associated with the field. A Each contract contains two clauses known generically as indefinite price escalators. The first is a governmental price escalator clause; this provides that if a governmental authority fixes a price for any natural gas that is higher than the price specified in the contract, the contract price shall be increased to that level. The second is a price redetermination clause; this gives ERG the option to have the contract price redetermined no more than once every two years. The new price is then set by averaging the prices being paid under three other gas contracts chosen by the parties. When the price is increased pursuant to either of these clauses, each contract requires KPL to seek from the Kansas Corporation Commission (Commission) approval to pass the increase through to consumers. App. to Juris. Statement 69a. The application for approval is to be submitted within 5 days after a price increase resulting from governmental action, or no fewer than 60 days before a price redetermination increase is to become effective. Ibid. If the Commission refuses to permit the pass-through and KPL elects not to pay the increase, ERG has the option to terminate the agreement on 30 days’ written notice. Each contract states that the purpose of the price escalator clauses is “solely” to compensate ERG for “anticipated” increases in its operating costs and in the value of its gas. Id., at 70a. Each contract also provides: “Neither party shall be held in default for failure to perform hereunder if such failure is due to compliance with,” ibid., any “relevant present and future state and federal laws.” Id., at 69a. In 1977, ERG invoked the price redetermination clause, and the parties agreed on a price of $1.77 per Mcf, effective November 27 of that year. The Commission approved the pass-through of this increase to consumers. KPL paid the new price through 1978. B On December 1, 1978, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (Act), Pub. L. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350, 15 U. S. C. §3301 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V), designed in principal part to encourage increased natural gas production, became effective. The Act replaced the federal price controls that had been established under the Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821, with price ceilings that rise monthly based on “an inflation adjustment factor” and other considerations. Different ceilings are set for different types of gas. Section 102 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. §3312 (1976 ed., Supp. V), sets a gradually increasing ceiling price for newly discovered or newly produced natural gas. The December 1978 ceiling price under § 102 was $2,078 per million British thermal units. Section 104 sets ceiling prices for “old” interstate gas, that is, gas from already discovered and producing wells. Section 109 sets another ceiling price for categories of natural gas not covered by the other sections of the Act. As of December 1978, the § 109 ceiling price was $1.63 per million Btu’s. In another departure from the 1938 Natural Gas Act, the new Act extended federal price regulation to the intrastate gas market. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1126, pp. 67-68 (1978); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1752, pp. 67-68 (1978). Section 105 of the Act establishes the rule for applying price ceilings to intrastate gas, described as gas not committed to interstate commerce on November 8, 1978. It provides, in its subsection (b)(1), that the maximum lawful price of such gas “shall be the lower of. . . the price under the terms of the existing contract, to which such natural gas was subject on [November 9, 1978], . . . or . . . the maximum lawful price . . . computed for such month under section 102 (relating to new natural gas).” The parties agree that § 105(b)(1) governs these contracts. The Act, by § 602(a), also permits a State “to establish or enforce any maximum lawful price for the first sale of natural gas produced in such State which does not exceed the applicable maximum lawful price, if any, under title I of this Act.” C In direct response to the Act, the Kansas Legislature promptly imposed price controls on the intrastate gas market. In May 1979, the Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act (Kansas Act), 1979 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 171, codified as Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 55 — 1401 to 55-1415 (Supp. 1982), was enacted. The Kansas Act applies only to natural gas contracts executed before April 20, 1977, § 55-1403, and controls natural gas prices until December 31, 1984, § 55-1411. Section 55-1404 prohibits consideration either of ceiling prices set by federal authorities or of prices paid in Kansas under other contracts in the application of governmental price escalator clauses and price redetermination clauses. Section 55-1405 of the Kansas Act, however, permits indefinite price escalator clauses to operate after March 1, 1979, to raise the price of old intrastate gas up to the federal Act’s § 109 ceiling price. Section §55-1406 exempts new gas and gas from stripper wells. D On November 20, 1978, ERG and other gas suppliers having similar contracts with KPL notified KPL that gas prices would be escalated to the § 102 price on December 1, pursuant to the governmental price escalator clause. KPL sought pass-through approval from the Commission for this increase by an application filed December 7, one day too late to satisfy the 5-day contractual requirement. KPL never elected to pay the higher price. On June 5, 1979, ERG notified KPL that it would terminate the contracts within 30 days because KPL had failed to apply to the Commission for pass-through authority within five days of December 1, 1978, had failed to obtain Commission approval, and had failed to pay the increased price ERG contends was required by the governmental price escalator clause. KPL’s response was that the clause was not triggered by the Act and that the Kansas Act prohibited its activation. ERG then filed an action in the District Court of Harper County, Kan., praying for a declaratory judgment that it had the contractual right to terminate the contracts. On July 24, in light of KPL’s refusal to terminate, ERG requested an increase up to the Act’s § 102 ceiling price under the price redetermination clause. The increase was to be effective in November 1979, the next redetermination date possible under the contracts. KPL conceded that the price redetermination clause permitted such an increase, but contended that § 55-1404 of the Kansas Act had extinguished the utility’s obligation to comply with that clause. ERG then filed an amended complaint, alleging that it was entitled to terminate the contracts because of KPL’s refusal to redetermine the price. KPL counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the contracts were still in effect. On the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the state trial court held that the Act’s imposition of price ceilings on intrastate gas did not trigger the governmental escalator clause. It also found that the Kansas Act did not violate the Contract Clause, reasoning that Kansas has a legitimate interest in addressing and controlling the serious economic dislocations that the sudden increase in gas prices would cause, and that the Kansas Act reasonably furthered that interest. App. to Juris. Statement 25a, 42a, 45a. The Supreme Court of Kansas, by unanimous vote, affirmed. 230 Kan. 176, 630 P. 2d 1142 (1981). We noted probable jurisdiction. 456 U. S. 904 (1982). HH t — 1 ERG raises both statutory and constitutional issues in challenging the ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court. The constitutional issue is whether the Kansas Act impairs ERG’s contracts with KPL in violation of the Contract Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §10, cl. I. The statutory issue is whether the federal enactment of §105 triggered the governmental price escalator clause. As to the latter issue, if § 105’s enactment did have that effect, ERG was entitled to a price increase on December 1,1978. If not, ERG could rely only on the price redetermination clause for any increase. That clause could not be exercised until November 1979. The statutory issue thus controls the timing of any increase. The constitutional issue, on the other hand, affects the price that ERG may claim under either clause. If ERG prevails, the price may be escalated to the § 102 ceiling; if ERG does not prevail, the price may be escalated only to the § 109 ceiling. We consider the Contract Clause issue first. A Although the language of the Contract Clause, is facially absolute, its prohibition must be accommodated to the inherent police power of the State “to safeguard the vital interests of its people.” Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 434 (1934). In Blaisdell, the Court approved a Minnesota mortgage moratorium statute, even though the statute retroactively impaired contract rights. The Court balanced the language of the Contract Clause against the State’s interest in exercising its police power, and concluded that the statute was justified. The Court in two recent cases has addressed Contract Clause claims. In United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U. S. 1 (1977), the Court held that New Jersey could not retroactively alter a statutory bond covenant relied upon by bond purchasers. One year later, in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U. S. 234 (1978), the Court invalidated a Minnesota statute that required an employer who closed its office in the State to pay a “pension funding charge” if its pension fund at the time was insufficient to provide full benefits for all employees with at least 10 years’ seniority. Although the legal issues and facts in these two cases differ in certain ways, they clarify the appropriate Contract Clause standard. The threshold inquiry is “whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.” Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U. S., at 244. See United States Trust Co., 431 U. S., at 17. The severity of the impairment is said to increase the level of scrutiny to which the legislation will be subjected. Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U. S., at 245. Total destruction of contractual expectations is not necessary for a finding of substantial impairment. United States Trust Co., 431 U. S., at 26-27. On the other hand, state regulation that restricts a party to gains it reasonably expected from the contract does not necessarily constitute a substantial impairment. Id., at 31, citing El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U. S. 497, 515 (1965). In determining the extent of the impairment, we are to consider whether the industry the complaining party has entered has been regulated in the past. Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U. S., at 242, n. 13, citing Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Assn., 310 U. S. 32, 38 (1940) (“When he purchased into an enterprise already regulated in the particular to which he now objects, he purchased subject to further legislation upon the same topic”). The Court, long ago observed: “One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about them.” Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 357 (1908). If the state regulation constitutes a substantial impairment, the State, in justification, must have a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation, United States Trust Co., 431 U. S., at 22, such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem. Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U. S., at 247, 249. Furthermore, since Blaisdell, the Court has indicated that the public purpose need not be addressed to an emergency or temporary situation. United States Trust Co., 431 U. S., at 22, n. 19; Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Assn., 310 U. S., at 39-40. One legitimate state interest is the elimination of unforeseen windfall profits. United States Trust Co., 431 U. S., at 31, n. 30. The requirement of a legitimate public purpose guarantees that the State is exercising its police power, rather than providing a benefit to special interests. Once a legitimate public purpose has been identified, the next inquiry is whether the adjustment of “the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties [is based] upon reasonable conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the legislation’s] adoption.” United States Trust Co., 431 U. S., at 22. Unless the State itself is a contracting party, see id., at 23, “[a]s is customary in reviewing economic and social regulation, . . . courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure.” Id., at 22-23. B The threshold determination is whether the Kansas Act has impaired substantially ERG’s contractual rights. Significant here is the fact that the parties are operating in a heavily regulated industry. See Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Assn., 310 U. S., at 38. State authority to regulate natural gas prices is well established. See Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U. S. 179 (1950). At the time of the execution of these contracts, Kansas did not regulate natural gas prices specifically, but its supervision of the industry was extensive and intrusive. Moreover, under the authority of §5(a) of the 1938 Natural Gas Act, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) set “just and reasonable” rates for prices of gas both at the wellhead and in pipelines. Although prices in the intrastate market have diverged somewhat from those in the interstate market due to the recent shortage of natural gas, the regulation of interstate prices effectively limits intrastate price increases. It is in this context that the indefinite escalator clauses at issue here are to be viewed. In drafting each of the contracts, the parties included a statement of intent, which made clear that the escalator clause was designed to guarantee price increases consistent with anticipated increases in the value of ERG’s gas. App. to Juris. Statement 70a. While it is not entirely inconceivable that ERG in September 1975 anticipated the deregulation of gas prices introduced by the Act in 1978, we think this is highly unlikely, and we read the statement of intent to refer to nothing more than changes in value resulting from changes in the federal regulator’s “just and reasonable” rates. In exchange for these anticipated increases, KPL agreed to accept gas from the Spivey-Grabs field for the lifetime of that field. Thus, at the time of the execution of the contracts, ERG did not expect to receive deregulated prices. The very existence of the governmental price escalator clause and the price redetermination clause indicates that the contracts were structured against the background of regulated gas prices. If deregulation had not occurred, the contracts undoubtedly would have called for a much smaller price increase than that provided by the Kansas Act’s adoption of the § 109 ceiling. Moreover, the contracts expressly recognize the existence of extensive regulation by providing that any contractual terms are subject to relevant present and future state and federal law. This latter provision could be interpreted to incorporate all future state price regulation, and thus dispose of the Contract Clause claim. Regardless of whether this interpretation is correct, the provision does suggest that ERG knew its contractual rights were subject to alteration by state price regulation. Price regulation existed and was foreseeable as the type of law that would alter contract obligations. Reading the Contract Clause as ERG does would mean that indefinite price escalator clauses could exempt ERG from any regulatory limitation of prices whatsoever. Such a result cannot be permitted. Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S., at 357. In short, ERG’s reasonable expectations have not been impaired by the Kansas Act. See El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U. S., at 515. C To the extent, if any, the Kansas Act impairs ERG’s contractual interests, the Kansas Act rests on, and is prompted by, significant and legitimate state interests. Kansas has exercised its police power to protect consumers from the escalation of natural gas prices caused by deregulation. The State reasonably could find that higher gas prices have caused and will cause hardship among those who use gas heat but must exist on limited fixed incomes. The State also has a legitimate interest in correcting the imbalance between the interstate and intrastate markets by permitting intrastate prices to rise only to the § 109 level. By slowly deregulating interstate prices, the Act took the cap off intrastate prices as well. The Kansas Act attempts to coordinate the intrastate and interstate prices by supplementing the federal Act’s regulation of intrastate gas. Congress specifically contemplated such action: “The conference agreement provides that nothing in this Act shall affect the authority of any State to establish or enforce any maximum lawful price for sales of gas in intrastate commerce which does not exceed the applicable maximum lawful price, if any, under Title I of this Act. This authority extends to the operation of any indefinite price escalator clause.” S. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1126, pp. 124-125 (1978); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1752, pp. 124-125 (1978). There can be little doubt about the legitimate public purpose behind the Act. Nor are the means chosen to implement these purposes deficient, particularly in light of the deference to which the Kansas Legislature’s judgment is entitled. On the surface, the State’s Act seems limited to altering indefinite price escalation clauses of intrastate contracts that affect less than 10% of the natural gas consumed in Kansas. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. To analyze properly the Kansas Act’s effect, however, we must consider the entire state and federal gas price regulatory structure. Only natural gas subject to indefinite price escalator clauses poses the danger of rapidly increasing prices in Kansas. Gas under contracts with fixed escalator clauses and interstate gas purchased by the utilities subject to § 109 would not escalate as would intrastate gas subject to indefinite price escalator clauses. The Kansas Act simply brings the latter category into line with old interstate gas prices by limiting the operation of the indefinite price escalator clauses. The Kansas Act also rationally exempts the types of new gas the production of which Congress sought to encourage through the higher § 102 prices. Finally, the Act is a temporary measure that expires when federal price regulation of certain categories of gas terminates. The Kansas statute completes the regulation of the gas market by imposing gradual escalation mechanisms on the intrastate market, consistent with the new national policy toward gas regulation. We thus resolve the constitutional issue against ERG. rH HH I — I We turn to ERG’s statutory contention that the Kansas courts misconstrued § 105 as fixing the contract price at the November 9,1978, level. While, on this point, the opinion of the Kansas Supreme Court is not entirely clear to us, it does not appear so to construe § 105. And KPL, in fact, does not contend that it did. Instead, the court recognized that § 105 permits the indefinite price escalator clauses to continue to operate to raise the contract price up to the lawful ceiling. See Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F. 2d 360, 379 (CA5 1981) (“[T]he NGPA does not preclude escalation of area rate clauses [a type of indefinite price escalators] to NGPA prices”), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 1142 (1982). The actual point of dispute is whether the governmental price escalator clauses in these contracts were triggered by the enactment of §105. The Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged that the Act could trigger a governmental price escalator clause. 230 Kan., at 184, 630 P. 2d, at 1149. In this case, however, it held that “[t]he NGPA did not trigger a price increase because the contracts herein did not contain a sufficient escalation mechanism.” Id., at 185, 630 P. 2d, at 1150. We agree that, as a matter of federal statutory interpretation, the Act does not trigger such clauses automatically. See 44 Fed. Reg. 16895, 16904 (1979). Section 105(b)(1) provides that the ceiling price shall be the lower of the § 102 price and “the price under the terms of the existing contract, to which such natural gas was subject on [November 9, 1978], as such contract was in effect on such date.” By this language, Congress set a ceiling for the operation of contractual provisions; it did not prescribe a price: “[T]he price under the contract may escalate through the operation of both fixed price escalator clauses and indefinite price escalator clauses in existence as of the date of enactment, but the price may not exceed the new gas price [provided by § 102]. “. . . The conferees do not intend that the mere establishment of the ceiling prices under this Act shall trigger indefinite price escalator clauses in existing intrastate contracts.” S. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1126, pp. 82-83 (1978); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1752, pp. 82-83 (1978). See Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F. 2d, at 379. The Kansas Supreme Court relied on its prior decision in Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 229 Kan. 631, 629 P. 2d 190, clarified, 230 Kan. 166, 630 P. 2d 1129 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 928 (1982), which interpreted the effect of § 105 on a similar contract provision. In that decision, it read § 105 to set the lawful ceiling at the lower price provided by the contract. In light of our discussion above, we view this reading of the federal statute as unassailable. The Kansas Supreme Court’s further holding in this case that these particular governmental price escalator clauses were insufficient to escalate the gas price is an interpretation of state law to which, of course, we defer. HH C The regulation of energy production and use is a matter of national concern. Congress set out on a new path with the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. In pursuing this path, Congress explicitly envisioned that the States would regulate intrastate markets in accordance with the overall national policy. The Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act is one State’s effort to balance the need to provide incentives for the production of gas against the need to protect consumers from hardships brought on by deregulation of a traditionally regulated commodity. We see no constitutional or statutory infirmity in Kansas’ attempt. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas is therefore Affirmed. The governmental price escalator provision states: “If any federal or Kansas regulatory or governmental authority having jurisdiction in the premises shall at any time hereafter fix a price per MCF applicable to any natural gas of any vintage produced in Kansas, higher than the contract price then in effect under this gas contract, the price to he paid for gas thereafter shall be increased to equal such regulated price. In that event, the increased price shall be effective as of the date of action of the governmental or regulatory authority establishing the regulated price, or its effective date, whichever is later . . . .” App. to Juris. Statement 66a. The price redetermination provision states in relevant part: “SELLER shall have the option to cause the price being paid for its gas by BUYER to be redetermined every two years, beginning in 1977. The request for a price redetermination shall be given in writing by SELLER to BUYER not later than 120 days prior to the beginning of the Contract Year for which the price redetermination is requested. . . . “. . . Within the same one hundred twenty (120) days following SELLER’S request for a price redetermination, the parties shall mutually redetermine the price by considering three (3) contracts under which the highest prices are actually being paid for flowing gas ninety (90) days prior to the date the redetermined price is to be effective. The contracts to be considered shall, (a) have a primary term of one (1) or more years, (b) be for gas produced in Kansas, (c) be for gas purchased by an interstate or intrastate company selling or using an average daily volume of 5,000 MCF or more of gas for the twelve (12) months period ending ninety (90) days prior to the date the redetermined price is to be effective, (d) not be for the purchase of Spivey-Grabs Field gas by BUYER under contracts dated in 1975, (e) not include more than one contract of any one purchaser in any one field, and (f) not be for a price then subject to regulatory suspense or refunds. . . . “After the BUYER and SELLER have decided on the three contracts and appropriate prices to be used from each one for this redetermination, the weighted average price per MCF being paid under the three contracts shall be calculated. This price shall become the redetermined price to be paid by BUYER to SELLER.” Id., at 67a-68a. On June 9, 1978, the Commission gave KPL permission to implement a purchased-gas price adjustment. This authorized an automatic pass-through to consumers of wholesale gas cost increases upon written notice to the Commission. The Commission retained authority to review and revoke any pass-through under its normal standards for reviewing rate increases. In pertinent part, § 105 provides: “(a) Application. — The maximum lawful price computed under subsection (b) shall apply to any first sale of natural gas delivered during any month in the case of natural gas, sold under any existing contract or any successor to an existing contract, which was not committed or dedicated to interstate commerce on the day before the enactment of this Act. “(b) Maximum lawful price.— “(1) General rule. — Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the maximum lawful price under this section shall be the lower of— “(A) the price under the terms of the existing contract, to which such natural gas was subject on the date of the enactment of this Act [November 9, 1978], as such contract was in effect on such date; or “(B) the maximum lawful price, per million Btu’s, computed for such month under section 102 (relating to new natural gas).” Section 105(b)(2) applies to contracts under which the price of gas on November 9, 1978, exceeded the § 102 price. ERG asserts that the Kansas Act is special interest legislation designed to permit KPL to avoid gas price increases and to aid KPL in this and other litigation. ERG notes that KPL supported the bill, that the Special Joint Committee approved the bill by only a narrow margin, and that several members of the Committee’s minority believed the bill to be special interest legislation. Brief for Appellant 9-12. The bill, however, was supported by the Governor, labor unions, farmers, and municipal representatives, and was passed by substantial margins in both Houses of the Kansas Legislature. Although KPL purchases a sizable portion of the gas affected by the Kansas Act, there are other purchasers as well. Moreover, as indicated in n. 3, swpra, KPL already had obtained from the Commission a purchased-gas price adjustment that allowed it to pass through to its customers any gas cost increase. Section 55-1404 provides, with certain exceptions, that “on or after December 1, 1978, the price allowed to be paid pursuant to federal legislation or any regulation by an agency implementing such legislation, or the price paid or to be paid for any sale of natural gas in the state of Kansas shall not be taken into account in applying any indefinite price escalator clause contained in any gas purchase contract subject to this act, to the extent that such contract provides for the sale in the state of Kansas, of gas produced within this state which was not committed or dedicated to interstate commerce on November 8, 1978. This section shall not require a reduction of any price contained in any gas purchase contract subject to this act below the price actually paid prior to the date of enactment of this act.” The court held that an emergency situation existed because the anticipated sudden escalation of intrastate gas prices threatened to boost dramatically both gas and electricity utility rates. The court suggested that because ERG had not attempted to exercise the price redetermination clause prior to the date of enactment, the Kansas Act was being applied only prospectively. The court concluded, however, that the State’s interest and chosen means could justify a retroactive application. 230 Kan., at 189-190, 630 P. 2d, at 1153. “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . If fairly possible, we of course construe a statute so as to avoid a constitutional question. Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 749-750 (1961). Because, however, the statutory issue affects only the operation of the governmental price escalator clause, its resolution in no way obviates the need to scrutinize the Kansas Act under the Contract Clause. The Court listed five factors that were then deemed to be significant in its analysis: whether the Act (1) was an emergency measure; (2) was one to protect a basic societal interest, rather than particular individuals; (3) was tailored appropriately to its purpose; (4) imposed reasonable conditions; and (5) was limited to the duration of the emergency. 290 U. S., at 444-447. See also Malone v. White Motor Corp., 444 U. S. 911 (1979), summarily aff’g 599 F. 2d 283 (CA8). In Allied, Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, the Court held that the Minnesota pension law severely impaired established contractual relations between employers and employees. The State had not acted to meet an important general social problem. The pension statute had a very narrow focus: it was aimed at specific employers. Indeed, it even may have been directed at one particular employer planning to terminate its pension plan when its collective-bargaining agreement expired. See 438 U. S., at 247-248, and n. 20. See generally Note, A Process-Oriented Approach to the Contract Clause, 89 Yale L. J. 1623, 1647-1648 (1980) (distinguishing public from private contracts). In United States Trust Co., but not in Allied Structural Steel Co., the State was one of the contracting parties. When a State itself enters into a contract, it cannot simply walk away from its financial obligations. In almost every case, the Court has held a governmental unit to its contractual obligations when it enters financial or other markets. See United States Trust Co., 431 U. S., at 25-28; W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56 (1935); Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432 (1878). But see Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U. S. 502 (1942). When the State is a party to the contract, “complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State’s self-interest is at stake.” United States Trust Co., 431 U. S., at 26. In the present case, of course, the stricter standard of United States Trust Co. does not apply because Kansas has not altered its own contractual obligations. In addition to the Kansas and federal regulations, 38 States regulate various aspects of gas production and sale. See Interstate Oil Compact Commission, Summary of State Statutes and Regulations for Oil and Gas Production (1979). For some time, the Court has recognized the validity of state regulation of the production and sale of natural gas in furtherance of conservation goals. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190, 210 (1900); see also 5 E. Kuntz, Law of Oil and Gas § 70.2, p. 307 (1978); cf. Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U. S. 258, 266 (1937) (state statute retrospectively regulating the contractual sale of natural gas containing different amounts of hydrogen sulfide does not violate Contract Clause of Texas Constitution). On several occasions, the Court has approved state price regulation of natural gas that did not interfere with interstate commerce. See, e. g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U. S. 190 (1950); Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U. S. 179 (1950); Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 252 U. S. 23 (1920); 5 E. Kuntz, supra, § 75.2, p. 371. Kansas in the past has regulated the wellhead price of natural gas. See Cities Service Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm’n, 355 U. S. 391 (1958), rev’g 180 Kan. 454, 304 P. 2d 528 (1956). Although this Court struck down the Commission’s earlier attempt to set a wellhead price, it apparently did so because the price regulation extended to gas in interstate commerce. See 355 U. S., at 392, citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U. S. 672 (1954), and Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Panoma Corp., 349 U. S. 44 (1955); see n. 16, supra. The instant case does not raise a Commerce Clause issue because the parties agree that the gas is not in interstate commerce and because Congress, by §602, authorized the State to regulate its price. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1126, p. 125 (1978) (“The Congress ... is ceding its authority under the commerce clause of the Constitution to regulate prices for such production to affected States”); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1752, p. 125 (1978) (same). For more than 75 years now, Kansas has regulated the production, transportation, distribution, and sale of natural gas. See Cities Service Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm’n, 222 Kan. 598, 609-610, 567 P. 2d 1343, 1352 (1977). Because of the shortage, some gas was diverted to the intrastate market where consumers were willing to pay higher prices. “As the FPC price ceiling dropped below market levels prevailing in the intrastate sector, new gas supply has increasingly gravitated toward the latter.” Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report of the Bureau of Economics, J. Mulholland, The Economic Structure and Behavior in the Natural Gas Production Industry 10 (1979) (footnote omitted); see Executive Office of the President, The National Energy Plan 18 (1977), reprinted in 1 National Energy Plan, 95th Congress: Legislative History of the National Energy Acts of 1978 (item 5) (1979); Comment, For Gas, Congress Spells Relief N-G-P-A: An Analysis of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 40 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 429, 434 (1979). The Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977, § 6(a), Pub. L. 95-2, 91 Stat. 7, addressed this problem by extending federal price regulation to the intrastate market during a Presidentially declared emergency. These emergency provisions were carried forward in § 302(a) of the 1978 Act. “Even if the gas can be sold intrastate, FPC price ceilings will indirectly affect price levels in the unregulated sector over the long term.” P. Starratt, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Congress 29 (1974). Determining the actual effect on the intrastate market of federal regulation of the interstate market is difficult because state oil and gas agencies have not collected information on intrastate sales. See Schanz & Frank, Natural Gas in the Future National Energy Pattern, in Regulation of the Natural Gas Producing Industry 18, 28-30 (K. Brown ed. 1972). Absent deregulation, the existing interstate price would have continued to act as a brake on increases ERG could obtain under the price re-determination clause. As has been noted, the originally specified contract price was $1.50 per Mcf. App. to Juris. Statement 66a. Under the contract, ERG was entitled to an increase of two cents per Mcf each year absent a price redetermination in excess of that amount. Ibid. A price re-determination occurred in November 1977, and by November 1978, the contract price had risen to $1.77 per Mcf. The July 1982 § 109 price ceiling was $2,194 and the § 102 ceiling was $3,152. 47 Fed. Reg. 17981, 17982 (1982). There is no reason to believe that, by operation of either escalator clause under the old regulatory structure, ERG’s prices ever would have reached the Act’s levels. Many gas sale contracts contain similar provisions. See 4 H. Williams, Oil and Gas Law § 734, pp. 800-801 (1981). These stem from the assumption that the contracts are subject to governmental price and other regulation. Id,., at 802. Their purpose is to “provide that the contract shall continue in effect though modified to conform to the requirements of such law or regulation.” Ibid. A similar clause has been held implicitly not to incorporate state price regulations that impair interstate commerce. See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Harrington, 139 F. Supp. 452, 454-455 (ND Tex. 1956), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 246 F. 2d 915 (CA5 1957), cert, denied, 356 U. S. 957 (1958). Analogously, state price regulations pre-empted by FPC price regulation have been held not to be incorporated by governmental price escalator clauses. See Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 297 F. 2d 561, 567-568 (CA8 1962). Although the Act does place a ceiling on intrastate gas, it is the highest ceiling under the law, that is, the § 102 limit for newly discovered gas. Old interstate gas is subject to the much lower ceilings of § 104, or § 106 in the case of rollover contracts. In fact, the § 109 price for July 1982 of $2,194 per Mcf is substantially higher than any of the § 104 or § 106 prices for old interstate gas from wells drilled before 1974. See 47 Fed. Reg. 17981, 17982-17988 (1982). The Spivey-Grabs Field gas wells covered by these contracts were drilled between 1954 and 1961. Brief for Appellee 41, and n. 139 (citing Kansas Geological Society Library, Drillers’ Log (Kansas producers)). ERG claims that the legislation was designed to benefit KPL. See n. 6, supra. Unlike Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U. S. 234 (1978), there is little or nothing in the record here to support the contention that the Kansas Act is special interest legislation. Given the nature of the industry — sales to public utilities — it is impossible for any regulation not to have a major effect on a small number of participants. This differs from the statute under challenge in Allied Structural Steel Co., where a small number of employers were singled out from the larger group. The fact that there was a close vote at the committee stage, and that some of the committee dissenters expressed the view that the Kansas Act was special interest legislation, bears little if any resemblance to the circumstantial evidence present in Allied Structural Steel Co. Nor is there any indication that the Kansas political process had broken down. Cf. Note, 89 Yale L. J., at 1645 (provided “legislature is functioning properly, selection of a public purpose and determinations of necessity and appropriateness should be left to it”). In addition, the automatic price pass-through adjustment indicates that KPL will not benefit significantly from the statute. Although ERG is correct that the Commission could revoke the pass-through, it has given no indication that it will do so. On December 1, 1978, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued interim regulations stating: “The establishment of maximum lawful prices under the NGPA shall not trigger indefinite price escalator clauses in existing intrastate or interstate contracts.” 43 Fed. Reg. 56448, 56550 (1978). After a comment period, the FERC altered the regulation to reserve to state law the question whether such clauses operate in intrastate contracts. 44 Fed. Reg. 16895, 16904 (1979).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WESTERN AIR LINES, INC. v. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD et al. NO. 225. Argued December 9-10, 1953. Decided February 1, 1954. Emory T. Nunneley, Jr. argued the cause for the Civil Aeronautics Board. With him on the brief was O. D. Ozment. Hugh W. Darling argued the cause for Western Air Lines, Inc., petitioner in No. 225 and respondent in No. 224. With him on the brief were Edward S. Shattuck and D. P. Renda. Daniel M. Friedman argued the cause for the United States and the Postmaster General, respondents. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Assistant Attorney General Barnes, Murray L. Schwartz and Eugene J. Brahm. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases, here on writs of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, present an important question in the construction of § 406 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 401 et seq. Section 406 (a) authorizes the Civil Aeronautics Board to fix “fair and reasonable rates of compensation for the transportation of mail by aircraft.” Section 406 (b) requires the Board to take into consideration, inter alia, “the need of each such air carrier for compensation for the transportation of mail sufficient to insure the performance of such service, and, together with all other revenue of the air carrier, to enable such air carrier under honest, economical, and efficient management, to maintain and continue the development of air transportation to the extent and of the character and quality required for the commerce of the United States, the Postal Service, and the national defense.” The controversy in the present cases turns on the meaning of the words “the need of each such air carrier” and “all other revenue of the air carrier.” Western Air Lines filed a petition for a rate order April 26, 1944. In 1951 the Board finally determined the rate applicable between May 1, 1944, and December 31, 1948. During this open-rate period Western realized some $88,000 in profits from the operation of restaurants and other concessions at airport terminals. The Board determined that this income was “other revenue” available to reduce mail pay. During the open-rate period Western with approval of the Board sold to United Air Lines its certificate and properties for air operations (Route 68) between Los Angeles and Denver, at a profit in excess of $1,000,000. The Board treated the profit derived from the sale of the tangible assets (approximately $650,000) as “other revenue” and reduced the mail compensation by that amount. But it declined to reduce the mail-pay allowance by the profit realized from the sale of the “intangible value” of the route. The Board concluded that that amount should not be used in offset because it wanted “to encourage improvement of the air route pattern through voluntary route transfers by other air carriers.” 14 C. A. B., at 246. On review, Western challenged the inclusion in “other revenue” of the amounts received from the concessions and the profit from the sale of the tangible assets. The Postmaster General challenged the exclusion from the offsets of the profit Western made on the sale of the intangibles. The Court of Appeals sustained the Board in Western’s petition and reversed it in the other petition and remanded the case to the Board for the fixing of a new rate after deducting the entire profit from the sale of Western’s Route 68. 92 U. S. App. D. C. 248, 207 F. 2d 200. Some air-mail rates are service rates, based on mail-miles flown; others are subsidy rates based on “need.” We are here concerned with a subsidy rate, which in Western’s case was fixed so as to produce a 7-percent return on investment after taxes for the period in question. In other words, the end problem concerns not the amount of money provided for operation and development but the amount of profit over and above all such sums. We read the Act as meaning that “the need” of the carrier which Congress has directed the Board to consider in fixing a subsidy rate is “the need” of the carrier as a whole. The need specified in § 406 (b) is measured by “compensation for the transportation of mail sufficient to insure the performance of such service, and, together with all other revenue of the air carrier, to enable” it to develop air transportation, etc. The “compensation for the transportation of mail” is flight income. It seems too clear for argument that “all other revenue” would include nonflight income from incidental air-carrier activities. We have found nothing persuasive as indicating that “all other revenue” means transportation revenue. The inclusive nature of the category precludes a narrow reading. If the carrier’s treasury is lush, “the need” for subsidy decreases whether the opulence is due to transportation activities or to activities incidental thereto. By the same reasoning the profit made by Western on the sale of Route 68 is also “other revenue” within the meaning of § 406 (b). The Board agrees; but it goes on to say that that is not the end of the matter, since the reduction of the subsidy by the entire amount of the profit is not mandatory. The Act, it is true, merely says that the Board in determining the rate “shall take into consideration” various factors, including “the need” of the carrier (§ 406 (b)); and the “need,” as we have noted, is not merely for compensation to insure the transportation of mail but compensation for “the development of air transportation” under the prescribed standards. By that standard the “need” in a given case may be so great that profits from other transactions should be allowed in addition to the normal rate. Or, on the other hand, the total revenues of the carrier as against its operating costs and developmental program may be so great that “the need” for subsidy disappears and the carrier is transferred to the service rate for mail pay. The difficulty here is that the Board, in concluding that a part of the profits from the sale to United should not be used as an offset, forsook the standard of “need” and adopted a different one. The Board wanted “to safeguard the incentive for voluntary route transfers.” It thought it could not keep this incentive alive in the industry unless the profit were allowed in addition to the subsidy. The Board thought it important to keep that incentive alive in order to promote route transfers and mergers which the Board could not compel. The Board therefore argues that allowance of the profit over and above a subsidy enables Western “to maintain and continue the development of air transportation” within the meaning of § 406 (b), since the sale of Route 68 was consistent with the development program which the Board deemed desirable. The Act, however, speaks of “the need” of the carrier for the subsidy, not the effect of a policy on carriers in general. This is not a case of recapture of earnings. Western keeps the entire amount of the profit. The issue is how much additional money Western is to receive in the form of a subsidy. Western’s “need” is the measure of the amount authorized by Congress. No finding was made that there was “need” for the additional subsidy, in the sense that otherwise Western would not have been willing or able to make the transfer of Route 68 in accordance with the development program which the Board deems advisable. Whether such a finding would have satisfied the statutory requirement is a question we do not reach, since the opinion of the Board makes plain that other considerations were controlling: “. . . our decision not to include the net profit from the sale of intangibles was reached solely because we are thus seeking to encourage improvement of the air route pattern through voluntary route transfers by other air carriers.” 14 C. A. B., at 246. The standard prescribed by Congress, however, is “the need” of the air carrier whose subsidy rates are being fixed. Affirmed. “The [Board] is empowered and directed, upon its own initiative or upon petition of the Postmaster General or an air carrier, (1) to fix and determine from time to time, after notice and hearing, the fair and reasonable rates of compensation for the transportation of mail by aircraft, the facilities used and useful therefor, and the services connected therewith (including the transportation of mail by an air carrier by other means than aircraft whenever such transportation is incidental to the transportation of mail by aircraft or is made necessary by conditions of emergency arising from aircraft operation), by each holder of a certificate authorizing the transportation of mail by aircraft, and to make such rates effective from such date as it shall determine to be proper; (2) to prescribe the method or methods, by aircraft-mile, pound-mile, weight, space, or any combination thereof, or otherwise, for ascertaining such rates of compensation for each air carrier or class of air carriers; and (3) to publish the same; and the rates so fixed and determined shall be paid by the Postmaster General from appropriations for the transportation of mail by aircraft.” “In fixing and determining fair and reasonable rates of compensation under this section, the [Board], considering the conditions peculiar to transportation by aircraft and to the particular air carrier or class of air carriers, may fix different rates for different air carriers or classes of air carriers, and different classes of service. In determining the rate in each case, the [Board] shall take into consideration, among other factors, the condition that such air carriers may hold and operate under certificates authorizing the carriage of mail only by providing necessary and adequate facilities and service for the transportation of mail; such standards respecting the character and quality of service to be rendered by air carriers as may be prescribed by or pursuant to law; and the need of each such air carrier for compensation for the transportation of mail sufficient to insure the performance of such service, and, together with all other revenue of the air carrier, to enable such air carrier under honest, economical, and efficient management, to maintain and continue the development of air transportation to the extent and of the character and quality required for the commerce of the United States, the Postal Service, and the national defense.” United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 8 C. A. B. 298 (1947). The Postmaster General has not only the duty to pay the mail rates from appropriations for the transportation of mail by aircraft but also is given standing by § 406 (a) to petition the Board to fix and determine the rates. A change in the function of the Postmaster General was made by Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1953, effective October 1,1953, 67 Stat. 644. See, for example, Eastern Air Lines, Mail Rates, 3 C. A. B. 733 (1942).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MARSHALL, SECRETARY OF LABOR, et al. v. BARLOW’S, INC. No. 76-1143. Argued January 9, 1978 Decided May 23, 1978 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined. SteveNS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BlackmuN and RehNQUist, JJ., joined, post, p. 325. BreNNAN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Solicitor General McCree argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Stuart A. Smith, and Michael H. Levin. John L. Runft argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Iver J. Longeteig. Warren Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota, Richard B. Allyn, Solicitor General, and Steven M. Gunn and Richard A. Lockridge, Special Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for 11 States as amici curiae urging reversal, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, William F. Hyland of New Jerssey, Toney Anaya of New Mexico, Rufus Edmisten of North Carolina, Robert P. Kane of Pennsylvania, Daniel R. McLeod of South Carolina, M. Jerome Diamond of Vermont, Anthony F. Troy of Virginia, and V. Frank Mendicino of Wyoming. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by J. Albert Woll and Laurence Gold for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; and by Michael R. Sherwood for the Sierra Club et al. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Wayne L. Kidwell, Attorney General of Idaho, and Guy G. Hurlbutt, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General of Utah, and Michael L. Deamer, Deputy Attorney General, for the States of Idaho and Utah; by Allen A. Lauterbach for the American Farm Bureau Federation; by Robert T. Thompson, Lawrence Kraus, and Stanley T. Kaleczyc for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; by Anthony J. Obadd, Steven R. Seniler, Stephen C. Yohay, Leonard J. Theberge, Edward H. Dowd, and James Watt for the Mountain States Legal Foundation; by James D. McKevitt for the National Federation of Independent Busipess; and by Ronald A. Zumbrun, John H. Findley, Albert Ferri, Jr., and W. Hugh O’Riordm for the Pacific Legal Foundation. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Robert E. Rader, Jr., for the American Conservative Union; and by David Ooldberger, Barbara O’Toole, McNeill Stokes, Ira J. Smotherman, Jr., and David Rudenstine for the Roger Baldwin Foundation, Inc., of the American Civil Liberties Union, Illinois Division. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 8 (a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA or Act) empowers agents of the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) to search the work area of any employment facility within the Act’s jurisdiction. The purpose of the search is to inspect for safety hazards and violations of OSHA regulations. No search warrant or other process is expressly required under the Act. On the morning of September 11, 1975, an OSHA inspector entered the customer service area of Barlow’s, Inc., an electrical and plumbing installation business located in Pocatello, Idaho. The president and general manager, Ferrol G. “Bill” Barlow, was on hand; and the OSHA inspector, after showing his credentials, informed Mr. Barlow that he wished to conduct a search of the working areas of the business. Mr. Barlow inquired whether any complaint had been received about his company. The inspector answered no, but that Barlow’s, Inc., had simply turned up in the agency’s selection process. The inspector again asked to enter the nonpublic area of the business; Mr. Barlow’s response was to inquire whether the inspector had a search warrant. The inspector had none. Thereupon, Mr. Barlow refused the inspector admission to the employee area of his business. He said he was relying on his rights as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Three months later, the Secretary petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Idaho to issue an order compelling Mr. Barlow to admit the inspector. The requested order was issued on December 30, 1975, and was presented to Mr. Barlow on January 5, 1976. Mr. Barlow again refused admission, and he sought his own injunctive relief against the warrantless searches assertedly permitted by OSHA. A three-judge court was convened. On December 30, 1976, it ruled in Mr. Barlow’s favor. 424 F. Supp. 437. Concluding that Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528-529 (1967), and See v. Seattle, 387 U. S. 541, 543 (1967), controlled this case, the court held that the Fourth Amendment required a warrant for the type of search involved here and that the statutory authorization for warrantless inspections was unconstitutional. An injunction against searches or inspections pursuant to § 8 (a) was entered. The Secretary appealed, challenging the judgment, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 430 U. S. 964. I The Secretary urges that warrantless inspections to enforce' OSHA are reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Among other things, he relies on § 8 (a) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 657 (a), which authorizes inspection of business premises without a warrant and which the Secretary urges represents a congressional construction of the Fourth Amendment that the courts should not reject. Regrettably, we are unable to agree. The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment protects commercial buildings as well as private homes. To hold otherwise would belie the origin of that Amendment, and the American colonial experience. An important forerunner of the first 10 Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Virginia Rill of Rights, specifically opposed “general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed.” The general warrant was a recurring point of contention in the Colonies immediately preceding the Revolution. The particular offensiveness it engendered was acutely felt by the merchants and businessmen whose premises and products were inspected for compliance with the several parliamentary revenue measures that most irritated the colonists. “•[T]he Fourth Amendment’s commands grew in large measure out of the colonists’ experience with the writs of assistance . . . [that] granted sweeping power to customs officials and other agents of the King to search at large for smuggled goods.” United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1977). See also G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 355 (1977). Against this background, it is untenable that the ban on warrantless searches was not intended to shield places of business as well as of residence. This Court has already held that warrantless searches are generally unreasonable, and that this rule applies to commercial premises as well as homes. In Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 528-529, we held: “[E]xcept in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.” On the same day, we also ruled: “As we explained in Camara, a search of private houses is presumptively unreasonable if conducted without a warrant. The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant.” See v. Seattle, supra, at 543. These same cases also held that the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches protects against warrantless intrusions during civil as well as criminal investigations. Ibid. The reason is found in the “basic purpose of this Amendment . . . [which] is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” Camara, supra, at 528. If the government intrudes on a person’s property, the privacy interest suffers whether the government’s motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards. It therefore appears that unless some recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies, See v. Seattle would require a warrant to conduct the inspection sought in this case. The Secretary urges that an exception from the search warrant requirement has been recognized for “pervasively regulated businesses],” United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311, 316 (1972), and for “closely regulated” industries “long subject to close supervision and inspection.” Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72, 74, 77 (1970). These cases are indeed exceptions, but they represent responses to relatively unique circumstances. Certain industries have such a history of government oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy, see Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 351-352 (1967), could exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an enterprise. Liquor (Colonnade) and firearms (Biswell) are industries of this type; when an entrepreneur embarks upon such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation. Industries such as these fall within the “certain carefully defined classes of cases,” referenced in Camara, 387 U. S., at 528. The element that distinguishes these enterprises from ordinary businesses is a long tradition of close government supervision, of which any person who chooses to enter such a business must already be aware. “A central difference between those cases [Colonnade and Biswell] and this one is that businessmen engaged in such federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the burdens as well as the benefits of their trade, whereas the petitioner here was not engaged in any regulated or licensed business. The businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him.” Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 271 (1973). The clear import of our cases is that the closely regulated industry of the type involved in Colonnade and Biswell is the exception. The Secretary would make it the rule. Invoking the Walsh-Healey Act of 1936, 41 U. S. C. § 35 et seq., the Secretary attempts to support a conclusion that all businesses involved in interstate commerce have long been subjected to close supervision of employee safety and health conditions. But the degree of federal involvement in employee working circumstances has never been of the order of specificity and pervasiveness that OSHA mandates. It is quite unconvincing to argue that the imposition of minimum wages and maximum hours on employers who contracted with the Government under the Walsh-Healey Act prepared the entirety of American interstate commerce for regulation of working conditions to the minutest detail. Nor can any but the most fictional sense of voluntary consent to later searches be found in the single fact that one conducts a business affecting interstate commerce; under current practice and law, few businesses can be conducted without having some effect on interstate commerce. The Secretary also attempts to derive support for a Colonnade-Biswell-type exception by drawing analogies from the field of labor law. In Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793 (1945), this Court upheld the rights of employees to solicit for a union during nonworking time where efficiency was not compromised. By opening up his property to employees, the employer had yielded so much of his private property rights as to allow those employees to exercise § 7 rights under the National Labor Relations Act. But this Court also held that the private property rights of an owner prevailed over the intrusion of nonemployee organizers, even in nonworking areas of the plant and during nonworking hours. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105 (1956). The critical fact in this case is that entry over Mr. Barlow’s objection is being sought by a Government agent. Employees are not being prohibited from reporting OSHA violations. What they observe in their daily functions is undoubtedly beyond the employer’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The Government inspector, however, is not an employee. Without a warrant he stands in no better position than a member of the public. What is observable by the public is observable, without a warrant, by the Government inspector as well. The owner of a business has not, by the necessary utilization of employees in his operation, thrown open the areas where employees alone are permitted to the warrantless scrutiny of Government agents. That an employee is free to report, and the Government is free to use, any evidence of noncompliance with OSHA that the employee observes furnishes no justification for federal agents to enter a place of business from which the public is restricted and to conduct their own warrantless search. II The Secretary nevertheless stoutly argues that the enforcement scheme of the Act requires warrantless searches, and that the restrictions on search discretion contained in the Act and its regulations already protect as much privacy as a warrant would. The Secretary thereby asserts the actual reasonableness of OSHA searches, whatever the general rule against warrantless searches might be. Because “reasonableness is still the ultimate standard,” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 539, the Secretary suggests that the Court decide whether a warrant is needed by arriving at a sensible balance between the administrative necessities of OSHA inspections and the incremental protection of privacy of business owners a warrant would afford. He suggests that only a decision exempting OSHA inspections from the Warrant Clause would give “full recognition to the competing public and private interests here at stake.” Ibid. The Secretary submits that warrantless inspections are essential to the proper enforcement of OSHA because they afford the opportunity to inspect without prior notice and hence to preserve the advantages of surprise. While the dangerous conditions outlawed by the Act include structural defects that cannot be quickly hidden or remedied, the Act also regulates a myriad of safety details that may be amenable to speedy alteration or disguise. The risk is that during the interval between an inspector’s initial request to search a plant and his procuring a warrant following the owner’s refusal of permission, violations of this latter type could be corrected and thus escape the inspector’s notice. To the suggestion that warrants may be issued ex parte and executed without delay and without prior notice, thereby preserving the element of surprise, the Secretary expresses concern for the administrative strain that would be experienced by the inspection system, and by the courts, should ex parte warrants issued in advance become standard practice. We are unconvinced, however, that requiring warrants to inspect will impose serious burdens on the inspection system or the courts, will prevent inspections necessary to enforce the statute, or will make them less effective. In the first place, the great majority of businessmen can be expected in normal course to consent to inspection without warrant; the Secretary has not brought to this Court’s attention any widespread pattern of refusal. In those cases where an owner does insist on a warrant, the Secretary argues that inspection efficiency will be impeded by the advance notice and delay. The Act’s penalty provisions for giving advance notice of a search, 29 U. S. C. § 666 (f), and the Secretary’s own regulations, 29 CFR § 1903.6 (1977), indicate that surprise searches are indeed contemplated. However, the Secretary has also promulgated a regulation providing that upon refusal to permit an inspector to enter the property or to complete his inspection, the inspector shall attempt to ascertain the reasons for the refusal and report to his superior, who shall “promptly take appropriate action, including compulsory process, if necessary.” 29 CFR § 1903.4 (1977). The regulation represents a choice to proceed by process where entry is refused; and on the basis of evidence available from present practice, the Act’s effectiveness has not been crippled by providing those owners who wish to refuse an initial requested entry with a time lapse while the inspector obtains the necessary process. Indeed, the kind of process sought in this case and apparently anticipated by the regulation provides notice to the business operator. If this safeguard endangers the efficient administration of OSHA, the Secretary should never have adopted it, particularly when the Act does not require it. Nor is it immediately apparent why the advantages of surprise would be lost if, after being refused entry, procedures were available for the Secretary to seek an ex parte warrant and to reappear at the premises without further notice to the establishment being inspected. Whether the Secretary proceeds to secure a warrant or other process, with or without prior notice, his entitlement to inspect will not depend on his demonstrating probable cause to believe that conditions in violation of OSHA exist on the premises. Probable cause in the criminal law sense is not required. For purposes of an administrative search such as this, probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that “reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S., at 538. A warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for an OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the Act derived from neutral sources such as, for example, dispersion of employees in various types of industries across a given area, and the desired frequency of searches in any of the lesser divisions of the area, would protect an employer’s Fourth Amendment rights. We doubt that the consumption of enforcement energies in the obtaining of such warrants will exceed manageable proportions. Finally, the Secretary urges that requiring a warrant for OSHA inspectors will mean that, as a practical matter, war-rantless-search provisions in other regulatory statutes are also constitutionally infirm. The reasonableness of a warrantless search, however, will depend upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute. Some of the statutes cited apply only to a single industry, where regulations might already be so pervasive that a Colonnade-Biswell exception to the warrant requirement could apply. Some statutes already envision resort to federal-court enforcement when entry is refused, employing specific language in some cases and general language in others. In short, we base today’s opinion on the facts and law concerned with OSHA and do not retreat from a holding appropriate to that statute because of its real or imagined effect on other, different administrative schemes. Nor do we agree that the incremental protections afforded the employer’s privacy by a warrant are so marginal that they fail to justify the administrative burdens that may be entailed. The authority to make warrantless searches devolves almost unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative officers, particularly those in the field, as to when to search and whom to search. A warrant, by contrast, would provide assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria. Also, a warrant would then and there advise the owner of the scope and objects of the search, beyond which limits the inspector is not expected to proceed. These are important functions for a warrant to perform, functions which underlie the Court’s prior decisions that the Warrant Clause applies to inspections for compliance with regulatory statutes. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967); See v. Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). We conclude that the concerns expressed by the Secretary do not suffice to justify warrantless inspections under OSHA or vitiate the general constitutional requirement that for a search to be reasonable a warrant must be obtained. III We hold that Barlow’s was entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Act is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to authorize inspections without warrant or its equivalent and to an injunction enjoining the Act’s enforcement to that extent. The judgment of the District Court is therefore affirmed. So ordered. Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. “In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is authorized— “(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed by an employee of an employer; and “(2) to inspect and' investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner, operator, agent, or employee.” 84 Stat. 1598, 29 U. S. C. § 657 (a). This is required by the Act. See n. 1, supra. A regulation of the Secretary, 29 CFR § 1903.4 (1977), requires an inspector to seek compulsory process if an employer refuses a requested search. See infra, at 317, and n. 12. No res judicata bar arose against Mr. Barlow from the December 30, 1975, order authorizing a search, because the earlier decision reserved the constitutional issue. See 424 F. Supp. 437. H. Commager, Documents of American History 104 (8th ed. 1968). See, e. g., Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution in The Era of the American Revolution 40 (R. Morris ed. 1939). The Stamp Act of 1765, the Townshend Revenue Act of 1767, and the tea tax of 1773 are notable examples. See Commager, supra, n. 5, at 53, 63. For commentary, see 1 S. Morison, H. Commager, & W. Leuchtejiburg, The Growth of the American Republic 143, 149, 159 (1969). The Government has asked that Mr. Barlow be ordered to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for refusing to honor the inspection order, and its position is that the OSHA inspector is now entitled to enter at once, over Mr. Barlow’s objection. Cf. Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U. S. 861 (1974). The automobile-search cases cited by the Secretary are even less helpful to his position than the labor cases. The fact that automobiles occupy a special category in Fourth Amendment case law is by now beyond doubt due, among other factors, to the quick mobility of a car, the registration requirements of both the car and the driver, and the more available opportunity for plain-view observations of a car’s contents. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 441-442 (1973); see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 48-51 (1970). Even so, probable cause has not been abandoned as a requirement for stopping and searching an automobile. We recognize that today’s holding itself might have an impact on whether owners choose to resist requested searches; we can only await the development of evidence not present on this record to determine how serious an impediment to effective enforcement this might be. It is true, as the Secretary asserts, that § 8 (a) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 657 (a), purports to authorize inspections without warrant; but it is also true that it does not forbid the Secretary from proceeding to inspect only by warrant or other process. The Secretary has broad authority to prescribe such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out his responsibilities under this chapter, “including rules and regulations dealing with the inspection of an employer’s establishment.” § 8 (g) (2), 29 U. S. C. § 657 (g) (2). The regulations with respect to inspections are contained in 29 CFR Part 1903 (1977). Section 1903.4, referred to in the text, provides as follows: “Upon a refusal to permit a Compliance Safety and Health Officer, in the exercise of his official duties, to enter without delay and at reasonable times any place of employment or any place therein, to inspect, to review records, or to question any employer, owner, operator, agent, or employee, in accordance with § 1903.3, or to permit a representative of employees to accompany the Compliance Safety and Health Officer during the physical inspection of any workplace in accordance with § 1903.8, the Compliance Safety and Health Officer shall terminate the inspection or confine the inspection to other areas, conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, materials, records, or interviews concerning which no objection is raised. The Compliance Safety and Health Officer shall endeavor to ascertain the reason for such refusal, and he shall immediately report the refusal and the reason therefor to the Area Director. The Area Director shall immediately consult with the Assistant Regional Director and the Regional Solicitor, who shall promptly take appropriate action, including compulsory process, if necessary.” When his representative was refused admission by Mr. Barlow, the Secretary proceeded in federal court to enforce his right to enter and inspect, as conferred by 29 U. S. C. § 657. A change in the language of the Compliance Operations Manual for OSHA inspectors supports the inference that, whatever the Act’s administrators might have thought at the start, it was eventually concluded that enforcement efficiency would not be jeopardized by permitting employers to refuse entry, at least until the inspector obtained compulsory process. The 1972 Manual included a section specifically directed to obtaining “warrants,” and one provision of that section dealt with ex ■parte warrants: “In cases where a refusal of entry is to be expected from the past performance of the employer, or where the employer has given some indication prior to the commencement of the investigation of his intention to bar entry or limit or interfere with the investigation, a warrant should be obtained before the inspection is attempted. Cases of this nature should also be referred through the Area Director to the appropriate Regional Solicitor and the Regional Administrator alerted.” Dept. of Labor, OSHA Compliance Operations Manual V-7 (Jan. 1972). The latest available manual, incorporating changes as of November 1977, deletes this provision, leaving only the details for obtaining “compulsory process” after an employer has refused entry. Dept. of Labor, OSHA Field Operations Manual, Vol. V, pp. V—4-V-5. In its present form, the Secretary’s regulation appears to permit establishment owners to insist on “process”; and hence their refusal to permit entry would fall short of criminal conduct within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. §§ 111 and 1114 (1976 ed.), which make it a crime forcibly to impede, intimidate, or interfere with federal officials, including OSHA inspectors, while engaged in or on account of the performance of their official duties. The proceeding was instituted by filing an “Application for Affirmative Order to Grant Entry and for an Order to show cause why such affirmative order should not issue.” The District Court issued the order to show cause, the matter was argued, and an order then issued authorizing the inspection and enjoining interference by Barlow’s. The following is the order issued by the District Court: “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the United States of America, United States Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, through its duly designated representative or representatives, are entitled to entry upon the premises known as Barlow’s Inc., 225 West Pine, Pocatello, Idaho, and may go upon said business premises to conduct an inspection and investigation as provided for in Section 8 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U. S. C. 651, et seq.), as part of an inspection program designed to assure compliance with that Act; that the inspection and investigation shall be conducted during regular working hours or at other reasonable times, within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, all as set forth in the regulations pertaining to such inspections promulgated by the Secretary of Labor, at 29 C. F. R., Part 1903; that appropriate credentials as representatives of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, United States Department of Labor, shall be presented to the Barlow’s Inc. representative upon said premises and the inspection and investigation shall be commenced as soon as practicable after the issuance of this Order and shall be completed within reasonable promptness; that the inspection and investigation shall extend to the establishment or other area, workplace, or environment where work is performed by employees of the employer, Barlow’s Inc., and to all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, materials, and all other things therein (including but n,ot limited to records, files, papers, processes, controls, and facilities) bearing upon whether Barlow’s Inc. is furnishing to its employees employment and a place of employment that are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to> its employees, and whether Barlow’s Inc. is complying with the Occupational Safety and Health Standards promulgated under the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the rules, regulations, and orders issued pursuant to that Act; that representatives of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration may, at the option of Barlow’s Inc., be accompanied by one or more employees of Barlow’s Inc., pursuant to Section 8 (e) of that Act; that Barlow’s Inc., its agents, representatives, officers, and employees are hereby enjoined and restrained from in anyway whatsoever interfering with the inspection and investigation authorized by this Order and, further, Barlow’s Inc. is hereby ordered and directed to, within five working days from the date of this Order, furnish a copy of this Order to its officers and managers, and, in addition, to post a copy of this Order at its employee’s bulletin board located upon the business premises; and Barlow’s Inc. is hereby ordered and directed to comply in all respects with this order and allow the inspection and investigation to take place without delay and forthwith.” Insofar as the Secretary’s statutory authority is concerned, a regulation expressly providing that the Secretary could proceed ex parte to seek a warrant or its equivalent would appear to be as much within the Secretary’s power as the regulation currently in force and calling for “compulsory process.” Section 8(f)(1), 29 U. S. C. §657 (f)(1), provides that employees or their representatives may give written notice to the Secretary of what they believe to be violations of safety or health standards and may request an inspection. If the Secretary then determines that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that such violation or danger exists, he shall make a special inspection in accordance with the provisions of this section as soon as practicable.” The statute thus purports to authorize a warrantless inspection in these circumstances. The Secretary, Brief for Petitioner 9 n. 7, states that the Barlow inspection was not based on an employee complaint but was a "general schedule” investigation. “Such general inspections,” he explains, “now called Regional Programmed Inspections, are carried out in accordance with criteria based upon accident experience and the number of employees exposed in particular industries. U. S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Field Operations Manual, supra, 1 CCH Employment Safety and Health Guide ¶ 4327.2 (1976).” The Federal Metal and Nonmetallie Mine Safety Act provides: “Whenever an operator . . . refuses to permit the inspection or investigation of any mine which is subject to this chapter ... a civil action for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order, may be instituted by the Secretary in the district court of the United States for the district 30 U. S. C. § 733 (a). “The Secretary may institute a civil action for relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or any other appropriate order in the district court . . . whenever such operator or his agent . . . refuses to permit the inspection of the mine .... Each court shall have jurisdiction to provide such relief as may be appropriate.” 30 U. S. C. § 818. Another example is the Clean Air Act, which grants federal district courts jurisdiction “to require compliance” with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency’s attempt to inspect under 42 U. S. C. § 7414 (1976 ed., Supp. I), when the Administrator has commenced “a civil action” for injunctive relief or to recover a penalty. 42 U. S. C. § 7413 (b)(4) (1976 ed., Supp. I). Exemplary language is contained in the Animal Welfare Act of 1970 which provides for inspections by the Secretary of Agriculture; federal district courts are vested with jurisdiction “specifically to enforce, and to prevent and restrain violations of this chapter, and shall have jurisdiction in all other kinds of cases arising under this chapter.” 7 U. S. C. § 2146 (c) (1976 ed.). Similar provisions are included in other agricultural inspection Acts; see, e. g., 21 U. S. C. § 674 (meat product inspection) ; 21 U. S. C. § 1050 (egg product inspection). The Internal Revenue Code, whose excise tax provisions requiring inspections of businesses are cited by the Secretary, provides: “The district courts . . . shall have such jurisdiction to make and issue in civil actions, writs and orders of injunction . . . and such other orders and processes, and to render such . . . decrees as may be necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws.” 26 U. S. C. § 7402 (a). For gasoline inspections, federal district courts are granted jurisdiction to restrain violations and enforce standards (one of which, 49 U. S. C. § 1677, requires gas transporters to permit entry or inspection). The owner is to be afforded the opportunity for notice and response in most cases, but “failure to give such notice and afford such opportunity shall not preclude the granting of appropriate relief [by the district court].” 49 U. S. C. § 1679 (a). The application for the inspection order filed by the Secretary in this case represented that “the desired inspection and investigation are contemplated as a part of an inspection program designed to assure compliance with the Act and are authorized by Section 8 (a) of the Act.” The program was not described, however, or any facts presented that would indicate why an inspection of Barlow’s establishment was within the program. The order that issued concluded generally that the inspection authorized was “part of an inspection program designed to assure compliance with the Act.” Section 8 (a) of the Act, as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 657 (a), provides that “[i]n order to carry out the purposes of this chapter” the Secretary may enter any establishment, area, work place or environment “where work is performed by an employee of an employer” and “inspect and investigate” any such place of employment and all “pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and . . . question privately any such employer, owner, operator, agent, or employee.” Inspections are to be carried out “during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner.” The Secretary’s regulations echo the statutory language in these respects. 29 CFR § 1903.3 (1977). They also provide that inspectors are to explain the nature and purpose of the inspection and to “indicate generally the scope of the inspection.” 29 CFR § 1903.7 (a) (1977). Environmental samples and photographs are authorized, 29 CFR § 1903.7 (b) (1977), and inspections are to be performed so as “to preclude unreasonable disruption of the operations of the employer’s establishment.” 29 CFR § 1903.7 (d) (1977). The order that issued in this case reflected much of the foregoing statutory and regulatory language. Delineating the scope of a search with some care is particularly important where documents are involved. Section 8 (c) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 657 (c), provides that an employer must “make, keep and preserve, and make available to the Secretary [of Labor] or to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare” such records regarding his activities relating to OSHA as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe by regulation as necessary or appropriate for enforcement of the statute or for developing information regarding the causes and prevention of occupational accidents and illnesses. Regulations requiring employers to maintain records of and to make periodic reports on “work-related deaths, injuries and illnesses” are also contemplated, as are rules requiring accurate records of employee exposures to potential toxic materials and harmful physical agents. In describing the scope of the warrantless inspection authorized by the statute, § 8 (a) does not expressly include any records among those items or things that may be examined, and § 8 (c) merely provides that the employer is to “make available” his pertinent records and to make periodic reports. The Secretary’s regulation, 29 CFR § 1903.3 (1977), however, expressly includes among the inspector’s powers the authority “to review records required by the Act and regulations published in this chapter, and other records which are directly related to the purpose of the inspection.” Further, § 1903.7 requires inspectors to indicate generally “the records specified in § 1903.3 which they wish to review” but “such designations of records shall not preclude access to additional records specified in § 1903.3.” It is the Secretary’s position, which we reject, that an inspection of documents of this scope may be effected without a warrant. The order that issued in this case included among the objects and things to be inspected “all other things therein (including but not limited to records, files, papers, processes, controls and facilities) bearing upon whether Barlow’s, Inc. is furnishing to its employees employment and a place of employment that are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to its employees, and whether Barlow’s, Inc. is complying with . . the OSHA regulations. The injunction entered by the District Court, however, should not be understood to forbid the Secretary from exercising the inspection authority conferred by § 8 pursuant to regulations and judicial process that satisfy the Fourth Amendment. The District Court did not address the issue whether the order for inspection that was issued in this case was the functional equivalent of a warrant, and the Secretary has limited his submission in this case to the constitutionality of a warrantless search of the Barlow establishment authorized by § 8 (a). He has expressly declined to rely on 29 CFR § 1903.4 (1977) and upon the order obtained in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 19. Of course, if the process obtained here, or obtained in other cases under revised regulations, would satisfy the Fourth Amendment, there would be no occasion for enjoining the inspections authorized by § 8 (a).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LOVE v. PULLMAN CO. No. 70-5033. Argued November 16, 1971 Decided January 17, 1972 Hugh J. McClearn argued the cause for' petitioner in No. 70-5033. With him on the brief was Gail L. Ireland. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States et al. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Acting Assistant Attorney General Norman, David L. Rose, Stanley Hebert, and Julia P. Cooper. Edward C. Eppich argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in both cases. Nathaniel B. Jones filed a brief for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People as amicus curiae urging reversal in No. 70-5033. Together with No. 70-37, United States et al. v. Pullman Co., also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. A person claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, may not maintain a suit for redress in federal district court until he has first unsuccessfully pursued certain avenues of potential administrative relief. In this litigation the petitioner employee filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging that his employer, the respondent Pullman Company, had engaged in employment practices violative of Title VII. The court dismissed the complaint, holding that the statutory prerequisites to the maintenance of the suit had not been met. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 430 P. 2d 49, and we granted certiorari to consider the question of federal law presented. 401 U. S. 907. The petitioner was employed by the Pullman Company as a “porter-in-charge.” In 1963 and again in 1965, he complained to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, alleging that the porters-in-charge, most of whom, like the petitioner, were Negroes, performed the same functions as conductors, most of whom were white, yet at lower pay. The proceedings of the Colorado Commission terminated in 1965 without reaching a resolution of the controversy satisfactory to the petitioner. On May 23, 1966, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission received from the petitioner a “letter of inquiry” which complained of this same alleged discrimination. In accord with its usual practice, the Commission treated this letter as a complaint but did not formally file it. Instead, to insure compliance with Title VII’s procedural requirements, EEOC orally advised the Colorado Commission that it had received a complaint from the petitioner. By letter of June 1, 1966, the Colorado Commission informed EEOC that it waived the opportunity to take further action on the petitioner’s grievance, and the EEOC then proceeded with its own investigation. The investigation resulted in a finding of probable cause to believe that the charge of discrimination was true, but the EEOC was unsuccessful in its attempts to obtain Pullman’s voluntary compliance. This lawsuit followed. The basis for the holding of the Court of Appeals was its finding that the charge of discrimination had not been “filed” with EEOC by the petitioner in conformity with the requirements of the Act. Two such requirements are critical here. Section 706 (b) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (b), provides that where there exists a state or local agency authorized to grant or seek relief against employment discrimination, "no charge may be filed [with the EEOC] by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated . . . .” Section 706 (d), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (d), requires that the complaint to the EEOC “shall be filed by the person aggrieved within two hundred and ten days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier . . . The EEOC takes the position that these requirements were fulfilled by the procedure followed here, whereby a charge filed with the EEOC prior to exhaustion of the state remedy was referred by it to the state agency, and then formally filed once the state agency indicated that it would decline to take action. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, regarded this procedure as a “manipulation of the filing date,” not contemplated or permitted by the statute or by the EEOC regulations then in force. We hold that the filing procedure followed here fully complied with the intent of the Act, and we thus reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Nothing in the Act suggests that the state proceedings may not be initiated by the EEOC acting on behalf of the complainant rather than by the complainant himself, nor is there any requirement that the complaint to the state agency be made in writing rather than by oral referral. Further, we cannot agree with the respondent’s claim that the EEOC may not properly hold a complaint in “suspended animation,” automatically filing it upon termination of the state proceedings. We see no reason why further action by the aggrieved party should be required. The procedure complies with the purpose both of § 706 (b), to give state agencies a prior opportunity to consider discrimination complaints, and of § 706 (d), to ensure expedition in the filing and handling of those complaints. The respondent makes no showing of prejudice to its interests. To require a second “filing” by the aggrieved party after termination of state proceedings would serve no purpose other than the creation of an additional procedural technicality. Such technicalities are particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process. The judgment is Reversed. Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. §§ 701-716 (c), 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15. Title 29 CFR §1601.11 (b) (1971) provides: “[A] charge is deemed filed when the Commission receives from the person aggrieved a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties and to describe generally the action or practices complained of. . . .” The Court of Appeals first adopted the reasoning of the District Court: The state commission had terminated the proceedings initiated by petitioner in July 1965, and petitioner failed to complain to the EEOC within the 30-day time period prescribed in §706 (d), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (d). Regarding this statutory time requirement as jurisdictional, the District Court dismissed the complaint. When the Government entered the case on a petition for rehearing to the Court of Appeals, it pointed out that Title VII had not gone into effect at the time of the events underlying petitioner’s applications to the state commission. Thus, the state commission’s termination of proceedings in 1965 did not toll the 30-day period for appeal to the EEOC. Respondent cites the following language of § 706 (b), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (b): “If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a State or local authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the appropriate State or local authority.” Nothing in this language implies that a state proceeding may not be commenced by an oral complaint; the statute guards against state proceedings that are difficult to commence, not against ones that are easily begun. The Court of Appeals expressed concern that if EEOC could ignore the requirement of 29 CFR § 1601.11 (b) (1971) that a charge is deemed filed when received, it could file any complaint whenever it chose, thereby nullifying the various statutory time requirements. But the statutory prohibition of § 706 (b) against filing charges that have not been referred to a state or local authority necessarily creates an exception to the regulation requiring filing on receipt. See Comment, A Look at Love v. Pullman, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 181, 188 (1969). When a member of EEOC, rather than an aggrieved party, files a complaint with EEOC, “the Commission shall, before taking any action with respect to such charge, notify the appropriate State or local officials and, upon request, afford them a reasonable time, but not less than sixty days ... to remedy the practice alleged.” Title VII, §706 (c), 42 U. S. C. §2000^5 (c). It is clear that Congress found nothing wrong, in this circumstance, with EEOC’s holding the charge in abeyance until a state agency is given the chance to act. There is no reason to think that Congress would disapprove this procedure when complaints are initiated by aggrieved parties; the difference in wording between §706 (b) and § 706 (c) seems to be only a reflection of the different persons who initiate the charge. Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1214 n. 117 (1971).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CARACHURI-ROSENDO v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 09-60. Argued March 31,2010 — Decided June 14, 2010 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Auto, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., post, p. 582, and Thomas, J., post, p. 584, filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Sri Srinivasan argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Irving L. Gornstein, Kathryn E. Tarbert, and Geoffrey A. Hoffman. Nicole A. Saharsky argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Kagan, Assistant Attorney General West, Deputy Solicitors General Kneedler and Dreeben, Donald E. Keener, W. Manning Evans, Saul Greenstein, Andrew MacLachlan, and Holly M. Smith. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Center on the Administration of Criminal Law by Catherine M. Amirfar, Jill van Berg, Anthony S. Barkow, and David B. Edwards; for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Jim Walden and Richard A. Bierschbach; for the National Association of Federal Defenders et al. by Iris E. Bennett, Paul M. Rashkind, Frances H. Pratt, Brett G. Sweitzer, Mary Price, and Margaret Colgate Love; and for Organizations Representing Asylum Seekers by Linda T. Coberly. Nancy Morawetz filed a brief for the Asian American Justice Center et al. as amici curiae. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner Jose Angel Carachuri-Rosendo, a lawful permanent resident who has lived in the United States since he was five years old, faced deportation under federal law after he committed two misdemeanor drug possession offenses in Texas. For the first, possession of less than two ounces of marijuana, he received 20 days in jail. For the second, possession without a prescription of one tablet of a common anti-anxiety medication, he received 10 days in jail. After this second offense, the Federal Government initiated removal proceedings against him. He conceded that he was removable, but claimed he was eligible for discretionary relief from removal under 8 U. S. C. § 1229b(a). To decide whether Carachuri-Rosendo is eligible to seek cancellation of removal or waiver of inadmissibility under § 1229b(a), we must decide whether he has been convicted of an “aggravated felony,” §1229b(a)(3), a category of crimes singled out for the harshest deportation consequences. The Court of Appeals held that a simple drug possession offense, committed after the conviction for a first possession offense became final, is always an aggravated felony. We now reverse and hold that second or subsequent simple possession offenses are not aggravated felonies under § 1101(a)(43) when, as in this case, the state conviction is not based on the fact of a prior conviction. I Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., a lawful permanent resident subject to removal from the United States may apply for discretionary cancellation of removal if, inter alia, he “has not been convicted of any aggravated felony,” § 1229b(a)(3). The statutory definition of the term “aggravated felony” includes a list of numerous federal offenses, one of which is “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance .. . including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18).” § 1101(a)(43)(B). Section 924(c)(2), in turn, defines a “drug trafficking crime” to mean “any felony punishable under,” inter alia, “the Controlled Substances Act (21 U. S. C. 801 et seq.).” A felony is a crime for which the “maximum term of imprisonment authorized” is “more than one year.” 18 U. S. C. § 3559(a). The maze of statutory cross-references continues. Section 404 of the Controlled Substances Act criminalizes simple possession offenses, the type of offense at issue in this case. But it prescribes punishment for both misdemeanor and felony offenses. Except for simple possession of crack cocaine or flunitrazepam, a first-time simple possession offense is a federal misdemeanor; the maximum term authorized for such a conviction is less than one year. 21 U. S. C. § 844(a). However, a conviction for a simple possession offense “after a prior conviction under this subchapter [or] under the law of any State .. . has become final” — what we will call recidivist simple possession — may be punished as a felony, with a prison sentence of up to two years. Ibid.* ** Thus, except for simple possession offenses involving isolated categories of drugs not presently at issue, only recidivist simple possession offenses are “punishable” as a federal “felony” under the Controlled Substances Act, 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(2). And thus only a conviction within this particular category of simple possession offenses might, conceivably, be an “aggravated felony” under 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43). For a subsequent simple possession offense to be eligible for an enhanced punishment, i. e., to be punishable as a felony, the Controlled Substances Act requires that a prosecutor charge the existence of the prior simple possession conviction before trial, or before a guilty plea. See 21 U. S. C. § 851(a)(1). Notice, plus an opportunity to challenge the validity of the prior conviction used to enhance the current conviction, §§851(b)-(c), are mandatory prerequisites to obtaining a punishment based on the fact of a prior conviction. And they are also necessary prerequisites under federal law to “authorize” a felony punishment, 18 U. S. C. § 3559(a), for the type of simple possession offense at issue in this case. Neither the definition of an “illicit trafficking” offense under 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) nor that of a “drug trafficking crime” under 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(2) describes or references any state offenses. The “aggravated felony” definition does explain that the term applies “to an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law.” § 1101(a)(43). But in Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U. S. 47, 56 (2006), we determined that, in order to be an “aggravated felony” for immigration law purposes, a state drug conviction must be punishable as a felony under federal law. We held that “a state offense constitutes a 'felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act’ only if it proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under that federal law.” Id., at 60. Despite the fact that the Lopez petitioner had been punished as a felon under state law — and, indeed, received a 5-year sentence — the conduct of his offense was not punishable as a felony under federal law, and this prevented the state conviction from qualifying as an aggravated felony for immigration law purposes. Id., at 55 (“Unless a state offense is punishable as a federal felony it does not count”). In the case before us, the Government argues that Carachuri-Rosendo, despite having received only a 10-day sentence for his Texas misdemeanor simple possession offense, nevertheless has been “convicted” of an “aggravated felony” within the meaning of the INA. This is so, the Government contends, because had Carachuri-Rosendo been prosecuted in federal court instead of state court, he could have been prosecuted as a felon and received a 2-year sentence based on the fact of his prior simple possession offense. Our holding in Lopez teaches that, for a state conviction to qualify as an “aggravated felony” under the INA, it is necessary for the underlying conduct to be punishable as a federal felony. Id., at 60. We now must determine whether the mere possibility, no matter how remote, that a 2-year sentence might have been imposed in a federal trial is a sufficient basis for concluding that a state misdemeanant who was not charged as a recidivist has been “convicted” of an “aggravated felony” within the meaning of § 1229b(a)(3). II Carachuri-Rosendo was born in Mexico in 1978. He came to the United States with his parents in 1983 and has been a lawful permanent resident of Texas ever since. His common-law wife and four children are American citizens, as are his mother and two sisters. Like so many in this country, Carachuri-Rosendo has gotten into some trouble with our drug laws. In 2004, he pleaded guilty to possessing less than two ounces of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, and was sentenced to confinement for 20 days by a Texas court. See App. 19a-22a; Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.121(a) and (b)(1) (West Supp. 2009). In 2005, he pleaded nolo contendere to possessing less than 28 grams — one tablet — of alprazolam (known commercially as Xanax) without a prescription, a class A misdemeanor. See App. 31a-34a; Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.117(a) and (b). Although Texas law, like federal law, authorized a sentencing enhancement if the prosecutor proved that Carachuri-Rosendo had been previously convicted of an offense of a similar class, the State did not elect to seek an enhancement based on his criminal history. App. 32a. In 2006, on the basis of Carachuri-Rosendo’s second possession offense, the Federal Government initiated removal proceedings against him. Appearing pro se before the Immigration Judge, Carachuri-Rosendo did not dispute that his conviction for possessing one tablet of Xanax without a prescription made him removable, but he applied for a discretionary cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U. S. C. §1229b(a). Under that statutory provision, the Attorney General may cancel an order of removal or an order of inadmissibility so long as, inter alia, the noncitizen “has not been convicted of a[n] aggravated felony.” § 1229b(a)(3). The Immigration Judge held that petitioner’s second simple possession conviction was an “aggravated felony” that made him ineligible for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) followed Circuit precedent and affirmed that decision, but it disagreed with the Immigration Judge’s legal analysis. In its en bane opinion, the BIA ruled that in cases arising in Circuits in which the question had not yet been decided, the BIA would not treat a second or successive misdemeanor conviction as an aggravated felony unless the conviction contained a finding that the offender was a recidivist. In re Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 382, 387, 391 (2007). The BIA explained that the statutory question is complicated by the fact that “‘recidivist possession’” is not a “discrete offense under Federal law.” Id., at 388. While most federal offenses are defined by elements that must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, recidivist possession is an “amalgam of elements, substantive sentencing factors, and procedural safeguards.” Id., at 389. Section 844(a) defines simple possession by reference to statutory elements, but “facts leading to recidivist felony punishment, such as the existence of a prior conviction, do not qualify as ‘elements’ in the traditional sense.” Ibid. The BIA observed, however, that “21 U. S. C. §851 precludes a Federal judge from enhancing a drug offender’s sentence on the basis of recidivism absent compliance with a number of safeguards that, among other things, serve to protect the right of the accused to notice and an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of an increased punishment based on prior convictions.” Ibid. Therefore, these requirements “are part and parcel of what it means for a crime to be a ‘recidivist’ offense.” Id., at 391. “[Ujnless the State successfully sought to impose punishment for a recidivist drug conviction,” the BIA concluded, a state simple possession “conviction cannot ‘proscribe conduct punishable as’ recidivist possession” under federal law. Ibid. On review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the BIA’s decision in Carachuri-Rosendo’s case, reading our decision in Lopez as dictating its outcome. “[I]f the conduct proscribed by state offense could have been prosecuted as a felony” under the Controlled Substances Act, the court reasoned, then the defendant’s conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony. 570 F. 3d 263, 267 (CA5 2009) (citing Lopez, 549 U. S., at 60). The court deemed its analysis “[t]he hypothetical approach,” a term it derived from its understanding of our method of analysis in Lopez. 570 F. 3d, at 266, and n. 3; see also United States v. Pacheco-Diaz, 513 F. 3d 776, 779 (CA7 2008) (per curiam) (employing the “hypothetical-federal-felony approach”). Under this approach, as the Court of Appeals understood it, courts “g[o] beyond the state statute’s elements to look at the hypothetical conduct a state statute proscribes.” 570 F. 3d, at 266, n. 3. Accordingly, any “conduct” that “hypothetically” “could have been punished as a felony” “had [it] been prosecuted in federal court” is an “aggravated felony” for federal immigration law purposes. Id., at 265. In applying this hypothetical approach, the Court of Appeals did not discuss the §851 procedural requirements. Instead, it concluded that because Carachuri-Rosendo’s “conduct” could have been prosecuted as simple possession with a recidivist enhancement under state law — even though it was not — it could have also been punished as a felony under federal law. Thus, in the Court of Appeals’ view, his conviction for simple possession under state law, without a recidivist enhancement, was an “aggravated felony” for immigration law purposes. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals over whether subsequent simple possession offenses are aggravated felonies. 558 U. S. 1091 (2009). Ill When interpreting the statutory provisions under dispute, we begin by looking at the terms of the provisions and the “eommonsense conception” of those terms. Lopez, 549 U. S., at 53. Carachuri-Rosendo is ineligible for cancellation of removal only if he was “convicted of a[n] aggravated felony,” 8 U. S. C. § 1229b(a)(3), which, in this case, could only be a conviction for “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance ... including a drug trafficking crime,” § 1101(a)(43)(B). A recidivist possession offense such as Carachuri-Rosendo’s does not fit easily into the “everyday understanding” of those terms, Lopez, 549 U. S., at 53. This type of petty simple possession offense is not typically thought of as an “aggravated felony” or as “illicit trafficking.” We explained in Lopez that “ordinarily ‘trafficking’ means some sort of commercial dealing.” Id., at 53-54 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1534 (8th ed. 2004». And just as in Lopez, “[cjommerce . . . was no part of” Caraehuri-Rosendo’s possessing a single tablet of Xanax, “and certainly it is no element of simple possession.” 549 U. S., at 54. As an initial matter, then, we observe that a reading of this statutory scheme that would apply an “aggravated” or “trafficking” label to any simple possession offense is, to say the least, counterintuitive and “unorthodox,” ibid. The same is true for the type of penalty at issue. We do not usually think of a 10-day sentence for the unauthorized possession of a trivial amount of a prescription drug as an “aggravated felony.” A “felony,” we have come to understand, is a “serious crime usu[ally] punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or by death.” Black’s Law Dictionary 694 (9th ed. 2009) (hereinafter Black’s). An “aggravated” offense is one “made worse or more serious by circumstances such as violence, the presence of a deadly weapon, or the intent to commit another crime.” Id., at 75. The term “aggravated felony” is unique to Title 8, which covers immigration matters; it is not a term used elsewhere within the United States Code. Our statutory criminal law classifies the most insignificant of federal felonies — “Class E” felonies — as carrying a sentence of “less than five years but more than one year.” 18 U. S. C. §3559(a)(5). While it is true that a defendant’s criminal history might be seen to make an offense “worse” by virtue thereof, Black’s 75, it is nevertheless unorthodox to classify this type of petty simple possession recidivism as an “aggravated felony.” Of course, as Justice Souter observed in his opinion for the Court in Lopez, Congress, like “Humpty Dumpty,” has the power to give words unorthodox meanings. 549 U. S., at 54. But in this case the Government argues for a result that “the English language tells us not to expect,” so we must be “very wary of the Government’s position.” Ibid. Because the English language tells us that most aggravated felonies are punishable by sentences far longer than 10 days, and that mere possession of one tablet of Xanax does not constitute “trafficking,” Lopez instructs us to be doubly wary of the Government’s position in this ease. IV The Government’s position, like the Court of Appeals’ “hypothetical approach,” would treat all “conduct punishable as a felony” as the equivalent of a “conviction” of a felony whenever, hypothetically speaking, the underlying conduct could have received felony treatment under federal law. We find this reasoning — and the “hypothetical approach” itself — unpersuasive for the following reasons. First, and most fundamentally, the Government’s position ignores the text of the INA, which limits the Attorney General’s cancellation power only when, inter alia, a nonciti-zen “has . . . been convicted of a[n] aggravated felony.” 8 U. S. C. § 1229b(a)(3) (emphasis added). The text thus indicates that we are to look to the conviction itself as our starting place, not to what might have or could have been charged. And to be convicted of an aggravated felony punishable as such under the Controlled Substances Act, the “maximum term of imprisonment authorized” must be “more than one year,” 18 U. S. C. § 3559(a)(5). Congress, recall, chose to authorize only a 1-year sentence for nearly all simple possession offenses, but it created a narrow exception for those cases in which a prosecutor elects to charge the defendant as a recidivist and the defendant receives notice and an opportunity to defend against that charge. See 21 U. S. C. §851; Part I, supra. Indisputably, Carachuri-Rosendo’s record of conviction contains no finding of the fact of his prior drug offense. Carachuri-Rosendo argues that even such a finding would be insufficient, and that a prosecutorial charge of recidivism and an opportunity to defend against that charge also would be required before he could be deemed “convicted” of a felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act. In the absence of any finding of recidivism, we need not, and do not, decide whether these additional procedures would be necessary. Although a federal immigration court may have the power to make a recidivist finding in the first instance, see, e. g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224, 247 (1998), it cannot, ex post, enhance the state offense of record just because facts known to it would have authorized a greater penalty under either state or federal law. Carachuri-Rosendo was not actually “convicted,” § 1229b(a)(3), of a drug possession offense committed “after a prior conviction . . . has become final,” § 844(a), and no subsequent development can undo that history. The Government contends that if Carachuri-Rosendo had been prosecuted in federal court for simple possession under 21 U. S. C. § 844(a) under identical circumstances, he would have committed an “aggravated felony” for immigration law purposes. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36-37. This is so, the Government suggests, because the only statutory text that matters is the word “punishable” in 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(2): Whatever conduct might be “punishable” as a felony, regardless of whether it actually is so punished or not, is a felony for immigration law purposes. But for the reasons just stated, the circumstances of Carachuri-Rosendo’s prosecution were not identical to those hypothesized by the Government. And the Government’s abstracted approach to § 924(c)(2) cannot be reconciled with the more concrete guidance of 8 U. S. C. § 1229b(a)(3), which limits the Attorney General’s cancellation authority only when the noncitizen has actually been “convicted of a[n] aggravated felony” — not when he merely could have been convicted of a felony but was not. Second, and relatedly, the Government’s position fails to give effect to the mandatory notice and process requirements contained in 21 U. S. C. §851. For federal-law purposes, a simple possession offense is not “punishable” as a felony unless a federal prosecutor first elects to charge a defendant as a recidivist in the criminal information. The statute, as described in Part I, supra, at 568-569, speaks in mandatory terms, permitting “[n]o person” to be subject to a recidivist enhancement — and therefore, in this case, a felony sentence — “unless” he has been given notice of the Government’s intent to prove the fact of a prior conviction. Federal law also gives the defendant an opportunity to challenge the fact of the prior conviction itself. §§851(b)-(c). The Government would dismiss these procedures as meaningless, so long as they may be satisfied during the immigration proceeding. But these procedural requirements have great practical significance with respect to the conviction itself and are integral to the structure and design of our drug laws. They authorize prosecutors to exercise discretion when electing whether to pursue a recidivist enhancement. See United States v. Dodson, 288 F. 3d 153, 159 (CA5 2002) (“Whereas the prior version of [§ 851(a)] made enhancements for prior offenses mandatory, the new statutory scheme gave prosecutors discretion whether to seek enhancements based on prior convictions”). Because the procedure^ are prerequisites to an enhanced sentence, §851 allows federal prosecutors to choose whether to seek a conviction that is “punishable” as a felony under § 844(a). Underscoring the significance of the §851 procedures, the United States Attorney’s Manual places decisions with respect to seeking recidivist enhancements on par with the filing of a criminal charge against a defendant. See Dept, of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual §9-27.300(B) (1997), online at http:// www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/ 27mcrm.htm#9-27.300 (as visited June 3, 2010, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (“Every prosecutor should regard the filing of an information under 21 U. S. C. § 851 . . . as equivalent to the filing of charges”). Many state criminal codes, like the federal scheme, afford similar deference to prosecutorial discretion when prescribing recidivist enhancements. Texas is one such State. See, e. g., Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.42, 12.43 (West 2003 and Supp. 2009) (recidivist enhancement is available “[i]f it is shown on the trial” that defendant was previously convicted of identified categories of felonies and misdemeanors). And, in this case, the prosecutor specifically elected to “[ajbandon” a recidivist enhancement under state law. App. 32a (reproducing state judgment). Were we to permit a federal immigration judge to apply his own recidivist enhancement after the fact so as to make the noncitizen’s offense “punishable” as a felony for immigration law purposes, we would denigrate the independent judgment of state prosecutors to execute the laws of those sovereigns. Third, the Court of Appeals’ hypothetical felony approach is based on a misreading of our decision in Lopez. We never used the term “hypothetical” to describe our analysis in that case. We did look to the “proscribed conduct” of a state offense to determine whether it is “punishable as a felony under that federal law.” 549 U. S., at 60. But the “hypothetical approach” employed by the Court of Appeals introduces a level of conjecture at the outset of this inquiry that has no basis in Lopez. It ignores both the conviction (the relevant statutory hook) and the conduct actually punished by the state offense. Instead, it focuses on facts known to the immigration court that could have but did not serve as the basis for the state conviction and punishment. As the Sixth Circuit has explained, this approach is really a “ ‘hypothetical to a hypothetical.’” Rashid v. Mukasey, 531 F. 3d 438, 445 (2008). Not only does the Government wish us to consider a fictional federal felony — whether the crime for which Carachuri-Rosendo was actually convicted would be a felony under the Controlled Substances Act — but the Government also wants us to consider facts not at issue in the crime of conviction (i. e., the existence of a prior conviction) to determine whether Carachuri-Rosendo could have been charged with a federal felony. This methodology is far removed from the more focused, categorical inquiry employed in Lopez. Fourth, it seems clear that the Government’s argument is inconsistent with common practice in the federal courts. It is quite unlikely that the “conduct” that gave rise to Caraehuri-Rosendo’s conviction would have been punished as a felony in federal court. Under the United States Sentenc-' ing Guidelines, Carachuri-Rosendo’s recommended sentence, based on the type of controlled substance at issue, would not have exceeded one year and very likely would have been less than six months. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §2D2.1(a)(3) (Nov. 2009) (base offense level of 4). And as was true in Lopez, the Government has provided us with no empirical data suggesting that “even a single eager Assistant United States Attorney” has ever sought to prosecute a comparable federal defendant as a felon. 549 U. S., at 57-58. The Government’s “hypothetical” approach to this case is therefore misleading as well as speculative, in that Carachuri-Rosendo’s federal-court counterpart would not, in actuality, have faced any felony charge. Finally, as we noted in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 11, n. 8 (2004), ambiguities in criminal statutes referenced in immigration laws should be construed in the noncitizen’s favor. And here the critical language appears in a criminal statute, 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2). We note that whether a noncitizen has committed an “aggravated felony” is relevant, inter alia, to the type of relief he may obtain from a removal order, but not to whether he is in fact removable. In other words, to the extent that our rejection of the Government’s broad understanding of the scope of “aggravated felony” may have any practical effect on policing our Nation’s borders, it is a limited one. Carachuri-Rosendo, and others in his position, may now seek cancellation of removal and thereby avoid the harsh consequence of mandatory removal. But he will not avoid the fact that his conviction makes him, in the first instance, removable. Any relief he may obtain depends upon the discretion of the Attorney General. * % * In sum, the Government is correct that to qualify as an “aggravated felony” under the INA, the conduct prohibited by state law must be punishable as a felony under federal law. See Lopez, 549 U. S., at 60. But as the text and structure of the relevant statutory provisions demonstrate, the defendant must also have been actually convicted of a crime that is itself punishable as a felony under federal law. The mere possibility that the defendant’s conduct, coupled with facts outside of the record of conviction, could have authorized a felony conviction under federal law is insufficient to satisfy the statutory command that a noncitizen be “convicted of a[n] aggravated felony” before he loses the opportunity to seek cancellation of removal. 8 U. S. C. § 1229b(a)(3). The Court of Appeals, as well as the Government, made the logical error of assuming that a necessary component of an aggravated felony is also sufficient to satisfy its statutory definition. V We hold that when a defendant has been convicted of a simple possession offense that has not been enhanced based on the fact of a prior conviction, he has not been “convicted” under § 1229b(a)(3) of a “felony punishable” as such “under the Controlled Substances Act,” 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(2). The prosecutor in Carachuri-Rosendo’s case declined to charge him as a recidivist. He has, therefore, not been convicted of a felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. The term “aggravated felony” “applies to an offense . . . whether in violation of Federal or State law” (or, in certain circumstances, “the law of a foreign country”). 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43). The Controlled Substances Act itself defines the term ‘Telón/’ as “any Federal or State offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony.” 21 U. S. C. §802(13). The Government concedes that the classification of felonies under 18 U. S. C. § 3559(a) controls in this case. Brief for Respondent 4. Although § 844(a) does not expressly define a separate offense of “recidivist simple possession,” the fact of a prior conviction must nonetheless be found before a defendant is subject to a felony sentence. True, the statutory scheme comports with Almendarez-Torres v. United, States, 523 U. S. 224, 247 (1998), in which we explained that the Constitution does not require treating recidivism as an element of the offense. In other words, Congress has permissibly set out a criminal offense for simple possession whereby a recidivist finding by the judge, by a preponderance of the evidence, authorizes a punishment that exceeds the statutory maximum penalty for a simple possession offense. But the fact of a prior conviction must still be found — if only by a judge and if only by a preponderance of the evidence — before a defendant is subject to felony punishment. For present purposes, we therefore view §844(a)’s felony simple possession provision as separate and distinct from the misdemeanor simple possession offense that section also prescribes. The statute provides in relevant part: “Any person who violates this subsection may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 1 year ... except that if he commits such offense after a prior conviction ... he shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than 15 days but not more than 2 years ....” 21 U. S. C. § 844(a). This subsection provides: “No person who stands convicted of an offense under this part shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason of one or more prior convictions, unless before trial, or before entry of a plea of guilty, the United States attorney files an information with the court (and serves a copy of such information on the person or counsel for the person) stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon.” § 851(a)(1). We have previously recognized the mandatory nature of these requirements, as have the Courts of Appeals. See United States v. LaBonte, 520 U. S. 751, 754, n. 1 (1997) (“We note that imposition of an enhanced penalty [for recidivism] is not automatic. ... If the Government does not file such notice [under 21 U. S. C. § 851(a)(1)] ... the lower sentencing range will he applied even though the defendant may otherwise be eligible for the increased penalty”); see also, e. g., United States v. Beasley, 495 F. 3d 142, 148 (CA4 2007); United States v. Ceballos, 302 F. 3d 679, 690-692 (CA7 2002); United States v. Dodson, 288 F. 3d 153, 159 (CA5 2002); United States v. Mooring, 287 F. 3d 725, 727-728 (CA8 2002). Although §851’s procedural safeguards are not constitutionally compelled, see Almendarez-Torres, 523 U. S., at 247, they are nevertheless a mandatory feature of the Controlled Substances Act and a prerequisite to securing a felony conviction under § 844(a) for a successive simple possession offense. But for trivial marijuana possession offenses (such as CarachuriRosendo's 2004 state offense), virtually all drug offenses are grounds for removal under 8 U. S. C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Since the Court of Appeals issued its decision in this case, CarachuriRosendo has been removed. Brief for Respondent 10-11. Neither party, however, has suggested that this case is now moot. If Carachuri-Rosendo was not convicted of an “aggravated felony,” and if he continues to satisfy the requirements of 8 U. S. C. § 1229b(a), he may still seek cancellation of removal even after having been removed. See § 1229b(a) (“The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable horn the United States if the alien” meets several criteria). Compare 570 F. 3d 263 (CA5 2009) (holding state conviction for simple possession after prior conviction for simple possession is a felony under the Controlled Substances Act and thus an aggravated felony) and Fernandez v. Mukasey, 544 P. 3d 862 (CA7 2008) (same), with Berhe v. Gonzales, 464 F. 3d 74 (CA1 2006) (taking contrary view), Alsol v. Mukasey, 548 F. 3d 207 (CA2 2008) (same), Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F. 3d 297 (CA3 2002) (same), and Rashid v. Mukasey, 531 F. 3d 438 (CA6 2008) (same). The Court stated in Lopez that "recidivist possession, see 21 U. S. C. § 844(a), clearly fall[s] within the definitions used by Congress in 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) and 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(2), regardless of whether these federal possession felonies or their state counterparts constitute ‘illicit trafficking in a controlled substance’ or ‘drug trafficking’ as those terms are used in ordinary speech.” 549 U. S., at 55, n. 6. Our decision today is not in conflict with this footnote; it is still true that recidivist simple possession offenses charged and prosecuted as such “clearly fall” within the definition of an aggravated felony. What we had no occasion to decide in Lopez, and what we now address, is what it means to be convicted of an aggravated felony. Lopez teaches us that it is necessary that the conduct punished under state law correspond to a felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act to be an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(B). But it does not instruct as to whether the mere possibility that conduct could be — but is not — charged as an offense punishable as a felony under federal law is sufficient. ibid., the Government will not have established that the defendant had a prior conviction for which the maximum term of imprisonment was 10 years or more (assuming the recidivist finding is a necessary precursor to such a sentence). Our decision last Term in Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U. S. 29 (2009), also relied upon by the Government, is not to the contrary. In that case, we rejected the so-called categorical approach employed in cases like United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U. S. 377 (2008), when assessing whether, under 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), a noncitizen has committed “an offense that . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the . . . victims exceeds $10,000.” Our analysis was tailored to the “circumstance-specific” language contained in that particular subsection of the aggravated felony definition. Nijhawan, 557 U. S., at 38. And we specifically distinguished the “generic” categories of aggravated felonies for which .a categorical approach might be appropriate — including the “illicit trafficking” provision — from the “circumstance-specific” offense at hand. Id., at 36-39. Moreover, unlike the instant ease, there was no debate in Nijhawan over whether the petitioner actually had been “convicted” of fraud; we only considered how to calculate the amount of loss once a conviction for a particular category of aggravated felony has occurred. Linking our inquiry to the record of conviction comports with how we have categorized convictions for state offenses within the definition of generic federal criminal sanctions under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U. S. C. § 924(e). The United States urges that our decision in Rodriquez, 553 U. S. 377, an ACCA ease, supports its position in this case. Brief for Respondent 29-30. To the extent that Rodriquez is relevant to the issue at hand, we think the contrary is true. In that decision we considered whether a recidivist finding under state law that had the effect of increasing the “maximum term of imprisonment” to 10 years, irrespective of the actual sentence imposed, made the offense a “serious drug offense” within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(1) and therefore an ACCA predicate offense. 553 U. S., at 382. We held that a recidivist finding could set the “maximum term of imprisonment,” but only when the finding is a part of the record of conviction. Id., at 389. Indeed, we specifically observed that “in those cases in which the records that may properly be consulted do not show that the defendant faced the possibility of a recidivist enhancement, it may well be that the Government will be precluded from establishing that a conviction was for a qualifying offense.” Ibid. In other words, when the recidivist finding giving rise to a 10-year sentence is not apparent from the sentence itself, or appears neither as part of the “judgment of conviction” nor the “formal charging document,”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

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UNITED STATES v. HOME CONCRETE & SUPPLY, LLC, et al. No. 11-139. Argued January 17, 2012 Decided April 25, 2012 Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV-C. Roberts, C. J., and Thomas and Auto, JJ., joined that opinion in full, and Scalia, J., joined except as to Part IV-C. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 492. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined, post, p. 497. Deputy Solicitor General Stewart argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Verrilli, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Ashford, Jeffrey B. Wall, Gilbert S. Rothenberg, Michael J. Haungs, and Joan I. Oppenheimer. Gregory G. Garre argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Richard T. Rice, C. Mark Wiley, Robert T. Numbers II, J. Scott Ballenger, Lori Alvino McGill, and Roger J. Jones Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Government of the United States Virgin Islands by Vincent F. Frazer, Attorney General, Carol Thomas-Jacobs and Tamika M. Archer, Assistant Attorneys General, Gene C. Schaerr, Linda T. Coberly, and Barry J. Hart; for Bauseh & Lomb Inc. by Lisa S. Blatt and Anthony J. Franze; for Grapevine Imports, Ltd., by Howard R. Rubin and Robert T Smith; for the National Association of Home Builders by Christopher M. Whitcomb; and for the National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center et al. by Elizabeth Milito, Karen R. Earned, and Ilya Shapiro. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American College of Tax Counsel by Clifford M. Sloan, Pamela F. Olson, Julia M. Kazaks, David W. Foster, Richard M. Lipton, and Russell Young; for UTAM, Ltd., et al. by James F. Martens; for Daniel S. Burks et al. by Joel N. Crouch, David E. Colmenero, and Anthony P. Daddino; and for Kristin E. Hickman by Ms. Hickman, pro se. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV-C. Ordinarily, the Government must assess a deficiency against a taxpayer within “3 years after the return was filed.” 26 U. S. C. § 6501(a) (2000 ed.). The 3-year period is extended to 6 years, however, when a taxpayer “omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in the return.” § 6501(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The question before us is whether this latter provision applies (and extends the ordinary 3-year limitations period) when the taxpayer overstates his basis in property that he has sold, thereby understating the gain that he received from its sale. Following Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U. S. 28 (1958), we hold that the provision does not apply to an overstatement of basis. Hence the 6-year period does not apply. I For present purposes the relevant underlying circumstances are not in dispute. We consequently assume that (1) the respondent taxpayers filed their relevant tax returns in April 2000; (2) the returns overstated the basis of certain property that the taxpayers had sold; (3) as a result the returns understated the gross' income that the taxpayers received from the sale of the property; and (4) the understatement exceeded the statute’s 25% threshold. We also take as undisputed that the Commissioner asserted the relevant deficiency within the extended 6-year limitations period, but outside the default 3-year period. Thus, unless the 6-year statute of limitations applies, the Government’s efforts to assert a tax deficiency came too late. Our conclusion — that the extended limitations period does not apply — follows directly from this Court’s earlier decision in Colony. II In Colony this Court interpreted a provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the operative language of which is identical to the language now before us. The Commissioner there had determined “that the taxpayer had understated the gross profits on the sales of certain lots of land for residential purposes as a result of having overstated the ‘basis’ of such lots by erroneously including in their cost certain unallowable items of development expense.” Id., at 30. The Commissioner’s assessment came after the ordinary 3-year limitations period had run. And, it was consequently timely only if the taxpayer, in the words of the 1939 Code, had “omit[ted] from gross income an amount properly includible therein which is in excess of 25 per centum of the amount of gross income stated in the return . . . .” 26 U. S. C. § 275(c) (1940 ed.). The Code provision applicable to this case, adopted in 1954, contains materially indistinguishable language. See § 6501(e)(1)(A) (2000 ed.) (same, but replacing “per centum” with “percent”). See also Appendix, infra. In Colony this Court held that taxpayer misstatements, overstating the basis in property, do not fall within the scope of the statute. But the Court recognized the Commissioner’s contrary argument for inclusion. 357 U. S., at 32. Then as now, the Code itself defined “gross income” in this context as the difference between gross revenue (often the amount the taxpayer received upon selling the property) and basis (often the amount the taxpayer paid for the property). Compare 26 U. S. C. §§22, 111 (1940 ed.) with §§ 61(a)(3), 1001(a) (2000 ed.)- And, the Commissioner pointed out, an overstatement of basis can diminish the “amount” of the gain just as leaving the item entirely off the return might do. 357 U. S., at 32. Either way, the error wrongly understates the taxpayer’s income. But, the Court added, the Commissioner’s argument did not fully account for the provision’s language, in particular the word “omit.” The key phrase says “omits ... an amount.” The word “omits” (unlike, say, “reduces” or “understates”) means “ ‘[t]o leave out or unmentioned; not to insert, include, or name.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1939)). Thus, taken literally, “omit” limits the statute’s scope to situations in which specific receipts or accruals of income are left out of the computation of gross income; to inflate the basis, however,, is not to “omit” a specific item, not even of profit. While finding this latter interpretation of the language the “more plausiblfe],” the Court also noted that the language was not “unambiguous.” Colony, 357 U. S., at 33. It then examined various congressional Reports discussing the relevant statutory language. It found in those Reports “persuasive indications that Congress merely had in mind failures to report particular income receipts and accruals, and did not intend the [extended] limitation to apply whenever gross income was understated . . . .” Id., at 35. This “history,” the Court said, “shows ... that the Congress intended an exception to the usual three-year statute of limitations only in the restricted type of situation already described,” a situation that did not include overstatements of basis. Id., at 36. The Court wrote that Congress, in enacting the provision, “manifested no broader purpose than to give the Commissioner an additional two [now three] years to investigate tax returns in cases where, because of a taxpayer’s omission to report some taxable item, the Commissioner is at a special disadvantage .. . [because] the return on its face provides no clue to the existence of the omitted item.... [W]hen, as here [i. e., where the overstatement of basis is at issue], the understatement of a tax arises from an error in reporting an item disclosed on the face of the return the Commissioner is at no such disadvantage . . . whether the error be one affecting ‘gross income’ or one, such as overstated deductions, affecting other parts of the return.” Ibid, (emphasis added). Finally, the Court noted that Congress had recently enacted the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. And the Court observed that “the conclusion we reach is in harmony with the unambiguous language of § 6501(e)(1)(A),” id., at 37, i. e., the provision relevant in this present case. III In our view, Colony determines the outcome in this case. The provision before us is a 1954 reenactment of the 1939 provision that Colony interpreted. The operative language is identical. It would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to give the same language here a different interpretation without effectively overruling Colony, a course of action that basic principles of stare decisis wisely counsel us not to take. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 139 (2008) (“[SJtare decisis in respect to statutory interpretation has special force, for Congress remains free to alter what we have done” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172-173 (1989). The Government, in an effort to convince us to interpret the operative language before us differently, points to differences in other nearby parts of the 1954 Code. It suggests that these differences counsel in favor of a different interpretation than the one adopted in Colony. For example, the Government points to a new provision, § 6501(e)(l)(A)(i), which says: “In the case of a trade or business, the term ‘gross income’ means the total of the amounts received or accrued from the sale of goods or services (if such amounts are required to be shown on the return) prior to the diminution by the cost of such sales or services.” If the section’s basic phrase “omi[ssion] from gross income” does not apply to overstatements of basis (which is what Colony held), then what need would there be for clause (i), which leads to the same result in a specific subset of cases? And why, the Government adds, does a later paragraph, referring to gifts and estates, speak of a taxpayer who “omits . . . items includible in [the] gross estate”? See § 6501(e)(2) (emphasis added). By speaking of “items” there does it not imply that omission of an “amount” covers more than omission of individual items — indeed that it includes overstatements of basis, which, after all, diminish the amount of the profit that should have been reported as gross income? In our view, these points are too fragile to bear the significant argumentative weight the Government seeks to place upon them. For example, at least one plausible reason why Congress might have added clause (i) has nothing to do with any desire to change the meaning of the general rule. Rather when Congress wrote the 1954 Code (prior to Colony), it did not yet know how the Court would interpret the provision’s operative language. At least one lower court had decided that the' provision did not apply to overstatements about the cost of goods that a business later sold. See Uptegrove Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 204 F. 2d 570 (CA3 1953). But see Reis v. Commissioner, 142 F. 2d 900, 902-903 (CA6 1944). And Congress could well have wanted to ensure that, come what may in the Supreme Court, Upte-grove’s interpretation would remain the law where a “trade or business” was at issue. Nor does our interpretation leave clause (i) without work to do. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31 (2001) (noting canon that statutes should be read to avoid making any provision “superfluous, void, or insignificant” (internal quotation marks omitted)). That provision also explains how to calculate the denominator for purposes of determining whether a conceded omission amounts to 25% of “gross income.” For example, it tells us that a merchant who fails to include $10,000 of revenue from sold goods has not met the 25% test if total revenue is more than $40,000, regardless of the cost paid by the merchant to acquire those goods. But without clause (i), the general statutory definition of “gross income” requires subtracting the cost from the sales price. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 61(a)(3), 1012. Under such a definition of “gross income,” the calculation would take (1) total revenue from sales, $40,000, minus (2) “the cost of such sales,” say, $25,000. The $10,000 of revenue would thus amount to 67% of the “gross income” of $15,000. And the clause does this work in respect to omissions from gross income irrespective of our interpretation regarding overstatements of basis. The Government’s argument about subsection (e)(2)’s use of the word “item” instead of “amount” is yet weaker. The Court in Colony addressed a similar argument about the word “amount.” It wrote: “The Commissioner states that the draftsman’s use of the word ‘amount’ (instead of, for example, ‘item’) suggests a concentration on the quantitative aspect of the error — that is whether or not gross income was understated by as much as 25%.” 357 U. S., at 32. But the Court, while recognizing the Commissioner’s logic, rejected the argument (and the significance of the word “amount”) as insufficient to prove the Commissioner’s conclusion. And the addition of the word “item” in a different subsection similarly fails to exert an interpretive force sufficiently strong to affect our conclusion. The word’s appear-anee in subsection (e)(2), we concede, is new. But to rely in the case before us on this solitary word change in a different subsection is like hoping that a new batboy will change the outcome of the World Series. IV A Finally, the Government points to Treasury Regulation § 301.6501(e)-l, which was promulgated in final form in December 2010. See 26 CFR §801.6501(e)-l (2011). The regulation, as relevant here, departs from Colony and interprets the operative language of the statute in the Government’s favor. The regulation says that “an understated amount of gross income resulting from an overstatement of unre-covered cost or other basis constitutes an omission from gross income.” § 301.6501(e)-l(a)(l)(iii). In the Government’s view this new regulation in effect overturns Colony’s interpretation of this statute. The Government points out that the Treasury Regulation constitutes “an agency’s construction of a statute which it administers.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984). See also Mayo Foundation for Medical Ed. and Research v. United States, 562 U. S. 44 (2011) (applying Chevron in the tax context). The Court has written that a “court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute . . ..” National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967, 982 (2005) (emphasis added). And, as the Government notes, in Colony itself the Court wrote that “it cannot be said that the language is unambiguous.” 357 U. S., at 33. Hence, the Government concludes, Colony cannot govern the outcome in this case. The question, rather, is whether the agency’s construction is a “permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, supra, at 843. And, since the Government argues that the regulation embodies a reasonable, hence permissible, construction of the statute, the Government believes it must win. B We do not accept this argument. In our view, Colony has already interpreted the statute, and there is no longer any different construction that is consistent with Colony and available for adoption by the agency. C The fatal flaw in the Government’s contrary argument is that it overlooks the reason why Brand X held that a “prior judicial construction,” unless reflecting an “unambiguous” statute, does not trump a different agency construction of that statute. 545 U. S., at 982. The Court reveals that reason when it points out that “it is for agencies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps.” Ibid. The fact that a statute is unambiguous means that there is “no gap for the agency to fill” and thus “no room for agency discretion.” Id., at 982-983. In so stating, the Court sought to encapsulate what earlier opinions, including Chevron, made clear. Those opinions identify the underlying interpretive problem as that of deciding whether, or when, a particular statute in effect delegates to an agency the power to fill a gap, thereby implicitly taking from a court the power to void a reasonable gap-filling interpretation. Thus, in Chevron the Court said that, when See also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 229 (2001); Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 741 (1996); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 448 (1987); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199, 231 (1974). “Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. . . . Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. [But in either instance], a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.” 467 U. S., at 843-844. Chevron and later cases find in unambiguous language a clear sign that Congress did not delegate gap-filling authority to an agency; and they find in ambiguous language at least a presumptive indication that Congress did delegate that gap-filling authority. Thus, in Chevron the Court wrote that a statute’s silence or ambiguity as to a particular issue means that Congress has not “directly addressed the precise question at issue” (thus likely delegating gap-filling power to the agency). 467 U. S., at 843. In Mead the Court, describing Chevron, explained: “Congress ... may not have expressly delegated authority or responsibility to implement a particular provision or fill a particular gap. Yet it can still be apparent from the agency’s generally- conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law, even one about which Congress did not actually have an intent as to a particular result.” 533 U. S., at 229 (internal quotation marks omitted). Chevron added that “[i]f a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.” 467 U. S., at 843, n. 9 (emphasis added). As the Government points out, the Court in Colony stated that the statutory language at issue is not “unambiguous.” 357 U. S., at 33. But the Court decided that case nearly 30 years before it decided Chevron. There is no reason to believe that the linguistic ambiguity noted by Colony reflects a post-Chevron conclusion that Congress had delegated gap-filling power to the agency. At the same time, there is every reason to believe that the Court thought that Congress had “directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” and thus left “[no] gap for the agency to fill.” Chevron, supra, at 842-843. . -, For one thing, the Court said that the taxpayer had the better side of the textual argument. Colony, 357 U. S., at 33. For another, its examination of legislative history led it to believe that Congress had decided the question definitively, leaving no room for the agency to reach a contrary result. It found in that history “persuasive indications” that Congress intended overstatements of basis to fall outside the statute’s scope, and it said that it was satisfied that Congress “intended an exception . . . only in the restricted type of situation” it had already described. Id., at 35-36. Further, it thought that the Commissioner’s interpretation (the interpretation once again advanced here) would “create a patent incongruity in the tax law.” Id., at 36-37. And it reached this conclusion despite the fact that, in the years leading up to Colony, the Commissioner had consistently advocated the opposite in the circuit courts. See, e. g., Uptegrove, 204 F. 2d 570; Reis, 142 F. 2d 900; Goodenow v. Commissioner, 238 F. 2d 20 (CA8 1956); American Liberty Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 1 T. C. 386 (1942). Cf. Staff v. Commissioner, 220 F. 2d 65 (CA9 1955); Davis v. Hightower, 230 F. 2d 549 (CA5 1956). Thus, the Court was aware it was rejecting the expert opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. And finally, after completing its analysis, Colony found its interpretation of the 1939 Code “in harmony with the [now] unambiguous language” of the 1954 Code, which at a minimum suggests that the Court saw nothing in the 1954 Code as inconsistent with its conclusion. 357 U. S., at 37. It may be that judges today would use other methods to determine whether Congress left a gap to fill. But that is beside the point. The question is whether the Court in Colony concluded that the statute left such a gap. And, in our view, the opinion (written by Justice Harlan for the Court) makes clear that it did not. Given principles of stare decisis, we roust follow that interpretation. And there being no gap to fill, the Government’s gap-filling regulation cannot change Colony’s interpretation of the statute. We agree with the taxpayers that overstatements of basis, and the resulting understatements of gross income, do not trigger the extended limitations period of § 6501(e)(1)(A). The Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion. See 634 F. 3d 249 (CA4 2011). And its judgment is affirmed. It is so ordered. APPENDIX We reproduce the applicable sections of the two relevant versions of the U. S. Code below. Section 6501 was amended and reorganized in 2010. See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, § 513,124 Stat. 111. But the parties agree that the amendments do not affect this case. We therefore have referred to, and reproduce here, the section as it appears in the 2000 edition of the U. S. Code. Title 26 U. S. C. §275 (1940 ed.) “Period of limitation upon assessment and collection, “(a) General rule. “The amount of income taxes imposed by this chapter shall be assessed within three years after the return was filed, and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such taxes shall be begun after the expiration of such period. “(c) Omission from gross income. “If the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein which is in excess of 25 per centum of the amount of gross income stated in the return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within 5 years after the return was filed.” Title 26 U. S. C. §6501 (2000 ed.) “Limitations on assessment and collection. “(a) General rule “Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of any tax imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed (whether or not such return was filed on or after the date prescribed) or, if the tax is payable by stamp, at any time after such tax became due and before the expiration of 3 years after the date on which any part of such tax was paid, and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such tax shall be begun after the expiration of such period. . . . “(e) Substantial omission of items “Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c)— “(1) Income taxes “In the case of any tax imposed by subtitle A— “(A) General rule “If the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in the return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within 6 years after the return was filed. For purposes of this subparagraph— “(i) In the case of a trade or business, the term ‘gross income’ means the total of the amounts received or accrued from the sale of goods or services (if such amounts are required to be shown on the return) prior to diminution by the cost of such sales or services; and “(ii) In determining the amount omitted from gross income, there shall not be taken into account any amount which is omitted from gross income stated in the return if such amount is disclosed in the return, or in a statement attached to the return, in a manner adequate to apprise the Secretary of the nature and amount of such item. “(2) Estate and gift taxes “In the case of a return of estate tax under chapter 11 or a return of gift tax under chapter 12, if the taxpayer omits from the gross estate or from the total amount of the gifts made during the period for which the return was filed items includible in such gross estate or such total gifts, as the case may be, as exceed in amount 25 percent of the gross estate stated in the return or the total amount of gifts stated in the return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within 6 years after the return was filed. ...”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WILLIAMSON COUNTY REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION et al. v. HAMILTON BANK OF JOHNSON CITY No. 84-4. Argued February 19, 1985 Decided June 28, 1985 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Marshall, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 201. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 202. White, J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 200. Powell, J., took no part in the decision of the case. Robert L. Estes argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was M. Milton Sweeney. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Habicht, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, and David C. Shilton. G. T. Nebel argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Gas Bauman Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of California ex reí. John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, et al. by Mr. Van de Kamp, pro se, N. Gregory Taylor and Theodora Berger, Assistant Attorneys General of California, Richard C. Jacobs, Craig C. Thompson, Richard M. Frank, Norman C. Gorsuch, Attorney General of Alaska, Jim Smith, Attorney General of Florida, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska, Brian McKay, Attorney General of Nevada, George V. Postrozny, Deputy Attorney General, Gregory H. Smith, Attorney General of New Hampshire, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas, Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General of North Carolina, Michael Turpén, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Robert L. McDonald, First Assistant Attorney General, Mark V. Meierhenry, Attorney General of South Dakota, David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General of Utah, Dallis W. Jensen, Solicitor General, John J. Easton, Attorney General of Vermont, Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, Archie G. McClintock, Attorney General of Wyoming, Aviata F. FaAlevao, Attorney General of American Samoa; for the National Association of Counties et al. by Lawrence R. Velvel and Joyce Holmes Benjamin; for the City of New York by Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., and Leonard Koemer; and for the City of St. Petersburg, Florida, by Charles L. Siemon, Wendy U. Larsen, and Michael S. Davis. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American College of Real Estate Lawyers by Edward I. Cutler, Eugene J. Morris, and John P. Trevaskis, Jr.; for the California Building Industry Association by Gideon Kanner; for the National Apartment Association by Jon D. Smock and Wilbur H. Haines III; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zumbrun and Robert K. Best. Morris A. Thurston, Robert K. Break, and John L. Fellows III filed a brief for Irvine Co. as amicus curiae. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent, the owner of a tract of land it was developing as a residential subdivision, sued petitioners, the Williamson County (Tennessee) Regional Planning Commission and its members and staff, in United States District Court, alleging that petitioners’ application of various zoning laws and regulations to respondent’s property amounted to a “taking” of that property. At trial, the jury agreed and awarded respondent $350,000 as just compensation for the “taking.” Although the jury’s verdict was rejected by the District Court, which granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict to petitioners, the verdict was reinstated on appeal. Petitioners and their amici urge this Court to overturn the jury’s award on the ground that a temporary regulatory interference with an investor’s profit expectation does not constitute a “taking” within the meaning of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, or, alternatively, on the ground that even if such interference does constitute a taking, the Just Compensation Clause does not require money damages as recompense. Before we reach those contentions, we examine the procedural posture of respondent’s claim. I A Under Tennessee law, responsibility for land-use planning is divided between the legislative body of each of the State’s counties and regional and municipal “planning commissions.” The county legislative body is responsible for zoning ordinances to regulate the uses to which particular land and buildings may be put, and to control the density of population and the location and dimensions of buildings. Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-101 (1980). The planning commissions are responsible for more specific regulations governing the subdivision of land within their region or municipality for residential development. §§ 13-3-403,13-4-303. Enforcement of both the zoning ordinances and the subdivision regulations is accomplished in part through a requirement that the planning commission approve the plat of a subdivision before the plat may be recorded. §§13-3-402, 13-4-302 (1980 and Supp. 1984). Pursuant to § 13-7-101, the Williamson County “Quarterly Court,” which is the county’s legislative body, in 1973 adopted a zoning ordinance that allowed “cluster” development of residential areas. Under “cluster” zoning, “both the size and the width of individual residential lots in . . . [a] development may be reduced, provided . . . that the overall density of the entire tract remains constant-provided, that is, that an area equivalent to the total of the areas thus ‘saved’ from each individual lot is pooled and retained as common open space.” 2 N. Williams, American Land Planning Law § 47.01, pp. 212-213 (1974). Cluster zoning thus allows housing units to be grouped, or “clustered” together, rather than being evenly spaced on uniform lots. As required by §13-3-402, respondent’s predecessor-in-interest (developer) in 1973 submitted a preliminary plat for the cluster development of its tract, the Temple Hills Country Club Estates (Temple Hills), to the Williamson County Regional Planning Commission for approval. At that time, the county’s zoning ordinance and the Commission’s subdivision regulations required developers to seek review and approval of subdivision plats in two steps. The developer first was to submit for approval a preliminary plat, or “initial sketch plan,” indicating, among other things, the boundaries and acreage of the site, the number of dwelling units and their basic design, the location of existing and proposed roads, structures, lots, utility layouts, and open space, and the contour of the land. App. in No. 82-5388 (CA6), pp. 857, 871 (CA App.). Once approved, the preliminary plat served as a basis for the preparation of a final plat. Under the Commission’s regulations, however, approval of a preliminary plat “will not constitute acceptance of the final plat.” Id., at 872. Approval of a preliminary plat lapsed if a final plat was not submitted within one year of the date of the approval, unless the Commission granted an extension of time, or unless the approval of the preliminary plat was renewed. Ibid. The final plat, which is the official authenticated document that is recorded, was required to conform substantially to the preliminary plat, and, in addition, to include such details as the lines of all streets, lots, boundaries, and building setbacks. Id., at 875. On May 3, 1973, the Commission approved the developer’s preliminary plat for Temple Hills. App. 246-247. The plat indicated that the development was to include 676 acres, of which 260 acres would be open space, primarily in the form of a golf course. Id., at 422. A notation on the plat indicated that the number of “allowable dwelling units for total development” was 736, but lot lines were drawn in for only 469 units. The areas in which the remaining 276 units were to be placed were left blank and bore the notation “this parcel not to be developed until approved by the planning commission.” The plat also contained a disclaimer that “parcels with note ‘this parcel not to be developed until approved by the planning commission’ not a part of this plat and not included in gross area.” Ibid. The density of 736 allowable dwelling units was calculated by multiplying the number of acres (676) by the number of units allowed per acre (1.089). Id., at 361. Although the zoning regulations in effect in 1973 required that density be calculated “on the basis of total acreage less fifty percent (50%) of the land lying in the flood plain . . . and less fifty percent (50%) of all land lying on a slope with a grade in excess of twenty-five percent (25%),” CA App. 858, no deduction was made from the 676 acres for such land. Tr. 369. Upon approval of the preliminary plat, the developer conveyed to the county a permanent open space easement for the golf course, and began building roads and installing utility lines for the project. App. 259-260. The developer spent approximately $3 million building the golf course, and another $500,000 installing sewer and water facilities. Defendant’s Ex. 96. Before housing construction was to begin on a particular section, a final plat of that section was submitted for approval. Several sections, containing a total of 212 units, were given final approval by 1979. App. 260, 270, 278, 423. The preliminary plat, as well, was reapproved four times during that period. Id., at 270, 274, 362, 423. In 1977, the county changed its zoning ordinance to require that calculations of allowable density exclude 10% of the total acreage to account for roads and utilities. Id., at 363; CA App. 862. In addition, the number of allowable units was changed to one per acre from the 1.089 per acre allowed in 1973. Id., at 858, 862; Tr. 1169-1170, 1183. The Commission continued to apply the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations in effect in 1973 to Temple Hills, however, and reapproved the preliminary plat in 1978. In August 1979, the Commission reversed its position and decided that plats submitted for renewal should be evaluated under the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations in effect when the renewal was sought. App. 279-282. The Commission then renewed the Temple Hills plat under the ordinances and regulations in effect at that time. Id., at 283-284. In January 1980, the Commission asked the developer to submit a revised preliminary plat before it sought final approval for the remaining sections of the subdivision. The Commission reasoned that this was necessary because the original preliminary plat contained a number of surveying errors, the land available in the subdivision had been decreased inasmuch as the State had condemned part of the land for a parkway, and the areas marked “reserved for future development” had never been platted. Plaintiff’s Exs. 1078 and 1079; Tr. 164-168. A special committee (Temple Hills Committee) was appointed to work with the developer on the revision of the preliminary plat. Plaintiff’s Ex. 1081; Tr. 169-170. The developer submitted a revised preliminary plat for approval in October 1980. Upon review, the Commission’s staff and the Temple Hills Committee noted several problems with the revised plat. App. 304-305. First, the allowable density under the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations then in effect was 548 units, rather than the 736 units claimed under the preliminary plat approved in 1973. The difference reflected a decrease in 18.5 acres for the parkway, a decrease of 66 acres for the 10% deduction for roads, and an exclusion of 44 acres for 50% of the land lying on slopes exceeding a 25% grade. Second, two cul-de-sac roads that had become necessary because of the land taken for the parkway exceeded the maximum length allowed for such roads under the subdivision regulations in effect in both 1980 and 1973. Third, approximately 2,000 feet of road would have grades in excess of the maximum allowed by county road regulations. Fourth, the preliminary plat placed units on land that had grades in excess of 25% and thus was considered undevelopable under the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations. Fifth, the developer had not fulfilled its obligations regarding the construction and maintenance of the main access road. Sixth, there were inadequate fire protection services for the area, as well as inadequate open space for children’s recreational activities. Finally, the lots proposed in the preliminary plat had a road frontage that was below the minimum required by the subdivision regulations in effect in 1980. The Temple Hills Committee recommended that the Commission grant a waiver of the regulations regarding the length of the cul-de-sacs, the maximum grade of the roads, and the minimum frontage requirement. Id., at 297, 304-306. Without addressing the suggestion that those three requirements be waived, the Commission disapproved the plat on two other grounds: first, the plat did not comply with the density requirements of the zoning ordinance or subdivision regulations, because no deduction had been made for the land taken for the parkway, and because there had been no deduction for 10% of the acreage attributable to roads or for 50% of the land having a slope of more than 25%; and second, lots were placed on slopes with a grade greater than 25%. Plaintiff’s Ex. 9112. The developer then appealed to the County Board of Zoning Appeals for an “interpretation of the Residential Cluster zoning [ordinance] as it relates to Temple Hills.” App. 314. On November 11, 1980, the Board determined that the Commission should apply the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations that were in effect in 1973 in evaluating the density of Temple Hills. Id., at 328. It also decided that in measuring which lots had excessive grades, the Commission should define the slope in a manner more favorable to the developer. Id., at 329. On November 26, respondent, Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, acquired through foreclosure the property in the Temple Hills subdivision that had not yet been developed, a total of 257.65 acres. Id., at 189-190. This included many of the parcels that had been left blank in the preliminary plat approved in 1973. In June 1981, respondent submitted two preliminary plats to the Commission — the plat that had been approved in 1973 and subsequently reapproved several times, and a plat indicating respondent’s plans for the undeveloped areas, which was similar to the plat submitted by the developer in 1980. Id., at 88. The new plat proposed the development of 688 units; the reduction from 736 units represented respondent’s concession that 18.5 acres should be removed from the acreage because that land had been taken for the parkway. Id., at 424, 425. On June 18, the Commission disapproved the plat for eight reasons, including the density and grade problems cited in the October 1980 denial, as well as the objections the Temple Hills Committee had raised in 1980 to the length of two cul-de-sacs, the grade of various roads, the lack of fire protection, the disrepair of the main-access road, and the minimum frontage. Id., at 370. The Commission declined to follow the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals that the plat should be evaluated by the 1973 zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations, stating that the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Commission. Id., at 187-188, 360-361. B Respondent then filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that the Commission had taken its property without just compensation and asserting that the Commission should be estopped under state law from denying approval of the project. Respondent’s expert witnesses testified that the design that would meet each of the Commission’s eight objections would allow respondent to build only 67 units, 409 fewer than respondent claims it is entitled to build, and that the development of only 67 sites would result in a net loss of over $1 million. App. 377. Petitioners’ expert witness, on the other hand, testified that the Commission’s eight objections could be overcome by a design that would allow development of approximately 300 units. Tr. 1467-1468. After a 3-week trial, the jury found that respondent had been denied the “economically viable” use of its property in violation of the Just Compensation Clause, and that the Commission was estopped under state law from requiring respondent to comply with the current zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations rather than those in effect in 1973. App. 32-33. The jury awarded damages of $350,000 for the temporary taking of respondent’s property. Id., at 33-34. The court entered a permanent injunction requiring the Commission to apply the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations in effect in 1973 to Temple Hills, and to approve the plat submitted in 1981. Id., at 34. The court then granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the Commission on the taking claim, reasoning in part that respondent was unable to derive economic benefit from its property on a temporary basis only, and that such a temporary deprivation, as a matter of law, cannot constitute a taking. Id., at 36, 41. In addition, the court modified its permanent injunction to require the Commission merely to apply the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations in effect in 1973 to the project, rather than requiring approval of the plat, in order to allow the parties to resolve “legitimate technical questions of whether plaintiff meets the requirements of the 1973 regulations,” id., at 42, through the applicable state and local appeals procedures. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. 729 F. 2d 402 (1984). The court held that application of government regulations affecting an owner’s use of property may constitute a taking if the regulation denies the owner all “economically viable” use of the land, and that the evidence supported the jury’s finding that the property had no economically feasible use during the time between the Commission’s refusal to approve the preliminary plat and the jury’s verdict. Id., at 405-406. Rejecting petitioners’ argument that respondent never had submitted a plat that complied with the 1973 regulations, and thus never had acquired rights that could be taken, the court held that the jury’s estoppel verdict indicates that the jury must have found that respondent had acquired a “vested right” under state law to develop the subdivision according to the plat submitted in 1973. Id., at 407. Even if respondent had no vested right under state law to finish the development, the jury was entitled to find that respondent had a reasonable investment-backed expectation that the development could be completed, and that the actions of the Commission interfered with that expectation. Ibid. The court rejected the District Court’s holding that the taking verdict could not stand as a matter of law. A temporary denial of property could be a taking, and was to be analyzed in the same manner as a permanent taking. Finally, relying upon the dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S. 621, 636 (1981), the court determined that damages are required to compensate for a temporary taking. hH hH We granted certiorari to address the question whether Federal, State, and local Governments must pay money damages to a landowner whose property allegedly has been “taken” temporarily by the application of government regulations. 469 U. S. 815 (1984). Petitioners and their amici contend that we should answer the question in the negative by ruling that government regulation can never effect a “taking” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. They recognize that government regulation may be so restrictive that it denies a property owner all reasonable beneficial use of its property, and thus has the same effect as an appropriation of the property for public use, which concededly would be a taking under the Fifth Amendment. According to petitioners, however, regulation that has such an effect should not be viewed as a taking. Instead, such regulation should be viewed as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, because it is an attempt by government to use its police power to effect a result that is so unduly oppressive to the property owner that it constitutionally can be effected only through the power of eminent domain. Violations of the Due Process Clause, petitioners’ argument concludes, need not be remedied by “just compensation.” The Court twice has left this issue undecided. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, supra; Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 263 (1980). Once again, we find that the question is not properly presented, and must be left for another day. For whether we examine the Planning Commission’s application of its regulations under Fifth Amendment “taking” jurisprudence, or under the precept of due process, we conclude that respondent’s claim is premature. HH HH k — i We examine the posture of respondent’s cause of action first by viewing it as stating a claim under the Just Compensation Clause. This Court often has referred to regulation that “goes too far,” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922), as a “taking.” See, e. g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1004-1005 (1984); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S., at 260; PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 83 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 174 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 65-66 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590, 594 (1962); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U. S. 155, 168 (1958). Even assuming that those decisions meant to refer literally to the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and therefore stand for the proposition that regulation may effect a taking for which the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation, see San Diego, 450 U. S., at 647-653 (dissenting opinion), and even assuming further that the Fifth Amendment requires the payment of money damages to compensate for such a taking, the jury verdict in this case cannot be upheld. ' Because respondent has not yet obtained a final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property, nor utilized the procedures Tennessee provides for obtaining just compensation, respondent’s claim is not ripe. A As the Court has made clear in several recent decisions, a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981), for example, the Court rejected a claim that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 447, 30 U. S. C. § 1201 et seq., effected a taking because: “There is no indication in the record that appellees have availed themselves of the opportunities provided by the Act to obtain administrative relief by requesting either a variance from the approximate-original-contour requirement of § 515(d) or a waiver from the surface mining restrictions in § 522(e). If [the property owners] were to seek administrative relief under these procedures, a mutually acceptable solution might well be reached with regard to individual properties, thereby obviating any need to address the constitutional questions. The potential for such administrative solutions confirms the conclusion that the taking issue decided by the District Court simply is not ripe for judicial resolution.” 452 U. S., at 297 (footnote omitted). Similarly, in Agins v. Tiburon, supra, the Court held that a challenge to the application of a zoning ordinance was not ripe because the property owners had not yet submitted a plan for development of their property. 447 U. S., at 260. In Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, supra, the Court declined to find that the application of New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law to Grand Central Terminal effected a taking because, although the Landmarks Preservation Commission had disapproved a plan for a 50-story office building above the terminal, the property owners had not sought approval for any other plan, and it therefore was not clear whether the Commission would deny approval for all uses that would enable the plaintiffs to derive economic benefit from the property. 438 U. S., at 136-137. Respondent’s claim is in a posture similar to the claims the Court held premature in Hodel. Respondent has submitted a plan for developing its property, and thus has passed beyond the Agins threshold. But, like the Hodel plaintiffs, respondent did not then seek variances that would have allowed it to develop the property according to its proposed plat, notwithstanding the Commission’s finding that the plat did not comply with the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations. It appears that variances could have been granted to resolve at least five of the Commission’s eight objections to the plat. The Board of Zoning Appeals had the power to grant certain variances from the zoning ordinance, including the ordinance’s density requirements and its restriction on placing units on land with slopes having a grade in excess of 25%. Tr. 1204-1205; see n. 3, supra. The Commission had the power to grant variances from the subdivision regulations, including the cul-de-sac, road-grade, and frontage requirements. Indeed, the Temple Hills Committee had recommended that the Commission grant variances from those regulations. App. 304-306. Nevertheless, respondent did not seek variances from either the Board or the Commission. Respondent argues that it “did everything possible to resolve the conflict with the commission,” Brief for Respondent 42, and that the Commission’s denial of approval for respondent’s plat was equivalent to a denial of variances. The record does not support respondent’s claim, however. There is no evidence that respondent applied to the Board of Zoning Appeals for variances from the zoning ordinance. As noted, the developer sought a ruling that the ordinance in effect in 1973 should be applied, but neither respondent nor the developer sought a variance from the requirements of either the 1973 or 1980 ordinances. Further, although the subdivision regulations in effect in 1981 required that applications to the Commission for variances be in writing, and that notice of the application be given to owners of adjacent property, the record contains no evidence that respondent ever filed a written request for variances from the cul-de-sac, road-grade, or frontage requirements of the subdivision regulations, or that respondent ever gave the required notice. App. 212-213; see also Tr. 1255-1257. Indeed, in a letter to the Commission written shortly before its June 18, 1981, meeting to consider the preliminary sketch, respondent took the position that it would not request variances from the Commission until after the Commission approved the proposed plat: “[Respondent] stands ready to work with the Planning Commission concerning the necessary variances. Until the initial sketch is renewed, however, and the developer has an opportunity to do detailed engineering work it is impossible to determine the exact nature of any variances that may be needed.” Plaintiff’s Ex. 9028, p. 6. The Commission’s regulations clearly indicated that unless a developer applied for a variance in writing and upon notice to other property owners, “any condition shown on the plat which would require a variance will constitute grounds for disapproval of the plat.” CA App. 933. Thus, in the face of respondent’s refusal to follow the procedures for requesting a variance, and its refusal to provide specific information about the variances it would require, respondent hardly can maintain that the Commission’s disapproval of the preliminary plat was equivalent to a final decision that no variances would be granted. As in Hodel, Agins, and Penn Central, then, respondent has not yet obtained a final decision regarding how it will be allowed to develop its property. Our reluctance to examine taking claims until such a final decision has been made is compelled by the very nature of the inquiry required by the Just Compensation Clause. Although “[t]he question of what constitutes a ‘taking’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty,” Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S., at 123, this Court consistently has indicated that among the factors of particular significance in the inquiry are the economic impact of the challenged action and the extent to which it interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations. Id., at 124. See also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S., at 1005; PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S., at 83; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S., at 175. Those factors simply cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question. Here, for example, the jury’s verdict indicates only that it found that respondent would be denied the economically feasible use of its property if it were forced to develop the subdivision in a manner that would meet each of the Commission’s eight objections. It is not clear whether the jury would have found that the respondent had been denied all reasonable beneficial use of the property had any of the eight objections been met through the grant of a variance. Indeed, the expert witness who testified regarding the economic impact of the Commission’s actions did not itemize the effect of each of the eight objections, so the jury would have been unable to discern how a grant of a variance from any one of the regulations at issue would have affected the profitability of the development. App. 377; see also id., at 102-104. Accordingly, until the Commission determines that no variances will be granted, it is impossible for the jury to find, on this record, whether respondent “will be unable to derive economic benefit” from the land. Respondent asserts that it should not be required to seek variances from the regulations because its suit is predicated upon 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and there is no requirement that a plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 action. Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496 (1982). The question whether administrative remedies must be exhausted is conceptually distinct, however, from the question whether an administrative action must be final before it is judicially reviewable. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U. S. 232, 243 (1980); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 669 F. 2d 903, 908 (CA3 1982). See generally 13A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532.6 (1984). While the policies underlying the two concepts often overlap, the finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate. Patsy concerned the latter, not the former. The difference is best illustrated by comparing the procedure for seeking a variance with the procedures that, under Patsy, respondent would not be required to exhaust. While it appears that the State provides procedures by which an aggrieved property owner may seek a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of zoning and planning actions taken by county authorities, see Fallin v. Knox County Bd. of Comm’rs, 656 S. W. 2d 338 (Tenn. 1983); Tenn. Code Ann. §§27-8-101, 27-9-101 to 27-9-113, and 29-14-101 to 29-14-113 (1980 and Supp. 1984), respondent would not be required to resort to those procedures before bringing its §1983 action, because those procedures clearly are remedial. Similarly, respondent would not be required to appeal the Commission’s rejection of the preliminary plat to the Board of Zoning Appeals, because the Board was empowered, at most, to review that rejection, not to participate in the Commission’s decisionmaking. Resort to those procedures would result in a judgment whether the Commission’s actions violated any of respondent’s rights. In contrast, resort to the procedure for obtaining variances would result in a conclusive determination by the Commission whether it would allow respondent to develop the subdivision in the manner respondent proposed. The Commission’s refusal to approve the preliminary plat does not determine that issue; it prevents respondent from developing its subdivision without obtaining the necessary variances, but leaves open the possibility that respondent may develop the subdivision according to its plat after obtaining the variances. In short, the Commission’s denial of approval does not conclusively determine whether respondent will be denied all reasonable beneficial use of its property, and therefore is not a final, reviewable decision. B A second reason the taking claim is not yet ripe is that respondent did not seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so. The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S., at 297, n. 40. Nor does the Fifth Amendment require that just compensation be paid in advance of, or contemporaneously with, the taking; all that is required is that a “‘reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation’ ” exist at the time of the taking. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 124-125 (1974) (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641, 659 (1890)). See also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S., at 1016; Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U. S. 18, 21 (1940); Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U. S. 95, 104 (1932). If the government has provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process “yield[s] just compensation,” then the property owner “has no claim against the Government” for a taking. Monsanto, 467 U. S., at 1013, 1018, n. 21. Thus, we have held that taking claims against the Federal Government are premature until the property owner has availed itself of the process provided by the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. §1491. Monsanto, 467 U. S., at 1016-1020. Similarly, if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation. The recognition that a property owner has not suffered a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain just compensation through the procedures provided by the State for obtaining such compensation is analogous to the Court’s holding in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981). There, the Court ruled that a person deprived of property through a random and unauthorized act by a state employee does not state a claim under the Due Process Clause merely by alleging the deprivation of property. In such a situation, the Constitution does not require predeprivation process because it would be impossible or impracticable to provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation. Instead, the Constitution is satisfied by the provision of meaningful postdeprivation process. Thus, the State’s action is not “complete” in the sense of causing a constitutional injury “unless or until the state fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the property loss.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517, 532, n. 12 (1984). Likewise, because the Constitution does not require pretaking compensation, and is instead satisfied by a reasonable and adequate provision for obtaining compensation after the taking, the State’s action here is not “complete” until the State fails to provide adequate compensation for the taking. Under Tennessee law, a property owner may bring an inverse condemnation action to obtain just compensation for an alleged taking of property under certain circumstances. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-123 (1980). The statutory scheme for eminent domain proceedings outlines the procedures by which government entities must exercise the right of eminent domain. §§29-16-101 to 29-16-121. The State is prohibited from “entering] upon [condemned] land” until these procedures have been utilized and compensation has been paid the owner, § 29-16-122, but if a government entity does take possession of the land without following the required procedures, “the owner of such land may petition for a jury of inquest, in which case the same proceedings may be had, as near as may be, as hereinbefore provided; or he may sue for damages in the ordinary way....” § 29-16-123. The Tennessee state courts have interpreted §29-16-123 to allow recovery through inverse condemnation where the “taking” is effected by restrictive zoning laws or development regulations. See Davis v. Metropolitan Govt. of Nashville, 620 S. W. 2d 532, 533-534 (Tenn. App. 1981); Speight v. Lockhart, 524 S. W. 2d 249 (Tenn. App. 1975). Respondent has not shown that the inverse condemnation procedure is unavailable or inadequate, and until it has utilized that procedure, its taking claim is premature. > HH We turn to an analysis of respondent’s claim under the due process theory that petitioners espouse. As noted, under that theory government regulation does not effect a taking for which the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation; instead, regulation that goes so far that it has the same effect as a taking by eminent domain is an invalid exercise of the police power, violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Should the government wish to accomplish the goals of such regulation, it must proceed through the exercise of its eminent domain power, and, of course, pay just compensation for any property taken. The remedy for a regulation that goes too far, under the due process theory, is not “just compensation,” but invalidation of the regulation, and if authorized and appropriate, actual damages. The notion that excessive regulation can constitute a “taking” under the Just Compensation Clause stems from language in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922). See San Diego, 450 U. S., at 649 (dissenting opinion). Writing for the Pennsylvania Coal Court, Justice Holmes stated: “The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” 260 U. S., at 415. Those who argue that excessive regulation should be considered a violation of the Due Process Clause rather than a “taking” assert that Pennsylvania Coal used the word “taking” not in the literal Fifth Amendment sense, but as a metaphor for actions having the same effect as a taking by eminent domain. See, e. g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 274, 598 P. 2d 25, 29 (1979), aff’d, 447 U. S. 255 (1980); Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N. Y. 2d 587, 594, 350 N. E. 2d 381, 385 (1976). Because no issue was presented in Pennsylvania Coal regarding compensation, it is argued, the Court was free to use the term loosely. The due process argument finds support, we are told, in the fact that the Pennsylvania Coal Court framed the question presented as “whether the police power can be stretched so far” as to destroy property rights, 260 U. S., at 413, and by the Court’s emphasis upon the need to proceed by eminent domain rather than by regulation when the effect of the regulation would be to destroy property interests: “Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must he an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act” Ibid. (Emphasis added.) Further, in earlier cases involving the constitutional limitations on the exercise of police power, Justice Holmes’ opinions for the Court made clear that the Court did not view overly restrictive regulation as triggering an award of compensation, but as an invalid means of accomplishing what constitutionally can be accomplished only through the exercise of eminent domain. See, e. g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 156 (1921); Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 355 (1908); Martin v. District of Columbia, 205 U. S. 135, 139 (1907). We need not pass upon the merits of petitioners’ arguments, for even if viewed as a question of due process, respondent’s claim is premature. Viewing a regulation that “goes too far” as an invalid exercise of the police power, rather than as a “taking” for which just compensation must be paid, does not resolve the difficult problem of how to define “too far,” that is, how to distinguish the point at which regulation becomes so onerous that it has the same effect as an appropriation of the property through eminent domain or physical possession. As we have noted, resolution of that question depends, in significant part, upon an analysis of the effect the Commission’s application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations had on the value of respondent’s property and investment-backed profit expectations. That effect cannot be measured until a final decision is made as to how the regulations will be applied to respondent’s property. No such decision had been made at the time respondent filed its § 1983 action, because respondent failed to apply for variances from the regulations. V In sum, respondent’s claim is premature, whether it is analyzed as a deprivation of property without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, or as a taking under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice White dissents from the holding that the issues in this case are not ripe for decision at this time. Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this case. "[Njor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The Fifth Amendment’s prohibition, of course, applies against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 241 (1897); see also San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S. 621, 623, n. 1 (1981). The developer also submitted the preliminary plat that had been approved in 1973 and reapproved on several subsequent occasions, contending that it had the right to develop the property according to that plat. As we have noted, that plat did not indicate how all of the parcels would be developed. App. 84-85. The Board of Zoning Appeals was empowered: “a. To hear and decide appeals on any permit, decision, determination, or refusal made by the [County] Building Commissioner or other administrative official in the carrying out or enforcement of any provision of this Resolution; and to interpret the Zoning map and this Resolution. “c. To hear and decide applications for variances from the terms of this Resolution. Such variances shall be granted only where by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness, or shape of a specific piece of property which at the time of adoption of this Resolution was a lot of record, or where by reason of exceptional topographic situations or conditions of a piece of property the strict application of the provisions of this Resolution would result in practical difficulties to or undue hardship upon the owner of such property.” Plaintiff’s Ex. 9112. See also Tenn. Code. Ann. §§ 13-7-106 to 13-7-109 (1980). Respondent also alleged that the Commission’s refusal to approve the plat violated respondent’s rights to substantive and procedural due process and denied it equal protection. The District Court granted a directed verdict to petitioners on the substantive due process and equal protection claims, and the jury found that respondent had not been denied procedural due process. App. 32. Those issues are not before us. Id., at 377; Tr. 238-243. Respondent claimed it was entitled to build 476 units: the 736 units allegedly approved in 1973 minus the 212 units already built or given final approval and minus 48 units that were no longer available because land had been taken from the subdivision for the parkway. Although the record is less than clear, it appears that the jury calculated the $350,000 award by determining a fair rate of return on the value of the property for the time between the Commission’s rejection of the preliminary plat in 1980 and the jury’s verdict in March 1982. See id., at 800-805; Tr. of Oral Arg. 25, 32-33. In light of our disposition of the case, we need not reach the question whether that measure of damages would provide just compensation, or whether it would be appropriate if respondent’s cause of action were viewed as stating a claim under the Due Process Clause. While respondent’s appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, the parties reached an agreement whereby the Commission granted a variance from its cul-de-sac and road-grade regulations and approved the development of 476 units, and respondent agreed, among other things, to rebuild existing roads, and build all new roads, according to current regulations. App. to Brief for Petitioners 35. Judge Wellford dissented. 729 F. 2d, at 409. He did not agree that the evidence supported a finding that respondent’s property had been taken, in part because there was no evidence that respondent had formally requested a variance from the regulations. Even if there was a temporary denial of the “economically viable” use of the property, Judge Wellford would have held that mere fluctuations in value during the process of governmental decisionmaking are ‘“incidents of ownership’” and cannot be considered a “‘taking,’” id., at 410, quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 263, n. 9 (1980). He also did not agree that damages could be awarded to remedy any taking, reasoning that the San Diego Gas dissent does not reflect the views of the majority of this Court, and that this Court never has awarded damages for a temporary taking where there was no invasion, physical occupation, or “seizure and direction” by the State of the landowner’s property. 729 P. 2d, at 411. The subdivision regulations in effect in 1980 and 1981 provided: “Variances may be granted under the following conditions: “Where the subdivider can show that strict adherence to these regulations would cause unnecessary hardship, due to conditions beyond the control of the subdivider. If the subdivider creates the hardship due to his design or in an effort to increase the yield of lots in his subdivision, the variance will not be granted. “Where the Planning Commission decides that there are topographical or other conditions peculiar to the site, and a departure from their regulations will not destroy their intent.” CA App. 932. The Commission’s regulations required that “Each applicant must file with the Planning Commission a written request for variance stating at least the following: “a. The variance requested. “b. Reason or circumstances requiring the variance. “c. Notice to the adjacent property owners that a variance is being requested. “Without the application any condition shown on the plat which would require a variance will constitute grounds for disapproval of the plat.” Id., at 933. Respondent’s predecessor-in-interest requested, and apparently was granted, a waiver of the 10% road-grade regulation for section VI of the subdivision. See Plaintiff’s Exs. 1078, 9094. The predecessor-in-interest wrote a letter on January 3, 1980, that respondent contends must be construed as a request for a waiver of the road-grade regulation for the entire subdivision: “I contend that the road grade and slope question ... is adequately provided for by both the [subdivision] Regulations and the Zoning Ordinance. In both, the Planning Commission is given the authority to approve roads that have grades in excess of 10%. “In our particular case, it was common knowledge from the beginning that due to the character of the land involved that there would be roads that exceeded the 10% slope. In fact in our first Section there is a stretch of road that exceeds the 10%; therefore I respectfully request that this letter be made an official part of the Planning Commission Minutes of January 3, 1980 and further the Zoning Approval which has been granted be allowed to stand without any changes.” Defendants’ Ex. 96. Even assuming, arguendo, that the letter constituted a request for a variance, respondent’s taking claim nevertheless is not ripe. There is no evidence that respondent requested variances from the regulations that formed the basis of the other objections raised by the Commission, such as those regulating the length of cul-de-sacs. Absent a final decision regarding the application of all eight of the Commission’s objections, it is impossible to tell whether the land retained any reasonable beneficial use or whether respondent’s expectation interests had been destroyed. The District Court’s instructions allowed the jury to find a taking if it ascertained that “the regulations in question as applied to [respondent’s] property denied [respondent] economically viable use of its property.” Tr. 2016. That instruction seems to assume that respondent’s taking theory was simply that its property was rendered valueless by the application of new zoning laws and subdivision regulations in 1980. The record indi-gates, however, that respondent’s claim was based upon a state-law theory Of “vested rights,” and that the alleged “taking” was the Commission’s interference with respondent’s “expectation interest” in completing the development according to its original plans. The evidence that it was not economically feasible to develop just the 67 units respondent claims the Commission’s actions would limit it to developing was based upon the cost of building the development according to the original plan. The expected income from the sale of the 67 units apparently was measured against the cost of the 27-hole golf course and the cost of installing water and sewer connections for a large development that would not have had to have been installed for a development of only 67 units. App. 191-197; Tr. 690; see also id., at 2154-2166. Thus, the evidence appears to indicate that it would not be profitable to develop 67 units because respondent had made various expenditures in the expectation that the development would contain far more units; the evidence does not appear to support the proposition that, aside from those “reliance” expenditures, development of 67 units on the property would not be economically feasible. We express no view of the propriety of applying the “economic viability” test when the taking claim is based upon such a theory of “vested rights” or “expectation interest.” Cf. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 66 (1979) (analyzing a claim that Government regulations effected a taking by reducing expected profits). It is sufficient for our purposes to note that whether the “property” taken is viewed as the land itself or respondent’s expectation interest in developing the land as it wished, it is impossible to determine the extent of the loss or interference until the Commission has decided whether it will grant a variance from the application of the regulations. Again, it is necessary to contrast the procedures provided for review of the Commission’s actions, such as those for obtaining a declaratory judgment, see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-14-101 to 29-14-113 (1980), with procedures that allow a property owner to obtain compensation for a taking. Exhaustion of review procedures is not required. See Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496 (1982). As we have explained, however, because the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings without just compensation, no constitutional violation occurs until just compensation has been denied. The nature of the constitutional right therefore requires that a property owner utilize procedures for obtaining compensation before bringing a § 1983 action. The analogy to Parrott is imperfect because Parrott does not extend to situations such as those involved in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422 (1982), in which the deprivation of property is effected pursuant to an established state policy or procedure, and the State could provide predeprivation process. Unlike the Due Process Clause, however, the Just Compensation Clause has never been held to require pretaking process or compensation. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1016 (1984). Nor has the Court ever recognized any interest served by pre-taking compensation that could not be equally well served by post-taking compensation. Under the Due Process Clause, on the other hand, the Court has recognized that predeprivation process is of “obvious value in reaching an accurate decision,” that the “only meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker is likely to be before the [deprivation] takes effect,” Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 543 (1985), and that predeprivation process may serve the purpose of making an individual feel that the government has dealt with him fairly. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 262 (1978). Thus, despite the Court’s holding in Logan, Parratt’s reasoning applies here by analogy because of the special nature of the Just Compensation Clause. See generally P. Bosselman, D. Callies, & J. Banta, The Taking Issue 238-255 (1973); Sterk, Government Liability for Unconstitutional Land Use Regulation, 60 Ind. L. J. 113 (1984); Oakes, “Property Rights” in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 Wash. L. Rev. 583 (1981); Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1057 (1980); Comment, Testing the Constitutional Validity of Land Use Regulations: Substantive Due Process as a Superior Alternative to Takings Analysis, 57 Wash. L. Rev. 715 (1982); Comment, Just Compensation or Just Invalidation: The Availability of a Damages Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 711 (1982); cf. Costonis, “Fair” Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1021 (1975) (proposing that regulation be viewed as neither an exercise of the police power, nor as a taking, but as an exercise of an “accommodation” power, which would require government to offer “fair compensation” for regulation that “goes too far”). In Pennsylvania Coal, homeowners sought to enjoin a coal company from mining coal under their house in violation of Pennsylvania’s Kohler Act, which prohibited the mining of coal that would cause the subsidence of any home or industrial or mercantile establishment. In defense, the coal company argued not that the regulation itself was a “taking” for which just compensation was required, but that ‘.‘[i]f surface support in the anthracite district is necessary for public use, it can constitutionally be acquired only by condemnation with just compensation to the parties affected.” 260 U. S., at 400. The attempt to determine when regulation goes so far that it becomes, literally or figuratively, a “taking” has been called the “lawyer’s equivalent of the physicist’s hunt for the quark.” C. Haar, Land-Use Planning 766 (3d ed. 1976). See generally Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 Rutgers L. J. 15, 20-32 (1983); Stoebuck, supra, at 1059-1079; Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 165 (1974); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L. J. 149 (1971); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1971); Miehelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36 (1964). In light of this disposition, we need not reach the question whether the jury’s verdict that respondent’s expectation interest had been “taken,” see n. 12, supra, can stand in light of the absence of any discussion in the jury instructions about the reasonableness of the alleged expectation interest. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S., at 1005-1006; Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S., at 66. Nor do we need to reach the question whether the jury was properly allowed to determine the economic feasibility of the property, or the extent of interference with respondent’s expectation interests, by reference to only that portion of the development purchased by respondent, rather than by reference to the development as a whole. Cf. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 130 (1978).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RUCKELSHAUS, ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY v. MONSANTO CO. No. 83-196. Argued February 27, 1984 Decided June 26, 1984 Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Liotta, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Walker, Jerrold J. Ganzfried, Raymond N. Zagone, Anne S. Almy, and John A. Bryson. A. Raymond Randolph, Jr., argued the cause for appellee. With him on the briefs were David G. Norrell, Thomas O. Kuhns, W. Wayne Withers, Frederick A. Provorny, Gary S. Dyer, C. David Barrier, and Kenneth R. Heineman Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Association for the Advancement of Science et al. by Thomas O. McGarity; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. by Marsha S. Berzon, Michael Rubin, Laurence Gold, Albert H. Meyerhoff, and J. Albert Woll; for the Pesticide Producers Association et al. by David B. Weinberg and William R. Weissman; and for PPG Industries, Inc., by Thomas H. Truitt, DavidR. Berz, and Jeffrey F. Liss. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Abbott Laboratories et al. by Kenneth W. Weinstein and Lawrence S. Ebner; for the American Chemical Society et al. by William J. Butler, Jr., and Arthur D. McKey; for the American Patent Law Association, Inc., by Donald S. Chisum; for Avco Corp. by Alvin D. Shapiro; for Sathon, Inc., by Ralph E. Brown and Mark E. Singer; for SDS Biotech Corp. et al. by Harold Himmelman and Cynthia A. Lewis; and for Stauffer Chemical Co. by Lawrence S. Ebner, John T. Ronan III, and John W. Behan. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, we are asked to review a United States District Court’s determination that several provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 61 Stat. 163, as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 136 et seq., are unconstitutional. The provisions at issue authorize the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to use data submitted by an applicant for registration of a pesticide in evaluating the application of a subsequent applicant, and to disclose publicly some of the submitted data. Over the past century, the use of pesticides to control weeds and minimize crop damage caused by insects, disease, and animals has become increasingly more important for American agriculture. See S. Rep. No. 95-334, p. 32 (1977); S. Rep. No. 92-838, pp. 3-4, 6-7 (1972); H. R. Rep. No. 92-511, pp. 3-7 (1971). While pesticide use has led to improvements in productivity, it has also led to increased risk of harm to humans and the environment. See S. Rep. No. 92-838, at 3-4, 6-7; H. R. Rep. No. 92-511, at 3-7. Although the Federal Government has regulated pesticide use for nearly 75 years, FIFRA was first adopted in 1947. 61 Stat. 163. As first enacted, FIFRA was primarily a licensing and labeling statute. It required that all pesticides be registered with the Secretary of Agriculture prior to their sale in interstate or foreign commerce. §§ 3(a) and 4(a) of the 1947 Act, 61 Stat. 166-167. The 1947 legislation also contained general standards setting forth the types of information necessary for proper labeling of a registered pesticide, including directions for use; warnings to prevent harm to people, animals, and plants; and claims made about the efficacy of the product. §§2(u)(2) and 3(a)(3). Upon request of the Secretary, an applicant was required to submit test data supporting the claims on the label, including the formula for the pesticide. §§ 4(a) and (b). The 1947 version of FIFRA specifically prohibited disclosure of “any information relative to formulas of products,” §§ 3(c)(4) and 8(c), but was silent with respect to the disclosure of any of the health and safety data submitted with an application. In 1970, the Department of Agriculture’s FIFRA responsibilities were transferred to the then newly created Environmental Protection Agency, whose Administrator is the appellant in this case. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (1970), 5 U. S. C. App., p. 1132. Because of mounting public concern about the safety of pesticides and their effect on the environment and because of a growing perception that the existing legislation was not equal to the task of safeguarding the public interest, see S. Rep. No. 92-838, at 3-9; S. Rep. No. 92-970, p. 9 (1972); H. R. Rep. No. 92-511, at 5-13, Congress undertook a comprehensive revision of FIFRA through the adoption of the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 973. The amendments transformed FIFRA from a labeling law into a comprehensive regulatory statute. H. R. Rep. No. 92-511, at 1. As amended, FIFRA regulated the use, as well as the sale and labeling, of pesticides; regulated pesticides produced and sold in both intrastate and interstate commerce; provided for review, cancellation, and suspension of registration; and gave EPA greater enforcement authority. Congress also added a new criterion for registration: that EPA determine that the pesticide will not cause “unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.” §§ 3(c)(5)(C) and (D), 86 Stat. 980-981. For purposes of this litigation, the most significant of the 1972 amendments pertained to the pesticide-registration procedure and the public disclosure of information learned through that procedure. Congress added to FIFRA a new section governing public disclosure of data submitted in support of an application for registration. Under that section, the submitter of data could designate any portions of the submitted material it believed to be “trade secrets or commercial or financial information.” § 10(a), 86 Stat. 989. Another section prohibited EPA from publicly disclosing information which, in its judgment, contained or related to “trade secrets or commercial or financial information.” § 10(b). In the event that EPA disagreed with a submitter’s designation of certain information as “trade secrets or commercial or financial information” and proposed to disclose that information, the original submitter could institute a declaratory judgment action in federal district court. § 10(c). The 1972 amendments also included a provision that allowed EPA to consider data submitted by one applicant for registration in support of another application pertaining to a similar chemical, provided the subsequent applicant offered to compensate the applicant who originally submitted the data. § 3(c)(1)(D). In effect, the provision instituted a mandatory data-licensing scheme. The amount of compensation was to be negotiated by the parties, or, in the event negotiations failed, was to be determined by EPA, subject to judicial review upon the instigation of the original data submitter. The scope of the 1972 data-consideration provision, however, was limited, for any data designated as “trade secrets or commercial or financial information” exempt from disclosure under § 10 could not be considered at all by EPA to support another registration application unless the original submitter consented. Ibid. The 1972 amendments did not specify standards for the designation of submitted data as “trade secrets or commercial or financial information.” In addition, Congress failed to designate an effective date for the data-consideration and disclosure schemes. In 1975, Congress amended § 3(c)(1)(D) to provide that the data-consideration and data-disclosure provisions applied only to data submitted on or after January 1, 1970, 89 Stat. 755, but left the definitional question unanswered. Much litigation centered around the definition of “trade secrets or commercial or financial information” for the purposes of the data-consideration and data-disclosure provisions of FIFRA. EPA maintained that the exemption from consideration or disclosure applied only to a narrow range of information, principally statements of formulae and manufacturing processes. In a series of lawsuits, however, data-submitting firms challenged EPA’s interpretation and obtained several decisions to the effect that the term “trade secrets” applied to any data, including health, safety, and environmental data, that met the definition of trade secrets set forth in Restatement of Torts §757 (1939). See, e. g., Mobay Chemical Cory. v. Costle, 447 F. Supp. 811 (WD Mo. 1978); Chevron Chemical Co. v. Costle, 443 F. Supp. 1024 (ND Cal. 1978). These decisions prevented EPA from disclosing much of the data on which it based its decision to register pesticides and from considering the data submitted by one applicant in reviewing the application of a later applicant. See S. Rep. No. 95-334, at 7; H. R. Rep. No. 95-663, p. 18. (1977). Because of these and other problems with the regulatory scheme embodied in FIFRA as amended in 1972, see S. Rep. No. 95-334, at 2-5; H. R. Rep. No. 95-663, at 15-21; see generally EPA Office of Pesticide Programs, FIFRA: Impact on the Industry (1977), reprinted in S. Rep. No. 95-334, at 34-68, Congress enacted other amendments to FIFRA in 1978. These were effected by the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 819. The new amendments included a series of revisions in the data-consideration and data-disclosure provisions of FIFRA’s §§3 and 10, 7 U. S. C. §§ 136a and 136h. Under FIFRA, as amended in 1978, applicants are granted a 10-year period of exclusive use for data on new active ingredients contained in pesticides registered after September 30, 1978. § 3(c)(l)(D)(i). All other data submitted after December 31, 1969, may be cited and considered in support of another application for 15 years after the original submission if the applicant offers to compensate the original submitter. § 3(c)(l)(D)(ii). If the parties cannot agree on the amount of compensation, either may initiate a binding arbitration proceeding. The results of the arbitration proceeding are not subject to judicial review, absent fraud or misrepresentation. The same statute provides that an original submitter who refuses to participate in negotiations or in the arbitration proceeding forfeits his claim for compensation. Data that do not qualify for either the 10-year period of exclusive use or the 15-year period of compensation may be considered by EPA without limitation. § 3(c)(l)(D)(iii). Also in 1978, Congress added a new subsection, § 10(d), 7 U. S. C. § 136h(d), that provides for disclosure of all health, safety, and environmental data to qualified requesters, notwithstanding the prohibition against disclosure of trade secrets contained in § 10(b). The provision, however, does not authorize disclosure of information that would reveal “manufacturing or quality control processes” or certain details about deliberately added inert ingredients unless “the Administrator has first determined that the disclosure is necessary to protect against an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.” §§ 10(d)(1)(A) to (C). EPA may not disclose data to representatives of foreign or multinational pesticide companies unless the original submitter of the data consents to the disclosure. § 10(g). Another subsection establishes a criminal penalty for wrongful disclosure by a Government employee or contractor of confidential or trade secret data. § 10(f). l — l HH Appellee Monsanto Company (Monsanto) is an inventor, developer, and producer of various kinds of chemical products, including pesticides. Monsanto, headquartered in St. Louis County, Mo., sells in both domestic and foreign markets. It is one of a relatively small group of companies that invent and develop new active ingredients for pesticides and conduct most of the research and testing with respect to those ingredients. These active ingredients are sometimes referred to as “manufacturing-use products” because they are not generally sold directly to users of pesticides. Rather, they must first be combined with “inert ingredients” — chemicals that dissolve, dilute, or stabilize the active components. The results of this process are sometimes called “end-use products,” and the firms that produce end-use products are called “formulators.” See the opinion of the District Court in this case, Monsanto Co. v. Acting Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency, 564 F. Supp. 552, 554 (ED Mo. 1983). A firm that produces an active ingredient may use it for incorporation into its own end-use products, may sell it to formulators, or may do both. Monsanto produces both active ingredients and end-use products. Ibid. The District Court found that development of a potential commercial pesticide candidate typically requires the expenditure of $5 million to $15 million annually for several years. The development process may take between 14 and 22 years, and it is usually that long before a company can expect any return on its investment. Id., at 555. For every manufacturing-use pesticide the average company finally markets, it will have screened and tested 20,000 others. Monsanto has a significantly better-than-average success rate; it successfully markets 1 out of every 10,000 chemicals tested. Ibid. Monsanto, like any other applicant for registration of a pesticide, must present research and test data supporting its application. The District Court found that Monsanto had incurred costs in excess of $23.6 million in developing the health, safety, and environmental data submitted by it under FIFRA. Id., at 560. The information submitted with an application usually has value to Monsanto beyond its instrumentality in gaining that particular application. Monsanto uses this information to develop additional end-use products and to expand the uses of its registered products. The information would also be valuable to Monsanto’s competitors. For that reason, Monsanto has instituted stringent security measures to ensure the secrecy of the data. Ibid. It is this health, safety, and environmental data that Monsanto sought to protect by bringing this suit. The District Court found that much of these data “contai[n] or relat[e] to trade secrets as defined by the Restatement of Torts and Confidential, commercial information.” Id., at 562. Monsanto brought suit in District Court, seeking injunc-tive and declaratory relief from the operation of the data-consideration provisions of FIFRA’s § 3(c)(1)(D), and the data-disclosure provisions of FIFRA’s § 10 and the related § 3(c)(2)(A). Monsanto alleged that all of the challenged provisions effected a “taking” of property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In addition, Monsanto alleged that the data-consideration provisions violated the Amendment because they effected a taking of property for a private, rather than a public, purpose. Finally, Monsanto alleged that the arbitration scheme provided by § 3(c)(l)(D)(ii) violates the original submitter’s due process rights and constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power. After a bench trial, the District Court concluded that Monsanto possessed property rights in its submitted data, specifically including the right to exclude others from the enjoyment of such data by preventing their unauthorized use and by prohibiting their disclosure. 564 F. Supp., at 566. The court found that the challenged data-consideration provisions “give Monsanto’s competitors a free ride at Monsanto’s expense.” Ibid. The District Court reasoned that § 3(c)(1)(D) appropriated Monsanto’s fundamental right to exclude, and that the effect of that appropriation is substantial. The court further found that Monsanto’s property was being appropriated for a private purpose and that this interference was much more significant than the public good that the appropriation might serve. 564 F. Supp., at 566-567. The District Court also found that operation of the disclosure provisions of FIFRA constituted a taking of Monsanto’s property. The cost incurred by Monsanto when its property is “permanently committed to the public domain and thus effectively destroyed” was viewed by the District Court as significantly outweighing any benefit to the general public from having the ability to scrutinize the data, for the court seemed to believe that the general public could derive all the assurance it needed about the safety and effectiveness of a pesticide from EPA’s decision to register the product and to approve the label. Id., at 567, and n. 4. After finding that the data-consideration provisions operated to effect a taking of property, the District Court found that the compulsory binding-arbitration scheme set forth in § 3(c)(l)(D)(ii) did not adequately provide compensation for the property taken. The court found the arbitration provision to be arbitrary and vague, reasoning that the statute does not give arbitrators guidance as to the factors that enter into the concept of just compensation, and that judicial review is foreclosed except in cases of fraud. 564 F. Supp., at 567. The District Court also found that the arbitration scheme was infirm because it did not meet the requirements of Art. Ill of the Constitution. Ibid. Finally, the court found that a remedy under the Tucker Act was not available for the deprivations of property effected by §§ 3 and 10. 564 F. Supp., at 567-568. The District Court therefore declared §§ 3(c)(1)(D), 3(c)(2)(A), 10(b), and 10(d) of FIFRA, as amended by the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, to be unconstitutional, and permanently enjoined EPA from implementing or enforcing those sections. See Amended Judgment, App. to Juris. Statement 41a. We noted probable jurisdiction. 464 U. S. 890 (1983). f — H > — 4 I — I In deciding this case, we are faced with four questions: (1) Does Monsanto have a property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause in the health, safety, and environmental data it has submitted to EPA? (2) If so, does EPA’s use of the data to evaluate the applications of others or EPA’s disclosure of the data to qualified members of the public effect a taking of that property interest? (3) If there is a taking, is it a taking for a public use? (4) If there is a taking for a public use, does the statute adequately provide for just compensation? For purposes of this case, EPA has stipulated that “Monsanto has certain property rights in its information, research and test data that it has submitted under FIFRA to EPA and its predecessor agencies which may be protected by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” App. 36. Since the exact import of that stipulation is not clear, we address the question whether the data at issue here can be considered property for the purposes of the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment. This Court never has squarely addressed the applicability of the protections of the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment to commercial data of the kind involved in this case. In answering the question now, we are mindful of the basic axiom that ‘“[pjroperty interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.’” Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U. S. 155, 161 (1980), quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972). Monsanto asserts that the health, safety, and environmental data it has submitted to EPA are property under Missouri law, which recognizes trade secrets, as defined in § 757, Comment b, of the Restatement of Torts, as property. See Reddi-Wip, Inc. v. Lemay Valve Co., 354 S. W. 2d 913, 917 (Mo. App. 1962); Harrington v. National Outdoor Advertising Co., 355 Mo. 524, 532, 196 S. W. 2d 786, 791 (1946); Luckett v. Orange Julep Co., 271 Mo. 289, 302-304, 196 S. W. 740, 743 (1917). The Restatement defines a trade secret as “any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.” §757, Comment b. And the parties have stipulated that much of the information, research, and test data that Monsanto has submitted under FIFRA to EPA “contains or relates to trade secrets as defined by the Restatement of Torts.” App. 36. Because of the intangible nature of a trade secret, the extent of the property right therein is defined by the extent to which the owner of the secret protects his interest from disclosure to others. See Harrington, supra; Reddi-Wip, supra; Restatement of Torts, supra; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U. S. 470, 474-476 (1974). Information that is public knowledge or that is generally known in an industry cannot be a trade secret. Restatement of Torts, supra. If an individual discloses his trade secret to others who are under no obligation to protect the confidentiality of the information, or otherwise publicly discloses the secret, his property right is extinguished. See Harrington, supra; 1 R. Milgrim, Trade Secrets § 1.01[2] (1983). Trade secrets have many of the characteristics of more tangible forms of property. A trade secret is assignable. See, e. g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 401-402 (1911); Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F. 2d 216, 225 (CA2 1971). A trade secret can form the res of a trust, Restatement (Second) of Trusts §82, Comment e (1959); 1 A. Scott, Law of Trusts §82.5, p. 703 (3d ed. 1967), and it passes to a trustee in bankruptcy. See In re Uniservices, Inc., 517 F. 2d 492, 496-497 (CA7 1975). Even the manner in which Congress referred to trade secrets in the legislative history of FIFRA supports the general perception of their property-like nature. In discussing the 1978 amendments to FIFRA, Congress recognized that data developers like Monsanto have a “proprietary interest” in their data. S. Rep. No. 95-334, at 31. Further, Congress reasoned that submitters of data are “entitled” to “compensation” because they “have legal ownership of the data.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1560, p. 29 (1978). This general perception of trade secrets as property is consonant with a notion of “property” that extends beyond land and tangible goods and includes the products of an individual’s “labour and invention.” 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *405; see generally J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government, ch. 5 (J. Gough ed. 1947). Although this Court never has squarely addressed the question whether a person can have a property interest in a trade secret, which is admittedly intangible, the Court has found other kinds of intangible interests to be property for purposes of the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause. See, e. g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 44, 46 (1960) (materialman’s lien provided for under Maine law protected by Taking Clause); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 596-602 (1935) (real estate lien protected); Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571, 579 (1934) (valid contracts are property within meaning of the Taking Clause). That intangible property rights protected by state law are deserving of the protection of the Taking Clause has long been implicit in the thinking of this Court: “It is conceivable that [the term ‘property’ in the Taking Clause] was used in its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law. On the other hand, it may have been employed in a more accurate sense to denote the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it. In point of fact, the construction given the phrase has been the latter.” United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 377-378 (1945). We therefore hold that to the extent that Monsanto has an interest in its health, safety, and environmental data cognizable as a trade-secret property right under Missouri law, that property right is protected by the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment. > HH Having determined that Monsanto has a property interest in the data it has submitted to EPA, we confront the difficult question whether a “taking” will occur when EPA discloses those data or considers the data in evaluating another application for registration. The question of what constitutes a “taking” is one with which this Court has wrestled on many occasions. It has never been the rule that only governmental acquisition or destruction of the property of an individual constitutes a taking, for “courts have held that the deprivation of the former owner rather than the accretion of a right or interest to the sovereign constitutes the taking. Governmental action short of acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, if its effects are so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter, to amount to a taking.” United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S., at 378. See also PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74 (1980); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922). As has been admitted on numerous occasions, “this Court has generally ‘been unable to develop any “set formula” for determining when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries caused by public action’” must be deemed a compensable taking. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 175 (1979), quoting Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978); accord, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 295 (1981). The inquiry into whether a taking has occurred is essentially an “ad hoc, factual” inquiry. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U. S., at 175. The Court, however, has identified several factors that should be taken into account when determining whether a governmental action has gone beyond “regulation” and effects a “taking.” Among those factors are: “the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations.” PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S., at 83; see Kaiser Aetna, 444 U. S., at 175; Penn Central, 438 U. S., at 124. It is to the last of these three factors that we now direct our attention, for we find that the force of this factor is so overwhelming, at least with respect to certain of the data submitted by Monsanto to EPA, that it disposes of the taking question regarding those data. A A “reasonable investment-backed expectation” must be more than a “unilateral expectation or an abstract need.” Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U. S., at 161. We find that with respect to any health, safety, and environmental data that Monsanto submitted to EPA after the effective date of the 1978 FIFRA amendments — that is, on or after October 1, 1978 — Monsanto could not have had a reasonable, investment-backed expectation that EPA would keep the data confidential beyond the limits prescribed in the amended statute itself. Monsanto was on notice of the manner in which EPA was authorized to use and disclose any data turned over to it by an applicant for registration. Thus, with respect to any data submitted to EPA on or after October 1, 1978, Monsanto knew that, for a period of 10 years from the date of submission, EPA would not consider those data in evaluating the application of another without Monsanto’s permission. § 3(c)(l)(D)(i). It was also aware, however, that once the 10-year period had expired, EPA could use the data without Monsanto’s permission. §§ 3(c)(l)(D)(ii) and (iii). Monsanto was further aware that it was entitled to an offer of compensation from the subsequent applicant only until the end of the 15th year from the date of submission. § 3(c)(l)(D)(iii). In addition, Monsanto was aware that information relating to formulae of products could be revealed by EPA to “any Federal agency consulted and [could] be revealed at a public hearing or in findings of fact” issued by EPA “when necessary to carry out” EPA’s duties under FIFRA. § 10(b). The statute also gave Monsanto notice that much of the health, safety, and efficacy data provided by it could be disclosed to the general public at any time. § 10(d). If, despite the data-consideration and data-disclosure provisions in the statute, Monsanto chose to submit the requisite data in order to receive a registration, it can hardly argue that its reasonable investment-backed expectations are disturbed when EPA acts to use or disclose the data in a manner that was authorized by law at the time of the submission. Monsanto argues that the statute’s requirement that a submitter give up its property interest in the data constitutes placing an unconstitutional condition on the right to a valuable Government benefit. See Brief for Appellee 29. But Monsanto has not challenged the ability of the Federal Government to regulate the marketing and use of pesticides. Nor could Monsanto successfully make such a challenge, for such restrictions are the burdens we all must bear in exchange for “ ‘the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community.’” Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 67 (1979), quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S., at 422 (Brandéis, J., dissenting); see Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, 424 (1952). This is particularly true in an area, such as pesticide sale and use, that has long been the source of public concern and the subject of government regulation. That Monsanto is willing to bear this burden in exchange for the ability to market pesticides in this country is evidenced by the fact that it has continued to expand its research and development and to submit data to EPA despite the enactment of the 1978 amendments to FIFRA. 564 F. Supp., at 561. Thus, as long as Monsanto is aware of the conditions under which the data are submitted, and the conditions are rationally related to a legitimate Government interest, a voluntary submission of data by an applicant in exchange for the economic advantages of a registration can hardly be called a taking. See Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy, 249 U. S. 427, 431-432 (1919) (“The right of a manufacturer to maintain secrecy as to his compounds and processes must be held subject to the right of the State, in the exercise of its police power and in promotion of fair dealing, to require that the nature of the product be fairly set forth”); see also Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 555 F. 2d 82, 95 (CA3 1977). B Prior to the 1972 amendments, FIFRA was silent with respect to EPA’s authorized use and disclosure of data submitted to it in connection with an application for registration. Another statute, the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1905, however, arguably is relevant. That Act is a general criminal statute that provides a penalty for any employee of the United States Government who discloses, in a manner not authorized by law, any trade-secret information that is revealed to him during the course of his official duties. This Court has determined that § 1905 is more than an “antileak” statute aimed at deterring Government employees from profiting by information they receive in their official capacities. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U. S. 281, 298-301 (1979). Rather, §1905 also applies to formal agency action, i. e., action approved by the agency or department head. Ibid. It is true that, prior to the 1972 amendments, neither FIFRA nor any other provision of law gave EPA authority to disclose data obtained from Monsanto. But the Trade Secrets Act is not a guarantee of confidentiality to submitters of data, and, absent an express promise, Monsanto had no reasonable, investment-backed expectation that its information would remain inviolate in the hands of EPA. In an industry that long has been the focus of great public concern and significant government regulation, the possibility was substantial that the Federal Government, which had thus far taken no position on disclosure of health, safety, and environmental data concerning pesticides, upon focusing on the issue, would find disclosure to be in the public interest. Thus, with respect to data submitted to EPA in connection with an application for registration prior to October 22, 1972, the Trade Secrets Act provided no basis for a reasonable investment-backed expectation that data submitted to EPA would remain confidential. A fortiori, the Trade Secrets Act cannot be construed as any sort of assurance against internal agency use of submitted data during consideration of the application of a subsequent applicant for registration. Indeed, there is some evidence that the practice of using data submitted by one company during consideration of the application of a subsequent applicant was widespread and well known. Thus, with respect to any data that Monsanto submitted to EPA prior to the effective date of the 1972 amendments to FIFRA, we hold that Monsanto could not have had a “reasonable investment-backed expectation” that EPA would maintain those data in strictest confidence and would use them exclusively for the purpose of considering the Monsanto application in connection with which the data were submitted. C The situation may be different, however, with respect to data submitted by Monsanto to EPA during the period from October 22, 1972, through September 30, 1978. Under the statutory scheme then in effect, a submitter was given an opportunity to protect its trade secrets from disclosure by designating them as trade secrets at the time of submission. When Monsanto provided data to EPA during this period, it was with the understanding, embodied in FIFRA, that EPA was free to use any of the submitted data that were not trade secrets in considering the application of another, provided that EPA required the subsequent applicant to pay “reasonable compensation” to the original submitter. § 3(c)(1)(D), 86 Stat. 979. But the statute also gave Monsanto explicit assurance that EPA was prohibited from disclosing publicly, or considering in connection with the application of another, any data submitted by an applicant if both the applicant and EPA determined the data to constitute trade secrets. § 10, 86 Stat. 989. Thus, with respect to trade secrets submitted under the statutory regime in force between the time of the adoption of the 1972 amendments and the adoption of the 1978 amendments, the Federal Government had explicitly guaranteed to Monsanto and other registration applicants an extensive measure of confidentiality and exclusive use. This explicit governmental guarantee formed the basis of a reasonable investment-backed expectation. If EPA, consistent with the authority granted it by the 1978 FIFRA amendments, were now to disclose trade-secret data or consider those data in evaluating the application of a subsequent applicant in a manner not authorized by the version of FIFRA in effect between 1972 and 1978, EPA’s actions would frustrate Monsanto’s reasonable investment-backed expectation with respect to its control over the use and dissemination of the data it had submitted. The right to exclude others is generally “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.” Kaiser Aetna, 444 U. S., at 176. With respect to a trade secret, the right to exclude others is central to the very definition of the property interest. Once the data that constitute a trade secret are disclosed to others, or others are allowed to use those data, the holder of the trade secret has lost his property interest in the data. That the data retain usefulness for Monsanto even after they are disclosed — for example, as bases from which to develop new products or refine old products, as marketing and advertising tools, or as information necessary to obtain registration in foreign countries — is irrelevant to the determination of the economic impact of the EPA action on Monsanto’s property right. The economic value of that property right lies in the competitive advantage over others that Monsanto enjoys by virtue of its exclusive access to the data, and disclosure or use by others of the data would destroy that competitive edge. EPA encourages us to view the situation not as a taking of Monsanto’s property interest in the trade secrets, but as a “pre-emption” of whatever property rights Monsanto may have had in those trade secrets. Brief for Appellant 27-2§. The agency argues that the proper functioning of the comprehensive FIFRA registration scheme depends upon its uniform application to all data. Thus, it is said, the Supremacy Clause dictates that the scheme not vary depending on the property law of the State in which the submitter is located. Id., at 28. This argument proves too much. If Congress can “pre-empt” state property law in the manner advocated by EPA, then the Taking Clause has lost all vitality. This Court has stated that a sovereign, “by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation .... This is the very kind of thing that the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent.” Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U. S., at 164. If a negotiation or arbitration pursuant to § 3(c)(l)(D)(ii) were to yield just compensation to Monsanto for the loss in the market value of its trade-secret data suffered because of EPA’s consideration of the data in connection with another application, then Monsanto would have no claim against the Government for a taking. Since no arbitration has yet occurred with respect to any use of Monsanto’s data, any finding that there has been an actual taking would be premature. See infra, at 1019-1020. In summary, we hold that EPA’s consideration or disclosure of data submitted by Monsanto to the agency prior to October 22,1972, or after September 30,1978, does not effect a taking. We further hold that EPA consideration or disclosure of health, safety, and environmental data will constitute a taking if Monsanto submitted the data to EPA between October 22, 1972, and September 30, 1978; the data constituted trade secrets under Missouri law; Monsanto had designated the data as trade secrets at the time of its submission; the use or disclosure conflicts with the explicit assurance of confidentiality or exclusive use contained in the statute during that period; and the operation of the arbitration provision does not adequately compensate for the loss in market value of the data that Monsanto suffers because of EPA’s use or disclosure of the trade secrets. V We must next consider whether any taking of private property that may occur by operation of the data-disclosure and data-consideration provisions of FIFRA is a taking for a “public use.” We have recently stated that the scope of the “public use” requirement of the Taking Clause is “coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.” Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, ante, at 240; see Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 33 (1954). The role of the courts in second-guessing the legislature’s judgment of what constitutes a public use is extremely narrow. Midkiff, supra; Berman, supra, at 32. The District Court found that EPA’s action pursuant to the data-consideration provisions of FIFRA would effect a taking for a private use, rather than a public use, because such action benefits subsequent applicants by forcing original submitters to share their data with later applicants. 564 F. Supp., at 566. It is true that the most direct beneficiaries of EPA actions under the data-consideration provisions of FIFRA will be the later applicants who will support their applications by citation to data submitted by Monsanto or some other original submitter. Because of the data-consideration provisions, later applicants will not have to replicate the sometimes intensive and complex research necessary to produce the requisite data. This Court, however, has rejected the notion that a use is a public use only if the property taken is put to use for the general public. Midkiff, ante, at 243-244; Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U. S. 700, 707 (1923); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 155 (1921). So long as the taking has a conceivable public character, “the means by which it will be attained is . . . for Congress to determine.” Berman, 348 U. S., at 33. Here, the public purpose behind the data-consideration provisions is clear from the legislative history. Congress believed that the provisions would eliminate costly duplication of research and streamline the registration process, making new end-use products available to consumers more quickly. Allowing applicants for registration, upon payment of compensation, to use data already accumulated by others, rather than forcing them to go through the time-consuming process of repeating the research, would eliminate a significant barrier to entry into the pesticide market, thereby allowing greater competition among producers of end-use products. S. Rep. No. 95-334, at 30-31, 40-41; 124 Cong. Rec. 29756-29757 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Leahy). Such a procompetitive purpose is well within the police power of Congress. See Midkiff, ante, at 241-242. Because the data-disclosure provisions of FIFRA provide for disclosure to the general public, the District Court did not find that those provisions constituted a taking for a private use. Instead, the court found that the data-disclosure provisions served no use. It reasoned that because ERA, before registration, must determine that a product is safe and effective, and because the label on a pesticide, by statute, must set forth the nature, contents, and purpose of the pesticide, the label provided the public with all the assurance it needed that the product is safe and effective. 564 F. Supp., at 567, and n. 4. It is enough for us to state that the optimum amount of disclosure to the public is for Congress, not the courts, to decide, and that the statute embodies Congress’ judgment on that question. See 123 Cong. Rec., at 25706 (remarks of Sen. Leahy). We further observe, however, that public disclosure can provide an effective check on the decisionmaking processes of EPA and allows members of the public to determine the likelihood of individualized risks peculiar to their use of the product. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-343, p. 8 (1977) (remarks of Douglas M. Costle); S. Rep. No. 95-334, at 13. We therefore hold that any taking of private property that may occur in connection with EPA’s use or disclosure of data submitted to it by Monsanto between October 22, 1972, and September 30, 1978, is a taking for a public use. VI Equitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to the taking. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 697, n. 18 (1949). The Fifth Amendment does not require that compensation precede the taking. Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U. S. 95, 104 (1932). Generally, an individual claiming that the United States has taken his property can seek just compensation under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491. United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 267 (1946) (“If there is a taking, the claim is ‘founded upon the Constitution’ and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine”); Yearsley v. Ross Construction Co., 309 U. S. 18, 21 (1940). In this case, however, the District Court enjoined EPA action under the data-consideration and data-disclosure provisions of FIFRA, finding that a Tucker Act remedy is not available for any taking of property that may occur as a result of the operation of those provisions. We do not agree with the District Court’s assessment that no Tucker Act remedy will lie for whatever taking may occur due to EPA activity pursuant to FIFRA. In determining whether a Tucker Act remedy is available for claims arising out of a taking pursuant to a federal statute, the proper inquiry is not whether the statute “expresses an affirmative showing of congressional intent to permit recourse to a Tucker Act remedy,” but “whether Congress has in the [statute] withdrawn the Tucker Act grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to hear a suit involving the [statute] ‘founded . . . upon the Constitution.’” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 126 (1974) (emphasis in original). Nowhere in FIFRA or in its legislative history is there discussion of the interaction between FIFRA and the Tucker Act. Since the Tucker Act grants what is now the Claims Court “jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded . . . upon the Constitution,” we would have to infer a withdrawal of jurisdiction with respect to takings under FIFRA from the structure of the statute or from its legislative history. A withdrawal of jurisdiction would amount to a partial repeal of the Tucker Act. This Court has recognized, however, that “repeals by implication are disfavored.” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S., at 133. See, e. g., Amell v. United States, 384 U. S. 158, 165-166 (1966); Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 565 (1963); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198-199 (1939). Monsanto argues that FIFRA’s provision that an original submitter of data who fails to participate in a procedure for reaching an agreement or in an arbitration proceeding, or fails to comply with the terms of an agreement or arbitration decision, “shall forfeit the right to compensation for the use of the data in support of the application,” § 3(c)(1)(D)(ii), indicates Congress’ intent that there be no Tucker Act remedy. But where two statutes are “ ‘capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.’” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S., at 183-134, quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974). Here, contrary to Monsanto’s claim, it is entirely possible for the Tucker Act and FIFRA to co-exist. The better interpretation, therefore, of the FIFRA language on forfeiture, which gives force to both the Tucker Act and the FIFRA provision, is to read FIFRA as implementing an exhaustion requirement as a precondition to a Tucker Act claim. That is, FIFRA does not withdraw the possibility of a Tucker Act remedy, but merely requires that a claimant first seek satisfaction through the statutory procedure. Cf. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S., at 154-156 (viewing Tucker Act remedy as covering any shortfall between statutory remedy and just compensation). With respect to data disclosure to the general public, FIFRA provides for no compensation whatsoever. Thus, Monsanto’s argument that Congress intended the compensation scheme provided in FIFRA to be exclusive has no relevance to the data-disclosure provisions of § 10. Congress in FIFRA did not address the liability of the Government to pay just compensation should a taking occur. Congress’ failure specifically to mention or provide for recourse against the Government may reflect a congressional belief that use of data by EPA in the ways authorized by FIFRA effects no Fifth Amendment taking or it may reflect Congress’ assumption that the general grant of jurisdiction under the Tucker Act would provide the necessary remedy for any taking that may occur. In any event, the failure cannot be construed to reflect an unambiguous intention to withdraw the Tucker Act remedy. “[WJhether or not the United States so intended,” any taking claim under FIFRA is one “founded . . . upon the Constitution,” and is thus remediable under the Tucker Act. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S., at 126. Therefore, where the operation of the data-consideration and data-disclosure provisions of FIFRA effect a taking of property belonging to Monsanto, an adequate remedy for the taking exists under the Tucker Act. The District Court erred in enjoining the taking. VII Because we hold that the Tucker Act is available as a remedy for any uncompensated taking Monsanto may suffer as a result of the operation of the challenged provisions of FIFRA, we conclude that Monsanto’s challenges to the constitutionality of the arbitration and compensation scheme are not ripe for our resolution. Because of the availability of the Tucker Act, Monsanto’s ability to obtain just compensation does not depend solely on the validity of the statutory compensation scheme. The operation of the arbitration procedure affects only Monsanto’s ability to vindicate its statutory right to obtain compensation from a subsequent applicant whose registration application relies on data originally submitted by Monsanto, not its ability to vindicate its constitutional right to just compensation. Monsanto did not allege or establish that it had been injured by actual arbitration under the statute. While the District Court acknowledged that Monsanto had received several offers of compensation from applicants for registration, 564 F. Supp., at 561, it did not find that EPA had considered Monsanto’s data in considering another application. Further, Monsanto and any subsequent applicant may negotiate and reach agreement concerning an outstanding offer. If they do not reach agreement, then the controversy must go to arbitration. Only after EPA has considered data submitted by Monsanto in evaluating another application and an arbitrator has made an award will Monsanto’s claims with respect to the constitutionality of the arbitration scheme become ripe. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 81 (1978); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S., at 138. VIII We find no constitutional infirmity in the challenged provisions of FIFRA. Operation of the provisions may effect a taking with respect to certain health, safety, and environmental data constituting trade secrets under state law and designated by Monsanto as trade secrets upon submission to EPA between October 22, 1972, and September 30, 1978. But whatever taking may occur is one for a public use, and a Tucker Act remedy is available to provide Monsanto with just compensation. Once a taking has occurred, the proper forum for Monsanto’s claim is the Claims Court. Monsanto’s challenges to the constitutionality of the arbitration procedure are not yet ripe for review. The judgment of the District Court is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. For purposes of our discussion of PIFRA, the term “pesticides” includes herbicides, insecticides, fungicides, rodenticides, and plant regulators. See §§2(t) and (u) of FIFRA, as amended, 7 U. S. C. §§136(t) and (u). The first federal legislation in this area was the Insecticide Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 331, which made it unlawful to manufacture and sell insecticides that were adulterated or misbranded. In 1947, the 1910 legislation was repealed and replaced with FIFRA. 61 Stat. 172. Some States had undertaken to regulate pesticide use before there was federal legislation, and many more continued to do so after federal legislation was enacted. In 1946, the Council of State Governments recommended for adoption a model state statute, the Uniform State Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. See S. Rep. No. 92-838, p. 7 (1972); H. R. Rep. No. 313, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1947). Appellant here concedes, however, that as a matter of practice, the Department of Agriculture did not publicly disclose the health and safety information. Brief for Appellant 5, n. 5. Section 3(c)(1)(D), 92 Stat. 820-822, 7 U. S. C. § 136a(c)(l)(D), reads in relevant part: “(i) With respect to pesticides containing active ingredients that are initially registered under this Act after [September 30,1978], data submitted to support the application for the original registration of the pesticide, or an application for an amendment adding any new use to the registration and that pertains solely to such new use, shall not, without the written permission of the original data submitter, be considered by the Administrator to support an application by another person during a period of ten years following the date the Administrator first registers the pesticide . . . ; “(ii) except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (D)(i) of this paragraph, with respect to data submitted after December 31, 1969, by an applicant or registrant to support an application for registration, experimental use permit, or amendment adding a new use to an existing registration, to support or maintain in effect an existing registration, or for reregistration, the Administrator may, without the permission of the original data submitter, consider any such item of data in support of an application by any other person . . . within the fifteen-year period following the date the data were originally submitted only if the applicant has made an offer to compensate the original data submitter and submitted such offer to the Administrator accompanied by evidence of delivery to the original data submitter of the offer. The terms and amount of compensation may be fixed by agreement between the original data submitter and the applicant, or, failing such agreement, binding arbitration under this subparagraph. If, at the end of ninety days after the date of delivery to the original data submitter of the offer to compensate, the original data submitter and the applicant have neither agreed on the amount and terms of compensation nor on a procedure for reaching an agreement on the amount and terms of compensation, either person may initiate binding arbitration proceedings by requesting the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to appoint an arbitrator from the roster of arbitrators maintained by such Service. . . . [T]he findings and determination of the arbitrator shall be final and conclusive, and no official or court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such findings and determination, except for fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct by one of the parties to the arbitration or the arbitrator where there is a verified complaint with supporting affidavits attesting to specific instances of such fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct. ... If the Administrator determines that an original data submitter has failed to participate in a procedure for reaching an agreement or in an arbitration proceeding as required by this subpara-graph, or failed to comply with the terms of an agreement or arbitration decision concerning compensation under this subparagraph, the original data submitter shall forfeit the right to compensation for the use of the data in support of the application. . . . Registration action by the Administrator shall not be delayed pending the fixing of compensation; “(in) after expiration of any period of exclusive use and any period for which compensation is required for the use of an item of data under sub-paragraphs (D)(i) and (D)(ii) of this paragraph, the Administrator may consider such item of data in support of an application by any other applicant without the permission of the original data submitter and without an offer having been received to compensate the original data submitter for the use of such item of data.” Section 10(d), 92 Stat. 830, reads in relevant part: “(1) All information concerning the objectives, methodology, results, or significance of any test or experiment performed on or with a registered or previously registered pesticide or its separate ingredients, impurities, or degradation products and any information concerning the effects of such pesticide on any organism or the behavior of such pesticide in the environment, including, but not limited to, data on safety to fish and wildlife, humans, and other mammals, plants, animals, and soil, and studies on persistence, translocation and fate in the environment, and metabolism, shall be available for disclosure to the public: Provided, That the use of such data for any registration purpose shall be governed by section 3 of this Act: Provided further, That this paragraph does not authorize the disclosure of any information that— “(A) discloses manufacturing or quality control processes, “(B) discloses the details of any methods for testing, detecting, or measuring the quantity of any deliberately added inert ingredients of a pesticide, or “(C) discloses the identity or percentage quantity of any deliberately added inert ingredient of a pesticide, unless the Administrator has first determined that disclosure is necessary to protect against an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment. “(2) Information concerning production, distribution, sale, or inventories of a pesticide that is otherwise entitled to confidential treatment under subsection (b) of this section may be publicly disclosed in connection with a public proceeding to determine whether a pesticide, or any ingredient of a pesticide, causes unreasonable adverse effects on health or the environment, if the Administrator determines that such disclosure is necessary in the public interest.” A study by the Office of Pesticide Programs of the EPA showed that in 1977 approximately 400 firms were registered to produce manufacturing-use products. S. Rep. No. 95-334, p. 34 (1977). It was estimated that the 10 largest firms account for 75% of this country’s pesticide production. Id., at 60. A correspondingly small number of new pesticides are marketed each year. In 1974, only 10 new pesticides were introduced. See Goring, The Costs of Commercializing Pesticides, International Conference of Entomology, Aug. 20, 1976, reprinted in Hearings on Extension of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodentieide Act before the Subcommittee on Agricultural Research and General Legislation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 250, 254 (1977). The District Court’s judgment in this case is in conflict with the holdings of other federal courts. See, e. g., Petrolite Corp. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 519 F. Supp. 966 (DC 1981); Mobay Chemical Corp. v. Costle, 517 F. Supp. 252, and 517 F. Supp. 254 (WD Pa. 1981), aff’d sub nom. Mobay Chemical Co. v. Gorsuch, 682 F. 2d 419 (CA3), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 988 (1982); Chevron Chemical Co. v. Costle, 499 F. Supp. 732 (Del. 1980), aff’d, 641 F. 2d 104 (CA3), cert. denied, 452 U. S. 961 (1981). Of course, it was not necessary that Congress recognize the data at issue here as property in order for the data to be protected by the Taking Clause. We mention the legislative history merely as one more illustration of the general perception of the property-like nature of trade secrets. Contrary to EPA's contention, Brief for Appellant 29, Justice Holmes’ dictum in E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U. S. 100 (1917), does not undermine our holding that a trade secret is property protected by the Fifth Amendment Taking Clause. Masland arose from a dispute about the disclosure of trade secrets during preparation for a trial. In his opinion for the Court, the Justice stated: “The case has been considered as presenting a conflict between a right of property and a right to make a full defence, and it is said that if the disclosure is forbidden to one who denies that there is a trade secret, the merits of his defence are adjudged against him before he has a chance to be heard or to prove his case. We approach the question somewhat differently. The word property as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The property may be denied but the confidence cannot be. Therefore the starting point for the present matter is not property or due process of law, but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs.” Id., at 102. Justice Holmes did not deny the existence of a property interest; he simply deemed determination of the existence of that interest irrelevant to resolution of the case. In a case decided prior to Masland, the Court had spoken of trade secrets in property terms. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236, 250-253 (1905) (Holmes, J., for the Court). See generally 1 R. Milgrim, Trade Secrets § 1.01[1] (1983). The Federal Pesticide Act of 1978 was approved on September 30, 1978. 92 Stat. 842. The new data-consideration and data-disclosure provisions applied with full force to all data submitted after that date. Because the market for Monsanto’s pesticide products is an international one, Monsanto could decide to forgo registration in the United States and sell a pesticide only in foreign markets. Presumably, it will do so in those situations where it deems the data to be protected from disclosure more valuable than the right to sell in the United States. The 1972 amendments to FIFRA became effective at the close of the business day on October 21, 1972. 86 Stat. 998. The Trade Secrets Act prohibits a Government employee from “publish[ing], divulg[ing], disclos[ing] or mak[ing] known” confidential information received in his official capacity. 18 U. S. C. § 1905. In considering the data of one applicant in connection with the application of another, EPA does not violate any of these prohibitions. The District Court found: “During the period that USDA administered FIFRA, it was also its policy that the data developed and submitted by companies such as [Monsanto] could not be used to support the registration of another’s product without the permission of the data submitter.” Monsanto Co. v. Acting Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency, 564 F. Supp. 552, 564 (ED Mo. 1988) (emphasis in original). ■ The District Court apparently based this finding on the testimony of two former Directors of the Pesticide Regulation Division, who testified that they knew of no instance in which data submitted by one applicant were subsequently considered in evaluating another application. Ibid. This finding is in marked conflict with the statement of the National Agricultural Chemicals Association, presented before a Senate Subcommittee in 1972, which advocated that the 1972 amendments to FIFRA should contain an exclusive-use provision: “Under the present law registration information submitted to the Administrator has not routinely been made available for public inspection. Such information has, however, as a matter of practice but without statutory authority, been considered by the Administrator to support the registration of the same or a similar product by another registrant.” Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Agricultural Research and General Legislation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 245 (1972). In addition, EPA points to the Department of Agriculture’s Interpretation with Respect to Warning, Caution and Antidote Statements Required to Appear on Labels of Economic Poisons, 27 Fed. Reg. 2267 (1962), which presents a list of pesticides that would require no additional toxicological data for registration. The clear implication from the Interpretation is that the Department determined that the data already submitted with respect to those chemicals would be sufficient for purposes of evaluating any future applications for registration of those chemicals. Although the evidence against the District Court’s finding seems overwhelming, we need not determine that the finding was clearly erroneous in order to find that a submitter had no reasonable expectation that the Department or EPA would not use the data it had submitted when evaluating the application of another. The District Court did not find that the policy of the Department wa~s publicly known at the time or that there was any explicit guarantee of exclusive use. We emphasize that the value of a trade secret lies in the competitive advantage it gives its owner over competitors. Thus, it is the fact that operation of the data-consideration or data-diselosure provisions will allow a competitor to register more easily its product or to use the disclosed data to improve its own technology that may constitute a taking. If, however, a public disclosure of data reveals, for example, the harmful side effects of the submitter’s product and causes the submitter to suffer a decline in the potential profits from sales of the product, that decline in profits stems from a decrease in the value of the pesticide to consumers, rather than from the destruction of an edge the submitter had over its competitors, and cannot constitute the taking of a trade secret. Because the record contains no findings with respect to the value of the trade-secret data at issue and because no arbitration proceeding has yet been held to detemine the amount of recovery to be paid by a subsequent applicant to Monsanto, we cannot preclude the possibility that the arbitration award will be sufficient to provide Monsanto with just compensation, thus nullifying any claim against the Government for a taking when EPA uses Monsanto’s data in considering another application. The statutory arbitration scheme, of course, provides for compensation only in cases where the data are considered in connection with a subsequent application, not in cases of disclosure of the data. While the 1975 amendments to FIFRA purported to carry backward the protections against data consideration and data disclosure to submissions of data made on or after January 1, 1970, 89 Stat. 751, the relevant consideration for our purposes is the nature of the expectations of the submitter at the time the data were submitted. We therefore do not extend our ruling as to a possible taking to data submitted prior to October 22, 1972. Monsanto argues that EPA and, by implication, Congress misapprehended the true “barriers to entry” in the pesticide industry and that the challenged provisions of the law create, rather than reduce, barriers to entry. Brief for Appellee 35, n. 48. Such economic arguments are better directed to Congress. The proper inquiry before this Court is not whether the provisions in fact will accomplish their stated objectives. Our review is limited to determining that the purpose is legitimate and that Congress rationally could have believed that the provisions would promote that objective. Midkiff, ante, at 242-243; Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648, 671-672 (1981). Any taking of private property that would occur as a result of EPA disclosure or consideration of data submitted by Monsanto between October 22, 1972, and September 30, 1978, is, of course, duly authorized by FIFRA as amended in 1978. The Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491, reads, in relevant part: “The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in eases not sounding in tort.” Exhaustion of the statutory remedy is necessary to determine the extent of the taking that has occurred. To the extent that the operation of the statute provides compensation, no taking has occurred and the original submitter of data has no claim against the Government. We emphasize.that nothing in our opinion prohibits EPA’s consideration or disclosure, in a manner authorized by FIFRA, of data submitted to it by Monsanto. Our decision merely holds that, with respect to a certain limited class of data submitted by Monsanto to EPA, EPA actions under the data-disclosure and data-eonsideration provisions of the statute may give Monsanto a claim for just compensation.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DETROIT & TOLEDO SHORE LINE RAILROAD CO. v. UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION et al. No. 29. Argued October 20, 1969 Decided December 9, 1969 Francis M. Shea argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Ralph J. Moore, Jr., David W. Miller, James A. Wilcox, and John M. Curphey. Richard R. Lyman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Clarence M. Mulholland. Milton Kramer filed a brief for the Railway-Labor Executives’ Association as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. This case raises a question concerning the extent to which the Railway Labor Act of 1926 imposes an obligation upon the parties to a railroad labor dispute to maintain the status quo while the “purposely long and drawn out” procedures of the Act are exhausted. Petitioner, a railroad, contends that the status quo which the Act requires be maintained consists only of the working conditions specifically covered in the parties’ existing collective-bargaining agreement. Respondent railroad brotherhood contends that what must be preserved as the status quo are the actual, objective working conditions out of which the dispute arose, irrespective of whether these conditions are covered in an existing collective agreement. For the reasons stated below, we think that only the union’s position is consistent with the language and purposes of the Railway Labor Act. The facts involved in this case are these: The main line of the Detroit and Toledo Shore Line (Shore Line), petitioner’s railroad, runs from Lang Yard in Toledo, Ohio, 50 miles north to Dearoad Yard near Detroit, Michigan. For many years prior to 1961, Lang Yard was the terminal at which all train and engine crews reported for work and from which they left at the end of the day. As the occasions arose, the Shore Line transported crews from Lang Yard to perform switching and other operations at various points to the north, assuming the costs of transportation and overtime for the crew members. On February 21, 1961, the railroad advised respondent, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen (BLF&E), of its intention to establish “outlying work assignments” at Trenton, Michigan, a point on the main line about 35 miles north of Lang Yard. These new assignments would have required many employees to report for work at Trenton rather than Lang Yard where they had been reporting. The BLF&E responded to this announcement by filing a notice under § 6 of the Railway Labor Act proposing an amendment to the collective-bargaining agreement to cover the changed working conditions of the employees who would work out of Trenton. Section 6 requires both the carrier and union to give the other party a 30-day notice of an “intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.” Since the union thus invoked the “major-dispute” settlement procedures of the Railway Labor Act, the dispute first went to conference and, when the parties failed to agree between themselves, then to the National Mediation Board. While the case was pending before the National Mediation Board, the Shore Line announced two new outlying assignments at Dearoad, Michigan, at the northern end of the line. Because work crews could be taken by cab from Dearoad south to Trenton, the railroad concluded that it no longer needed to establish assignments at Trenton and so advised the Mediation Board. When the Dearoad assignments were announced, the union withdrew from the Mediation Board proceedings, and, before a Special Board of Adjustment convened under § 3 of the Act, challenged the railroad’s right under the parties’ collective agreement to establish outlying assignments. On November 30, 1965, the Special Board ruled that the Shore Line-BLF&E agreement did not prohibit the railroad from making the assignments. Relying in part on the ruling of the Special Board, the railroad notified the union on January 24, 1966, that it was reviving its plan for work assignments at Trenton. Again the union responded by filing a § 6 notice of a proposed change in the parties’ collective agreement. This time the union sought to amend the agreement to forbid the railroad from making any outlying assignments at all. The parties were again unable to negotiate a settlement themselves, and on June 17, 1966, the union invoked the services of the National Mediation Board. While the Mediation Board proceedings were pending, the railroad posted a bulletin definitely creating the disputed work assignments at Trenton effective September 26, 1966. Faced with this unilateral change in working conditions, the union threatened a strike. The railroad then brought this action in the United States District Court to enjoin the BLF&E from calling and carrying out the allegedly illegal strike. The union counterclaimed for an injunction prohibiting the Shore Line from establishing outlying assignments on the ground that the status quo provision of § 6 of the Railway Labor Act forbids a carrier from taking unilateral action altering “rates of pay, rules, or working conditions” while the dispute is pending before the National Mediation Board. The pertinent part of § 6 provides: “In every case where . . . the services of the Mediation Board have been requested by either party . . . , rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon ... by the Mediation Board . . . .” 45 U. S. C. § 156. The District Court dismissed the railroad’s complaint, from which no appeal has been taken, but it granted the injunction sought by the union restraining the railroad from establishing any new outlying assignments at Trenton or elsewhere. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the issuance of the injunction against the railroad. 401 F. 2d 368 (1968). We granted certiorari, 393 U. S. 1116 (1969). In granting the injunction the District Court held that the status quo requirement of § 6 prohibited the Shore Line from making outlying assignments even though there was nothing in the parties’ collective agreement which prohibited such assignments. The Shore Line vigorously challenges this holding. It contends that the purpose of the status quo provisions of the Act is to guarantee only that existing collective agreements continue to govern the parties’ rights and duties during efforts to change those agreements. Therefore, the railroad argues, what Congress intended by writing in § 6 that “rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered” was that rates of pay, rules, or working conditions as expressed in an agreement shall not be altered. And since nothing in the railroad’s agreement with the union precluded the railroad from altering the location of work assignments, this working condition was not “expressed in an agreement.” Thus, the argument runs, the railroad could make outlying assignments without violating the status quo provision of § 6, and the judgments below must be reversed. We note at the outset that the language of § 6 simply does not say what the railroad would have it say. Instead, the section speaks plainly of “rates of pay, rules, or working conditions” without any limitation to those obligations already embodied in collective agreements. More important, wTe are persuaded that the railroad’s interpretation of this section is sharply at variance with the overall design and purpose of the Railway Labor Act. The Railway Labor Act was passed in 1926 to encourage collective bargaining by railroads and their employees in order to prevent, if possible, wasteful strikes and interruptions of interstate commerce. The problem of strikes was considered to be particularly acute in the area of “major disputes,” those disputes involving the formation of collective agreements and efforts to change them. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711, 722-726 (1945). Rather than rely upon compulsory arbitration, to which both sides were bitterly opposed, the railroad and union representatives who drafted the Act chose to leave the settlement of major disputes entirely to the processes of noncompulsory adjustment. Id., at 724. To this end, the Act established rather elaborate machinery for negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and conciliation. General Committee, B. L. E. v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., 320 U. S. 323, 328-333 (1943). It imposed upon the parties an obligation to make every reasonable effort to negotiate a settlement and to refrain from altering the status quo by resorting to self-help while the Act’s remedies were being exhausted. Railroad Trainmen v. Terminal Co., 394 U. S. 369, 378 (1969); Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, supra, at 721-731; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 565-566 (1930). A final and crucial aspect of the Act was the power given to the parties and to representatives of the public to make the exhaustion of the Act’s remedies an almost interminable process. As we noted in Railway Clerks v. Florida E. C. R. Co., 384 U. S. 238, 246 (1966), “the procedures of the Act are purposely long and drawn out, based on the hope that reason and practical considerations will provide in time an agreement that resolves the dispute.” The Act’s status quo requirement is central to its design. Its immediate effect is to prevent the union from striking and management from doing anything that would justify a strike.' In the long run, delaying the time when the parties can resort to self-help provides time for tempers to cool; helps create an atmosphere in which rational bargaining can occur, and permits the forces of public opinion to be mobilized in favor of a settlement without a strike or lockout. Moreover, since disputes usually arise when one party wants to change the status quo without undue delay, the power which the Act gives the other party to preserve the status quo for a prolonged period will frequently make it worthwhile for the moving party to compromise with the interests of the other side and thus reach agreement without interruption to commerce. There are three status quo provisions in the Act, each covering a different stage of the major dispute settlement procedures. Section 6, the section of immediate concern in this case, provides that “rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered” during the period from the first notice of a proposed change in agreements up to and through any proceedings before the National Mediation Board. Section 5 First provides that for 30 days following the closing of Mediation Board proceedings “no change shall be made in the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions or established practices in effect prior to the time the dispute arose,” unless the parties agree to arbitration or a Presidential Emergency Board is created during the 30 days. Finally, § 10 provides that after the creation of an Emergency Board and for 30 days after the Board has made its report to the President, “no change, except by agreement, shall be made by the parties to the controversy in the conditions ont of which the dispute arose.” These provisions must be read in conjunction with the implicit status quo requirement in the obligation imposed upon both parties by § 2 First, “to exert every reasonable effort” to settle disputes without interruption to interstate commerce. While the quoted language of §§ 5, 6, and 10 is not identical in each case, we believe that these provisions, together with § 2 First, form an integrated, harmonious scheme for preserving the status quo from the beginning of the major dispute through the final 30-day “cooling-off” period. Although these three provisions are applicable to different stages of the Act’s procedures, the intent and effect of each is identical so far as defining and preserving the status quo is concerned. The obligation of both parties during a period in which any of these status quo provisions is properly invoked is to preserve and maintain unchanged those actual, objective working conditions and practices, broadly conceived, which were in effect prior to the time the pending dispute arose and which are involved in or related to that dispute. It is quite apparent that under our interpretation of the status quo requirement, the argument advanced by the Shore Line has little merit. The railroad contends that a party is bound to preserve the status quo in only those working conditions covered in the parties’ existing collective agreement, but nothing in the status quo provisions of §§ 5, 6, or 10 suggests this restriction. We have stressed that the status quo extends to those actual, objective working conditions out of which the dispute arose, and clearly these conditions need not be covered in an existing agreement. Thus, the mere fact that the collective agreement before us does not expressly prohibit outlying assignments would not have barred the railroad from ordering the assignments that gave rise to the present dispute if, apart from the agreement, such assignments had occurred for a sufficient period of time with the knowledge and acquiescence of the employees to become in reality a part of the actual working conditions. Here, however, the dispute over the railroad’s establishment of the Trenton assignments arose at a time when actual working conditions did not include such assignments. It was therefore incumbent upon the railroad by virtue of § 6 to refrain from making outlying assignments at Trenton or any other place in which there had previously been none, regardless of the fact that the railroad was not precluded from making these assignments under the existing agreement. The Shore Line’s interpretation of the status quo requirement is also fundamentally at odds with the Act’s primary objective — the prevention of strikes. This case provides a good illustration of why that is so. The goal of the BLF&E was to prevent the Shore Line from making outlying assignments, a matter not covered in their existing collective agreement. To achieve its goal, the union invoked the procedures of the Act. The railroad, however, refused to maintain the status quo and, instead, proceeded to make the disputed outlying assignments. It could hardly be expected that the union would sit idly by as the railroad rushed to accomplish the very result the union was seeking to prohibit by agreement. The union undoubtedly felt it could resort to self-help if the railroad could, and, not unreasonably, it threatened to strike. Because the railroad prematurely resorted to self-help, the primary goal of the Act came very close to being defeated. The example of this case could no doubt be multiplied many times. It would be virtually impossible to include all working conditions in a collective-bargaining agreement. Where a condition is satisfactorily tolerable to both sides, it is often omitted from the agreement, and it has been suggested that this practice is more frequent in the railroad industry than in most others. When the union moves to bring such a previously uncovered condition within the agreement, it is absolutely essential that the status quo provisions of the Act apply to that working condition if the purpose of the Act is to be fulfilled. If the railroad is free at this stage to take advantage of the agreement’s silence and resort to self-help, the union cannot be expected to hold back its own economic weapons, including the strike. Only if both sides are equally restrained can the Act’s remedies work effectively. We now turn to answer some of the arguments advanced by the Shore Line in support of its position. The first of these involves § 2 Seventh of the Act. That section forbids a carrier from changing “the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or in section 6 of this Act.” (Emphasis added.) The Shore Line argues that this section is a status quo provision and that the “as embodied in agreements” restriction it contains should be read into the status quo provisions of §§ 5, 6, and 10. We find no merit in this argument. Section 2 Seventh, which was added to the Act in 1934, does not impose any status quo dutiés attendant upon major dispute procedures. It simply states one category of cases in which those procedures must be invoked. The purpose of § 2 Seventh is twofold: it operates to give legal and binding effect to collective agreements, and it lays down the requirement that collective agreements can be changed only by the statutory procedures. The violation of this section is a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment or fine or both. Violations of the status quo provisions of §§ 5, 6, and 10 are only civil wrongs. Second, the Shore Line contends that the interpretation of § 6 which we adopt today is at variance with the position we have taken on two previous occasions, citing Order of Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U. S. 561 (1946), and Williams v. Terminal Co., 315 U. S. 386 (1942). Although these cases do contain statements which out of context tend to support petitioner’s position, neither dealt with the question we have before us today. Pitney involved a suit brought by a union to enjoin the reorganization trustees of a bankrupt railroad from transferring certain job assignments to another union. The plaintiff’s contention was that the disputed jobs belonged to its members by both custom and agreement. The trustees were therefore prohibited from reassigning the jobs, the union argued, since they had never filed the appropriate notice of “intended change in agreements” required by § 6. The railroad disputed that the reassignments of the jobs would require a “change in agreements” and thus put the meaning of the parties’ agreements in issue. We held that the proper forum for interpreting the agreements was the Adjustment Board provided by Congress in the Railway Labor Act, § 3 First (i), for that purpose, and directed the District Court to stay its proceedings accordingly. 326 U. S., at 567-568. Thus, Pitney, at most, involved a question of the necessity of filing a § 6 notice and was not at all concerned with the status quo provision of that section. The Williams case is equally inapposite. In that case “redcaps” brought suit through their union representative against the Dallas railroad terminal to recover wages allegedly owed them and retained by the terminal in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Railway Labor Act. The redcaps’ argument under the Fair Labor Standards Act was that Congress had not intended that tips be included in their wages for purposes of satisfying minimum wage requirements. Yet, that is what the terminal had done under its “accounting and guarantee” plan from October 1938, when the F. L. S. A. became effective, until March 1940. The majority of the Court rejected the redcaps’ argument, holding that the F. L. S. A. neither prohibited nor required the inclusion of tips within wages. The question was held to be one for contract between the parties. 315 U. S., at 407-408. The redcaps’ claim under the Railway Labor Act was that the terminal’s “accounting and guarantee” plan under which tips were considered as part of wages was put into operation unilaterally by the terminal on the effective date of the F. L. S. A., despite the fact that the redcaps had two weeks earlier asked for a conference to negotiate an agreement which would include the subject of wages. This, the redcaps argued, violated the status quo provisions of § 6 since prior to the F. L. S. A. tips had not been included in wages. The Court concluded, however, that § 6 was not applicable to the dispute between the parties. The Court reasoned that when the redcaps continued to work after being individually notified of the “accounting and guarantee” plan, new and independent contracts were formed between each redcap and the terminal. The Court held that these contracts were not affected by the pending request for collective bargaining under the Railway Labor Act. The decision rested partially on the ground that “[independent individual contracts are not affected by the Act.” 315 U. S., at 399. And the Court also said more narrowly that the status quo requirements of § 6 were inapplicable since that section applies only when a “change in agreements” is involved. 315 U. S., at 400. In Williams there was absolutely no prior history of any collective bargaining or agreement between the parties on any matter. Without pausing to comment upon the present vitality of either of these grounds for dismissing the redcaps’ Railway Labor Act claim, it is readily apparent that Williams involved only the question of whether the status quo requirement of § 6 applied at all. The Court in Williams therefore never reached the question of the scope of the status quo requirement in a dispute, such as the one before the Court today, to which that requirement concededly applies. Finally, the Shore Line points out, quite correctly, that its position on § 6 is identical to that taken by the National Mediation Board in several of its Annual Reports. However, the Mediation Board has no adjudicatory authority with regard to major disputes, nor has it a mandate to issue regulations construing the Act generally. Certainly there is nothing in the Act which can be interpreted as giving the Mediation Board the power to change the plain, literal meaning of the statute, which would be the result were we to adopt its interpretation of § 6. The judgment is Affirmed. 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. Railway Clerks v. Florida E. C. R. Co., 384 U. S. 238, 246 (1966). The United Transportation Union, the successor organization to the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, was substituted as party respondent by order of the Court, March 3, 1969. Respondents also include two officers of the BLF&E named in the original complaint. The parties treat the term “outlying work assignment” as meaning a work assignment with a reporting point for going on and off duty located elsewhere than at the Shore Line’s principal yard, Lang Yard in Toledo, Ohio. We adopt that usage here. 44 Stat. 582, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 156. Section 6, in its entirety, provides: “Carriers and representatives of the employees shall give at least thirty days’ written notice of an intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, and the time and place for the beginning of conference between the representatives of the parties interested in such intended changes shall be agreed upon within ten days after the receipt of said notice, and said time shall be within the thirty days provided in the notice. In every case where such notice of intended change has been given, or conferences are being held with reference thereto, or the services of the Mediation Board have been requested by either party, or said Board has proffered its services, rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon as required by section 5 of this Act, by the Mediation Board, unless a period of ten days has elapsed after termination of conferences without request for or proffer of the services of the Mediation Board.” See n. 5, supra. A “major dispute” is one arising out of the formation or change of collective agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711, 722-727 (1945). 44 Stat. 578, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 153. At this point, the BLF&E was considering the controversy as a “minor dispute,” i. e., a dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of collective agreements. Under § 3 of the Railway Labor Act such disputes are settled by an Adjustment Board whose interpretation of the collective agreement is binding on the parties. See Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, supra, at 722-727. The Special Board of Adjustment found: “What took place here was not a change in the recognized terminal, but simply amounted to an outlying assignment. There is nothing in the rules of agreement which precludes this carrier from establishing an outside assignment.” App. 110. The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen was also named a defendant, as were several officers of both unions. The causes of action against the two brotherhoods were completely different, however, and the cases were treated as distinct at trial and on appeal. The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen is not involved in the present litigation at this stage. The full section is set out in n. 5, supra. The order of the District Court is unreported. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, No. C 66-207 (D. C. N. D. Ohio, filed Nov. 15, 1966). The opinion of the District Court on motion to vacate the judgment is reported at 267 F. Supp. 572 (1967). In Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 648, 565 (1930), the Court said: “The Brotherhood insists, and we think rightly, that the major purpose of Congress in passing the Railway Labor Act was 'to provide á machinery to prevent strikes.’ ” The Act’s major-dispute procedures and status quo requirement were concisely stated in an opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan only last Term, Railroad Trainmen v. Terminal Co., 394 U. S. 369, 378 (1969): “The Act provides a detailed framework to facilitate the voluntary settlement of major disputes. A party desiring to effect a change of rates of pay, rules, or working conditions must give advance written notice. § 6. The parties must confer, § 2 Second, and if conference fails to resolve the dispute, either or both may invoke the services of the National Mediation Board, which may also proffer its services sua sponte if it finds a labor emergency to exist. § 5 First. If mediation fails, the Board must endeavor to induce the parties to submit the controversy to binding arbitration, which can take place, however, only if both consent. §§ 5 First, 7. If arbitration is rejected and the dispute threatens ‘substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service, the Mediation Board shall notify the President,’ who may create an emergency board to investigate and report on the dispute. § 10. While the dispute is working its way through these stages, neither party may unilaterally alter the status quo. §§ 2 Seventh, 5 First, 6, 10.” Section 6 is set out in its entirety in n. 5, supra. Section 5 First, 44 Stat. 580, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 155 First, provides in part: “If arbitration at the request of the Board shall be refused by one or both parties, the Board shall at once notify both parties in writing that its mediatory efforts have failed and for thirty days thereafter, unless in the intervening period the parties agree to arbitration, or an emergency board shall be created under section 10 of this Act, no change shall be made in the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions or established practices in effect prior to the time the dispute arose.” Section 10, 44 Stat. 586, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 160, provides in part: “After the creation of such board and for thirty days after such board has made its report to the President, no change, except by agreement, shall be made by the parties to the controversy in the conditions out of which the dispute arose.” Section 2 First, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 152 First, provides: “It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the application of such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the employees thereof.” The relationship between the status quo provisions and §2 First, was made explicit in the testimony of Donald Richberg who spoke as the unions’ representative when the proposed railroad legislation was presented to Congress jointly by the railroads and the unions: “As to maintaining the status quo from the time that a dispute is engendered, it is a violation of the duties imposed by this law for either party to take any action to arbitrarily change the conditions until that dispute has been adjusted in accordance with the law. Their primary duty is to exert every reasonable effort to avoid interruptions of commerce through disputes. The ‘reasonable efforts’ are set forth here that all disputes shall be considered and decided in conference, if possible; that, second, if conference fails a certain type of disputes shall be carried to the board of adjustment; the other type of disputes, or those not decided by the board of adjustment, may be carried to the board of mediators, and it shall be the duty of the board of mediators to act.” Hearings on H. R. 7180 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 92-93 (1926). This interpretation of the status quo provisions is supported by the legislative history of the Act. See, e. g., the testimony of Donald Richberg set out in n. 18, supra. Mr. Richberg also testified: “[T]he only thing that can provoke an arbitrary action [referring to strikes] is the power to arbitrarily change the rates of pay or rules of working conditions before the controversy is settled, and it is provided that they shall not be altered during the entire period of utilization of this law.” Hearings on H. R. 7180 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 (1926). Moreover, when the status quo provision of § 5 was added to that section in 1934, its purpose was to provide continuity between §§ 6 and 10 by preserving the status quo for 30 days following the end of proceedings before the Mediation Board. Joseph B. Eastman, Federal Co-ordinator of Transportation, the principal draftsman and proponent of the 1934 amendments, testified: “As the present act reads, a railroad, by rejecting the Board of Mediation’s final recommendation to arbitrate the dispute, is enabled to change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions arbitrarily, prior to the issuance of an order by the President appointing a fact-finding board and maintaining the status quo for 60 days. . . . The railroads have taken advantage of this unintentional hiatus in the present law in several instances. The change now proposed is designed to plug this hole.” Hearings on S. 3266 before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1934). The status quo provision of § 10 was the only one discussed in any depth at the 1926 congressional hearings on the bill. Donald Richberg, n. 19, supra, testified as follows when questioned about the intended scope of the status quo provision: “The thought was to include in the broadest way all the factors which contributed to what is commonly called the status quo. In other words, the conditions may depend upon the dispute, whether it is with regard to rules or with regard to wages.” Hearings on H. R. 7180 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 44 (1926). “What broader phrase could be used than 'conditions out of which the dispute arose’ which comprehends all the elements affecting the controversy? It is intended to make it clear that the parties are going to wait and give the Government full opportunity to adjust the controversy.” Hearings on S. 2306 before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 88-89 (1926). See n. 9, supra. Brief of Railway Labor Executives’ Association as amicus curiae 17. Respondent BLF&E has urged in its brief that we also consider the question whether the Shore Line violated a duty to bargain in good faith, citing Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203 (1964), and NLRB v. Katz, 369 U. S. 736 (1962). Deciding the case as we do under the status quo provisions of the Act, we find it unnecessary to reach this argument. Section 2 Seventh, 48 Stat. 1188, 45 U. S. C. §152 Seventh, provides as follows: “No carrier, its officers or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or in section 6 of this Act.” Railway Labor Act, § 2 Tenth, 48 Stat. 1189, 45 U. S. C. § 152 Tenth. The 34th Annual Report of the National Mediation Board stated: "Section 6 states that where notice of intended change in an agreement has been given, rates of pay, rules, and working conditions as expressed in the agreement shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon in accordance with specified procedures.” NMB, 34th Ann. Rep. 23 (fiscal year ended June 30, 1968). (Emphasis added.) See also NMB, 33d Ann. Rep. 36 (fiscal year ended June 30, 1967); NMB, 31st Ann. Rep. 25 (fiscal year ended June 30, 1965).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCAST ENGINEERS UNION, LOCAL 1212, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO. No. 69. Argued November 10, 14, 1960. Decided January 9, 1961. Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Stuart Rothman, Norton J. Come and Melvin J. Welles. Robert Silagi and Louis Sherman argued the cause for respondent. With them on the brief were Joseph B. Robison and Joseph M. Stone. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. This case, in which the Court of Appeals refused to enforce a cease-and-desist order of the National Labor Relations Board, grew out of a “jurisdictional dispute” over work assignments between the respondent union, composed of television “technicians,” and another union, composed of “stage employees.” Both of these unions had collective bargaining agreements in force with the Columbia Broadcasting System and the respondent union was the certified bargaining agent for its members, but neither the certification nor the agreements clearly apportioned between the employees represented by the two unions the work of providing electric lighting for television shows. This led to constant disputes, extending over a number of years, as to the proper assignment of this work, disputes that were particularly acrimonious with reference to “remote lighting,” that is, lighting for telecasts away from the home studio. Each union repeatedly urged Columbia to amend its bargaining agreement so as specifically to allocate remote lighting to its members rather than to members of the other union. But, as the Board found, Columbia refused to make such an agreement with either union because “the rival locals had failed to agree on the resolution of this jurisdictional dispute over remote lighting.” Thus feeling itself caught “between the devil and the deep blue/’ Columbia chose to divide the disputed work between the two unions according to criteria improvised apparently for the sole purpose of maintaining peace between the two. But, in trying to satisfy both of the unions, Columbia has apparently not succeeded in satisfying either. During recent years, it has been forced to contend with work stoppages by each of the two unions when a particular assignment was made in favor of the other. The precise occasion for the present controversy was the decision of Columbia to assign the lighting work for a major telecast from the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City to the stage employees. When the technicians’ protest of this assignment proved unavailing, they refused to operate the cameras for the program and thus forced its cancellation. This caused Columbia to file the unfair labor practice charge which started these proceedings, claiming a violation of § 8 (b) (4) (D) of the National Labor Relations Act. That section clearly makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor union to induce a strike or a concerted refusal to work in order to compel an employer to assign particular work to employees represented by it rather than to employees represented by another union, unless the employer’s assignment is in violation of “an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work . ...” Obviously, if § 8 (b) (4) (D) stood alone, what this union did in the absence of a Board order or certification entitling its members to be assigned to these particular jobs would be enough to support a finding of an unfair labor practice in a normal proceeding under § 10 (c) of the Act. But when Congress created this new type of unfair labor practice by enacting § 8 (b) (4) (D) as part of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, it also added § 10 (k) to the Act. Section 10 (k), set out below, quite plainly emphasizes the belief of Congress that it is more important to industrial peace that jurisdictional disputes be settled permanently than it is that unfair labor practice sanctions for jurisdictional strikes be imposed upon unions. Accordingly, § 10 (k) offers strong inducements to quarrelling unions to settle their differences by directing dismissal of unfair labor practice charges upon voluntary adjustment of jurisdictional disputes. And even where no voluntary adj ustment is made, “the Board is empowered and directed,” by § 10 (k), “to hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen,” and upon compliance by the disputants with the Board’s decision the unfair labor practice charges must be dismissed. In this case respondent failed to reach a voluntary agreement with the stage employees union so the Board held the § 10 (k) hearing as required to “determine the dispute.” The result of this hearing was a decision that the respondent union was not entitled to have the work assigned to its members because it had no right to it under either an outstanding Board order or certification, as provided in §8 (b)(4)(D), or a collective bargaining agreement. The Board refused to consider other criteria, such as the employer’s prior practices and the custom of the industry, and also refused to make an affirmative award of the work between the employees represented by the two competing unions. The respondent union refused to comply with this decision, contending that the Board’s conception of its duty to “determine the dispute” was too narrow in that this duty is not at all limited, as the Board would have it, to strictly legal considerations growing out of prior Board orders, certifications or collective bargaining agreements. It urged, instead, that the Board’s duty was to make a final determination, binding on both unions, as to which of the two unions’ members were entitled to do the remote lighting work, basing its determination on factors deemed important in arbitration proceedings, such as the nature of the work, the practices and customs of this and other companies and of these and other unions, and upon other factors deemed relevant by the Board in the light of its experience in the field of labor relations. On the basis of its decision in the § 10 (k) proceeding and the union’s challenge to the validity of that decision, the Board issued an order under § 10 (c) directing the union to cease and desist from striking to compel Columbia to assign remote lighting work to its members. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to enforce the cease-and-desist order, accepting the respondent’s contention that the Board had failed to make the kind of determination that § 10 (k) requires. The Third and Seventh Circuits have construed § 10 (k) the same way, while the Fifth Circuit has agreed with the Board’s narrower conception of its duties. Because of this conflict and the importance of this problem, we granted certiorari. We agree with the Second, Third and Seventh Circuits that § 10 (k) requires the Board to decide jurisdictional disputes on their merits and conclude that in this case that requirement means that the Board should affirmatively have decided whether the technicians or the stage employees were entitled to the disputed work. The language of § 10 (k), supplementing §8 (b)(4)(D) as it does, sets up a method adopted by Congress to try to get jurisdictional disputes settled. The words “hear and determine the dispute” convey not only the idea of hearing but also the idea of deciding a controversy. And the clause “the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen” can have no other meaning except a jurisdictional dispute under § 8 (b) (4) (D) which is a dispute between two or more groups of employees over which is entitled to do certain work for an employer. To determine or settle the dispute as between them would normally require a decision that one or the other is entitled to do the work in dispute. Any decision short of that would obviously not be conducive to quieting a quarrel between two groups which, here as in most instances, is of so little interest to the employer that he seems perfectly willing to assign work to either if the other will just let him alone. This language also indicates a congressional purpose to have the Board do something more than merely look at prior Board orders and certifications or a collective bargaining contract to determine whether one or the other union has a clearly defined statutory or contractual right to have the employees it represents perform certain work tasks. For, in the vast majority of cases, such a narrow determination would leave the broader problem of work assignments in the hands of the employer, exactly where it was before the enactment of § 10 (k) — with the same old basic jurisdictional dispute likely continuing to vex him, and the rival unions, short of striking, would still be free to adopt other forms of pressure upon the employer. The § 10 (k) hearing would therefore accomplish little but a restoration of the pre-existing situation, a situation already found intolerable by Congress and by all parties concerned. If this newly granted Board power to hear and determine jurisdictional disputes had meant no more than that, Congress certainly would have achieved very little to solve the knotty problem of wasteful work stoppages due to such disputes. This conclusion reached on the basis of the language of § 10 (k) and § 8 (b) (4) (D) is reinforced by reference to the history of those provisions. Prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, labor, business and the public in general had for a long time joined in hopeful efforts to escape the disruptive consequences of jurisdictional disputes and resulting work stoppages. To this end unions had established union tribunals, employers had established employer tribunals, and both had set up joint tribunals to arbitrate such disputes. Each of these efforts had .helped some but none had achieved complete success. The result was a continuing and widely expressed dissatisfaction with jurisdictional strikes. As one of the forerunners to these very provisions of the Act, President Truman told the Congress in 1947 that disputes “involving the question of which labor union is entitled to perform a particular task” should be settled, and that if the “rival unions are unable to settle such disputes themselves, provision must be made for peaceful and binding determination of the issues.” And the House Committee report on one of the proposals out of which these sections came recognized the necessity of enacting legislation to protect employers from being “the helpless victims of quarrels that do not concern them at all.” The Taft-Hartley Act as originally offered contained only a section making jurisdictional strikes an unfair labor practice. Section 10 (k) came into the measure as the result of an amendment offered by Senator Morse which, in its original form, proposed to supplement this blanket proscription by empowering and directing the Board either “to hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen or to appoint an arbitrator to hear and determine such dispute . . . .” That the purpose of this amendment was to set up machinery by which the underlying jurisdictional dispute would be settled is clear and, indeed, even the Board concedes this much. The authority to appoint an arbitrator passed the Senate but was eliminated in conference, leaving it to the Board alone “to hear and determine” the underlying jurisdictional dispute. The Board’s position is that this change can be interpreted as an indication that Congress decided against providing for the compulsory determination of jurisdictional disputes. We find this argument unpersuasive, to say the very least. The obvious effect of this change was simply to place the responsibility for compulsory determination of the dispute entirely on the Board, not to eliminate the requirement that there be such a compulsory determination. The Board’s view of its powers thus has no more support in the history of § 10 (k) than it has in the language of that section. Both show that the section was designed to provide precisely what the Board has disclaimed the power to provide^ — an effective compulsory method of getting rid of what were deemed to be the bad consequences of jurisdictional disputes. The Board contends, however, that this interpretation of § 10 (k) should be rejected, despite the language and history of that section. In support of this contention, it first points out that § 10 (k) sets forth no standards to guide it in determining jurisdictional disputes on their merits. From this fact, the Board argues that §. 8(b)(4)(D) makes the employer’s assignment decisive unless he is at the time acting in violation of a Board order or certification and that the proper interpretation of § 10 (k) must take account of this right of the employer. It is true, of course, that employers normally select and assign their own individual employees according to their best judgment. But here, as in most situations where jurisdictional strikes occur, the employer has contracted with two unions, both of which represent employees capable of doing the particular tasks involved. The result is that the employer has been placed in a situation where he finds it impossible to secure the benefits of stability from either of these contracts, not because he refuses to satisfy the unions, but because the situation is such .that he cannot satisfy them. Thus, it is the employer here, probably more than anyone else, who has been and will be damaged by a failure of the Board to make the binding decision that the employer has not been able to make. We therefore are not impressed by the Board’s solicitude for the employer’s right to do that which he has not been, and most likely will not be, able to do. It is true that this forces the Board to exercise under § 10 (k) powers which are broad and lacking in rigid standards to govern their application. But administrative agencies are frequently given rather loosely defined powers to cope with problems as difficult as those posed by jurisdictional disputes and strikes. It might have been better, as some persuasively argued in Congress, to intrust this matter to arbitrators. But Congress, after discussion and consideration, decided to intrust this decision to the Board. It has had long experience in hearing and disposing of similar labor problems. With this experience and a knowledge of the standards generally used by arbitrators, unions, employers, joint boards and others in wrestling with this problem, we are confident that the Board need not disclaim the power given it for laek of standards. Experience and common sense will supply the grounds for the performance of this job which Congress has assigned the Board. The Board also contends that respondent’s interpretation of § 10 (k) should be avoided because that interpretation completely vitiates the purpose of Congress to encourage the private settlement of jurisdictional disputes. This contention proceeds on the assumption that the parties to a dispute will have no incentive to reach a private settlement if they are permitted to adhere to their respective views until the matter is brought before the Board and then given the same opportunity to prevail which they would have had in a private settlement. Respondent disagrees with this contention and attacks the Board’s assumption. We find it unnecessary to resolve this controversy for it turns upon the sort of policy determination that must be regarded as implicitly settled by Congress when it chose to enact § 10 (k). Even if Congress has chosen the wrong way to accomplish its aim, that choice is binding both upon the Board and upon this Court. The Board’s next contention is that respondent’s interpretation of § 10 (k) should be rejected because it is inconsistent with other provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. The first such inconsistency urged is with §§ 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2) of the Act on the ground that the determination of jurisdictional disputes on their merits by the Board might somehow enable unions to compel employers to discriminate in regard to employment in order to encourage union membership. The argument here, which is based upon the fact that § 10 (k), like § 8 (b)(4)(D), extends to jurisdictional disputes between unions and unorganized groups as well as to disputes between two or more unions, appears to be that groups represented by unions would almost always prevail over nonunion groups in such a determination because their claim to the work would probably have more basis in custom and tradition than that of unorganized groups. No such danger is present here, however, for both groups of employees are represented by unions. Moreover, we feel entirely confident that the Board, with its many years of experience in guarding against and redressing violations of §§ 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2), will devise means of discharging its duties under § 10 (k) in a manner entirely harmonious with those sections. A second inconsistency is urged with § 303 (a) (4) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which authorizes suits for damages suffered because of jurisdictional strikes. The argument here is that since §303.(a) (4) does not permit a union to establish, as a defense to an action for damages under that section, that it is entitled to the work struck for on the basis of such factors as practice or custom, a similar result is required here in order to preserve “the substantive symmetry” between §303 (a)(4) on the one hand and §§8 (b)(4)(D) and 10 (k) on the other. This argument ignores the fact that this Court has recognized the separate and distinct nature of these two approaches to the problem of handling jurisdictional strikes. Since we do not require a “substantive symmetry” between the two, we need not and do not decide what effect a decision of the Board under § 10 (k) might have on actions under § 303 (a) (4). The Board’s final contention is that since its construction of § 10 (k) was adopted shortly after the section was added to the Act and has been consistently adhered to since, that construction has itself become a part of the statute by reason of congressional acquiescence. In support of this contention, the Board points out that Congress has long been aware of its construction and yet has not seen fit to adopt proposed amendments which would have changed it. In the ordinary case, this argument might have some weight. But an administrative construction adhered to in the face of consistent rejection by Courts of Appeals is not such an ordinary case. Moreover, the Board had a regulation on this subject from 1947 to 1958 which the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit thought, with some reason, was wholly inconsistent with the Board’s present interpretation. With all this uncertainty surrounding the eventual authoritative interpretation of the existing law, the failure of Congress to enact a new law simply will not support the inference which the Board asks us to make. We conclude therefore that the Board’s interpretation of its duty under.§ 10 (k) is wrong and that under that section it is the Board’s responsibility and duty to decide which of two or more employee groups claiming' the right to perform certain work tasks is right and then specifically to award such tasks in accordance with its decision. Having failed to meet that responsibility in this case, the Board could not properly proceed under § 10 (c) to adjudicate the unfair labor practice charge. The Court of Appeals was therefore correct in refusing to enforce the order which resulted from that proceeding. Affirmed. Radio & Television Broadcast Engineers Union, Local 1212, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO. Theatrical Protective Union No. 1, International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Machine Operators of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO. The other major television broadcasting companies have also been forced to contend with this same problem. The record shows that there has been joint bargaining on this point between Columbia, National and American Broadcasting Systems on the one hand and the unions on the other. All the companies refused to allocate the work to either union because the unions did not agree among themselves. Columbia’s vice president in charge of labor relations explained the situation in these terms: “All three companies negotiating jointly here took the position that they could not do this. They could not give exclusive jurisdiction because each of them had a conflicting claim from another union.” See also National Association of Broadcast Engineers, 105 N. L. R. B. 355. This phrase was used by the Hearing Examiner to describe the position of Columbia as explained by its vice president in charge of labor relations. See Theatrical Protective Union No. 1, International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 124 N. L. R. B. 249, for a report of a recent jurisdictional strike against Columbia by the same stage employees’ union involved here which resulted from an assignment of remote lighting work favorable to the technicians. Respondent, for the purposes of this proceeding only, concedes the correctness of a Board finding to this effect. 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (4) (D). Section 8 (b). “It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “ (4) . . . to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal ... to perform any services, where an object thereof is: . . . (D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work: . . .” 29 U. S. C. § 160 (c). 29 U. S. C. § 160 (k). “Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4) (D) of section 8 (b), the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless . . . the parties to such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed.” This latter consideration was made necessary because the Board has adopted the position that jurisdictional strikes in support of contract rights do not constitute violations of §8(b)(4)(D) despite the fact that the language of that section contains no provision for special treatment of such strikes. See Local 26, International Fur Workers, 90 N. L. R. B. 1379. The Board has explained this position as resting upon the principle that “to fail to hold as controlling . . . the contractual preemption of the work in dispute would be to encourage disregard for observance of binding obligations under collective-bargaining agreements and invite the very jurisdictional disputes Section 8 (b) (4) (D) is intended to prevent.” National Association of Broadcast Engineers, supra, n. 3, at 364. 272 F. 2d 713. N. L. R. B. v. United Association of Journeymen, 242 F. 2d 722. N. L. R. B. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 261 F. 2d 166. N. L. R. B. v. Local 4-50, International Union of Operating Engineers, 275 F. 2d 413. 363 U. S. 802. For a review and criticism of some of these efforts, see Dunlop, Jurisdictional Disputes, N. Y. U. 2d Ann. Conference on Labor 477, at 494^504. 93 Cong. Rec. 136. H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 23, I Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, at 314 (hereinafter cited as Leg. Hist.). The amendment was contained in a bill (S. 858) offered by Senator Morse, which also contained a number of other proposals. 93 Cong. Rec. 1913, II Leg. Hist. 987. 1 Leg. Hist. 241, 258-259. See also the Senate Committee Report on the bill, S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 8, I Leg. Hist. 414. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 57, I Leg. Hist. 561. 29 U. S. C. §§ 158 (a) (3) and 158 (b) (2). 29 U. S. C. §187 (a)(4). International Longshoremen’s Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U. S. 237. See N. L. R. B. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, supra, at 170-172. The Rules and Regulations adopted in 1947 by the Board provided that in § 10 (k) proceedings the Board was “to certify the labor organization or the particular trade, craft, or class of employees, as the case may be, which shall perform the particular work tasks in issue, or to make other disposition of the matter.” (Emphasis supplied.) 29 CFR, 1957 Supp., § 102.73. This rule remained in effect until 1958.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL & PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 306. Argued May 2, 1961. Decided June 5, 1961. Raymond K. Merrill argued the cause for appellants in both cases. With him on the briefs for appellant in No. 306 were Edwin R. Eckersall, Edwin O. Schiewe and Byron E. Lutterman. On the briefs for appellant in No. 307 were Carl J. Stephens, Neil Brooks and Donald A. Campbell. Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for the United States et al. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Rankin, Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Loevinger, Assistant Attorney General Bicks, Richard A. Solomon and Charlie H. Johns, Jr. Fletcher Rockwood argued the cause for the railroad company appellees. With him on the briefs were Marcellas L. Countryman, Jr., Anthony Kane, Louis E. Torinus, Jr., Charles A. Hart, Martin L. Cassell, Jordan J. Hillman and Richard Musenbrock. Together with No. 307, Benson, Secretary of Agriculture, v. United States et al., also on appeal from the same Court. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. These are direct appeals from an order of a three-judge District Court dismissing appellants’ complaint seeking to set aside an Interstate Commerce Commission decision which refused to prescribe through routes and joint rates for traffic moving between appellant railroad and the Spokane, Portland and Seattle Railway (the “S. P. & S.”) system via Spokane, Washington. The Commission found, contrary to appellants’ contention, that, with limited exceptions, no through routes existed for the movement of freight by the S. P. & S. system and appellant railroad (the “Milwaukee”) via Spokane. It also held. that the short-haul protection provided in § 15 (4) of the Interstate Commerce Act applied because the S. P. & S. was operated in conjunction with and under common management of its parents, the Great Northern Railway Co. and the Northern Pacific Railway Co. (the “Northern Lines”), each of which owned 50% of the S. P. & S. Finally, it entered a finding that the refusal of the S. P. & S. system to grant the through routes and joint rates requested did not result in discrimination against the Milwaukee or in undue preference or prejudice between shippers and localities and further found that they were not “needed in order to provide adequate and more efficient or more economic transportation.” 300 I. C. C. 453. The District Court held that the findings of the Commission were supported by substantial evidence and affirmed its ruling as to the application of § 15 (4). 182 F. Supp. 81. We noted probable jurisdiction. 364 U. S. 860. We affirm the judgment. The factual situation is described in detail in the Commission’s report and we will, therefore, set it out only briefly. It appears that the S. P. & S. was built by the Northern Lines for the purpose of relieving congestion, avoiding double mountain trackage, and obtaining low grade road facilities to the West Coast. Its lines— approximately 950 miles in length — run along the Snake and Columbia Rivers westward between Spokane, Washington, and the Pacific Coast via Portland, Oregon. The lines of its parents, the Northern Lines, operate between Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota, and the head of the Great Lakes on the east and Portland, Oregon, and coastal points in Washington on the west. They serve the larger cities in northern Idaho, Montana, North and South Dakota and Minnesota. The Milwaukee operates some 10,600 miles of line from Chicago, Illinois, and West-port, Indiana, on the east and Longview, Washington, on the west. While it serves many of the same cities in Idaho, Montana, the Dakotas and Minnesota from which the Northern Lines receive traffic, appellant railroad serves no point in Oregon directly. If it could establish through routes and joint rates with the S. P. & S. system, the Milwaukee might secure, on interchange at Spokane, much of the traffic that originates or terminates on the S. P. & S. system. On the other hand, the Northern Lines seek to obtain as much of this haul as possible and have published joint rates on all important commodities interchanged between the S. P. & S. system and the Northern Lines at Spokane. These rates are lower than the combination of the local rates of the S. P. & S. and the appellant railroad now applicable to traffic which could be interchanged at the same point, Spokane, between these carriers. It appears that the S. P. & S. system and the Northern Lines are not opposed to the publication of joint rates by the S. P. & S. system and the Milwaukee for traffic to or from points served only by the latter (local points) but refuse to establish through routes and joint rates via appellant’s line to points which are also served by the Northern Lines. We find, as did the District Court, that substantial evidence does support the factual findings of the Commission. We shall, therefore, forego a discussion of the appellants’ contentions based on the findings. We are left with only the principal issue, namely, whether the protection of § 15 (4) of the Act extends to two railroads owning a third in the relationship existing here. The Northern Lines compete with- each other but own in equal shares all of the bonds and stock of the S. P. & S. Their presidents alternate yearly as president and vice president of, and personally pass upon the executive problems of, the S. P. & S., which, however, has an operating vice president of its own. As to equipment, the Northern Lines furnish a substantial amount of the car supply of the S. P. & S. system. The traffic policies of the latter are directed and controlled jointly by the traffic departments of the Northern Lines. Transcontinental traffic matters are handled by representatives of the Northern Lines but local traffic problems — under the general policies aforementioned — are left to the S. P. & S. officials. In short, except when the Northern Lines disagree between themselves, they entirely control the operation of the S. P. & S. Section 1 (4) of the Interstate Commerce Act requires railroads “to establish reasonable through routes” with each other. Where such routes are not established voluntarily, the Commission has the power, under § 15 (3) of the Act, to prescribe them “whenever deemed by it to be necessary or desirable in the public interest.” This authority is restricted against short hauling, however, by § 15 (4) which provides that the Commission “shall not . . . require any carrier by railroad ... to embrace in such route substantially less than the entire length of its railroad and of any intermediate railroad operated in conjunction and under a common management or control therewith, which lies between the termini of such proposed through route . . . .” Appellants contend that since the eastern terminus of the S. P. & S. is Spokane, the establishment of the through routes via that point would not short haul the S. P. & S. If, however, the S. P. & S. is under the “common management or control” of the Northern Lines and the short-haul protection of § 15 (4) is available to them, the through routes sought would, if granted; result in the latter being short hauled in contravention of this section. The findings of the Commission, approved by the District Court, indicate clearly that neither of the Northern Lines individually controls the S. P. & S. However, it is equally clear that jointly they do manage and control it as effectively as if it' were part of their own lines. This is particularly true of its traffic policy, which is the heart of the problem here. However, appellants contend that, regardless of the factual circumstances, as a matter of law only a single railroad can operate or control another line within the meaning of the short-haul protection of § 15 (4). The short-haul exception of § 15 (4) originated in the Mann-Elkins Act of 191Ó. 36 Stat. 539, 552. The crucial words “common management or control” were not defined and the subsequent legislative history of the provision is of little assistance to our inquiry. However, the overriding purpose of the Congress seems to have been the protection of the traffic of the controlling line. As Senator Elkins, a coauthor of the measure, stated to the Senate, the exception “is one which has always been recognized in the transportation business of the country. The road that initiates the freight and starts it on its movement in interstate commerce should not be required . . . to transfer its business from its own road to that of a competitor . . . when the commerce initiated by it can be as promptly and safely transported ... by its road as by the line of its competitor.” 45 Cong. Rec. 3475-3476. The same reasoning would equally apply here. Moreover, the Senate Report on the provision emphasizes the same purpose. While the language of the section is framed in the singular, it appears to us that the reason for this exception is as valid and necessary in the case of two railroads owning a third as it is when only a single railroad and its subsidiary are involved. See Louisville & N. R. Co. v. United States, 242 U. S. 60 (1916), where this Court, in construing the discrimination provisions of the predecessor of § 3 (4) of the Act, stated, “[tjherefore, if either carrier owned and used this terminal alone it could not be found to discriminate against the Tennessee Central by merely refusing to switch for it ... . We conceive that what is true of one owner would be equally true of two joint owners . . . .” At p. 73. . Appellants rely heavily on the fact that the Congress, in enacting the Transportation Act of 1940, broadened the definition of the term “control” in many of the sections of the Interstate Commerce Act but did not do so in § 15 (4), thereby indicating an intention to restrict the scope of the exception. This definition, however, was enacted as the result of this Court’s holding in Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125 (1939), which gave a broad construction to “control” as used in § 2 (b) of the Communications Act. 47 U. S. C. § 152 (b). It appears that the Congress decided to extend this broad definition to certain sections of the Interstate Commerce Act to insure Commission jurisdiction over persons in indirect .control of carriers. See H. R. Rep. No. 2016, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 58. If, however, that definition were applied to § 15 (4), the opposite result would obtain and the Commission’s power would be restricted, for the short-haul exception would then be afforded to carriers having only an indirect control of another line. For this reason, the Congress “thought [it] undesirable to make any change in the interpretation of present law, . . . notably . . . section 15 (4).” H. R. Rep. No. 2832, 76th Cong, 3d Sess. 63. Apparently the phrase “operated in conjunction and under a common management or control” has received no prior judicial interpretation, as we have been unable to find any cases in point and have been referred to none by counsel. However, the decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission support the view that control of the traffic policy of an affiliate is sufficient to constitute “control” or “management” within the meaning of § 15 (4). The Commission’s conception of these terms was first expressed in a rate case, Blackshear Mfg. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 87 I. C. C. 654 (1924), in which the Commission stated that “the term ‘carriers under the same management and control’. . . refers to carriers generally controlled through ownership, lease, or otherwise to the extent of controlling traffic policy, even though separate corporate entity may be maintained.” At p. 664. (Emphasis added.) In subsequent rate cases the Commission has continued to apply this criterion to determine whether or not lines are under the same “management” or “control.” In another line of rate-making cases, the Commission has held that there can be joint management and control of a third railroad. In rate cases, the Commission generally prescribes a higher scale of distance rates for traffic moving over a combination of independent lines than it does for goods carried over a single line or over a parent-subsidiary system. The distinction is made because the latter are expected to result in economies of operation which should be passed on to the public. Livestock To, From, and Between Points in the Southeast, 101 I. C. C. 105 (1925). For the same reason, short or “weak” lines are allowed arbitrarles, i. e., differentially higher rates in addition to rate scales prescribed for general application, whereas - small railroads under the “management” or “control” of larger lines are not permitted the additional rates. Rate Structure Investigation, Part 13, Salt, 197 I. C. C. 115 (1933). Unless the long haul of railroads, under joint management and control as interpreted by the rate-making cases, is protected by § 15 (4), the advantages which the Commission assumed existed, i. e., economies of operation, will be taken from them. The very reasons for applying the higher distance rates and denying arbitraries would cease to exist. Such a result, flowing from the failure to construe § 15 (4) as including joint control, would be clearly inconsistent with Commission policy in the rate-making cases. Therefore, the Commission has relied upon the same criteria in § 15 (4) cases. In Alabama, T. & N. R. Co. v. Southern R. Co., 148 I. C. C. 708 (1928), the Commission specifically referred to its definition in Black-shear, supra, and applied the limitation of § 15 (4) to the three roads there involved. See also Georgia & F. R. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 191 I. C. C. 489 (1933). In fact, in seven separate proceedings involving the S. P. & S., the Commission has noted that for rate-making purposes it must be considered as part of the Northern Lines. In one of these proceedings, West Coast Lumbermen’s Assn. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 129 I. C. C. 363 (1927), joint through rates via Canada were sought to destinations served by the Milwaukee and the Northern Lines. It was urged that the joint rates, if they were prescribed, should be made over routes that would secure the long haul of these railroads. The Commission refused to establish the joint fates via the Canadian routes, holding, inter alia, that the S. P. & S. “is considered for rate-making purposes a part of the Northern Pacific and Great Northern.” At p. 364. Likewise, the case of Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Carolina & N. R. Co., 204 I. C. C. 416 (1934), applied the Blackshear definition to discrimination cases under § 3 (4) of the Act. The Commission held that under §3 (3), the predecessor of § 3 (4), there could be no discrimination where the roads involved were under a common management and control. The Commission found that the Carolina & Northwestern officials “determine the policy to be adopted with regard to traffic matters local to that carrier, but in matters of common interest between the Southern and the Carolina & Northwestern, the policy determined by the Southern prevails. It is apparent, therefore, that both carriers are operated under a common management and control.” At p. 420. Although not a § 15 (4) case, it is significant, as pointed out by the District Court, because the Commission applied the Blackshear test and, upon finding the roads under common management and control, permitted them to retain the long haul as protected by § 15 (4). The interrelationship between the two sections as applied by the Commission indicates the necessity for the use of the same criteria as to control in each. We do not consider the cases, relied upon by the appellants, to the contrary. Common management and control was not established. They were concerned with ownership, as distinguished from control, and even that by more than two railroads. There is nothing in these cases holding that such control cannot exist under the joint ownership and active management of two carriers. Nor do we feel that appellants’ other Commission cases are apposite. Summarizing, we find that the Commission has for many years followed the Blackshear criteria as to what constitutes “common management” or “control.” Likewise, it has since permitted such management and control to be jointly exercised by more than one railroad. We believe that the Congress took note of these cases in 1940 when it decided not “to make any change in the interpretation” of the limitation provision of § 15 (4) of the Act. The judgment is therefore Affirmed. Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this'case. The S. P. & S. system is composed of the Spokane, Portland and Seattle Railway Co. and two wholly owned subsidiaries, the Oregon Trunk Railway and the Oregon Electric Railway Co. 49 U. S. C. § 15 (4) provides in pertinent part: “In establishing any such through route the Commission shall not . . . require any carrier by railroad, without its consent, to embrace in such route substantially less than the entire length of its railroad and of any intermediate railroad operated in conjunction and under a common management or control therewith, which lies between the termini of such proposed through route . . . .” “A 'through route’ is an arrangement, express or implied, between connecting railroads for the continuous carriage of goods from the originating point on the line of one carrier to destination on the line of another.” St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. United States, 245 U. S. 136, 139, note 2 (1917). “[T]he essential feature of a joint rate is that connecting roads have agreed or mutually consented to carry traffic from points bn one road to points on another road for an aggregate charge which is less than the sum of their local charges between the same points.” New York, N. H. & H. B. Co. v. Platt, 7 I. C. C. 323, 333 (1897). “It would seem to be unreasonable to empower the commission to require a railroad company having a line of its own between two designated termini to allow a portion only of that line to be taken and linked up with other lines for the purpose of creating another through route in competition with it, thus depriving it of the natural advantage of possessing a direct line between the termini . . . .” S. Rep. No. 355, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 10. 49 U. S. C. § 1 (3)(b). Rates on Chert, Clay, Sand, and Gravel, 197 I. C. C. 215 (1933); Humbard Construction Co. v. Southern R. Co., 161 I. C. C. 38 (1930); Justice Co. v. Holton Interurban R. Co., 153 I. C. C. 673 (1929); Raleigh Freight Traffic Bureau v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 107 I. C. C. 156 (1926); Livestock To, From, and Between Points in the Southeast, 101 I. C. C. 105 (1925); Livestock To, From, and Between Points in the Southeast, 91 I. C. C. 292 (1924). This group of cases is bottomed on Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Assn., 247 U. S. 490 (1918), wherein this Court found that two competitive railroads owning a subsidiary coequally did, for rate purposes, each “directly control and operate” the subsidiary and that the latter must be treated as a part of each of the two owning carriers. See Des Moines Union Ry. Switching, 231 I. C. C. 631 (1939); Blum Packing Co. v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 204 I. C. C. 93 (1934); Russ Market Co. v. Northwestern Pacific R. Co., 171 I. C. C. 117 (1930); Eriksen v. Ann Arbor R. Co., 102 I. C. C. 374 (1925); Pacific Lumber Co. v. Northwestern Pacific R. Co., 51 I. C. C. 738 (1918). Helix Milling Co. v. Great Northern R. Co., 287 I. C. C. 77 (1952); Pillsbury-Astoria Flour Mills Co. v. Great Northern R. Co., 198 I. C. C. 642 (1934); Spokane, P. & S. R. Co., 41 I. C. C. Valuation Reports 1 (1932); West Coast Lumbermen’s Assn. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 129 I. C. C. 363 (1927); Inland Empire Shippers League v. Director General, 59 I. C. C. 321 (1920); Astoria v. Spokane, P. & S. R. Co., 38 I. C. C. (1916); Portland Chamber of Commerce v. Oregon Railroad & Navigation Co., 19 I. C. C. 265 (1910). 49 U. S. C. § 3 (4) provides in part that carriers “shall not discriminate in their rates, fares, and charges between connecting lines, or unduly prejudice any connecting line in- the distribution of traffic that is not specifically routed by the shipper.” Manufacturers R. Co. v. Ahnapee & W. R. Co., 172 I. C. C. 554 (1931); Absorption of Switching Charges, 157 I. C. C. 129 (1929).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MARTINEZ, as next friend of MORALES v. BYNUM, TEXAS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION, et al. No. 81-857. Argued January 10, 1983 Decided May 2, 1983 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Con-nor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 333. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 334. Edward, J. Tuddenham argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Richard L. Arnett, Special Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the causeforrespondents. With him on the brief were Mark White, Attorney General, John W. Fainter, Jr., First Assistant Attorney General, Richard E. Gray III, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and C. Ed Davis. Robert S. Ogden, Jr., and Charles S. Sims filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. David Crump filed a brief for the Texas Association of School Boards et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the Texas residency requirement governing minors who wish to attend public free schools while living apart from their parents or guardians. I Roberto Morales was born in 1969 in McAllen, Texas, and is thus a United States citizen by birth. His parents are Mexican citizens who reside in Reynosa, Mexico. He left Reynosa in 1977 and returned to McAllen to live with his sister, petitioner Oralia Martinez, for the primary purpose of attending school in the McAllen Independent School District. Although Martinez is now his custodian, she is not — and does not desire to become — his guardian. As a result, Morales is not entitled to tuition-free admission to the McAllen schools. Sections 21.031(b) and (c) of the Texas Education Code would require the local school authorities to admit him if he or “his parent, guardian, or the person having lawful control of him” resided in the school district, Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 21.031(b) and (c) (Supp. 1982), but § 21.031(d) denies tuition-free admission for a minor who lives apart from a “parent, guardian, or other person having lawful control of him under an order of a court” if his presence in the school district is “for the primary purpose of attending the public free schools.” Respondent McAllen Independent School District therefore denied Morales’ application for admission in the fall of 1977. In December 1977 Martinez, as next friend of Morales, and four other adult custodians of school-age children instituted the present action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas against the Texas Commissioner of Education, the Texas Education Agency, four local School Districts, and various local school officials in those Districts. Plaintiffs initially alleged that § 21.031(d), both on its face and as applied by defendants, violated certain provisions of the Constitution, including the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Plaintiffs also sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The District Court denied a preliminary injunction in August 1978. It found “that the school boards . . . have been more than liberal in finding that certain children are not living away from parents and residing in the school district for the sole purpose of attending school.” App. 20a. The evidence “conclusively” showed “that children living within the school districts with someone other than their parents or legal guardians will be admitted to school if any reason exists for such situation other than that of attending school only.” Ibid, (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs subsequently amended the complaint to narrow their claims. They now seek only “a declaration that . . . § 21.031(d) is unconstitutional on its face,” id., at 3a, an injunction prohibiting defendants from denying the children admission to school pursuant to § 21.031(d), restitution of certain tuition payments, costs, and attorney’s fees. App. 3a, 7a. After a hearing on the merits, the District Court granted judgment for the defendants. Arredondo v. Brockette, 482 F. Supp. 212 (1979). The court concluded that § 21.031(d) was justified by the State’s “legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its educational system and the right of its own bona fide residents to attend state schools on a preferred tuition basis.” 482 F. Supp., at 222. In an appeal by two plaintiffs, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 648 F. 2d 425 (1981). In view of the importance of the issue, we granted certiorari. 457 U. S. 1131 (1982). We now affirm. HH This Court frequently has considered constitutional challenges to residence requirements. On several occasions the Court has invalidated requirements that condition receipt of a benefit on a minimum period of residence within a jurisdiction, but it always has been careful to distinguish such dura-tional residence requirements from bona fide residence requirements. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), for example, the Court invalidated one-year durational residence requirements that applicants for public assistance benefits were required to satisfy despite the fact that they otherwise had “met the test for residence in their jurisdictions,” id., at 627. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stressed that “[t]he residence requirement and the one-year waiting-period requirement are distinct and independent prerequisites for assistance,” id., at 636, and carefully “implied] no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth,” id., at 638, n. 21. In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972), the Court similarly invalidated Tennessee laws requiring a prospective voter to have been a state resident for one year and a county resident for three months, but it explicitly distinguished these durational residence requirements from bona fide residence requirements, id., at 334, 337, n. 7, 338, 343, 350, n. 20, 351-352. This was not an empty distinction. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, again emphasized that “States have the power to require that voters be bona fide residents of the relevant political subdivision.” Id., at 343. See also Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 255, 267 (1974) (invalidating one-year durational residence requirement before an applicant became eligible for public medical assistance, but recognizing validity of appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence requirements). We specifically have approved bona fide residence requirements in the field of public education. The Connecticut statute before us in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973), for example, was unconstitutional because it created an irrebut-table presumption of nonresidency for state university students whose legal addresses were outside of the State before they applied for admission. The statute violated the Due Process Clause because it in effect classified some bona fide state residents as nonresidents for tuition purposes. But we “fully recognize[d] that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving . . . the right of its own bona fide residents to attend [its colleges and universities] on a preferential tuition basis.” Id., at 452-453. This “legitimate interest” permits a “State [to] establish such reasonable criteria for in-state status as to make virtually certain that students who are not, in fact, bona fide residents of the State, but who have come there solely for educational purposes, cannot take advantage of the in-state rates.” Id., at 453-454. Last Term, in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202 (1982), we reviewed an aspect of Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §21.031 — the statute at issue in this case. Although we invalidated the portion of the statute that excluded undocumented alien children from the public free schools, we recognized the school districts’ right “to apply . . . established criteria for determining residence.” Id., at 229, n. 22. See id., at 240, n. 4 (Powell, J., concurring) (“Of course a school district may require that illegal alien children, like any other children, actually reside in the school district before admitting them to the schools. A requirement of de facto residency, uniformly applied, would not violate any principle of equal protection”). A bona fide residence requirement, appropriately defined and uniformly applied, furthers the substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for its residents are enjoyed only by residents. Such a requirement with respect to attendance in public free schools does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It does not burden or penalize the constitutional right of interstate travel, for any person is free to move to a State and to establish residence there. A bona fide residence requirement simply requires that the person does establish residence before demanding the services that are restricted to residents. There is a further, independent justification for local residence requirements in the public-school context. As we explained in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (1974): “No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational process. . . . [L]ocal control over the educational process affords citizens an opportunity to participate in decision-making, permits the structuring of school programs to fit local needs, and encourages ‘experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence.’” Id., at 741-742 (quoting San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 50 (1973)). The provision of primary and secondary education, of course, is one of the most important functions of local government. Absent residence requirements, there can be little doubt that the proper planning and operation of the schools would suffer significantly. The State thus has a substantial interest in imposing bona fide residence requirements to maintain the quality of local public schools. III The central question we must decide here is whether § 21.031(d) is a bona fide residence requirement. Although the meaning may vary according to context, “residence” generally requires both physical presence and an intention to remain. As the Supreme Court of Maine explained over a century ago: “When... a person voluntarily takes up his abode in a given place, with intention to remain permanently, or for an indefinite period of time; or, to speak more accurately, when a person takes up his abode in a given place, without any present intention to remove therefrom, such place of abode becomes his residence. . . .” Inhabitants of Warren v. Inhabitants of Thomaston, 43 Me. 406, 418 (1857). This classic two-part definition of residence has been recognized as a minimum standard in a wide range of contexts time and time again. In Vlandis v. Kline, we approved a more rigorous domicile test as a “reasonable standard for determining the residential status of a student.” 412 U. S., at 454. That standard was described as follows: “ ‘In reviewing a claim of in-state status, the issue becomes essentially one of domicile. In general, the domicile of an individual is his true, fixed and permanent home and place of habitation. It is the place to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.’” Ibid. (quoting Opinion of the Attorney General of the State of Connecticut Regarding Non-Resident Tuition, Sept. 6, 1972); cf. n. 6, supra. This standard could not be applied to school-age children in the same way that it was applied to college students. But at the very least, a school district generally would be justified in requiring school-age children or their parents to satisfy the traditional, basic residence criteria— i. e., to live in the district with a bona fide intention of remaining there — before it treated them as residents. Section 21.031 is far more generous than this traditional standard. It compels a school district to permit a child such as Morales to attend school without paying tuition if he has a bona fide intention to remain in the school district indefinitely, for he then would have a reason for being there other than his desire to attend school: his intention to make his home in the district. Thus §21.031 grants the benefits of residency to all who satisfy the traditional requirements. The statute goes further and extends these benefits to many children even if they (or their families) do not intend to remain in the district indefinitely. As long as the child is not living in the district for the sole purpose of attending school, he satisfies the statutory test. For example, if a person comes to Texas to work for a year, his children will be eligible for tuition-free admission to the public schools. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37. Or if a child comes to Texas for six months for health reasons, he would qualify for tuition-free education. See id., at 31. In short, §21.031 grants the benefits of residency to everyone who satisfies the traditional residence definition and to some who legitimately could be classified as nonresidents. Since there is no indication that this extension of the traditional definition has any impermissible basis, we certainly cannot say that § 21.031(d) violates the Constitution. IV The Constitution permits a State to restrict eligibility for tuition-free education to its bona fide residents. We hold that §21.031 is a bona fide residence requirement that satisfies constitutional standards. The judgment of the Court of Appeals accordingly is Affirmed. Section 51.02(4) of the Texas Family Code defines “custodian” as “the adult with whom the child resides.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §51.02(4) (1975). “Guardian” is defined as “the person who, under court order, is the guardian of the person of the child or the public or private agency with whom the child has been placed by a court.” § 51.02(3). Section 21.031 provides, in relevant part: “(b) Every child in this state . . . who is over the age of five years and not over the age of 21 years on the first day of September of the year in which admission is sought shall be permitted to attend the public free schools of the district in which he resides or in which his parent, guardian, or the person having lawful control of him resides at the time he applies for admission. “(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall admit into the public free schools of the district free of tuition all persons . . . who are over five and not over 21 years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his parent, guardian or person having lawful control resides within the school district. “(d) In order for a person under the age of 18 years to establish a residence for the purpose of attending the public free schools separate and apart from his parent, guardian, or other person having lawful control of him under an order of a court, it must be established that his presence in the school district is not for the primary purpose of attending the public free schools. The board of trustees shall be responsible for determining whether an applicant for admission is a resident of the school district for purposes of attending the public schools.” Although the “special purpose” test was not codified in § 21.031(d) until 1977, it had been a feature of Texas common law since at least 1905. See, e. g., De Leon v. Harlingen Consolidated Independent School District, 552 S. W. 2d 922, 924-925 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. No. H-63, pp. 2-3 (July 12,1973); Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 0-586, pp. 3-4 (May 25, 1939); 1906-1908 Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. 245, 248 (1905). Before 1905, courts in several States had ruled that a child could not acquire residence for school purposes if his presence in the school district was for the sole purpose of attending school. See, e. g., Yale v. West Middle School District, 59 Conn. 489, 491, 22 A. 295, 296 (1890); State ex rel. School District Board v. Thayer, 74 Wis. 48, 58-59, 41 N. W. 1014, 1017 (1889); Wheeler v. Burrow, 18 Ind. 14, 17 (1862); School District No. 1 v. Bragdon, 23 N. H. 507, 510, 516 (1851). Morales attended school in the McAllen School District during the fall, 1978 semester when Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., paid his tuition. Bond has been posted to cover subsequent tuition payments. The vast majority of the States have some residence requirements governing entitlement to tuition-free public schooling. Many States have statutes substantially similar to § 21.031(d). See, e. g., Ind. Code § 20-8.1-6.1-1 (c) (1982); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 20, § 859(3)(B)(2) (Supp. 1982); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 76, § 6 (West 1982); Mich. Comp. Laws § 380.1148 (Supp. 1981); Ore. Rev. Stat. §332.595(5) (1981). In McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Comm’n, 424 U. S. 645 (1976) (per curiam), the Court upheld a bona fide continuing-residence requirement. Again, we carefully distinguished this from a durational residence requirement. Id., at 646-647. Two years before Vlandis, the Court upheld a domicile requirement for resident tuition rates at the University of Minnesota. Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U. S. 985 (1971), summarily aff’g 326 F. Supp. 234 (Minn. 1970) (three-judge court). The governing regulations declared: “No student is eligible for resident classification in the University . . . unless he has been a bona fide domiciliary of the state for at least a year immediately prior thereto. . . . For University purposes, a student does not acquire a domicile in Minnesota until he has been here for at least a year primarily as a permanent resident and not merely as a student; this involves the probability of his remaining in Minnesota beyond his completion of school.” 326 F. Supp., at 235-236. Shortly after Vlandis, we upheld a domicile requirement for resident tuition rates at the University of Washington. Sturgis v. Washington, 414 U. S. 1057, summarily aff’g 368 F. Supp. 38 (WD Wash. 1973) (three-judge court). The relevant statute declared: “The term ‘resident student’ shall mean a student who has had a domicile in the state of Washington for . . . one year . . . and has in fact established a bona fide domicile in this state for other than educational purposes. . . .” 368 F. Supp., at 39, n. 1. “Domicile” was defined as “a person’s true, fixed and permanent home and place of habitation. It is the place where he intends to remain, and to which he expects to return when he leaves without intending to establish a new domicile elsewhere.” Ibid. In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974), we recognized that a one-year residence requirement was consistent with Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972), in the context of higher education — despite its durational aspect. 415 U. S., at 259-260, and nn. 12 and 15. A bona fide residence requirement implicates no “suspect” classification, and therefore is not subject to strict scrutiny. Indeed, there is nothing invidiously discriminatory about a bona fide residence requirement if it is uniformly applied. Thus the question is simply whether there is a rational basis for it. This view assumes, of course, that the “service” that the State would deny to nonresidents is not a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. A State, for example, may not refuse to provide counsel to an indigent nonresident defendant at a criminal trial where a deprivation of liberty occurs. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972). As we previously have recognized, however, “[p]ublic education is not a ‘right’ granted to individuals by the Constitution.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 221 (1982) (citing San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 35 (1973)). The courts below construed § 21.031(d) to apply to children entering a Texas school district not only from other States or countries, but also from other school districts within Texas. 648 F. 2d, at 428; 482 F. Supp., at 222. Thus there are applications of the statute that do not even involve interstate travel, let alone burden or penalize it. The Court of Appeals accepted the District Court’s findings on the adverse impact that invalidating § 21.031(d) would have on the quality of education in Texas. 648 F. 2d, at 428-429. The District Court explicitly found: “28. Declaring the statute unconstitutional would cause substantial numbers of int[er]-district transfers, which would . . . cause school populations to fluctuate. . . . “29. Fluctuating school populations would make it impossible to predict enrollment figures — even on a semester-by-semester basis, causing over- or-under-estimates on teachers, supplies, materials, etc. “30. The increased enrollment of students would cause overcrowded classrooms and related facilities; over-large teacher-pupil ratios; expansion of bilingual programs; the purchase of books, equipment, supplies and other customary items of support; all of which would require a substantial increase in the budget of the school districts.” 482 F. Supp., at 215. We do not suggest that findings of this degree of specificity are necessary in every case. But they do illustrate the problems that prompt States to adopt regulations such as §21.031. We need not decide whether § 21.031(d) is unconstitutional as applied, for plaintiffs limited their complaint to a facial challenge of this statute. See supra, at 325. We reject the argument that § 21.031(d) violates the Due Process Clause because it creates an irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence. Brief for Petitioner 46-49; see Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441, 446 (1973). Morales easily could rebut any “presumption” of nonresidence if he were, in fact, a resident. See infra, at 332, and n. 15; App. 20a. We also find no merit to the argument that § 21.031(d) constitutes an impermissible burden on children who choose to adopt a nontraditional family-living arrangement. Brief for Petitioner 23-24; see Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 506 (1977) (plurality opinion). Unlike the housing ordinance we invalidated in Moore v. East Cleveland, the statute before us imposes residence requirements that are justified by substantial state interests on children who live apart from their parents, § 21.031(d), and on children who live with their parents, §§ 21.031(b) and (c); see Mills v. Bartlett, 377 S. W. 2d 636, 637 (Tex. 1964); Snyder v. Pitts, 150 Tex. 407,412-417, 241 S. W. 2d 136, 139-141 (1951); Whitney v. State, 472 S. W. 2d 524, 525-526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Harrison v. Chesshir, 316 S. W. 2d 909, 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), rev’d on other grounds, 159 Tex. 359, 320 S. W. 2d 814 (1959) (per curiam); Prince v. Inman, 280 S. W. 2d 779, 782 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955). Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, post, at 337-341, we have said nothing about domicile. The Texas statute, like many similar ones, speaks only in terms of residence. We hold simply that a State may impose bona fide residence requirements for tuition-free admission to its public schools. Our conclusion is supported by the fact that several States have recognized the “intention to remain” requirement in this context. See, e. g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-253(d) (Supp. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-1-102(2)(g) (1973); Op. No. 76-94,1975-1976 Biennial Report of the Atty. Gen. of S. D. 660, 662 (1976); Op. No. 2825,1969-1970 Annual Report & Official Opinions of the Atty. Gen. of S. C. 39, 40 (1970); Op. No. 59-146, 1915-1971 Ariz. Atty. Gen. Reports & Opinions 218, 220 (1959); In re VanCurran, 18 Ed. Dept. Rep. 523, 524 (N. Y. Comm’r Educ. 1979). Cf. n. 13, infra. See, e. g., Kiehne v. Atwood, 93 N. M. 657, 662, 604 P. 2d 123, 128 (1979); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 269-270, 501 P. 2d 266, 272 (1972); Estate of Schoof v. Schoof, 193 Kan. 611, 614, 396 P. 2d 329, 331-332 (1964); Hughes v. Illinois Public Aid Comm’n, 2 Ill. 2d 374, 380,118 N. E. 2d 14,17 (1954); Spratt v. Spratt, 210 La. 370, 371, 27 So. 2d 154,154 (1946); Appeal of Lawrence County in re Forman, 71 S. D. 49, 51, 21 N. W. 2d 57, 58 (1945); Jenkins v. North Shore Dye House, Inc., 277 Mass. 440, 444, 178 N. E. 644, 646 (1931); Thomas v. Warner, 83 Md. 14, 20, 34 A. 830, 831 (1896); Pfoutz v. Comford, 36 Pa. 420, 422 (1860). Of course, the “intention to remain” component of the traditional residency standard does not imply an intention never to leave. Given the mobility of people and families in this country, changing a place of residence is commonplace. The standard accommodates that possibility as long as there is a bona fide present intention to remain. See n. 11, supra. In most cases, of course, it is the intention of the parent or guardian on behalf of the child that is relevant. See Deterly v. Wells, 53 S. W. 2d 847, 848 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (minor presumed to lack capacity to form requisite intention necessary to establish separate domicile). But for convenience we speak of the child’s intention. Respondents have conceded that “the statute permits any child to attend school in a district in which he is present for the purpose of ‘establishing a home.’” Brief for Respondents 25. But even if §21.031(d) could be read to exclude a child who moves to a school district with the intent of making his home there when the desire to make the new home is motivated solely by the desire to attend school, Martinez does not have standing to raise such a claim. The record shows that Morales does not intend to make his home in McAllen: the District Court found as a fact that “Morales only intends to reside in the McAllen Independent School District until he completes his education.” 482 F. Supp., at 214. He thus fails to satisfy even this most basic criterion of residence.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WISCONSIN v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al. No. 94-1614. Argued January 10, 1996 Decided March 20, 1996 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Solicitor General Days argued the cause for the federal petitioners. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Malcolm L. Stewart, and Mark B. Stern. James E. Doyle, Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for petitioners in No. 94-1614 and No. 94-1631. With him on the brief for petitioner in No. 94-1614 was Peter C. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General. Don G. Holladay and Shelia D. Tims filed briefs for petitioner in No. 94-1631. Robert S. Rifkind argued the cause for respondents in all cases. With him on the brief were Paul A. Crotty, Lorna B. Goodman, Peter L. Zimroth, Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of New York, Victoria Graffeo, Solicitor General, Barbara Billet, Deputy Solicitor General, and Lula Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, James K. Hahn, Susan S. Sher, Benna Ruth Solomon, Robert A. Ginsburg, Helen M. Gros, Dennis Hayes, Frank Shafroth, Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas, and Javier P. Guajardo, Special Assistant Attorney General, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, and George L. Waas, Assistant Attorney General, Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General of New Jersey, and Michael S. Bokar, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, and Robert Carey, First Assistant Attorney General, Tom Udall, Attorney General of New Mexico, and Christopher D. Coppin, Assistant Attorney General, Ada Treiger, John J. Copelan, Jr., Louise Renne, Burk E. Delventhal, Stan M. Sharoff, T. Michael Mather, John P. Frank, Avis M. Russell, Nicholas Rodriguez, Robert Cohen, Michael W L. McCrory, George Rios, Burton H. Levin, Pastel Vann, Assistant Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia, and Kendrick Smith. Together with No. 94-1631, Oklahoma v. City of New York et al., and No. 94-1985, Department of Commerce et al. v. City of New York et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., Attorney General, and John G. Knorr III, Chief Deputy Attorney General; and for United States Senator Herb Kohl et al. by Brady C. Williamson. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the City of Detroit by Linda D. Fegins; and for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Jonathan L. Greenblatt, Paul C. Saunders, Herbert J. Hansell, Norman Redlich, Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson, Christopher A. Hansen, Steven R. Shapiro, Samuel Rabinove, Elaine R. Jones, Theodore M. Shaw, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Arthur N. Eisenberg. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. In conducting the 1990 United States Census, the Secretary of Commerce decided not to use a particular statistical adjustment that had been designed to correct an undercount in the initial enumeration. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Secretary’s decision was subject to heightened scrutiny because of its effect on the right of individual respondents to have their vote counted equally. We hold that the Secretary’s decision was not subject to heightened scrutiny, and that it conformed to applicable constitutional and statutory provisions. The Constitution requires an “actual Enumeration” of the population every 10 years and vests Congress with the authority to conduct that census “in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.” Art. I, § 2, cl. 3. Through the Census Act, 13 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., Congress has delegated to the Secretary of the Department of Commerce the responsibility to take “a decennial census of [the] population ... in such form and content as he may determine ....” § 141(a). The Secretary is assisted in the performance of that responsibility by the Bureau of the Census and its head, the Director of the Census. See §2; §21 (“[The] Director shall perform such duties as may be imposed upon him by law, regulations, or orders of the Secretary”). The Constitution provides that the results of the census shall be used to apportion the Members of the House of Representatives among the States. See Art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives ... shall be apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers . . .”); Arndt. 14, §2 (“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State . . .”). Because the Constitution provides that the number of Representatives apportioned to each State determines in part the allocation to each State of votes for the election of the President, the decennial census also affects the allocation of members of the electoral college. See Art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint... a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . .”). Today, census data also have important consequences not delineated in the Constitution: The Federal Government considers census data in dispensing funds through federal programs to the States, and the States use the results in drawing intrastate political districts. There have been 20 decennial censuses in the history of the United States. Although each was designed with the goal of accomplishing an “actual Enumeration” of the population, no census is recognized as having been wholly successful in achieving that goal. Cf. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 732 (1983) (recognizing that “census data are not perfect,” and that “population counts for particular localities are outdated long before they are completed”); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 745 (1973) (census data “are inherently less than absolutely accurate”). Despite consistent efforts to improve the quality of the count, errors persist. Persons who should have been counted are not counted at all or are counted at the wrong location; persons who should not have been counted (whether because they died before or were born after the decennial census date, because they were not a resident of the country, or because they did not exist) are counted; and persons who should have been counted only once are counted twice. It is thought that these errors have resulted in a net “undercount” of the actual American population in every decennial census. In 1970, for instance, the Census Bureau concluded that the census results were 2.7% lower than the actual population. Brief for Respondents 12. The undercount is not thought to be spread consistently across the population: Some segments of the population are “undercounted” to a greater degree than are others, resulting in a phenomenon termed the “differential undercount.” Since at least 1940, the Census Bureau has thought that the undercount affects some racial and ethnic minority groups to a greater extent than it does whites. In 1940, for example, when the undercount for the entire population was 5.4%, the undercount for blacks was estimated at 8.4% (and the under-count for whites at 5.0%). Ibid. The problem of the differential undercount has persisted even as the census has come to provide a more numerically accurate count of the population. In the 1980 census, for example, the overall under-count was estimated at 1.2%, and the undercount of blacks was estimated at 4.9%. Ibid. The Census Bureau has recognized the undercount and the differential undercount as significant problems, and in the past has devoted substantial effort toward achieving their reduction. Most recently, in its preparations for the 1990 census, the Bureau initiated an extensive inquiry into various means of overcoming the impact of the undercount and the differential undercount. As part of this effort, the Bureau created two task forces: the Undercount Steering Committee, responsible for planning undercount research and policy development; and the Undercount Research Staff (URS), which conducted research into various methods of improving the accuracy of the census. In addition, the Bureau consulted with state and local governments and various outside experts and organizations. Largely as a result of these efforts, the Bureau adopted a wide variety of measures designed to reduce the rate of error in the 1990 enumeration, including an extensive advertising campaign, a more easily completed census questionnaire, and increased use of automation, which among other things facilitated the development of accurate maps and geographic files for the 1990 census. Pet. App. 321a-322a. The Bureau also implemented a number of improvements specifically targeted at eliminating the differential undercount; these included advertising campaigns developed by and directed at traditionally undercounted populations and expanded questionnaire assistance operations for non-English speaking residents. Ibid. In preparing for the 1990 census, the Bureau and the task forces also looked into the possibility of using large-scale statistical adjustment to compensate for the undercount and differential undercount. Although the Bureau had previously considered that possibility (most recently in 1980), it always had decided instead to rely upon more traditional methodology and the results of the enumeration. See Cuomo v. Baldrige, 674 F. Supp. 1089 (SDNY 1987) (noting that Bureau rejected large-scale statistical adjustment of the 1980 census). In 1985, preliminary investigations by the URS suggested that the most promising method of statistical adjustment was the “capture-recapture” or “dual system estimation” (DSE) approach. The particular variations of the DSE considered by the Bureau are not important for purposes of this opinion, but an example may serve to make the DSE more understandable. Imagine that one wanted to use DSE in order to determine the number of pumpkins in a large pumpkin patch. First, one would choose a particular section of the patch as the representative subset to which the “recapture” phase will be applied. Let us assume here that it is a section exactly one-tenth the size of the entire patch that is selected. Then, at the next step — the “capture” stage — one would conduct a fairly quick count of the entire patch, making sure to record both the number of pumpkins counted in the entire patch and the number of pumpkins counted in the selected section. Let us imagine that this stage results in a count of 10,000 pumpkins for the entire patch and 1,000 pumpkins for the selected section. Next, at the “recapture” stage, one would perform an exacting count of the number of pumpkins in the selected section. Let us assume that we now count 1,100 pumpkins in that section. By comparing the results of the “capture” phase and the results of the “recapture” phase for the selected section, it is possible to estimate that approximately 100 pumpkins actually in the patch were missed for every 1,000 counted at the “capture” phase. Extrapolating this data to the count for the entire patch, one would conclude that the actual number of pumpkins in the patch is 11,000. In the context of the census, the initial enumeration of the entire population (the “capture”) would be followed by the postenumeration survey (PES) (the “recapture”) of certain representative geographical areas. The Bureau would then compare the results of the PES to the results of the initial enumeration for those areas targeted by the PES, in order to determine a rate of error in those areas for the initial enumeration (i. e., the rate at which the initial enumeration undercounted people in those areas). That rate of error would be extrapolated to the entire population, and thus would be used to statistically adjust the results of the initial enumeration. The URS thought that the PES also held some promise for correcting the differential undercount. The PES would be conducted through the use of a system called post-stratification. Thus, each person counted through the PES would be placed into one, and only one, of over 1,000 post-strata defined by five categories: geography; age; sex; status of housing unit (rent versus own); and race (including Hispanic versus non-Hispanic origin). By comparing the post-stratified PES data to the results of the initial enumeration, the Bureau would be able to estimate not only an overall undercount rate, but also an undercount rate for each post-strata. Hence, the statistical adjustment of the census could reflect differences in the undercount rate for each poststrata. Through the mid-1980’s, the Bureau conducted a series of field tests and statistical studies designed to measure the utility of the PES as a tool for adjusting the census. The Director of the Bureau decided to adopt a PES-based adjustment, and in June 1987, he informed his superiors in the Department of Commerce of that decision. The Secretary of Commerce disagreed with the Director’s decision to adjust, however, and in October 1987, the Department of Commerce announced that the 1990 census would not be statistically adjusted. In November 1988, several plaintiffs (including a number of the respondents in this action) brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, arguing that the Secretary’s decision against statistical adjustment of the 1990 census was unconstitutional and contrary to federal law. The parties entered into an interim stipulation providing, inter alia, that the Secretary would reconsider the possibility of a statistical adjustment. In July 1991, the Secretary issued his decision not to use the PES to adjust the 1990 census. Pet. App. 135a-415a. The Secretary began by noting that large-scale statistical adjustment of the census through the PES would “abandon a two hundred year tradition of how we actually count people.” Id., at 138a. Before taking a “step of that magnitude,” he held, it was necessary to be “certain that it would make the census better and the distribution of the population more accurate.” Ibid. Emphasizing that the primary purpose of the census was to apportion political representation among the States, the Secretary concluded that “the primary criterion for accuracy should be distributive accuracy — that is, getting most nearly correct the proportions of people in different areas.” Id., at 146a-147a. After reviewing the recommendations of his advisers and the voluminous statistical research that had been compiled, the Secretary concluded that although numerical accuracy (at the national level) might be improved through statistical adjustment, he could not be confident that the distributive accuracy of the census — particularly at the state and local level — would be improved by a PES-based adjustment. Id., at 140a-141a, 200a-201a. In particular, the Secretary noted, the adjusted figures became increasingly unreliable as one focused upon smaller and smaller political subdivisions. Id., at 142a. The Secretary stated that his decision not to adjust was buttressed by a concern that adjustment of the 1990 census might present significant problems in the future. Id., at 143a. Because small changes in adjustment methodology would have a large impact upon apportionment — an impact that could be determined before a particular methodology was chosen — the Secretary found that statistical adjustment of the 1990 census might open the door to political tampering in the future. The Secretary also noted that statistical adjustment might diminish the incentive for state and local political leaders to assist in the conduct of the initial enumeration. See id., at 143a-144a. In conclusion, the Secretary stated that the Bureau would continue its research into the possibility of statistical adjustment of future censuses, and would maintain its efforts to improve the accuracy and inclusiveness of the initial enumeration. Id., at 145a. The plaintiffs returned to court. The District Court concluded that the Secretary’s decision violated neither the Constitution nor federal law. See New York v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 822 F. Supp. 906 (EDNY 1993). Respondents appealed, arguing that the District Court had adopted the wrong standard of review for their constitutional claim, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed by a divided vote. 34 F. 3d 1114 (1994); Pet. App. 1a-40a. The majority looked to a line of precedent involving judicial review of intrastate districting decisions, see, e. g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725 (1983); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964), and found that a heightened standard of review was required here both because the Secretary’s decision impacted a fundamental right, viz., the right to have one’s vote counted, and because the decision had a disproportionate impact upon certain identifiable minority racial groups. 34 F. 3d, at 1128. The court then held that the plaintiffs had shown that the Secretary had failed to make a good-faith effort to achieve equal districts as nearly as possible, id., at 1130, and therefore that the defendants must bear the burden of proving that population deviations were necessary to achieve some legitimate state goal, id., at 1131. The court remanded for an inquiry into whether the Secretary could show that the decision not to adjust was essential for the achievement of a legitimate governmental objective. Ibid. The dissenting judge stated that he would have affirmed based upon the decision of the District Court. See ibid. He also noted that the majority’s decision created a conflict with two other decisions of the Courts of Appeals. See Detroit v. Franklin, 4 F. 3d 1367 (CA6 1993), and Tucker v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 958 F. 2d 1411 (CA7 1992). Wisconsin, Oklahoma, and the United States each filed a petition for certiorari. We granted those petitions, and consolidated them for argument. 515 U. S. 1190 (1995). We now reverse. II In recent years, we have twice considered constitutional challenges to the conduct of the census. In Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U. S. 442 (1992), the State of Montana, several state officials, and Montana’s Members of Congress brought suit against the Federal Government, challenging as unconstitutional the method used to determine the number of Representatives to which each State is entitled. A majority of a three-judge District Court looked to the principle of equal representation for equal numbers of people that was applied to intrastate districting in Wesberry v. Sanders, supra, and held it applicable to congressional apportionment of seats among the States. Noting a significant variance between the population of Montana’s single district and the population of the “ideal district,” the court found that Congress’ chosen method of apportionment violated the principle of Wesberry, and therefore voided the federal statute providing the method of apportionment. In a unanimous decision, this Court reversed. We began by revisiting Wesberry, a case in which the Court held unconstitutional wide disparities in the population of congressional districts drawn by the State of Georgia. Montana, supra, at 459-460. We recognized that the principle of Wesberry— “ ‘equal representation for equal numbers of people’ ” — had evolved though a line of cases into a strictly enforced requirement that a State “ ‘make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality”’ among the populations of congressional districts. See Montana, supra, at 460, quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526, 530-531 (1969) (disparities between congressional districts in Missouri held unconstitutional); see also Karcher v. Daggett, supra (1% disparity between population of New Jersey districts held unconstitutional). Returning to Montana’s challenge to Congress’ apportionment decision, we noted that the Wesberry line of cases all involved intrastate disparities in the population of voting districts that had resulted from a State’s redistricting decisions, whereas Montana had challenged interstate disparities resulting from the actions of Congress. Montana, supra, at 460. We found this difference to be significant beyond the simple fact that Congress was due more deference than the States in this area. Wesberry required a State to make “a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality” in the size of voting districts. Kirkpatrick, supra, at 530-531. While this standard could be applied easily to intrastate dis-tricting because there was no “theoretical incompatibility entailed in minimizing both the absolute and the relative differences” in the sizes of particular voting districts, we observed that it was not so easily applied to interstate districting decisions where there was a direct tradeoff between absolute and relative differences in size. Montana, supra, at 461-462. Finding that Montana demanded that we choose between several measures of inequality in order to hold the Wesberry standard applicable to congressional apportionment decisions, we concluded that “[n]either mathematical analysis nor constitutional interpretation provide[d] a conclusive answer” upon which to base that choice. Montana, supra, at 463. We further found that the Constitution itself, by guaranteeing a minimum of one representative for each State, made it virtually impossible in interstate apportionment to achieve the standard imposed by Wesberry. Montana, supra, at 463. In conclusion, we recognized the historical pedigree of the challenged method of apportionment, and reemphasized that Congress’ “good-faith choice of a method of apportionment of Representatives among the several States ‘according to their respective Numbers’ commands far more deference than a state districting decision that is capable of being reviewed under a relatively rigid mathematical standard.” Montana, supra, at 464. In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788 (1992), we reiterated our conclusion that the Constitution vests Congress with wide discretion over apportionment decisions and the conduct of the census. In Franklin, the State of Massachusetts and two of its registered voters sued the Federal Government, arguing that the method used by the Secretary to count federal employees serving overseas was (among other things) unconstitutional. Restating the standard of review established by Montana, we examined the Secretary’s decision in order to determine whether it was “consistent with the constitutional language and the constitutional goal of equal representation.” See Franklin, supra, at 804; Montana, supra, at 459. After a review of the historical practice in the area, we found that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving that a decision contrary to that made by the Secretary would “make representation . . . more equal.” Franklin, 505 U. S., at 806. Concluding that the Secretary’s decision reflected a “judgment, consonant with, though not dictated by, the text and history of the Constitution . . . ,” we held the Secretary’s decision to be well within the constitutional limits on his discretion. Ibid. In its decision in this action, the Court of Appeals found that a standard more strict than that established in Montana and Franklin should apply to the Secretary’s decision not to statistically adjust the census. The court looked to equal protection principles distilled from the same line of state redistricting cases relied upon by the plaintiffs in Montana, and found that both the nature of the right asserted by respondents — the right to have one’s vote counted equally— and the nature of the affected classes — “certain identifiable minority groups” — required that the Secretary’s decision be given heightened scrutiny. 34 F. 3d, at 1128. The court drew from the District Court’s decision “implicit” findings: that the census did not achieve equality of voting power as nearly as practicable; “that for most purposes and for most of the population [the PES-based] adjustment would result in a more accurate count than the original census; and that the adjustment would lessen the disproportionate under-counting of minorities.” Id., at 1129. The court recognized two significant differences between the intrastate districting cases and the instant action: first, that this case involves the federal rather than a state government; and second, that constitutional requirements make it impossible to achieve precise equality in voting power nationwide. Ibid. But it found these differences nondetermi-native, deciding that no deference was owed to the Executive Branch on a question of law, and that the “impossibility of achieving precise mathematical equality is no excuse for [the Federal Government] not making [the] mandated good-faith effort.” Ibid. The court found that the respondents here had established a prima facie violation of the Wesberry standard both by showing that the PES-based adjustment would increase numerical accuracy, and by virtue of the fact that “the differential undercount in the 1990 enumeration was plainly foreseeable and foreseen.” 34 F. 3d, at 1130-1131. The court held that the Secretary’s decision would have to be vacated as unconstitutional unless on remand he could show that the decision not to adjust “(a) furthers a governmental objective that is legitimate, and (b) is essential for the achievement of that objective.” Id., at 1131. We think that the Court of Appeals erred in holding the “one person-one vote” standard of Wesberry and its progeny applicable to the action at hand. For several reasons, the “good-faith effort to achieve population equality” required of a State conducting intrastate redistricting does not translate into a requirement that the Federal Government conduct a census that is as accurate as possible. First, we think that the Court of Appeals understated the significance of the two differences that it recognized between state redistricting cases and the instant action. The court failed to recognize that the Secretary’s decision was made pursuant to Congress’ direct delegation of its broad authority over the census. See Art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (Congress may conduct the census “in such Manner as they shall by Law direct”). The court also undervalued the significance of the fact that the Constitution makes it impossible to achieve population equality among interstate districts. As we have noted before, the Constitution provides that “[t]he number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000 persons; each State shall have at least one Representative; and district boundaries may not cross state lines.” Montana, 503 U. S., at 447-448. While a court can easily determine whether a State has made the requisite “good-faith effort” toward population equality through the application of a simple mathematical formula, we see no way in which a court can apply the Wes-berry standard to the Federal Government’s decisions regarding the conduct of the census. The Court of Appeals found that Wesberry required the Secretary to conduct a census that would “achieve voting-power equality,” which it understood to mean a census that was as accurate as possible. 34 F. 3d, at 1129. But in so doing, the court implicitly found that the Constitution prohibited the Secretary from preferring distributive accuracy to numerical accuracy, and that numerical accuracy — which the court found to be improved by a PES-based adjustment — was constitutionally preferable to distributive accuracy. See id., at 1131 (“[T]he Secretary did not make the required effort to achieve numerical accuracy as nearly as practicable,. . . the burden thus shifted to the Secretary to justify his decision not to adjust.. .”). As in Montana, where we could see no constitutional basis upon which to choose between absolute equality and relative equality, so here can we see no ground for preferring numerical accuracy to distributive accuracy, or for preferring gross accuracy to some particular measure of accuracy. The Constitution itself provides no real instruction on this point, and extrapolation from our intrastate districting cases is equally unhelpful.' Quite simply, “[t]he polestar of equal representation does not provide sufficient guidance to allow us to discern a single constitutionally permissible course.” Montana, supra, at 463. In Montana, we held that Congress’ “apparently good-faith choice of a method of apportionment of Representatives among the several States ‘according to their respective Numbers’” was not subject to strict scrutiny under Wesberry. Montana, supra, at 464. With that conclusion in mind, it is difficult to see why or how Wesberry would apply to the Federal Government’s conduct of the census — a context even further removed' from intrastate districting than is congressional apportionment. Congress’ conduct of the census, even more than its decision concerning apportionment, “commands far more deference than a state districting decision that is capable of being reviewed under a relatively rigid mathematical standard.” Montana, supra, at 464. Rather than the standard adopted by the Court of Appeals, we think that it is the standard established by this Court in Montana and Franklin that applies to the Secretary’s decision not to adjust. The text of the Constitution vests Congress with virtually unlimited discretion in conducting the decennial “actual Enumeration,” see Art. I, §2, cl. 3, and notwithstanding the plethora of lawsuits that inevitably accompany each decennial census, there is no basis for thinking that Congress’ discretion is more limited than the text of the Constitution provides. See also Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U. S. 345, 361 (1982) (noting broad scope of Congress’ discretion over census). Through the Census Act, Congress has delegated its broad authority over the census to the Secretary. See 13 U. S. C. § 141(a) (Secretary shall take “a decennial census of [the] population ... in such form and content as he may determine . . .”). Hence, so long as the Secretary’s conduct of the census is “consistent with the constitutional language and the constitutional goal of equal representation,” Franklin, 505 U. S., at 804, it is within the limits of the Constitution. In light of the Constitution’s broad grant of authority to Congress, the Secretary’s decision not to adjust need bear only a reasonable relationship to the accomplishment of an actual enumeration of the population, keeping in mind the constitutional purpose of the census. In 1990, the Census Bureau made an extraordinary effort to conduct an accurate enumeration, and was successful in counting 98.4% of the population. See 58 Fed. Reg. 70 (1993); Brief for Federal Parties 28. The Secretary then had to consider whether to adjust the census using statistical data derived from the PES. He based his decision not to adjust the census upon three determinations. First, he held that in light of the constitutional purpose of the census, its distributive accuracy was more important than its numerical accuracy. Second, he determined that the unadjusted census data would be considered the most distributive^ accurate absent a showing to the contrary. And finally, after reviewing the results of the PES in light of extensive research and the recommendations of his advisers, the Secretary found that the PES-based adjustment would not improve distributive accuracy. Each of these three determinations is well within the bounds of the Secretary’s constitutional discretion. As we have already seen, supra, at 18, the Secretary’s decision to focus on distributive accuracy is not inconsistent with the Constitution. Indeed, a preference for distributive accuracy (even at the expense of some numerical accuracy) would seem to follow from the constitutional purpose of the census, viz., to determine the apportionment of the Representatives among the States. Respondents do not dispute this point. See Brief for Respondents 54 (“Distributive accuracy is an appropriate criterion for judging census accuracy because it calls attention to a concern with the uses to which census data are put”). Rather, they challenge the Secretary’s first determination by arguing that he improperly “regarded evidence of superior numeric accuracy as ‘not relevant’ to the determination of distributive accuracy.” Id., at 39 (quoting Pet. App. 201a); see also Brief for Respondents 51-54. In support of this argument, respondents note that an enumeration that results in increased numerical accuracy will also result in increased distributive accuracy. We think that respondents rest too much upon the statement by the Secretary to which they refer. When quoted in full, the statement reads: “While the preponderance of the evidence leads me to believe that the total population at the national level falls between the census counts and the adjusted figures, that conclusion is not relevant to the determination of distributive accuracy.” Pet. App. 201a. In his decision, the Secretary found numerical accuracy (in addition to distributive accuracy) to be relevant to his decision whether to adjust. See id., at 157a. Even if the Secretary had chosen to subordinate numerical accuracy, we are not sure why the fact that distributive and numerical accuracy correlate closely in an improved enumeration would require the Secretary to conclude that they correlate also for a PES-based statistical adjustment. Turning to the Secretary’s second determination, we previously have noted, and respondents do not dispute, the importance of historical practice in this area. See Franklin, supra, at 803-806 (noting importance of historical experience in conducting the census); cf. Montana, 503 U. S., at 465 (“To the extent that the potentially divisive and complex issues associated with apportionment can be narrowed by the adoption of both procedural and substantive rules that are consistently applied year after year, the public is well served . . .”). Nevertheless, respondents challenge the Secretary’s second determination by arguing that his understanding of historical practice is flawed. According to respondents, the Secretary assumed that the census traditionally was conducted via a simple “headcount,” thereby ignoring the fact that statistical adjustment had been used in both the 1970 and 1980 censuses. See Brief for Respondents 4-5. We need not tarry long with this argument.' The Secretary reasonably recognized that a PES-based statistical adjustment would be a significant change from the traditional method of conducting the census. The statistical adjustments in 1970 and 1980 to which respondents refer were of an entirely different type than the adjustment considered here, and they took place on a dramatically smaller scale. See Cuomo v. Baldrige, 674 F. Supp., at 1107 (rejecting argument that Secretary had to conduct PES-like statistical adjustment of 1980 census and finding that “none of [the] adjustments in 1970 were even remotely similar to the types of wholesale adjustments presently suggested . . .”). Moreover, the PES-based adjustment would have been the first time in history that the States’ apportionment would have been based upon counts in other States. See Pet. App. 251a-252a. Here, the Secretary’s understanding of the traditional method of conducting the census was well founded, as was his establishment of a rebuttable presumption that the traditional method was the most accurate. The Secretary ultimately determined that the available evidence “tends to support the superior distributive accuracy of the actual enumeration,” id., at 185a, and it is this determination at which respondents direct the brunt of their attack. Respondents contend that the Secretary’s review of the evidence is due no deference from this Court. They argue that the Secretary’s decision is not the sort of “highly technical” administrative decision that normally commands judicial deference, and that regardless of its technical complexity, the Secretary’s review of the evidence presents a constitutional issue that deserves no deference. Respondents contend that the Secretary’s review of the evidence is of dubious validity because the Secretary is admittedly “not a statistician,” id., at 139a, and because his conclusion is at odds with that of the Director of the Census. According to respondents, we should carefully comb the Secretary’s decision in order to review his conclusions de novo. Respondents’ argument fundamentally misapprehends the basis for our deference to the Secretary’s determination that the adjusted census results do not provide a more distributively accurate count of the population. Our deference arises not from the highly technical nature of his decision, but rather from the wide discretion bestowed by the Constitution upon Congress, and by Congress upon the Secretary. Regardless of the Secretary’s statistical expertise, it is he to whom Congress has delegated its constitutional authority over the census. For that same reason, the mere fact that the Secretary’s decision overruled the views of some of his subordinates is by itself of no moment in any judicial review of his decision. Turning finally to review the Secretary’s conclusion that the PES-based adjustment would not improve distributive accuracy, we need note only that the Secretary’s conclusion is supported by the reasoning of some of his advisers, and was therefore a reasonable choice in an area where technical experts disagree. Cf. Tucker v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 958 F. 2d, at 1418 (Plaintiffs seeking PES-based statistical adjustment “are asking [courts] to take sides in a dispute among statisticians, demographers, and census officials concerning the desirability of making a statistical adjustment to the census headcount”). The Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs and the Administrator of the Economics and Statistics Administration both voted against adjustment. Pet. App. 59a, 140a. Moreover, even those who recommended in favor of adjustment recognized that their conclusion was not compelled by the evidence: The Director of the Census Bureau, upon whose recommendation respondents heavily rely, stated in her report to the Secretary that “[adjustment is an issue about which reasonable men and women and the best statisticians and demographers can disagree.” App. 73. And one of the principal statisticians at the Bureau, Dr. Robert E. Fay, “ ‘told the Secretary that . . . reasonable statisticians could differ’ ” on the question of adjustment. Pet. App. 91a. Therefore, and because we find the Secretary’s two prior determinations as well to be entirely reasonable, we conclude that his decision not to adjust the 1990 census was “consonant with . . . the text and history of the Constitution.” Franklin, 505 U. S., at 806. Ill The Constitution confers upon Congress the responsibility to conduct an “actual Enumeration” of the American public every 10 years, with the primary purpose of providing a basis for apportioning political representation among the States. Here, the Secretary of Commerce, to whom Congress has delegated its constitutional authority over the census, determined that in light of the constitutional purpose of the census, an “actual Enumeration” would best be achieved without the PES-based statistical adjustment of the results of the initial enumeration. We find that conclusion entirely reasonable. Therefore we hold that the Secretary’s decision was well within the constitutional bounds of discretion over the conduct of the census provided to the Federal Government. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. The Census Clause provides in full: “The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.” Art. I, §2, cl. 3. Indeed, even the first census did not escape criticism. Thomas Jefferson, who oversaw the conduct of that census in 1790 as Secretary of State, was confident that it had significantly undercounted the young Nation’s population. See C. Wright, History and Growth of the United States Census 16-17 (1900). One might wonder how the Census Bureau is able to determine whether there is an undercount and its size. Specifically: Against what standard are the census results measured? After all, if the actual population of the United States is known, then the conduct of the census would seem wholly redundant. For the most part, we are told, the size of the error in a particular census is determined by comparing the census results not with some definite and established measure of the population, but rather with estimates of the population developed from demographic data. See App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 94-1614, pp. 158a-168a, 366a-369a (hereinafter Pet. App.). A similar procedure traditionally has been used to determine the size and makeup of the differential undercount, see infra, at 9-10. All references to Pet. App. are to the appendix to the petition for certiorari in No. 94-1614 unless otherwise noted. Examples of poststrata actually used include: female blacks between the ages of 20 and 29 who owned a home in either Detroit or Chicago; nonblack non-Hispanic females, aged 45-64, living in owned or rented housing in a nonmetropolitan area with a population of 10,000 or more in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, or Wyoming; and male Asians or Pacific Islanders, aged 65 or above, renting a home in either the Los Angeles-Long Beach area or another central city in a metropolitan area in Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, or Washington. The distinction between distributive and numerical accuracy becomes clear with an example. Imagine that the Bureau somehow were able to determine definitely that the census had failed to count exactly 10 million people nationwide. If those 10 million “persons” were added to the Nation’s total population, and all 10 million were allocated to one particular State, then the numerical accuracy of the census would be improved, but the distributive accuracy would almost certainly be significantly impaired. Respondents did not appeal the District Court’s treatment of their statutory claims. Nor do we think that strict scrutiny applies here for some other reason. Strict scrutiny of a classification affecting a protected class is properly invoked only where a plaintiff can show intentional discrimination by the Government. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239-245 (1976). Respondents here have not argued that the Secretary’s decision not to adjust was based upon an intent to discriminate on the basis of race. Indeed, in light of the Government’s extraordinary efforts to include traditionally undercounted minorities in the 1990 census, see Pet. App. 78a, 321a-322a, we think that respondents here would have had a tough row to hoe had they set out to prove intentional discrimination by the Secretary. We do not decide whether the Constitution might prohibit Congress from conducting the type of statistical adjustment considered here. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 94-1614, pp. 40-42. See, e. g., Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788, 790 (1992) (“As one season follows another, the decennial census has again generated a number of reapportionment controversies”); National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty v. Brown, appeal pending, No. 94-5312 (CADC) (argued Oct. 6,1995) (challenging Census Bureau’s procedures for finding and counting homeless persons); Carey v. Klutznick, 637 F. 2d 834 (CA2 1980) (seeking order directing Census Bureau to adopt certain processes for counting persons); Borough of Bethel Park v. Stans, 449 F. 2d 575 (CA3 1971). We do not here decide the precise bounds of the authority delegated to the Secretary through the Census Act. First, because no party here has suggested that Congress has, in its delegation of authority over the conduct of the census to the Secretary, constrained the Secretary’s authority to decide not to adjust the census, we assume here that the Secretary’s discretion not to adjust the census is commensurate with that of Congress. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 94-1614, p. 24, n. 19 (stating that “Congress did not enact any ... legislation ... to compel... statistical adjustment” of the 1990 census). Second, although Oklahoma argues that Congress has constrained the Secretary’s discretion to statistically adjust the decennial census, see 13 U. S. C. § 195, we need not decide that question in order to resolve this action.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CHICAGO & EASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD CO. et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 275. Decided December 2, 1963. Richard M. Freeman and F. F. Vesper for appellants. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Or-rick, Lionel Kestenbaum, Elliott H. Moyer, Robert W. Ginnane and Stanton P. Sender for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission. Richard J. Murphy, John W. Hanifin and Robert H. Bierma for rail carrier appellees. Per Curiam. The motion to add the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company et al., as parties appellee, is granted. The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

REISMAN et al., doing business as TRAMMELL, RAND & NATHAN, v. CAPLIN et al. No. 119. Argued December 12, 1963. —Decided January 20, 1964. Warren E. Magee argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Hans A. Nathan. Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Caplin were Solicitor General Cox, Stephen J. Poliak, Joseph M. Howard and Norman Sepenuk. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners, attorneys for taxpayers Martin J. and Allyn Bromley, seek declaratory and injunctive relief against respondent Caplin, the Internal Revenue Commissioner, and the accounting firm of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., which at the instance of petitioners has been working on the financial records of the Bromleys. Petitioners claim as null and void summonses issued by the Commissioner, under § 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, to Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., directing the production of “all audit reports, work papers and correspondence” in that firm’s custody pertaining to Mr. Bromley and his several business interests. The contention is that the enforced production of the papers is an unlawful appropriation of petitioners’ work product and trial preparation as well as an unreasonable seizure requiring the Bromleys to incriminate themselves and depriving them of the effective assistance of counsel. The District Court concluded that petitioners had no standing to sue; that the complaint failed to state a cause of action; that none of the papers were the work product of the petitioners; and, that the papers did not fall within the attorney-client privilege. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but on the entirely different theory that the suit was, in substance, one against the United States to which it had not consented. 115 U. S. App. D. C. 59, 317 F. 2d 123. We granted certiorari, 374 U. S. 825, and have concluded that petitioners have an adequate remedy at law and that the complaint is therefore subject to dismissal for want of equity. This obviates our passing upon any of the other questions presented. I. Petitioner Reisman, an attorney of California, had for several years represented the Bromleys. In April 1960 he associated with himself the three other attorney petitioners of Washington, D. C., as counsel in connection with the Bromleys’ tax matters. Petitioners employed the accounting firm of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. to assist them in connection with certain civil and criminal tax proceedings arising from the alleged tax liability of the Bromleys. Under the supervision of the petitioners, the accountants analyzed various original records of Mr. Bromley and his business interests and made periodic reports thereof. The products of the joint work of the accountants together with all of the records and papers of Bromley furnished them by the petitioners were kept separate in the accounting firm’s files and labeled as the property of petitioners. The subpoenas were served on June 13, 1961, after Bromley had refused to make his papers available upon being informed that a criminal investigation against him was pending. The subpoenas were directed to three separate branches of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., located in Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York. They required the accountants to testify before a special agent of the Commissioner on the work performed and also to produce all documents, work papers and other material in their possession with regard to the Bromley matters. At the time of service there were four civil tax cases pending in the Tax Court contesting alleged deficiencies in income tax returns of the Bromleys. In addition, a criminal investigation of Mr. Bromley on the tax matters was in progress. None of the parties involved here had prepared the tax returns under scrutiny nor advised the Bromleys with regard to the same. On July 7,1961, petitioners filed the complaint involved here. They alleged that Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. intended to comply with the subpoenas. This would result, they claimed, in an unlawful appropriation of their work product and trial preparation as well as an unconstitutional seizure of confidential and privileged documents for future use in civil and criminal litigation against petitioners’ clients, the Bromleys. They moved for and obtained a temporary restraining order which was later dissolved when the complaint was dismissed. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the complaint was properly dismissed because “it is not within the court’s jurisdiction because it is in substance a suit against the United States to which it has not consented.” 115 U. S. App. D. C. 59, 61, 317 F. 2d 123, 125. The case reaches us at a stage when the only affirmative action taken by the Commissioner is the issuance of the summonses for the accountants to appear before a hearing officer, i. e., a special agent of the Internal Revenue Service, to testify and produce records. The accountants have not yet refused to do so. It is therefore necessary that we first consider the statutory scheme which Congress has provided for the issuance and enforcement of the summonses. II. Section 7602 authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, or his delegate, for “the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return . . . , determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax ... , or collecting any such liability . . . [t]o summon the person liable for tax ... , or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax ... , or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear . . . and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry . . . .” The petitioners make no claim that this provision suffers any constitutional infirmity on its face. This Court has never passed upon the rights of a party summoned to appear before a hearing officer under § 7602. However, the Government concedes that a witness or any interested party may attack the summons before the hearing officer. There are cases among the circuits which hold that both parties summoned and those affected .by a disclosure may appear or intervene before the District Court and challenge the summons by asserting their constitutional or other claims. In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital, 209 F. 2d 122 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Falsone v. United States, 205 F. 2d 734 (C. A. 5th Cir.); and Corbin Deposit Bank v. United States, 244 F. 2d 177 (C. A. 6th Cir.). We agree with that view and see no reason why the same rule would not apply before the hearing officer. Should the challenge to the summons be rejected by the hearing examiner and the witness still refuse to testify or produce, the examiner is given no power to enforce compliance or to impose sanctions for noncompliance. If the Secretary or his delegate wishes to enforce the summons, he must proceed under § 7402 (b), which grants the District Courts of the United States jurisdiction “by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, or other data.” Any enforcement action under this section would be an adversary proceeding affording a judicial determination of the challenges to the summons and giving complete protection to the witness. In such a proceeding only a refusal to comply with an order of the district judge subjects the witness to contempt proceedings. III. It is urged that the penalties of contempt risked by a refusal to comply with the summonses are so severe that the statutory procedure amounts to a denial of judicial review. The leading cases on this question are Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), and Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331 (1920). However, we do not believe that this point is well taken here. In Young certain railroad rates could be tested only by a failure to comply, which occasioned a risk of both imprisonment and large fines, regardless of the willfulness of the refusal to comply. And in Oklahoma Operating Co. the laundry rate fixed by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission could be tested only by contempt with a penalty of $500 per day, each day being a separate violation. On the other hand, in tax enforcement proceedings the hearing officer has no power of enforcement or right to levy any sanctions. It is true that any person summoned who “neglects to appear or to produce” may be prosecuted under § 7210 and is subject to a fine not exceeding $1,000, or imprisonment for not more than a year, or both. However, this statute on its face does not apply where the witness appears and interposes good faith challenges to the summons. It only prescribes punishment where the witness “neglects” either to appear or to produce. We need not pass upon the coverage of this provision in light of the facts here. It is sufficient to say that noncompliance is not subject to prosecution thereunder when the summons is attacked in good faith. Petitioners also point to § 7604 (b) as posing the risk of arrest should the Commissioner proceed under that section for an “attachment ... as for a contempt.” Arguably, such a sanction, even though temporary, might be a penalty severe enough to bring the section within the rationale of Young, supra, but we do not so read § 7604 (b). This section provides that where “any person summoned . . . neglects or refuses to obey such summons” the Commissioner may proceed before the United States Commissioner or the judge of the District Court “for an attachment against him, as for a contempt.” Upon a showing of “satisfactory proof,” an attachment for the person so refusing is issued and he is brought before the United States Commissioner or the district judge who proceeds “to a hearing of the case.” Upon the hearing the United States Commissioner or the district judge may “make such order as he shall deem proper, not inconsistent with the law for the punishment of con-tempts . . . .” The predecessor of § 7604 (b) was adopted by the Congress in 1864 (13 Stat. 226) at a time when Congress was greatly concerned with tax collection delay. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2440-2441 (1864). The proponents of the bill emphasized that after arrest the witness could assert his objections to the summons. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2997 (1864). It appears to us that the provision was intended only to cover persons who were summoned and wholly made default or contumaciously refused to comply. Section 7402 (b) came into the statute in 1913 (38 Stat. 179) and has been uniformly used since that time. As we read the legislative history, § 7604 (b) remains in this comprehensive procedure provided by Congress to cover only a default or contumacious refusal to honor a summons before a hearing officer. But even in such cases, just as in a criminal prosecution under § 7210, the witness may assert his objections at the hearing before the court which is authorized to make such order as it “shall deem proper.” § 7604 (b). Furthermore, we hold that in any of these procedures before either the district judge or United States Commissioner, the witness may challenge the summons on any appropriate ground. This would include, as the circuits have held, the defenses that the material is sought for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution, Boren v. Tucker, 239 F. 2d 767, 772-773, as well as that it is protected by the attorney-client privilege, Sale v. United States, 228 F. 2d 682. In addition, third parties might intervene to protect their interests, or in the event the taxpayer is not a party to the summons before the hearing officer, he, too, may intervene. See In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital, supra, and Corbin Deposit Bank v. United States, supra. And this would be true whether the contempt be of a civil or criminal nature. Cf. McCrone v. United States, 307 U. S. 61 (1939); Brody v. United States, 243 F. 2d 378. Finally, we hold that such orders are appealable. See O’Connor v. O’Connell, 253 F. 2d 365 (C. A. 1st Cir.) ; In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital, supra; Falsone v. United States, supra; Bouschor v. United States, 316 F. 2d 451 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 128 F. 2d 731 (C. A. 9th Cir.); D. I. Operating Co. v. United States, 321 F. 2d 586 (C. A. 9th Cir.). Contra, Application of Davis, 303 F. 2d 601 (C. A. 7th Cir.). It follows that with a stay order a witness would suffer no injury while testing the summons. Nor would there be a difference should the witness indicate — as has Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. — that he would voluntarily turn the papers over to the Commissioner. If this be true, either the taxpayer or any affected party might restrain compliance, as the Commissioner suggests, until compliance is ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction. This relief was not sought here. Had it been, the Commissioner would have had to proceed for compliance, in which event the petitioners or the Brom-leys might have intervened and asserted their claims. Finding that the remedy specified by Congress works no injustice and suffers no constitutional invalidity, we remit the parties to the comprehensive procedure of the Code, which provides full opportunity for judicial review before any coercive sanctions may be imposed. Cf. United States v. Babcock, 250 U. S. 328, 331 (1919). Affirmed. “§ 7602. Examination of books and witnesses. “For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized— “(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry; “(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and “(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.” These have been heard and are now under advisement in the Tax Court. In their answer Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. admitted the essential allegations in the complaint, except the one alleging that they would voluntarily comply with the subpoenas. As to this they said compliance “could compromise trial preparations” in the Tax Court cases. They joined the prayer of petitioners for relief. Section 7604 (a) and (b) gives an additional remedy which is considered hereafter. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 7210: “Any person who, being duly summoned to appear to testify, or to appear and produce books, accounts, records, memoranda, or other papers, as required under sections 6420 (e) (2), 6421 (f) (2), 7602, 7603, and 7604 (b), neglects to appear or to produce such books, accounts, records, memoranda, or other papers, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together with costs of prosecution.” The only prosecution under § 7210 is United States v. Becker, 259 F. 2d 869. There the word “neglect” was equated with willfulness. The Government admits that the section is inapplicable to persons who appear and in good faith interpose defenses as a basis for noncompliance. Brief for the Respondent Caplin, pp. 9, 22. Cf. Federal Power Comm’n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U. S. 375, 387 (1938). Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 7604 (b): “Enforcement.— Whenever any person summoned under section 6420 (e)(2), 6421 (f)(2), or 7602 neglects or refuses to obey such summons, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, or to give testimony, as required, the Secretary or his delegate may apply to the judge of the district court or to a United States commissioner for the district within which the person so summoned resides or is found for an attachment against him as for a contempt. It shall be the duty of the judge or commissioner to hear the application, and, if satisfactory proof is made, to issue an attachment, directed to some proper officer, for the arrest of such person, and upon his being brought before him to proceed to a hearing of the case; and upon such hearing the judge or the United States commissioner shall have power to make such order as he shall deem proper, not inconsistent with the law for the punishment of contempts, to enforce obedience to the requirements of the summons and to punish such person for his default or disobedience.” It is true that the attachment procedure of § 7604 (b) has been occasionally used even where the person summoned refused to testify because of a claimed privilege. E. g., Sale v. United States, 228 F. 2d 682, and Brownson v. United States, 32 F. 2d 844. We believe that the use of §'7604 (b) in that context is inappropriate. Attachment of a witness who has neither defaulted nor contumaciously refused to comply would raise constitutional considerations, which need not be considered at this time under our reading of the statute.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY v. ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY No. 86-1715. Argued February 23, 1988 Decided April 4, 1988 Ruth E. Peters argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were William E. Persina and Arthur A. Horowitz. Lawrence S. Robbins argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Cohen, and William Ranter. Per Curiam. The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U. S. C. § 7101 et seq., protects the right of federal employees “to form, join, or assist any labor organization, or to refrain from any such activity,” § 7102, and requires that federal agencies and labor organizations bargain in good faith concerning the terms and conditions of employment, §§ 7102, 7114, 7116(a)(5), and (b)(5). Recognizing “the special requirements and needs of the Government,” § 7101(b), Title VII exempts certain matters from the duty to negotiate. One such exemption provides that an agency’s duty to bargain extends “to matters which are the subject of any agency rule or regulation . . . only if the [Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority)] has determined under subsection (b) of this section that no compelling need . . . exists for the rule or regulation.” § 7117(a)(2). Subsection (b) specifies detailed procedures for determining whether there is a “compelling need” for the agency regulation. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between Circuits as to whether § 7117(b) provides the exclusive procedure for determining whether there is a compelling need for an agency regulation or whether the Authority alternatively may make a compelling need determination in connection with an unfair labor practice (ULP) proceeding. 484 U. S. 813 (1987). In September 1981, the respondent, Aberdeen Proving Ground, notified its employees’ union representatives that Aberdeen intended to curtail operations for the three days after Thanksgiving, November 27-29, 1981, and that, as a result, Aberdeen employees would be placed on forced annual leave for Friday, November 27. Thereafter, Aberdeen met with union representatives to discuss leave procedures. Union representatives requested that the employees instead be granted administrative leave; management replied that administrative leave was not permitted by the relevant rules and regulations and that the issue “verges on nonnegotiability.” 21 F. L. R. A. 826, 829 (1982). The union then filed an ULP charge with the Authority, and the Authority’s General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that Aberdeen’s refusal to negotiate concerning the union’s administrative leave proposal was a failure to negotiate in good faith. The Administrative Law Judge held in Aberdeen’s favor, concluding that the union’s proposal was inconsistent with agency regulations and thus not subject to negotiations because the Authority had not previously determined under § 7117(b) that there was no compelling need for the regulations. Id., at 834. The Authority reversed, holding that an ULP charge is properly filed where the Government employer undertakes a unilateral change in conditions of employment, even though the union’s proposal may conflict with an agency regulation and there has been no compelling need determination. In the Authority’s view, in such cases the compelling need determination may be properly unified with the ULP proceeding. 21 F. L. R. A. 814, 816-820 (1986). Finding that the regulation was not justified by a compelling need, the Authority held that Aberdeen had violated its duty to negotiate in good faith. See §§ 7116(a)(1) and (a)(5). The Court of Appeals summarily reversed on the authority of its prior decision in U. S. Army Engineer Center v. FLRA, 762 F. 2d 409 (CA4 1985). In U. S. Army Engineer Center the Court of Appeals wrote that “an examination of the history, policies, and, above all, the language of the Federal Labor-Management Relations Act persuades us that Congress meant the § 7117(b) negotiability appeal to be the sole means of determining a compelling need question under the statute.” 762 F. 2d, at 417. We agree with both the analysis and conclusion of the Court of Appeals. The plain language of Title VII unambiguously provides that where a matter is covered by regulation, no duty to bargain arises until the Authority has first determined that no compelling need justifies adherence to the regulation. Section 7117(a)(2) states unequivocally that “[t]he duty to bargain in good faith shall . . . extend to matters which are the subject of any agency rule or regulation . . . only if the Authority has determined under subsection (b) of this section that no compelling need . . . exists for the rule or regulation.” (Emphasis supplied.) As the Court of Appeals noted, the language of the statute is that of a condition precedent. 762 F. 2d, at 413. The phrase “only if” denotes exclusivity; it does not suggest one of multiple options. Moreover, the words “has determined under subsection (b) of this section” .clearly refer to an event that has come to pass. Thus, the duty to bargain does not arise until the § 7117(b) determination has occurred. Section 7117(b) further confirms this reading of the statute. Here, the statute again speaks in exclusive and mandatory terms: “In any case of collective bargaining in which an exclusive representative alleges that no compelling need exists for any rule or regulation . . . which is then in effect and which governs any matter at issue in such collective bargaining, the Authority shall determine under paragraph (2) of this subsection . . . whether such a compelling need exists.” (Emphasis supplied.) This plain reading of Title VII is fully consistent with — if not compelled by — the legislative history and asserted purpose of the statute. Title VII strives to achieve a balance between the rights of federal employees to bargain collectively and “the paramount public interest in the effective conduct of the public’s business.” Message from the President Transmitting A Draft of Proposed Legislation to Reform the Civil Service Laws 4 (1978), Legislative History of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Committee Print compiled for the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service) Print No. 96-7, p. 626 (1979) (Leg. Hist.); see also 124 Cong. Rec. 25600-25601, 25613-25614 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Clay), Leg. Hist. 842-845. Section 7117(b) is carefully constructed to strike such a balance. Under § 7117(b) employees are provided with a means to clarify the scope of the agency’s duty to bargain; if the agency then refuses to bargain, the union may seek relief through an ULP proceeding. At the same time, § 7117(b) provides special procedures designed to promote effective government. For instance, under a § 7117(b) negotiability appeal, but not in the ULP forum, the agency that issued the relevant regulation is a necessary party, § 7117(b)(4); the Authority’s General Counsel is not a party, § 7117(b)(3); and the negotiability appeal is presented directly to the Authority, rather than first to an administrative law judge, 5 CFR pt. 2424 (1987). Moreover, a § 7117(b) hearing is an expedited proceeding, § 7117(b)(3), thus resolving doubt as to whether a regulation is controlling as promptly as practicable. Most importantly, requiring that compelling need be resolved exclusively through a § 7117(b) appeal allows agencies to act in accordance with their regulations without an overriding apprehension that their adherence to the regulations might result in sanctions under an ULP proceeding. See § 7118(a)(7). To allow compelling need to be adjudicated in the context of an ULP proceeding, without any prior § 7117(b) negotiability appeal, would frustrate this careful balance and would disregard Congress’ direction that Title VII “be interpreted in a manner consistent with the requirement of an effective and efficient Government.” § 7101(b). Although “reviewing courts should uphold reasonable and defensible constructions of an agency’s enabling Act,... they must not ‘rubber-stamp . . . administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.’” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U. S. 89, 97 (1983), quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U. S. 278, 291-292 (1965). The Court of Appeals properly concluded that the Authority acted inconsistently with the language and purpose of Title VII in permitting resolution of the compelling need issue in the ULP forum. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly Affirmed. Compare Defense Logistics Agency v. FLRA, 244 U. S. App. D. C. 22, 754 F. 2d 1003 (1985) (permissible for Authority to resolve compelling need in either § 7117(b) negotiability appeal or ULP forum in unilateral change eases), with U. S. Army Engineer Center v. FLRA, 762 F. 2d 409 (CA4 1985) (§ 7117(b) negotiability appeal exclusive procedure to resolve compelling need).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. HENRY BROCH & CO. No. 74. Argued November 16, 1961. Decided January 15, 1962. Solicitor General Cox argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Loevinger, Daniel M. Friedman, Richard A. Solomon, Irwin A. Seibel, Charles H. Weston, James Mcl. Henderson, PGad B. Morehouse and Alan B. Hobbes. Frederick M. Rowe argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Joseph DuCoeur and Harold Orlinsky. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The Federal Trade Commission seeks reversal of the action of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in modifying the cease-and-desist order which the Commission had issued against the respondent Broch on finding that Broch violated § 2 (c) of the Clayton Act. 285 F. 2d 764. The action of the Court of Appeals was sua sponte, and was taken in proceedings on remand which followed our reversal of that Court’s earlier action setting aside the order in its entirety because Broch’s conduct was thought not to violate § 2 (c). Federal Trade Comm’n v. Broch & Co., 363 U. S. 166, reversing 261 F. 2d 725. We granted certiorari, 366 U. S. 923. Broch is a broker selling food products on commission for some 25 seller principals. One of his principals is Canada Foods, Ltd., a processor of apple concentrate. The Commission found that Broch, to make possible Canada Foods’ acceptance of an offer from J. M. Smucker Co. to buy an unusually large quantity of apple concentrate at less than Canada Foods’ established price, reduced to 3%, for this sale, the agreed 5% rate of commission ordinarily payable by Canada Foods to Broch. The Commission adjudged, and in our prior opinion we agreed, that this action of Broch was, in the circumstances, a violation of § 2 (c). The Commission’s order was not confined to restraints against repetition of the precise violation of § 2 (c) which Broch was found to have committed, nor was the application of the order limited to future sales from Canada Foods to Smucker. Paragraph (1) did prohibit the repetition of the particular violation which Broch committed, but in connection with sales for Canada Foods, or for “any other seller principal,” to Smucker, or “to any other buyer.” Paragraph (2) also extended its prohibitions to sales from all seller principals to all buyers, but went beyond paragraph (1) to prohibit Broch from “In any other manner . . . directly or indirectly” paying, granting or allowing, in the words of § 2 (c), “anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof . . . .” The Court of Appeals excised from the order all references to “any other seller principal” and to “any other buyer,” thus limiting the order’s application to future sales from Canada Foods to Smucker. The Commission renews here the argument it made in the Court of Appeals that judicial modification of the order was precluded because Broch failed to object to the scope of the order before the Commission. Broch disputes that he failed to register a proper objection before the Commission. We see no reason to determine the fact. We will assume, without deciding, that the Court of Appeals properly passed upon the scope of the order. We nevertheless think that in the circumstances of this case the order should have been affirmed in the form entered by the Commission. Broch supports the action of the Court of Appeals as to paragraph (1) of the order with the argument that, since the order was based only upon findings limited to an asserted illegal payment respecting a single sale from Canada Foods to Smucker, the Commission's ban was too sweeping in its application to sales from all seller principals to all buyers. There is no merit in this argument. The Commission has a wide discretion to formulate a remedy adequate to prevent Broch’s repetition of the violation he was found to have committed. See Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 327 U. S. 608, 611-612. We cannot say that the Commission exceeded its discretion in banning repetitions of Broch’s violation in connection with transactions involving any seller and buyer, rather than simply forbidding recurrence of the transgression in sales between Canada and Smucker. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 728-729. Compare United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U. S. 76, 90. Broch further argues that the Commission exceeded its discretion in the prohibitions embodied in paragraph (2). He did not cross-petition this Court for a writ of certiorari and does not here challenge paragraph (2) as modified by the Court of Appeals. Had the only vice claimed in paragraph (2) been its extension to all seller principals and all buyers, the Court of Appeals’ sua sponte amendment would for reasons already stated have been clearly erroneous. But Broch contends that, before it was restricted to transactions involving Canada and Smucker, this part of the order was so broad as to jeopardize the conduct of his entire business, in that it unqualifiedly prohibited reductions of commissions coupled with lower prices — even uniform reductions, or reductions which are service- or cost-justified, or reductions for the purpose of meeting competition. In considering Broch’s challenge to paragraph (2) it is necessary to observe that the 1959 amendments to § 11 of the Clayton Act — which substitute for the Clayton Act provisions for enforcement of administrative orders those in § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act — do not apply to enforcement of the instant order. In consequence, Broch cannot be subjected to penalties except for violation of an enforcement order yet to be entered by an appropriate Court of Appeals, to be predicated upon a determination that some particular practice of Broch violated the Commission’s order. Thus Broch is not, by virtue of that order, presently acting under the risk of incurring any penalty without further administrative and judicial consideration and interpretation, despite the fact that he has already received determination of his petition for review. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U. S. 470, 477-480. Upon any future enforcement proceeding, the Commission and the Court of Appeals will have ready at hand interpretive tools — the employment of which we have previously sanctioned — for use in tailoring the order, in the setting of a specific asserted violation, so as to meet the legitimate needs of the case. They will be free to construe the order as designed strictly to cope with the threat of future violations identical with or like or related to the violations which Broch was found to have committed, or as forbidding "no activities except those which if continued would directly aid in perpetuating the same old unlawful practices.” Federal Trade Comm’n v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 727. They need not— as we have already made clear — read the order as denying to Broch the benefit of statutory defenses or exceptions. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Ruberoid Co., supra, at 475-476; Federal Trade Comm’n v. National Lead Co., 352 U. S. 419, 426. Nor need the order be construed as prohibiting anything as clearly lawful as a uniform reduction in commissions. And, we repeat, these various interpretive aids will have to be brought to bear by a Court of Appeals upon a particular practice of Broch, and will have to yield the announced result that such practice violates the order, before Broch can be subjected to penalties because of still a second repetition of the violation. In this situation, and on this record, we hold that the attempt of the Court of Appeals to redress the asserted overbroadness by the inapt device of confining paragraph (2) to Canada’s sales to Smucker was inappropriate and, indeed, any attempt to restrict the scope of the order would have been premature. We do not wish to be understood-, however, as holding that the generalized language of paragraph (2) would necessarily withstand scrutiny under the 1959 amendments. The severity of possible penalties prescribed by the amendments for violations of orders which have become final underlines the necessity for fashioning orders which are, at the outset, sufficiently clear and precise to avoid raising serious questions as to their meaning and application. See Labor Board v. Express Pub. Co., 312 U. S. 426, 435-437; Federal Trade Comm’n v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 726; Federal Trade Comm’n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 54. Compare New Haven R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 200 U. S. 361, 404; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 400-401. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to affirm the order of the Federal Trade Commission. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result. Section 2 (c) as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1527, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (c), is as follows: “(c) Payment or acceptance of commission, brokerage or other compensation. “It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such compensation is so granted or paid.” Following the remand Broch filed a motion which sought, inter alia, a modification of the order on the ground of its allegedly “unduly broad scope.” In opposing the motion the Commission claimed that Broch had not objected to the scope of the order in the proceedings before the Commission or in the original review proceedings, and was therefore not entitled to have the Court entertain the motion. Broch’s motion was denied but the order embodying the denial also included the provision questioned here amending the order “On the Court’s own motion.” There was evidence in the proceedings before the Commission that, following the transaction described above, Broch continued to sell apple concentrate to Smucker on behalf of Canada Foods at a reduced price and to receive a reduced commission of 3% on such sales. The Commission’s order was as follows: “It is ordered That respondents Henry Broch and Oscar Adler, copartners trading as Henry Broch & Co., their representatives, agents, or employees, directly or'through any corporate or other device, in connection with the sale of food or food products for Canada Foods Ltd., or any other seller principal, in commerce, as ‘commerce’ is defined in the Clayton Act, as amended, do forthwith cease and desist from: "(1) Paying, granting or allowing, directly or indirectly, to The J. M. Smucker Co., or to any other buyer, or to anyone acting for or in behalf of or who is subject to the direct or indirect control of such buyer, any allowance or discount in lieu of brokerage, or any part or percentage thereof, by selling any food or food products to such buyer at prices reflecting a reduction.from the prices at which sales of such foods are currently being effected by respondents for Canada Foods Ltd. or any other seller principal, as the case may be, where such reduction in price is accompanied by a reduction in the regular rate of commission, brokerage or other compensation currently being paid to respondents by such seller principal for brokerage services; or “(2) In any other manner, paying, granting or allowing, directly or indirectly, to The J. M. Smucker Go., or to any other buyer, or to anyone acting for or in behalf of or who is subject to the direct or indirect control of such buyer, anything of value as a commission, brokerage or othér compensation or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof upon, or in connection with, any sale of food or food products to such buyer for its own account.” 38 Stat. 734, 15 U. S. C. § 21, as amended July 23, 1959, Pub. L. 86-107, 73 Stat. 243. The order herein was entered by the Commission on December 10, 1957. The procedures enacted by the 1959 amendments therefore do not apply to it. See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 110 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 288 F. 2d 403. The 1959 Amendments resulted from a congressional conclusion that the former § 11 procedures were too cumbersome to assure effective enforcement of agency orders. It was said in the House Committee Report accompanying the 1959 amendments: “The Clayton Act, in its present enforcement procedures, permits a person to engage in the same illegal practices three times before effective legal penalties can be applied as a result of action by the commission or board vested with jurisdiction. First, in order to issue and serve a cease-and-desist order initially, the commission or board must investigate and prove that the respondent has violated the prohibitions of the Clayton Act. No provision of the Clayton Act, however, makes the commission or board’s cease-and-desist order final in the absence of an appeal by the respondent for judicial review. At the present time, the Clayton Act contains no procedure by which the commission or board may secure civil penalties for violations of its orders. “Second, before the commission or board may obtain a court ruling that commands obedience to its cease-and-desist order, it must again investigate and prove that the respondent has violated both the order and the Clayton Act. The jurisdiction of the court of appeals, under the present provisions of Clayton Act section 11, cannot be invoked by the commission or board unless a violation of the cease-and-desist order is first shown. “Third, enforcement of the court’s order must be secured in a subsequent contempt proceeding, which requires proof that new activities of the respondent have violated the court’s order. This entails a third hearing before the commission and a review thereof by the court of appeals. “In contrast, the procedures that are contained in the Federal Trade Commission Act for enforcement of cease-and-desist orders issued thereunder are much simpler and more direct. A cease-and-desist order issued pursuant to section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, becomes final upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for review, if no such petition is filed within that time.” H. R. Rep. No. 580, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 4. See also S. Rep. No. 83, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3. Cf. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 51-53; Federal Trade Comm’n v. National Lead Co., 352 U. S. 419, 430-431. “In carrying out [its] function the Commission is not limited to prohibiting the illegal practice in the precise form in which it is found to have existed in the past. If the Commission is to attain the objectives Congress envisioned, it cannot be required to confine its road block to the narrow lane the transgressor has traveled; it must be allowed effectively to close all roads to the prohibited goal, so that its order may not be by-passed with impunity.” Federal Trade Comm’n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U. S. 470, 473. Broch complains of the order’s omission of any reference to the statutory exception for brokerage “for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods . . . .” We made it clear in our prior opinion that the order need not be read as prohibiting transactions to which the statutory exception applies. 363 U. S., at 173, 177, n. 19. Nor need the order, when viewed in the context of Broch’s violation, be read as prohibiting Broch from reducing commissions competitively to gain a particular buyer’s account, if the competitive setting would otherwise have afforded a defense to a charge under § 2 (c). “Had respondent . . .. agreed to accept a 3% commission on all sales to all buyers there plainly would be no room for finding that the price reductions were violations of §2 (c). Neither the legislative history nor the purposes of the Act would require such an absurd result, and neither the Commission nor the courts have ever suggested it.” 363 U. S., at 176. See notes 5, 6, supra. The penalties under the 1959 amendments are as follows: “Any person who violates any order issued by the commission or board under subsection (b) of this section after such order has become final, and while such order is in effect, shall forfeit and pay to the United States a civil penalty of not more than $5,000 for each violation .... Each separate violation of any such order shall be a separate offense, except that in the case of a violation through continuing failure or neglect to obey a final order of the commission or board each day of continuance of such failure or neglect shall be deemed a separate offense.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BATTERTON, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES OF MARYLAND, et al. v. FRANCIS et al. No. 75-1181. Argued April 19, 1977 Decided June 20, 1977 BlacemuN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BreNNAN, Marshall, and SteveNs, JJ., joined, post, p. 432. Joel J. Babin, Assistant Attorney General of Maryland, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, George A. Nilson, Deputy Attorney General, and Theodore Losin, Assistant Attorney General. C. Christopher Brown argued the cause for respondents Francis et al. With him on the brief was Dennis M. Sweeney. Gerard C. Smetana, William H. DuBoss III, Lawrence B. Kraus, and Bichard O’Brecht filed briefs for respondent Chamber of Commerce of the United States. Me. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the validity of 45 CFR § 233.100 (a) (1) (1976), a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) pursuant to a delegation of rulemaking authority in § 407 (a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 607 (a). The issue is whether the regulation is a proper exercise of the Secretary’s statutory authority. I The statute is contained in the Social Security Act’s Title IV, which has to do primarily with Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). The AFDC program was established by the Act in 1935 to provide welfare payments where children are needy because of the death, absence, or incapacity of a parent. 42 IT. S. C. § 606 (a). The original conception of AFDC was to allow widows and divorced mothers to care for their children at home without having to go to work, thus eliminating the practice of removing needy children in situations of that kind to institutions. See Burns v. Alcala, 420 U. S. 575, 581-582 (1975). AFDC was not originally designed to assist children who are needy simply because the family breadwinner is unable to find work; it was contemplated that other programs would alleviate that problem by attacking unemployment directly. See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U. S. 598, 603 (1972); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 313, 327-329 (1968). Other parts of the Act encouraged the establishment of state unemployment compensation programs, primarily through tax incentives, but the federal role in these programs is not so great as in AFDC. See Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U. S. 471 (1977). Title IY was amended in 1961 to add § 407. Pub. L. 87-31, § 1, 75 Stat. 75. This section established an experimental program (AFDC-UF) to provide assistance in some cases where the unemployment of a parent causes dependent children to be needy. The States were given broad power to define “unemployment” for purposes of the program and to determine the relationship of this new program to existing state unemployment compensation plans. In 1968 the AFDC-UF program was made permanent, 81 Stat. 882, but the eligibility criteria were modified to withdraw some of the definitional authority delegated to the States. The statute now requires a participating State to provide assistance where a needy child “has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment (as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) of his father.” 42 U. S. C. § 607 (a). See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S. 707, 709-711 (1975). Both AFDC and AFDC-UF are cooperative ventures of the Federal Government and the States. States that elect to participate in these programs administer them under federal standards and HEW supervision. Funding is provided from state and federal revenues on a matching basis. See, e. g., Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S. 251, 253 (1974); King v. Smith, 392 U. S., at 316. Although every. State currently participates in AFDC, only about half the States participate in the AFDC-UF program. Dept. of HEW, Public Assistance Statistics, Oct. 1976, table 5, p. 9 (1977). II The instant case originated in 1971 as a challenge to Rule 200.X. (A) (2) of the Maryland Department of Employment and Social Services. That Rule denies AFDC-UF benefits to families where the father is out of work for reasons that disqualify him for state unemployment insurance compensation. The original plaintiffs represented two classes of families with dependent children who were thereby ineligible for AFDC-UF benefits: one where the father had been discharged for misconduct (excessive absenteeism), and the other where the father was out of work because of a strike. The defendants were Maryland officials having responsibility for the administration of public assistance grants in the State. A three-judge United States District Court was convened to consider the claim that Rule 200.X.(A)(2) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court sustained the constitutionality of the state regulation but went on to hold it invalid because it was contrary to the federal regulation prescribing standards for the determination of unemployment under the AFDC-UF program. Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351 (Md.), summarily aff’d, 409 U. S. 904 (1972) (Francis I). Although HEW did not agree that its regulation was inconsistent with Rule 200.X.(A) (2), the Solicitor General, in his memorandum for the United States as amicus curiae, filed in Francis I at this Court’s invitation, 408 U. S. 920 (1972), suggested a summary affirmance in that case in light of the then-forthcoming revision of the HEW regulation. The HEW regulation, as amended, expressly authorizes some state discretion in defining unemployment. Generally, it requires the States to consider a person to be unemployed for AFDC-UF purposes if he works less than 100 hours a month, except for intermittent employment, and “except that, at the option of the State, such definition need not include a father whose unemployment results from participation in a labor dispute or who is unemployed by reason of conduct or circumstances which result or would result in disqualification for unemployment compensation under the State’s unemployment compensation law.” 45 CFR § 233.100 (a) (1) (1976). The Secretary had stated that the purpose of this amendment was to nullify the effect of Francis I by making explicit the HEW policy of allowing the States to exclude AFDC-UF participants based on the particular reason that the father was out of work. After the amended HEW regulation became effective, the defendant Maryland officials moved that the District Court dissolve its earlier injunction issued March 16, 1972, after Francis I had been decided, against enforcement of Rule 200.X.(A) (2). That court recognized that “[t]he conflict between the federal and the Maryland regulation ended after the former was amended,” but nevertheless it denied the motion and continued the injunction on the ground that the amended federal regulation now was in conflict with the federal statute. Francis v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 78, 81 (Md. 1974) (Francis II). First, with regard to the class of fathers discharged for misconduct, the District Court stated that these people are necessarily “unemployed,” within the meaning of the statute, and that any contrary regulation is invalid. Second, the court recognized that it is not clear whether the statutory term “unemployed” includes persons involved in a labor dispute. The court held, however, that the HEW regulation was invalid in this regard because it delegated the question of coverage to the States without providing a uniform national standard. Id., at 81-82. After this Court dismissed a direct appeal in Francis II for want of jurisdiction, 419 U. S. 1042 (1974), appeals were taken by the state defendants and by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, as intervenor, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. There the case was consolidated with an appeal in a similar case, Bethea v. Mason, 384 F. Supp. 1274 (Md. 1974), where a single District Judge had followed Francis II in holding the same HEW regulation invalid insofar as it authorized the State to deny AFDC-UF benefits to fathers who had voluntarily quit their previous jobs. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the three appeals in an unpublished per curiam adopting the respective opinions of the two District Judges. See 529 F. 2d 514 and 515 (1975). The state defendants petitioned for certiorari, contending that the current HEW regulation is authorized by the federal statute and that the injunction against the state regulation therefore should be dissolved. The Solicitor General, at the invitation of the Court, 425 U. S. 969 (1976), filed a memorandum for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the state defendants’ position. We granted certiorari. 429 U. S. 939 (1976). Ill The ultimate question in this case is whether the statutory term “unemployment” may be interpreted to allow the State to exclude the three classes" of respondents from receiving AFDC-UF benefits. There can be no doubt that 45 CFR § 233.100 (a)(1) (1976) embodies that interpretation. Thus, the actual issue we must decide is not how the statutory term should be interpreted, but whether the Secretary’s regulation is proper. Ordinarily, administrative interpretations of statutory terms are given important but not controlling significance. This was the Court’s approach, for example, when it had under consideration the question whether the term “wages” in Title II of the Social Security Act included a backpay award. Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U. S. 358, 369 (1946). Unlike the statutory term in Title II, however, Congress in § 407 (a) expressly delegated to the Secretary the power to prescribe standards for determining what constitutes “unemployment” for purposes of AFDC-UF eligibility. In a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term. In exercising that responsibility, the Secretary adopts regulations with legislative effect. A reviewing court is not free to set aside those regulations simply because it would have interpreted the statute in a different, manner. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232, 235-237 (1936). The regulation at issue in this ease is therefore entitled to more than mere deference or weight. It can be set aside only if the Secretary exceeded his statutory authority or if the regulation is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U. S. C. §§ 706 (2) (A), (C). IV We turn now to the grounds on which the District Courts and the Court of Appeals held the regulation invalid, keeping in mind the narrow scope of review that is indicated in this situation. These courts held that the Secretary exceeded his statutory authority to prescribe standards, in the first place, because he permitted the determination of eligibility to turn in part on the reason for the father’s unemployment. The language of § 407 (a) was thought to make the only relevant consideration that of whether, not why, the father was out of work: “ ‘A man out of work because he was discharged for cause by his employer is unemployed. There can be no two ways about that conclusion’.... [N]o combination of federal and state regulations may provide that a father who is unemployed is not unemployed.” Francis II, 379 F. Supp., at 81, quoting Francis I, 340 F. Supp., at 366. And in Bethea the court by like reasoning held that a person who voluntarily quit his job is to be considered unemployed within the meaning of the statute. 384 F. Supp., at 1280-1281. We do not agree that the statutory language is so unambiguous. The term “unemployment” is often used in a specialized context where its meaning is other than simply not having a job. For example, the concept of unemployment is frequently limited to persons who have some connection with the work force, that is, individuals who desire to work and are capable of working, and who, usually but not always, have held- jobs in the past. In addition, the feature of involuntariness is often linked with unemployment. Limitations of this nature are found in the definitions used by the Department of Labor in compiling unemployment statistics. State unemployment compensation programs generally confine their benefits in this manner. Indeed, the other provisions of § 407 impose similar limitations, indicating that the AFDC-UF program was not intended to provide assistance without regard to the reason a person is out of work. Thus, we conclude that the statutory term is capable of more than the tautological definition imposed by the District Judges and the Court of Appeals. Congress- itself must have appreciated that the meaning of the statutory term was not self-evident, or it would not have given the Secretary the power to prescribe standards. Respondents argue, however, that Congress intended that the Secretary prescribe an “hours-worked” standard for determining unemployment but did not intend any further additions to the eligibility criteria specified in other provisions of the statute. In fact, a minimum hours-worked standard is part of the regulation at issue in this case, but there is no indication in the statutory language or legislative history that Congress intended to foreclose other factors in the determination of what constitutes unemployment for purposes of the AFDC-TJF program. Of course, the Secretary’s statutory authority to prescribe standards is not unlimited. He could not, for example, adopt a regulation that bears no relationship to any recognized concept of unemployment or that would defeat the purpose of the AFDC-UF program. But the regulation here at issue does not even approach these limits of the delegated authority. By allowing the States to exclude persons who would be disqualified under the State’s unemployment compensation law, the Secretary has incorporated a well-known and widely applied standard for “unemployment.” Exclusion of individuals who are out of work as a result of their own conduct and thus disqualified from state unemployment compensation is consistent with the goal of AFDC-UF, namely, to aid the families of the involuntarily unemployed. On the other hand, state unemployment benefits are ordinarily available only after a waiting period and only for a limited number of weeks or months. By providing benefits during the periods before and after state unemployment compensation is available, AFDC-UF fills a significant gap in social insurance coverage. Thus we cannot say that the Secretary’s regulation defeats the purpose of the AFDC-UF program. We therefore hold that the HEW regulation, to the extent it allows the States to determine that persons disqualified under unemployment compensation laws are not "unemployed” under §407 (a), is within the statutory authority delegated to the Secretary, and is reasonable. V The second stated reason for the District Judges’ and Court of Appeals’ holding that the Secretary’s regulation was invalid was that it permitted the States the option of denying unemployment compensation benefits to participants in a labor dispute. Although the holding is not entirely clear to us, it appears that what was regarded as fatal was the Secretary’s failure to impose sufficient standards to control the States’ decisions under this optional feature. Presumably, the same rationale would provide an alternative basis for holding the regulation invalid to the extent it allows States the uncontrolled option of denying benefits to persons who were discharged for cause or had voluntarily quit their jobs. It is clear that a major purpose of the 1968 amendment was to retract some of the authority previously delegated to the States under § 407 (a). Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S., at 710. We, however, do not think this shift of authority from the States to the Secretary required the Secretary to adopt a regulation that precludes any recognition of local policies. If Congress had intended such a result, it might have changed the statutory language from “unemployment (as defined by the State)” to “unemployment (as defined by the Secretary).” Instead, § 407 (a) now reads “unemployment (as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary).” The power to “determine” unemployment remains with the States, and we conclude that the power to prescribe “standards” gives the Secretary sufficient flexibility to recognize some local options in determining AFDC-TJF eligibility. The legislative history, we acknowledge, is at some variance with the statutory language. The effect of the 1968 amendment is described as to “provide for a -uniform definition of unemployment throughout the United States,” and as to “authorize a Federal definition of unemployment by the Secretary.” S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-4,160 (1967). See H. R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 3, 17, 108 (1967); 113 Cong. Rec. 32592 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Long). We do not understand these comments to mean, however, that the Secretary is prohibited from allowing the States any options in determining whether or not a person is “unemployed” for purposes of the AFDC-UF program. First, the legislative history cannot be read literally in its claim that the amended statute itself provides a federal definition of unemployment; at best the statute delegates to the Secretary the power to- prescribe such a definition. Second, we have no quarrel with the statements in the legislative history that the Secretary is authorized to adopt such a uniform definition; we simply hold that he is not required to do so. Certainly, the congressional purpose was to promote greater uniformity in the applicability of the AFDC-UF program. But the goal of greater uniformity can be met without imposing identical standards on each State. In one case, for example, a State was permitted to adopt a somewhat more liberal hours-worked test than the minimum required by the Secretary. Macias v. Finch, 324 F. Supp. 1252 (ND Cal.), summarily aff’d, 400 U. S. 913 (1970). We conclude, therefore, that the Secretary’s approach in the present case is not contrary to the purpose of the statute. Our conclusion is reinforced by our understanding of the AFDC-UF program as involving the concept of cooperative federalism. The States are free not to participate in the program, and, as we have noted, only about half of them in fact do so. The congressional purpose is not served at all in those States where AFDC-UF is totally unavailable. Accordingly, we should not lightly infer a congressional intention to preclude the Secretary from recognizing legitimate local policies in determining eligibility. See New York Dept. of Soc. Services v. Dublino, 413 U. S. 405, 413-414, 421-422 (1973). We therefore hold that 45 CFR § 233.100 (a) (1) (1976) adequately promotes the statutory goal of reducing interstate variations in the AFDC-UF program. In this respect, the regulation is both reasonable and within the authority delegated to the Secretary. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. “§ 233.100 Dependent children of unemployed fathers. “(a) Requirements for State Plans. If a State wishes to provide AFDC for children of unemployed fathers, the State plan under Title IV — Part A of the Social Security Act must, except as specified in paragraph (b) of this section: “(1) Include a definition of an unemployed father which shall apply only to families determined to be needy in accordance with the provisions in § 233.20 of this chapter. Such definition must include any father who: “ (i) Is employed less than 100 hours a month; or “ (ii) Exceeds that standard for a particular month, if his work is intermittent and the excess is of a temporary nature as evidenced by the fact that he was under the 100-hour standard for the prior 2 months and is expected to be under the standard during the next month; “except that, at the option of the State, such definition need not include a father whose unemployment results from participation in a labor dispute or who is unemployed by reason of conduct or circumstances which result or would result in disqualification for unemployment compensation under the State’s unemployment compensation law.” “§ 607. Dependent children of unemployed fathers; definition. “(a) The term ‘dependent child’ shall, notwithstanding section 606 (a) of this title, include a needy child who meets the requirements of section 606 (a) (2) of this title who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment (as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) of his father, and who is living with any of the relatives specified in section 606 (a)(1) of this title in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his (or their) own home.” The program originally was to expire June 30, 1962. It was extended, however, first for five years, 76 Stat. 193, and then to June 30, 1968, 81 Stat. 94. Before the 1968 amendments, § 407 (a) referred to “unemployment (as defined by the State).” 75 Stat. 75. Under the original statute the States were also free to decide to what extent receipt of unemployment compensation would affect eligibility for AFDC-UF benefits. Section 407 (b) (2) (C) (ii) was added and amended in 1968 to require participating States to deny AFDC-UF benefits “with respect to any week for which such child's father receives unemployment compensation under an unemployment compensation law of a State or of the United States.” § 302, 82 Stat. 273. In Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S., at 710 n. 6, 719, the Court observed that a purpose of the 1968 amendments was to eliminate variations in AFDC-UF coverage among the States. Accordingly, § 407 (b) (2) (C) (ii) was held to establish a nationwide test of eligibility under which only the actual “receipt” of unemployment compensation would preclude AFDC-UF benefits. Thus the States were required to allow persons eligible for both programs to refuse unemployment compensation and receive AFDC-UF benefits instead. 421 U. S., at 713-719. The effect of the Court’s decision in Phübrook was counteracted the following year when Congress again amended § 407 (b) (2) (C) (ii) to require denial of AFDC-UF benefits where a father is qualified for unemployment compensation but refuses to apply for or accept it. Pub. L. 94^566, § 502, 90 Stat. 2688. This Rule, which has since been redesignated COMAR 07.02.09.10 (A) (2) (1975), provides that AFDC-UF benefits' may not be paid “[t]o meet need due to being disqualified for unemployment insurance.” Maryland’s Unemployment Insurance Law specifies various grounds that disqualify otherwise eligible individuals from receiving benefits. These grounds include, among others, voluntarily leaving work without good cause, gross misconduct, discharge or suspension as a disciplinary measure (temporary disqualification for not less than one week and for not more than nine weeks), and certain work stoppages due to labor disputes other than lockouts. Md. Ann. Code, art. 95A, §§6 (a), (b), (c), and (e) (1969). The notice of rulemaking read: “Dependent Children of Unemployed Fathers “Notice is hereby given that the regulation set forth in tentative, alternative form below is proposed by the Administrator, Social and Rehabilitation Service, with the approval of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Both alternatives would amend § 233.100 (a) (1), which provides a Federal definition of unemployed father under the AFDC program in terms of hours of work. “In applying the existing regulation, the Department policy has been to permit a State, at its option, to use a definition of unemployed father which imposes additional conditions relating to the reason for the unemployment, e. g., the State definition might exclude a father whose unemployment results from participation in a labor dispute or who is unemployed by reason of conduct or circumstances which result or would result in disqualification for unemployment compensation under the State’s unemployment compensation law. In Davidson v. Francis, the U. S. Supreme Court on October 16, summarily affirmed the judgment of the district court which held, in effect, that while the Secretary has broad authority to define an unemployed father for purposes of section 407 of the Social Security Act, the existing Federal regulation provides only an hours-of-work test, and thus prohibits a State from excluding fathers who meet this test but are disqualified for unemployment compensation. “Accordingly, the proposed alternative A below would amend the regulation to make the prior Department policy explicit, by stating the options which are permitted to the States in defining an unemployed father. Alternative B, on the other hand, would amend the regulation to make clear that the hours-of-work test is intended as the exclusive definition of unemployed father, so that States may not have definitions which impose added conditions. This would be a change in Department policy, but would be consistent with the way that the existing regulation has been interpreted by the courts.” 38 Fed. Reg. 49 (1973). “Alternative A” was eventually adopted. Id., at 18549. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States, as intervenor in Francis II, also filed a petition for certiorari, No. 75-1182, arguing that federal labor policy prohibits the payment of welfare benefits to persons involved in labor disputes. Although we did not act on its petition, the Chamber filed a brief as respondent-intervenor in the present case. In light of today’s decision, the petition for certiorari in No. 75-1182 is denied. The Court there explained: “Administration, when it interprets a statute so as to make it apply to particular circumstances, acts as a delegate to the legislative power. Congress might have declared that 'back pay’ awards under the Labor Act should or should not be treated as wages. Congress might have delegated to the Social Security Board to determine what compensation paid by employers to employees should be treated as wages. Except as such interpretive power may be included in the agencies’ administrative functions, Congress did neither. An agency may not finally decide the limits of its statutory power. That is a judicial function. Congress used a well understood word — 'wages’—to indicate the receipts which were to govern taxes and benefits under the Social Security Act. There may be borderline payments to employees on which courts would follow administrative determination as to whether such payments were or were not wages under the act. “We conclude, however, that the Board’s interpretation of this statute to exclude back pay goes beyond the boundaries of administrative routine and the statutory limits.” 327 U. S., at 369 (footnote omitted). Legislative, or substantive, regulations are “issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority and . . . implement the statute, as, for example, the proxy rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission .... Such rules have the force and effect of law.” U. S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney' General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 30 n. 3 (1947). See United States v. Mersky, 361 U. S. 431, 437-438 (1960); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Scarlett, 300 U. S. 471, 474 (1937). By way of contrast, a court is not required to give effect to an interpretative regulation. Varying degrees of deference are accorded to administrative interpretations, based on such factors as the timing and consistency of the agency’s position, and the nature of its expertise. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 141-145 (1976); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199, 231-237 (1974); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944). See generally K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 5.03 (1958 and Supps. 1970, 1976); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 564r-565 (1965). The other kinds of review provided by the Administrative Procedure Act are not involved in this case. The constitutionality and procedural aspects of the regulation, 5 U. S. C. §§ 706 (2) (B), (D), are not at issue at this time. Neither substantial-evidence review nor trial de novo, §§706 (2)(E), (F), was available in this case. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U. S. 138, 140-142 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 413-416 (1971). “Employed persons are (1) those who worked for pay any time during the week which includes the 12th day of the month or who worked unpaid for 15 hours or more in a family-operated enterprise and (2) those who were temporarily absent from their regular jobs because of illness, vacation, industrial dispute, or similar reasons. . . . “Unemployed persons are those who did not work during the survey week, but were available for work except for temporary illness and had looked for jobs within the preceding 4 weeks. Persons who were available for work but did not work because they were on layoff or waiting to start new jobs within the next 30 days are also counted among the unemployed. . . . "... Persons not in the labor force are those not classified as employed or unemployed; this group includes persons retired, those engaged in their own housework, those not working while attending school, those unable to work because of long-term illness, those discouraged from seeking work because of personal or job market factors and those who are voluntarily idle. . . .” U. S. Dept, of Labor, Monthly Labor Review 91 (Apr. 1977). “Unemployment insurance programs are designed to provide cash benefits to regularly employed members of the labor force who become involuntarily unemployed and who are able and willing to accept suitable jobs.” Dept. of HEW, Social Security Programs in the United States 54 (1971). See also Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U. S., at 482, and 487 n. 15. Among the conditions imposed by § 407 (b) are requirements that the unemployed father have a substantial connection with the work force and that he actively seek employment. See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S. 707, 710 n. 6 (1975). In describing the bill on the floor of the House, a cosponsor stated that the concern was with the “involuntarily unemployed and I put the emphasis on the word 'involuntarily.’ ” 107 Cong. Rec. 3767 (1961) (remarks of Cong. Byrnes). When President Kennedy proposed the adoption of the AFDC-UF program in 1961, the only example he gave of the sort of person that would be covered was one “who has exhausted unemployment benefits and is not receiving adequate local assistance. . . Message from the President on Economic Recovery and Growth, 107 Cong. Rec. 1679 (1961). Although 45 CFR § 233.100 (a) (1) (1976) contains a separate option for States to exclude labor-dispute participants from AFDC-UF, Maryland has incorporated its labor-dispute rule as a disqualification for unemployment compensation. The labor-dispute provision of the federal regulation, therefore, is not directly at issue in this case. We attach no significance to the approach followed by Maryland in this case. The Francis I court initially held that the Secretary could have left the decision on whether strikers are unemployed up to each State, but that he had failed to do so in the regulation then in effect. 340 F. Supp., at 367-368. After the regulation was so amended, however, the same court held it invalid, 379 F. Supp., at 81-82, because the Secretary failed to establish “national standards within which the regulations of each of the states were to be channelized and confined.” Id., at 82. The extent to which any significant options in coverage would be tolerated under this approach is not clear. The court, however, stopped short of repudiating its previous conclusion that § 407 (a) does not require the Secretary to adopt a “national definition” of unemployment. 379 F. Supp., at 82.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. No. 108. Argued February 26-27, 1951. Decided June 4, 1951. Louis Sherman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Philip R. Collins. Mozart G. Ratner argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, David P. Findling and Bernard Dunau. Clif Langsdale filed a brief for the United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, A. F. of L., et al., as amici curiae, supporting petitioners. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a companion case to No. 393, Labor Board v. Denver Building Trades Council (the Denver case), ante, p. 675, and No. 85, Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Labor Board (the Chattanooga case), post, p. 707. The principal question here is whether a labor organization and its agent committed an unfair labor practice, within the meaning of § 8 (b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. § 151, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, when, by peaceful picketing, the agent induced employees of a subcontractor on a construction project to engage in a strike in the course of their employment, where an object of such inducement was to force the general contractor to terminate its contract with another subcontractor. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that an unfair labor practice was committed. In December, 1947, the Giorgi Construction Company, a partnership (here called Giorgi), having its principal place of business at Port Chester, New York, contracted to build a private dwelling in Greenwich, Connecticut. The contract price was $15,200. Giorgi did part of the work with its own employees but subcontracted the electrical work to Samuel Langer and the carpentry work to Nicholas Deltorto, the principal place of business of each of whom was also at Port Chester. Langer’s subcontract was for $325. Langer in the past had employed union men but, prior to this project, had become involved in a dispute with petitioner, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, A. F. of L., here called the Electricians Union, because of his employment of nonunion men. By the middle of April, 1948, Langer’s two electricians, neither of whom was a member of the Electricians Union, had completed the roughing in of the electrical work which was necessary before the walls of the house could be completed. At that point, on two days when no employees of Langer were present on the project, but before the completion of Langer’s subcontract, William Patterson, the other petitioner herein, visited the project in his capacity of agent and business representative of the Electricians Union. The only workmen then present were Deltorto and his two carpenters, each of whom was a member of Local 543, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, A. F. of L., here called the Carpenters Union. Patterson informed Deltorto and one or both of his workmen that the electrical work on the job was being done by nonunion men. Deltorto and his men expressed ignorance of that fact, but Patterson, on the second day of his visits, repeated the statement and proceeded to picket the premises himself, carrying a placard which read “This job is unfair to organized labor: I. B. E. W. 501 A. F. L.” Deltorto and his men thereupon stopped work and left the project. Del-torto promptly telephoned Giorgi, the general contractor, that his carpenters had walked off the job because the electrical delegate had picketed it. Patterson also telephoned Giorgi saying that Langer was “unfair” and that Giorgi would have to replace Langer with a union contractor in order to complete the job. He added that if Giorgi did not replace Langer, he would not receive any skilled trades to finish the rest of the work. No communication was had with Langer by either of petitioners. The next day, Giorgi recited these circumstances to Langer and the latter released Giorgi from the electrical subcontract, saying that he would step aside so that a union subcontractor could take over. He did no further work on the project. Giorgi informed Deltorto that the trouble had been straightened out, and thé latter’s carpenters returned to the project. On a charge filed by Langer, based upon these events, the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint against the Electricians Union and Patterson. It alleged that they had induced and encouraged the employees of Deltorto to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to perform services for him, an object thereof being to force or require Giorgi to cease doing business with Langer in violation of § 8 (b) (4) (A). With the consent of the present petitioners, a restraining order was issued against them by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, pursuant to § 10 (1) . The complaint was referred to the same trial examiner who heard the Denver case, ante, p. 675. He distinguished the action of petitioners from that which he had found in the Denver case to constitute a strike signal, and recommended dismissal of the complaint on the ground that petitioners’ action here was permissible under § 8 (c), despite the provisions of § 8 (b) (4) (A). The Board, with two members dissenting, upheld its jurisdiction of the complaint against a claim that the actions complained of did not sufficiently affect interstate commerce. The majority of the Board so holding then affirmed the rulings which the examiner had made during the hearings, adopted certain of his findings, conclusions and recommendations, attached his intermediate report to its decision, but declined to follow his recommendation to dismiss the complaint. The Board expressly held that § 8 (c) did not immunize petitioners’ conduct from the proscriptions of § 8 (b) (4) (A). 82 N. L. R. B. 1028. It ordered petitioners to— “Cease and desist from inducing or encouraging the employees of Nicholas Deltorto or any employer, by picketing or related conduct, to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require Giorgi Construction Co. or any other employer or person to cease doing business with Samuel Langer.” Id., at 1030. Petitioners asked the United States Court of Appeals, under § 10 (f), to review and set aside that order. The Board answered and asked enforcement of it. With one judge dissenting, the court below ordered enforcement. 181 F. 2d 34. We granted certiorari. 340 U. S. 902. See Labor Board v. Denver Building Trades Council, ante, p. 675. 1. Petitioners contest the jurisdiction of the Board on the ground of the insufficiency of the effect of the actions complained of upon interstate commerce. The facts, which were found in detail in the intermediate report, approved by the Board and upheld by the court below, are in our opinion sufficient to sustain that jurisdiction on the grounds stated in the Denver case, ante, p. 675. In addition, the contractor and both subcontractors in the instant case had their principal places of business in New York. The performance of their contractual obligations on this project in Connecticut accordingly emphasizes the interstate movement of the services and materials which they here supplied. 2. The secondary character of the activities here complained of and their objectives also come within the pattern of the Denver case. In the instant case, a labor dispute had been pending for some time between Langer and the Electricians Union, but no demands were made upon him directly by either of petitioners in connection with this project. There are no findings that the picketing was aimed at Langer to force him to employ union workmen on this job. On the contrary, the findings demonstrate that the picketing was directed at Deltorto’s employees to induce them to strike and thus force Deltorto, the carpentry subcontractor, to force Giorgi, the general contractor, to terminate Langer’s electrical subcontract. 3. The Denver case also covers the point that it was sufficient that an objective of the picketing, although not necessarily the only objective of the picketing, was to force Giorgi to terminate Langer’s uncompleted contract and thus cease doing business with him on the project. 4. The principal feature of the instant case, not squarely covered by the Denver case, is that there is no finding here that the picketing and other activities of petitioners were mere signals in starting and stopping a strike in accordance with by-laws or other controlling practices of the Electricians and Carpenters Unions. The complaint here is not that petitioners, like the Trades Council in the Denver case, themselves engaged in or called a strike of Deltorto’s carpenters in order to force the general contractor to cease doing business with the electrical subcontractor. Here the complaint is that petitioners, by peaceful picketing, rather than by prearranged signal, induced or encouraged the employees of Deltorto to strike (or to engage in a concerted refusal to perform any services for Deltorto) in the course of their employment to force Giorgi, the contractor, to cease doing business with Langer, the electrical subcontractor. While in the Denver case we have held that § 8 (c) had no application to a strike signal, there are other considerations that enter into the decision here. The question here is what effect, if any, shall be given to § 8 (c) in its application to peaceful picketing conducted by a labor organization or its agents merely as an inducement or encouragement of employees to engage in a secondary boycott. Petitioners contend that § 8 (c) immunizes peaceful picketing, even though the picketing induces a secondary boycott made unlawful by § 8 (b) (4). The Board reached the opposite conclusion and the court below approved the Board’s order as applied to the facts of this case which it recognized as amounting to “bare instigation” of the secondary boycott. We agree with the Board. a. To exempt peaceful picketing from the condemnation of § 8 (b) (4) (A) as a means of bringing about a secondary boycott is contrary to the language and purpose of that section. The words “induce or encourage” are broad enough to include in them every form of influence and persuasion. There is no legislative history to Justify an interpretation that Congress by those terms has limited its proscription of secondary boycotting to cases where the means of inducement or encouragement amount to a “threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” Such an interpretation would give more significance to the means used than to the end sought. If such were the case there would have been little need for § 8 (b) (4) defining the proscribed objectives, because the use of “restraint and coercion” for any purpose was prohibited in this whole field by § 8 (b) (1) (A). “Induce or encourage” appear in like context in § 303. The action proscribed by the terms of § 8 (b) (4) is made in § 303 the basis for the recovery of damages in a civil action. Because § 8 (c) is in terms limited to unfair labor practice proceedings and § 303 refers only to civil actions for damages, it seems clear that § 8 (c) does not apply to an action under § 303. That section does not mention unfair labor practices through which alone the provisions of § 8 (c) can become applicable. If § 8 (c) were given the effect which petitioners urge, it would limit § 8 (b) (4) (A) so as to give the words “induce or encourage” a meaning in that section different than they have in § 303. We think that the words are entitled to the same meaning in §§ 8 (b) (4) and 303. b. The intended breadth of the words “induce or encourage” in § 8 (b) (4) (A) is emphasized by their contrast with the restricted phrases used in other parts of § 8 (b). For example, the unfair labor practice described in § 8 (b) (1) is one “to restrain or coerce” employees; in § 8 (b) (2) it is to “cause or attempt to cause an employer”; in § 8 (b) (5) it is to “require of employees”; and in § 8 (b) (6) it is to “cause or attempt to cause an employer.” The scope of “induce” and especially of “encourage” goes beyond each of them. c. To exempt peaceful picketing from the reach of § 8 (b) (4) would be to open the door to the customary means of enlisting the support of employees to bring economic pressure to bear on their employer. The Board quickly recognized that to do so would be destructive of the purpose of § 8 (b) (4) (A). It said “To find that peaceful picketing was not thereby proscribed would be to impute to Congress an incongruous intent to pérmit, through indirection, the accomplishment of an objective which it forbade to be accomplished directly.” United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 81 N. L. R. B. 802, 811. Also— “It was the objective of the unions’ secondary activities . . . and not the quality of the means employed to accomplish that objective, which was the dominant factor motivating Congress in enacting that provision. ... In these circumstances, to construe Section 8 (b) (4) (A) as qualified by Section 8 (c) would practically vitiate its underlying purpose and amount to imputing to Congress an unrealistic approach to the problem.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 812. The legislative history does not sustain a congressional purpose to outlaw secondary boycotts under § 8 (b) (4) and yet in effect to sanction them under § 8 (c). d. We find no indication that Congress thought that the kind of picketing and related conduct which was used in this case to induce or encourage a strike for an unlawful object was any less objectionable than engaging directly in that strike. The court below, after finding that there was “bare instigation” here rather than an appeal to reason by “the expressing of any views, argument, or opinion,” traced the development of the doctrine that he who provokes or instigates a wrong makes himself a party to it. That court then reached the conclusion that it is “highly unlikely that by § 8 (c) Congress meant to abolish a doctrine, so deeply embedded in our civil and criminal law.” 181 F. 2d at 39. e. The remedial function of § 8 (c) is to protect nonco-ercive speech by employer and labor organization alike in furtherance of a lawful object. It serves that purpose adequately without extending its protection to speech or picketing in furtherance of unfair labor practices such as are defined in § 8 (b) (4). The general terms of § 8 (c) appropriately give way to the specific provisions of §8(b) (4). 5. The prohibition of inducement or encouragement of secondary pressure by § 8 (b) (4) (A) carries no unconstitutional abridgment of free speech. The inducement or encouragement in the instant case took the form of picketing followed by a telephone call emphasizing its purpose. The constitutionality of § 8 (b) (4) (A) is here questioned only as to its possible relation to the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. This provision has been sustained by several Courts of Appeals. The substantive evil condemned by Congress in § 8 (b) '(4) is the secondary boycott and we recently have recognized the constitutional right of states to proscribe picketing in furtherance of comparably unlawful objectives. There is no reason why Congress may not do likewise. 6. Petitioners object to the breadth of the Board’s order as stated in 82 N. L. R. B. at 1030, supra, pp. 698-699. They contend that its language prohibits inducement not only of employees of Deltorto but also the inducement of employees of any other employer to strike, where an object thereof is to force Giorgi or any other employer or person to cease doing business with Langer. To confine the order solely to secondary pressure through Giorgi or Deltorto would leave Langer and other employers who do business with him exposed to the same type of pressure through other comparable channels. The order properly enjoins petitioners from exerting this pressure upon Langer, through other employers, as well as through Giorgi and Deltorto. We may well apply here the principle stated in International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392, 400: “When the purpose to restrain trade appears from a clear violation of law, it is not necessary that all of the untraveled roads to that end be left open and that only the worn one be closed.” And see United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U. S. 76, 90. The judgment of the Court of Appeals accordingly is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Reed, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Jackson would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 61 Stat. 140-141, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 158 (b) (4) (A). For text see Labor Board v. Denver Building Trades Council, ante, p. 677, note 1. The complaint referred originally not only to the unfair labor practice here considered but also to coercion in violation of § 8 (b) (1) (A), and to threats of action addressed to other employers. Those charges were dismissed by the Board and are not before us. 61 Stat. 149-150, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 160 (l). For text see Labor Board v. Denver Building Trades Council, ante, p. 682, note 10. 61 Stat. 148-149, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 160 (f). “The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” 61 Stat. 142, 29 U. S. C. (Supp.III) § 158 (c). This issue is extensively reviewed and determined in favor of the view that § 8 (c) does not immunize otherwise unfair labor practice against § 8 (b) (4) (A) in United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 81 N. L. R. B. 802, 807-816. In affirming that conclusion the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit said: “They established a picket at the building project of Klassen. And they placed Klassen on a so-called blacklist and gave wide circulation of the fact among those particularly interested in the building industry, all for the purpose of compelling Klassen to cease doing business with Wadsworth. There is nothing in the language or legislative history of section 8 (c) which indicates persuasively .a Congressional intent to create an asylum of immunity from the proscription of section 8 (b) (4) (A) for acts and conduct of that kind.” Labor Board v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 184 F. 2d 60, 62. Petition for certiorari was filed in this Court and action on the petition was withheld pending decision of the instant cases. The United Brotherhood of Carpenters filed a brief as amicus curiae in connection with the hearings of these cases and the petition of certiorari is this day being denied, post, p. 947. See also, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Sperry, 170 F. 2d 863, 868-869; Printing Specialties Union, 82 N. L. R. B. 271; Bricklayers Union, 82 N. L. R. B. 228; Local 1796, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 82 N. L. R. B. 211; Dennis, The Boycott Under the Taft-Hartley Act, N. Y. U. Third Annual Conference on Labor (1950), 367, 382-386, Induce: “1. To lead on; to influence; to prevail on; to move by persuasion or influence.” Encourage: “1. To give courage to; to inspire with courage, spirit, or hope; to raise the confidence of; to animate; hearten; .... “2. To embolden, incite, or induce as by inspiration, recommendation, etc.; hence, to advise; .... “3. To give help or patronage to, as an industry; to foster; . . . .” Webster’s New Int’l Diet., Unabridged (2d ed. 1945). “Sec. 303. (a) It shall be unlawful, for the purposes of this section only, in an industry or activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is— “(1) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person; “(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any violation of subsection (a) may sue therefor in any district court of the United States subject to the limitations and provisions of section 301 hereof without respect to the amount in controversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit.” 61 Stat. 158-159,29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 187. See Labor Board v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 184 F. 2d 60, 62, certiorari denied this day as No. 387, post, p. 947; Labor Board v. Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 181 F. 2d 126, 132, aff’d as No. 85, post, p. 707; Labor Board v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union, 178 F. 2d 584, 587-588; Printing Specialties Union v. Le Baron, 171 F. 2d 331, 334-335; United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Sperry, 170 F. 2d 863, 868-869. See also, as to § 8 (b) (4) (C), Douds v. Local 1250, 170 F. 2d 700, 701. See Building Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 U. S. 532; International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U. S. 470; Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460; Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U. S. 490.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PRESEAULT et ux. v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION et al. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 88-1076. Argued November 1, 1989 Decided February 21, 1990 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. O’Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined, post, p. 20. Michael M. Berger argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Clarke A. Gravel, Richard E. Davis, and T. Christopher Gr'eene. Brian J. Martin argued the cause for the federal respondents. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Carr, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Anne S. Almy, James E. Brook-shire, Robert S. Burk, and Ellen D. Hanson. John K. Dunleavy, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents State of Vermont et al. With him on the brief were Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and John T. Leddy. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Farm Bureau Federation et al. by John J. Rademacher and Richard L. Krause; for the Missouri Farm Bureau Federation et al. by Ron McMilliu and Lori J. Levine; for the National Association of Realtors by Ralph IT. Hoi men; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by Ronald A. Ziunbrun and Edwavd J. Connor, Jr. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Montgomery County, Maryland, by Fritz R. Kahn and Clyde H. Sorrell; for the Iowa Association of County Conservation Boards et al. by Charles H. Montange; for the National Association of Counties et al. by Benua Ruth Solomon, Joyce Holmes Benjamin, Beate Bloch, James L. Quarles III, and Jerold S. Kayden; and for the Rails-to-Trails Conservancy et al. by Robert Brager, David 31. Friedlaud, and David Burtcell. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of California et al. by John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, F. Gregory Taylor and Theodora P. Berger, Assistant Attorneys General, Dennis 31. Eagan, Craig C. Thompson, and Terry T. Fujimoto, Deputy Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Robert A. Buttericorth of Florida, Thomas J. 31iller of Iowa, Frederick J. Coivan of Kentucky, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Brian McKay of Nevada, Stephen E. 3Ierrill of New Hampshire, Fichólas Spaeth of North Dakota, Anthony J. Celebrezze. Jr., of Ohio, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Roger A. Tellinghuisen of South Dakota, R. Paul Van Dam of Utah, and Charles G. Brown of West Virginia; and for the National Association of Reversionary Property Owners by Daryl A. Deutsch. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is the constitutionality of a federal “rails-to-trails” statute under which unused railroad rights-of-way are converted into recreational trails notwithstanding whatever reversionary property interests may exist under state law. Petitioners contend that the statute violates both the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and the Commerce Clause, Art. I, §8. We find it unnecessary to evaluate the merits of the takings claim because we hold that even if the rails-to-trails statute gives rise to a taking, compensation is available to petitioners under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491(a)(1) (1982 ed.), and the requirements of the Fifth Amendment are satisfied. We also hold that the statute is a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. I A The statute at issue in this case, the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983 (Amendments), Pub. L. 98-11, 97 Stat. 48, to the National Trails System Act (Trails Act), Pub. L. 90-543, 82 Stat. 919 (codified, as amended, at 16 U. S. C. § 1241 et seq.), is the culmination of congressional efforts to preserve shrinking rail trackage by converting unused rights-of-way to recreational trails. In 1920, the Nation’s railway system reached its peak of 272,000 miles; today only about 141,000 miles are in use, and experts predict that 3,000 miles will be abandoned every year through the end of this century. Concerned about the loss of trackage, Congress included in the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act), Pub. L. 94-210, 90 Stat. 144, as amended, 49 U. S. C. §10906 (1982 ed.), several provisions aimed at promoting the conversion of abandoned lines to trails. Section 809(a) of the 4-R Act required the Secretary of Transportation to prepare a report on alternative uses for abandoned railroad rights-of-way. Section 809(b) authorized the Secretary of the Interior to encourage conversion of abandoned rights-of-way to recreational and conservational uses through financial, educational, and technical assistance to local, state, and federal agencies. See note following 49 U. S. C. §10906 (1982 ed.). Section 809(c) authorized the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission) to delay the disposition of rail property for up to 180 days after the effective date of an order permitting abandonment, unless the property had first been offered for sale on reasonable terms for public purposes including recreational use. See 49 U. S. C. §10906 (1982 ed.). By 1983, Congress recognized that these measures “ha[d] not been successful in establishing a process through which railroad rights-of-way which are not immediately necessary for active service can be utilized for trail purposes.” H. R. Rep. No. 98-28, p. 8 (1983) (H. R. Rep.); S. Rep. No. 98-1, p. 9 (1983) (S. Rep.) (same). Congress enacted the Amendments to the Trails Act, which authorize the ICC to preserve for possible future railroad use rights-of-way not currently in service and to allow interim use of the land as recreational trails. Section 8(d) provides that a railroad wishing to cease operations along a particular route may negotiate with a State, municipality, or private group that is prepared to assume financial and managerial responsibility for the right-of-way. If the parties reach agreement, the land may be transferred to the trail operator for interim trail use, subject to ICC-imposed terms and conditions; if no agreement is reached, the railroad may abandon the line entirely and liquidate its interest. Section 8(d) of the amended Trails Act provides that interim trail use “shall not be treated, for any purposes of any law or rule of law, as an abandonment of the use of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes.” 16 U. S. C. § 1247(d). This language gives rise to a takings question in the typical rails-to-trails case because many railroads do not own their rights-of-way outright but rather hold them under easements or similar property interests. While the terms of these easements and applicable state law vary, frequently the easements provide that the property reverts to the abutting landowner upon abandonment of rail operations. State law generally governs the disposition of reversionary interests, subject of course to the ICC’s “exclusive and plenary” jurisdiction to regulate abandonments, Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U. S. 311, 321 (1981), and to impose conditions affecting postabandonment use of the property. See Hayfield Northern R. Co. v. Chicago & North Western Transp. Co., 467 U. S. 622, 633 (1984). By deeming interim trail use to be like discontinuance rather than abandonment, see n. 3, supra, Congress prevented property interests from reverting under state law: “The key finding of this amendment is that interim use of a railroad right-of-way for trail use, when the route itself remains intact for future railroad purposes, shall not constitute an abandonment of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes. This finding alone should eliminate many of the problems with this program. The concept of attempting to establish trails only after the formal abandonment of a railroad right-of-way is self-defeating; once a right-of-way is abandoned for railroad purposes there may be nothing left for trail use. This amendment would ensure that potential interim trail use will be considered prior to abandonment.” H. R. Rep., at 8-9. See S. Rep., at 9 (same). The primary issue in this case is whether Congress has violated the Fifth Amendment by precluding reversion of state property interests. B Petitioners claim a reversionary interest in a railroad right-of-way adjacent to their land in Vermont. In 1962, the State of Vermont acquired the Rutland Railway Corporation’s interest in the right-of-way and then leased the right-of-way to Vermont Railway, Inc. Vermont Railway stopped using the route more than a decade ago and has since removed all railroad equipment, including switches, bridges, and track, from the portion of the right-of-way claimed by petitioners. In 1981, petitioners brought a quiet title action in the Superior Court of Chittenden County, alleging that the easement had been abandoned and was thus extinguished, and that the right-of-way had reverted to them by operation of state property law. In August 1983, the Superior Court dismissed the action, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the ICC had not authorized abandonment of the route and therefore still exercised exclusive jurisdiction over it. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. Trustees of Diocese of Vermont v. State, 145 Vt. 510, 496 A. 2d 151 (1985). Petitioners then sought a certificate of abandonment of the rail line from the ICC. The State of Vermont intervened, claiming title in fee simple to the right-of-way and arguing in the alternative that, even if the State’s interest were an easement, the land could not revert while it was still being used for a public purpose. Vermont Railway and the State then petitioned the ICC to permit the railroad to discontinue rail service and transfer the right-of-way to the city of Burlington for interim use as a public trail under § 8(d) of the Trails Act. By a Notice of Exemption decided January 2, 1986, the ICC allowed the railroad to discontinue service and approved the agreement between the State and the city for interim trail use. See 51 Fed. Reg. 454-455. On February 4, 1986, the ICC Chairman denied petitioners’ application for a stay pending administrative review, and the decision became effective on February 5, 1986. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and/or clarification was denied on July 17, 1987. The Commission noted that “[i]nevitably, interim trail use will conflict with the reversionary rights of adjacent land owners, but that is the very purpose of the Trails Act.” State of Vermont & Vermont Railway, Inc. — Discontinuance of Service Exemption in Chittenden County, 3 I. C. C. 2d 903, 908. Petitioners sought review of the ICC’s order in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that § 8(d) of the Trails Act is unconstitutional on its face because it takes private property without just compensation and because it is not a valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power. The Court of Appeals rejected both arguments. 853 F. 2d 145 (1988). It reasoned that the ICC has “plenary and exclusive authority” over abandonments, id., at 151, and that federal law must be considered in determining the property right held by petitioners. “For as long as it determines that the land will serve a ‘railroad purpose,’ the ICC retains jurisdiction over railroad rights-of-way; it does not matter whether that purpose is immediate or in the future.” Ibid. Because the court believed that no reversionary interest could vest until the ICC determined that abandonment was appropriate, the court concluded that the Trails Act did not result in a taking. Next, the court found that the Trails Act was reasonably adapted to two legitimate congressional purposes under the Commerce Clause: “preserving rail corridors for future railroad use” and “permitting public recreational use of trails.” Id., at 150. The Court of Appeals therefore dismissed petitioners’ Commerce Clause challenge. We granted certiorari. 490 U. S. 1034 (1989). II The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The Amendment “does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.” First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304, 314 (1987). It is designed “not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.” Id., at 315 (emphasis in original). Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment does not require that just compensation be paid in advance of or even contemporaneously with the taking. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172, 194 (1985). All that is required is the existence of a “ ‘reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation’ ” at the time of the taking. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 124-125 (1974) (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641, 659 (1890)). “If the government has provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process ‘yield[s] just compensation,’ then the property owner ‘has no claim against the Government’ for a taking.” Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n, supra, at 194-195 (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1013, 1018, n. 21 (1984)). For this reason, “taking claims against the Federal Government are premature until the property owner has availed itself of the process provided by the Tucker Act.” Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n, supra, at 195; see also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U. S. 121, 127-128 (1985); Monsanto, supra, at 1016; Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 94, n. 39 (1978). The Tucker Act provides juriscliction in the United States Claims Court for any claim against the Federal Government to recover damages founded on the Constitution, a statute, a regulation, or an express or implied-in-fact contract. See 28 U. S. C. § 1491(a)(1) (1982 ed.); see also § 1346(a)(2) (Little Tucker Act, which creates concurrent jurisdiction in the district courts for such claims not exceeding $10,000 in amount). “If there is a taking, the claim is ‘founded upon the Constitution’ and within the jurisdiction of the [Claims Court] to hear and determine.” United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 267 (1946). The critical question in this case, therefore, is whether a Tucker Act remedy is available for claims arising out of takings pursuant to the Amendments. The proper inquiry is not whether the statute “expresses an affirmative showing of congressional intent to permit recourse to a Tucker Act remedy,” but rather “whether Congress has in the [statute] withdrawn the Tucker Act grant of jurisdiction to the [Claims Court] to hear a suit involving the [statute] ‘founded . . . upon the Constitution.’” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra, at 126 (emphasis in original). Under this standard, we conclude that the Amendments did not withdraw the Tucker Act remedy. Congress did not exhibit the type of “unambiguous intention to withdraw the Tucker Act remedy,” Monsanto, supra, at 1019, that is necessary to preclude a Tucker Act claim. See Glosemeyer v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 685 F. Supp. 1108, 1120-1121 (ED Mo. 1988), aff’d, 879 F. 2d 316, 324-325 (CA8 1989). Neither the statute nor its legislative history mentions the Tucker Act. As indirect evidence of Congress’ intent to prevent recourse to the Tucker Act, petitioners point to § 101 of the Amendments which, although it was not codified into law, provides in relevant part that: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, authority to enter into contracts, and to make payments, under this Act shall be effective only to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation Acts.” 97 Stat. 42, note following 16 U. S. C. § 1249. Petitioners contend that this section limits the ICC’s authority for conversions to those not requiring the expenditure of any funds and to those others for which funds had been appropriated in advance. Thus, any conversion that could result in Claims Court litigation was not authorized by Congress, since payment for such an acquisition would not have been approved by Congress in advance. Petitioners insist that such unauthorized Government actions cannot create Tucker Act liability, citing Hooe v. United States, 218 U. S. 322, 335 (1910), and Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra, at 127, n. 16. We need not decide what types of official authorization, if any, are necessary to create federal liability under the Fifth Amendment, because we find that rail-to-trail conversions giving rise to just compensation claims are clearly authorized by § 8(d). That section speaks in capacious terms of “interim use of any established railroad rights-of-way” (emphasis added) and does not support petitioners’ proposed distinction between conversions that might result in a taking and those that do not. Although Congress did not explicitly promise to pay for any takings, we have always assumed that the Tucker Act is an “implie[d] promis[e]” to pay just compensation which individual laws need not reiterate. Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U. S. 18, 21 (1940). .Petitioners’ argument that specific congressional authorization is required for those conversions that might result in takings is a thinly veiled attempt to circumvent the established method for determining whether Tucker Act relief is available for claims arising out of takings pursuant to a federal statute. We reaffirm that a Tucker Act remedy exists unless there are unambiguous indications to the contrary. Section 101, moreover, speaks only to appropriations under the Amendments themselves and not to relief available under the Tucker Act, as evidenced by §101’s opening clause — “[notwithstanding any other provision of this Act” (emphasis added) — which refers to the 1983 Amendments. The section means simply that payments made pursuant to the Amendments, such as funding for scenic trails, markers, and similar purposes, see Amendments §209(5)(C), 97 Stat. 49 (codified at 16 U. S. C. § 1249(c)(2)) (authorizing appropriations for the development and administration of certain National Scenic and National Historic Trails), are effective only “in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation Acts,” a concept that mirrors Art. I, §9, of the Constitution (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law”). Payments for takings claims are not affected by this language, because such claims “arise” under the Fifth Amendment, see First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U. S., at 315-316. Payments for takings would be made “under” the Tucker Act, not the Trails Act, and would be drawn from the Judgment Fund, which is a separate appropriated account, see 31 U. S. C. § 1304(a) (1982 ed.). Section 101 does not manifest the type of clear and unmistakable congressional intent necessary to withdraw Tucker Act coverage. Petitioners next assert that Congress’ desire that the Amendments operate at “low cost,” H. R. Rep., at 3, somehow indicates that Congress withdrew the Tucker Act remedy. There is no doubt that Congress meant to keep the costs of the Amendments to a minimum. This intent, however, has little bearing on the Tucker Act question. We have previously rejected the argument that a generalized desire to protect the public fisc is sufficient to withdraw relief under the Tucker Act. In the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, we recognized that the Rail Act established “[mjaximum” funding authorizations, 419 U. S., at 127-128, but we nevertheless held that those limits were not an unambiguous repeal of the Tucker Act remedy. We reasoned that the maximum limits might “support the inference that Congress was so convinced that the huge sums provided would surely equal or exceed the required constitutional minimum that it never focused upon the possible need for a suit in the Court of Claims.” Id., at 128. In Monsanto, we stated that: “Congress in [the statute] did not address the liability of the Government to pay just compensation should a taking occur. Congress’ failure specifically to mention or provide for recourse against the Government may reflect a congressional belief that use of data by [the Government] in the ways authorized by [the statute] effects no Fifth Amendment taking or it may reflect Congress’ assumption that the general grant of jurisdiction under the Tucker Act would provide the necessary remedy for any taking that may occur. In any event, the failure cannot be construed to reflect an unambiguous intention to withdraw the Tucker Act remedy.” 467 U. S., at 1018-1019. Similar logic applies to the instant case. The statements made in Congress during the passage of the Trails Act Amendments might reflect merely the decision not to create a program of direct federal purchase, construction, and maintenance of trails, and instead to allow state and local governments and private groups to establish and manage trails. The alternative chosen by Congress is less costly than a program of direct federal trail acquisition because, under any view of takings law, only some rail-to-trail conversions will amount to takings. Some rights-of-way are held in fee simple. See National Wildlife Federation v. ICC, 271 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 10, 850 F. 2d 694, 703 (1988). Others are held as easements that do not even as a matter of state law revert upon interim use as nature trails. In addition, under § 8(d) the Federal Government neither incurs the costs of constructing and maintaining the trails nor assumes legal liability for the transfer or use of the right-of-way. In contrast, the costs of acquiring and administering national scenic and national historic trails are borne directly by the Federal Government. See n. 1, supra. Thus, the “low cost” language might reflect Congress’ rejection of a more ambitious program of federally owned and managed trails, rather than withdrawal of a Tucker Act remedy. The language does not amount to the “unambiguous intention” required by our prior cases. In sum, petitioners’ failure to make use of the available Tucker Act remedy renders their takings challenge to the ICG’s order premature. We need not decide whether a taking occurred in this case. Ill Petitioners also contend that the Amendments are not a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, Art. I, §8, because the true purpose of § 8(d) is to prevent reversion of railroad rights-of-way to property owners after abandonment and to create recreational trails, rather than to preserve rail corridors for future railroad use. We evaluate this claim under the traditional rationality standard of review: we must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce “if there is any rational basis for such a finding,” Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 276 (1981), and we must ensure only that the means selected by Congress are “ ‘reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.’” Ibid, (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 262 (1964)); see also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U. S. 314, 323-324 (1981). The Amendments clearly pass muster. Two congressional purposes are evident. First, Congress intended to “encourage the development of additional trails” and to “assist recreation[al] users by providing opportunities for trail use on an interim basis.” H. R. Rep., at 8, 9; S. Rep., at 9, 10 (same); see also 16 U. S. C. § 1241(a) (Trails Act “promote[s] the preservation of, public access to, travel within, and enjoyment and appreciation of the open-air, outdoor areas and historic resources of the Nation”). Second, Congress intended “to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service, to protect rail transportation corridors, and to encourage energy efficient transportation use.” H. R. Rep., at 8; S. Rep., at 9; see also 16 U. S. C. § 1247(d). These are valid congressional objectives to which the Amendments are reasonably adapted. Petitioners contend that the Amendments do not reasonably promote the latter purpose because the ICC cannot authorize trail use until it has found that the right-of-way at issue is not necessary for “present or future public convenience and necessity.” 49 U. S. C. § 10903(a) (1982 ed.) (emphasis added). The ICC has explained that: “In every Trails Act case, we will already have found that the public convenience and necessity permit abandonment (or that regulatory approval is not required under 49 U. S. C. [§]10505).” 54 Fed. Reg. 8012, n. 3 (1989). Thus, trail conversion is permitted only after the Commission determines that rail service will not be not needed in the foreseeable future. This, according to petitioners, reveals that the rail banking rationale is a sham. If Congress really wished to address the problem of shrinking trackage, it would not have left conversions to voluntary agreements between railroads and state and local agencies or private groups. Rather, petitioners suggest, Congress would have created a mandatory program administered directly by the ICC. We note at the outset that even under petitioners’ reading, the Amendments would still be a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause because they are reasonably adapted to the goal of encouraging the development of additional recreational trails. There is no requirement that a law serve more than one legitimate purpose. Moreover, we are not at liberty under the rational basis standard of review to hold the Amendments invalid merely because more Draconian measures — such as a program of mandatory conversions or a prohibition of all abandonments —might advance more completely the rail banking purpose. The process of legislating often involves tradeoffs, compromises, and imperfect solutions, and our ability to imagine ways of redesigning the statute to advance one of Congress’ ends does not render it irrational. See, e. g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456, 469 (1981). The history of congressional attempts to address the problem of rail abandonments, see supra, at 5-6, provides sufficient reason to defer to the legislative judgment that § 8(d) is an appropriate answer. Here, as in Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., “Congress considered the effectiveness of existing legislation and concluded that additional measures were necessary.” 452 U. S., at 283. Petitioners’ argument that § 8(d) does not serve the rail banking purpose, moreover, is not well taken. That the ICC must certify that public convenience and necessity permit abandonment before granting a CITU or NITU does not indicate that the statute fails to promote its purpose of preserving rail corridors. Congress did not distinguish between short-term and long-term rail banking, nor did it require that • the Commission develop a specific contingency plan for reactivation of a line before permitting conversion. To the contrary, Congress apparently believed that every line is a potentially valuable national asset that merits preservation even if no future rail use for it is currently foreseeable. Given the long tradition of congressional regulation of railroad abandonments, see, e. g., Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153 (1926), that is a judgment that Congress is entitled to make. IV For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice O’Connor, with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy join, concurring. Petitioners assert that the actions of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission) prevent them from enjoying property rights secured by Vermont law and thereby have effected a compensable taking. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that, no matter what Vermont law might provide, the ICC’s actions forestalled petitioners from possessing the asserted reversionary interest, and thus that no takings claim could arise. Today the Court affirms the Second Circuit’s judgment on quite different grounds. I join the Court’s opinion, but write separately to express my view that state law determines what property interest petitioners possess and that traditional takings doctrine will determine whether the Government must compensate petitioners for the burden imposed on any property interest they possess. As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 8-9, 15-16, state law creates and defines the scope of the reversionary or other real property interests' affected by the ICC’s actions pursuant to §208 of the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, 16 U. S. C. § 1247(d). In determining whether a taking has occurred, “we are mindful of the basic axiom that ‘[property interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.’” Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1001 (1984), quoting Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U. S. 155, 161 (1980) (internal quotation omitted). Although original federal grants of railway easements may influence certain disputes over interests in land, see Great Northern R. Co. v. United States, 315 U. S. 262 (1942); Idaho v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 617 F. Supp. 207 (Idaho 1985), no such federal role is present in this case. Rather, the parties sharply dispute what interest, according to Vermont law, the State of Vermont acquired from the Rutland Railway Corporation and, correspondingly, whether petitioners possess the property interest that they claim has been taken. See Brief for Petitioners 15, and n. 14; Brief for Respondents State of Vermont et al. 22-25; Reply Brief for Petitioners 2-4. Similar reference to state law has guided other courts seeking to determine whether a railway right of way lapsed upon the conversion to trail use. Compare State by Washington Wildlife Preservation, Inc. v. State, 329 N. W. 2d 543, 545-548 (Minn.) (trail use within original interest, thus reversionary rights have not matured), cert. denied, 463 U. S. 1209 (1983), with Lawson v. State, 107 Wash. 2d 444, 730 P. 2d 1308 (1986) (change in use would give effect to reversionary interests); McKinley v. Waterloo R. Co., 368 N. W. 2d 131, 133-136 (Iowa 1985) (lack of railway use triggered period leading to reversion); Schnabel v. County of DuPage, 101 Ill. App. 3d 553, 428 N. E. 2d 671 (1981) (easement lapsed). Determining what interest petitioners would have enjoyed under Vermont law, in the absence of the ICC’s recent actions, will establish whether petitioners possess the predicate property interest that must underlie any takings claim. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., supra, at 1001-1004. We do not attempt to resolve that issue. It is also clear that the Interstate Commerce Act, and the ICC’s actions pursuant to it, pre-empt the operation and effect of certain state laws that “conflict with or interfere with federal authority over the same activity.” Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U. S. 311, 319 (1981); see id., at 318-319. States may not impose obligations upon carriers at odds with those governed through the ICC’s “exclusive” and “plenary authority to regulate . . . rail carriers’ cessations of service on their lines.” Id., at 323; see id., at 324-327. A State may again exercise its regulatory powers once the ICC authorizes a carrier’s abandonment of service, and, thus, unless the Commission attaches postabandonment conditions to the abandonment certificate, “brings [the Commission’s] regulatory mission to an end.” Hayfield Northern R. Co. v. Chicago & North Western Transp. Co., 467 U. S. 622, 633 (1984). As the Vermont Supreme Court recognized, state courts cannot enforce or give effect to asserted reversionary interests when enforcement would interfere with the Commission’s administration of the Interstate Commerce Act. See Trustees of Diocese of Vermont v. State, 145 Vt. 510, 496 A. 2d 151 (1985). These results are simply routine and well-established consequences of the Supremacy Clause, U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. The scope of the Commission’s authority to regulate abandonments, thereby delimiting the ambit of federal power, is an issue quite distinct from whether the Commission’s exercise of power over matters within its jurisdiction effected a taking of petitioners’ property. Cf. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 174 (1979) (“[T]here is no question but that Congress could assure the public a free right of access .... Whether a statute or regulation that went so far amounted to a ‘taking,’ however, is an entirely separate question”). Although the Commission’s actions may pre-empt the operation and effect of certain state laws, those actions do not displace state law as the traditional source of the real property interests. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., supra, at 1003-1004, 1012 (state law creates property right in trade secrets for purposes of Fifth Amendment, and regulatory regime does not pre-empt state property law). The Commission’s actions may delay property owners’ enjoyment of their reversionary interests, but that delay burdens and defeats the property interest rather than suspends or defers the vesting of those property rights. See National Wildlife Federation v. ICC, 271 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 11-12, and n. 16, 850 F. 2d 694, 704-705, and n. 16 (1988). Any other conclusion would convert the ICC’s power to pre-empt conflicting state regulation of interstate commerce into the power to pre-empt the rights guaranteed by state property law, a result incompatible with the Fifth Amendment. See Ruckels haus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S., at 1012 (“If Congress can ‘pre-empt’ state property law in the manner advocated by EPA, then the Taking Clause has lost all vitality. [A] sovereign, ‘by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation .... This is the very kind of thing that the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent’”), quoting Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U. S., at 164. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted just this unjustified interpretation of the effect of the ICC’s exercise of federal power. The court concluded that even if petitioners held the reversionary interest they claim, no taking occurred because “no reversionary interest can or would vest” until the ICC determines that abandonment is appropriate. See 853 F. 2d 145, 151 (1988). This view conflates the scope of the ICC’s power with the existence of a compensable taking and threatens to read the Just Compensation Clause out of the Constitution. The ICC may possess the power to postpone enjoyment of reversionary interests, but the Fifth Amendment and well-established doctrine indicate that in certain circumstances the Government must compensate owners of those property interests when it exercises that power. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304, 314-315 (1987) (The Taking Clause “does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power,” and the Clause “is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking”). Nothing in the Court’s opinion disavows these principles. The Court’s conclusion that § 8(d) authorizes rails-to-trails conversions that amount to takings, ante, at 13, and its conclusion that “under any view of takings law, only some rail-to-trail conversions will amount to takings,” ante, at 16, are inconsistent with the Second Circuit’s view. Indeed, if the Second Circuit’s approach were adopted, discussion of the availability of the Tucker Act remedy would be unnecessary. Even the federal respondents acknowledge that the existence of a taking will rest upon the nature of the state-created property interest that petitioners would have enjoyed absent the federal action and upon the extent that the federal action burdened that interest. See Brief for Federal Respondents 23-24. Well-established principles will govern analysis of whether the burden the ICC’s actions impose upon state-defined real property interests amounts to a compensable taking. We recently concluded in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U. S. 825, 831-832 (1987), that a taking would occur if the Government appropriated a public easement. See also Kaiser Aetna, supra, at 179-180 (“[T]he ‘right to exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation”) (footnote omitted). In such a case, a “permanent physical occupation” of the underlying property “has occurred . . . where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises.” Nollan, supra, at 832; see also, Kaiser Aetna, supra, at 180 (“[E]ven if the Government physically invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay just compensation”). The Government’s appropriation of other, lesser servitudes may also impose a burden requiring payment of just compensation. See United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 327 (1922). And the Court recently concluded that the Government’s burdening of property for a distinct period, short of a permanent taking, may nevertheless mandate compensation. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, supra, at 318-319. Of course, a party may gain the benefit of these principles only after establishing possession of a property interest that has been burdened. As today’s decision indicates, petitioners and persons similarly situated will have ample opportunity to make that showing. With this understanding, and for the reasons set forth in the Court’s opinion, I agree that the judgment below should be affirmed. Many nature trails are operated directly by the Federal Government pursuant to the Trails Act, in which Congress reserved to itself the right to designate scenic and historic trails and delegated to the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture authority to designate recreational trails and to develop and administer the entire trails system. See 16 U. S. C. §§ 1242-1246. Section 7(e) of the Trails Act, 16 U. S. C. § 1246(e), provides that the land necessary for a designated scenic or historic trail may be acquired by state or local governments or by federal authorities, either through cooperative agreements with landowners or by purchase. In the event that all voluntary means for acquiring the property fail, the appropriate Secretary is given limited power to obtain private lands through condemnation proceedings. See 16 U. S. C. § 1246(g). See authorities cited in Comment, Rails to Trails: Converting America’s Abandoned Railroads Into Nature Trails, 22 Akron L. Rev. 645 (1989); see also 102 ICC Ann. Rep. 44-45 (1.988); 101 ICC Ann. Rep. 37-38 (1987). There is an important distinction in the Interstate Commerce Act between “abandonment” of a rail line and “discontinuance” of service. See 49 U. S. C. § 10903 (1982 ed.). Once a carrier “abandons” a rail line pursuant to authority granted by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the line is no longer part of the national transportation system, and although the Commission is empowered to impose conditions on abandonments, see, e. g.. 49 U. S. C. §§ 10905(f)(4), 10906 (1982 ed.), as a general proposition ICC jurisdiction terminates. See Hayfield Northern R. Co. v. Chicago & North Western Transp. Co., 467 U. S. 622, 633-634 (1984); 54 Fed. Reg. 8011-8012 (1989). In contrast, “discontinuance" authority allows a railroad to cease operating a line for an indefinite period while preserving the rail corridor for possible reactivation of service in the future. Section 8(d), codified at 16 U. S. C. § 1247(d), provides: “The Secretary of Transportation, the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Secretary of the Interior, in administering the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, shall encourage State and local agencies and private interests to establish appropriate trails using the provisions of such programs. Consistent with the purposes of that Act, and in furtherance of the national policy to preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service, to protect rail transportation corridors, and to encourage energy efficient transportation use, in the case of interim use of any established railroad rights-of-way pursuant to donation, transfer, lease, sale, or otherwise in a manner consistent with this chapter [the Trails Act], if such interim use is subject to restoration or reconstruction for railroad purposes, such interim use shall not be treated, for purposes of any law or rule of law, as an abandonment of the use of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes. If a State, political subdivision, or qualified private organization is prepared to assume full responsibility for management of such rights-of-way and for any legal liability arising out of such transfer or use, and for the payment of any and all taxes that may be levied or assessed against such rights-of-way, then the Commission shall impose such terms and conditions as a requirement of any transfer or conveyance for interim use in a manner consistent with this chapter, and shall not permit abandonment or discontinuance inconsistent or disruptive of such use.” Under implementing regulations promulgated by the ICC, a railroad may apply to the ICC for either a Certificate of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment (CITU) or, in a proceeding involving the exemption of a route from ICC regulation, a Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment (NITU). See Rail Abandonments — Use of Rights-of-Way as Trails, 2 I. C. C. 2d 591, 628 (1986); 49 CFR § 1152.29 (1988). A CITU or NITU provides a 180-day period during which the railroad may discontinue service, cancel tariffs, and salvage track and other equipment, and also negotiate a voluntary agreement for interim trail use with a qualified trail operator. If agreement is reached, interim trail use is thereby authorized. If not, the CITU or NITU automatically converts into an effective certificate or notice of abandonment. Because the ICC had not yet promulgated its final regulations implementing $8(d) at the time of its decision in the instant case, the Commission did not issue a CTTU or NITU. State of Vermont and Vermont Railway, Inc. — Discontinuance of Service Exemption in Chittenden County, Docket No. AB-265 (Sub-No. IX). See H. R. Rep., at 2 (noting that the Committee “eliminated most of the items which could require future Federal expenditures”); S. Rep., at 3 (same); H. R. Rep., at 11 (reporting required funding for the bill to be “insignificant”); 129 Cong. Rec. 5219 (1983) (remarks of floor manager Rep. Seiberling) (“[T]he committee recommended a revised text which eliminated most of the items which would require future Federal expenditures. . . . Additional recommendations reflect continuing efforts to encourage the expansion of trail recreation opportunities across the Nation at a low cost”). We note that the ICC has construed §8(d) as not providing federal power to condemn railroad rights-of-way for interim trail use. See RailAbandonments, 2 I. C. C. 2d, at 596-598; see also National Wildlife Federation v. ICC, 271 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 4, n. 4, 6-9, 850 F. 2d. 694, 697, n. 4, 699-702 (1988); Connecticut Trust for Historic Preservation v. ICC, 841 F. 2d 479, 482-483 (CA2 1988); Washington State Dept. of Game v. ICC, 829 F. 2d 877, 879-882 (CA9 1987). Some state courts have held that trail use does not constitute abandonment of a right-of-way for public travel so as to trigger reversionary rights. See State by Washington Wildlife Preservation, Inc. v. State, 329 N. W. 2d 543, 545-548 (Minn.), cert. denied, 463 U. S. 1209 (1983); Reiger v. Penn Central Corp., No. 85-CA-11 (Ct. App. Greene County, Ohio, May 21, 1985). Petitioners also claim that a floor statement by Senator Domenici that “the Federal Government has acquired too much land from landowners using condemnation procedures that in essence short changed the property rights of the landowners,” 129 Cong. Rec. 1607 (1983), means that Tucker Act relief is unavailable. We disagree. The Senator spoke in the context of praising the statute for “encouraging] cooperation” rather than resorting automatically to condemnation. Ibid. As administered by the ICC, the conversion process begins when a railroad voluntarily seeks a CITU or NITU; it then negotiates with a qualified trail operator to establish interim trail use. The ICC does not set up trails on its own and has interpreted § 8(d) to exclude the type of condemnation power vested in the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture by 16 U. S. C. § 1246(g). See n. 8, supra. This limitation on ICC condemnation authority is not relevant to the question whether compensation under the Tucker Act is available for takings resulting from the conversions that do occur, and it certainly is not an unambiguous sign that Congress meant to withdraw Tucker Act relief.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. AMAX COAL CO., A DIVISION OF AMAX, INC., et al. No. 80-692. Argued April 28, 1981 Decided June 29, 1981 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BrenNAN, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 339. Harrison Combs argued the cause for petitioners in No. 80-289. With him on the briefs were J. Craig Kuhn, Melvin P. Stein, and James C. Kuhn III. Harlon L. Dalton argued the cause for the National Labor Relations Board in both cases. On the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Andrew J. Levander, Robert E. Allen, Norton J. Come, Linda Sher, and Richard B. Bader. Daniel F. Gruender argued the cause for respondent Amax Coal Co., a Division of Amax, Inc., in both cases. With him on the brief was Raymond K. Denworth, Jr. Together with No. 80-289, United Mine Workers of America, Local No. 1854, et al. v. National Labor Relations Board et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Robert J. Ferdon, Julia Penny Clark, J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and David R. Boyd, for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al.; by Charles P. O’Connor and Harry A. Rissetto for the Bituminous Coal Operators’ Association, Inc.; and by E. Ccdvin Golumbic for the Board of Trustees of the United Mine Workers of America Health and Retirement Funds. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. This litigation concerns the relationship between two important provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA). Section 8 (b)(1)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by § 101 of the LMRA, 61 Stat. 141, makes it an unfair labor practice for a union “to restrain or coerce ... an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances . ...” Section 302 (c) (5) of the LMRA, 61 Stat. 157, permits employers and unions to create employer-financed trust funds for the benefit of employees, so long as employees and employers are equally represented by the trustees of the funds. The question at issue is whether the employer-selected trustees of a trust fund created under § 302 (c)(5) are “representatives” of the employer “for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances” within the meaning of § 8 (b)(1)(B). I The Amax Coal Co. owns several deep-shaft bituminous coal mines, most of them in the Midwestern United States. The United Mine Workers of America (the union) represents Amax’s employees, and, with respect to the midwestern mines, Amax is a member of the Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA), a national multiemployer group that bargains with the union. Through its collective-bargaining contract with the union, Amax, along with the other members of the BCOA, agreed to contribute to the union’s national pension and welfare trust funds. These funds, established under § 302 (c) (5) of the Act, provide comprehensive health and retirement benefits to coal miners and their families. In accord with § 302 (c) (5) (B), the trust funds are administered by three trustees, one selected by the union, one by the members of BOCA, and one by the other two. In 1972, Amax opened the Belle Ayr Mine in Wyoming, the company’s first sub-bituminous surface mine. Although Amax did not join the BCOA with respect to that mine, Amax and the union negotiated a collective-bargaining contract for Belle Ayr which resembled the BCOA national contract, and under which Amax contributed specified amounts of money to the national trust funds to benefit the employees at Belle Ayr. In January 1975, when the collectively bargained contract covering the Belle Ayr Mine ended, the union struck Belle Ayr and other western mines, attempting to compel the mine owners to establish a multiemployer bargaining unit and to agree to a new collective contract proposed by the union, under which the members of the new employer unit would contribute to the national trust funds. Amax resisted, and the union, threatened with a complaint from the National Labor Relations Board Regional Counsel for illegally attempting to coerce the employer into a multiemployer bargaining unit, soon began separate negotiations with Amax. Those negotiations came to an impasse, and the union continued its strike at the Belle Ayr Mine. Amax then filed with the Board unfair labor practice charges against the union. The matter of pension and welfare benefits had been a major barrier to agreement between Amax and the union, and formed an important part of Amax’s charges before the Board. Amax had proposed its own benefit and pension trust plan, outside the purview of § 302 (c)(5), but the union, claiming that such a plan would not be sufficiently portable to or reciprocal with the national trust funds, had rejected this proposal. Rather, the union had insisted that Amax, even as a separately bargaining employer, continue to contribute to the national trust funds for the Belle Ayr employees. Amax, of course, as a member of BCOA, had participated in selecting the management-appointed trustee of the national trust funds, but it now wanted to appoint its own trustee for any trust fund covering the employees of the Belle Ayr Mine. Amax took the view that any management-appointed trustee of a § 302 (c)(5) trust fund was a collective-bargaining “representative” of the employer within the meaning of § 8 (b)(1)(B); therefore, since the management trustee of the national trust fund had already been selected by BCOA, Amax contended that the union’s insistence that it participate in the national trust funds with regard to Belle Ayr employees constituted illegal coercion under §8 (b)(1)(B) of the Act. Amax also charged the union with refusing to bargain in good faith in violation of § 8 (b) (3) of the Act. The National Labor Relations Board unanimously concluded that the union had acted legally in bargaining to impasse and striking to obtain Amax’s participation in the national trust funds for the Belle Ayr employees. The Board noted that the purpose of § 8 (b)(1) (B) was to ensure that an employer can bargain through a freely chosen representative completely faithful to his interests under the principles of agency law, while the trustee of a joint trust fund, though he may appropriately consider the recommendations of the party who appoints him, is a fiduciary owing undivided loyalty to the interest of the beneficiaries in administering the trust. Accordingly, the Board concluded that the union had not violated § 8 (b)(1)(B). On cross-petitions by the parties, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, relying on its earlier decision in Associated Contractors of Essex County, Inc. v. Laborers International Union, 559 F. 2d 222, 227-228, held that management-appointed trustees of a § 302 (c) (5) trust fund act as both fiduciaries of the employee-beneficiaries and as agents of the appointing employers, and, insofar as is consistent with their fiduciary obligations, are expected to administer the trusts in such a way as to advance the employer’s interests. 614 F. 2d 872, 881-882. The court therefore concluded that the union had acted in violation of §8 (b)(1)(B) in exerting its economic power to induce Amax to participate in the national trust funds with respect to employees of the Belle Ayr Mine, and reversed the Board’s ruling to the contrary. We granted certiorari to consider the important question of federal labor law these cases present. 449 U. S. 1110. II Although § 302 (a) of the Act generally prohibits an employer from making payments to any representative of his employees, § 302 (c)(5) allows an employer to contribute to an employee benefit trust fund that satisfies certain statutory requirements. To ensure that the funds in such a trust are not used as a union “war chest,” Arroyo v. United States, 359 U. S. 419, 426, the Act provides that the funds may be used only for specified benefits for employees and their dependents, and that the basis for these payments be laid out in a detailed written agreement between the union and the employer. The fund must be subject to an annual audit, and the results of the audit must be made available to all interested persons. Furthermore, pension or annuity funds must be kept in a trust separate from other union welfare funds. Finally, § 302 (c) (5) (B) requires that “employees and employers [be] equally represented in the administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the representatives of the employers and the representatives of the employees may agree upon . . . Congress directed that union welfare funds be established as written formal trusts, and that the assets of the funds be “held in trust,” and be administered “for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees . . . and their families and dependents . . . .” 29 U. S. C. § 186 (c)(5). Where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under either equity or the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42-43. Under principles of equity, a trustee bears an unwavering duty of complete loyalty to the beneficiary of the trust, to the exclusion of the interests of all other parties. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 (1) (1957); 2 A. Scott, Law of Trusts § 170 (1967). To deter the trustee from all temptation and to prevent any possible injury to the beneficiary, the rule against a trustee dividing his loyalties must be enforced with "uncompromising rigidity.” Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 464, 164 N. E. 545, 546 (Cardozo, C. J.). A fiduciary cannot contend “that, although he had conflicting interests, he served his masters equally well or that his primary loyalty was not weakened by the pull of his secondary one.” Woods v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 312 U. S. 262, 269. Given this established rule against dual loyalties and Congress’ use of terms long established in the courts of chancery, we must infer that Congress intended to impose on trustees traditional fiduciary duties unless Congress has unequivocally expressed an intent to the contrary. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 637. However, although § 302 (c)(5)(B) requires an equal balance between trustees appointed by the union and those appointed by the employer, nothing in the language of § 302 (c) (5) reveals any congressional intent that a trustee should or may administer a trust fund in the interest of the party that appointed him, or that an employer may direct or supervise the decisions of a trustee he has appointed. And the legislative history of the LMRA confirms that § 302 (c) (5) was designed to reinforce, not to alter, the long-established duties of a trustee. As explained by Senator Ball, one of the two sponsors of the provision, the “sole purpose” of § 302 (c) (5) is to ensure that employee benefit trust funds “are legitimate trust funds, used actually for the specified benefits to the employees of the employers who contribute to them . . . .” 93 Cong. Rec. 4678 (1947). Senator Ball stated that “all we seek to do by [§ 302 (c)(5)] is to make sure that the employees whose labor builds this fund and are really entitled to benefits under it shall receive the benefits; that it is a trust fund, and that, if necessary, they can go into court and obtain the benefits to which they are entitled.” Id., at 4753; see H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 66-67 (1947), 1 NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, p. 570 (1948) (Leg. Hist. LMRA). The debates on § 302 (c) (5) further reveal Congress’ intent to cast employee benefit plans in traditional trust form precisely because fiduciary standards long established in equity would best protect employee beneficiaries. For example, one opponent of the bill suggested that § 305 (c) (5) was unnecessary because even without that provision, the “officials who administer [the fund] thereby become trustees, subject to all of the common law and State safeguards against misuse of funds bv trustees.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4751 (1947) (Sen. Morse). Senator Taft, the primary author of the entire Act, answered that many existing funds were not created expressly as trusts, and that § 302 (c) (5)’s requirement that each fund be an express and enforceable trust would ensure that the future operations of all such funds would be subject to supervision by a court of chancery. 93 Cong. Rec. 4753 (1947). See also id., at 4678 (Sen. Ball) ; id., at 3564-3565 (Rep. Case, author of House bill on which § 302 (c)(5) was patterned). In sum, the duty of the management-appointed trustee of an employee benefit fund under § 302 (c)(5) is directly antithetical to that of an agent of the appointing party. Whatever may have remained implicit in Congress' view of the employee benefit fund trustee under the Act became explicit when Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829. ERISA essentially codified the strict fiduciary standards that a § 302 (c)(5) trustee must meet. See 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002 (1) and (2); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, pp. 296, 307 (1974). Section 404(a)(1) of ERISA requires a trustee to “discharge his duties . . . solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries . . . 29 U. S. C. § 1104 (a)(1). Section 406 (b) (2) declares that a trustee may not “act in any transaction involving the plan on behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose interests are adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of its participants or beneficiaries.” 29 IT. S. C. §1106 (b)(2). Section 405 (a) imposes on each trustee an affirmative duty to prevent every other trustee of the same fund from breaching fiduciary duties, including the duty to act solely on behalf of the beneficiaries. 29 U. S. C. § 1105 (a). Moreover, the fiduciary requirements of ERISA specifically insulate the trust from the employer’s interest. Except in circumstances involving excess contributions or termination of the trust, “the assets of a plan shall never inure to the. benefit of any employer and shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.” § 403 (c)(1), 29 IT. S. C. § 1103 (c) (1). Finally, §406 (a)(1)(E) prohibits any transaction between the trust and a “party in interest,” including an employer, and § 407 carefully limits the amount and types of employer-owned property and securities that the trustees may obtain for the trust. 29 IT. S. C. §§ 1106 (a)(1)(E), 1107. In sum, ERISA vests the “exclusive authority and discretion to manage and control the assets of the plan” in the trustees alone, and not the employer or the union. 29 IT. S. C. § 1103 (a). The legislative history of ERISA confirms that Congress intended in particular to prevent trustees “from engaging in actions where there would be a conflict of interest with the fund, such as representing any party dealing with the fund.” S. Rep. No. 93-383, pp. 31, 32 (1973). In short, the fiduciary provisions of ERISA were designed to prevent a trustee “from being put into a position where he has dual loyalties, and, therefore, he cannot act exclusively for the benefit of a plan’s participants and beneficiaries.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, supra, at 309. Ill The language and legislative history of § 302 (c)(5) and ERISA therefore demonstrate that an employee benefit fund trustee is a fiduciary whose duty to the trust beneficiaries must overcome any loyalty to the interest of the party that appointed him. Thus, the statutes defining the duties of a management-appointed trustee make it virtually self-evident that welfare fund trustees are not “representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances” within the meaning of § 8 (b)(1)(B). But close examination of the latter provision makes it even clearer that it does not limit the freedom of a union to try to induce an employer to select a particular § 302 (c) (5) trustee. Congress enacted §8 (b)(1)(B) largely to prevent unions from forcing employers to join multiemployer bargaining units, or to dictate the identity of those who would represent employers in collective-bargaining negotiations or the settlement of employee grievances. See American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild, 437 U. S. 411, 422-423, 429-431, 435-436; Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U. S. 790, 803; S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 21, (1947), 1 Leg. Hist. LMRA, at 427; 93 Cong. Rec. 4143 (1947) (Sen. Ellender). The legislative history reveals the concern of some Senators that if unions could strike or bargain to impasse to compel employers to join industrywide bargaining units, the large unions might exercise monopoly power over wages or call strikes threatening large portions of the national economy. S. Rep. No. 105, pt. 1, supra, at 51, 1 Leg. Hist. LMRA, at 457; 93 Cong. Rec. 4582-4588 (1947) (Sen. Taft). However, the power of a union to strike or bargain to impasse to induce an employer to contribute to a multiemployer trust fund does not pose the danger Congress sought to prevent. Congress treated the issues of multiem-ployer bargaining units and multiemployer trust funds quite distinctly. It is permissible under the law, and may be in the interest of the public, for an employer to bargain separately with a union, independently of any industrywide employer association, while the union exerts economic pressure to obtain protection for the employees through the medium of a multiemployer benefit fund. Moreover, union pressure to force an employer to contribute to an established employee trust fund does not amount to dictating to an employer who shall represent him in collective bargaining and the adjustment of grievances, because the trustees of a § 302 (c) (5) trust fund simply do not, as such, engage in these activities. The term “collective bargaining” in § 8 (b) (1) (B) of the Act is defined by § 8 (d): “[T]he performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession 29 U. S. C. § 158 (d). Under this definition, the collective-bargaining representatives of an employer and a union attempt to reach an agreement by negotiation, and, failing agreement, are free to settle their differences by resort to such economic weapons as strikes and lockouts, without any compulsion to reach agreement. See Carbon Fuel Co. v. Mine Workers, 444 U. S. 212, 219; NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. 477, 495. The atmosphere in which employee benefit trust fund fiduciaries must operate, as mandated by § 302 (c) (5) and ERISA, is wholly inconsistent with this process of compromise and economic pressure. The management-appointed and union-appointed trustees do not bargain with each other to set the terms of the employer-employee contract; they can neither require employer contributions not required by the original collectively bargained contract, nor compromise the claims of the union or the employer with regard to the latter’s contributions. Rather, the trustees operate under a detailed written agreement, 29 U. S. C. § 186 (c) (5) (B), which is itself the product of bargaining between the representatives of the employees and those of the employer. Indeed, the trustees have an obligation to enforce the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement regarding employee fund contributions against the employer “for the sole benefit of the beneficiaries of the fund.” United States v. Carter, 353 U. S. 210, 220. Finally, disputes between benefit fund trustees over the administration of the trust cannot, as can disputes between parties in collective bargaining, lead to strikes, lockouts, or other exercises of economic power. Rather, whereas Congress has expressly rejected compulsory arbitration as a means of resolving collective-bargaining disputes, § 302 (c) (5) explicitly provides for the compulsory resolution of any deadlocks among welfare fund trustees by a neutral umpire. Compare 29 U. S. C. § 158 (d) with 29 U. S. C. § 186 (c) (5); see. n. 12, supra. Like collective bargaining, the adjustment of grievances concerns the relationship between employer and employee. See 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a). The trustees’ concern, however, is the relationship between the beneficiaries and the fund. The only “grievances” it may adjust are those concerning the eligibility of employees or their dependents for participation in the benefits of the fund. See Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U. S. 157, 164-171. And whereas Congress has adopted the principle of voluntary settlement, free of governmental compulsion, in the adjustment of employee grievances against the employer, § 203 (d) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 173 (d), a trustee deadlock over eligibility matters, like any other deadlock, must be submitted to the compulsory resolution procedure established by § 302 (c)(5). “Both the language and the legislative history of § 8 (b) (1)(B) reflect a clearly focused congressional concern with the protection of employers in the selection of representatives to engage in two particular and explicitly stated activities, namely collective bargaining and the adjustment of grievances.” Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U. S., at 803. The duties of an employer-appointed trustee of an employee benefit trust fund, under § 302 (c) (5) of the Act, under principles long ago developed in the courts of chancery, and under the specific provisions of ERISA, are totally alien to both of these activities. The Court of Appeals, therefore, was mistaken in believing that the conduct of the union in this case violated the provisions of §8 (b)(1)(B). For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 29 U. S. C. § 141 et seq. 29 U. S. C. §158 (b)(1)(B). 29 U. S. C. §186 (c)(5). The trust agreement sets out the health and retirement benefits provided to employees and their dependents, defines the terms and the responsibilities of the trustees, describes the method of administration of the trust, and provides for periodic audits, reports, and notices. The agree-inent also fixes the employers’ contributions to the trust, requiring a specified number of cents per ton of coal produced, with the one exception that the trustees themselves retain the power to fix the rate for coal salvaged from slurry, sludge, or other refuse. 29 U. S. C. §158 (b)(3). On other claims by Amax, the Board found that the union had not bargained in bad faith in violation of § 8 (b) (3), but that the union had acted illegally in attempting to coerce Amax to join the multiemployer bargaining unit for the western mines, in failing to notify the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service of its dispute with Amax before striking, and by insisting to impasse on certain contract proposals that would have violated § 8 (e) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158(e). The Court of Appeals affirmed all these rulings, and they are not before this Court. The Board relied on its earlier resolution of this same issue in Sheet Metal Workers’ International Assn. and Edward J. Carlough (Central Florida Sheetmetal Contractors Assn., Inc.), 234 N. L. R. B. 1238 (1978). 29 U. S. C. §186 (a). Trust funds may pay only “for medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance, or accident insurance.” 29 U. S. C. § 186 (c)(5)(A). 29 U. S. C. §186 (e)(5)(B). 29 U. S. C. §186 (c)(5)(C). If the trustees deadlock over a matter of trust administration, the statute further provides that the trustees may select a neutral arbiter, or “in event of their failure to agree within a reasonable length of time, an impartial umpire to decide such dispute shall, on petition of either group, be appointed by the district court of the United States for the district where the trust fund has its principal office . . . .” 29 U. S. C. §186 (c)(5)(B). The use of the word “representatives” in §302 (c)(5)(B) in no way suggests that Congress did not intend to incorporate the equitable principles of fiduciary duty. The requirement that employer and employee be equally represented among the trustees of an employee benefit fund prevents any misuse of those funds by union officers who would otherwise have sole control of vast amounts of money contributed by the employer. See Arroyo v. United States, 359 U. S. 419, 425-426. The management-appointed trustee “represents” the employer only in the sense that he ensures that the union-appointed trustee does not abuse his trust with respect to the funds contributed by the employer. Nowhere in the debates over § 302 (c) (5) did any Member of either House of Congress suggest that the employer “representative” as a trustee of a benefit fund created under this statute could or should advance the interest of the employer in administering the fund. In fact, some opponents of the provision objected that the requirement of equal management-union representation imposed onerous administrative duties on the employers. E. g., 93 Cong. Rec. 4749 (1947) (Sen. Murray). The legislative history of § 302 (c) (5) also bears directly on the actual question underlying the statutory issue in this litigation: whether Congress intended to prohibit union demands for employer participation in established multiemployer trust funds. One of the events that greatly influenced the legislative efforts culminating in the Act was the demand of John L. Lewis, then head of the United Mine Workers, that all mine owners contribute 10 cents per ton of coal produced into a central welfare fund established by the union itself. United States v. Ryan, 350 U. S. 299, 304-305; S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 52 (1947), 1 Leg. Hist. LMRA, at 458. The debates and Reports reveal that despite considerable congressional opposition to Lewis’ demands, ibid.; 93 Cong. Rec. 3423, 3516-3517, 3564-3565 (1947) (remarks of Reps. Hartley, Fisher, and Case) ; id., at 4678, 4746-4748 (Sens. Byrd and Taft), Congress specifically rejected proposals that would have rendered those demands illegal either by providing that union proposals concerning pension welfare benefits were not mandatory subjects of bargaining, or by prohibiting all such funds even indirectly established or managed by a union. See H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., §§2(11), 8 (a) (2) (C) (ii) (1947), 1 Leg. Hist. LMRA, at 39-40, 51; H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 14-17 (1947), 2 Leg. Hist. LMRA, at 305-308. A “participant” is “any employee or former employee . . . who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan ... , or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit.” 29 U. S. C. § 1002 (7). A “beneficiary” is “a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder.” 29 U. S. C. § 1002 (8). Although § 408 (c) (3) of ERISA permits a trustee of an employee benefit fund to serve as an agent or representative of the union or employer, that provision in no way limits the duty of such a person to follow the law’s fiduciary standards while he is performing his responsibilities as trustee. In 1980, Congress amended ERISA to impose new responsibilities upon the trustees of multiemployer trust funds, passing the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1209, which reaffirmed that the trustees must act solely in the interest of the trust beneficiaries, see H. R. Rep. No. 96-869, pt. 1, p. 67 (1980). Neither statutory provision refers to the other, and though the same congressional Committees considered the issues of employee benefit trust funds and multiemployer bargaining, the legislative history nowhere suggests that Congress intended that the restrictions on union activity created by § 8 (b) (1) (B) were relevant to the selection of § 302 (c) (5) trustees. Indeed, though faced with a United Mine Workers demand that owners contribute a fixed percentage of their coal receipts to a multiemployer trust fund created by the union, Congress rejected several proposals that would have denied the union the power to make such demands. See n. 14, swpra. Another concern of § 8 (b)(1)(B), of no relevance here, was to prevent a union from striking to force an employer to fire a supervisor who, in the union’s view, was too stern in his treatment of employees. 93 Cong. Rec. 3837-3838 (1947) (Sen. Taft). The sole and minor exception under the agreement governing the national trust funds in this litigation is the authority of the trustees to fix the number of cents per ton of salvage coal produced which a mine operator must contribute to the funds. See n. 4, supra. If the administration of § 302 (c) (5) trust funds were “collective bargaining” within the meaning of federal labor law, as it would be under the Court of Appeals’ view, the NLRB would have to review the discretionary-actions of the trustees according to the statutory duty of good-faith bargaining. 29 U. S. C. §§158 (a) (5), (b)(3), (d). The Board would thereby be thrust “into a new area of regulation which Congress [has] not committed to it,” NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. 477, 499. Moreover, under the Court of Appeals’ view, a trustee would be subject to simultaneous regulation by the Board, the Secretary of Labor, and the courts, and might be tom between conflicting duties imposed by the National Labor Relations Act and ERISA. For example, ERISA requires a trustee to prevent any other trustee from breaching his fiduciary responsibilities to the trust beneficiaries. 29 U. S. C. §§ 1105 (a) (3), (b) (1) (A). On the other hand, § 8 (b) (1) (B) bars a union representative from interfering with the employer’s collective-bargaining agent’s performance of his duties in accordance with the employer’s instructions. American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild, 437 U. S. 411, 436. Therefore, if trust fund administration is collective bargaining, a trustee could be charged with an unfair labor practice by carrying out his duties under ERISA. The view of the Court of Appeals that the union could not seek to compel the employer to join an established employee trust fund conflicts with recent legislation concerning multiemployer pension plans. In this litigation, Amax claimed complete power under §8 (b)(1)(B), unaffected by union economic pressure, to select the sole trustee, or all the trustees, of the trust fund benefiting the Belle Ayr Mine employees. Since, by definition, it is impossible for every employer participating in a multi-employer trust fund to exercise such power, the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding Amax’s claim would effectively preclude a union from resorting to economic pressure to cause an employer to participate in a multiemployer trust fund. Congress amended ERISA in 1980 to strengthen the funding requirements and enhance the financial stability of multiemployer pension plans. In these amendments, Congress sought to foster “the maintenance and growth of multiemployer pension plans . . . [and] to provide reasonable protection for the interests of the participants and beneficiaries of financially distressed multiemployer pension plans.” §§ 3 (c) (2) and (c) (3) of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1209-1210. Section 3(a)(4)(A) of the 1980 Act states that “withdrawals of contributing employers from a multiemployer pension . . . adversely [affect] the plan, its participants and beneficiaries, and labor-management relations. . . .” 94 Stat. 1209. The Court of Appeals’ decision therefore runs afoul of express congressional policy favoring multiemployer trusts.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al. v. ROSSI et al. No. 80-1924. Argued February 22, 1982 Decided March 31, 1982 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. Barbara E. Etkind argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, William, G. Ranter, and Freddi Lipstein. Randy M. Mott argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Raymond J. Rasenberger, Charles J. Simpson, Jr., J. Stanley Pottinger, Warren L. Dennis, and Carolyn Dye. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Mark D. Roth for the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, et al; and by Cornelius B. Kennedy for Congressman William V. Chappel, Jr., et al. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 106 of Pub. L. 92-129, 85 Stat. 355, note following 5 U. S. C. §7201 (1976 ed., Supp. IV), prohibits employment discrimination against United States citizens on military bases overseas unless permitted by “treaty.” The question in this case is whether “treaty” includes executive agreements concluded by the President with the host country, or whether the term is limited to those international agreements entered into by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate pursuant to Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution. This issue is solely one of statutory interpretation. I In 1944, Congress authorized the President, “by such means as he finds appropriate,” to acquire, after negotiation with the President of the Philippines, military bases “he may deem necessary for the mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and of the United States.” 58 Stat. 626, 22 U. S. C. § 1392. Pursuant to this statute, the United States and the Republic of the Philippines in 1947 entered into a 99-year Military Bases Agreement (MBA), Mar. 14, 1947, 61 Stat. 4019, T. I. A. S. No. 1775. The MBA grants the United States the use of various military facilities in the Philippines. It does not, however, contain any provisions regarding the employment of local nationals on the base. In 1968, the two nations negotiated a Base Labor Agreement (BLA), May 27, 1968, [1968] 19 U. S. T. 5892, T. I. A. S. No. 6542, as a supplement to the MBA. The BLA, inter alia, provides for the preferential employment of Filipino citizens at United States military facilities in the Philippines. In 1971, Congress enacted § 106 of Pub. L. 92-129, the employment discrimination statute at issue in this case. At the time §106 was enacted, 12 agreements in addition to the BLA were in effect providing for preferential hiring of local nationals on United States military bases overseas. Since § 106 was enacted, four more such agreements have been concluded. None of these agreements were submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent pursuant to Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. In 1978, respondents, all United States citizens residing in the Philippines, were notified that their jobs at the United States Naval Facility at Subic Bay were being converted into local national positions in accordance with the BLA, and that they would be discharged from their employment with the Navy. After unsuccessfully pursuing an administrative remedy, respondents filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the preferential employment provisions of the BLA violated, inter alia, § 106. The District Court granted summary judgment for petitioners, Rossi v. Brown, 467 F. Supp. 960 (1979), but the Court of Appeals reversed. Rossi v. Brown, 206 U. S. App. D. C. 148, 642 F. 2d 553 (1980). We in turn reverse the Court of Appeals. II Simply because the question presented is entirely one of statutory construction does not mean that the question necessarily admits of an easy answer. Chief Justice Marshall long ago observed that “[wjhere the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived .. . .” United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805). More recently, the Court has stated: “Generalities about statutory construction help us little. They are not rules of law but merely axioms of experience. They do not solve the special difficulties in construing a particular statute. The variables render every problem of statutory construction unique.” United States v. Universal Corp., 344 U. S. 218, 221 (1952) (citations omitted). We naturally begin with the language of § 106, which provides in relevant part as follows: “Unless prohibited by treaty, no person shall be discriminated against by the Department of Defense or by any officer or employee thereof, in the employment of civilian personnel at any facility or installation operated by the Department of Defense in any foreign country because such person is a citizen of the United States or is a dependent of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States.” 85 Stat. 355, note following 5 U. S. C. § 7201 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added). The statute is awkwardly worded in the form of a double negative, and we agree with the Court of Appeals that “[r]e-placing the phrase ‘[ujnless prohibited by’ with either the words ‘unless permitted by’ or ‘unless provided by’ would convey more precisely the meaning of the statute, but we do not think that this awkward phrasing bears on congressional intent in selecting the word ‘treaty.’” 206 U. S. App. D. C., at 153, n. 21, 642 F. 2d, at 558, n. 21. Discrimination in employment against United States citizens at military facilities overseas is prohibited by § 106, unless such discrimination is permitted by a “treaty” between the United States and the host country. Our task is to determine the meaning of the word “treaty” as Congress used it in this statute. Congress did not separately define the word, as it has done in other enactments. Infra, at 30. We must therefore ascertain as best we can whether Congress intended the word “treaty” to refer solely to Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, “Treaties” — those international agreements concluded by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate — or whether Congress intended “treaty” to also include executive agreements' such as the BLA. The word “treaty” has more than one meaning. Under principles of international law, the word ordinarily refers to an international agreement concluded between sovereigns, regardless of the manner in which the agreement is brought into force. 206 U. S. App. D. C., at 151, 642 F. 2d, at 556. Under the United States Constitution, of course, the word “treaty” has a far more restrictive meaning. Article II, § 2, cl. 2, of that instrument provides that the President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” Congress has not been consistent in distinguishing between Art. II treaties and other forms of international agreements. For example, in the Case Act, 1 U. S. C. § 112b(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), Congress required the Secretary of State to “transmit to the Congress the text of any international agreement, . . . other than a treaty, to which the United States is a party” no later than 60 days after “such agreement has entered into force.” Similarly, Congress has explicitly referred to Art. II treaties in the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U. S. C. § 1801 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), and the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 22 U. S. C. § 2551 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). On the other hand, Congress has used “treaty” to refer only to international agreements other than Art. II treaties. In 39 U. S. C. § 407(a), for example, Congress authorized the Postal Service, with the consent of the President, to “negotiate and conclude postal treaties or conventions.” A “treaty” which requires only the consent of the President is not an Art. II treaty. Thus it is not dispositive that Congress in § 106 used the term “treaty” without specifically including international agreements that are not Art. II treaties. The fact that Congress has imparted no precise meaning to the word “treaty” as that term is used in its various legislative Acts was recognized by this Court in B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U. S. 583 (1912). There this Court construed “treaty” in § 5 of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, to include international agreements concluded by the President under congressional authorization. 224 U. S., at 601. The Court held that the word “treaty” in the jurisdictional statute extended to such an agreement, saying: “If not technically a treaty requiring ratification, nevertheless it was a compact authorized by the Congress of the United States, negotiated and proclaimed under the authority of its President. We think such a compact is a treaty under the Circuit Court of Appeals Act. . . .” Ibid. The statute involved in the Altman case in no way affected the foreign policy of the United States, since it dealt only with the jurisdiction of this Court. In the case of a statute such as § 106, that does touch upon the United States’ foreign policy, there is even more reason to construe Congress’ use of “treaty” to include international agreements as well as Art. II treaties. At the time §106 was enacted, 13 executive agreements provided for preferential hiring of local nationals. Supra, at 27. Thus, if Congress intended to limit the “treaty exception” in § 106 to Art. II treaties, it must have intended to repudiate these executive agreements that affect the hiring practices of the United States only at its military bases overseas. One would expect that Congress would be aware that executive agreements may represent a quid pro quo: the host country grants the United States base rights in exchange, inter alia, for preferential hiring of local nationals. See n. 17, infra. It has been a maxim of statutory construction since the decision in Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804), that “an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains . . . In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U. S. 10, 20-21 (1963), this principle was applied to avoid construing the National Labor Relations Act in a manner contrary to State Department regulations, for such a construction would have had foreign policy implications. The McCulloch Court also relied on the fact that the proposed construction would have been contrary to a “well-established rule of international law.” Id., at 21. While these considerations apply with less force to a statute which by its terms is designed to affect conditions on United States enclaves outside of the territorial limits of this country than they do to the construction of statutes couched in general language which are sought to be applied in an extraterritorial way, they are nonetheless not without force in either case. At the time § 106 was enacted, there were in force 12 agreements in addition to the BLA providing for preferential hiring of local nationals on United States military bases overseas. Since the time of the enactment of § 106, four more such agreements have been concluded, and none of these were submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. Supra, at 27. We think that some affirmative expression of congressional intent to abrogate the United States’ international obligations is required in order to construe the word “treaty” in § 106 as meaning only Art. II treaties. We therefore turn to what legislative history is available in order to ascertain whether such an intent may fairly be attributed to Congress. The legislative history seems to us to indicate that Congress was principally concerned with the financial hardship to American servicemen which resulted from discrimination against American citizens at overseas bases. As the Conference Committee Report explains: “The purpose of [§ 106] is to correct a situation which exists at some foreign bases, primarily in Europe, where discrimination in favor of local nationals and against American dependents in employment has contributed to conditions of hardship for families of American enlisted men whose dependents are effectively prevented from obtaining employment.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-433, p. 31 (1971). The Conference Report, however, is entirely silent as to the scope of the “treaty” exception. Similarly, there is no mention of the 13 agreements that provided for preferential hiring of local nationals. Thus, the Conference Report provides no support whatsoever for the conclusion that Congress intended in some way to limit the President’s use of international agreements that may discriminate against American citizens who seek employment at United States military bases overseas. On the contrary, the brief congressional debates on this provision indicate that Congress was not concerned with limiting the authority of the President to enter into executive agreements with the host country, but with the ad hoc deci-sionmaking of military commanders overseas. In early 1971, Brig. Gen. Charles H. Phipps, Commanding General of the European Exchange System, issued a memorandum encouraging the recruitment and hiring of local nationals instead of United States citizens at the system’s stores. The hiring of local nationals, General Phipps reasoned, would result in lower wage costs and turnover rates. Senator Schweiker, a sponsor of § 106, complained of General Phipps’ policy. Both the Conference Report and the debates indicate that Congress was concerned primarily about the economic hardships American servicemen endured in Europe, particularly Germany. In this regard, it must be noted that of the 13 executive agreements in existence at the time § 106 was enacted, only one involved an agreement with a European country — Iceland. The Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Regarding the Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, [1953] 4 U. S. T. 1792, T. I. A. S. No. 2846, merely provides that local law governs the terms and conditions of the employment of local nationals. It does not provide for preferential treatment for local nationals. Thus, those servicemen whose interests Congress expressly sought to further in § 106 were not subject to the type of agreement at issue in this case. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on a statement by Senator Hughes, a sponsor of § 106, that dependents of enlisted personnel “are denied the opportunity to work on overseas bases, by agreement with the countries in which they are located, and are forced to live in poverty.” 117 Cong. Rec. 16126 (1971). Taken out of context, this remark is certainly supportive of respondents’ position. In context, however, it is not altogether clear to which “agreements” Senator Hughes was referring. Immediately prior to this remark, Senator Cook explained that dependents of American servicemen were unable to obtain anything but tourist visas, thus precluding them from working in the local economy: “On my inquiry of the Defense Department, it was my understanding that there was an agreement, through the NATO organization, that those young wives, because they were there on tourists visas, could not get a work permit under any circumstances.” Ibid. As we indicated above, the NATO agreements do not contain any provision for preferential hiring of local nationals. Supra, at 34. Senator Hughes could well have been referring to agreements that in effect precluded dependents from working in the local economy. Be that as it may, it suffices to say that one isolated remark by a single Senator, ambiguous in meaning when examined in context, is insufficient to establish the kind of affirmative congressional expression necessary to evidence an intent to abrogate provisions in 13 international agreements. Finally, respondents rely on postenactment legislative history that “firmly reiterate[s] the Congressional policy against preferential hiring of local nationals.” Brief for Respondents 23. In particular, respondents offer two examples of congressional Committees urging the Department of Defense to renegotiate those agreements containing local-national preferential hiring provisions. Such post hoc statements of a congressional Committee are not entitled to much weight. Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 118, and n. 13 (1980). If anything, these postenactment statements cut against respondents’ argument that Congress sought in § 106 to eliminate discrimination owing to executive agreements. By urging the Department of Defense to renegotiate these agreements, the Committees assume the validity of those very international agreements respondents contend were abrogated by Congress in § 106. While the question is not free from doubt, we conclude that the “treaty” exception contained in § 106 extends to executive agreements as well as to Art. II treaties. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. This agreement has been amended periodically, most recently on January 7, 1979. [1978-1979] 30 U. S. T. 863, T. I. A. S. No. 9224. In relevant part, Article I of the BLA provides: “1. Preferential Employment. — The United States Armed Forces in the Philippines shall fill the needs for civilian employment by employing Filipino citizens, except when the needed skills are found, in consultation with the Philippine Department of Labor, not to be locally available, or when otherwise necessary for reasons of security or special management needs, in which cases United States nationals may be employed. . . .” Section 106 provides in pertinent part: “Unless prohibited by treaty, no person shall be discriminated against by the Department of Defense or by any officer or employee thereof, in the employment of civilian personnel at any facility or installation operated by the Department of Defense in any foreign country because such person is a citizen of the United States or is a dependent of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States.” 85 Stat. 355, note following 5 U. S. C. § 7201 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added). Brief for Petitioners 5-6, and nn. 3-4. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Art. 2, ¶ 1(a), reprinted in 63 Am. J. Int’l L. 875, 876 (1969); Restatement of Foreign Relations of the United States, Introductory Note 3, p. 74 (Tent. Draft No. 1, Apr. 1, 1980) (“[I]nternational law does not distinguish between agreements designated as ‘treaties’ and other agreements”). We have recognized, however, that the President may enter into certain binding agreements with foreign nations without complying with the formalities required by the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, even when the agreement compromises commercial claims between United States citizens and a foreign power. See, e. g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 (1937). Even though such agreements are not treaties under the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, they may in appropriate circumstances have an effect similar to treaties in some areas of domestic law. In this context, it is entirely logical that Congress should distinguish between Art. II treaties and other international agreements. Submission of Art. II treaties to the Senate for ratification is already required by the Constitution. Congress defined “treaty” to mean “any international fishery agreement which is a treaty within the meaning of section 2 of article II of the Constitution.” 16 U. S. C. § 1802(23). “[N]o action shall be taken under this chapter or any other law that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the treaty making power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States.” 22 U. S. C. § 2573. See 117 Cong. Rec. 14395 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Schweiker). “I have never heard of anything so ridiculous in my life. We actually send our GI’s to Europe at poverty wages. We do not pay to send the wives there. They have to beg or borrow that money. They get over there, and if they do bring their wives at their own expense, the wives cannot even go to the Army Exchange Service and get a job, because a general has sent out a memorandum that says we are going to give those jobs to the nationals of the countries involved.” Ibid. At another point, Senator Schweiker commented: “Here is an American general saying that when the GI’s go to their canteen or service post exchange and spend their money, they do not even have the right to have their wives working there because we should give those jobs to German nationals.” Id., at 16128. See, e. g., id., at 14395 (remarks of Sen. Schweiker); id., at 16126 (remarks of Sen. Cook); ibid, (remarks of Sen. Hughes). Agreement Concerning the Status of United States Personnel and Property (Annex), May 8, 1951, United States-Iceland, [1951] 2 U. S. T. 1533, T. I. A. S. No. 2295. This NATO agreement is an Art. II treaty. The contemporaneous remarks of a sponsor of legislation are certainly not controlling in analyzing legislative history. Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 118 (1980); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U. S. 281, 311 (1979). See H. R. Rep. No. 95-68, p. 25 (1977); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-410, p. 54 (1981). Although we do not ascribe it much weight, we note that a Conference Committee recently deleted a provision that would have prohibited the hiring of foreign nationals at military bases overseas when qualified United States citizens are available. Ibid. In urging this provision’s deletion, Senator Percy explained that the provision would place the United States in violation of its obligations, inter alia, under the BLA with the Philippines. 127 Cong. Rec. S14110 (Nov. 30, 1981). He argued: “Some host nations might view enactment of 777 as a material breach of our agreements, thus entitling them to open negotiations on terminating, redefining or further restricting U. S. basing and use rights. Nations could, for example, retaliate by suspending or reducing our current rights to engage in routine military operations such as aircraft transits.” Ibid. In view of its construction of § 106, the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to determine whether the BLA in the instant case violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). Rossi v. Brown, 206 U. S. App. D. C. 148, 156, n. 36, 642 F. 2d 553, 561, n. 36 (1980). Because this question was neither raised in the petition for certiorari nor reached by the Court of Appeals, we do not consider it.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

D. H. HOLMES CO., LTD. v. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF REVENUE AND TAXATION OF LOUISIANA No. 87-267. Argued March 22, 1988 Decided May 16, 1988 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Andrew Rinker, Jr., argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were William F. Grace, Jr., and Kenneth J. Servay. Robert G. Pugh argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Robert G. Pugh, Jr. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Retail Federation by Maryann B. Gall; for the Committee on State Taxation of the Council of State Chambers of Commerce by Jean A. Walker and Paul H. Frankel; for the National Association of Catalog Showroom Merchandisers by Richard B. Kelly and Thomas P. Mohen; and for R. R. Don-nelley & Sons Co. et al. by Rex E. Lee, Michael A. Nemeroff Carter G. Phillips, and Mark D. Hopson. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Multistate Tax Commission by Alan H. Friedman; and for the National Governors’ Association et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon and Gregory Evers May. George S. Isaacson, Martin I. Eiseristein, and Robert J. Levering filed a brief for the Direct Marketing Association as amicus curiae. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant, a Louisiana corporation, challenges the State’s imposition of a use tax on catalogs printed at appellant’s direction outside Louisiana and shipped to prospective customers within the State. The Louisiana Court of Appeal found that this application of the use tax did not violate the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. We affirm. HH Appellant D. H. Holmes Company, Ltd., is a Louisiana corporation with its principal place of business and registered office in New Orleans. Holmes owns and operates 13 department stores in various locations throughout Louisiana that employ about 5,000 workers. It has approximately 500,000 credit card customers and an estimated 1,000,000 other customers within the State. In 1979-1981, Holmes contracted with several New York companies for the design and printing of merchandise catalogs. The catalogs were designed in New York, but were actually printed in Atlanta, Boston, and Oklahoma City. From these locations, 82% of the catalogs were directly mailed to residents of Louisiana; the remainder of the catalogs were mailed to customers in Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida, or were sent to Holmes for distribution at its flagship store on Canal Street in New Orleans. The catalogs were shipped free of charge to the addressee, and their entire cost (about $2 million for the 3-year period), including mailing, was borne by Holmes. Holmes did not, however, pay any sales tax where the catalogs were designed or printed. Although the merchandise catalogs were mailed to selected customers, they contained instructions to the postal carrier to leave them with the current resident if the addressee had moved, and to return undeliverable catalogs to Holmes’ Canal Street store. Holmes freely concedes that the purpose of the catalogs was to promote sales at its stores and to instill name recognition in future buyers. The catalogs included inserts which could be used to order Holmes’ products by mail. The Louisiana Department of Revenue and Taxation, of which appellee is the current Secretary, conducted an audit of Holmes’ tax returns for 1979-1981 and determined that it was liable for delinquent use taxes on the value of the catalogs. The Department of Revenue and Taxation assessed the use tax pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§47:302 and 47:321 (West 1970 and Supp. 1988), which are set forth in the margin. Together, §§47:302(A)(2) and 47:321(A)(2) impose a use tax of 3% on all tangible personal property used in Louisiana. “Use,” as defined elsewhere in the statute, is the exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to ownership, and includes consumption, distribution, and storage. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 47:301(18) and (19) (West 1970 and Supp. 1988). The use tax is designed to compensate the State for sales tax that is lost when goods are purchased out-of-state and brought for use into Louisiana, and is calculated on the retail price the property would have brought when imported. When Holmes refused to pay the use tax assessed against it, the State filed suit in Louisiana Civil District Court to collect the tax. In response to the State’s complaint, Holmes answered that it owed no tax under §§47:302 and 47:321 as properly applied, a position Holmes claimed was reinforced by La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §47:305(5) (West 1970). Holmes also contended that the use tax violated the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. After a 2-day bench trial, the District Court determined that the distribution of the catalogs in Louisiana was “intended for the use of D. H. Holmes in increasing its sales to potential customers who are residents of Louisiana.” No. 83-15523 (La. Civ. Dist. Ct., July 19, 1985), App. to Juris. Statement 12A, 21A. The court also found that “[o]nce the catalogs reach the residences of the prospective customers to whom they are addressed, Louisiana taxing authority reaches the resting place of the catalogs,” id., at 22A, and concluded that the application of the use tax statutes did not unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce. The court then ordered Holmes to pay the State $49,937.03, plus interest and attorney’s fees, which was the amount the parties stipulated as due on the use tax. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 505 So. 2d 102 (1987). After reviewing the Louisiana use tax statute, the Court of Appeal found that the catalog distribution was properly subjected to the tax, since once the catalogs landed in Louisiana mailboxes they left the stream of interstate commerce and became part of the property mass of the State. Furthermore, “[distribution of the catalogs certainly constitutes ‘use’ by Holmes under the statute and is subject to the tax.” Id., at 105. Turning to the federal question in the case, the Court of Appeal analyzed the use tax under the test we articulated in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977), and found that it did not Violate the Commerce Clause. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied discretionary review. 506 So. 2d 1224 (1987). We noted probable jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2). 484 U. S. 923 (1987). HH b-H The Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Even where Congress has not acted affirmatively to protect interstate commerce, the Clause prevents States from discriminating against that commerce. The “distinction between the power of the State to shelter its people from menaces to their health or safety and from fraud, even when those dangers emanate from interstate commerce, and its lack of power to retard, burden or constrict the flow of such commerce for their economic advantage, is one deeply rooted in both our history and our law.” H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 533 (1949). One frequent source of conflict of this kind occurs when a State seeks to tax the sale or use of goods within its borders. See, e. g., Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U. S. 100 (1975); Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80 (1948). This recurring dilemma is exemplified in what has come to be the leading case in the area, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, supra. In Complete Auto, Mississippi imposed a tax on appellant’s business of in-state transportation of motor vehicles manufactured outside the State. We found that the State’s tax did not violate the Commerce Clause, because appellant’s activity had a substantial nexus with Mississippi, and the tax was fairly apportioned, did not discriminate against interstate commerce, and .was fairly related to benefits provided by the State. Id., at 287. This four-part formulation has since been used to evaluate the validity of state taxes vis-a-vis the Commerce Clause in a number of contexts. Two Terms ago, for instance, we upheld a Florida tax on aviation fuel purchased within the State, finding that all four of the Complete Auto criteria were satisfied. Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U. S. 1 (1986). The Complete Auto test has also been employed to test the constitutionality of business and occupation taxes, Department of Revenue of Washington v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S. 734 (1978); mineral severance taxes, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609 (1981); and the taxation of income received by an out-of-state corporation from its in-state subsidiaries, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U. S. 425 (1980). Complete Auto abandoned the abstract notion that interstate commerce “itself” cannot be taxed by the States. We recognized that, with certain restrictions, interstate commerce may be required to pay its fair share of state taxes. Accordingly, in the present case, it really makes little difference for Commerce Clause purposes whether Holmes’ catalogs “came to rest” in the mailboxes of its Louisiana customers or whether they were still considered in the stream of interstate commerce. This distinction may be of some importance for other purposes (in determining, for instance, whether a “taxable moment” has occurred, see 505 So. 2d, at 105), but for Commerce Clause analysis it is largely irrelevant. Holmes argues that Louisiana’s assessment against its merchandise catalogs is, in essence, a tax on the mere presence of goods within the State. This contention was expressly rejected by the Louisiana Court of Appeal’s finding that the distribution of the catalogs constituted use under §§47:802 and 47:321. We accept this construction of state law, and thus see no merit in the argument that Louisiana has attempted to tax only the existence of goods within the State. In the case before us, then, the application of Louisiana’s use tax to Holmes’ catalogs does not violate the Commerce Clause if the tax complies with the four prongs of Complete Auto. We have no doubt that the second and third elements of the test are satisfied. The Louisiana taxing scheme is fairly apportioned, for it provides a credit against its use tax for sales taxes that have been paid in other States. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §47:303(A) (West 1970) (“A credit against the use tax imposed by this Chapter shall be granted to taxpayers who have paid a similar tax upon the sale or use of the same tangible personal property in another state”); §47:302(A)(2) (instructing that “there shall be no duplication of the tax”); §47:321(A)(2) (West Supp. 1988) (same). Holmes paid no sales tax for the catalogs where they were designed or printed; if it had, it would have been eligible for a credit against the use tax exacted. Similarly, Louisiana imposed its use tax only on the 82% of the catalogs distributed in-state; it did not attempt to tax that portion of the catalogs that went to out-of-state customers. The Louisiana tax structure likewise does not discriminate against interstate commerce. The use tax is designed to compensate the State for revenue lost when residents purchase out-of-state goods for use within the State. It is equal to the sales tax applicable to the same tangible personal property purchased in-state; in fact, both taxes are set forth in the same sections of the Louisiana statutes. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§47:302 and 47:321 (West 1970 and Supp. 1988). Complete Auto requires that the tax be fairly related to benefits provided by the State, but that condition is also met here. Louisiana provides a number of services that facilitate Holmes’ sale of merchandise within the State: It provides fire and police protection for Holmes’ stores, runs mass transit and maintains public roads which benefit Holmes’ customers, and supplies a number of other civic services from which Holmes profits. To be sure, many others in the State benefit from the same services; but that does not alter the fact that the use tax paid by Holmes, on catalogs designed to increase sales, is related to the advantages provided by the State which aid Holmes’ business. Finally, we believe that Holmes’ distribution of its catalogs reflects a substantial nexus with Louisiana. To begin with, Holmes’ contention that it lacked sufficient control over the catalogs’ distribution in Louisiana to be subject to the use tax verges on the nonsensical. Holmes ordered and paid for the catalogs and supplied the list of customers to whom the catalogs were sent; any catalogs that could not be delivered were returned to it. Holmes admits that it initiated the distribution to improve its sales and name recognition among Louisiana residents. Holmes also has a significant presence in Louisiana, with 13 stores and over $100 million in annual sales in the State. See App. 68-69, 98. The distribution of catalogs to approximately 400,000 Louisiana customers was directly aimed at expanding and enhancing its Louisiana business. There is “nexus” aplenty here. Holmes and several amici argue that Holmes’ posture here closely resembles the predicament of the mail-order business we confronted in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U. S. 753 (1967). In National Bellas Hess, we held that the State of Illinois could not, consistently with the Commerce Clause, compel an out-of-state mail-order company to collect a use tax on purchases of goods by Illinois residents when the seller’s only connection with its Illinois customers was by mail or common carrier. Holmes apparently views its catalog distribution as analogous to the mail-order solicitation in National Bellas Hess. This argument ignores, however, Holmes’ significant economic presence in Louisiana, its many connections with the State, and the direct benefits it receives from Louisiana in conducting its business. We thus see little similarity between the mail-order shipments in National Bellas Hess and Holmes’ activities in this case. We find Holmes’ activities much closer to those considered in National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization, 430 U. S. 551 (1977). National Geographic involved the operation of two California offices by a national magazine devoted solely to soliciting advertising for the magazine. California nonetheless applied its use tax, which required every retailer engaged in business in the State to collect a tax from its purchasers, on the magazine’s mail-order activities. We determined that the imposition of the tax did not violate the Commerce Clause, since the magazine’s “maintenance of the two offices in California and activities there adequately established] a relationship or ‘nexus’ between the [magazine] and the State” sufficient to support the tax. Id., at 556. This conclusion applies a fortiori here, since Holmes’ connection with Louisiana far exceeds that of the magazine with California in National Geographic. Because Louisiana’s imposition of its use tax on Holmes does not violate the Commerce Clause, the judgment of the Louisiana Court of Appeal is Affirmed. “§47:302. Imposition of tax “A. There is hereby levied a tax upon the sale at retail, the use, the consumption, the distribution, and the storage for use or consumption in this state, of each item or article of tangible personal property, as defined herein, the levy of said tax to be as follows: “(2) At the rate of two per centum (2%) of the cost price of each item or article of tangible personal property when the same is not sold but is used, consumed, distributed, or stored for use or consumption in this state; provided there shall be no duplication of the tax.” “§ 47:321. Imposition of tax “A. In addition to the tax levied by R. S. 47:302(A) and collected under the provisions of Chapter 2 of Subtitle II of Title 47 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, there is hereby levied an additional tax upon the sale at retail, the use, the consumption, the distribution, and the storage for use or consumption in this state, of each item or article of tangible personal property . . . the levy of said tax to be as follows: “(2) At the rate of one percent of the cost price of each item or article of tangible personal property when the same is not sold but is used, consumed, distributed, or stored for use or consumption in this state, provided that there shall be no duplication of the tax.” As originally filed in Louisiana Civil District Court, the State’s complaint included a claim for delinquent sales taxes on candy sold by Holmes. The State apparently reached an acceptable compromise with Holmes, and the Civil District Court granted a joint motion by the parties to dismiss without prejudice the candy sales tax issue. That issue is thus no longer a part of this case. As then codified this section provided: “§ 47:305. Exclusions and exemptions from the tax “(5) It is not the intention of this Chapter to levy a tax upon articles of tangible personal property imported into this state, or produced or manufactured in this state, for export; nor is it the intention of this Chapter to levy a tax on bona fide interstate commerce. It is, however, the intention of this Chapter to levy a tax on the sale at retail, the use, the consumption, the distribution, and the storage to be used or consumed in this state, of tangible personal property after it has come to rest in this state and has become a part of the mass of property in this state.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. NATURAL GAS UTILITY DISTRICT OF HAWKINS COUNTY, TENNESSEE No. 785. Argued April 20, 1971. Decided June 1, 1971 BrennaN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Black, Douglas, HarlaN, White, Marshall, and BlackmuN, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 609. Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Peter L. Strauss, Arnold Ordman, and Norton J. Come. Eugene Greener, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Charles F. Wheatley, Jr., and Jerome C. Muys filed a brief for the American Public Gas Association as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Upon the petition of Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 102, the National Labor Relations Board ordered that a representation election be held among the pipefitters employed by respondent, Natural Gas Utility District of Hawkins County, Tennessee, 167 N. L. R. B. 691 (1967). In the representation proceeding, respondent objected to the Board’s jurisdiction on the sole ground that as a “political subdivision” of Tennessee, it was not an “employer” subject to Board jurisdiction under § 2 (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 137, 29 U. S. C. § 152 (2). When the Union won the election and was certified by the Board as bargaining representative of the pipefitters, respondent refused to comply with the Board’s certification and recognize and bargain with the Union. An unfair labor practice proceeding resulted and the Board entered a cease-and-desist order against respondent on findings that respondent was in violation of §§ 8 (a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §§158 (a)(1) and 158(a)(5). 170 N. L. R. B. 1409 (1968). Respondent continued its noncompliance and the Board sought enforcement of the order in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Enforcement was refused, the court holding that respondent was a “political subdivision,” as contended. 427 F. 2d 312 (1970). We granted certiorari, 400 U. S. 990 (1971). We affirm. The respondent was organized under Tennessee’s Utility District Law of 1937, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 6-2601 to 6-2627 (1955). In First Suburban Water Utility District v. McCanless, 177 Tenn. 128, 146 S. W. 2d 948 (1941), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a utility district organized under this Act was an operation for a state governmental- or public purpose. The Court of Appeals held that this decision “was of controlling importance on the question whether the District was a political subdivision of the state” within § 2 (2) and “was binding on the Board.” 427 F. 2d, at 315. The Board, on the other hand, had held that “while such State law declarations and interpretations are given careful consideration . . . , they are not necessarily controlling.” 167 N. L. R. B., at 691. We disagree with the Court of Appeals and agree with the Board. Federal, rather than state, law governs the determination, under §2 (2), whether an entity created under state law is a “political subdivision” of the State and therefore not an “employer” subject to the Act. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dealt with this question in NLRB v. Randolph Electric Membership Corp., 343 F. 2d 60 (1965), where the Board had determined that Randolph Electric was not a “political subdivision” within § 2 (2). We adopt as correct law what was said at 62-63 of the opinion in that case: “There are, of course, instances in which the application of certain federal statutes may depend on state law. . . . “But this is controlled by the will of Congress. In the absence of a plain indication to the contrary, however, it is to be assumed when Congress enacts a statute that it does not intend to make its application dependent on state law. Jerome v. United States, 318 U. S. 101, 104 .. . (1943). “The argument of the electric corporations fails to persuade us that Congress intended the result for which they contend. Furthermore, it ignores the teachings of the Supreme Court as to the congressional purpose in enacting the national labor laws. In National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 123 . . . (1944), the Court dealt with the meaning of the term 'employee' as used in the Wagner Act, saying: “ ‘Both the terms and the purposes of the statute, as well as the legislative history, show that Congress had in mind no . . . patchwork plan for securing freedom of employees’ organization and of collective bargaining. The Wagner Act is federal legislation, administered by a national agency, intended to solve a national problem on a national scale. . . . Nothing in the statute’s background, history, terms or purposes indicates its scope is to be limited by . . . varying local conceptions, either statutory or judicial, or that it is to be administered in accordance with whatever different standards the respective states may see fit to adopt for the disposition of unrelated, local problems.’ “Thus, it is clear that state law is not controlling and that it is to the actual operations and characteristics of [respondents] that we must look in deciding whether there is sufficient support for the Board’s conclusion that they are not 'political subdivisions’ within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.” We turn then to identification of the governing federal law. The term “political subdivision” is not defined in the Act and the Act’s legislative history does not disclose that Congress explicitly considered its meaning. The legislative history does reveal, however, that Congress enacted the §' 2 (2) exemption to except from Board cognizance the labor relations of federal, state, and municipal governments, since governmental employees did not usually enjoy the right to strike. In the light of that purpose, the Board, according to its Brief, p. 11, “has limited the exemption for political subdivisions to entities that are either (1) created directly by the state, so as to constitute departments or administrative arms of the government, or (2) administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate.” The Board’s construction of the broad statutory term is, of course, entitled to great respect. Randolph Electric, supra, at 62. This case does not however require that we decide whether “the actual operations and characteristics” of an entity must necessarily feature one or the other of the Board’s limitations to qualify an entity for the exemption, for we think that it is plain on the face of the Tennessee statute that the Board erred in its reading of it in light of the Board’s own test. The Board found that “the Employer in this case is neither created directly by the State, nor administered by State-appointed or elected officials.” 167 N. L. R. B., at 691-692 (footnotes omitted). But the Board test is not whether the entity is administered by “State-appointed or elected officials.” Rather, alternative (2) of the test is whether the entity is “administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate” (emphasis added), and the Tennessee statute makes crystal clear that respondent is administered by a Board of Commissioners appointed by an elected county judge, and subject to removal proceedings at the instance of the Governor, the county prosecutor, or private citizens. Therefore, in the light of other “actual operations and characteristics” under that administration, the Board’s holding that respondent “exists as an essentially private venture, with insufficient identity with or relationship to the State of Tennessee,” 167 N. L. R. B., at 691, has no “warrant in the record” and no “reasonable basis in law.” NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 131 (1944). Respondent is one of nearly 270 utility districts established under the Utility District Law of 1937. Under that statute, Tennessee residents may create districts to provide a wide range of public services such as the furnishing of water, sewers, sewage disposal, police protection, fire protection, garbage collection, street lighting, parks, and recreational facilities as well as the distribution of natural gas. Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-2608 (Supp. 1970). Acting under the statute, 38 owners of real property submitted in 1957 a petition to the county court of Hawkins County requesting the incorporation of a utility district to distribute natural gas within a specified portion of the county. The county judge, after holding a required public hearing and making required findings that the “public convenience and necessity requires the creation of the district,” and that “the creation of the district is economically sound and desirable,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-2604 (Supp. 1970), entered an order establishing the District. The judge’s order and findings were appealable to Tennessee’s appellate courts by any party “having an interest in the subject-matter.” Tenn. Code Ann. §6-2606 (1955). To carry out its functions, the District is granted not only all the powers of a private corporation, Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-2610 (1955), but also “all the powers necessary and requisite for the accomplishment of the purpose for which such district is created, capable of being delegated by the legislature.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-2612 (1955). This delegation includes the power of eminent domain, which the District may exercise even against other governmental entities. Tenn. Code Ann. §6-2611 (1955). The District is operated on a nonprofit basis, and is declared by the statute to be “a 'municipality’ or public corporation in perpetuity under its corporate name and the same shall in that name be a body politic and corporate with power of perpetual succession, but without any power to levy or collect taxes.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-2607 (Supp. 1970). The property and revenue of the District are exempted from all state, county, and municipal taxes, and the District’s bonds are similarly exempt from such taxation, except for inheritance, transfer, and estate taxes. Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-2626 (1955). The District’s records are “public records” and as such open for inspection. Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-2615 (Supp. 1970). The District is required to publish its annual statement in a newspaper of general circulation, showing its financial condition, its earnings, and its method of setting rates. Tenn. Code Ann. §6-2617 (Supp. 1970). The statute requires the District’s commissioners to hear any protest to its rates filed within 30 days of publication of the annual statement at a public hearing, and to make and to publish written findings as to the reasonableness of the rates. Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-2618 (1955). The commissioners’ determination may be challenged in the county court, under procedures prescribed by the statute. Ibid. The District’s commissioners are initially appointed, from among persons nominated in the petition, by the county judge, who is an elected public official. Tenn. Code Ann. §6-2604 (Supp. 1970). The commissioners serve four-year terms and, contrary to the Board’s finding that the State reserves no “power to remove or otherwise discipline those responsible for the Employer’s operations,” 167 N. L. R. B., at 692, are subject to removal under Tennessee’s General Ouster Law, which provides procedures for removing public officials from office for misfeasance or nonfeasance. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-2701 et seq. (1955); First Suburban Water Utility District v. McCanless, 177 Tenn., at 138, 146 S. W. 2d, at 952. Proceedings under the law may be initiated by the Governor, the state attorney general, the county prosecutor, or ten citizens. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 8-2708, 8-2709, 8-2710 (1955). When a vacancy occurs, the county judge appoints a new commissioner if the remaining two commissioners cannot agree upon a replacement. Tenn. Code Ann. §6-2614 (Supp. 1970). In large counties, all vacancies are filled by popular election. Ibid. The commissioners are generally empowered to conduct the District’s business. They have the power to subpoena witnesses and to administer oaths in investigating District affairs, Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-2616 (5) (1955), and they serve for only nominal compensation. Tenn. Code Ann. §6-2615 (Supp. 1970). Plainly, commissioners who are beholden to an elected public official for their appointment, and are subject to removal procedures applicable to all public officials, qualify as “individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate” within the Board’s test. In such circumstances, the Board itself has recognized that authority to exercise the power of eminent domain weighs in favor of finding an entity to be a political subdivision. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 33 L. R. R. M. 1528 (1954). We have noted that respondent’s power of eminent domain may be exercised even against other governmental units. And the District is further given an extremely broad grant of “all the powers necessary and requisite for the accomplishment of the purpose for which such district is created, capable of being delegated by the legislature.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-2612 (1955). The District’s “public records” requirement and the automatic right to a public hearing and written “decision” by the commissioners accorded to all users betoken a state, rather than a private, instrumentality. The commissioners’ power of subpoena and their nominal compensation further suggest the public character of the District. Moreover, a conclusion that the District is a political subdivision finds support in the treatment of the District under other federal laws. Income from its bonds is exempt from federal income tax, as income from an obligation of a “political subdivision” under 26 U. S. C. § 103. Social Security benefits for the District’s employees are provided through voluntary rather than mandatory coverage since the District is considered a political subdivision under the Social Security Act. 42 U. S. C. § 418. Respondent is therefore an entity “administered by individuals [the commissioners] who are responsible to public officials [an elected county judge]” and this together with the other factors mentioned satisfies us that its relationship to the State is such that respondent is a “political subdivision” within the meaning of § 2 (2) of the Act. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment denying enforcement of the Board’s order is Affirmed. Section 2 (2), 29 U. S. C. § 152 (2), provides: “The term ‘employer’ includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.” Respondent agrees in its brief in this Court, p. 13, that state law is not controlling. See 78 Cong. Rec. 10351 et seq.; Hearings on Labor Disputes Act before the House Committee on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 179; 93 Cong. Rec. 6441 (Sen. Taft). See also C. Rhyne, Labor Unions and Municipal Employee Law 436-437 (1946). Vogel, What About the Rights of the Public Employee?, 1 Lab. L. J. 604, 612-615 (1950). The commissioners’ initial terms are staggered, with one commissioner appointed to a two-year term, one to a three-year term, and one to a four-year term. Tenn. Code Ann. §6-2604 (Supp. 1970).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SECURITY SERVICES, INC. v. KMART CORP. No. 93-284. Argued February 28, 1994 Decided May 16, 1994 Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 444. Thomas, J., post, p. 444, and Ginsburg, J., post, p. 455, filed dissenting opinions. Paul O. Taylor argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. William J. Augello argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Alice I. Buckley. John F. Manning argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. On the brief were Solicitor General Days, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Michael R. Dreeben, Henri F. Rush, and Ellen D. Hanson. Joseph L. Steinfeld, Jr., Robert B. Walker, John T. Siegler, and Scott H. Lyon filed a brief for Overland Express, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. Frederick L. Wood, Nicholas J. DiMichael, and Richard D. Fortin filed a brief for the National Industrial Transportation League as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether a motor carrier in bankruptcy may recover for undercharges based on tariff rates that are void as a matter of law under the Interstate Commerce Commission’s regulations. We hold that the carrier may not rely on the filed but void tariff. I On August 20, 1984, petitioner Security Services, Inc., (then known as Riss International Corp.) filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission (Commission or ICC) a mileage (or distance) rate tariff having an effective date 30 days later. The tariff was received, accepted, and filed, and was never rejected by the ICC. Although the tariff specified rates to be charged per mile of carriage, it was not complete in itself, for it included no list of distances or map on which a shipper could rely in calculating charges for a given shipment. For the distance component of this mileage-based tariff, petitioner relied upon a Household Goods Carriers’ Bureau (HGCB) Mileage Guide, its supplements, and subsequent issues. HGCB is itself not a carrier, but a publisher of distance guides for use in tariff filings. The Mileage Guide is a 565-page volume of large format, which specifies the distances in miles between various points of origin and destination, and contains maps and supplemental rules. The Mileage Guide refers shippers to a separate HGCB tariff and its supplements, filed with the ICC, for a list of the carriers who are “participants” in the Mileage Guide. A participant is a carrier who pays HGCB a nominal fee and issues it a valid power of attorney. The first page of HGCB’s Mileage Guide states that it “MAY NOT BE EMPLOYED BY A CARRIER AS A GOVERNING PUBLICATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION RATES BASED ON MILEAGE OR DISTANCE, UNLESS .CARRIER IS SHOWN AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE ABOVE NAMED TARIFF.” HGCB, Mileage Guide No. 12, p. 1 (Dec. 1982). HGCB filed a tariff supplement to its Mileage Guide, effective February 19, 1985, listing participants and canceling Riss’s participation in the Mileage Guide for failure to pay the nominal participation fee to HGCB. HGCB treats a power of attorney issued to it as void if not renewed by remitting the participation fee within a reasonable time after cancellation. Riss did not renew. On April 17,1986, Riss contracted with respondent Kmart Corporation to transport Kmart’s goods at rates specified in the contract, and from November 3, 1986, to December 29, 1989, Riss transported goods for Kmart under the contract. Riss billed, and Kmart paid, at the contract rate. In November 1989, Riss filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and while undergoing reorganization became Security Services. As debtor-in-possession, Security Services billed Kmart for undercharges (and interest) it was allegedly owed, based on the difference between the contract rate Kmart paid and the tariff rates that Riss assertedly had on file with the ICC. Security Services argued that under the Interstate Commerce Act’s filed rate doctrine, Kmart was liable for the tariff rates filed with the ICC, regardless of any contract rate negotiated. Kmart refused to pay, and this suit ensued. The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment for Kmart on the ground that Security Services had no valid tariff on file with the ICC (without which it could not collect for undercharges), because HGCB had canceled its participation in the Mileage Guide. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 996 F. 2d 1516 (1993). The court reasoned that under ICC regulations Riss’s tariff was void for nonparticipation in the HGCB Mileage Guide, that Riss had not filed any mileages of its own to replace its canceled participation, and that the consequently incomplete and void tariff could not support a claim for undercharges. Id., at 1524. The court took the position that, although the ICC regulations operated retroactively to void a filed tariff, that retroactive application was permissible under this Court’s test in ICC v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 467 U. S. 354 (1984). 996 F. 2d, at 1524-1526. Finally, the court rejected Security Services’s argument that its failure to participate formally in the HGCB Mileage Guide was a mere technical defect excused by its substantial compliance with the rule requiring it to file its rates with the Commission. Id., at 1526. We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 930 (1993), to resolve a Circuit conflict over the validity of the ICC void-fornonparticipation regulation, and now affirm. II A motor carrier subject to the Interstate Commerce Act must publish its rates in tariffs filed with the ICC. 49 U. S. C. §§ 10761(a), 10762(a)(1). The carrier “may not charge or receive a different compensation for that transportation . . . than the rate specified in the tariff . . . .” § 10761(a). We have held these provisions “to create strict filed rate requirements and to forbid equitable defenses to collection of the filed tariff.” Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U. S. 116, 127 (1990); accord, Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U. S. 258, 266 (1993); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94, 97 (1915) (“Ignorance or misquotation of rates is not an excuse for paying or charging either less or more than the rate filed”). The purpose of the filed rate doctrine is “to ensure that rates are both reasonable and nondiscriminatory,” Maislin, supra, at 119 (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101(a), 10701(a), 10741(b) (1982 ed.)), and failure to charge or pay the filed rate may result in civil or criminal sanctions. See 49 U. S. C. §§ 11902-11904. The ICC has authority to “prescribe the form and manner” of tariff filing, § 10762(b)(1), and the information to be included in tariffs beyond any matter required by statute, § 10762(a)(1). Each carrier is responsible for ensuring that it has rates on file with the ICC. §§ 10702, 10762. Under ICC regulations, a carrier has some choice about the form in which to state its rates, one possibility being a rate based on mileage. A mileage rate has two components: the rate per mile and distances between shipping points. 49 CFR § 1312.30 (1993). A carrier may file the distance portion of the rate by listing in its own tariff the distances between all relevant points, by referring to a map attached to its tariff, or by referring to a separately filed distance guide, such as the HGCB Mileage Guide. § 1312.30(c)(1). Petitioner does not dispute that distance guides are themselves tariffs. Brief for Petitioner 9, n. 4. A carrier may refer to a tariff filed by another carrier or by an agent only by formally “participating” in the referenced tariff, which may be done only by issuing a power of attorney (or concurrence) to the other carrier or agent. 49 CFR §§ 1312.4(d), 1312.10, 1312.27(e) (1993). The Commission’s void-for-nonparticipation regulation provides that “a carrier may not participate in a tariff issued in the name of another carrier or an agent unless a power of attorney or concurrence has been executed. Absent effective concurrences or powers of attorney, tariffs are void as a matter of law.” § 1312.4(d). Tariff agents like HGCB are required to identify carriers participating in their tariffs, by listing their names either in the tariff containing the mileage guide itself, or in a separate tariff. §§ 1312.13(c), 1312.25. The listings are meant to be kept reasonably current, but are effective until changed. “Revocation or amendment of the power of attorney should be reflected through lawfully published tariff revisions effective concurrently. In the event of failure to so revise the applicable tariff or tariffs, the rates in such tariff or tariffs will remain applicable until lawfully changed.” § 1312.10(a). That is, cancellation of a power of attorney (whether by carrier or agent) is accomplished by filing or amending a tariff. §§ 1312.10(a), 1312.25(d), 1312.17(b). Until such filing or amendment, the carrier’s reference to the agent’s tariff remains effective, § 1312.10(a); once the agent’s tariff is filed or amended to note cancellation of the carrier’s participation, the carrier’s tariff is void as a matter of law (absent additional filing by the carrier). See § 1312.4(d). As the ICC explained, once cancellation of participation is published, as it was here, the mileage-based tariff is incomplete, and “eease[s] to satisfy the fundamental purpose of tariffs; to disclose the freight charges due to the carrier.” Jasper Wyman & Son — Petition for Declaratory Order — Certain Rates and Practices of Overland Express, Inc., 8 I. C. C. 2d 246,258 (1992) (applying void-for-nonparticipation regulation), petition for review granted, Overland Express, Inc. v. ICC, 996 F. 2d 356 (CADC 1993). Congress passed the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 793, to encourage competition in the industry. In response to this enactment and changes in the carrier market, the ICC simplified its tariff filing rules, as by eliminating the requirement that the actual powers of attorney be filed with the ICC. See 48 Fed. Reg. 31265, 31266 (1983); see also Revision of Tariff Regulations, All Carriers, 1 I. C. C. 2d 404, 408 (1984). The ICC’s rule that “participation” is required, however, remained in force. See id., at 434; see also 48 Fed. Reg. 31266 (1983) (“The obligation to limit tariff publication to existing agency relationships remains, however, as a matter of law”). Many shippers and carriers nevertheless responded to the very changes in the market that prompted the ICC’s revision of its rules by ignoring the rates the carriers had filed with the ICC and instead negotiating rates for carriage lower than the filed rates. As a further result of competitive pressures, many carriers also went bankrupt. A number of trustees and debtors-in-possession then attempted to recover as undercharges the difference between the negotiated and filed rates. Since the market changes convinced the ICC that strict adherence to the filed rate doctrine was no longer necessary under some circumstances, Maislin, 497 U. S., at 121, the ICC decided to follow a new policy of determining, case by case, whether it would be an “unreasonable practice” under 49 U. S. C. § 10701 for a carrier (often by then bankrupt) to recover for undercharges from a shipper who had paid a negotiated, rather than filed, rate. See National Industrial Transportation League— Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Motor Common Carrier Rates, 3 I. C. C. 2d 99, 104-108 (1986); 5 I. C. C. 2d 623, 628-634 (1989). In Maislin, we held that this ICC practice violated the core purposes of the Act, because “[b]y refusing to order collection of the filed rate solely because the parties had agreed to a lower rate, the ICC has permitted the very price discrimination that the Act by its terms seeks to prevent.” 497 U. S., at 130 (citing 49 U. S. C. § 10741). Thus, we held that any bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession was entitled to recover for undercharges based on effective, filed rates. Petitioner argues that the effect of the void-for-non-participation rule is to allow transactions to be governed by secretly negotiated rates, rather than the publicly filed rates mandated by the Act. Petitioner would thus have us see the ICC’s recent enforcement of its void-for-nonparticipation regulation as merely an attempt to evade Maislin and undermine the filed rate doctrine by keeping trustees or debtors-in-possession from recovering for undercharges. The argument is an odd one. The filed rate requirement mandates that carriers charge the rates filed in a tariff. We held in Maislin, swpra, that the requirement was not subject to discretionary enforcement when raised against a shipper who had agreed with a carrier to a negotiated rate lower than the rate on file. When the carrier’s bankruptcy prompted second thoughts about the wisdom of the agreement, the carrier and its creditors obtained the benefit of the requirement. Here, as in Jasper Wyman, supra, the carrier seeks to escape its burden by recovering for undercharges even though in effect it had no rates on file because its tariff lacked an essential element. The filed rate rule applied here to bar the carrier’s recovery is the same rule that was applied to bar the shipper’s defense. Nor is the rule somehow more technical or less equitable when applied against Security Services. It can hardly be gainsaid that a carrier employing distance rates without purporting to be bound by stated distances would be just as well placed to discriminate among shippers by measuring with rubber instruments as it would be by charging shippers for a stated distance at mutable rates per mile. While some may debate in other forums about the wisdom of the filed rate doctrine, it is enough to say here that the carriers cannot have it both ways. Ill Petitioner is left to invoke the limitations on the ICC’s authority to declare a rate void retroactively, and the “technical defect” rule. Neither is availing. A The Court of Appeals believed, 996 F. 2d, at 1524-1526, as petitioner now argues, that the void-for-nonparticipation rule retroactively voids rates and is thus subject to the analysis we applied in American Trucking, 467 U. S., at 361-364, 367. See also Overland Express, 996 F. 2d, at 360. In American Trucking, we held that the Commission could retroactively void effective tariffs ab initio only if the action “furthers] a specific statutory mandate of the Commission” and is “directly and closely tied to that mandate.” 467 U. S., at 367. But the rule is not apposite here, for the void-fornonparticipation regulation does not apply retroactively. The ICC did not, as in American Trucking, void a rate for a period during which an effective rate was filed. The ICC’s regulations operate to void tariffs that would otherwise apply to future transactions, by providing that the rate becomes inapplicable when the tariff reference to the Mileage Guide is canceled, i. e., from the moment at which examination of the tariff filings would show that the carrier’s tariff is incomplete, 49 CFR § 1312.10(a) (1993), after which the shipper would be unable to rely on the incomplete tariff to calculate the applicable charges. Transactions occurring before cancellation of the power of attorney are governed by the filed rate; transactions occurring after cancellation would have no filed mileages to which a carrier’s per-mile tariff rates would apply to determine charges due. The regulation does not require any ICC “retroactive rejection” of a filed rate, or indeed any agency action at all. The regulation works like an expiration date on an otherwise valid tariff in voiding its future application, in accordance with § 1312.23(a). Neither regulation works a retroactive voiding. We thus disagree with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which held that once a tariff is in effect, a regulation that voids the tariff operates retroactively. Overland Express, supra, at 360. Here, petitioner’s tariff reference to the HGCB Mileage Guide became void as a matter of law and its tariff filings incomplete on their face on February 19, 1985, when HGCB canceled its participation in the Mileage Guide by filing a supplemental tariff. The transactions with Kmart occurred after that date. B Nor does the “technical defect” rule apply here. Under our cases, neither procedural irregularity nor unreasonableness nullifies a filed rate; the shipper’s remedy for irregularity or unreasonable rates is damages. See, e. g., BerwindWhite Coal Mining Co. v. Chicago & Erie R. Co., 235 U. S. 371 (1914); Davis v. Portland Seed Co., 264 U. S. 403 (1924). In Berwind-White, the Court held that filed tariffs falling short of full compliance in stylistic matters were still “adequate to give notice” and so could support a carrier’s claim against a shipper for charges due. 235 U. S., at 375. In Davis, the effect of applying the carrier’s tariff violated a former statutory bar to charging less for a longer distance than for a shorter one over the same route, other things being equal. The Court rejected the position that the higher rate was void and the lower rate legally applicable, so that damages would depend upon the difference between the two, and held that the shipper’s remedy was instead to be measured by its actual damages from having been charged the higher rate as compared to a reasonable one. 264 U. S., at 424-426. Unlike the shippers in the “technical defect” cases, the shipper here could not determine the carrier’s rates, since under the regulations, distance tariffs are incomplete once the carrier’s participation in the Mileage Guide has been canceled by the agent’s filing. See 49 CFR §§ 1312.4(d), 1312.10(a), 1312.30 (1993). We are dealing not with a complete tariff subject to some blemish independently remediable, but with an incomplete tariff insufficient to support a reliable calculation of charges. Security Services, however, questions the distinction by arguing that a shipper is unlikely to search for the list of participating carriers and to determine from the agent’s supplemental tariffs that a carrier’s participation has been canceled. Rather, a shipper is likely only to follow the reference in the carrier’s tariff to the HGCB Mileage Guide, and can fully calculate the applicable charges. But the likelihood or unlikelihood of a shipper’s actually reading all the applicable tariffs is simply irrelevant, for carriers and shippers alike are charged with constructive notice of tariff filings, Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639,653 (1913); Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U. S., at 266, and the fact that shippers may take shortcuts through the filings cannot convert an incomplete tariff into a complete one. In sum, a tariff that refers to another tariff for essential information, which tariff in turn states that the carrier may not refer to it, does not provide the “adequate notice” of rates to be charged that our “technical defect” cases require. IV When a carrier relies on a mileage guide filed by another carrier or agent, under ICC regulations the carrier must participate in the guide by maintaining a power of attorney; when a carrier fails to maintain its power of attorney and its participation is canceled by its former agent’s filing of an appropriate tariff, the carrier’s tariff is void. Trustees in bankruptcy and debtors-in-possession may rely on the filed rate doctrine to collect for undercharges, Maislin Industries, U S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U. S. 116 (1990), but they may not collect for undercharges based on filed, but void, rates. The decision of the Court of Appeals is accordingly Affirmed. Compare Overland Express, Inc. v. ICC, 996 F. 2d 356 (CADC 1993); Security Services, Inc. v. P-Y Transp., Inc., 3 F. 3d 966 (CA6 1993); Brizendine v. Cotter & Co., 4 F. 3d 457 (CA71993), with the decision below, 996 F. 2d 1516 (CA3 1993); see also Atlantis Express, Inc. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 989 F. 2d 281 (CA8 1993); Freightcor Services, Inc. v. Vitro Packaging, Inc., 969 F. 2d 1563 (CA5 1992), cert, denied, 506 U. S. 1053 (1993). Amicus Overland Express, Inc., contends that participation in mileage guides is not required, citing. Revision of Tariff Regulations, All Carriers, 1 I. C. C. 2d 404, 425 (1984). But the ICC has interpreted its rules to require such participation, Jasper Wyman & Son — Petition for Declaratory Order — Certain Rates and Practices of Overland Express, Inc., 8 I. C. C. 2d 246, 249-252 (1992) (applying void-for-nonparticipation regulation), petition for review granted, Overland Express, Inc. v. ICC, 996 F. 2d 356 (CADC 1993), and its interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to “controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,” Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U. S. 410, 414 (1945). The ICC’s interpretation is neither. The ICC has apparently had a similar rule for many decades. In Cancelation of Participation in Agency Tariffs, 4 Fed. Reg. 4440 (1939), the Commission made clear that if an agent in whose tariff a carrier participated canceled the carrier’s participation for nonpayment of dues or failure to follow the agent’s rules, the carrier could no longer lawfully rely on the agent’s tariffs and had to file its own tariffs to comply with the Act. We have no occasion even to reach its factual predicate, which is vigorously disputed. Security Services argues that the agency failed to enforce its regulation from amendment in 1984 until 1993. Petitioner contends that the ICC routinely accepted tariffs containing methods for computing distances that were not authorized by 49 CFR § 1312.30(c) (1993), and that from 1984 to 1988, approximately 40 percent of all motor carriers filing distance rate tariffs referring to HGCB mileage guides did so without formally participating in them. See Overland Express, 996 F. 2d, at 359. Petitioner states that the ICC took no action after discovering these failures to participate. The Government argues that the ICC currently enforces its void-for-nonparticipation rule. It represents, for example, that in fiscal year 1993, the ICC “entered 24 consent decrees with carriers who had let their participations in mileage guides and other tariffs lapse, . . . sought and obtained one injunction, and . . . issued an order pursuant to its broad remedial powers” directing carriers who had let their participation in the HGCB lapse either to renew their participation or “strike any reference” to the Mileage Guide in their tariffs. Tr. of Oral Arg. 42. The Government also disputes the assertion that 40 percent of carriers referring to an HGCB guide failed to participate in the guide. The Government and Kmart claim that HGCB found only 111 süch failures among the filings of some 12,800 carriers who referred to HGCB guides, and that the ICC has taken action for failure to participate. See Household Goods Carriers’ Bureau, Inc. — Petition for Cancellation of Tariffs of Non-Participating Carriers, 9 I. C. C. 2d 378 (1993); National Motor Freight Traffic Assn. — Petition for Cancellation of Tariffs That Refer to the National Motor Freight Classification, but are Filed by or on Behalf of Non-Participating Carriers, 9 I. C. C. 2d 186 (1992). Both Justice Thomas, post, at 451, and n. 3, and Justice Ginsburg, post, at 457-458, argue that the effect of today’s ruling is to validate secretly negotiated rates. Indeed, Justice Thomas goes so far as to suggest that our opinion would allow the ICC to circumvent Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc-, 497 U. S. 116 (1990), merely by declaring that a filed rate is void whenever another rate is negotiated, post, at 455. But our opinion does nothing of the kind. The Interstate Commerce Act states that carriers may provide transportation “only if the rate for the transportation or service is contained in a tariff that is in effect” under the provisions of the Act, 49 U. S. C. § 10761(a), and the Act provides for civil and criminal penalties for failure to maintain such rates, and to charge or pay them. See generally §§ 11901-11904. Justice Thomas in dissent argues that we ignore petitioner’s “broader argument . . . that the rule is not within the Commission’s authority.” See post, at 453, n. 4. But petitioner’s question presented was whether “the Interstate Commerce Commission has discretionary authority to retroactively void an effective tariff.” Brief for Petitioner i. On the same page cited by Justice Thomas for petitioner’s “broader argument,” petitioner in fact describes the ICC rule as “treating [tariffs] as retroactively void,” id., at 20, and petitioner concludes the section by arguing that the ICC has no power “to retroactively void effective tariffs.” Id., at 24. Petitioner’s argument in that section is that the Interstate Commerce Act “prescribes the remedies available to Kmart,” id., at 17, not that the regulation is ultra vires. Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for petitioner stated that the ICC’s void-for-nonparticipation rule “is authorized. The rule is proper, but the application of the rule ... is contrary to law.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. If a canceled participation is renewed before the effective cancellation date, participation may be restored on five days’ notice by filing an amended tariff. 49 CFR § 1312.39(a) (1993). See also Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Cisco Oil Mill, 204 U. S. 449 (1907) (Tariff rates filed with ICC and furnished to freight officers of railroad are legally operative despite railroad’s failure to post two copies in each railroad depot); Genstar Chemical Ltd. v. ICC, 665 F. 2d 1304, 1309 (CADC 1981) (“[T]he ‘error’ in the tariff was certainly not apparent on its face”), cert, denied, 456 U. S. 905 (1982).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMPLETE AUTO TRANSIT, INC. v. BRADY, CHAIRMAN, MISSISSIPPI TAX COMMISSION No. 76-29. Argued January 19, 1977 Decided March 7, 1977 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Alan W. Perry argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Robert C. Cannada, George H. Butler, D. Carl Black, and Rhesa H. Barksdale. James H. Haddock argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Once again we are presented with “ 'the perennial problem of the validity of a state tax for the privilege of carrying on, within a state, certain activities’ related to a corporation’s operation of an interstate business.” Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U. S. 100, 101 (1975), quoting Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 85 (1948). The issue in this case is whether Mississippi runs afoul of the Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, when it applies the tax it imposes on “the privilege of . . . doing business” within the State to appellant’s activity in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court of Mississippi unanimously sustained the tax against appellant’s constitutional challenge. 330 So. 2d 268 (1976). We noted probable jurisdiction in order to consider anew the applicable principles in this troublesome area. 429 U. S. 813 (1976). I The taxes in question are sales taxes assessed by the Mississippi State Tax Commission against the appellant, Complete Auto Transit, Inc., for the period from August 1, 1968, through July 31, 1972. The assessments were made pursuant to the following Mississippi statutes: “There is hereby levied and assessed and shall be collected, privilege taxes for the privilege of engaging or continuing in business or doing business within this state to be determined by the application of rates against gross proceeds of sales or gross income or values, as the case may be, as provided in the following sections.” Miss. Code Ann., 1942, § 10105 (1972 Supp.), as amended. “Upon every person operating a pipeline, railroad, airplane, bus, truck, or any other transportation business for the transportation of persons or property for compensation or hire between points within this State, there is hereby levied, assessed, and shall be collected, a tax equal to five per cent of the gross income of such business . . . .” § 10109 (2), as amended. Any person liable for the tax is required to add it to the gross sales price and, “insofar as practicable,” to collect it at the time the sales price is collected. § 10117, as amended. Appellant is a Michigan corporation engaged in the business of transporting motor vehicles by motor carrier for General Motors Corporation. General Motors assembles outside Mississippi vehicles that are destined for dealers within the State. The vehicles are then shipped by rail to Jackson, Miss., where, usually within 48 hours, they are loaded onto appellant’s trucks and transported by appellant to the Mississippi dealers. App. 47-48, 78-79, 86-87. Appellant is paid on a contract basis for the transportation from the railhead to the dealers. Id., at 50-51, 68. By letter dated October 5, 1971, the Mississippi Tax Commission informed appellant that it was being assessed taxes and interest totaling $122,160.59 for the sales of transportation services during the three-year period from August 1, 1968, through July 31, 1971. Remittance within 10 days was requested. Id., at 9-10. By similar letter dated December 28, 1972, the Commission advised appellant of an assessment of $42,990.89 for the period from August 1, 1971, through July 31, 1972. Id., at 11-12. Appellant paid the assessments under protest and, in April 1973, pursuant to § 10121.1, as amended, of the 1942 Code (now § 27-65-47 of the 1972 Code), instituted the present refund action in the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County. Appellant claimed that its transportation was but one part of an interstate movement, and that the taxes assessed and paid were unconstitutional as applied to operations in interstate commerce. App. 4, 6-7. The Chancery Court, in an unreported opinion, sustained the assessments. Id., at 99-102. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. It concluded: “It will be noted that Taxpayer has a large operation in this State. It is dependent upon the State for police protection and other State services the same as other citizens. It should pay its fair share of taxes so long, but only so long, as the tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and there is no danger of interstate commerce being smothered by cumulative taxes of several states. There is no possibility of any other state duplicating the tax involved in this case.” 330 So. 2d, at 272. Appellant, in its complaint in Chancery Court, did not allege that its activity which Mississippi taxes does not have a sufficient nexus with the State; or that the tax discriminates against interstate commerce; or that the tax is unfairly apportioned; or that it is unrelated to services provided by the State. No such claims were made before the Mississippi Supreme Court, and although appellant argues here that a tax on “the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce” creates an unacceptable risk of discrimination and undue burdens, Brief for Appellant 20-27, it does not claim that discrimination or undue burdens exist in fact. Appellant's attack is based solely on decisions of this Court holding that a tax on the “privilege” of engaging in an activity in the State may not be applied to an activity that is part of interstate commerce. See, e. g., Spector Motor Service v. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602 (1951); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249 (1946). This rule looks only to the fact that the incidence of the tax is the “privilege of doing business”; it deems irrelevant any consideration of the practical effect of the tax. The rule reflects an underlying philosophy that interstate commerce should enjoy a sort of “free trade” immunity from state taxation. Appellee, in its turn, relies on decisions of this Court stating that “ [i]t was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business,” Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 254 (1938). These decisions have considered not the formal language of the tax statute but rather its practical effect, and have sustained a tax against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State. Over the years, the Court has applied this practical analysis in approving many types of tax that avoided running afoul of the prohibition against taxing the “privilege of doing business,” but in each instance it has refused to overrule the prohibition. Under the present state of the law, the Spector rule, as it has come to be known, has no relationship to economic realities. Rather it stands only as a trap for the unwary draftsman. II The modern origin of the Spector rule may be found in Freeman v. Hewit, supra. At issue in Freeman was the application of an Indiana tax upon “the receipt of the entire gross income” of residents and domiciliaries. 329 U. S., at 250. Indiana sought to impose this tax on income generated when a trustee of an Indiana estate instructed his local stockbroker to sell certain securities. The broker arranged with correspondents in New York to sell the securities on the New York Stock Exchange. The securities were sold, and the New York brokers, after deducting expenses and commission, transmitted the proceeds to the Indiana broker who in turn delivered them, less his commission, to the trustee. The Indiana Supreme Court sustained the tax, but this Court reversed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for five Members of the Court, announced a blanket prohibition against any state taxation imposed directly on an interstate transaction. He explicitly deemed unnecessary to the decision of the case any showing of discrimination against interstate commerce or error in apportionment of the tax. Id., at 254, 256-257. He recognized that a State could constitutionally tax local manufacture, impose license taxes on corporations doing business in the State, tax property within the State, and tax the privilege of residence in the State and measure the privilege by net income, including that derived from interstate commerce. Id., at 255. Nevertheless, a direct tax on interstate sales, even if fairly apportioned and nondiscriminatory, was held to be unconstitutional per se. Mr. Justice Rutledge, in a lengthy concurring opinion, argued that the tax should be judged by its economic effects rather than by its formal phrasing. After reviewing the Court’s prior decisions, he concluded: “The fact is that 'direct incidence’ of a state tax or regulation . . . has long since been discarded as being in itself sufficient to outlaw state legislation.” Id., at 265-266. In his view, a state tax is unconstitutional only if the activity lacks the necessary connection with the taxing state to give “jurisdiction to tax,” id., at 271, or if the tax discriminates against interstate commerce, or if the activity is subject to multiple taxation. Id., at 276-277. The rule announced in Freeman was viewed in the commentary as a triumph of formalism over substance, providing little guidance even as to formal requirements. See P. Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce 200-204 (1953); Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transactions, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 211 (1947). Although the rule might have been utilized as the keystone of a movement toward absolute immunity of interstate commerce from state taxation, the Court consistently has indicated that “interstate commerce may be made to pay its way,” and has moved toward a standard of permissibility of state taxation based upon its actual effect rather than its legal terminology. The narrowing of the rule to one of draftsmanship and phraseology began with another Mississippi case, Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80 (1948). Memphis Natural Gas Company owned and operated a pipeline running from Louisiana to Memphis. Approximately 135 miles of the line were in Mississippi. Mississippi imposed a “franchise or excise” tax measured by “the value of the capital used, invested or employed in the exercise of any power, privilege or right enjoyed by [a corporation] within this state.” Miss. Code Ann., 1942, § 9313. The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the tax, and this Court affirmed. In an opinion for himself and two others, Mr. Justice Reed noted that the tax was not discriminatory, that there was no possibility of multiple taxation, that the amount of the tax was reasonable, and that the tax was properly apportioned to the investment in Mississippi. 335 U. S., at 87-88. He then went on to consider whether the tax was “upon the privilege of doing interstate business within the state.” Id., at 88. He drew a distinction between a tax on “the privilege of doing interstate business” and a tax on “the privilege of exercising corporate functions within the State,” and held that while the former is unconstitutional, the latter is not barred by the Commerce Clause. Id., at 88-93. He then approved the tax there at issue because “there is no attempt to tax the privilege of doing an interstate business or to secure anything from the corporation by this statute except compensation for the protection of the enumerated local activities of 'maintaining, keeping in repair, and otherwise in manning the facilities.’ ” Id., at 93. Mr. Justice Black concurred in the judgment without opinion. Id., at 96. Mr. Justice Rutledge provided the fifth vote, stating in his concurrence: “[I]t is enough for me to sustain the tax imposed in this case that it is one clearly within the state’s power to lay insofar as any limitation of due process or 'jurisdiction to tax’ in that sense is concerned; it is nondiscriminatory, that is, places no greater burden upon interstate commerce than the state places upon competing intrastate commerce of like character; is duly apportioned, that is, does not undertake to tax any interstate activities carried on outside the state’s borders; and cannot be repeated by any other state.” Id., at 96-97 (footnotes omitted). Four Justices dissented, id., at 99, on the grounds that it had not been shown that the State afforded any protection in return for the tax, and that, therefore, the tax must be viewed as one on the “privilege” of engaging in interstate commerce. The dissenters recognized that an identical effect could be achieved by an increase in the ad valorem property tax, id., at 104, but would have held, notwithstanding, that a tax on the “privilege” is unconstitutional. The prohibition against state taxation of the “privilege” of engaging in commerce that is interstate was reaffirmed in Spector Motor Service v. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602 (1951), a case similar on its facts to the instant case. The taxpayer there was a Missouri corporation engaged exclusively in interstate trucking. Some of its shipments originated or terminated in Connecticut. Connecticut imposed on a corporation a “tax or excise upon its franchise for the privilege of carrying on or doing business within the state,” measured by apportioned net income. Id., at 603-604, n. 1. Spector brought suit in federal court to enjoin collection of the tax as applied to its activities. The District Court issued the injunction. The Second Circuit reversed. This Court, with three Justices in dissent, in turn reversed the Court of Appeals and held the tax unconstitutional as applied. The Court recognized that “where a taxpayer is engaged both in intrastate and interstate commerce, a state may tax the privilege of carrying on intrastate business and, within reasonable limits, may compute the amount of the charge by applying the tax rate to a fair proportion of the taxpayer’s business done within the state, including both interstate and intrastate.” Id., at 609-610 (footnote omitted). It held, nevertheless, that a tax on the “privilege” of doing business is unconstitutional if applied against what is exclusively interstate commerce. The dissenters argued, on the other hand, id., at 610, that there is no constitutional difference between an “exclusively interstate” business and a “mixed” business, and that a fairly apportioned and nondiscriminatory tax on either type is not prohibited by the Commerce Clause. The Spector rule was applied in Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U. S. 359 (1954) (Railway Express I), to declare unconstitutional a State’s “annual license tax” levied on gross receipts for the “privilege of doing business in this State.” The Court, by a 5-to-4 vote, held that the tax on gross receipts was a tax on the privilege of doing business rather than a tax on property in the State, as Virginia contended. Virginia thereupon revised the wording of its statute to impose a “franchise tax” on “intangible property” in the form of “going concern” value as measured by gross receipts. The tax was again asserted against the Agency which in Virginia was engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. This Court’s opinion, buttressed by two concurring opinions and one concurrence in the result, upheld the reworded statute as not violative of the Spector rule. Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U. S. 434 (1959) (Railway Express II). In upholding the statute, the Court’s opinion recognized that the rule against taxing the “privilege” of doing interstate business had created a situation where “the use of magic words or labels” could “disable an otherwise constitutional levy.” Id., at 441. There was no real economic difference between the statutes in Railway Express I and Railway Express II. The Court long since had recognized that interstate commerce may be made to pay its way. Yet under the Spector rule, the economic realities in Railway Express I became irrelevant. The Spector rule had come to operate only as a rule of draftsmanship, and served only to distract the courts and parties from their inquiry into whether the challenged tax produced results forbidden by the Commerce Clause. On the day it announced Railway Express II, the Court further confirmed that a State, with proper drafting, may tax exclusively interstate commerce so long as the tax does not create any effect forbidden by the Commerce Clause. In Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U. S. 450 (1959), the Court held that net income from the interstate operations of a foreign corporation may be subjected to state taxation, provided the levy is not discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local activities within the taxing State forming sufficient nexus to support the tax. Limited in that way, the tax could be levied even though the income was generated exclusively by interstate sales. Spector was distinguished, briefly and in passing, as a case in which “the incidence” of the tax “was the privilege of doing business.” 358 U. S., at 464. Thus, applying the rule of Northwestern Cement to the facts of Spector, it is clear that Connecticut could have taxed the apportioned net income derived from the exclusively interstate commerce. It could not, however, tax the “privilege” of doing business as measured by the apportioned net income. The reason for attaching constitutional significance to a semantic difference is difficult to discern. The unsatisfactory operation of the Spector rule is well demonstrated by our recent case of Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U. S. 100 (1975). Colonial was a Delaware corporation with an interstate pipeline running through Louisiana for approximately 258 miles. It maintained a work force and pumping stations in Louisiana to keep the pipeline flowing, but it did no intrastate business in that State. Id., at 101-102. In 1962, Louisiana imposed on Colonial a franchise tax for “the privilege of carrying on or doing business” in the State. The Louisiana Court of Appeal invalidated the tax as violative of the rule of Spector. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Mouton, 228 So. 2d 718 (1969). The Supreme Court of Louisiana refused review. 255 La. 474, 231 So. 2d 393 (1970). The Louisiana Legislature, perhaps recognizing that it had run afoul of a rule of words rather than a rule of substance, then redrafted the statute to levy the tax, as an alternative incident, on the “qualification to carry on or do business in this state or the actual doing of business within this state in a corporate form.” Again, the Court of Appeal held the tax unconstitutional as applied to the appellant. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Agerton, 275 So. 2d 834 (1973). But this time the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the new tax. 289 So. 2d 93 (1974) By a 7-to-1 vote, this Court affirmed. No question had been raised as to the propriety of the apportionment of the tax, and no claim was made that the tax was discriminatory. 421 U. S., at 101. The Court noted that the tax was imposed on that aspect of interstate commerce to which the State bore a special relation, and that the State bestowed powers, privileges, and benefits sufficient to support a tax on doing business in the corporate form in Louisiana. Id., at 109. Accordingly, on the authority of Memphis Gas, the tax was held to be constitutional. The Court distinguished Spector on the familiar ground that it involved a tax on the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce, while the Louisiana Legislature, in contrast, had worded the statute at issue “narrowly to confine the impost to one related to appellant’s activities within the State in the corporate form.” 421 U. S., at 113-114. While refraining from overruling Spector, the Court noted: “[D]ecisions of this Court, particularly during recent decades, have sustained nondiscriminatory, properly apportioned state corporate taxes upon foreign corporations doing an exclusively interstate business when the tax is related to a corporation’s local activities and the State has provided benefits and protections for those activities for which it is justified in asking a fair and reasonable return.” Id., at 108. One commentator concluded: “After reading Colonial, only the most sanguine taxpayer would conclude that the Court maintains a serious belief in the doctrine that the privilege of doing interstate business is immune from state taxation.” Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court, 1974 Term: Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 Va. L. Rev. 149, 188 (1976). III In this case, of course, we are confronted with a situation like that presented in Spector. The tax is labeled a privilege tax “for the privilege of . . . doing business” in Mississippi, § 10105 of the State’s 1942 Code, as amended, and the activity taxed is, or has been assumed to be, interstate commerce. We note again that no claim is made that the activity is not sufficiently connected to the State to justify a tax, or that the tax is not fairly related to benefits provided the taxpayer, or that the tax discriminates against interstate commerce, or that the tax is not fairly apportioned. The view of the Commerce Clause that gave rise to the rule of Spector perhaps was not without some substance. Nonetheless, the possibility of defending it in the abstract does not alter the fact that the Court has rejected the proposition that interstate commerce is immune from state taxation: “It is a truism that the mere act of carrying on business in interstate commerce does not exempt a corporation from state taxation. 'It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing business.’ Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 254 (1938).” Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U. S., at 108. Not only has the philosophy underlying the rule been rejected, but the rule itself has been stripped of any practical significance. If Mississippi had called its tax one on “net income” or on the “going concern value” of appellant’s business, the Spector rule could not invalidate it. There is no economic consequence that follows necessarily from the use of the particular words, “privilege of doing business,” and a focus on that formalism merely obscures the question whether the tax produces a forbidden effect. Simply put, the Spector rule does not address the problems with which the Commerce Clause is concerned. Accordingly, we now reject the rule of Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O’Connor, that a state tax on the “privilege of doing business” is per se unconstitutional when it is applied to interstate commerce, and that case is overruled. There being no objection to Mississippi’s tax on appellant except that it was imposed on nothing other than the “privilege of doing business” that is interstate, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi is affirmed. It is so ordered. The statute is now § 27-65-13 of the State’s 1972 Code. This statute is now § 27-65-19 (2) of the 1972 Code. It was amended, effective August 1, 1972, to exclude the transportation of property. 1972 Miss. Laws, c. 506, § 2. Section 10109, as codified in 1942, imposed a tax on gross income from all transportation, with gross income defined to exclude “so much thereof as is derived from business conducted in commerce between this State and other States of the United States . . . which the State of Mississippi is prohibited from taxing under the Constitution of the United States of America.” In 1955, this exclusionary language was eliminated and the statute was amended to cover only transportation “between points within this state.” 1955 Miss. Laws, c. 109, § 10. The amendment gave the statute essentially the form it possessed during the period relevant here. It might be argued that the statute as so amended evinces an intent to reach only intrastate commerce, and that it should be so construed. Appellant, however, does not make that argument, and the Supreme Court of Mississippi clearly viewed that statute as applying to both intrastate commerce and interstate commerce. We are advised by the appellee that the tax has been applied only to commercial transactions in which a distinct service is performed and payment made for transportation from one point within the State to another point within the State. Tr. of Oral Arg. 34-35, 38. This statute is now § 27-65-31 of the 1972 Code. Violation of the requirements of the section is a misdemeanor. Ibid. The parties understandably go to great pains to describe the details of the bills of lading, and the responsibility of various entities for the vehicles as they travel from the assembly plant to the dealers. Appellant seeks to demonstrate that the transportation it provides from the railhead to the dealers is part of a movement in interstate commerce. Appellee argues that appellant’s transportation is intrastate business, but further argues that even if the activity is part of interstate commerce, the tax is not unconstitutional. Brief for Appellant 11-14; Brief for Appellee 12-24; Reply Brief for Appellant 44-16. The Mississippi courts, in upholding the tax, assumed that the transportation is in interstate commerce. For present purposes, we make the same assumption. Although appellant had been operating in Mississippi since 1960, App. 77, the state audit and assessment covered only the period beginning August 1, 1968. Id., at 37-38. No effort had been made to apply the tax to appellant for any period prior to that date. See Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U. S. 318 (1977); General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U. S. 436 (1964); Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 309 U. S. 157 (1940); Ingels v. Morf, 300 U. S. 290 (1937). See also Standard Steel Co. v. Washington Rev. Dept., 419 U. S. 560 (1975), and Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U. S. 583 (1939). The Court summarized the “free trade” view in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S., at 252: “[T]he Commerce Clause was not merely an authorization to Congress to enact laws for the protection and encouragement of commerce among the States, but by its own force created an area of trade free from interference by the States. In short, the Commerce Clause even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States. . . . This limitation on State power . . . does not merely forbid a State to single out interstate commerce for hostile action. A State is also precluded from taking any action which may fairly be deemed to have the effect of impeding the free flow of trade between States. It is immaterial that local commerce is subjected to a similar encumbrance.” See, e. g., General Motors Corp. v. Washington, supra; Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U. S. 450 (1959); Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80 (1948); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444 (1940). Although we mention Freeman as the starting point, elements of the views expressed therein, and the positions that underlie that debate, were evident in prior opinions. Compare State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284 (1873), with Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230 (1887); and compare Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34 (1927), and Cooney v. Mountain States Tel. Co., 294 U. S. 384 (1935), with Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250 (1938). See generally P. Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce (1953); Barrett, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce—“Direct Burdens,” “Multiple Burdens,” or What Have You?, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 496 (1951), and writings cited therein at 496 n. 1; Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transactions, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 211 (1947). Mr. Justice Rutledge agreed with the result the Court reached in Freeman because of his belief that the apportionment problem was best solved if States other than the market State were forbidden to impose unapportioned gross receipts taxes of the kind Indiana sought to exact. A consistent application of the doctrine of immunity for interstate commerce, of course, would have necessitated overruling the cases approved by the Freeman Court that upheld taxes whose burden, although indirect, fell on interstate commerce. In arriving at this conclusion, the dissent relied upon a construction of a stipulation entered into by the parties, 335 U. S., at 100-101, and upon an independent review of the record. The plurality rejected the dissent’s reading of the stipulation and noted, in addition, that the question presented in the petition for certiorari did not raise a claim that the State was providing no service for which it could ask recompense. Id., at 83-84. The plurality then relied on the Supreme Court of Mississippi’s holding that the State did provide protection that could properly be the subject of a tax. Five Members of the Court joined in the opinion distinguishing Spector. Two concurred in the judgment, but viewed Spector as indistinguishable and would have overruled it. 421 U. S., at 114-116. One also viewed Spector as indistinguishable, but felt that it was an established precedent until forthrightly overruled. Id., at 116. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part. Less charitably put: “In light of the expanding scope of the state taxing power over interstate commerce, Spector is an anachronism. . . . Continued adherence to Spector, especially after Northwestern States Portland Cement, cannot be justified.” Comment, Pipelines, Privileges and Labels: Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 70 Nw. U. L. Rev. 835, 854 (1975). It might be argued that "privilege” taxes, by focusing on the doing of business, are easily tailored to single out interstate businesses and subject them to effects forbidden by the Commerce Clause, and that, therefore, “privilege” taxes should be subjected to a per se rule against their imposition on interstate business. Yet property taxes also may be tailored to differentiate between property used in transportation and other types of property, see Railway Express II, 358 U. S. 434 (1959); an income tax could use different rates for different types of business; and a tax on the “privilege of doing business in corporate form” could be made to change with the nature of the corporate activity involved. Any tailored tax of this sort creates an increased danger of error in apportionment, of discrimination against interstate commerce, and of a lack of relationship to the services provided by the State. See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S., at 265-266, n. 13 (concurring opinion). A tailored tax, however accomplished, must receive the careful scrutiny of the courts to determine whether it produces a forbidden effect on interstate commerce. We perceive no reason, however, why a tax on the “privilege of doing business” should be viewed as creating a qualitatively different danger so as to require a per se rule of unconstitutionality. It might also be argued that adoption of a rule of absolute immunity for interstate commerce (a rule that would, of course, go beyond Spector) would relieve this Court of difficult judgments that on occasion will have to be made. We believe, however, that administrative convenience, in this instance, is insufficient justification for abandoning the principle that “interstate commerce may be made to pay its way.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BARAL v. UNITED STATES No. 98-1667. Argued January 18, 2000 Decided February 22, 2000 Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Walter J. Rockier argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Julius Greisman and Thomas Klein. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Argrett, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Gilbert S. Rothenberg, and Charles Bricken. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. Internal Revenue Code § 6511(b)(2)(A) imposes a ceiling on the amount of credit or refund to which a taxpayer is entitled as compensation for an overpayment of tax: “[T]he amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return.” 26 U. S. C. § 6511(b)(2)(A). We are called upon in this case to decide when two types of remittance are “paid” for purposes of this section: a remittance by a taxpayer of estimated income tax, and a remittance by a taxpayer’s employer of withholding tax. The plain language of a nearby Code section, § 6513(b), provides the answer: These remittances are “paid” on the due date of the taxpayer’s income tax return. I The relevant facts are not disputed. Two remittances were made to the Internal Revenue Service toward petitioner David H. Baral’s income tax liability for the 1988 tax year. The first, a withholding of $4,104 from Baral’s wages throughout 1988, was a garden-variety collection of income tax by the employer, see §3402. The second, an estimated income tax of $1,100 remitted in January 1989, was sent by Baral himself out of concern that his employer’s withholding might be inadequate to meet his tax obligation for the year, see §6654. In the ordinary course, Baral’s income tax return for 1988 was due to be filed on April 15,1989. Though he applied for and received an extension of time until August 15, Baral missed this deadline; he did not file the return until nearly four years later, on June 1, 1993. The Service, on July 19,1993, assessed the tax liability reported on this belated return. On the return, Baral claimed that he (and his employer on his behalf) had remitted $1,175 more with respect to the 1988 taxable year than he actually owed. Baral requested that the Service apply this excess as a credit toward his outstanding tax obligations for the 1989 taxable year. The Service denied the requested credit. It did not dispute that Baral had timely filed the request under the relevant filing deadline — “within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later.” § 6511(a); see § 6511(b)(1). But the Service concluded that the claim exceeded the ceiling imposed by § 6511(b)(2)(A). That provision states that “the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return.” Ibid.; see generally Commissioner v. Lundy, 516 U. S. 235, 240 (1996) (explaining that §6511 contains two separate timeliness provisions: (1) § 6511(b)(l)’s filing deadline and (2) § 6511(b)(2)’s ceilings, which are defined by reference to that provision’s “look-back period[s]”). Since Baral had filed his return on June 1,1993, and had earlier received a 4-month extension from the initial due date, the relevant look-back period under § 6511(b)(2)(A) extended from June 1, 1993, back to February 1, 1990 (i. e., three years plus four months). According to the Service, Baral had paid no portion of the overpaid tax during that period, and so faced a ceiling of zero on any allowable refund or credit. Baral then commenced the instant suit for refund in Federal District Court. That court sustained the Service’s position and granted summary judgment in its favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-1, judgt. order reported at 172 F. 3d 918 (CADC 1999). The Court of Appeals looked to § 6513(b)(1), which states that amounts of tax withheld from wages “shall... be deemed to have been paid by [the taxpayer] on the 15th day of the fourth month following the close of his taxable year,” and to § 6513(b)(2), which makes similar provision for amounts submitted as estimated income tax, and concluded that, under these subsections, both of the remittances at issue were “paid” on April 15, 1989. Accord, e. g., Dantzler v. United States, 183 F. 3d 1247, 1250-1251 (CA11 1999) (estimated income tax); Ertman v. United States, 165 F. 3d 204, 207 (CA2 1999) (same); Ehle v. United States, 720 F. 2d 1096, 1096-1097 (CA9 1983) (withholding from wages). In view of apparent tension between this approach and a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Ford v. United States, 618 F. 2d 357, 360-361, and n. 4 (1980) (suggesting that a remittance respecting any sort of tax is “paid” under § 6511 only when the Service assesses the tax liability), we granted certiorari, 527 U. S. 1067 (1999). II The parties renew before us the contentions advanced below. The Government submits that §§ 6513(b)(1) and (2) unequivocally provide that the two remittances at issue were “paid” on April 15, 1989, for purposes of § 6511(b)(2)(A), so that they precede the look-back period, which, as noted, commenced on February 1, 1990. Baral, on the other hand, urges that a tax cannot be “paid” within the meaning of § 6511(b)(2)(A) until the tax liability is assessed (i. e., the value of the liability is definitively fixed). According to Baral, the requisite assessment might be made either when the taxpayer files his return (here June 1, 1993) or when the Service, under §6201, formally assesses the liability (here July 19, 1993), though he seems to prefer the latter date. See Brief for Petitioner 9 (“Payment of the income tax . . . occurred at the earliest on June 1,1993, when the amount of that tax first became known, and more precisely on July 19, 1993, when the income tax was assessed”). We agree with the Government that §§ 6513(b)(1) and (2) settle the matter. We set out these provisions in full: “(b) Prepaid income tax “For purposes of section 6511 or 6512— “(1) Any tax actually deducted and withheld at the source during any calendar year under chapter 24 shall, in respect of the recipient of the income, be deemed to have been paid by him on the 15th day of the fourth month following the close of his taxable year with respect to which such tax is allowable as a credit under section 31. “(2) Any amount paid as estimated income tax for any taxable year shall be deemed to have been paid on the last day prescribed for filing the return under section 6012 for such taxable year (determined without regard to any extension of time for filing such return).” Subsection (1) resolves when the remittance of withholding tax by Baraks employer was “paid”: Since Baral is a calendar year taxpayer, the $4,104 withheld from his wages during the 1988 calendar year was “paid” on April 15, 1989. Subsection (2) determines when Baraks remittance of estimated income tax was “paid”: Since the referenced § 6012 together with § 6072(a) requires that a calendar year taxpayer like Baral file his income tax return on the April 15th following the close of the calendar year, the $1,100 remitted as an estimated income tax in respect of Baraks 1988 tax liability was likewise “paid” on April 15,1989. And both of these statutorily defined payment dates apply “[f]or purposes of section 6511,” the provision directly at issue in this case. This means that, under § 6511(b)(2)(A), both remittances at issue (the withholding and the estimated income tax) fall before, and hence outside, the look-back period, which commenced on February 1,1990. Because neither these remittances nor any others were “paid” within the look-baek period (February 1, 1990, to June 1, 1998), the ceiling on Baral’s requested credit of $1,175 is zero, and the Service was correct to deny the requested credit. Baral disputes this reading of § 6513(b). He claims that §§ 6513(b)(1) and (2) establish a “deemed paid” date for payment of estimated tax and withholding tax, but in no sense prescribe when the income tax is “paid,” which is the crucial inquiry under § 6511(b)(2)(A). According to Baral, withholding tax and estimated tax are taxes in their own right (separate from the income tax), and are converted into income tax only on the income tax return. (On this view, payment of the income tax occurred no earlier than June 1, 1993, when Baral filed the return.) This reading is evident, he says, from the significance that the Treasury Regulations place on the filing of the return, see 26 CFR §301.6315-1 (1999) (“The aggregate amount of the payments of estimated tax should be entered upon the income tax return for such taxable year as payments to be applied against the tax shown on such return”); § 301.6402-3(a)(1) (providing that “in the case of an overpayment of income taxes, a claim for credit or refund of such overpayment shall be made on the appropriate income tax return”), and from the fact that the Code’s provisions regarding withholding and estimated tax are found in different subtitles (C and F, respectively) from the provisions governing income tax (A). We disagree. Withholding and estimated tax remittances are not taxes in their own right, but methods for collecting the income tax. Thus, § 31(a)(1) of the Code provides that amounts withheld from wages “shall be allowed to the recipient of the income as a credit against the [income] tax,” and § 6315 states that “[pjayment of the estimated income tax, or any installment thereof, shall be considered payment on account of the income taxes imposed by subtitle A for the taxable year.” Similarly, one of the regulations cited by Baral explains that a remittance of estimated income tax “shall be considered payment on account of the income tax for the taxable year for which the estimate is made.” 26 CFR §301.6315-1 (1999) (emphasis added). Baral’s reading fails, moreover, to give any meaning to 26 U. S. C. § 6513. That section exists “[f]or purposes of section 6511,” and §6511 concerns credits and refunds, which result only when the aggregate of remittances (such as withholding tax and estimated income tax) exceed the tax liability, see §6401. Thus, the concepts of credit or refund have no meaning as applied to Baral’s notion of withholding taxes and estimated taxes as freestanding taxes. Not surprisingly, the caption to § 6513(b) describes withholding and estimated income tax remittances as “[p]repaid income tax.” Taking a more metaphysical tack, Baral contends that income tax is “paid” under § 6511(b)(2)(A) only when the income tax is assessed — here, June 1 or July 19, 1993, see supra, at 434-435 — because the concept of payment makes sense only when the liability is “defined, known, and fixed by assessment,” Brief for Petitioner 9. But the Code directly contradicts the notion that payment may not occur before assessment. See § 6151(a) (“[T]he person required to make [a return of tax] shall, without assessment or notice and demand from the Secretary, pay such tax ... at the time and place fixed for filing the return” (emphasis added)); § 6213(b)(4) (“Any amount paid as a tax or in respect of a tax may be assessed upon the receipt of such payment’ (emphasis added)). Nor does Baral’s argument find support in our decision in Rosenman v. United States, 323 U. S. 658 (1945), where we applied § 6511’s predecessor to a remittance of estimated estate tax. To be sure, a part of our opinion seems to endorse petitioner’s view that payment only occurs at assessment: "It is [the] erroneous assessment that gave rise to a claim for refund. Not until then was there such a claim as could start the time running for presenting the claim. In any responsible sense payment was then made by the application of the balance credited to the petitioners in the suspense account....” Id., at 661. But the remittance in Rosenman, unlike the ones here, was not governed by a “deemed paid” provision akin to §6513, and we therefore had no occasion to consider the implications of such a provision for determining when a tax is “paid” under the predecessor to §6511. See ibid, (noting that “no extraneous relevant aids to construction have been called to our attention”). Moreover, if the quoted passage had represented our holding, we would have broadly rejected the Government’s argument that payment occurred when the remittance of estimated estate tax was made, instead of rejecting the argument, as we did, only because it was not in accord with the “tenor” of the “business transaction,” id., at 663. We observe, finally, that Baral’s position — to the extent he submits that payment occurs only at the Service’s assessment — would work to the detriment of taxpayers who timely file their returns and claim a refund or credit as compensation for an overpayment. The Service 'will not always assess the taxpayer’s liability immediately upon receiving the return; the Service generally has three years in which to do so, see 26 U. S. C. § 6501(a) (1994 ed., Supp. III). The Code does allow for payment of interest to the taxpayer on over-payments once the return has been filed and the tax paid, 26 U. S. C. § 6611 (1994 ed. and Supp. III), but under Baral’s view no interest could accrue during the time between the filing of the return and the Service’s assessment. Fortunately for the timely taxpayer, the Code definitively rejects Baral’s position in this setting. Section 6611(d) of 26 U. S. C. explains that the date of payment is determined according to the provisions of § 6513, which, as noted, supra, at 435-436, plainly set a deemed date of payment for remittances of withholding and estimated income tax on the April 15 following the relevant taxable year. * * * For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment below. It is so ordered. Central to our analysis in this regard was a concern that the Service should not be able to treat the same remittance as a payment for statute of limitations purposes — disadvantaging the taxpayer by decreasing the time in which a refund claim could be filed — and as a deposit for purposes of accrual of interest on overpayments — disadvantaging the taxpayer by starting the accrual of interest only at assessment. Rosenman, 328 U. S., at 662-663. Indeed, we suggested that an amendment to the Code disapproving of the Service's treatment of remittances as deposits for interest purposes might change the analysis. Id., at 663 (citing Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, § 4(d), 57 Stat. 140) (presently codified at 26 U. S. C. § 6401(c)). We need not address the proper treatment under §6511 of remittances that, unlike withholding and estimated income tax, are not governed by a “deemed paid” provision akin to § 6513(b). Such remittances might include remittances of estimated estate tax, as in Rosenman, or remittances of any sort of tax by a taxpayer under audit in order to stop the running of interest and penalties, see, e. g., Moran v. United States, 63 F. 3d 663 (CA7 1995). In the latter situation, the taxpayer will often desire treatment of the remittance as a deposit — even if this means forfeiting the right to interest on an overpayment — in order to preserve jurisdiction in the Tax Court, which depends on the existence of a deficiency, 26 U. S. C. §6213 (1994 ed. and Supp. III), a deficiency that would be wiped out by treatment of the remittance as a payment. We note that the Service has promulgated procedures to govern classification of a remittance as a deposit or payment in this context. See Rev. Proc. 84-58, 1984-2 Cum. Bull. 501.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SCHWABACHER et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 258. Argued January 6-7, 1948. Decided May 3, 1948. Carl McFarland argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were T. W. Dahlquist, Ashley Sellers and Stephen J. Angland. Daniel H. Kunkel argued the cause for the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellee. With him on the brief was Daniel W. Knowlton. George D. Gibson argued the cause for the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. et al., appellees. With him on the brief were R. W. Purcell, John C. Shields, George H. Gardner and John W. Riely. Mr. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court. This controversy grows out of the voluntary merger of Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company and Pere Marquette Railway Company, which companies, together with Alleghany Corporation, sought approval by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Pere Marquette is incorporated under the laws of Michigan, while Chesapeake & Ohio is chartered by Virginia. Chesapeake & Ohio acquired and for some years exercised active control of Pere Marquette, whose properties and operations complement rather than compete with those of Chesapeake & Ohio. Late in 1945 merger proceedings were commenced under enabling statutes of the two states and were consummated with approval of considerably more than the number of shares made necessary by statutes of the respective states. The Interstate Commerce Commission found, and there is no attack upon the findings, that the public interest is served by merger and unification of these properties and operations. The Commission also concluded that the plan as a whole, and as applied to each group of shareholders, is just and reasonable, and there is no attack upon this conclusion except that by the appellants which is treated fully herein. Consequently, details of the plan are of little importance to this litigation. Appellants are owners of 2,100 shares of $100 par 5% cumulative preferred stock of Pere Marquette. Their interests aggregate a little less than 2% of the outstanding stock of this class. Dividends on this stock have been unpaid since 1931 and, as of the commencement of this controversy, were in arrears in the sum of $72.50 per share, an amount that is increasing with time. The Pere Marquette charter provides for full payment of the stock at par, plus accrued unpaid dividends, “in the event of dissolution, liquidation, or winding up of the company, voluntary or involuntary . . . before any amounts are paid to holders of the . . . common stock.” The appellants contend that the merger hereinafter described terminates the corporate existence and, under this clause as construed by Michigan law, amounts to a “winding up.” They insist that since the merger makes provision for some compensation to common stockholders these appellants have the right, under Michigan law, to have their shares recognized on the basis of at least $172.50 each. The Commission found the market value per share ranged, at different times, from $87 to $99, while the merger terms give stocks in exchange which would have realized about $90 and $111 per share on the same dates. Appellants dissented from the merger, but Michigan law provides no specific right or procedure for appraisal and retirement of the holdings of a stockholder dissenting from a railroad merger. When application was filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission under § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended (49 U. S. C. § 5), for approval and authorization of the merger, as well as for other relief, appellants intervened and asked that body to determine, recognize and protect their asserted right to the full legal liquidation figure. The Commission approved the merger and the merger terms, finding them just and reasonable as to each class of stockholders. However, it disclaimed jurisdiction to pass upon the further claims of the appellants asserted on the basis of their interpretation of Michigan law. It reviewed at some length the economic position of the stock. It recited that these shares had received no dividends since 1931 and that appellants’ witnesses agreed that these stockholders could not expect to receive any dividends for many years, apart from the merger. The Commission also pointed out the deficit in operations of Pere Marquette for the first quarter of 1946 as contrasted with the net income of Chesapeake and Ohio, and concluded that “On the whole, it would seem that the prospects of Pere Marquette stockholders for returns on their investments would be enhanced by merger of their company into the Chesapeake & Ohio.” The Commission did not question that the stockholders, on liquidation, dissolution or winding up of Pere Marquette, would be entitled to be paid in full the par value of their shares and accumulated dividends before any payment to holders of common stock. It did not undertake to determine the ultimate worth of these stocks in case of an actual liquidation, but it considered their present intrinsic value on a capitalized earnings basis, an actual yield basis, and its present market position and concluded: “Accordingly, considering Pere Marquette’s investment according to its books, other property values, the company’s history as to earnings, its future prospects, and the market appraisal of its stocks, all as set forth above, we find that, as to the stockholders of both parties generally, the proposed ratios of exchange, stock issues, and assumptions of indebtedness are just and reasonable.” The Commission then noted the contention of the appellants that as to them the terms were not just and reasonable, because they are deprived of contract rights under Michigan law, which they have not waived. It is contended that the Commission should not remit the dissenting stockholders to remedies in state courts as the Commission would thereby decline the jurisdiction conferred by § 5 and § 20a of the Act. But the Commission considered that it was entrusted with authority to decide the public interest aspects of the merger of these transportation facilities and that it could not be expected to enter into the question of “compensation of dissenting stockholders on specified bases” before approval and merger. It thought that, having found the treatment of each class to be just and reasonable, it had done its full duty “when we make certain that all stockholders of the same class are to be treated alike.” It declined to decide the Michigan law question as to what the rights of dissenting stockholders were, and whether the merger was equivalent to a liquidation, but said: “This does not mean that the Chesapeake & Ohio and the Pere Marquette do not remain free to settle controversies with dissenting stockholders through negotiation and litigation in the courts.” Taking into account the small percentage of the dissenting shares, the current assets position of the Chesapeake & Ohio, and the maximum possible cost to the merged company of the settlement of these claims on the basis most favorable to appellants, it considered that the company was amply able to bear “any probable expenditure of cash that it might be required to make in connection with the merger. Accordingly, it appears that consummation of the merger will not involve a burden of excessive expenditure.” The Commission thus left in a state of suspense, subject to further litigation or negotiation, these claims concerning the extent of the capital obligations of a constituent company, after examining them sufficiently to determine only that, however settled, they did not involve enough to affect the solvency of the new company or jeopardize its operations. The Commission denied appellants’ petition for rehearing and they filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to set aside the order authorizing the merger. A court of three judges, convened as required by law, sustained the Commission, 72 F. Supp. 560. Appellants bring to us the question whether the Commission, in view of its authority over mergers, which is declared to be exclusive and plenary, could decline to determine just what the dissenting stockholders’ legal rights were under the Michigan law and the Pere Marquette charter, and to recognize them in full by the terms of the merger. The disposition of appellants’ claims, as well as the nature of the claims themselves, requires consideration of the relative function and authority of federal and state law in regulating and approving voluntary railroad mergers. The appellants contend that their share in the merged company is to be measured by, or their remedies as dissenters are to be found in, state law, but that the federal agency is bound to determine and apply that law. The Commission on the other hand refuses either finally to foreclose or to allow these claims. It apparently leaves it open to the state courts, or to the parties by negotiation, to add to the surviving carrier’s capital obligations, which the Commission has found to be just and reasonable, others founded only in state law and as to which it has made no such findings. We conclude that neither position is wholly consistent with the federal statutory plan for authorization and approval of mergers. It is not for us to adjudicate the existence or the measure of any rights that Michigan law may confer upon dissenting stockholders. Neither the Commission nor this Court can make a plenary and exclusive decision as to what the law of a state may be, for the function of declaring and interpreting its own law is left to each state of the Union. But the effect of the state law in relation to a constitutional Act of Congress, in view of the constitutional provision that the latter shall be “the supreme law of the land,” “laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding,” is for us to determine. Our first inquiry here, therefore, is whether the Interstate Commerce Act accords recognition to those state law rights, if any exist. To determine this federal question we assume, but do not decide, that Michigan law would consider this merger to be a liquidation, and would regard the recognition given to the common stock as entitling these dissenters to “full payment” in cash or its equivalent for both the par value of their preferred shares and accrued unpaid dividends thereon. Assuming such to be their rights under the law of the State, we must decide whether approval of a railroad merger under the Transportation Act of 1940 is conditioned upon observance of such state law rights or can be made by the Commission contingently subject to them. A résumé of the history of that Act throws light on the problem dealt with by that legislation. The basic railroad facilities of the United States were constructed under state authorization and restrictions by corporations whose powers and limitations were prescribed by state legislatures, or resulted from limitations on. the states themselves. Construction in reference primarily to local or regional transportation needs created duplicating and competing facilities in some areas and provided inadequate ones in others. Expansion necessary to serve advancing national frontiers was stimulated by extensive subsidies from the Federal Government, largely in the form of land grants. But the stress and strain of World War I brought home to us that the railroads of the country did not function as a really national system of transportation. That crisis also made plain the confusions, inefficiencies, inadequacies and dangers to our national defense and economy flowing from the patchwork railroad pattern that local interests under local law had created. The demand for an integrated, efficient and coordinated system of rail transport, equal to the needs of our national economy and defense, resulted in the Transportation Act of 1920. In a series of decisions on particular problems, this Court defined the general purposes of that Act to be the establishment of a new federal railway policy to insure adequate transportation service by means of securing a fair return on capital devoted to the service, restoration of impaired railroad credit, and regulation of rates, security issues, consolidations and mergers in the interest of the public. The tenor of all of these was to confirm the power and duty of the Interstate Commerce Commission, regardless of state law, to control rate and capital structures, physical make-up and relations between carriers, in the light of the public interest in an efficient national transportation system. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563; New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184; Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456; Railroad Commission of California v. Southern Pacific Co., 264 U. S. 331; Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R.Co., 270 U. S. 266. As a means to this end, the 1920 Act required the Commission to prepare and adopt a plan for nationwide consolidations of the railway properties of the country. It made this master plan the governing consideration in approving voluntary consolidations of railroads which were permitted only if in harmony with and in furtherance of the Commission’s over-all plans. If they met that test, Congress provided that mergers could be consummated notwithstanding any restraint or prohibition by state authority. By 1940 it had become apparent that the ambitious nation-wide plan of consolidation was not bearing fruit. Various studies and investigations led to the conclusion that it was a case where the best was an enemy of the good, and waiting for the perfect official plan was defeating or postponing less ambitious but more attainable voluntary improvements. The Transportation Act of 1940 relieved the Commission of formulating a nationwide plan of consolidations. Instead, it authorized approval by the Commission of carrier-initiated, voluntary plans of merger or consolidation if, subject to such terms, conditions and modifications as the Commission might prescribe, the proposed transactions met with certain tests of public interest, justice and reasonableness, in which case they should become effective regardless of state authority. The Act does not specify every consideration to which the Commission must give weight in determining whether or not any plan meets the tests. Section 5 (2) provides only that, “among others,” the Commission shall consider the effect upon adequate transportation service, the effect of inclusion or failure to include other railroads, total fixed charges, and the interests of the carrier employees affected. This Court has recently and unanimously said in reference to this Act, “Congress has long made the maintenance and development of an economical and efficient railroad system a matter of primary national concern. Its legislation must be read with this purpose in mind.” Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Daniel, 333 U.S. 118. So reading the legislation relevant to this merger, we find that approval of a voluntary railroad merger which is within the scope of the Act is dependent upon three, and upon only three, considerations: First, a finding that it “will be consistent with the public interest.” (§ 5 (2) (b).) Second, a finding that, subject to any modification made by the Commission, it is “just and reasonable.” (§ 5 (2) (b).) Third, assent of a “majority, unless a different vote is required under applicable State law, in which case the number so required shall assent, of the votes of the holders of the shares entitled to vote.” (§5(11).) When these conditions have been complied with, the Commission-approved transaction goes into effect without need for invoking any approval under state authority, and the parties are relieved of “restraints, limitations, and prohibitions of law, Federal, State, or municipal, insofar as may be necessary to enable them to carry into effect the transaction so approved or provided for in accordance with the terms and conditions, if any, imposed by the Commission, and to hold, maintain, and operate any properties and exercise any control or franchises acquired through such transaction.” (§5(11).) The Commission, under this Act as well as the Act of 1920, was also given complete control of the capital structure to result from a merger. The carrier, even if permitted by state law which created it, may issue no stock,, bond or evidence of indebtedness without approval. It may assume no obligation in respect of the securities of another person or corporation except with approval. And the approval is to be given only on a finding that it “(a) is for some lawful object within its corporate purposes, and compatible with the public interest, which is necessary or appropriate for or consistent with the proper performance by the carrier of service to the public as a common carrier, and which will not impair its ability to perform that service, and (b) is reasonably necessary and appropriate for such purpose.” 49 U. S. C. § 20a (2). The jurisdiction of the Commission under both § 5 and § 20a is made plenary and exclusive and independent of all other state or federal authority. §5 (11); § 20a (7). The Commission, as we have seen, has found that the liabilities asserted by appellants, if settled by litigation or negotiation, will not impair the carrier’s ability to perform its service, but it has not found the assumption of such liabilities to be compatible with the public interest under § 5 and § 20a. Indeed, since these claims exceed what the Commission has found to be just and reasonable, it could hardly find that assumption of such claims would be compatible with the public interest. It appears to us inconsistent with the Interstate Commerce Act for the Commission to leave claims growing out of the capital structure of one of the constituent companies to be added to the obligations of the surviving carrier, contingent upon the decision of some other tribunal or agreement of the parties themselves. We think that the Commission must pass upon and approve all capital liabilities which the merged company will assume or discharge as a result of merger. If some greater amount than that specified in the agreement is to be allowed to any class of stockholders, it must either deplete the cash or inflate the liabilities or capital issues of the new company. It may be that in this case the merged company will be strong enough to carry this burden and still perform its public service. But that is not the sole purpose of the supervision provided by statute. It is also in the public interest that no capitalization or indebtedness be carried over except that which meets the test of the Act in all other respects. We think the Commission was in error in assuming tha,t it did not have, or was at liberty to renounce or delegate, power finally to settle the amount of capital liabilities of the new company and the proportion or amount thereof which each class of stockholders should receive on account of its contributions to the new entity. We think it is equally clear that the Commission must look for standards in passing on a voluntary merger only to the Interstate Commerce Act. In matters within its scope it is the supreme law of the land. Its purpose to bring within its scope everything pertaining to the capital structures of such mergers could hardly be made more plain. Indeed, the very fact on which appellants rely heavily, that the Commission’s jurisdiction is “plenary” and “exclusive,” argues with equal force that federal law is also plenary and exclusive. The Commission likely would not and probably could not be given plenary and exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and apply any state’s law. Whatever rights the appellants ask- the Commission to assure must be founded on federal, not on state, law. Apart from meeting the test of the public interest, the merger terms, as to stockholders, must be found to be just and reasonable. These terms would be largely meaningless to the stockholders if their interests were ultimately to be settled by reference to provisions of corporate charters and of state laws. Such charters and laws usually have been drawn on assumptions that time and experience have unsettled. Public regulation is not obliged and we cannot lightly assume it is intended to restore values, even if promised by charter terms, if they have already been lost through the operation of economic forces. Cf. Market Street R. Co. v. Commission, 324 U. S. 548. In appraising a stockholder’s position in a merger as to justice and reasonableness, it is not the promise that a charter made to him but the current worth of that promise that governs, it is not what he once put into a constituent company but what value he is contributing to the merger that is to be made good. In construing the words “fair and equitable” in a federal statute of very similar purposes, we have held that although the full priority rule applies in liquidation of a solvent holding company pursuant to a federal statute, the priority is satisfied by giving each class the full economic equivalent of what they presently hold, and that, as a matter of federal law, liquidation preferences provided by the charter do not apply. We said that, although the company was in fact being liquidated in compliance with an administrative order, the rights of the stockholders could be valued “on the basis of a going business and not as though a liquidation were taking place.” Consequently the liquidation preferences were only one factor in valuation rather than determinative of amounts payable. Otis & Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 323 U. S. 624. The appellants here, although the enterprise is to continue, insist on a valuation according to the letter of the charter. By this method the longer their stock is in default of dividends or earnings, the greater interest it would have in the merged properties if the common stock was to be recognized at all. The Commission, however, did not consider that a long-continued default and the prospect of further default added greatly to the present intrinsic or market value of the stock in exchange. Its measuring rod was an economic rather than a legalistic one. The Commission considered the stock’s past yield, present market value, and future prospects. It found that, all things considered, the merger terms gave to these appellants in new stock the fair economic equivalent of what they already held. It considered the deal just and reasonable on an exchange basis for a continuing enterprise. But it did not undertake to say whether, under the letter of their charter as construed under the law of Michigan, the preferred stockholders may not have a contract that would exact more than an economic equivalent. Since the federal law clearly contemplates merger as a step in continuing the enterprise, it follows that what Michigan law might give these dissenters on a winding-up or liquidation is irrelevant, except insofar as it may be reflected in current values for which they are entitled to an equivalent. It would be inconsistent to allow state law to apply a liquidation basis to what federal law designates as a basis for continued public service. Federal law requires that merger terms be just and reasonable to all groups of stockholders, in contemplation of the continued use of their capital in the public calling to which it has been dedicated. Congress has made no provision by which minority stockholders, dissatisfied with a proposed railroad merger, may block it or compel retirement of their capital, as statutes often permit to be done in the case of private corporations where the public interest is not much concerned with its effect on the enterprise. And since Congress dealt with the subject of stockholders’ consent, its failure to provide for withdrawal of non-consenting capital cannot be considered an oversight to be supplied by us. A part of the capital dedicated to a railroad enterprise cannot withdraw itself without authorization any more than all of the capital can withdraw itself and abandon the railroad without approval. It must submit to regulations and to readjustments in the public interest on just and reasonable terms. In determining whether each class of stockholder receives an equivalent of what it turns in, the Commission, of course, is under a duty to see that minority interests are protected, especially when there is an absence of arm’s length bargaining or the terms of the merger have been imposed by management interests adverse to any class of stockholders. The Commission indicates both awareness and discharge of this duty in this case. Its finding that this plan is just and reasonable is not challenged here except on the basis of Michigan law. When stockholders are given what it is just and reasonable they should have, the Interstate Commerce Act does not permit state law to impose greater obligations on the financial structure of the merging railroads with consequent increased calls upon their assets or earning capacity. We therefore hold that no rights alleged to have been granted to dissenting stockholders by state law provision concerning liquidation survive the merger agreement approved by the requisite number of stockholders and approved by the Commission as just and reasonable. Any such rights are, as a matter of federal law, accorded recognition in the obligation of the Commission not to approve any plan which is not just and reasonable. In making that determination, those rights are to be considered to the extent that they may affect intrinsic or market values. While the Commission has found that what the appellants are given in this plan is just and reasonable, the record indicates that it may have declined to consider these claims, even if they are found to have some effect on the intrinsic value of the stock, because it thought it lacked jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, we cannot be sure that in arriving at its conclusion that the plan was just and reasonable it did not exclude some factors that it should consider under the views set out in this opinion. We therefore reverse the judgment below and remand the case to the Commission for reconsideration under the principles herein expressed. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Reed took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section 5 as amended provides in part as follows: “(2) (a) It shall be lawful, with the approval and authorization of the Commission, as provided in subdivision (b)— “(i) for two or more carriers to consolidate or merge their properties or franchises, or any part thereof, into one corporation for the ownership, management, and operation of the properties theretofore in separate ownership . . . “(b) Whenever a transaction is proposed under subparagraph (a), the carrier or carriers or persons seeking authority therefor shall present an application to the Commission, and thereupon the Commission shall notify the Governor of each State in which any part of the properties of the carriers involved in the proposed transaction is situated, and also such carriers and the applicant or applicants . . . and shall afford reasonable opportunity for interested parties to be heard. ... If the Commission finds that, subject to such terms and conditions and such modifications as it shall find to be just and reasonable, the proposed transaction is within the scope of sub-paragraph (a) and will be consistent with the public interest, it shall enter an order approving and authorizing such transaction, upon the terms and conditions, and with the modifications, so found to be just and reasonable . . . “(c) In passing upon any proposed transaction under the provisions of this paragraph (2), the Commission shall give weight to the following considerations, among others: (1) The effect . . . upon adequate transportation service to the public; (2) the effect upon the public interest of the inclusion, or failure to include, other railroads in the territory . . .; (3) the total fixed charges resulting from the proposed transaction; and (4) the interest of the carrier employees affected. . . . “(e) No transaction which contemplates a guaranty or assumption of payment of dividends or of fixed charges, shall be approved by the Commission under this paragraph (2) except upon a specific finding by the Commission that such guaranty or assumption is not inconsistent with the public interest. . . . “(4) It shall be unlawful for any person, except as provided in paragraph (2), to enter into any transaction within the scope of subparagraph (a) thereof . . . “(11) The authority conferred by this section shall be exclusive and plenary, and any carrier or corporation participating in or resulting from any transaction approved by the Commission thereunder, shall have full power (with the assent, in the case of a purchase and sale, a lease, a corporate consolidation, or a corporate merger, of a majority, unless a different vote is required under applicable State law, in which case the number so required shall assent, of the votes of the holders of the shares entitled to vote of the capital stock of such corporation at a regular meeting of such stockholders, the notice of such meeting to include such purpose, or at a special meeting thereof called for such purpose) to carry such transaction into effect and to own and operate any properties and exercise any control or franchises acquired through said transaction without invoking any approval under State authority; and any carriers or other corporations, and their officers and employees and any other persons, participating in a transaction approved or authorized under the provisions of this section shall be and they are hereby relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws and of all other restraints, limitations, and prohibitions of law, Federal, State, or municipal, insofar as may be necessary to enable them to carry into effect the transaction so approved or provided for in accordance with the terms and conditions, if any, imposed by the Commission, and to hold, maintain, and operate any properties and exercise any control or franchises acquired through such transaction. Nothing in this section shall be construed to create or provide for the creation, directly or indirectly, of a Federal corporation, but any power granted by this section to any carrier or other corporation shall be deemed to be in addition to and in modification of its powers under its corporate charter or under the laws of any State.” For pertinent provisions of § 5 and § 20a see notes 1 and 15 respectively. 28 U. S. C. § 47 28 U. S. C. § 47 (a); 28 U. S. C. § 345 Act of September 18,1940, 54 Stat. 898. Act of February 28,1920, 41 Stat. 456. “It is manifest . . . that the act made a new departure. . . .” Chief Justice Taft, in Railroad Commisdon of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 585. In Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 466, 478, in referring to the Wisconsin case, 257 U. S. 563, and the New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, the late Chief Justice said: “In both cases it was pointed out that the Transportation Act adds a new and important object to previous interstate commerce legislation, which was designed primarily to prevent unreasonable or discriminatory rates against persons and localities. The new act seeks affirmatively to build up a system of railways prepared to handle promptly all the interstate traffic of the country. It aims to give the owners of the railways an opportunity to earn enough to maintain their properties and equipment in such a state of efficiency that they can carry well this burden. To achieve this great purpose, it puts the railroad systems of the country more completely than ever under the fostering guardianship and control of the Commission, which is to supervise their issue of securities, their car supply and distribution, their joint use of terminals, their construction of new lines, their abandonment of old lines, and by a proper division of joint rates, and by fixing adequate rates for interstate commerce, and in case of discrimination, for intrastate commerce, to secure a fair return upon the properties of the carriers engaged.” § 407 (4). §407 (6) (a). §407 (8). See, for example, report and recommendations by the President’s Committee of Six, appointed September 20, 1938, whose report dated December 23, 1938, is considered part of the legislative history of the Transportation Act of 1940. See note 1, supra. The Act itself included a statement of the “National Transportation Policy” in these terms: “It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of the Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers; to encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable charges for transportation services, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices; to cooperate with the several States and the duly authorized officials thereof; and to encourage fair wages and equitable working conditions; — all to the end of developing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail, as well as other means, adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense. All of the provisions of this Act shall be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the above declaration of policy.” Repeated recommendations of the Commission that the federal government occupy the field of regulation of railroad security issues and assumption of obligations were followed in 1920 by addition of § 20a to the Interstate Commerce Act (§ 439 of the Transportation Act of 1920,41 Stat.494). As early as 1907 the Commission had stated that “the time has come when some reasonable regulation should be imposed upon the issuance of securities by railways engaged in interstate commerce.” 12 I. C. C. 277, 306. This recommendation was renewed in the Commission’s annual report for 1907, p. 24, and in every succeeding annual report up to and including 1919. The Commission incorporated in the 1919 report the statement concerning recommended legislation it had submitted to the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, which inclúded a recommendation for regulation of security issues. House Report No. 456, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (November 10, 1919), said with respect to the section which later became § 20a: . . The enactment of the pending bill will put the control over stock and bond issues exclusively in the hands of the Federal Government and will result in uniformity and greater promptness of action.” Section 20a as enacted in 1920 remained unchanged by the Transportation Act of 1940 and provides in part as follows: “(2) ... it shall be unlawful for any carrier to issue any share of capital stock or any bond or other evidence of interest in or indebtedness of the carrier ... or to assume any obligation or liability as lessor, lessee, guarantor, indorser, surety, or otherwise, in respect of the securities of any other person, natural or artificial, even though permitted by the authority creating the carrier corporation, unless and until, and then only to the extent that, upon application by the carrier, and after investigation by the Commission of the purposes and uses of the proposed issue and the proceeds thereof, or of the proposed assumption of obligation or liability in respect of the securities of any other person, natural or artificial, the Commission by order authorizes such issue or assumption. The Commission shall make such order only if it finds that such issue or assumption: (a) is for some lawful object within its corporate purposes, and compatible with the public interest, which is necessary or appropriate for or consistent with the proper performance by the carrier of service to the public as a common carrier, and which will not impair its ability to perform that service, and (b) is reasonably necessary and appropriate for such purpose. . . . “(6) Upon receipt of any such application for authority the Commission shall cause notice thereof to be given to and a copy filed with the governor of each State in which the applicant carrier operates. The railroad commissions, public service or utilities commissions, or other appropriate State authorities of the State shall have the right to make before the Commission such representations as they may deem just and proper for preserving and' conserving the rights and interests of their people and the States, respectively, involved in such proceedings. The Commission may hold hearings, if it sees fit, to enable it to determine its decision upon the application for authority. “(7) The jurisdiction conferred upon the Commission by this section shall be exclusive and plenary, and a carrier may issue securities and assume obligations or liabilities in accordance with the provisions of this section without securing approval other than as specified herein. . . For text of § 5 (11) see note 1. For text of § 20a (7) see note 15. In an early case (Pittsburgh & W. Va. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 54 App. D. C. 34, 293 F. 1001, appeal dismissed 266 U. S. 640) in which the constitutionality of § 20a had been upheld, the Court said: “If ‘a fair return on capital devoted to the transportation service’ [New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, 189] was to be insured the railway companies, and at the same time proper service and equitable rates accorded the public, the supervision of the issuance of stock, the incurring of bonded indebtedness, the extension and consolidation of railway lines, becomes of the utmost importance. Without this power to supervise the issue of stock and bonds, and thus limit the dividend and interest obligations of the carriers, as well as the expenditures in extensions and improvements, the fixing of adequate rates to insure a just return to the carrier, and at the same time equitable protection to the public, would be impossible. . . .”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. INTERNATIONAL MINERALS & CHEMICAL CORP. No. 557. Argued April 26, 1971 Decided June 1, 1971 Douglas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Black, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which HarlaN and Bren-NAN, JJ., joined, post, p. 565. John F. Dienelt argued the cause for the United States pro hac vice. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wilson, and Beatrice Rosenberg. Harold E. Spencer argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Charles J. McCarthy. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The information charged that appellee shipped sulfuric acid and hydrofluosilicic acid in interstate commerce and “did knowingly fail to show on the shipping papers the required classification of said property, to wit, Corrosive Liquid, in violation of 49 C. P. R. 173.427.” Title 18 U. S. C. § 834 (a) gives the Interstate Commerce Commission power to “formulate regulations for the safe transportation” of “corrosive liquids” and 18 U. S. C. § 834 (f) states that whoever “knowingly violates any such regulation” shall be fined or imprisoned. Pursuant to the power granted by § 834 (a) the regulatory agency promulgated the regulation already cited which reads in part: “Each shipper offering for transportation any hazardous material subject to the regulations in this chapter, shall describe that article on the shipping paper by the shipping name prescribed in § 172.5 of this chapter and by the classification prescribed in § 172.4 of this chapter, and may add a further description not inconsistent therewith. Abbreviations must not be used.” 49 CFR § 173.427. The District Court, relying primarily on Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S, 337, ruled that the information did not charge a “knowing violation” of the regulation and accordingly dismissed the information. The United States filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, 18 U. S. C. § 3731, and in reliance on that section later moved to certify the case to this Court which the Court of Appeals did; and we noted probable jurisdiction, 400 U. S. 990. Here as in United States v. Freed, 401 U. S. 601, which dealt with the possession of hand grenades, strict or absolute liability is not imposed; knowledge of the shipment of the dangerous materials is required. The sole and narrow question is whether “knowledge” of the regulation is also required. It is in that narrow zone that the issue of “mens rea” is raised; and appellee bears down hard on the provision in 18 U. S. C. § 834 (f) that whoever “knowingly violates any such regulation” shall be fined, etc. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, supra, on which the District Court relied, is not dispositive of the issue. It involved a regulation governing transporting explosives, inflammable liquids, and the like and required drivers to “avoid, so far as practicable, and, where feasible, by prearrangement of routes, driving into or through congested thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled, street car tracks, tunnels, viaducts, and dangerous crossings.” The statute punished whoever “knowingly” violated the regulation. Id., at 339. The issue of “mens rea” was not raised below, the sole question turning on whether the standard of guilt was unconstitutionally vague. Id., at 340. In holding the statute was not void for vagueness we said: “The statute punishes only those who knowingly violate the Regulation. This requirement of the presence of culpable intent as a necessary element of the offense does much to destroy any force in the argument that application of the Regulation would be so unfair that it must be held invalid. That is evident from a consideration of the effect of the requirement in this case. To sustain a conviction, the Government not only must prove that petitioner could have taken another route which was both commercially practicable and appreciably safer (in its avoidance of crowded thoroughfares, etc.) than the one it did follow. It must also be shown that petitioner knew that there was such a practicable, safer route and yet deliberately took the more dangerous route through the tunnel, or that petitioner willfully neglected to exercise its duty under the Regulation to inquire into the availability of such an alternative route. “In an effort to give point to its argument, petitioner asserts that there was no practicable route its trucks might have followed which did not pass through places they were required to avoid. If it is true that in the congestion surrounding the lower Hudson there was no practicable way of crossing the River which would have avoided such points of danger to a substantially greater extent than the route taken, then petitioner has not violated the Regulation. But that is plainly a matter for proof at the trial. We are not so conversant with all the routes in that area that we may, with no facts in the record before us, assume the allegations of the indictment to be false. We will not thus distort the judicial notice concept to strike down a regulation adopted only after much consultation with those affected and penalizing only those who knowingly violate its prohibition.” Id., at 342-343. The “mens rea” that emerged in the foregoing discussion was not knowledge of the regulation but knowledge of the safer routes and those that were less safe within the meaning of the regulation. Mr. Justice Jackson, writing in dissent for himself, Mr. Justice Black, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, correctly said: “I do not suppose the Court intends to suggest that if petitioner knew nothing of the existence of such a regulation its ignorance would constitute a defense.” 342 U. S., at 345. There is no issue in the present case of the propriety of the delegation of the power to establish regulations and of the validity of the regulation at issue. We therefore see no reason why the word “regulations” should not be construed as a shorthand designation for specific acts or omissions which violate the Act. The Act, so viewed, does not signal an exception to the rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse and is wholly consistent with the legislative history. The failure to change the language in § 834 in 1960 should not lead to a contrary conclusion. The Senate approved an amendment deleting “knowingly” and substituting therefor the language “being aware that the Interstate Commerce Commission has formulated regulations for the safe transportation of explosives and other dangerous articles.” But the House refused to agree. As the House Committee stated, its version would “retain the present law by providing that a person must ‘knowingly’ violate the regulations.” The House Committee noted there was a “judicial pronouncement as to the standards of conduct that make a violation a ‘knowing’ violation.” In St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. United States, 220 F. 2d 393, 397, Chief Judge Magruder had concluded that knowledge of the regulations was necessary. But whether the House Committee was referring to Boyce Motor Lines or the opinion of Chief Judge Magruder is not clear since both views of the section were before Congress. It is clear that strict liability was not intended. The Senate Committee felt it would be too stringent and thus rejected the position of the Interstate Commerce Commission. But despite protestations of avoiding strict liability the Senate version was very likely to result in strict liability because knowledge of the facts would have been unnecessary and anyone involved in the business of shipping dangerous materials would very likely know of the regulations involved. Thus in rejecting the Senate version the House was rejecting strict liability. But it is too much to conclude that in rejecting strict liability the House was also carving out an exception to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse. The principle that ignorance of the law is no defense applies whether the law be a statute or a duly promulgated and published regulation. In the context of these proposed 1960 amendments we decline to attribute to Congress the inaccurate view that that Act requires proof of knowledge of the law, as well as the facts, and that it intended to endorse that interpretation by retaining the word “knowingly.” We conclude that the meager legislative history of the 1960 amendments makes unwarranted the conclusion that Congress abandoned the' general rule and required knowledge of both the facts and the pertinent law before a criminal conviction could be sustained under this Act. So far as possession, say, of sulfuric acid is concerned the requirement of “mens rea” has been made a requirement of the Act as evidenced by the use of the word “knowingly.” A person thinking in good faith that he was shipping distilled water when in fact he was shipping some dangerous acid would not be covered. As stated in Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 250: “The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.” There is leeway for the exercise of congressional discretion in applying the reach of “mens rea.” United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250. United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, closely confined the word “willfully” in the income tax law to include a purpose to bring about the forbidden result: “He whose conduct is defined as criminal is one who ‘willfully’ fails to pay the tax, to make a return, to keep the required records, or to supply the needed information. Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a return, or as to the adequacy of the records he maintained, should become a criminal by his mere failure to measure up to the prescribed standard of conduct. And the requirement that the omission in these instances, must be willful, to be criminal, is persuasive that the same element is essential to the offense of failing to supply information.” Id., at 396. In Balint the Court was dealing with drugs, in Freed with hand grenades, in this case with sulfuric and other dangerous acids. Pencils, dental floss, paper clips may also be regulated. But they may be the type of products which might raise substantial due process questions if Congress did not require, as in Murdock, “mens rea” as to each ingredient of the offense. But where, as here and as in Balint and Freedl, dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation. Reversed. The regulatory authority originally granted the Interstate Commerce Commission was transferred to the Department of Transportation by 80 Stat. 939, 49 U. S. C. § 1655 (e) (1964 ed., Supp. V). See H. R. Rep. No. 1975, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11. Id., at 2. Ibid. See the HEW Staff Memorandum, id., at 16-19. S. Rep. No. 901, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 3. The Senate language might “well create an almost absolute liability for violation.” H. R. Rep. No. 1975, supra, at 2.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RUST et al. v. SULLIVAN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES No. 89-1391. Argued October 30, 1990 Decided May 23, 1991 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, in Parts II and III of which Stevens, J., joined, and in Part I of which O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 203. SteveNS, J., post, p. 220, and O’Connor, J., post, p. 223, filed dissenting opinions. Laurence H. Tribe argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs for petitioners in No. 89-1391 were Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rachael N. Pine, Janet Ben-shoof, Lynn Paltrow, Kathryn Kolbert, Steven R. Shapiro, Norman Siegel, Arthur Eisenberg, Roger K. Evans, Laurie R. Rockett, and Peter J. Rubin. Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, O. Peter Sherwood, Solicitor General, Suzanne M. Lynn and Sanford M. Cohen, Assistant Attorneys General, Victor A. Kovner, Leonard J. Koerner, Lorna Bade Goodman, Gail Rubin, and Hillary Weisman filed briefs for petitioners in No. 89-1392. Solicitor General Starr argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in both cases. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, Jeffrey P. Minear, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, Lowell V. Sturgill, Jr., and Joel Mangel. Together with No. 89-1392, New York et al. v. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services, also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. by David D. Cole, James M. Shannon, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Ruth A. Bourquin, Assistant Attorney General; for Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General of Ohio, et al. by Mr. Celebrezze, pro se, Suzanne E. Mohr and Jack W. Decker, Assistant Attorneys General, and Rita S. Eppler, Douglas B. Baily, Attorney General of Alaska, John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, Clarine Nardi Riddle, Attorney General of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, Herbert O. Reid, Sr., Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia, James E. Tierney, Attorney General of Maine, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Robert M. Spire, Attorney General of Nebraska, Robert J. Del Tufo, Attorney General of New Jersey, Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon, Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas, Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont, and Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General of Virginia; for the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al. by Carter G. Phillips, Ann E. Allen, Kirk B. Johnson, Laurie R. Rockett, Joel I. Klein, and Jack R. Bierig; for the American Library Association et al. by Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., and David W. Ogden; for the American Public Health Association et al. by Larry M. Lavinsky, Charles S. Sims, Michele M. Ovesey, and Nadine Taub; for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York by Conrad K. Harper, Janice Goodman, and Diane S. Wilner; for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al. by Julius LeVonne Chambers and Charles Stephen Ralston; for the National Association of Women Lawyers et al. by James F. Fitzpatrick, L. Hope O'Keeffe, and Walter Dellinger; for the Planned Parenthood Federation of America et al. by Dara Klassel, Eve W. Paid, and Barbara E. Often; for Twenty-Two Biomedical Ethicists by Michael E. Fine and Douglas W. Smith; and for Representative Patricia Schroeder et al. by David M. Becker. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Academy of Medical Ethics by Carolyn B. Knhl; for the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons by Clarke D. Forsythe and Kent Masterson Broivn; for Feminists for Life of America et al. by Edward R. Grant; for the Knights of Columbus by Carl A. Anderson; for The Rutherford Institute et al. by Wm. Charles Bundren, John W. Whitehead, A. Eric Johnston, David E. Morris, Stephen E. Hurst, Joseph P. Secóla, Thomas S. Neuberger, J. Brian Heller, Thomas W. Strahan, William Bonner, Larry Crain, and James Knicely; for the United States Catholic Conference by Mark E. Chopko and Phillip H. Harris; and for Senator Gordon J. Humphrey et al. by James Bopp, Jr., and Richard E. Coleson. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Life League, Inc., et al. by Robert L. Sassone; for Catholics United for Life et al. by Thomas Patrick Monaghan, Jay Alan Seknloiv, Walter M. Weber, Thomas A. Glessner, Charles E. Rice, and Michael J. Laird; for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by John H. Hall, Sarah E. Bums, and Alison Wetherfield; and for the National Right to Life Committee Inc. et al. by James Bopp, Jr., and Richard E. Coleson. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases concern a facial challenge to Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations which limit the ability of Title X fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the regulations, finding them to be a permissible construction of the statute as well as consistent with the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. We granted certiorari to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals. We affirm. I A In 1970, Congress enacted Title X of the Public Health Service Act (Act), 84 Stat. 1506, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§300 to 300a-6, which provides federal funding for family-planning services. The Act authorizes the Secretary to “make grants to and enter into contracts with public or nonprofit private entities to assist in the establishment and operation of voluntary family planning projects which shall offer a broad range of acceptable and effective family planning methods and services.” § 300(a). Grants and contracts under Title X must “be made in accordance with such regulations as the Secretary may promulgate.” §300a-4(a). Section 1008 of the Act, however, provides that “[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning.” 42 U. S. C. § 300a-6. That restriction was intended to ensure that Title X funds would “be used only to support preventive family planning services, population research, infertility services, and other related medical, informational, and educational activities.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1667, p. 8 (1970). In 1988, the Secretary promulgated new regulations designed to provide “ ‘clear and operational guidance’ to grantees about how to preserve the distinction between Title X programs and abortion as a method of family planning.” 53 Fed. Reg. 2923-2924 (1988). The regulations clarify, through the definition of the term “family planning,” that Congress intended Title X funds “to be used only to support preventive family planning services.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1667, p. 8 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Title X services are limited to “preconeeptional counseling, education, and general reproductive health care,” and expressly exclude “pregnancy care (including obstetric or prenatal care).” 42 CFR §59.2 (1989). The regulations “focus the emphasis of the Title X program omits traditional mission: The provision of preventive family planning services specifically designed to enable individuals to determine the number and spacing of their children, while clarifying that pregnant women must be referred to appropriate prenatal care services.” 53 Fed. Reg. 2925 (1988). The regulations attach three principal conditions on the grant of federal funds for Title X projects. First, the regulations specify that a “Title X project may not provide counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning or provide referral for abortion as a method of family planning.” 42 CFR § 59.8(a)(1) (1989). Because Title X is limited to preconeeptional services, the program does not furnish services related to childbirth. Only in the context of a referral out of the Title X program is a pregnant woman given transitional information. § 59.8(a)(2). Title X projects must refer every pregnant client “for appropriate prenatal and/or social services by furnishing a list of available providers that promote the welfare of mother and unborn child.” Ibid. The list may not be used indirectly to encourage or promote abortion, “such as by weighing the list of referrals in favor of health care providers which perform abortions, by including on the list of referral providers health care providers whose principal business is the' provision of abortions, by excluding available providers who do not provide abortions, or by ‘steering’ clients to providers who offer abortion as a method of family planning.” § 59.8(a)(3). The Title X project is expressly prohibited from referring a pregnant woman to an abortion provider, even upon specific request. One permissible response to such an inquiry is that “the project does not consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for abortion. ” § 59.8(b)(5). Second, the regulations broadly prohibit a Title X project from engaging in activities that “encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a method of family planning.” §59.10(a). Forbidden activities include lobbying for legislation that would increase the availability of abortion as a method of family planning, developing or disseminating materials advocating abortion as a method of family planning, providing speakers to promote abortion as a method of family planning, using legal action to make abortion available in any way as a method of family planning, and paying dues to any group that advocates abortion as a method of family planning as a substantial part of its activities. Ibid. Third, the regulations require that Title X projects be organized so that they are “physically and financially separate” from prohibited abortion activities. §59.9. To be deemed physically and financially separate, “a Title X project must have an objective integrity and independence from prohibited activities. Mere bookkeeping separation of Title X funds from other-monies is not sufficient.” Ibid. The regulations provide a list of nonexclusive factors for the Secretary to consider in conducting a case-by-case determination of objective integrity and independence, such as the existence of separate accounting records and separate personnel, and the degree of physical separation of the project from facilities for prohibited activities. Ibid. B Petitioners are Title X grantees and doctors who supervise Title X funds suing on behalf of themselves and their patients. Respondent is the Secretary of HHS. After the regulations had been promulgated, but before they had been applied, petitioners filed two separate actions, later consolidated, challenging the facial validity of the regulations and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent implementation of the regulations. Petitioners challenged the regulations on the grounds that they were not authorized by Title X and that they violate the First and Fifth Amendment rights of Title X clients and the First Amendment rights of Title X health providers. After initially granting petitioners a preliminary injunction, the District Court rejected petitioners’ statutory and constitutional challenges to the regulations and granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary. New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261 (SDNY 1988). A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 889 F. 2d 401 (1989). Applying this Court’s decision in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984), the Court of Appeals determined that the regulations were a permissible construction of the statute that legitimately effectuated congressional intent. The court rejected as “highly strained,” petitioners’ contention that the plain language of § 1008 forbids Title X projects only from performing abortions. The court reasoned that “it would be wholly anomalous to read Section 1008 to mean that a program that merely counsels but does not perform abortions does not include abortion as a ‘method of family planning.’ ” 889 F. 2d, at 407. “[T]he natural construction of. . . the term ‘method of family planning’ includes counseling concerning abortion.” Ibid. The court found this construction consistent with the legislative history and observed that “[appellants’ contrary view of the legislative history is based entirely on highly generalized statements about the expansive scope of the family planning services” that “do not specifically mention counseling concerning abortion as an intended service of Title X projects” and that “surely cannot be read to trump a section of the statute that specifically excludes it.” Id., at 407-408. Turning to petitioners’ constitutional challenges to the regulations, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners’ Fifth Amendment challenge. It held that the regulations do not impermissibly burden a woman’s right to an abortion because the “government may validly choose to favor childbirth over abortion and to implement that choice by funding medical services relating to childbirth but not those relating to abortion.” Id., at 410. Finding that the prohibition on the performance of abortions upheld by the Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S. 490 (1989), was “substantially greater in impact than the regulations challenged in the instant matter,” 889 F. 2d, at 411, the court concluded that the regulations “create[d] no affirmative legal barriers to access to abortion.” Ibid., citing Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. The court likewise found that the “Secretary’s implementation of Congress’s decision not to fund abortion counseling, referral or advocacy also does not, under applicable Supreme Court precedent, constitute a facial violation of the First Amendment rights of health care providers or of women.” 889 F. 2d, at 412. The court explained that under Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540 (1983), the Government has no obligation to subsidize even the exercise of fundamental rights, including “speech rights.” The court also held that the regulations do not violate the First Amendment by “condition[ing] receipt of a benefit on the relinquishment of constitutional rights" because Title X grantees and their employees "remain free to say whatever they wish about abortion outside the Title X project." 889 F. 2d, at 412. Finally, the court rejected petitioners' contention that the regulations "facially discriminate on the basis of the viewpoint of the speech involved." Id., at 414. II We begin by pointing out the posture of the cases before us. Petitioners are challenging the facial validity of the regulations. Thus, we are concerned only with the question whether, on their face, the regulations are both authorized by the Act and can be construed in such a manner that they can be applied to a set of individuals without infringing upon constitutionally protected rights. Petitioners face a heavy burden in seeking to have the regulations invalidated as facially unconstitutional. "A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. The fact that [the regulations] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render [them] wholly invalid." United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987). We turn first to petitioners' contention that the regulations exceed the Secretary's authority under Title X and are arbitrary and capricious. We begin with an examination of the regulations concerning abortion counseling, referral, and advocacy, which every Court of Appeals has found to be authorized by the statute, and then turn to the "program integrity requirement," with respect to which the courts below have adopted conflicting positions. We then address petitioners' claim that the regulations must be struck down because they raise a substantial constitutional question. A We need not dwell on the plain language of the statute because we agree with every court to have addressed the issue that the language is ambiguous. The language of § 1008— that “[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning” — does not speak directly to the issues of counseling, referral, advocacy, or program integrity. If a statute is “silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U. S., at 842-843. The Secretary’s construction of Title X may not be disturbed as an abuse of discretion if it reflects a plausible construction of the plain language of the statute and does not otherwise conflict with Congress’ expressed intent. Ibid. In determining whether a construction is permissible, “[t]he court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted ... or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.” Id., at 843, n. 11. Rather, substantial deference is accorded to the interpretation of the authorizing statute by the agency authorized with administering it. Id., at 844. The broad language of Title X plainly allows the Secretary’s construction of the statute. By its own terms, § 1008 prohibits the use of Title X funds “in programs where abortion is a method of family planning.” Title X does not define the term “method of family planning,” nor does it enumerate what types of medical and counseling services are entitled to Title X funding. Based on the broad directives provided by Congress in Title X in general and § 1008 in particular, we are unable to say that the Secretary’s construction of the prohibition in § 1008 to require a ban on counseling, referral, and advocacy within the Title X project is impermissible. The District Courts and Courts of Appeals that have examined the legislative history have all found, at least with regard to the Act’s counseling, referral, and advocacy provisions, that the legislative history is ambiguous with respect to Congress’ intent in enacting Title X and the prohibition of § 1008. Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 899 F. 2d 53, 62 (CA1 1990) (“Congress has not addressed specifically the question of the scope of the abortion prohibition. The language of the statute and the legislative history can support either of the litigants’ positions”); Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Sullivan, 913 F. 2d 1492, 1497 (CA10 1990) (“[T]he contemporaneous legislative history does not address whether clinics receiving Title X funds can engage in nondirective counseling including the abortion option and referrals”); 889 F. 2d, at 407 (case below) (“Nothing in the legislative history of Title X detracts” from the Secretary’s construction of § 1008). We join these courts in holding that the legislative history is ambiguous and fails to shed light on relevant congressional intent. At no time did Congress directly address the issues of abortion counseling, referral, or advocacy. The parties’ attempts to characterize highly generalized, conflicting statements in the legislative history into accurate revelations of congressional intent are unavailing. When we find, as we do here, that the legislative history is ambiguous and unenlightening on the matters with respect to which the regulations deal, we customarily defer to the expertise of the agency. Petitioners argue, however, that the regulations are entitled to little or no deference because they “reverse a longstanding agency policy that permitted nondi-rective counseling and referral for abortion,” Brief for Petitioners in No. 89-1392, p. 20, and thus represent a sharp break from the Secretary’s prior construction of the statute. Petitioners argue that the agency’s prior consistent interpretation of §1008 to permit nondirective counseling and to encourage coordination with local and state family planning services is entitled to substantial weight. This Court has rejected the argument that an agency’s interpretation “is not entitled to deference because it represents a sharp break with prior interpretations” of the statute in question. Chevron, 467 U. S., at 862. In Chevron, we held that a revised interpretation deserves deference because “[a]n initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone” and “the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.” Id., at 863-864. An agency is not required to “‘establish rules of conduct to last forever,”’ Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 42 (1983), quoting American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U. S. 397, 416 (1967); NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U. S. 775 (1990), but rather “must be given ample latitude to ‘adapt [its] rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances.’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs., supra, at 42, quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 784 (1968). We find that the Secretary amply justified his change of interpretation with a “reasoned analysis.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs., supra, at 42. The Secretary explained that the regulations are a result of his determination, in the wake of the critical reports of the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), that prior policy failed to implement properly the statute and that it was necessary to provide “ ‘clear and operational guidance’ to grantees about how to preserve the distinction between Title X programs and abortion as a method of family planning. ” 53 Fed. Reg. 2923-2924 (1988). He also determined that the new regulations are more in keeping with the original intent of the statute, are justified by client experience under the prior policy, and are supported by a shift in attitude against the “elimination of unborn children by abortion.” We believe that these justifications are sufficient to support the Secretary’s revised approach. Having concluded that the plain language and legislative history are ambiguous as to Congress’ intent in enacting Title X, we must defer to the Secretary’s permissible construction of the statute. B We turn next to the “program integrity” requirements embodied at § 59.9 of the regulations, mandating separate facilities, personnel, and records. These requirements are not inconsistent with the plain language of Title X. Petitioners contend, however, that they are based on an impermissible construction of the statute because they frustrate the clearly expressed intent of Congress that Title X programs be an integral part of a broader, comprehensive, health-care system-. They argue that this integration is impermissibly burdened because the efficient use of non-Title-X funds by Title X grantees will be adversely affected by the regulations. The Secretary defends the separation requirements of §59.9 on the grounds that they are necessary to assure that Title X grantees apply federal funds only to federally authorized purposes and that grantees avoid creating the appearance that the Government is supporting abortion-related activities. The program integrity regulations were promulgated in direct response to the observations in the GAO and OIG reports that “[b]ecause the distinction between the recipients’ title X and other activities may not be easily recognized, the public can get the impression that Federal funds are being improperly used for abortion activities.” App. 85. The Secretary concluded: “[MJeeting the requirement of section 1008 mandates that Title X programs be organized so that they are physically and financially separate from other activities which are prohibited from inclusion in a Title X program. Having a program that is separate from such activities is a necessary predicate to any determination that abortion is not being included as a method of family planning in the Title X program.” 53 Fed. Reg. 2940 (1988). The Secretary further argues that the separation requirements do not represent a deviation from past policy because the agency has consistently taken the position that § 1008 requires some degree of physical and financial separation between Title X projects and abortion-related activities. We agree that the program integrity requirements are based on a permissible construction of the statute and are not inconsistent with congressional intent. As noted, the legislative history is clear about very little, and program integrity is no exception. The statements relied upon by petitioners to infer such an intent are highly generalized and do not directly address the scope of § 1008. For example, the Cornerstone of the conclusion that in Title X Congress intended a comprehensive, integrated system of family planning services is the statement in the statute requiring state health authorities applying for Title X funds to submit “a State plan for a coordinated and comprehensive program of family planning services.” § 1002. This statement is, on its face, ambiguous as to Congress’ intent in enacting Title X and the prohibition of § 1008. Placed in context, the statement merely requires that a state health authority submit a plan for a “coordinated and comprehensive program of family planning services” in order to be eligible for Title X funds. By its own terms, the language evinces Congress’ intent to place a duty on state entities seeking federal funds; it does not speak either to an overall view of family planning services or to the Secretary’s responsibility for implementing the statute. Likewise, the statement in the original House Report on Title X that the Act was “not intended to interfere with or limit programs conducted in accordance with State or local laws” and supported through non-Title X funds is equally unclear. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1667, pp. 8-9 (1970). This language directly follows the statement that it is the “intent of both Houses that the funds authorized under this legislation be used only to support preventive family planning services .... The conferees have adopted the language contained in section 1008, which prohibits the use of such funds for abortion, in order to make this intent clear.” Id., at 8. When placed in context and read in light of the express prohibition of § 1008, the statements fall short of evidencing a congressional intent that would render the Secretary’s interpretation of the statute impermissible. While petitioners’ interpretation of the legislative history may be a permissible one, it is by no means the only one, and it is certainly not the one found by the Secretary. It is well established that legislative history which does not demonstrate a clear and certain congressional intent cannot form the basis for enjoining regulations. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U. S., at 42. The Secretary based the need for the separation requirements “squarely on the congressional intent that abortion not be a part of a Title X funded program.” • 52 Fed. Reg. 33212 (1987). Indeed, if one thing is clear from the legislative history, it is that Congress intended that Title X funds be kept separate and distinct from abortion-related activities. It is undisputed that Title X was intended to provide primarily prepregnancy preventive services. Certainly the Secretary’s interpretation of the statute that separate facilities are necessary, especially in light of the express prohibition of § 1008, cannot be judged unreasonable. Accordingly, we defer to the Secretary’s reasoned determination that the program integrity requirements are necessary to implement the prohibition. Petitioners also contend that the regulations must be invalidated because they raise serious questions of constitutional law. They rely on Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568 (1988), and NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490 (1979), which hold that “an Act of Congress ought not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible construction remains available.” Id., at 500. Under this canon of statutory construction, “‘[t]he elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.’” DeBartolo Corp., supra, at 575 (emphasis added), quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 657 (1895). The principle enunciated in Hooper v. California, supra, and subsequent cases, is a categorical one: “as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act.” Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927) (opinion of Holmes, J.). This principle is based at least in part on the fact that a decision to declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional “is the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform.” Ibid. Following Hooper, supra, cases such as United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 408 (1909), and United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394, 401 (1916), developed the corollary doctrine that “[a] statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score.” This canon is followed out of respect for Congress, which we assume legislates in the light of constitutional limitations. FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298, 306-307 (1924). It is qualified by the proposition that “avoidance of a difficulty will not be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion.” George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 379 (1933). Here Congress forbade the use of appropriated funds in programs where abortion is a method of family planning. It authorized the Secretary to promulgate regulations implementing this provision. The extensive litigation regarding governmental restrictions on abortion since our decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), suggests that it was likely that any set of regulations promulgated by the Secretary— other than the ones in force prior to 1988 and found by him to be relatively toothless and ineffectual — would be challenged on constitutional grounds. While we do not think that the constitutional arguments made by petitioners in these cases are without some force, in Part III, infra, we hold that they do not carry the day. Applying the canon of construction under discussion as best we can, we hold that the regulations promulgated by the Secretary do not raise the sort of “grave and doubtful constitutional questions,” Delaware & Hudson Co., supra, at 408, that would lead us to assume Congress did not intend to authorize their issuance. Therefore, we need not invalidate the regulations in order to save the statute from unconstitutionality. I-H HH I — Í Petitioners contend that the regulations violate the First Amendment by impermissibly discriminating based on viewpoint because they prohibit “all discussion about abortion as a lawful option — including counseling, referral, and the provision of neutral and accurate information about ending a pregnancy — while compelling the clinic or counselor to provide information that promotes continuing a pregnancy to term.” Brief for Petitioners in No. 89-1391, p. 11. They assert that the regulations violate the “free speech rights of private health care organizations that receive Title X funds, of their staff, and of thpir patients” by impermissibly imposing “viewpoint-discriminatory conditions on government subsidies” and thus “penaliz[e] speech funded with non-Title X monies.” Id., at 13, 14, 24. Because “Title X continues to fund speech ancillary to pregnancy testing in a manner that is not evenhanded with respect to views and information about abortion, it invidiously discriminates on the basis of viewpoint.” Id., at 18. Relying on Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540 (1983), and Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221, 234 (1987), petitioners also assert that while the Government may place certain conditions on the receipt of federal subsidies, it may not “discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to ‘ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’” Regan, supra, at 548 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S. 498, 513 (1959)). There is no question but that the statutory prohibition contained in §1008 is constitutional. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464 (1977), we upheld a state welfare regulation under which Medicaid recipients received payments for services related to childbirth, but not for nontherapeutic abortions. The Court rejected the claim that this unequal subsidization worked a violation of the Constitution. We held that the government may “make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement that judgment by the alio-cation of public funds.” Id,., at 474. Here the Government is exercising the authority it possesses under Maher and Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297 (1980), to subsidize family planning services which will lead to conception and childbirth, and declining to “promote or encourage abortion.” The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other. “[A] legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right.” Regan, supra, at 549. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976); Cammarano v. United States, supra. “A refusal to fund protected activity, without more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a ‘penalty’ on that activity.” McRae, supra, at 317, n. 19. “There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy.” Maher, supra, at 475. The challenged regulations implement the statutory prohibition by prohibiting counseling, referral, and the provision of information regarding abortion as a method of family planning. They are designed to ensure that the limits of the federal program are observed. The Title X program is designed not for prenatal care, but to encourage family planning. A doctor who wished to offer prenatal care to a project patient who became pregnant could properly be prohibited from doing so because such service is outside the scope of the federally funded program. The regulations prohibiting abortion counseling and referral are of the same ilk; “no funds appropriated for the project may be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning,” and a doctor employed by the project may be prohibited in the course of his project duties from counseling abortion or referring for abortion. This is not a case of the Government “suppressing a dangerous idea,” but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its employees from engaging in activities outside of the project’s scope. To hold that the Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to advance certain permissible goals, because the program in advancing those goals necessarily discourages alternative goals, would render numerous Government programs constitutionally suspect. When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles, 22 U. S. C. § 4411(b), it was not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as communism and fascism. Petitioners’ assertions ultimately boil down to the position that if the Government chooses to subsidize one protected right, it must subsidize analogous counterpart rights. But the Court has soundly rejected that proposition. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., supra; Maher v. Roe, supra; Harris v. McRae, supra. Within far broader limits than petitioners are willing to concede, when the Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that program. We believe that petitioners’ reliance upon our decision in Arkansas Writers’ Project, supra, is misplaced. That case involved a state sales tax which discriminated between magazines on the basis of their content. Relying on this fact, and on the fact that the tax “targets a small group within the press,” contrary to our decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U. S. 575 (1983), the Court held the tax invalid. But we have here not the case of a general law singling out a disfavored group on the basis of speech content, but a case of the Government refusing to fund activities, including speech, which are specifically excluded from the scope of the project funded. Petitioners rely heavily on their claim that the regulations would not, in the circumstance of a medical emergency, permit a Title X project to refer a woman whose pregnancy places her life in imminent peril to a provider of abortions or abortion-related services. These cases, of course, involve only a facial challenge to the regulations, and we do not have before us any application by the Secretary to a specific fact situation. On their face, we do not read the regulations to bar abortion referral or counseling in such circumstances. Abortion counseling as a “method of family planning” is prohibited, and it does not seem that a medically necessitated abortion in such circumstances would be the equivalent of its use as a “method of family planning.” Neither § 1008 nor the specific restrictions of the regulations would apply. Moreover, the regulations themselves contemplate that a Title X project would be permitted to engage in otherwise-prohibited, abortion-related activity in such circumstances. Section 59.8(a)(2) provides a specific exemption for emergency care and requires Title X recipients “to refer the client immediately to an appropriate provider of emergency medical services.” 42 CFR § 59.8(a)(2) (1989). Section 59.5(b)(1) also requires Title X projects to provide “necessary referral to other medical facilities when medically indicated.” Petitioners also contend that the restrictions on the subsidization of abortion-related speech contained in the regulations are impermissiblé because they condition the receipt of a benefit, in these cases Title X funding, on the relinquishment of a constitutional right, the right to engage in abortion advocacy and counseling. Relying on Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597 (1972), and FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U. S. 364 (1984), petitioners argue that “even though the government may deny [a] . . . benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests — especially, his interest in freedom of speech.” Perry, supra, at 597. Petitioners’ reliance on these cases is unavailing, however, because here the Government is not denying a benefit to anyone, but is instead simply insisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized. The Secretary’s regulations do not force the Title X grantee to give up abortion-related speech; they merely require that the grantee keep such activities separate and distinct from Title X activities. Title X expressly distinguishes between a Title X grantee and a Title X project. The grantee, which normally is a health-care organization, may receive funds from a variety of sources for a variety of purposes. Brief for Petitioners in No. 89-1391, pp. 3, n. 5, 13. The grantee receives Title X funds, however, for the specific and limited purpose of establishing and operating a Title X project. 42 U. S. C. § 300(a). The regulations govern the scope of the Title X project’s activities, and leave the grantee unfettered in its other activities. The Title X grantee can continue to perform abortions, provide abortion-related services, and engage in abortion advocacy; it simply is required to conduct those activities through programs that are separate and independent from the project that receives Title X funds. 42 CFR §59.9 (1989). In contrast, our “unconstitutional conditions” cases involve situations in which the Government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program. In FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., we invalidated a federal law providing that noncommercial television and radio stations that receive federal grants may not “engage in editorializing.” Under that law, a recipient of federal funds was “barred absolutely from all editorializing” because it “is not able to segregate its activities according to the source of its funding” and thus “has no way of limiting the use of its federal funds to all noneditorializing activities.” The effect of the law was that “a noncommercial educational station that receives only 1% of its overall income from [federal] grants is barred absolutely from all editorializing” and “barred from using even wholly private funds to finance its editorial activity.” 468 U. S., at 400. We expressly recognized, however, that were Congress to permit the recipient stations to “establish ‘affiliate’ organizations which could then use the station’s facilities to editorialize with nonfederal funds, such a statutory mechanism would plainly be valid.” Ibid. Such a scheme would permit the station “to make known its views on matters of public importance through its nonfederally funded, editorializing affiliate without losing federal grants for its non-editorializing broadcast activities. ” Ibid. Similarly, in Regan we held that Congress could, in the exercise of its spending power, reasonably refuse to subsidize the lobbying activities of tax-exempt charitable organizations by prohibiting such organizations from using tax-deductible contributions to support their lobbying efforts. In so holding, we explained that such organizations remained free “to receive deductible contributions to support . . . nonlobby-ing activities].” 461 U. S., at 546. Thus, a charitable organization could create, under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 501(c)(3), an affiliate to conduct its nonlobbying activities using tax-deductible contributions, and at the same time establish, under §501 (c)(4), a separate affiliate to pursue itsvlobbying efforts without such contributions. 461 U. S., at 544. Given that alternative, the Court concluded that “Congress has not infringed any First Amendment rights or regulated any First Amendment activity[; it] has simply chosen not to pay for [appel-lee’s] lobbying.” Id., at 546. We also noted that appellee “would, of course, have to ensure that the § 501(c)(3) organization did not subsidize the § 501(c)(4) organization; otherwise, public funds might be spent on an activity Congress chose not to subsidize.” Id., at 544. The condition that federal funds will be used only to further the purposes of a grant does not violate constitutional rights. “Congress could, for example, grant funds to an organization dedicated to combating teenage drug abuse, but condition the grant by providing that none of the money received from Congress should be used to lobby state legislatures.” See id., at 548. By requiring that the Title X grantee engage in abortion-related activity separately from activity receiving federal funding, Congress has, consistent with our teachings in League of Women Voters and Regan, not denied it the right to engage in abortion-related activities. Congress has merely refused to fund such activities out of the public fisc, and the Secretary has simply required a certain degree of separation from the Title X project in order to ensure the integrity of the federally funded program. The same principles apply to petitioners’ claim that the regulations abridge the free speech rights of the grantee’s staff. Individuals who are voluntarily employed for a Title X project must perform their duties in accordance with the regulation’s restrictions on abortion counseling and referral. The employees remain free, however, to pursue abortion-related activities when they are not acting under the auspices of the Title X project. The regulations, which govern solely the scope of the Title X project’s activities, do not in any way restrict the activities of those persons acting as private individuals. The employees’ freedom of expression is limited during the time that they actually work for the project; but this limitation is a consequence of their decision to accept employment in a project, the scope of which is permissibly restricted by the funding authority. This is not to suggest that funding by the Government, even when coupled with the freedom of the fund recipients to speak outside the scope of the Government-funded project, is invariably sufficient to justify Government control over the content of expression. For example, this Court has recognized that the existence of a Government “subsidy,” in the form of Government-owned property, does not justify the restriction of speech in areas that have “been traditionally open to the public for expressive activity,” United States v. Kokinda, 497 U. S. 720, 726 (1990); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.), or have been “expressly dedicated to speech activity.” Kokinda, supra, at 726; Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983). Similarly, we have recognized that the university is a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the Government’s ability to control speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, State Univ. of N. Y., 385 U. S. 589, 603, 605-606 (1967). It could be argued by analogy that traditional relationships such as that between doctor and patient should enjoy protection under the First Amendment from Government regulation, even when subsidized by the Government. We need not resolve that question here, however, because the Title X program regulations do not significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient relationship. Nothing in them requires a doctor to represent as his own any opinion that he does not in fact hold. Nor is the doctor-patient relationship established by the Title X program sufficiently all encompassing so as to justify an expectation on the part of the patient of comprehensive medical advice. The program does not provide postconception medical care, and therefore a doctor’s silence with regard to abortion cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the doctor does not consider abortion an appropriate option for her. The doctor is always free to make clear that advice regarding abortion is simply beyond the scope of the program. In these circumstances, the general rule that the Government may choose not to subsidize speech applies with full force. I — H <1 We turn now to petitioners’ argument that the regulations violate a woman’s Fifth Amendment right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy. We recently reaffirmed the long-recognized principle that “'the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.’ ” Webster, 492 U. S., at 507, quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U. S. 189, 196 (1989). The Government has no constitutional duty to subsidize an activity merely because the activity is constitutionally protected and may validly choose to fund childbirth over abortion and “'implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds’ ” for medical services relating to childbirth but not to those relating to abortion. Webster, supra, at 510 (citation omitted). The Government has no affirmative duty to “commit any resources to facilitating abortions,” Webster, 492 U. S., at 511, and its decision to fund childbirth but not abortion “places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but rather, by means of unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical services, encourages alternative activity deemed in the public interest.” McRae, 448 U. S., at 315. That the regulations do not impermissibly burden a woman’s Fifth Amendment rights is evident from the line of cases beginning with Maher and McRae and culminating in our most recent decision in Webster. Just as Congress’ refusal to fund abortions in McRae left “an indigent woman with at least the same range of choice in deciding whether to obtain a medically necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all,” 448 U. S., at 317, and “Missouri’s refusal to allow public employees to perform abortions in public hospitals leaves a pregnant woman with the same choices as if the State had chosen not to operate any public hospitals,” Webster, supra, at 509, Congress’ refusal to fund abortion counseling and advocacy leaves a pregnant woman with the same choices as if the Government had chosen not to fund family-planning services at all. The difficulty that a woman encounters when a Title X project does not provide abortion counseling or referral leaves her in no different position than she would have been if the Government had not enacted Title X. In Webster, we stated that “[hjaving held that the State’s refusal [in Maher] to fund abortions does not violate Roe v. Wade, it strains logic to reach a contrary result for the use of public facilities and employees.” 492 U. S., at 509-510. It similarly would strain logic, in light of the more extreme restrictions in those cases, to find that the mere decision to exclude abortion-related services from a federally funded preconceptional family planning program is unconstitutional. Petitioners also argue that by impermissibly infringing on the doctor-patient relationship and depriving a Title X client of information concerning abortion as a method of family planning, the regulations violate a woman’s Fifth Amendment right to medical self-determination and to make informed medical decisions free of government-imposed harm. They argue that under our decisions in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747 (1986), the Government cannot interfere with a woman’s right to make an informed and voluntary choice by placing restrictions on the patient-doctor dialogue. In Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring all physicians to make specified statements to the patient prior to performing an abortion in order to ensure that the woman’s consent was “truly informed.” 462 U. S., at 423. Similarly, in Thornburgh, we struck down a state statute mandating that a list of agencies offering alternatives to abortion and a description of fetal development be provided to every woman considering terminating her pregnancy through an abortion. Critical to our decisions in Akron and Thornburgh to invalidate a governmental intrusion into the patient-doctor dialogue was the fact that the laws in both cases required all doctors within their respective jurisdictions to provide all pregnant patients contemplating an abortion a litany of information, regardless of whether the patient sought the information or whether the doctor thought the information necessary to the patient’s decision. Under the Secretary’s regulations, however, a doctor’s ability to provide, and a woman’s right to receive, information concerning abortion and abortion-related services outside the context of the Title X project remains unfettered. It would undoubtedly be easier for a woman seeking an abortion if she could receive information about abortion from a Title X project, but the Constitution does not require that the Government distort the scope of its mandated program in order to provide that information. Petitioners contend, however, that most Title X clients are effectively precluded by indigency and poverty from seeing a health-care provider who will provide abortion-related services. But oncé again, even these Title X clients are in no worse position than if Congress had never enacted Title X. “The financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman’s ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortion, but rather of her indigency.” McRae, supra, at 316. The Secretary’s regulations are a permissible construction of Title X and do not violate either the First or Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Both the First Circuit and the Tenth Circuit have invalidated the regulations, primarily on constitutional grounds. See Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 899 F. 2d 53 (CA1 1990); Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Sullivan, 913 F. 2d 1492 (CA10 1990). “Most clients of title X-sponsored clinics are not pregnant and generally receive only physical examinations, education on contraceptive methods, and services related to birth control.” General Accounting Office Report, App. 95. For instance, the Secretary relies on the following passage of the House Report as evidence that the regulations are consistent with legislative intent: “It is, and has been, the intent of both Houses that the funds authorized under this legislation be used only to support preventive family planning services, population research, infertility services, and other related medical, informational, and educational activities. The conferees have adopted the language contained in section 1008, which prohibits the use of such funds for abortion, in order to make this intent clear.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1667, p. 8 (1970). Petitioners, however, point to language in the statement of purpose in the House Report preceding the passage of Title X stressing the importance of supplying both family planning information and a full range of family planning information and of developing a comprehensive and coordinated program. Petitioners also rely on the Senate Report, which states: “The committee does not view family planning as merely a euphemism for birth control. It is properly a part of comprehensive health care and should consist of much more than the dispensation of contraceptive devices. ... [A] successful family planning program must contain . . . [m]edical services, including consultation examination, prescription, and continuing supervision, supplies, instruction, and referral to other medical services as needed.” S. Rep. No. 91-1004, p. 10 (1970). These directly conflicting statements of legislative intent demonstrate amply the inadequacies of the “traditional tools of statutory construction,” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 446-447 (1987), in resolving the issue before us. We also find that, on their face, the regulations are narrowly tailored to fit Congress’ intent in Title X that federal funds not be used to “promote or advocate” abortion as a “method of family planning.” The regulations are designed to ensure compliance with the prohibition of § 1008 that none of the funds appropriated under Title X be used in a program where abortion is a method of family planning. We have recognized that Congress’ power to allocate funds for public purposes includes an ancillary power to ensure that those funds are properly applied to the prescribed use. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U. S. 203, 207-209 (1987) (upholding against Tenth Amendment challenge requirement that States raise drinking age as condition to receipt of federal highway funds); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 99 (1976). Petitioners also contend that the regulations violate the First Amendment by penalizing speech funded with non-Title X moneys. They argue that since Title X requires that grant recipients contribute to the financing of Title X projects through the use of matching funds and grant-related income, the regulation’s restrictions on abortion counseling and advocacy penalize privately funded speech. We find this argument flawed for several reasons. First, Title X subsidies are just that, subsidies. The recipient is in no way compelled to operate a Title X project; to avoid the force of the regulations, it can simply decline the subsidy. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U. S. 555, 575 (1984) (petitioner’s First Amendment rights not violated because it “may terminate its participation in the [federal] program and thus avoid the requirements of [the federal program]”). By accepting Title X funds, a recipient voluntarily consents to any restrictions placed on any matching funds or grant-related income. Potential grant recipients can choose between accepting Title X funds — subject to the Government’s conditions that they provide matching funds and forgo abortion counseling and referral in the Title X project — or declining the subsidy and financing their own unsubsidized program. We have never held that the Government violates the First Amendment simply by offering that choice. Second, the Secretary’s regulations apply only to Title X programs. A recipient is therefore able to “limi[t] the use of its federal funds to [Title X] activities.” FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U. S. 364, 400 (1984). It is in no way “barred from using even wholly private funds to finance” its pro-abortion activities outside the Title X program. Ibid. The regulations are limited to Title X funds; the recipient remains free to use private, non-Title X funds to finance abortion-related activities.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DILLARD v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA et al. No. 72-5411. Decided December 11, 1972 Per Curiam. Appellant brought a class action to challenge the constitutionality of a state regulation that permitted temporary suspension of his workmen’s compensation payments without a prior hearing. He appealed an adverse judgment, but his jurisdictional statement states that after the decision below “an Order was entered by the Commission approving a lump-sum settlement of $4,243.20 in full settlement of [his] individual claim for compensation for his injury which occurred on March 15, 1971.” In this state of the record, the motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to consider whether this case is moot.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BARSKY v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. No. 69. Argued January 4, 1954. Decided April 26, 1954. Abraham, Fishbein argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. Henry S. Manley, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney General, and Wendell P. Brown, Solicitor General. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. The principal question here presented is whether the New York State Education Law, on its face or as here construed and applied, violates the Constitution of the United States by authorizing the suspension from practice, for six months, of a physician because he has been convicted, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, of failing to produce, before a Committee of the United States House of Representatives, certain papers subpoenaed by that Committee. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that it does not. In 1945, the Committee of the United States House of Representatives, known as the Committee on Un-Amer-ican Activities, was authorized to make investigations of “the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States.” In 1946, in the course of that investigation, the Committee subpoenaed Dr. Edward K. Barsky, appellant herein, who was then the national chairman and a member of the executive board of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, to produce “all books, ledgers, records and papers relating to the receipt and disbursement of money by or on account of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee or any subsidiary or any subcommittee thereof, together with all correspondence and memoranda of communications by any means whatsoever with persons in foreign countries for the period from January 1, 1945, to March 29, 1946.” Similar subpoenas were served on the executive secretary and the other members of the executive board of the Refugee Committee. Appellant appeared before the Congressional Committee but, pursuant to advice of counsel and the action of his executive board, he and the other officers of the Refugee Committee failed and refused to produce the subpoenaed papers. In 1947, appellant, the executive secretary and several members of the executive board of the Refugee Committee were convicted by a jury, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, of violating R. S. § 102, as amended, 2 U. S. C. § 192, by failing to produce the subpoenaed papers. Appellant was sentenced to serve six months in jail and pay $500. See United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58; United States v. Barsky, 72 F. Supp. 165. In 1948, this judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Barsky v. United States, 83 U. S. App. D. C. 127, 167 F. 2d 241, and certiorari was denied, 334 U. S. 843. In 1950, a rehearing was denied. Two Justices noted their dissents, and two did not participate. 339 U. S. 971. Appellant served his sentence, being actually confined five months. Appellant was a physician who practiced his profession in New York under a license issued in 1919. However, in 1948, following the affirmance of his above-mentioned conviction, charges were filed against him with the Department of Education of the State of New York by an inspector of that department. This was done under § 6515 of the Education Law, seeking disciplinary action pursuant to subdivision 2 (b) of § 6514 of that law: “2. The license or registration of a practitioner of medicine, osteopathy or physiotherapy may be revoked, suspended or annulled or such practitioner reprimanded or disciplined in accordance with the provisions and procedure of this article upon decision after due hearing in any of the following cases: “(b) That a physician, osteopath or physiotherapist has been convicted in a court of competent jurisdiction, either within or without this state, of a crime; or . . . .” In 1951, after filing an amended answer, appellant was given an extended hearing before a subcommittee of the Department’s Medical Committee on Grievances. The three doctors constituting the subcommittee made a written report of their findings, determination and recommendation, expressly taking into consideration the five months during which appellant had been separated from his practice while confined in jail, and also the testimony and letters submitted in support of his character. They recommended finding him guilty as charged and suspending him from practice for three months. The ten doctors constituting the full Grievance Committee unanimously found appellant guilty as charged. They also, adopted the findings, determination and recommendation of their subcommittee, except that, by a vote of six to four, they fixed appellant’s suspension at six months. Promptly thereafter, the Committee on Discipline of the Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York held a further hearing at which appellant appeared in person and by counsel. This committee consisted of two lawyers and one doctor. After reviewing the facts and issues, it filed a detailed report recommending that, while appellant was guilty as charged, his license be not suspended and that he merely be censured and reprimanded. The Board of Regents, however, returned to and sustained the determination of the Medical Committee on Grievances, and suspended appellant’s license for six months. Appellant sought a review of this determination, under § 6515 of the Education Law, supra, and Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Act, Gilbert-Bliss’ N. Y. Civ. Prac., Vol. 6B, 1944, §§ 1283-1306. The proceeding was instituted in the Supreme Court for the County of Albany and transferred to the Appellate Division, Third Department. That court confirmed the order of the Board of Regents. In re Barsky, 279 App. Div. 1117, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 778, and see 279 App. Div. 447, 111 N. Y. S. 2d 393, and 279 App. Div. 1101, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 780, 781. The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, affirmed. 305 N. Y. 89, 111 N. E. 2d 222. That court allowed an appeal to this Court and amended its remittitur by adding the following: “Upon the appeals herein there were presented and necessarily passed upon questions under the Federal Constitution, viz., whether sections 6514 and 6515 of the Education Law, as construed and applied here, are violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals held that the rights of the petitioners under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States had not been violated or denied.” 305 N. Y. 691, 112 N. E. 2d 773. We noted probable jurisdiction, The Chief Justice not participating at that time. 346 U. S. 807, 801. That appellant was convicted of a violation of R. S. § 102, as amended, 2 U. S. C. § 192, in a court of competent jurisdiction is settled. In the New York courts, appellant argued that a violation of that section of the federal statutes was not a crime under the law of New York and that, accordingly, it was not a “crime” within the meaning of § 6514-2 (b) of the New York Education Law. He argued that his conviction, therefore, did not afford the New York Board of Regents the required basis for suspending his license. That issue was settled adversely to him by the Court of Appeals of New York and that court’s interpretation of the state statute is conclusive here. He argues that § 6514-2 (b) is unconstitutionally vague. As interpreted by the New York courts, the provision is extremely broad in that it includes convictions for any crime in any court of competent jurisdiction within or without New York State. This may be stringent and harsh but it is not vague. The professional standard is clear. The discretion left to enforcing officers is not one of defining the offense. It is merely that of matching the measure of the discipline to the specific case. A violation of R. S. § 102, as amended, 2 U. S. C. § 192, is expressly declared by Congress to be a misdemeanor. It is punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than twelve months. See note 2, supra. For its violation appellant received a sentence of one-half the maximum and served five months in jail. There can be no doubt that appellant was convicted in a court of competent jurisdiction of a crime within the meaning of the New York statute. It is elemental that a state has broad power to establish and enforce standards of conduct within its borders relative to the health of everyone there. It is a vital part of a state’s police power. The state’s discretion in that field extends naturally to the regulation of all professions concerned with health. In Title VIII of its Education Law, the State of New York regulates many fields of professional practice, including medicine, osteopathy, physiotherapy, dentistry, veterinary medicine, pharmacy, nursing, podiatry and optometry. New York has had long experience with the supervision of standards of medical practice by representatives of that profession exercising wide discretion as to the discipline to be applied. It has established detailed procedures for investigations, hearings and reviews with ample opportunity for the accused practitioner to have his case thoroughly considered and reviewed. Section 6514, as a whole, demonstrates the broad field of professional conduct supervised by the Medical Committee on Grievances of the Department of Education and the Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York. In the present instance, the violation of § 6514-2 (b) is obvious. The real problem for the state agencies is that of the appropriate disciplinary action to be applied. The practice of medicine in New York is lawfully prohibited by the State except upon the conditions it imposes. Such practice is a privilege granted by the State under its substantially plenary power to fix the terms of admission. The issue is not before us but it has not been questioned that the State could make it a condition of admission to practice that applicants shall not have been convicted of a crime in a court of competent jurisdiction either within or without the State of New York. It could at least require a disclosure of such convictions as a condition of admission and leave it to a competent board to determine, after opportunity for a fair hearing, whether the convictions, if any, were of such a date and nature as to justify denial of admission to practice in the light of all material circumstances before the board. It is equally clear that a state’s legitimate concern for maintaining high standards of professional conduct extends beyond initial licensing. Without continuing supervision, initial examinations afford little protection. Appellant contends, however, that the standard which New York has adopted exceeds reasonable supervision and deprives him of property rights in his license and his established practice, without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. He argues that New York’s suspension of his license because of his conviction in a foreign jurisdiction, for an offense not involving moral turpitude and not criminal under the law of New York, so far transcends that State’s legitimate concern in professional standards as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. We disagree and hold that New York’s governmental discretion is not so restricted. This statute is readily distinguishable from one which would require the automatic termination of a professional license because of some criminal conviction of its holder. Realizing the importance of high standards of character and law observance on the part of practicing physicians, the State has adopted a flexible procedure to protect the public against the practice of medicine by those convicted of many more kinds and degrees of crime than it can well list specifically. It accordingly has sought to attain its justifiable end by making the conviction of any crime a violation of its professional medical standards, and then leaving it to a qualified board of doctors to determine initially the measure of discipline to be applied to the offending practitioner. Section 6515 of the New York Education Law thus meets the charge of unreasonableness. All charges are passed upon by a Committee on Grievances of the department. That committee consists of ten licensed physicians, appointed by the Board of Regents. The term of each member is five years. They serve without compensation. Three are “members of conspicuous professional standing” appointed upon the board’s own nomination. § 6515-2. The others are appointed from lists of nominees submitted respectively by the New York State Medical, Homeopathic and Osteopathic Societies. Charges must be filed in writing and a subcommittee of three or more members hears and reports on them. At least ten days’ notice of a hearing is required and opportunity is afforded the accused to appear personally, or by counsel, with the right to produce witnesses and evidence on his own behalf, to cross-examine witnesses, to examine evidence produced against him and to have subpoenas issued by the committee. The subcommittee transmits its report, findings and recommendation, together with a transcript of evidence, to the Committee on Grievances. That committee may take further testimony. It determines the merit of the charges and, if the practitioner is found guilty by a unanimous verdict, the record, together with the findings and determination of the committee, is transmitted to the Board of Regents. That board, “after due hearing,” may accept or modify the committee’s recommendation, or find the practitioner not guilty and dismiss the charges. § 6515-7. “The committee on grievances shall not be bound by the laws of evidence in the conduct of its proceedings, but the determination shall be founded upon sufficient legal evidence to sustain the same.” § 6515-5. If the accused is found guilty, he may institute proceedings for review under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act, returnable before the Appellate Division of the Third Judicial Department. The above provisions, on their face, are well within the degree of reasonableness required to constitute due process of law in a field so permeated with public responsibility as that of health. The statutory procedure as above outlined has been meticulously followed in this case and no objection is made on that score. Appellant, nevertheless, complains that, as construed and applied by the Medical Committee on Grievances and its subcommittee, his hearing violated the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment. He contends that evidence was introduced which was immaterial and prejudicial and that the committee based its determination upon that evidence. He contends, in effect, that the committee reached its determination without “sufficient legal evidence to sustain the same,” thus exceeding its statutory authority. He claims further that the committee acted capriciously and arbitrarily upon immaterial and prejudicial evidence, thus not only exceeding its statutory authority but depriving him of his property without due process of law. The state courts have determined that the hearing did not violate the statute and, accordingly, we are concerned only with the constitutional question. The claim is that immaterial and prejudicial evidence of the alleged subversive activities of the Refugee Committee was introduced and relied upon. Emphasis is given to evidence that the Refugee Committee had been placed on the Attorney General’s list of subversive or Communistic organizations. To emphasize the prejudicial character of this testimony, appellant refers to the fact that, at the time of the subcommittee hearing, litigation involving such list was pending in the courts and had resulted in a decision adverse to appellant, whereas that decision subsequently was set aside by this Court. The State’s answer to these claims is that such testimony was invited by appellant’s own testimony as to the activities of the Refugee Committee. The State shows also that while such evidence was not necessary to establish appellant’s violation of the federal statute as to the subpoenaed papers, it was material and admissible to assist the Committee on Grievances and the other agencies in determining the appropriate disciplinary measures to be applied to appellant under the state law. Appellant recognized this materiality by endeavoring to use evidence as to the Refugee Committee’s charitable activities to justify and excuse his failure to produce the subpoenaed papers. We find nothing sufficient to sustain a conclusion that the Board of Regents or the recommending committees made an arbitrary or capricious decision or relied upon irrelevant evidence. The report made by the original subcommittee of three that heard the evidence indicates that it was not influenced by the character of the Refugee Committee. It said: “We do not feel that we are now concerned, nor would we be able to determine, whether the books and records of that Committee would disclose whether the Committee was completely philanthropic in character, or whether it was engaged in subversive activities.” The painstaking complete review of the evidence and the issues by the Committee on Discipline of the Board of Regents demonstrates a high degree of unbiased objectivity. Before the final action of the Board of Regents, the Committee on Discipline in its report to that board noted that— “After the hearing below and the determination of the Medical Committee on Grievances, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed an order of the District Court dismissing a complaint by the Refugee Committee in an action by it for declaratory and injunctive relief (Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, Attorney General, 341 U. S. 123), some of the majority justices going on the ground that a determination of this kind could not constitutionally be made without a hearing and opportunity to offer proof and disproof. In view of this decision, no evidentiary weight can be given in the present proceeding to the listing by the Attorney General.” That committee thus recognized the existence of a valid basis for disciplinary action but found “no valid basis for discipline beyond the statutory minimum of censure and reprimand.” With this recommendation before the Board of Regents, we see no reason to conclude that the board disregarded it or acted arbitrarily, capriciously or through prejudice and deprived appellant of due process of law. The board made no specific findings. It accepted and sustained the unanimous determination of the Medical Committee on Grievances, which was that appellant was guilty. Then, in compliance with the recommendation of that committee, it fixed the measure of discipline at a six months’ suspension of appellant’s registration as a physician. The Court has considered the other points raised by appellant but finds no substantial federal constitutional objection in them, even assuming that they are before us as having been considered by the Court of Appeals, although not mentioned in its opinion or the amendment to its remittitur. The judgment of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, accordingly, is Affirmed. McKinney’s N. Y. Laws, Education Law, §§ 6514, 6515. The conviction was for violating R. S. § 102, as amended, 52 Stat. 942, 2 U. S. C. § 192: “Sec. 102. Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months.” “The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle, of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation.” 91 Cong. Rec. 10, 15. This was carried into the Rules of the House as Rule XI (q) (2), 60 Stat. 823, 828. United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58, 60. For related litigation, see United, States v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323; United States v. Fleischman, 339 U. S. 349; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123. The committee said: “Since violation of the Federal statute which Respondent has been convicted of violating involves inherently no moral turpitude, and since there has been no impeachment by evidence of Respondent’s explanation (sufficient if unimpeached) of his failure to produce the subpoenaed documents, we find in the record no valid basis for discipline beyond the statutory minimum of censure and reprimand; and we therefore recommend that Respondent’s license be not suspended, as the Medical Committee on Grievances has recommended, but that he be censured and reprimanded.” The order suspending appellant’s license was issued by the Commissioner of Education in 1951, but its effect was stayed by the New York Court of Appeals, pending an appeal to this Court. 305 N. Y. 691, 112 N. E. 2d 773. At about the same time, the board fixed at three months the suspension of the license of another doctor who was a member of the executive board of the Refugee Committee and who had been convicted with appellant. It also directed that a third doctor, who was a member of the same board, be censured and reprimanded. Each such determination was confirmed by the New York courts simultaneously with the confirmations relating to appellant. See 279 App. Div. 447, 111 N. Y. S. 2d 393; 279 App. Div. 1101, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 780, 781; 279 App. Div. 1117, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 778; and 305 N. Y. 89, 111 N. E. 2d 222. The subsequent designation of certain other contempts of Congress as federal “crimes” (18 U. S. C. §402) does not prevent this misdemeanor from being a crime within the meaning of the New York statute. “§ 6514. Revocation of certificates; annulment of registrations “1. Whenever any practitioner of medicine, osteopathy or physiotherapy shall be convicted of a felony, as defined in section sixty-five hundred two of this article, the registration of the person so convicted may be annulled and his license revoked by the department. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the court wherein such conviction takes place to transmit a certificate of such conviction to the department. Upon reversal of such judgment by a court having jurisdietion, the department, upon receipt of a certified copy of such judgment or order of reversal, shall vacate its order of revocation or annulment. “2. The license or registration of a practitioner of medicine, osteopathy or physiotherapy may be revoked, suspended or annulled or such practitioner reprimanded or disciplined in accordance with the provisions and procedure of this article upon decision after due hearing in any of the following cases: “(a) That a physician, osteopath or physiotherapist is guilty of fraud or deceit in the practice of medicine, osteopathy or physiotherapy or in his admission to the practice of medicine, osteopathy or physiotherapy; or “(b) That a physician, osteopath or physiotherapist has been convicted in a court of competent jurisdiction, either within or without this state, of a crime; or “(c) That a physician, osteopath or physiotherapist is an habitual drunkard, or is or has been addicted to the use of morphine, cocaine or other drugs having similar effect, or has become insane; or “(d) That a physician, osteopath or physiotherapist offered, undertook or agreed to cure or treat disease by a secret method, procedure, treatment or medicine or that he can treat, operate and prescribe for any human condition by a method, means or procedure which he refuses to divulge upon demand to the committee on grievances; or that he has advertised for patronage by means of handbills, posters, circulars, letters, stereopticon slides, motion pictures, radio, or magazines; or “(e) That a physician, osteopath or physiotherapist did undertake or engage in any manner or by any ways or means whatsoever to perform any criminal abortion or to procure the performance of the same by another or to violate section eleven hundred forty-two of the penal law, or did give information as to where or by whom such a criminal abortion might be performed or procured. “(f) That a physician, osteopath or physiotherapist has directly or indirectly requested, received or participated in the division, transference, assignment, rebate, splitting or refunding of a fee for, or has directly or indirectly requested, received or profited by means of a credit or other valuable consideration as a commission, discount or gratuity in connection with the furnishing of medical, surgical or dental care, diagnosis or treatment or service, including x-ray examination and treatment, or for or in connection with the sale, rental, supplying or furnishing of clinical laboratory services or supplies, x-ray laboratory services or supplies, inhalation therapy service or equipment, ambulance service, hospital or medical supplies, physiotherapy or other therapeutic service or equipment, artificial limbs, teeth or eyes, orthopedic or surgical appliances or supplies, optical appliances, supplies or equipment, devices for aid of hearing, drugs, medication or medical supplies or any other goods, services or supplies prescribed for medical diagnosis, care or treatment under this chapter, except payment, not to exceed thirty-three and one-third per centum of any fee received for x-ray examination, diagnosis or treatment, to any hospital furnishing facilities for such examination, diagnosis or treatment. . . .” See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, 299. A conviction for a crime which, under the law of New York, would amount to a felony has been given such an automatic effect in some instances. See McKinney’s N. Y. Laws, Education Law, § 6613-12, as to dentists; and McKinney’s N. Y. Laws, Judiciary Law, § 90-4, as to attorneys. Cf. § 6514-1, note 9, supra, as to physicians. See In re Raab, 156 Ohio St. 158, 101 N. E. 2d 294. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123. The character of the activities of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee was placed in issue by appellant’s amended answer. He volunteered much testimony as to the benevolent and charitable programs in which the committee participated and he introduced many exhibits on the same subject. Reference to the Attorney General’s list of subversives developed naturally during the resulting cross-examination of appellant.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MORRIS v. McCOMB, WAGE AND HOUR ADMINISTRATOR. No. 7. Argued October 13, 1947. Decided November 17, 1947. George S. Dixon argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Harold C. Nystrom argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Stanley M. Silverberg and William S. Tyson. Daniel W. Knowlton filed a brief for the Interstate Commerce Commission, as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. This case requires further application of the principles stated in Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U. S. 649, and Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U. S. 695. The first question is whether the Interstate Commerce Commission has the power, under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service with respect to drivers and mechanics employed full time, as such, by a common carrier by motor vehicle, when the services rendered, through such employees, by such carrier, in interstate commerce, are distributed generally throughout the year, constitute 3% to 4% of the carrier’s total carrier services, and the performance of such services is shared indiscriminately among such employees and mingled with their performance of other like services for such carrier not in interstate commerce. The other question is whether, if the Commission has that power, the overtime requirements of § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 apply to such employees in view of the exemption stated in § 13 (b) (1) of that Act. We hold that the Commission has the power in question and that the overtime requirements of § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act therefore do not apply to such employees. This action was brought March 26, 1942, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan by the Administrator of the Wage and Plour Division, United States Department of Labor, under § 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, to enjoin the petitioner, James F. Morris, from violating § 15 (a) (1) and (2) of that Act through failure to pay his employees compensation for overtime in accordance with § 7 of that Act. After a trial based on the pleadings and stipulated facts, the complaint was dismissed September 26, 1945. In its unreported conclusions of law the court stated that neither the petitioner nor his employees were engaged “in the production of goods for commerce” within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act and that, to the extent that they might be considered to be engaged “in commerce” within the meaning of that Act, the requirements of its § 7, as to compensation for overtime, did not apply to them. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed this judgment May 29, 1946, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Walling v. Morris, 155 F. 2d 832. Because of its importance in interpreting the Motor Carrier Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act and because the question first stated above had not been passed upon in our decisions in the Levinson and Pyramid cases, supra, we granted certiorari, 330 U. S. 817, limited to the following question: “2. Where such employees [i. e., those of a common carrier for hire who conducts a general cartage business] during a minority of their time are engaged in the transportation of interstate traffic are they exempt under the provisions of Section 13 (b) (1) of the Act from the maximum hours provision of Section 7 of the Act as employees with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of Section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935 (49 U. S. C. sec. 301, et seq.)V’ In response to our invitation, the Interstate Commerce Commission filed a brief amicus curiae. The material facts are treated by the parties as being those shown by the record to have been in effect when the complaint was filed in 1942. They may be summarized as follows: The petitioner then was, and for the past 12 years had been, the sole owner and proprietor of the J. F. Morris Cartage Company which operated a general cartage business as a common carrier by motor vehicle in and about the metropolitan area of Detroit, Michigan, and all within three contiguous counties of that State. His operations were centralized at Ecorse, Michigan, at his garage and yard, used for a dispatching office, general maintenance and repair garage and storage space for equipment. His principal business was the transportation of steel. In the regular course of his business, in 1941, he generally employed about 60 persons, 40 as truck drivers, 14 as mechanics, painters, washers and repairmen in the garage, three as dispatchers and three as general office workers. His equipment consisted of about 50 trucks or tractors and 60 trailers. He was prepared to and did render general cartage service to the general shipping public. In 1941, he rendered such service to 47 consigning firms, but about 97 % of his revenue came from the Great Lakes Steel Corporation and the Michigan Steel Corporation, both in Ecorse. His general cartage services, in 1941, were made up of three intermingled types of service, generally classifiable as follows on the basis of the revenue derived from them: (1) 35%: Transportation of steel largely within steel plants. This was transported for further processing in those plants and an unsegregated portion of it was shipped ultimately in interstate commerce. (2) 61%: Transportation between steel mills and industrial establishments. These shipments consisted principally of bumper stock, fender stock and other types of steel used in connection with the manufacture of automobiles, a substantial portion of which entered interstate commerce. (3) 4%: Transportation of miscellaneous freight directly in interstate commerce, either as part of continuous interstate movements or of interstate movements begun or terminated in metropolitan Detroit. Ever since § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act took effect, October *24, 1938, petitioner’s employees, with the exception of his office workers, consistently worked enough hours to entitle them to additional compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their regular wages if such Section were applicable to them. They were, however, paid on the assumption that the Section did not apply to them and, therefore, for the most part, received only their regular rate of pay for such overtime. Accordingly, if it is found that § 7 is applicable to them, there is ground for an injunction against its further violation. No issue is presented here as to the office workers because there is no proof of overtime services having been rendered by them or being now in prospect. No issue is presented here as to the dispatchers. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that § 7 applies to them as employees engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce and that they are not exempt as administrative employees. Those issues, however, are not within the limited grant of certiorari. As to the garagemen and laborers, including mechanics, painters, washers and repairmen, together with their superintendent of maintenance, there is no issue presented here, except to the extent that such classifications include mechanics doing the class of work defined as that of “mechanics” in Ex Parte No. MC-2, 28 M. C. C. 125, 132, 133, including the making of mechanical repairs directly affecting the safe operation of motor vehicles. All of the garagemen and laborers, except their superintendent of maintenance, were paid for their overtime work at “straight” or regular hourly rates. He was paid a weekly wage, and received no overtime pay, although he devoted approximately 25% of his time to the performance of routine physical tasks of the same general character as those of the employees working under his direction. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the superintendent of maintenance was not exempt as an executive or administrative employee and should be classified in the same manner as the others in this group. There is nothing in the record showing the extent to which the respective garagemen and laborers devoted themselves to the several classes of work above mentioned and, if this were an action to recover overtime compensation for individual employees, it would be necessary to determine that fact. However, as this is an action only for an injunction relating to future practices, the situation can be met by limiting the injunction to the appropriate classifications of workers. On this basis, the injunction against violation of § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act may be issued as to those garagemen and laborers who are not “mechanics” as defined by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the issue before us is limited to the proper application of such an injunction to such “mechanics.” The drivers are full-time drivers of motor vehicles well within the definition of that class of work by the Commission if the work is done in interstate commerce. From October 24, 1938, to August 1, 1940, the drivers received their “straight” or regular hourly rate of pay for all overtime work. Since August 1, 1940, their overtime work has been paid for in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement in force as to union drivers, throughout metropolitan Detroit, employed either in intrastate or interstate general cartage. From August 1, 1940, to August 1, 1941, these agreements required payment of overtime in excess of 52 hours a week at one and one-half times the regular rate. After August 1, 1941, as a concession to wartime conditions, this additional rate was applied only to overtime in excess of 54 hours a week. The statutory workweek which would be applicable under § 7 of the Pair Labor Standards Act at all times has been substantially shorter than those just mentioned. As to these drivers and these “mechanics” whose work affects safety of transportation, the first question here, as in the Levinson case, is whether the Commission has the power, under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service with respect to them. The special situation presented is that, on the average, only about 4% of their time and effort has been, or is likely to be, devoted to services in interstate commerce. The issue would appear in its simplest form if each driver were required, each day, to devote 24 minutes (i. e., 4% of his allowable daily aggregate of ten hours of driving time) to driving in interstate commerce. The question then would be whether the Commission has the power to establish his qualifications and maximum hours of service in view of the relation of this driving to safety of operation in interstate commerce. Under the tests of the Commission’s power, as approved in both the majority and minority opinions in the Levinson case, and, under the analysis of that power developed by the Interstate Commerce Commission and cited in that case, it is “the character of the activities rather than the proportion of either the employee’s time or of his activities that determines the actual need for the Commission’s power to establish reasonable requirements with respect to qualifications, maximum hours of service, safety of operation and equipment.” It is beyond question that, under such circumstances, § 204 (a) (1) of the Motor Carrier Act has authorized the Commission to establish reasonable requirements with respect to qualifications and maximum hours of service of such drivers. The Fair Labor Standards Act, which was passed three years later, has recognized and does not restrict the Commission’s power over the safety of operation under the Motor Carrier Act. What is thus true for the driver is true also for the mechanic who repairs his truck. In the record before us, instead of 4% of the driving time of each driver being devoted each day to interstate commerce without relation to what the driver does at other times, the parties present the actual experience of the petitioner and his drivers throughout 1941. The printed record, together with an unprinted exhibit filed with the Clerk, classifies all of the 19,786 trips taken in 1941 by the 43 drivers who respectively drove motor vehicles for the petitioner during not less than eight weeks in that year. Only the “Pickup Trips” and “Boat Dock Trips” are counted as being in “interstate commerce.” These involved movements of goods to or from railroad freight houses, line haul motor carrier depots or the boat docks of the several steamship companies in Detroit. It was stipulated that the petitioner was “engaged as a common carrier for hire in the local transportation of property by motor vehicle,” was “engaged in a general cartage business and . . . [was] prepared to render such service to the general shipping public . . . Each driver appears to have been a full-time driver during each week that he worked. The tables show 464 “Pickup Trips” and 260 “Boat Dock Trips,” or a total of 724 made in interstate commerce, when and as required by petitioner’s consignors. These constituted 3.65% of the petitioner’s total trips. They were not distributed equally to each driver nor on the basis of 4% of his time each day. However, apparently in the normal operation of the business, these strictly interstate commerce trips were distributed generally throughout the year and their performance was shared indiscriminately by the drivers and was mingled with the performance of other like driving services rendered by them otherwise than in interstate commerce. These trips were thus a natural, integral and apparently inseparable part of the common carrier service of the petitioner and of his drivers. One or more such trips were taken by one or more drivers each week. The average number of drivers making one or more such trips in each week was nine drivers out of 37, or 24.4%. There were six weeks in which more than half of the drivers thus engaged directly in interstate commerce. The highest percentage of drivers making such trips in one week was 78.1%, when 25 drivers, out of the 32 then on duty, did so. As to the distribution of such trips, throughout the year, among the total of 43 drivers, every driver, except two, made at least one such trip with interstate freight. Each of the two who failed to make any such trip was employed for only about one-half the year and that was during the months when the trips in interstate commerce were the less frequent. On the other hand, one driver made 97 such trips in interstate commerce. Another made 52 and the average per driver was over 16. The greatest number of such trips made by a single driver in a single week was seven out of nine. In several other weeks he made six such trips out of a total of seven in the week. The net result is a practical situation such as may confront any common carrier engaged in a general cartage business, and who is prepared and offering to serve the normal transportation demands of the shipping public in an industrial metropolitan center. From the point of view of safety in interstate commerce, the hazards are not distinguishable from those which would be presented if each driver drove 4% of his driving time each day in interstate commerce. In both cases there is the same essential need for the establishment of reasonable requirements with respect to qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees. If the common carrier is required, by virtue of that status, to take this interstate business he must perform the required service in accordance with the requirements established by the Commission. The Commission has made no exception in these qualifications and maximum hours of service that would exempt the drivers of the petitioner from them as a class. The applicability of the Commission’s present requirements as to specific drivers during specific weeks is not the issue before us. We hold that the Commission has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service, pursuant to the provisions of § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, for the entire classification of petitioner’s drivers and “mechanics” and it is the existence of that power (rather than the precise terms of the requirements actually established by the Commission in the exercise of that power) that Congress has made the test as to whether or not § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act is applicable to these employees. Congress has gone out of its way to make this purpose clear in cases comparable to the one before us. It has done this by making the power of the Commission, under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, expressly applicable to motor vehicle pickup and delivery service within terminal areas to transportation in interstate commerce wholly within a metropolitan area, and to casual, occasional, or reciprocal transportation of property in interstate commerce by any person not engaged in transportation by motor vehicle as a regular occupation or business. It has made the Commission’s power over safety requirements expressly applicable to these operations, even though, at the same time, Congress has exempted them from general regulatory control. Congress furthermore has provided a special procedure by which, in an appropriate case, an intrastate motor carrier or any other party in interest, may secure the general exemption of such a carrier from compliance with the Motor Carrier Act even though such carrier does perform some interstate transportation. Congress, however, expressly has authorized the Commission, and not the courts, to decide when the case is an appropriate one for such a general exemption. It does not appear that any such certificate of exemption has been obtained or sought as to this petitioner. Having determined that the Commission has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service for these drivers and “mechanics” under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, the question recurs as to whether, in the face of the exemption stated in § 13 (b) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the requirements of § 7 of that Act nevertheless apply to these employees. This issue as to the possible reconciliation of the language of these Acts so as to provide for concurrent jurisdiction was considered at length in the Levinson case and the conclusion was there reached that such a construction was not permissible. This discussion has proceeded on the basis of the facts which were stipulated to exist in 1942. This treatment, however, should not be interpreted as necessarily restricting the District Court to the present record if, for good cause, that court finds it advisable to consider additional evidence or to retry the case de novo. For these reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is vacated and the cause is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals, as here modified. It is so ordered. “Sec. 204 (a) It shall be the duty of the Commission— “(1) To regulate common carriers by motor vehicle as provided in this part, and to that end the Commission may establish reasonable requirements with respect to continuous and adequate service, transportation of baggage and express, uniform systems of accounts, records, and reports, preservation of records, qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees, and safety of operation and equipment. . . .” 49 Stat. 546,49 U. S. C. § 304 (a) (1). “Sec. 7. (a) No employer shall, except as otherwise provided in this section, employ any of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce — • (1) for a workweek longer than forty-four hours during the first year from the effective date of this section, (2) for a workweek longer than forty-two hours during the second year from such date, or (3) for a workweek longer than forty hours after the expiration of the second year from such date, unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. . . .” 52 Stat. 1063, 29 U. S. C. § 207 (a). “Sec. 13. . . . “(b) The provisions of section 7 shall not apply with respect to (1) any employee with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935; . . . .” 52 Stat. 1068, 29 U. S. C. § 213 (b) (1). “Sec. 17. The district courts of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown, and subject to the provisions of section 20 (relating to notice to opposite party) of the Act entitled 'An Act to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes’, approved October 15, 1914, as amended (U. S. C., 1934 edition, title 28, sec. 381), to restrain violations of section 15.” 52 Stat. 1069,29 U. S. C. § 217. “Sec. 15. (a) ... , it shall be unlawful for any person— (1) to transport, offer for transportation, ship, deliver, or sell in commerce, or to ship, deliver, or sell with knowledge that shipment or delivery or sale thereof in commerce is intended, any goods in the production of which any employee was employed in violation of section 6 or section 7, or in violation of any regulation or order of the Administrator issued under section 14; except that no provision of this Act shall impose any liability upon any common carrier for the transportation in commerce in the regular course of its business of any goods not produced by such common carrier, and no provision of this Act shall excuse any common carrier from its obligation to accept any goods for transportation; (2) to violate any of the provisions of section 6 or section 7, or any of the provisions of any regulation or order of the Administrator issued under section 14; 52 Stat. 1068, 29 U. S. C. § 215. See note 2, supra. This activity is described as follows: “C. Approximately three (3) per cent of the defendant’s operations consists of the transportation of freight between the plants of the Great Lakes Steel Corporation and the plants of the Michigan Steel Corporation on the one hand, and, on the other hand, interchange points, such as boat docks, railroad depots, freight terminals and truck terminals lying in the Detroit Metropolitan Area, wholly within the boundaries of the State of Michigan, involving the picking up of freight from or the delivery of freight to water carriers, railroad carriers and line haul motor carriers, which freight either has moved across the Michigan State lines or is about to move across the Michigan State lines in continuous transportation through connection between the defendant and such other interstate carriers. The defendant’s compensation for his portion of the through transportation service is in some instances paid to him by the interstate carrier, the compensation representing a division of the through rates on the transportation movement, and other instances being compensated by the shipper. “E. Approximately one (1) per cent of the defendant’s operations consists of the transportation of miscellaneous freight in general cartage service for hire and for shippers other than Great Lakes Steel Corporation or Michigan Steel Corporation. Cartage in this category is of the same physical character as that described in subparagraphs A, C, and D above, except that it is done on behalf of and for the account of shippers other than Great Lakes Steel Corporation and Michigan Steel Corporation.” “(I) Mechanics and other garage workers. — The evidence is clear that carriers that do not operate approximately 10 motor vehicles or more cannot economically employ mechanics to do repair work, and they do not do so. . . . “The larger carriers, however, do employ mechanics whose primary duties are to keep the motor vehicles in a good and safe working condition. They are required, for example, to keep the lights and brakes in such condition. They perform many other duties, of course, but these are sufficient to show clearly that the duties of these employees do affect safety of operation directly, as it is obvious that a large motor vehicle without the required lights or adequate brakes is a great potential hazard to highway safety. All witnesses testifying at the hearing agreed that the work of mechanics has such a direct and intimate relation to safety of operation, and no conflicting evidence was submitted. “Our conclusion is that mechanics devote a large portion of their time to activities which directly affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles operated in interstate or foreign commerce, and hence that we have power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service for such employees under said section 204 (a). “There are other garage employees who do not perform work which affects safety of operation directly. Some carriers employ men who do nothing but paint vehicles. Others employ carpenters, and some few employ tarpaulin tailors. We find that the work done by none of these employees affects safety of operation. “It is possible, although the record does not clearly establish the fact, that some of the larger carriers employ men whose sole duty is to see that the motor vehicles are properly supplied with oil, gas, and grease, or to wash the vehicles. In the majority of cases, undoubtedly, the mechanics perform this work. However, if there be employees who do nothing but oil, gas, grease, or wash the motor vehicles, we find that they do not perform duties which directly affect the safety of operation and are not subject to our jurisdiction. To make our finding in this regard entirely clear, it is that mechanics are the only garage workers we find subject to our jurisdiction.” Ex Parte No. MC-2, 28 M. C. C. 125, 132, 133. Safety Regulations (Carriers by Motor Vehicle), 49 CFR Cum. Supp., Parts 190-193. See note 2, supra. Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U. S. 649, 674-675. “For, factually speaking, not the amount of time an employee spends in work affecting safety, but what he may do in the time thus spent whether it be large or small determines the effect on safety. Ten minutes of driving by an unqualified driver may do more harm on the highway than a month or a year of constant driving by a qualified one.” Id., dissenting opinion, at p. 687. See note 1, supra. “We recognize, as a practical matter, that private carriers transport property both in interstate and intrastate commerce. The same motor vehicle, operated by the same driver, on 1 or 2 days in a week may be engaged in transporting property in interstate commerce and the rest of the week may be engaged in intrastate commerce. In our opinion if a driver operates a motor vehicle in the transportation of interstate or foreign commerce on any day of a given week, such driver is subject to the weekly maximum herein prescribed. Likewise if a driver employed by a private carrier of property is engaged in interstate commerce during any one period of 24 consecutive hours, he is subject to the daily maximum herein prescribed. If such a driver does not drive or operate a truck in the transportation of property in interstate or foreign commerce for an entire week, he is not subject to the regulations herein prescribed during that week. We express no opinion as to whether or not during that week the driver is subject to the provisions of section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act.” (Italics supplied.) Ex Parte No. MC-3, 23 M. C. C. 1,39. The above statement demonstrates the Commission’s opinion as to its power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service in the field of mixed interstate and intrastate transportation. The rules that it has prescribed have not extended to its full power to make rules in this field. The fact that this statement was made in 1940, three years before the decision of this Court in Southland Co. v. Bayley, 319 U. S. 44, explains the express reservation made as to the Commission’s opinion relating to the effect of the scope of its unexercised powers under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act in relation to §7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. For the Commission’s regulations of Hours of Service (Carriers by Motor Vehicle) see 49 CFR Cum. Supp., Part 191. “Sec. 202. . . . “(c) Notwithstanding any provision of this section or of section 203, the provisions of this part, except the provisions of section 204 relative to qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety of operation and equipment, shall not apply— “(1) to transportation by motor vehicle by a carrier by railroad subject to part I, or by a water carrier subject to part III, or by a freight forwarder subject to part IV, incidental to transportation or service subject to such parts, in the performance within terminal areas of transfer, collection, or delivery services; . . . .” §202 (c) (1), 49 Stat. 543, as amended by 56 Stat. 300, 49 U. S. C. (Supp. V, 1946), §302 (c) (1). “Sec. 203. . . . “(b) Nothing in this part, except the provisions of section 204 relative to qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety of operation or standards of equipment shall be construed to include ... (8) The transportation of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce wholly within a municipality or between contiguous municipalities or within a zone adjacent to and commercially a part of any such municipality or municipalities, except when such transportation is under a common control, management, or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment to or from a point without such municipality, municipalities, or zone, and provided that the motor carrier engaged in such transportation of passengers over regular or irregular route or routes in interstate commerce is also lawfully engaged in the intrastate transportation of passengers over the entire length of such interstate route or routes in accordance with the laws of each State having jurisdiction; or (9) the casual, occasional, or reciprocal transportation of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce for compensation by any person not engaged in transportation by motor vehicle as a regular occupation or business.” 49 Stat. 545-546, 49 U. S. C. § 303 (b) (8) and (9). See note 15, supra. “Sec. 204 (a) It shall be the duty of the Commission— “ (4a) To determine, upon its own motion, or upon application by a motor carrier, a State board, or any other party in interest, whether the transportation in interstate or foreign commerce performed by any motor carrier or class of motor carriers lawfully engaged in operation solely within a single State is in fact of such nature, character, or quantity as not substantially to affect or impair uniform regulation by the Commission of transportation by motor carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce in effectuating the national transportation policy declared in this Act. Upon so finding, the Commission shall issue a certificate of exemption to such motor carrier or class of motor carriers which, during the period such certificate shall remain effective and unrevoked, shall exempt such carrier or class of motor carriers from compliance with the provisions of this part, and shall attach to such certificate such reasonable terms and conditions as the public interest may require. At any time after the issuance of any such certificate of exemption, the Commission may by order revoke all or any part thereof, if it shall find that the transportation in interstate or foreign commerce performed by the carrier or class of carriers designated in such certificate shall be, or shall have become, or is reasonably likely to become, of such nature, character, or quantity as in fact substantially to affect or impair uniform regulation by the Commission of interstate or foreign transportation by motor carriers in effectuating the national transportation policy declared in this Act. . . .” 49 Stat. 546, as amended by 54 Stat. 921, 49 U. S. C. §304 (a) (4a).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

IN RE ANASTAPLO. No. 58. Argued December 14, 1960. Decided April 24, 1961. Petitioner argued the cause and filed a brief pro se. William C. Wines, Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for the State of Illinois, respondent. With him on the brief were William L. Guild, Attorney General, and Raymond S. Sarnow and A. Zola Groves, Assistant Attorneys General. Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed by Roscoe T. Steffen for the American Civil Liberties Union and by David Scribner, Leonard B. Boudin, Ben Margolis, William B. Murrish and Charles Stewart for the National Lawyers Guild. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. The questions presented by this case are similar to those involved in No. 28, Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, decided today, ante, p. 36. ' In 1954 petitioner, George Anastaplo, an instructor and research assistant at the University of Chicago, having previously passed his Illinois bar examinations, was denied admission to the bar of that State by the Illinois Supreme Court. The denial was based upon his refusal to answer questions of the Committee on Character and Fitness as to whether he was a member of the Communist Party. This Court, two Justices dissenting, refused review. 348 U. S. 946. In 1957, following this Court’s decisions in the earlier Konigsberg case, 353 U. S. 252, and in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U. S. 232, Anastaplo sought to have the Character Committee rehear his application for certification. The Committee, by a divided vote, refused, but the State Supreme Court reversed and directed rehearing. The ensuing lengthy proceedings before the Committee, at which Anastaplo was the only witness, are perhaps best described as a wide-ranging exchange between the Committee and Anastaplo in which the Committee sought to explore Anastaplo’s ability conscientiously to swear support of the Federal and State Constitutions, as required by the Illinois attorneys’ oath, and Anastaplo undertook to expound and defend, on historical and ideological premises, his abstract belief in the “right of revolution,” and to resist, on grounds of asserted constitutional right and scruple, Committee questions which he deemed improper. The Committee already had before it uncontroverted evidence as to Anastaplo’s “good moral character,” in the form of written statements or affidavits furnished by persons of standing acquainted with him, and the record on rehearing contains nothing which could properly be considered as reflecting adversely upon his character or reputation or on the sincerity of the beliefs' he espoused before the Committee. Anastaplo persisted, however, in refusing to answer, among other inquiries, the Committee’s questions as to his possible membership in the Communist Party or in other allegedly related organizations. Thereafter the Committee, by a vote of 11 to 6, again declined to certify Anastaplo because of his refusal to answer such questions, the majority stating in its report to the Illinois'Supreme Court: “his [Anastaplo’s] failure to reply, in our .view, (i) obstructs the lawful processes of the Committee, (ii) prevents inquiry into subjects which bear intimately upon the issue of character and fitness, such as loyalty to our basic institutions, belief in representative government and bona fides of the attorney’s oath and (iii) results in his failure to meet the burden of establishing that he possesses the good moral character and fitness to practice law, which are conditions to the granting of a license to practice law. “We draw no inference of disloyalty or subversion from applicant’s continued refusal to answer questions concerning Communist or other subversive affiliations. We do, however, hold that there is a strong public interest in our being free to question applicants for admission to the bar on their adherence to our basic institutions and form of government and that such public interest in the character of its attorneys overrides an applicant’s private interest in keeping such views to himself. By failing to respond to this higher public interest we hold that the applicant has obstructed the proper functions of the Committee. ... We cannot certify the applicant as worthy of the trust and confidence of the public when we do not know that he is so worthy and when he has prevented us from finding out.” At the same time the full Committee acknowledged that Anastaplo “is well regarded by his academic associates, by professors who had taught him in school and by members of the Bar who know him personally . . ; that it had “not been supplied with any information by any third party which is derogatory to Anastaplo’s character or general reputation . . and that it had “received no information from any outside source which would cast any doubt on applicant’s loyalty or which would tend to connect him in any manner with any subversive group.” Further, the majority found that Anastaplo’s views “with respect to the right to overthrow the government by force or violence, while strongly libertarian and expressed with an intensity and fervor not necessarily shared by all good citizens, are not inconsistent with those held by many patriotic Americans both at the present time and throughout the course of this country’s history and do not in and of themselves reveal any adherence to subversive doctrines.” Upon review, the Illinois Supreme Court, over three dissents, confirmed the Committee’s report and refusal to certify Anastaplo, reaffirming in its per curiam opinion the court’s “. . . earlier conclusion that a determination as to whether an applicant can in good conscience take the attorney’s oath to support and defend the constitutions of the United States and the State of Illinois is impossible where he refuses to state whether he is a member of a group dedicated to the overthrow of the government of the United States by force and violence.” 18 Ill. 2d 182, 200-201, 163 N. E. 2d 429, 439. We granted certiorari, 362 U. S. 968, and set the matter for argument along with the Konigsberg case, ante, p. 36, and Cohen v. Hurley, post, p. 117. Two of the basic issues in this litigation have been settled by our contemporary Konigsberg opinion. We have there held it not constitutionally impermissible for a State legislatively, or through court-made regulation as here and in Konigsberg, to adopt a rule that an applicant will not be admitted to the practice of law if, and so long as, by refusing to answer matérial questions, he obstructs a bar examining committee in its proper functions of interrogating and cross-examining him upon his qualifications. That such was a proper function of the Illinois Character Committee is incontestably established by the opinions of the State Supreme Court in this case. 3 Ill. 2d, at 476, 121 N. E. 2d, at 829; 18 Ill. 2d, at 188, 163 N. E. 2d, at 432. We have also held in Konigsberg that the State's interest in enforcing such a rule as applied to refusals to answer questions about membership in the Communist Party outweighs any deterrent effect upon freedom of speech and association, and hence that such state action does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment. We think that in this respect no valid constitutional distinction can be based on the circumstance that in Konigsberg there was some, though weak, independent evidence that the applicant had once been connected with the Communist Party, while here there was no such evidence as to Anastaplo. Where, as with membership in the bar, the State may withhold a privilege available only to those possessing the requisite qualifications, it is of no constitutional significance whether the State’s interrogation of an applicant on matters relevant to these qualifications— in this case Communist Party membership — is prompted by information which it already has about him from other sources, or arises merely from a good faith belief in the need for exploratory or testing questioning of the applicant. Were it otherwise, a bar examining committee such as this, having no resources of its own for independent investigation, might be placed in the untenable position of having to certify an applicant without assurance as to a significant aspect of his qualifications which the applicant himself is best circumstanced to supply. The Constitution does not so unreasonably fetter the States. Two issues, however, do arise upon this record which are not disposed of by Konigsberg. The first is whether Anastaplo was given adequate warning as to the consequences of his refusal to answer the Committee’s questions relating to Communist Party membership. The second is whether his exclusion from the bar on this ground was, in the- circumstances of this case, arbitrary ■ or discriminatory. I. The opinions below reflect full awareness on the part of the Character Committee and the Illinois Supreme Court of Anastaplo’s constitutional right to be warned in advance of the consequences of his refusal to answer. Cf. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U. S., at 261. On the part of Anastaplo, he stands in the unusual position of one who had already been clearly so warned as a result of his earlier exclusion from the bar for refusal to answer the very question which was again put to him on rehearing. See note 2, supra. Anastaplo nevertheless, contends in effect that he was lulled into a false, sense of security by various occurrences at the Committee hearings: (1) several statements by Committee members indicating that all questions asked and refused an answer should not be considered as bearing the same level of importance in the eyes of the Committee; and (2) a statement by one of the principal Committee members that Illinois had no “per se” rule of exclusion, that is that Anastaplo’s refusal to answer would not automatically operate to exclude him from the bar. These suggestions, whether taken separately or together, can only be viewed as insubstantial. The sum and substance of the matter is that throughout the renewed proceedings petitioner was fully aware that his application for admission had already once been rejected on the very ground about which he now professes to have been left in doubt, and that the Committee made manifest both that it continued to attach special importance- to its Communist Party affiliation questions, and that adverse consequences might well follow if Anastaplo persisted in refusing to answer them. What follows will suffice to show that statements to the effect that the Committee as a whole did not necessarily approve or adopt every question asked by any of its members can hardly be taken as having left petitioner in doubt as to the central importance and general approval of questions about Communist Party membership. At an early stage of the proceedings Anastaplo was informed: “Now you have asked for a warning when we put a question to you that we think is a pivotal, important question in connection with your qualification. I must tell you that we consider that question, ‘Are you a member of the Communist Party,’ such a question; and that the refusal to answer it may have serious consequences to your application.” And at the last hearing one of the leading Committee members responded to Anastaplo’s insistence on being told even more explicitly what refusals to answer would be of significance to the Committee, by pointing out that “The Supreme Court of Illinois has ruled that it is proper for us to ask you whether you are a member of the Communist Party. You have refused to answer the question.” Further, petitioner’s repeated objections throughout the hearings to the effect that there was no basis for the Committee’s evident purpose to give much greater emphasis to questions about Communist Party membership than to other unanswered inquiries, dispel any doubt that Anastaplo was quite aware that Communist-affiliation questions were to be treated differently from other questions he had refused to answer. The other aspect of petitioner’s claim on lack of adequate warning is equally untenable. It is true that the Committee told Anastaplo that his refusal to answer questions would not ipso jacto result in his exclusion from the bar, but only that it “could and might.” This, however, certainly did not give rise to constitutional infirmity. Even as to one charged with crime due process does not demand that he be warned as to what specific sanction will be applied to him if he violates the law. It is enough that he know what sanction “could and might” be visited on him. Anastaplo was entitled to no more. It is of course indubitable that by reason of the original rejection of his application, Anastaplo knew of Illinois’ rule of exclusion for refusal to answer relevant questions — indeed the very questions involved here. Petitioner having been fairly warned that exclusion from admission to practice might follow from his refusal to answer, it must be found that this requirement of due process was duly met. II. Petitioner’s claim that the application of the State’s exclusionary rule was arbitrary and discriminatory in the circumstances of this case must also be rejected. It is contended (1) that Anastaplo’s refusal to answer these particular questions did not obstruct the Committee’s investigation, because that body already had before it uncontroverted evidence establishing petitioner’s good character and fitness for the practice of law; and (2) that the real reason why the State proceeded as it did was because of its disapproval of Anastaplo’s constitutionally protected views on the right to resist tyrannical government. Neither contention can be accepted. It is sufficient to say in answer to the first contention that even though the Committee already had before it substantial character evidence altogether favorable to Anastaplo, there is nothing in the Federal Constitution which required the Committee to draw the curtain upon its investigation at that point. It had the right to supplement that evidence and to test the applicant’s own credibility by interrogating him. And to those ends the Committee could insist upon unprivileged answers to relevant questions, such as we have held in our today’s Konigsberg opinion those relating to Communist affiliations were, even though as to them the Committee could not, as it did not, draw an unfavorable inference from refusal to answer. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, supra. As to the second contention, there is nothing in the record which would justify our holding that the State has invoked its exclusionary refusal-to-answer rule as a mask for its disapproval of petitioner’s notions on the right to overthrow tyrannical government. While the Committee’s majority report does observe that there was “a serious question” whether Anastaplo’s views on the right to resist judicial decrees would be compatible with his taking of the attorney’s oath, and that “certain” members of the Committee thought that such views affirmatively demonstrated his disqualification for admission to the bar, it is perfectly clear that the Illinois Bar Committee and Supreme Court regarded petitioner’s refusal to cooperate in the Committee’s examination of him as the basic and only reason for a denial of certification. A different conclusion is not suggested by the circumstances that the Committee when it reheard Anastaplo evinced its willingness to consider the effect of petitioner’s refusal to answer in light of what might transpire at the hearings, and that it continued to explore petitioner’s views on resistance and overthrow long after it became clear that he would refuse to answer Communist-affiliation questions. These factors indicate no more than that the Committee was attempting to exercise an informed judgment as to whether the situation was an appropriate one for waiver of the Committee’s continuing requirement, earlier enforced after the first Anastaplo hearings, that such questions must be answered. Finally, contrary to the assumption on which some of the arguments on behalf of Anastaplo seem to have proceeded, we do not understand that Illinois’ exclusionary requirement will continue to operate to exclude Anastaplo from the bar any longer than he continues in his refusal to answer. We find nothing to suggest that he would not be admitted now if he decides to answer, assuming of course that no grounds justifying his exclusion from practice resulted. In short, petitioner holds the key to admission in his own hands. We conclude with observing that our function here is solely one of constitutional adjudication, not to pass judgment on what has been done as if we were another state court of review, still less to express any view upon the wisdom of the State’s action. With appropriate regard for the limited range of our authority we cannot say that the State’s denial of Anastaplo’s application for admission to its bar offends the Federal Constitution. The judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court must therefore be Affirmed. The Illinois procedure for admission to the bar was thus summarized by the State Supreme Court (3 Ill. 2d, at 475-476, 121 N. E. 2d, at 829): “In the exercise of its judicial power over the bar, and in discharge of its responsibility for the choice of personnel who will compose that bar, this court has adopted Rule 58, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 110, par. 259.58,) which governs admissions and provides, among other things, that applicants shall be admitted to the practice of law by this court after satisfactory examination by the Board of Examiners and certification of approval by a Committee on Character and Fitness. Section IX of the rule provides for the creation of such committees and imposes upon them the duty to examine applicants who appear before them for moral character, general fitness to practice law and good citizenship. Still another condition precedent to admission to practice law in this State, imposed by the legislature, is the taking of an oath to support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the State of Illinois. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 13, par. 4.)” On that occasion the State Supreme Court said (3 Ill. 2d, at 480, 121 N. E. 2d, at 831): “It is our opinion, therefore, that a member of the Communist Party may, because of such membership, be unable truthfully and in good conscience to take the oath required as a condition for admission to practice, and we hold that it is relevant to inquire of an applicant as to his membership in that party. A negative answer to the question, if accepted as true, would end the inquiry on the point. If the truthfulness of a negative answer were doubted, further questions and information to test the veracity of the applicant would be proper. If an affirmative answer were received, further inquiry into the applicant’s innocence or knowledge as to the subversive nature of the organization would be relevant. Under any hypothesis, therefore, questions as to membership in the Communist Party or known subversive 'front’ organizations were relevant to the inquiry into petitioner’s fitness for admission to the bar. His refusal to answer has prevented the committee from inquiring fully into his general fitness and good citizenship and justifies their refusal to-issue a certificate.” In remanding the matter to the Character Committee, the Illinois Supreme Court stated (see 18 Ill. 2d, at 186, 163 N. E. 2d, at 431): “ 'The principal question presented by the petition for rehearing concerns the significance of the applicant’s views as to the overthrow of government by force in the light of Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U. S. 252, and Yates v. United States, 1 L. ed. 2d 1356, 77 S. Ct. 1064. Additional questions presented concern the applicant’s activities since his original application was denied, and his present reputation. “ 'We are of the opinion that the Committee should have allowed the petition for rehearing and heard evidence on these matters, and the Committee is requested to do so, and to report the evidence and its conclusions.’ ” The proceedings consumed six hearing days, and resulted in a transcript of over 400 pages. More particularly: petitioner was first asked routine questions about his personal history. He refused, on constitutional grounds, to answer whether he was affiliated with any church. He answered all questions about organizational relationships so long as he did not know that the organization was “political” in character. He refused, on grounds of protected free speech and association, to answer whether he was a member of the Communist Party or of any other group named in the Attorney General's list of “subversive” organizations, including the Ku Klux Klan and the Silver Shirts of America. Much of the ensuing five sessions was devoted to discussion of Anastaplo’s reasons for believing that inquiries into such matters were constitutionally privileged, and to an unjustifiable attempt, later expressly repudiated by the Committee, to delve into the consistency of petitioner’s religious beliefs with an attorney’s duty to take an oath of office. A substantial part of the proceedings revolved around Anastaplo’s views as to the right to revolt against tyrannical government, and the right to resist judicial decrees in exceptional circumstances. Although the transcript of the prior Committee proceedings has not been made part of the record before us, it is evident that it contained nothing which affirmatively reflected unfavorably on petitioner’s character or reputation. See note 5, supra. Two dissenting opinions were filed. Justice Bristow dissented on constitutional grounds. 18 Ill. 2d, at 201, 163 N. E. 2d, at 439. Justices Schaefer and Davis, joining in a single opinion, did not reach the constitutional questions. 18 Ill. 2d, at 224, 163 N. E. 2d, at 928. In its second opinion, the State Supreme Court stated (18 Ill. 2d, at 188, 163 N. E. 2d, at 432): “The committee further advises us that it has conducted no independent investigation into Anastaplo’s character, reputation or activities. For the very practical reason that the committee has no personnel or other resources for any such investigation, the committee states that it has traditionally asserted the view that it cannot be expected to carry the burden of establishing, by independent investigation, whether .an applicant possesses the requisite character and fitness for admission to the bar and that a duty devolves upon the applicant to establish that he possesses the necessary qualifications and that it is then the duty of the committee to test, by hearings and questioning of the applicant, the worth of the evidence which he proffers. We agree, and have held that the discretion exercised by the Committee on Character and Fitness will not ordinarily be reviewed. In re Frank, 293 Ill. 263.” The fact that in Konigsberg the materiality of questions relating to Communist Party membership rested directly on the existence of a California statute disqualifying from membership in the bar those advocating forcible overthrow of government, whereas here materiality stemmed from their bearing upon the likelihood that a bar applicant would observe as a lawyer the orderly processes • that lie at the roots of this country’s legal and political systems, cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, is of course a circumstance of no significance. Cf. Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U. S. 716; American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382. The Committee's majority report states: “The Committee repeatedly warned the applicant that questions regarding Communist affiliation were viewed as important by the Committee members and that his failure to respond to them could adversely affect his application for admission to the bar.” The Illinois Supreme Court stated (18 Ill. 2d, at 196, 163 N. E. 2d, at 436): “. . .no problem exists as to inadequate notice of the consequences of a refusal to answer; the applicant was specifically notified both by the Illinois Supreme Court in its opinion in 3 111. 2d 471, and by the committee on rehearing that his continued refusal to answer might lead to the denial of his application.” It was stated at one point in the Committee hearings: “It has been pointed out before to you, that the mere fact that a question is asked does not indicate that. other people would have asked or approved that question, nor does it indicate that any particular weight will be attached to the answer or failure to answer the question; do you understand?” It should be observed, however, that this remark, as was also the case with an earlier similar remark, was made in the context of questions involving petitioner’s religious beliefs. See note 5, supra. This aspect of Anastaplo’s contention is based on the following episode relating to the Committee’s Communist Party questions: “Mr. Anastaplo: ... I would like to find out exactly what this entails. You are not suggesting that refusal to answer that question would per se block my admission to the bar? “Commissioner Stephan: No, I am saying your refusal to answer that question as to whether you are a member of the Communist Party, could and might. “Mr. Anastaplo: I see. “Commissioner Stephan: To us, it is relevant to your character and fitness. If you should answer the question 'yes,' I am not at all sure that would end the inquiry. I think if you should answer it 'yes,' the committee should be entitled to probe further and find out what kind of Communist Party member the applicant might be, whether he is an active member, whether he is a dues-paying member, whether he is a policy-making member, whether he is an officer in a local group, or just what he is. So I would point out the seriousness of that issue to you at this time. “Mr. Anastaplo: I assume that the committee does not care to state why this is a particularly serious issue with respect to me? I mean — I notice you say nothing about the Ku Klux Klan or the Silver Shirts of America, about which you have also asked with the same amount of emphasis up to this point, and which I have refused to answer for the same reasons. Would you care to indicate why you say this about this question and not about the other ones? “Commissioner Stephan: I think there is an easy answer to that. This committee has not come into being — this committee cannot completely ignore the history of this proceeding. “Commissioner-: But the history includes that question, and that question has been before two of the high courts of the country. “Commissioner Stephan: Whatever the relevance of other questions, we consider that one quite relevant.”- The particular importance which the Committee attached to its Communist Party questions was still further brought home to Anastaplo by the fact that after this Court’s decisions in Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U. S. 399, and Lerner v. Casey, 357 U. S. 468, had come down, the Committee wrote Anastaplo specifically drawing his attention to them. We find it difficult to understand how it can be seriously suggested, as it further is, that petitioner was put off guard by the fact that instead of standing on petitioner’s mere refusal to answer such questions, the Committee proceeded to interrogate him widely. Not only are subsequent events generally irrelevant to an earlier warning, but a large part of the questioning which Anastaplo now complains led him astray was in fact devoted to exploring' the bearing of these questions on his fitness for admission to the bar and his reasons for declining to answer them. Both the Committee’s report and the State Supreme Court’s opinion make it apparent that this area of Anastaplo’s views played no part in his exclusion from the bar. See pp. 86-88, supra; 18 Ill. 2d, at 188, 163 N. E. 2d, at 432. This of course could hardly be so in the context of the illustrations which Anastaplo gave of his views as to when a right to resist might arise. These were: Nazi Germany; Hungary during the 1956 revolt against Russia; a hypothetical decree of this Court establishing “some dead pagan religion as the official religion of the country . . .”; a capital sentence of Jesus Christ. Asked to give a more realistic instance of when resistance would be proper, Anastaplo summarized: “I know of no decree, off hand, in the history of American government, where such a single instance has occurred. No — I grant that it is hard -to find these instances. I think it is important to insist that there might be such instances.” Nothing in the State Court’s opinion remotely suggests its approbation of these views of “certain” Committee members. Supra, pp. 86-88. Apart from anything else, there is of course no room under our Rules for the suggestion made in petitioner’s brief that he be admitted to the Bar of this Court, “independently of the. action Illinois might be induced to take.” See Rule 5, Revised Rules of this Court.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC. v. ELLERTH No. 97-569. Argued April 22, 1998 — Decided June 26, 1998 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 766. Thomas, X, filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 766. James J. Casey argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Mary Margaret Moore and Robert A. Wicker. Ernest T Rossiello argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Margaret A. Zuleger and Eric Schnapper. Deputy Solicitor General Underwood argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Lee, Irving L. Gornstein, C. Gregory Stewart, Philip B. Sklover, Carolyn L. Wheeler, and Susan L. P. Starr. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Carol Connor Flowe, Stephen A. Bokat, Robin S. Conrad, and Sussan L. Mahallati; and for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Ann Elizabeth Reesman. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Jonathan P. Hiatt, Marsha S. Berzon, and Laurence Gold; for Equal Rights Advocates et al. by Samuel A. Marcosson, Beth H. Parker, and Rose Fua; and for the Rutherford Institute by John W. Whitehead and Steven II. Aden. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, H. Candace Gorman, and Paula A. Brantner filed a brief for the National Employment Lawyers Association as amicus curiae. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. We decide whether, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., an employee who refuses the unwelcome and threatening sexual advances of a supervisor, yet suffers no adverse, tangible job consequences, can recover against the employer without showing the employer is negligent or otherwise at fault for the supervisor’s actions. í — H Summary judgment was granted for the employer, so we must take the facts alleged by the employee to be true. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U. S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam). The employer is Burlington Industries, the petitioner. The employee is Kimberly Ellerth, the respondent. From March 1993 until May 1994, Ellerth worked as a salesperson in one of Burlington’s divisions in Chicago, Illinois. During her employment, she alleges, she was subjected to constant sexual harassment by her supervisor, one Ted Slowik. In the hierarchy of Burlington’s management structure, Slowik was a midlevel manager. Burlington has eight divisions, employing more than 22,000 people in some 50 plants around the United States. Slowik was a vice president in one of five business units within one of the divisions. He had authority to make hiring and promotion decisions subject to the approval of his supervisor, who signed the paperwork. See 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1119, n. 14 (ND Ill. 1996). According to Slowik’s supervisor, his position was “not considered an upper-level management position,” and he was “not amongst the decision-making or policy-making hierarchy.” Ibid. Slowik was not Ellerth’s immediate supervisor. Ellerth worked in a two-person office in Chicago, and she answered to her office colleague, who in turn answered to Slowik in New York. Against a background of repeated boorish and offensive remarks and gestures which Slowik allegedly made, Ellerth places particular emphasis on three alleged incidents where Slowik’s comments could be construed as threats to deny her tangible job benefits. In the summer of 1993, while on a business trip, Slowik invited Ellerth to the hotel lounge, an invitation Ellerth felt compelled to accept because Slowik was her boss. App. 155. When Ellerth gave no encouragement to remarks Slowik made about her breasts, he told her to “loosen up" and warned, “you know, Kim, I could make your life very hard or very easy at Burlington.” Id., at 156. In March 1994, when Ellerth was being considered for a promotion, Slowik expressed reservations during the promotion interview because she was not “loose enough.” Id., at 159. The comment was followed by his reaching over and rubbing her knee. Ibid. Ellerth did receive the promotion; but when Slowik called to announce it, he told Ellerth, “you’re gonna be out there with men who work in factories, and they certainly like women with pretty butts/legs.” Id., at 159-160. In May 1994, Ellerth called Slowik, asking permission to insert a customer’s logo into a fabric sample. Slowik responded, “I don’t have time for you right now, Kim . . .— unless you want to tell me what you’re wearing.” Id., at 78. Ellerth told Slowik she had to go and ended the call. Ibid. A day or two later, Ellerth called Slowik to ask permission again. This time he denied her request, but added something along the lines of, “are you wearing shorter skirts yet, Kim, because it would make your job a whole heck of a lot easier.” Id., at 79. A short time later, Ellerth’s immediate supervisor cautioned her about returning telephone calls to customers in a prompt fashion. 912 F. Supp., at 1109. In response, Ellerth quit. She faxed a letter giving reasons unrelated to the alleged sexual harassment we have described. Ibid. About three weeks later, however, she sent a letter explaining she quit because of Slowik’s behavior. Ibid. During her tenure at Burlington, Ellerth did not inform anyone in authority about Slowik’s conduct, despite knowing Burlington had a policy against sexual harassment. Ibid. In fact, she chose not to inform her immediate supervisor (not Slowik) because “ ‘it would be his duty as my supervisor to report any incidents of sexual harassment.’ ” Ibid. On one occasion, she told Slowik a comment he made was inappropriate. Ibid. In October 1994, after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Copimission (EEOC), Ellerth filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging Burlington engaged in sexual harassment and forced her constructive discharge, in violation of Title VIL The District Court granted summary judgment to Burlington. The court found Slowik’s behavior, as described by Ellerth, severe and pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment, but found Burlington neither knew nor should have known about the conduct. There was no triable issue of fact on the latter point, and the court noted Ellerth had not used Burlington’s internal complaint procedures. Id., at 1118. Although Ellerth’s claim was framed as a hostile work environment complaint, the District Court observed there was a quid pro quo “component” to the hostile environment. Id., at 1121. Proceeding from the premise that an employer faces vicarious liability for quid pro quo harassment, the District Court thought it necessary to apply a negligence standard because the quid pro quo merely contributed to the hostile work environment. See id., at 1123. The District Court also dismissed Ellerth’s constructive discharge claim. The Court of Appeals en bane reversed in a decision which produced eight separate opinions and no consensus for a controlling rationale. The judges were able to agree on the problem they confronted: Vicarious liability, not failure to comply with a duty of care, was the essence of Ellerth’s case against Burlington on appeal. The judges seemed to agree Ellerth could recover if Slowik’s unfulfilled threats to deny her tangible job benefits was sufficient to impose vicarious liability on Burlington. Jansen v. Packing Corp. of America, 123 F. 3d 490, 494 (CA7 1997) (per curiam). With the exception of Judges Coffey and Easterbrook, the judges also agreed Ellerth’s claim could be categorized as one of quid pro quo harassment, even though she had received the promotion and had suffered no other tangible retaliation. Ibid. The consensus disintegrated on the standard for an employer’s liability for such a claim. Six judges, Judges Flaum, Cummings, Bauer, Evans, Rovner, and Diane P. Wood, agreed the proper standard was vicarious liability, and so Ellerth could recover even though Burlington was not negligent. Ibid. They had different reasons for the conclusion. According to Judges Flaum, Cummings, Bauer, and Evans, whether a claim involves a quid pro quo determines whether vicarious liability applies; and they in turn defined quid pro quo to include a supervisor’s threat to inflict a tangible job injury whether or not it was completed. Id., at 499. Judges Wood and Rovner interpreted agency principles to impose vicarious liability on employers for most claims of supervisor sexual harassment, even absent a quid pro quo. Id., at 565. Although Judge Easterbrook did not think Ellerth had stated a quid pro quo claim, he would have followed the law of the controlling State to determine the employer’s liability, and by this standard, the employer would be liable here. Id., at 552. In contrast, Judge Kanne said Ellerth had stated a quid pro quo claim, but negligence was the appropriate standard of liability when the quid pro quo involved threats only. Id., at 505. Chief Judge Posner, joined by Judge Manion, disagreed. He asserted Ellerth could not recover against Burlington despite having stated a quid pro quo claim. According to Chief Judge Posner, an employer is subject to vicarious liability for “aet[s] that significantly alte[r] the terms or conditions of employment,” or “company act[s].” Id., at 515. In the emergent terminology, an unfulfilled quid pro quo is a mere threat to do a company act rather than the act itself, and in these circumstances, an employer can be found liable for its negligence only. Ibid. Chief Judge Posner also found Ellerth failed to create a triable issue of fact as to Burlington’s negligence. Id., at 517. Judge Coffey rejected all of the above approaches because he favored a uniform standard of negligence in almost all sexual harassment eases. Id., at 518. The disagreement revealed in the careful opinions of the judges of the Court of Appeals reflects the fact that Congress has left it to the courts to determine controlling agency law principles in a new and difficult area of federal law. We granted certiorari to assist in defining the relevant standards of employer liability. 522 U. S. 1086 (1998). i — i At the outset, we assume an important proposition yet to be established before a trier of fact. It is a premise assumed as well, in explicit or implicit terms, in the various opinions by the judges of the Court of Appeals. The premise is: A trier of fact could find in Slowik’s remarks numerous threats to retaliate against Ellerth if she denied some sexual liberties. The threats, however, were not carried out or fulfilled. Cases based on threats which are carried out are referred to often as quid pro quo cases, as distinct from bothersome attentions or sexual remarks that are sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. The terms quid pro quo and hostile work environment are helpful, perhaps, in making a rough demarcation between cases in which threats are carried out and those where they are not or are absent altogether, but beyond this are of limited utility. Section 708(a) of Title YII forbids “an employer— “(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s ... sex.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(l). “Quid pro quo” and “hostile work environment” do not appear in the statutory text. The terms appeared first in the academic literature, see C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (1979); found their way into decisions of the Courts of Appeals, see, e. g., Henson v. Dundee, 682 F. 2d 897, 909 (CA11 1982); and were mentioned in this Court’s decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57 (1986). See generally E. Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Policy 807 (1998). In Meritor, the terms served a specific and limited purpose. There we considered whether the conduct in question constituted discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment in violation of Title VII. We assumed, and with adequate reason, that if an employer demanded sexual favors from an employee in return for a job benefit, discrimination with respect to terms or conditions of employment was explicit. Less obvious was whether an employer’s sexually demeaning behavior altered terms or conditions of employment in violation of Title VII. We distinguished between quid pro quo claims and hostile environment claims, see 477 U. S., at 65, and said both were cognizable under Title VII, though the latter requires harassment that is severe or pervasive. Ibid. The principal significance of the distinction is to instruct that Title VII is violated by either explicit or constructive alterations in the terms or conditions of employment and to explain the latter must be severe or pervasive. The distinction was not discussed for its bearing upon an employer’s liability for an employee’s discrimination. On this question Meritor held, with no further specifics, that agency principles controlled. Id., at 72. Nevertheless, as use of the terms grew in the wake of Meritor, they acquired their own significance. The standard of employer responsibility turned on which type of harassment occurred. If the plaintiff established a quid pro quo claim, the Courts of Appeals held, the employer was subject to vicarious liability. See Davis v. Sioux City, 115 F. 3d 1365, 1367 (CA8 1997); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F. 3d 503, 513-514 (CA9 1994); Bouton v. BMW of North America, Inc., 29 F. 3d 103, 106-107 (CA3 1994); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F. 3d 1122, 1127 (CA10 1993); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F. 2d 178, 185-186 (CA6), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 1041 (1992); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F. 2d 1311, 1316 (CA11 1989). The rule encouraged. Title VII plaintiffs to state their claims as quid pro quo claims, which in turn put expansive pressure on the definition. The equivalence of the quid pro quo label and vicarious liability is illustrated by this case. The question presented on certiorari is whether Ellerth can state a claim of quid pro quo harassment, but the issue of real concern to the parties is whether Burlington has vicarious liability for Slowik’s alleged misconduct, rather than liability limited to its own negligence. The question presented for certiorari asks: ‘Whether a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment may be stated under Title VII . . . where the plaintiff employee has neither submitted to the sexual advances of the alleged harasser nor suffered any tangible effects on the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment as a consequence of a refusal to submit to those advances?” Pet. for Cert. i. We do not suggest the terms quid pro quo and hostile work environment are irrelevant to Title VII litigation. To the extent they illustrate the distinction between eases involving a threat which is carried out and offensive conduct in general, the terms are relevant when there is a threshold question whether a plaintiff can prove discrimination in violation of Title VII. When a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted from a refusal to submit to a supervisor’s sexual demands, he or she establishes that the employment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of employment that is actionable under Title VII. For any sexual harassment preceding the employment decision to be actionable, however, the conduct must be severe or pervasive. Because Ellerth’s claim involves only unfulfilled threats, it should be categorized as a hostile work environment claim which requires a showing of severe or pervasive conduct. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 81 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U. S. 17, 21 (1993). For purposes of this ease, we accept the District Court’s finding that the alleged conduct was severe or pervasive. See supra, at 749. The case before us involves numerous alleged threats, and we express no opinion as to whether a single unfulfilled threat is sufficient to constitute discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment. When we assume discrimination can be proved, however, the factors we discuss below, and not the categories quid pro quo and hostile work environment, will be controlling on the issue of vicarious liability. That is the question we must resolve. Ill We must decide, then, whether an employer has vicarious liability when a supervisor creates á hostile work environment by making explicit threats to alter a subordinate’s terms or conditions of employment, based on sex, but does not fulfill the threat. We turn to principles of agency law, for the term “employer” is defined under Title VII to include “agents.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(b); see Meritor, supra, at 72. In express terms, Congress has directed federal courts to interpret Title VII based on agency principles. Given such an explicit instruction, we conclude a uniform and predictable standard must be established as a matter of federal law. We rely “on the general common law of agency, rather than on the law of any particular State, to give meaning to these terms.” Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U. S. 730, 740 (1989). The resulting federal rule, based on a body of ease law developed over time, is statutory interpretation pursuant to congressional direction. This is not federal common law in “the strictest sense, i. e., a rule of decision that amounts, not simply to an interpretation of a federal statute ..., but, rather, to the judicial ‘creation’ of a special federal rule of decision.” Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U. S. 213, 218 (1997). State-court decisions, applying state employment discrimination law, may be instructive in applying general agency principles, but, it is interesting to note, in many cases their determinations of employer liability under state law rely in large part on federal-court decisions under Title VIL E. g., Arizona v. Schallock, 189 Ariz. 250, 259, 941 P. 2d 1275, 1284 (1997); Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 132 N. J. 587, 622, 626 A. 2d 445, 463 (1993); Thompson v. Berta Enterprises, Inc., 72 Wash. App. 531, 537-539, 864 P. 2d 983, 986-988 (1994). As Meritor acknowledged, the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1957) (hereinafter Restatement) is a useful beginning point for a discussion of general agency principles. 477 U. S., at 72. Since our decision in Meritor, federal courts have explored agency principles, and we find useful instruction in their decisions, noting that “common-law principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII.” Ibid. The EEOC has issued Guidelines governing sexual harassment claims under Title VII, but they provide little guidance on the issue of employer liability for supervisor harassment. See 29 CFR § 1604.11(e) (1997) (vicarious liability for supervisor harassment turns on “the particular employment relationship and the job functions performed by the individual”). A Section 219(1) of the Restatement sets out a central principle of agency law: “A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment.” An employer may be liable for both negligent and intentional torts committed by an employee within the scope of his or her employment. Sexual harassment under Title VII presupposes intentional conduct. While early decisions absolved employers of liability for the intentional torts of their employees, the law now imposes liability where the employee’s “purpose, however misguided, is wholly or in part to further the master’s business.” W. Keeton, B. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts §70, p. 505 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter Prosser and Keeton on Torts). In applying scope of employment principles to intentional torts, however, it is accepted that “it is less likely that a willful tort will properly be held to be in the course of employment and that the liability of the master for such torts will naturally be more limited.” F. Mechem, Outlines of the Law of Agency §394, p. 266 (P. Mechem 4th ed. 1952). The Restatement defines conduct, including an intentional tort, to be within the scope of employment when “actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the [employer],” even if it is forbidden by the employer. Restatement §§ 228(l)(e), 230. For example, when a salesperson lies to a customer to make a sale, the tortious conduct is within the scope of employment because it benefits the employer by increasing sales, even though it may violate the employer’s policies. See Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 70, at 505-506. As Courts of Appeals have recognized, a supervisor acting out of gender-based animus or a desire to fulfill sexual urges may not be actuated by a purpose to serve the employer. See, e. g., Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F. 3d 1437, 1444 (CA10 1997), vacated on other grounds, post, p. 947; Torres v. Pisano, 116 F. 3d 625, 634, n. 10 (CA2 1997). But see Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F. 2d, at 184-185 (holding harassing supervisor acted within scope of employment, but employer was not liable because of its quick and effective remediation). The harassing supervisor often acts for personal motives, motives unrelated and even antithetical to the objectives of the employer. Cf. Mechem, supra, §368 (“[F]or the time being [the supervisor] is conspicuously and unmistakably seeking a personal end”); see also Restatement §235, Illustration 2 (tort committed while “[ajeting purely from personal ill will” not within the scope of. employment); id., Illustration 3 (tort committed in retaliation for failing to pay the employee a bribe not within the scope of employment). There are instances, of course, where a supervisor engages in unlawful discrimination with the purpose, mistaken or otherwise, to serve the employer. E. g., Sims v. Montgomery County Comm’n, 766 F. Supp. 1052, 1075 (MD Ala. 1990) (supervisor acting in scope of employment where employer has a policy of discouraging women from seeking advancement and “sexual harassment was simply a way of furthering that policy”). The concept of scope of employment has not always been construed to require a motive to serve the employer. E. g., Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F. 2d 167, 172 (CA2 1968). Federal courts have nonetheless found similar limitations on employer liability when applying the agency laws of the States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which makes the Federal Government liable for torts committed by employees within the scope of employment. 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b); see, e. g., Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F. 3d 222, 237 (CA4 1994) (supervisor’s unfair criticism of subordinate’s work in retaliation for rejecting his sexual advances not within scope of employment); Wood v. United States, 995 F. 2d 1122, 1123 (CA1 1993) (Breyer, C. J.) (sexual harassment amounting to assault and battery “clearly outside the scope of employment”); see also 2 L. Jayson & R. Longstreth, Handling Federal Tort Claims § 9.07[4], p. 9-211 (1998). The general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment. B Scope of employment does not define the only basis for employer liability under agency principles. In limited circumstances, agency principles impose liability on employers even where employees commit torts outside the scope of employment. The principles are set forth in the much-cited § 219(2) of the Restatement: “(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless: “(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or “(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or “(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or “(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.” See also §219, Comment e (Section 219(2) “enumerates the situations in which a master may be liable for torts of servants acting solely for their own purposes and hence not in the scope of employment”). Subsection (a) addresses direct liability, where the employer acts with tortious intent, and indirect liability, where the agent's high rank in the company makes him or her the employer’s alter ego. None of the parties contend Slowik’s rank imputes liability under this principle. There is no contention, furthermore, that a nondelegable duty is involved. See § 219(2) (e). So, for our purposes here, subsections (a) and (c) can be put aside. Subsections (b) and (d) are possible grounds for imposing employer liability on account of a supervisor’s acts and must be considered. Under subsection (b), an employer is liable when the tort is attributable to the employer’s own negligence. §219(2)(b). Thus, although a supervisor’s sexual harassment is outside the scope of employment because the conduct was for personal motives, an employer can be liable, nonetheless, where its own negligence is a cause of the harassment. An employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it. Negligence sets a minimum standard for employer liability under Title VII; but Ellerth seeks to invoke the more stringent standard of vicarious liability. Section 219(2)(d) concerns vicarious liability for intentional torts committed by an employee when the employee uses apparent authority (the apparent authority standard), or when the employee “was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation” (the aided in the agency relation standard). Ibid. As other federal decisions have done in discussing vicarious liability for supervisor harassment, e. g., Henson v. Dundee, 682 F. 2d 897, 909 (CA11 1982), we begin with § 219(2)(d). C As a general rule, apparent authority is relevant where the agent purports to exercise a power which he or she does not have, as distinct from where the agent threatens to misuse actual power. Compare Restatement §6 (defining “power”) with §8 (defining “apparent authority”). In the usual case, a supervisor’s harassment involves misuse of actual power, not the false impression of its existence. Apparent authority analysis therefore is inappropriate in this context. If, in the unusual case, it is alleged there is a false impression that the actor was a supervisor, when he in fact was not, the victim’s mistaken conclusion must be a reasonable one. Restatement § 8, Comment c (“Apparent authority exists only to the extent it is reasonable for the third person dealing with the agent to believe that the agent is authorized”). When a party seeks to impose vicarious liability based on an agent’s misuse of delegated authority, the Restatement’s aided in the agency relation rule, rather than the apparent authority rule, appears to be the appropriate form of analysis. D We turn to the aided in the agency relation standard. In a sense, most workplace tortfeasors are aided in accomplishing their tortious objective by the existence of the agency relation: Proximity and regular contact may afford a captive pool of potential victims. See Gary v. Long, 59 F. 3d 1391, 1397 (CADC 1995). Were this to satisfy the aided in the agency relation standard, an employer would be subject to vicarious liability not only for all supervisor harassment, but also for all co-worker harassment, a result enforced by neither the EEOC nor any court of appeals to have considered the issue. See, e. g., Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers, Inc., 123 F. 3d 868, 872 (CA6 1997), cert. denied, 522 U. S. 1110 (1998) (sex discrimination); McKenzie v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 92 F. 3d 473, 480 (CA7 1996) (sex discrimination); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F. 2d 1264, 1273 (CA7 1991) (race discrimination); see also 29 CFR § 1604.11(d) (1997) (“knows or should have known” standard of liability for cases of harassment between “fellow employees”). The aided in the agency relation standard, therefore, requires the existence of something more than the employment relation itself. At the outset, we can identify a class of cases where, beyond question, more than the mere existence of the employment relation aids in commission of the harassment: when a supervisor takes a tangible employment action against the subordinate. Every Federal Court of Appeals to have considered the question has found vicarious liability when a discriminatory act results in a tangible employment action. See, e. g., Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F. 3d 1122, 1127 (CA10 1993) (“ ‘If the plaintiff can show that she suffered an economic injury from her supervisor’s actions, the employer becomes strictly liable without any further showing . . .’ ”). In Meritor, we acknowledged this consensus. See 477 U. S., at 70-71 (“[Tjhe courts have consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory discharges of employees by supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer knew, or should have known, or approved of the supervisor’s actions”). Although few courts have elaborated how agency principles support this rule, we think it reflects a correct application of the aided in the agency relation standard. In the context of this ease, a tangible employment action would have taken the form of a denial of a raise or a promotion. The concept of a tangible employment aetion appears in numerous cases in the Courts of Appeals discussing claims involving race, age, and national origin discrimination, as well as sex discrimination. Without endorsing the specific results of those decisions, we think it prudent to import the concept of a tangible employment action for resolution of the vicarious liability issue we consider here. A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. Compare Crady v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F. 2d 132, 136 (CA7 1993) (“A materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation”), with Flaherty v. Gas Research Institute, 31 F. 3d 451, 456 (CA7 1994) (a “bruised ego” is not enough), Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F. 3d 876, 887 (CA6 1996) (demotion without change in pay, benefits, duties, or prestige insufficient), and Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F. 3d 379, 382 (CA8 1994) (reassignment to more inconvenient job insufficient). When a supervisor makes a tangible employment decision, there is assurance the injury could not have been inflicted absent the agency relation. A tangible employment action in most eases inflicts direct economic harm. As a general proposition, only a supervisor, or other person acting with the authority of the company, can cause this sort of injury. A co-worker can break a co-worker’s arm as easily as a supervisor, and anyone who has regular contact with an employee can inflict psychological injuries by his or her offensive conduct. See Gary, supra, at 1397; Henson, 682 F. 2d, at 910; Barnes v. Costle, 561 F. 2d 983, 996 (CADC 1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring). But one co-worker (absent some elaborate scheme) cannot dock another’s pay, nor can. one co-worker demote another. Tangible employment actions fall within the special province of the supervisor. The supervisor has been empowered by the company as a distinct class of agent to make economic decisions affecting other employees under his or her control. Tangible employment actions are the means by which the supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates. A tangible employment decision requires an official act of the enterprise, a company act. Tie decision in most cases is documented in official company records, and may be subject to review by higher level supervisors. E. g., Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F. 2d 398, 405 (CA7 1990) (noting that the supervisor did not fire plaintiff; rather, the Career Path Committee did, but the employer was still liable because the committee functioned as the supervisor’s “cat’s-paw”). The supervisor often must obtain the imprimatur of the enterprise and use its internal processes. See Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc., 957 F. 2d 59, 62 (CA2 1992) (“From the perspective of the employee, the supervisor and the employer merge into a single entity”). For these reasons, a tangible employment action taken by the supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the employer. Whatever the exact contours of the aided in the agency relation standard, its requirements will always be met when a supervisor takes a tangible employment action against a subordinate. In that instance, it would be implausible to interpret agency principles to allow an employer to escape liability, as Meritor itself appeared to acknowledge. See supra, at 760-761. Whether the agency relation aids in commission of supervisor harassment which does not culminate in a tangible employment action is less obvious. Application of the standard is made difficult by its malleable terminology, which can be read to either expand or limit liability in the context of supervisor harassment. On the one hand, a supervisor’s power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular threatening character, and in this sense, a supervisor always is aided by the agency relation. See Meritor, 477 U. S., at 77 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) (“[I]t is precisely because the supervisor is understood to be clothed with the employer’s authority that he is able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on subordinates”). On the other hand, there are acts of harassment a supervisor might commit which might be the same acts a coemployee would commit, and there may be some circumstances where the supervisor’s status makes little difference. It is this tension which, we think, has caused so much confusion among the Courts of Appeals which have sought to apply the aided in the agency relation standard to Title VII cases. The aided in the agency relation standard, however, is a developing feature of agency law, and we hesitate to render a definitive explanation of our understanding of the standard in an area where other important considerations must affect our judgment. In particular, we are bound by our holding in Meritor that agency principles constrain the imposition of vicarious liability in cases of supervisory harassment. See id., at 72 (“Congress’ decision to define ‘employer’ to include any ‘agent’ of an employer, 42 U. S. C. §2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible”). Congress has not altered Mer- itor’s rule even though it has made significant amendments to Title YII in the interim. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 720, 736 (1977) (“[W]e must bear in mind that considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to change this Court’s interpretation of its legislation”). Although Meritor suggested the limitation on employer liability stemmed from agency principles, the Court acknowledged other considerations might be relevant as well. See 477 U. S., at 72 (“common-law principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII”). For example, Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms. Were employer liability to depend in part on an employer’s effort to create such procedures, it would effect Congress’ intention to promote conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context, see EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U. S. 54, 77 (1984), and the EEOC’s policy of encouraging the development of grievance procedures. See 29 CFR § 1604.11(f) (1997); EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 BNA FEP Manual 405:6699 (Mar. 19,1990). To the extent limiting employer liability could encourage employees to report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive, it would also serve Title VII’s deterrent purpose. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U. S. 352, 358 (1995). As we have observed, Title VII borrows from tort law the avoidable consequences doctrine, see Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U. S. 219, 231, n. 15 (1982), and the considerations which animate that doctrine would also support the limitation of employer liability in certain circumstances. In order to accommodate the agency principles of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as Title VIPs equally basic policies of encouraging forethought by employers and saving action by objecting employees, we adopt the following holding in this case and in Faragher v. Boca Raton, post, p. 775, also decided today. An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible employment aetion is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of the defense. No affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment aetion, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment. IV Relying on existing case law which held out the promise of vicarious liability for all quid pro quo claims, see supra, at 752-753, Ellerth focused all her attention in the Court of Appeals on proving her claim fit within that category. Given our explanation that the labels quid pro quo and hostile work environment are not controlling for purposes of establishing employer liability, see supra, at 754, Ellerth should have an adequate opportunity to prove she has a claim for which Burlington is liable. Although Ellerth has not alleged she suffered a tangible employment action at the hands of Slowik, which would deprive Burlington of the availability of the affirmative defense, this is not dispositive. In light of our decision, Burlington is still subject to vicarious liability for Slowik’s activity, but Burlington should have an opportunity to assert and prove the affirmative defense to liability. See supra, at 765. For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reversing the grant of summary judgment against Ellerth. On remand, the District Court will have the opportunity to decide whether it would be appropriate to allow Ellerth to amend her pleading or supplement her discovery. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SUPER TIRE ENGINEERING CO. et al. v. McCORKLE et al. No. 72-1554. Argued January 15, 1974 Decided April 16, 1974 Blackmun,-- J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Douglas, Brennan; White, and Marshall, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, post, p. 127. . Lawrence M. Cohen argued the.'cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Herbert G. Keene, Jr., and James A. Young. Stephen SJcillman, First Assistant Attorney" General of New jersey, argued the cause for respondents McCorkle et al. With him on the briefs were George F. Kugler, Jr., former Attorney General, William F. Hyland, Attorney General, and Jane Sommer and Paul N. Waiter, Deputy Attorneys General. Robert F. O’Brien argued the cause and filed briefs for respondent Teamsters Local Union No. 676. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Milton Smith, Gerard C. Smetana, and Jerry Kronenberg for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and by J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and Thomas E. Harris for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. In New Jersey, workers engaged in an economic strike are eligible for public assistance through state welfare programs. Employers whose plants were struck instituted this suit for injunctive and declaratory relief against such eligibility. Before the .case was tried, the labor dispute- was settled and the strike came to an end. The question presented is whether a “case” or “controversy” still exists, within the meaning of Art. Ill, § 2, of the • Constitution, and of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2201-2202. I A collective-bargaining agreement between petitioners Super Tire Engineering Company and Supercap Corporation, affiliated New Jersey corporations, and Teamsters Local Union No. 676, the certified collective-bargaining representative for the two corporations’ production and maintenance employees, expired on May 14, 1971. Because ¿ new agreement had not as yet been reached, the employees promptly went out on strike. Some four weeks later, with the strike continuing, the two corporations, and their president and chief executive officer, filed the present suit in the United States District Court for the District of- New Jersey against various New Jersey officials. The complaint alleged that many of the striking employees had received and would continue to receive pub-lie assistance through two New Jersey public welfare programs, pursuant to regulations issued and administered by the named defendants. The petitioners sought a declaration that these interpretive regulations, according benefits, to striking workers, were null and void because they constituted an interference with the federal labor policy of free collective bargaining expressed in the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U. S. C. § 141 et seq., and with other federal policy pronounced in provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935, viz., 42 U. S. C. §§ 602 (a)(8)(C), ¿06 (e)(1), and 607 (b)(1)(B)'. The petitioners also sought injunctive relief against the New Jersey welfare administrators’ making public, funds available to labor union members engaged in the strike. With their complaint, the petitioners filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The supporting affidavit by the individual petitioner recited the expiration of .the collective-bargaining agreement, the failure of the parties to reach a new agreement, the commencement and continuation of the strike, the application by many of the strikers for state welfare benefits, and their receipt of such benefits from the beginning of the strike to the date of the affidavit. The affiant further stated that the availability of these benefits interfered with and infringed upon free collective bargaining as guaranteed by Congress and “hardened the resolve of the said strikers to remain out of work in support of their bargaining demands,” App. 32, and, in addition, that “the current strike will undoubtedly be of longer duration than would have otherwise been the case; that the impact of the grant of welfare benefits and public assistance to the strikers involved has resulted in the State of New Jersey subsidizing one party to the current labor dispute; and that such subsidization by the State has resulted in upsetting the economic balance between employer and employees otherwise obtained in such a labor dispute.” Ibid. At the hearing held on June 24- on the motion for preliminary injunction, the union, now a respondent here, was permitted to intervene. App. 37. Counsel for the union contended that “this entire matter . . . has been mooted” because “these employees voted to return to work and are scheduled to return to work tomorrow morning.” App. 39. The District Court, nonetheless, proceeded to the merits of the dispute and, on the basis of the holding in ITT Lamp Division v. Minter, 435 F. 2d 989 (CA1 1970), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 933 (1971), ruled that the appropriate forum for the petitioners’ claim was the Congress, and that the New Jersey practice of according aid to striking workers was not violative of thé Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. The court denied the motion for preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint. App. 45-46. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, by a divided vote, did not reach the merits but remanded the case.with instructions to vacate and dismiss for mootness. 469 F. 2d 911, 922 (1972). We granted certiorari to consider the mootness issue. 414 U. S. 817 (1973). n The respondent union invites us to conclude that this controversy between the petitioners and the State became moot when the particular economic strike terminated upon the execution of the new collective-bargaining agreement and the return of the strikers to work in late June. That conclusion, however, is appropriate with respect to only one aspect of the lawsuit, that is, the request for injunctive relief made in the context of official state action during the pendency of the strike. The petitioners here have sought, from the very beginning,, declaratory relief as well as an injunction. Clearly, the District Court had “the duty to decide the appropriateness and the merits of the declaratory request irrespective of its conclusion as to the propriety of the issuance of the injunction.” Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 254 (1967); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 166 (1973); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 468-A69 (1974). Thus, even though the case for an injunction dissolved with the subsequent settlement of the strike and the strikers’ return to wofk, the parties to the principal controversy, that is, the corporate petitioners and the New Jersey officials, may still retain sufficient interests and injury as. to justify the award of declaratory relief! The question is “whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having advérse legal interests, of sufficiént immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270, 273 (1941), And ' since this case involves governmental action, we must ponder the broader consideration whether the short-term, nature of that action makes the issues presented here “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” so that peti-. tioners are adversely affected by government “without a chance of redress.” Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). ' A. We hold that the facts here provide full and complete satisfaction of the. requirement of the Constitution's Art. Ill, § 2, and the Declaratory Judgment Act, that a case or controversy exist between the parties. Unlike the situations that prevailed in Oil Workers Unions v. Missouri, 361 U. S. 363 (1960), on which the Court of Appeals' majority chiefly relied, and. in Harris v. Battle, 348 U. S. 803 (1954), the challenged governmental activity in the present, case is not contingent, has not' evaporated or disappeared, and,- by' its continuing and brooding presence, casts what may well, be a substantial adverse effect on the interests of the petitioning parties. In both Harris and Oil Workers k state statute authorized the Governor to take immediate possession of a public utility in the event of a strike or work stoppage that interfered with the public interest. The seizure was not automatic for every public utility labor dispute. It took effect only upon the exercise of the Governor’s discretion. In each case the Court held the controversy to be moot because both the seizure and the strike had terminated prior to the time the case reached this. Court, The governmental action challenged was the authority to seize the !public utility, and it was clear that a seizure would not recur except in circumstances where (a) there was another strike or' stoppage, and (b) in the judgment of'the Governor, the public interest required it. The question was thus posed in a situation where the threat of governmental action was two steps removed from reality. "This made the recurrence of a seizure so remote and speculative that there, was no tangible prejudice to the existing interests of the parties and, therefore, there was a “want of a subject matter” on which any judgment' of this Court could operate. Oil Workers, 361 U. S., at 371. This was particularly apparent in Oil Workers because, although the union had sought both declaratory and injunctive relief,, the decision the Court was asked'to review “upheld only the validity of an injunction, an injunction that expired by its own terms more than three years ago.” Ibid. The present case has a decidedly different .posture. As in Harris and Oil Workers, the strike here was settled before the litigation reached this’ Court. But, unlike those cases, thq challenged governmental action has not ceased. The . New, Jersey governmental action does not rest on the distant contingencies of another strike and the discretionary act of an official. Rather, New Jersey has declared positively that able-bodied striking workers who are engaged, .individually and collectively, in an economic dispute with their employer are eligible for economic benefits. This policy is fixed and definite. It is not contingent upon executive discretion. Employees know that if they go out on strike, public funds are available. The petitioners’ claim is that this eligibility affects the collective-bargaining relationship, both in the context of a live labor dispute when a collective-bargaining agreement is in process of formulation, and in the ongoing collective relationship, so that the economic balance between labor and management, carefully formulated and preserved by Congress in the federal labor statutes, is altered by the State’s beneficent policy toward strikers. It cannot be doubted that the availability of state welfare assistance for striking workers in New Jersey pervades every work stoppage, affects every existing collective-bargaining agreement, • and is a factor lurking in the background of every incipient labor contract. The question, of course, is whether Congress, explicitly or implicitly, has ruled out such assistance in its calculus of laws regulating labor-management disputes. In this sense petitioners allege a colorable claim of injury from an extant and fixed policy directive of the State of New Jersey. That claim deserves a hearing. The decision in- Bus Employees v. Missouri, 374 U. S. 74 (1963), is not to the contrary. .In that case the Court adjudicated the merits of the same statutory scheme that had been challenged earlier in Oil Workers. It reached the merits even though the Governor had terminated the seizure of the public utility. His executive order, however, recited that the labor dispute “remains unresolved.” The Court’s rationale was that, since the labor dispute had not ended, “[tjhere thus exists in the present case not merely the speculative possibility of invocation of the King-Thompson Act in some future labor dispute, but the presence of an existing unresolved dispute which continues subject to all the provisions of the Act. Cf. Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 219 U. S. 498, 514-516; United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 632.” 374 U. S., at 78. The existence of the strike was important in that it rendered concrete the likelihood of state action prejudicial to the interests of the union. It was the remoteness of the threat of state action that convinced the Court in Oil Workers to hold that case moot. In the case now before us, the state action is not at all contingent. Under the petitioners’ view of the case, it is immediately and directly injurious to thé corporate petitioners’ economic positions. Pidiere such state action or its imminence adversely affects the status of private parties, the courts should be available to render appropriate relief and judgments affecting the parties’ rights and interests: B. If we were to condition our review on the existence of an economic strike, this case most certainly would be of the type presenting an issue “capable-of repetition, yet evading review.” Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S., at 515; Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F. 2d 449 (CA1), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 858 and 879 (1973); ITT Lamp Division v. Minter, 435 F. 2d, at 991. To require the presence of an active and live labor dispute would tax the litigant too much by arbitrarily slighting claims of adverse injury from concrete governmental action (of the immediate threat thereof). It is sufficient, therefore, that the litigant show the existence of an immediate and definite governmental action or policy that has adversely affected and continues to affect a present interest. Otherwise, a state policy affecting a collective-bargaining arrangement, except one involving a fine or other penalty, could be adjudicated only rarely, and the. purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act would be frustrated. Certainly, the pregnant appellants in Roe v. Wade, supra, and in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973), had long since outlasted their pregnancies by the time their cases reached this Court. Yet we h'ad no difficulty in rejecting suggestions of' mootness. 410 U. S., at. 125 and 187. Similar and consistent results were reached in Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 737 n, 8 (1974); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752, 756 n. 5 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 333 n. 2 (1972); and Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814, 816 (1969), cases concerning various challenges to state election laws. The important ingredient' in these cases was governmental action directly affecting, and continuing to affect, the behavior of citizens in our society. The issues here are no different. Economic' strikes are of comparatively short duration. There are exceptions, of course; See, for example, Local 888, UAW v. NLRB, 112 U. S. App. D. C. 107, 300 F. 2d 699, cert. denied sub nom. Kohler Co. v. Local 888, UAW, 370 U. S. 911 (1962)., But the great majority of economic strikes do not last long enough for complete judicial review of the controversies they engender. U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Analysis of Work Stoppages 1971, TableA 3, p. 16 (1973). A strike that lasts six weeks, as this'one did, may seem long, but its termination, like pregnancy at nine months and elections spaced at year-long or biennial intervals, should not preclude challenge to state policies that-have had their impact and that continue in force, unabated and unreviewed. The judiciary must not close the door to the resolution of the important* questions these concrete ■disputes present. ' The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings on the merits of the controversy. Zi * so ordered¡ Super Tire Engineering Company is engaged in the business of truck tire sales and service and the manufacture-and sale of industrial polyurethane tires and wheels. Supercap Corporation is engaged in the business of truck tire recapping and repairing. The named defendants were Lloyd W. McCorkle, Commissioner of the Department of Institutions and Agencies of the State of New Jersey; Irving J. Engelman, Director of the Division of Public Welfare of the Department of Institutions and .Agencies of the State of New Jersey; Fred L. Streng, Director of the Camden County, New Jersey, Welfare Board; and Juanita E. Dicks, Welfare Director of the Municipal Welfare Department of the City of Camden, New Jersey. The General Public Assistance Law, N. J.' Stat. Ann. •§ 44:8-107 et seq. (Supp. 1973-1974), a state program, and the Assistance for Dependent Children Law (ADC), N. J. Stat. Ann. §44:10-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973-1974), a federal-state program created by § 402 of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 602. Effective June 30, 1971, New Jersey elected no longer to participate in the unemployed parent segment of the AEDC program, and enacted, in its place, the Assistance to Families of the- Working Poor program, N. J. Stat. Ann. §44:13-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973-1974). The Regulations (M. A. 1.006/revised Mar. 1957), issued by the New. Jersey Department of Institutions and Agencies under the General Public Assistance Law, provided in pertinent part: “A. Citation of Statute and Constitution “Chapter 156, P. L. 1947 (R. S. 44:8-108) defines reimbursable public assistance as ‘assistance rendered to needy persons not otherwise provided for under the laws of this State, where such persons are willing to work but are unable to secure employment due either to physical disability or inability to find employment.’ “The Constitution of New Jersey 1947, Article I, paragraph 19, guarantees that ‘Persons in private employment shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively.’ “B. Interpretation and Policy “It may be inferred from the quoted section of the statute that persons unwilling to work are ineligible for public assistance. However, for purposes of public administration, the phrase ‘unwilling to work’ must be defined as objectively as possible. “. . . The Constitutional guarantee of the ‘right to organize and bargain colleetivély’ implies the right of the individual to participate in a bona -fide labor dispute as between.the employer and the' collective bargaining unit by which the individual is represented. Moreover, a ‘strike,’ when lawfully authorized and conducted, is recognized as an inherent and lawful element of the process of bargaining collectively and of .resolving labor disputes. Accordingly, when an individual is participating in a lawful ‘strike,’ he may not be considered merely because of. such participation, as refusing to work without just cause. “C. Regulations “Based on the foregoing statement of interpretation and' policy, the following regulations are established: “4. No individual shall be presumed to be unwilling to work, or to be wrongfully refusing to accept suitable employment, merely because he is participating in a lawful labor dispute. “5. An individual who is participating in a lawful labor.dispute, and who is 'needy, has the same right to apply far public assistance, for himself and his dependents, as any other individual who is needy. “6. In the ease "of an applicant for public assistance who is participating iñ a lawful labor dispute, there shall be an investigation of need and other conditions of eligibility, and an evaluation of income, and resources, in the same way and to the same extent as in all other cases. In such instances, 'strike benefits’ or other payments available to the individual from the labor union or other source; shall be considered a resource and shJUL be determined and accounted for.” . The record is not clear as to the eligibility of strikers under. New Jersey’s newly enacted program 'of Assistance to Families of' the Working Poor. Petitioners state that striking workers are eligible for benefits under that program. Brief for Petitioners 4 n. 1. The respondents concede this, as “a matter of administrative application.-” Tr. of Oral Arg.. 46. The complaint also alleged that the inclusion of -striking workers in these programs was contrary to. New Jersey law. . All the strikers returned to work by Monday, June 28, 1971, and normal operations at the corporate petitioners’ plants were then resumed. -Although the threat of seizure'in Oil Workers constituted a far more severe form of governmental- action, going as it did to cripple any strike, the features of that .action were inexorably contingent, serving to make it more remote and speculative. It 'may not 'appropriately be argued that there is an element of discretion present here, in the making of the determination of individual “need" for welfare benefits. That determination has no measurable effect on th? rights of the corporate petitioners. Instead, it is the basic eligibility for- assistance that allegedly prejudices those petitioners’ economic position.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE et al. v. CAMP, COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, et al. No. 61. Argued December 15, 1970 Decided April 5, 1971 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Black, Douglas, BrenNAN, White, and Marshall, JJ., joined. HarlaN, J., post, p. 639, and BlackmuN, J., post, p. 642, filed dissenting opinions. Burger, C. J., took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. G. Duane Vieth argued the cause for petitioners in No. 61. With him on the briefs were James F. Fitzpatrick, Melvin Spaeth, and Robert Augenblick. Joseph B. Levin argued the cause for petitioner in No. 59. With him on the briefs was Lloyd J. Derrickson. Deputy Solicitor General Friedman argued the cause for respondent Camp, Comptroller of the Currency, in No. 61. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Ruckelshaus, Richard B. Stone, Alan S. Rosenthal, Leonard Schaitman, and C. Westbrook Murphy. Mr. Friedman, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance in No. 59. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold and Mr. Stone. Archibald Cox argued the cause for respondent First National City Bank in both cases. With him on the brief was Stephen Ailes. Robert L. Stern filed a brief for Corporate Fiduciaries Association of Chicago as amicus curiae urging affirmance in both cases. Together with No. 59, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission et al., argued December 14-15, 1970, also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. These companion cases involve a double-barreled assault upon the efforts of a national bank to go into the business of operating a mutual investment fund. The petitioners in No. 61 are an association of open-end investment companies and several individual such companies. They brought an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, attacking portions of Regulation 9 issued by the Comptroller of the Currency, on the ground that this Regulation, in purporting to authorize banks to establish and operate collective investment funds, sought to permit activities prohibited to national banks or their affiliates by various provisions of the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162. The petitioners also specifically attacked the Comptroller’s approval of the application of First National City Bank of New York for permission to establish and operate a collective investment fund. In No. 59 the National Association of Securities Dealers filed a petition in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit seeking review of an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission that partially exempted the collective investment fund of First National City Bank of New York from various provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940. In No. 61 the District Court concluded that the challenged provisions of Regulation 9 were invalid under the Glass-Steagall Act. The Comptroller and First National City Bank appealed from this decision, and the appeal was consolidated with the petition for review in No. 59. The Court of Appeals held that the actions taken by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Comptroller were fully consonant with the statutes committed to their regulatory supervision. Accordingly, it affirmed the order of the Commission and reversed the judgment of the District Court. We granted certiorari to consider important questions presented under federal regulatory statutes. For the reasons that follow, we hold Regulation 9 invalid insofar as it authorizes the sale of interests in an investment fund of the type established by First National City Bank pursuant to the Comptroller’s approval. This disposition makes it unnecessary to consider the propriety of the action of the Securities and Exchange Commission in affording this fund exemption from certain of the provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940. I In No. 61 it is urged at the outset that petitioners lack standing to question whether national banks may legally enter a field in competition with them. This contention is foreclosed by Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150. There we held that companies that offered data processing services to the general business community had standing to seek judicial review of a ruling by the Comptroller that national banks could make data processing services available to other banks and to bank customers. We held that data processing companies were sufficiently injured by the competition that the Comptroller had authorized to create a case or controversy. The injury to the petitioners in the instant case is indistinguishable. We also concluded that Congress did not intend “to preclude judicial review of administrative rulings by the Comptroller as to the legitimate scope of activities available to national banks under [the National Bank Act].” 397 U. S., at 157. This is precisely the review that the petitioners have sought in this case. Finally, we concluded that Congress had arguably legislated against the competition that the petitioners sought to challenge, and from which flowed their injury. We noted that whether Congress had indeed prohibited such competition was a question for the merits. In the discussion that follows in the balance of this opinion we deal with the merits of the petitioners’ contentions and conclude that Congress did legislate against the competition that the petitioners challenge. There can be no real question, therefore, of the petitioners’ standing in the light of the Data Processing case. See also Arnold Tours v. Camp, 400 U. S. 45. II The issue before us is whether the Comptroller of the Currency may, consistently with the banking laws, authorize a national bank to offer its customers the opportunity to invest in a stock fund created and maintained by the bank. Before 1963 national banks were prohibited by administrative regulation from offering this service. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, which until 1962 had regulatory jurisdiction over all the trust activities of national banks, allowed the collective investment of trust assets only for “the investment of funds held for true fiduciary purposes.” The applicable regulation, Regulation F, specified that “the operation of such Common Trust Funds as investment trusts for other than strictly fiduciary purposes is hereby prohibited.” The Board consistently ruled that it was improper for a bank to use “a Common Trust Fund as an investment trust attracting money seeking investment alone and to embark upon what would be in effect the sale of participations in a Common Trust Fund to the public as investments.” 26 Fed. Reserve Bull. 393 (1940); see also 42 Fed. Reserve Bull. 228 (1956); 41 Fed. Reserve Bull. 142 (1955). In 1962 Congress transferred jurisdiction over most of the trust activities of national banks from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to the Comptroller of the Currency, without modifying any provision of substantive law. Pub. L. 87-722, 76 Stat. 668, 12 U. S. C. § 92a. The Comptroller thereupon solicited suggestions for improving the regulations applicable to trust activities. Subsequently, new regulations were proposed which expressly authorized the collective investment of monies delivered to the bank for investment management, so-called managing agency accounts. These proposed regulations were officially promulgated in 1963 with changes not material here. In 1965 the First National City Bank of New York submitted for the Comptroller’s approval a plan for the collective investment of managing agency accounts. The Comptroller promptly approved the plan, and it is now in operation. This plan, which departs in some respects from the plan envisaged by the Comptroller’s Regulation, is expected, the briefs tell us, to be a model for other banks which decide to offer their customers a collective investment service. Under the plan the bank customer tenders between $10,000 and $500,000 to the bank, together with an authorization making the bank the customer’s managing agent. The customer’s investment is added to the fund, and a written evidence of participation is issued which expresses in “units of participation” the customer’s proportionate interest in fund assets. Units of participation are freely redeemable, and transferable to anyone who has executed a managing agency agreement with the bank. The fund is registered as an investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940. The bank is the underwriter of the fund’s units of participation within the meaning of that Act. The fund has filed a registration statement pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933. The fund is supervised by a five-member committee elected annually by the participants pursuant to the Investment Company Act of 1940. The Securities and Exchange Commission has exempted the fund from the Investment Company Act to the extent that a majority of this committee may be affiliated with the bank, and it is expected that a majority always will be officers in the bank’s trust and investment division. The actual custody and investment of fund assets is carried out by the bank as investment advisor pursuant to a management agreement. Although the Investment Company Act requires that this management agreement be approved annually by the committee, including a majority of the unaffiliated members, or by the participants, it is expected that the bank will continue to be investment advisor. Ill Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 24, Seventh, provides that the “business of dealing in securities and stock [by a national bank] shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account .... Except as hereinafter provided or otherwise permitted by law, nothing herein contained shall authorize the purchase by [a national bank] for its own account of any shares of stock of any corporation.” The petitioners contend that a purchase of stock by a bank’s investment fund is a purchase of stock by a bank for its own account in violation of this section. Section 16 also provides that a national bank “shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock.” And § 21 of the same Act, 12 U. S. C. § 378 (a), provides that “it shall be unlawful — (1) For any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other similar organization, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in the business of [deposit banking].” The petitioners contend that the creation and operation of an investment fund by a bank which offers to its customers the opportunity to purchase an interest in the fund’s assets constitutes the issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing of securities or stocks in violation of these sections. The questions raised by the petitioners are novel and substantial. National banks were granted trust powers in 1913. Federal Reserve Act, § 11, 38 Stat. 261. The first common trust fund was organized in 1927, and such funds were expressly authorized by the Federal Reserve Board by Regulation F promulgated in 1937. Report on Commingled or Common Trust Funds Administered by Banks and Trust Companies, H. R. Doc. No. 476, 76th Cong., 2d Sess., 4-5 (1939). For at least a generation, therefore, there has been no reason to doubt that a national bank can, consistently with the banking laws, commingle trust funds on the one hand, and act as a managing agent on the other. No provision of the banking law suggests that it is improper for a national bank to pool trust assets, or to act as a managing agent for individual customers, or to purchase stock for the account of its customers. But the union of these powers gives birth to an investment fund whose activities are of a different character. The differences between the investment fund that the Comptroller has authorized and a conventional open-end mutual fund are subtle at best, and it is undisputed that this bank investment fund finds itself in direct competition with the mutual fund industry. One would suppose that the business of a mutual fund consists of buying stock “for its own account” and of “issuing” and “selling” “stock” or “other securities” evidencing an undivided and redeemable interest in the assets of the fund. On their face, §§16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act appear clearly to prohibit this activity by national banks. But we cannot come lightly to the conclusion that the Comptroller has authorized activity that violates the banking laws. It is settled that courts should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement of that statute. The Comptroller of the Currency is charged with the enforcement of the banking laws to an extent that warrants the invocation of this principle with respect to his deliberative conclusions as to the meaning of these laws. See First National Bank v. Missouri, 263 U. S. 640, 658. The difficulty here is that the Comptroller adopted no expressly articulated position at the administrative level as to the meaning and impact of the provisions of §§16 and 21 as they affect bank investment funds. The Comptroller promulgated Regulation 9 without opinion or accompanying statement. His subsequent report to Congress did not advert to the prohibitions of the Glass-Steagall Act. Comptroller of the Currency, 101st Annual Report 14-15 (1963). To be sure, counsel for the Comptroller in the course of this litigation, and specifically in his briefs and oral argument in this Court, has rationalized the basis of Regulation 9 with great professional competence. But this is hardly tantamount to an administrative interpretation of §§16 and 21. In Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, we said, “The courts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action .... For the courts to substitute their or counsel’s discretion for that of the [agency] is incompatible with the orderly functioning of the process of judicial review.” Id., at 168-169. Congress has delegated to the administrative official and not to appellate counsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing statutory commands. It is the administrative official and not appellate counsel who possesses the expertise that can enlighten and rationalize the search for the meaning and intent of Congress. Quite obviously the Comptroller should not grant new authority to national banks until he is satisfied that the exercise of this authority will not violate the intent of the banking laws. If he faces such questions only after he has acted, there is substantial danger that the momentum generated by initial approval may seriously impair the enforcement of the banking laws that Congress enacted. IV There is no dispute that one of the objectives of the Glass-Steagall Act was to prohibit commercial banks, banks that receive deposits subject to repayment, lend money, discount and negotiate promissory notes and the like, from going into the investment banking business. Many commercial banks were indirectly engaged in the investment banking business when the Act was passed in 1933. Even before the passage of the Act it was generally believed that it was improper for a commercial bank to engage in investment banking directly. But in 1908 banks began the practice of establishing security affiliates that engaged in, inter alia, the business of floating bond issues and, less frequently, underwriting stock issues. The Glass-Steagall Act confirmed that national banks could not engage in investment banking directly, and in addition made affiliation with an organization so engaged illegal. One effect of the Act was to abolish the security affiliates of commercial banks. It is apparent from the legislative history of the Act why Congress felt that this drastic step was necessary. The failure of the Bank of United States in 1930 was widely attributed to that bank’s activities with respect to its numerous securities affiliates. Moreover, Congress was concerned that commercial banks in general and member banks of the Federal Reserve System in particular had both aggravated and been damaged by stock market decline partly because of their direct and indirect involvement in the trading and ownership of speculative securities. The Glass-Steagall Act reflected a determination that policies of competition, convenience, or expertise which might otherwise support the entry of commercial banks into the investment banking business were outweighed by the “hazards” and “financial dangers” that arise when commercial banks engage in the activities proscribed by the Act. The hazards that Congress had in mind were not limited to the obvious danger that a bank might invest its own assets in frozen or otherwise imprudent stock or security investments. For often securities affiliates had operated without direct access to the assets of the bank. This was because securities affiliates had frequently been established with capital paid in by the bank’s stockholders, or by the public, or through the allocation of a legal dividend on bank stock for this purpose. The legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act shows that Congress also had in mind and repeatedly focused on the more subtle hazards that arise when a commercial bank goes beyond the business of acting as fiduciary or managing agent and enters the investment banking business either directly or by establishing an affiliate to hold and sell particular investments. This course places new promotional and other pressures on the bank which in turn create new temptations. For example, pressures are created because the bank and the affiliate are closely associated in the public mind, and should the affiliate fare badly, public confidence in the bank might be impaired. And since public confidence is essential to the solvency of a bank, there might exist a natural temptation to shore up the affiliate through unsound loans or other aid. Moreover, the pressure to sell a particular investment and to make the affiliate successful might create a risk that the bank would make its credit facilities more freely available to those companies in whose stock or securities the affiliate has invested or become otherwise involved. Congress feared that banks might even go so far as to make unsound loans to such companies. In any event, it was thought that the bank’s salesman’s interest might impair its ability to function as an impartial source of credit. Congress was also concerned that bank depositors might suffer losses on investments that they purchased in reliance on the relationship between the bank and its affiliate. This loss of customer good will might “become an important handicap to a bank during a major period of security market deflation.” More broadly, Congress feared that the promotional needs of investment banking might lead commercial banks to lend their reputation for prudence and restraint to the enterprise of selling particular stocks and securities, and that this could not be done without that reputation being undercut by the risks necessarily incident to the investment banking business. There was also perceived the danger that when commercial banks were subject to the promotional demands of investment banking, they might be tempted to make loans to customers with the expectation that the loan would facilitate the purchase of stocks and securities. There was evidence before Congress that loans for investment written by commercial banks had done much to feed the speculative fever of the late 1920’s. Senator Glass made it plain that it was “the fixed purpose of Congress” not to see the facilities of commercial banking diverted into speculative operations by the aggressive and promotional character of the investment banking business. Another potential hazard that very much concerned Congress arose from the plain conflict between the promotional interest of the investment banker and the obligation of the commercial banker to render disinterested investment advice. Senator Bulkley stated: “Obviously, the banker who has nothing to sell to his depositors is much better qualified to advise disinterestedly and to regard diligently the safety of depositors than the banker who uses the list of depositors in his savings department to distribute circulars concerning the advantages of this, that, or the other investment on which the bank is to receive an originating profit or an underwriting profit or a distribution profit or a trading profit or any combination of such profits.” Congress had before it evidence that security affiliates might be driven to unload excessive holdings through the trust department of the sponsor bank. Some witnesses at the hearings expressed the view that this practice constituted self-dealing in violation of the trustee’s obligation of loyalty, and indeed that it would be improper for a bank’s trust department to purchase anything from the bank’s securities affiliate. In sum, Congress acted to keep commercial banks out of the investment banking business largely because it believed that the promotional incentives of investment banking and the investment banker’s pecuniary stake in the success of particular investment opportunities was destructive of prudent and disinterested commercial banking and of public confidence in the commercial banking system. As Senator Bulkley put it: “If we want banking service to be strictly banking service, without the expectation of additional profits in selling something to customers, we must keep the banks out of the investment security business.” y The language that Congress chose to achieve this purpose includes the prohibitions of § 16 that a national bank “shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock” and shall not purchase “for its own account . . . any shares of stock of any corporation,” and the prohibition of § 21 against engaging in “the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing . . . stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities.” In this litigation the Comptroller takes the position that the operation of a bank investment fund is consistent with these provisions, because participating interests in such a fund are not “securities” within the meaning of the Act. It is argued that a bank investment fund simply makes available to the small investor the benefit of investment management by a bank trust department which would otherwise be available only to large investors, and that the operation of an investment fund creates no problems that are not present whenever a bank invests in securities for the account of customers. But there is nothing in the phrasing of either § 16 or § 21 that suggests a narrow reading of the word “securities.” To the contrary, the breadth of the term is implicit in the fact that the antecedent statutory language encompasses not only equity securities but also securities representing debt. And certainly there is nothing in the language of these provisions to suggest that the sale of an interest in the business of buying, holding, and selling stocks for investment is to be distinguished from the sale of an interest in a commercial or industrial enterprise. Indeed, there is direct evidence that Congress specifically contemplated that the word “security” includes an interest in an investment fund. The Glass-Steagall Act was the product of hearings conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution 71 which included among the topics to be investigated the impact on the banking system of the formation of investment and security trusts. The subcommittee found that one of the activities in which bank security affiliates engaged was that of an investment trust: “buying and selling securities acquired purely for investment or speculative purposes.” Since Congress generally intended to divorce commercial banking from the kinds of activities in which bank security affiliates engaged, there is reason to believe that Congress explicitly intended to prohibit a national bank from operating an investment trust. But, in any event, we are persuaded that the purposes for which Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall Act leave no room for the conclusion that a participation in a bank investment fund is not a “security” within the meaning of the Act. From the perspective of competition, convenience, and expertise, there are arguments to be made in support of allowing commercial banks to enter the investment banking business. But Congress determined that the hazards outlined above made it necessary to prohibit this activity to commercial banks. Those same hazards are clearly present when a bank undertakes to operate an investment fund. A bank that operates an investment fund has a particular investment to sell. It is not a matter of indifference to the bank whether the customer buys an interest in the fund or makes some other investment. If its customers cannot be persuaded to invest in the bank’s investment fund, the bank will lose their investment business and the fee which that business would have brought in. Even as to accounts large enough to qualify for individual investment management, there might be a potential for a greater profit if the investment were placed in the fund rather than in individually selected securities, because of fixed costs and economies of scale. The mechanics of operating an investment fund might also create promotional pressure. When interests in the fund were redeemed, the bank would be effectively faced with the choice of selling stocks from the fund’s portfolio or of selling new participations to cover redemptions. The bank might have a pecuniary incentive to choose the latter course in order to avoid the cost of stock transactions undertaken solely for redemption purposes. Promotional incentives might also be created by the circumstance that the bank’s fund would be in direct competition with mutual funds that, from the point of view of the investor, offered an investment opportunity comparable to that offered by the bank. The bank would want to be in a position to show to the prospective customer that its fund was more attractive than the mutual funds offered by others. The bank would have a salesman’s stake in the performance of the fund, for if the fund were less successful than the competition the bank would lose business and the resulting fees. A bank that operated an investment fund would necessarily put its reputation and facilities squarely behind that fund and the investment opportunity that the fund offered. The investments of the fund might be conservative or speculative, but in any event the success or failure of the fund would be a matter of public record. Imprudent or unsuccessful management of the bank’s investment fund could bring about a perhaps unjustified loss of public confidence in the bank itself. If imprudent management should place the fund in distress, a bank might find itself under pressure to rescue the fund through measures inconsistent with sound banking. The promotional and other pressures incidental to the operation of an investment fund, in other words, involve the same kinds of potential abuses that Congress intended to guard against when it legislated against bank security affiliates. It is not the slightest reflection on the integrity of the mutual fund industry to say that the traditions of that industry are not necessarily the conservative traditions of commercial banking. The needs and interests of a mutual fund enterprise more nearly approximate those of securities underwriting, the activity in which bank security affiliates were primarily engaged. When a bank puts itself in competition with mutual funds, the bank must make an accommodation to the kind of ground rules that Congress firmly concluded could not be prudently mixed with the business of commercial banking. And there are other potential hazards of the kind Congress sought to eliminate with the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act. The bank’s stake in the investment fund might distort its credit decisions or lead to unsound loans to the companies in which the fund had invested. The bank might exploit its confidential relationship with its commercial and industrial creditors for the benefit of the fund. The bank might undertake, directly or indirectly, to make its credit facilities available to the fund or to render other aid to the fund inconsistent with the best interests of the bank’s depositors. The bank might make loans to facilitate the purchase of interests in the fund. The bank might divert talent and resources from its commercial banking operation to the promotion of the fund. Moreover, because the bank would have a stake in a customer’s making a particular investment decision — the decision to invest in the bank’s investment fund — the customer might doubt the motivation behind the bank’s recommendation that he make such an investment. If the fund investment should turn out badly there would be a danger that the bank would lose the good will of those customers who had invested in the fund. It might be unlikely that disenchantment would go so far as to threaten the solvency of the bank. But because banks are dependent on the confidence of their customers, the risk would not be unreal. These are all hazards that are not present when a bank undertakes to purchase stock for the account of its individual customers or to commingle assets which it has received for a true fiduciary purpose rather than for investment. These activities, unlike the operation of an investment fund, do not give rise to a promotional or salesman’s stake in a particular investment; they do not involve an enterprise in direct competition with aggressively promoted funds offered by other investment companies; they do not entail a threat to public confidence in the bank itself; and they do not impair the bank’s ability to give disinterested service as a fiduciary or managing agent. In short, there is a plain difference between the sale of fiduciary services and the sale of investments. VI The Glass-Steagall Act was a prophylactic measure directed against conditions that the experience of the 1920’s showed to be great potentials for abuse. The literal terms of that Act clearly prevent what the Comptroller has sought to authorize here. Because the potential hazards and abuses that flow from a bank’s entry into the mutual investment business are the same basic hazards and abuses that Congress intended to eliminate almost 40 years ago, we cannot but apply the terms of the federal statute as they were written. We conclude that the operation of an investment fund of the kind approved by the Comptroller involves a bank in the underwriting, issuing, selling, and distributing of securities in violation of §§ 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment in No. 61 and vacate the judgment in No. 59. It is so ordered. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. 12 CFR Pt. 9 (1970). The provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act are codified in various sections scattered through Title 12 of the United States Code. The exemption was granted in response to an application filed pursuant to § 6 (c) of the Act, 54 Stat. 802, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-6 (c). 274 F. Supp. 624. 136 U. S. App. D. C. 241, 420 F. 2d 83. 397 U. S. 986. 12 CFR §9.18 (a) provides that: “Where not in contravention of local law, funds held by a national bank as fiduciary may be invested collectively: ... (3) In a common trust fund, maintained by the bank exclusively for the collective investment and reinvestment of monies contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity as managing agent under a managing agency agreement expressly providing that such monies are received by the bank in trust . . . .” For example, the investment fund plan as established does not provide that the bank receives the investor’s money in trust. The opinion of the Commission and the dissent of Commissioner Budge are unofficially reported at CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep., 1964-1966 Decisions, ¶ 77,332. Section 16, as enacted in 1933, granted no authority to purchase stock for the account of customers and prohibited any purchase of stock by a national bank. The 1935 Amendments to the National Bank Act included a provision intended to make it clear that a national bank may buy stock for the account of customers but not for its own account. S. Rep. No. 1007, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 17; H. R. Rep. No. 742, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 18. A mutual fund is an open-end investment company. The Investment Company Act of 1940 defines an investment company as an “issuer” of “any security” which “is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily ... in the business of investing ... in securities . . . .” 15 U. S. C. §§ 80a-2 (a) (21), 80a-3 (a)(1). An open-end company is one “which is offering for sale or has outstanding any redeemable security of which it is the issuer.” 15 U. S. C. § 80a-5 (a) (1). An investment company also includes a “unit investment trust”: an investment company which, among other things, “is organized under a . . . contract of . . . agency . . . and . . . issues only redeemable securities, each of which represents an undivided interest in a unit of specified securities . . . .” 15 U. S. C. § 80a-4 (2). Section 20 of the Act, 12 U. S. C. § 377, prohibits affiliations between banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System and organizations “engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities . . . .” And § 32, 12 U. S. C. § 78, provides that no officer, director, or employee of a bank in the Federal Reserve System may serve at the same time as officer, director, or employee of an association primarily engaged in the activity described in § 20. The petitioners contend that if a bank’s investment fund be conceived as an entity distinct from the bank, then its affiliation with the investment fund is in violation of these sections. The Board of Governors has had occasion to consider whether an investment fund of the type operated by First National City Bank involves a violation of § 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act. 12 CFR § 218.111 (1970). The Board concluded, based on “general principles that have been developed in respect to the application of section 32,” that it would not violate that section for officers of the bank’s trust department to serve at the same time as officers of the investment fund because the fund and the bank “constitute a single entity,” and the fund “would be regarded as nothing more than an arm or department of the bank.” The Board called attention to § 21 whose provisions it summarized as forbidding “a securities firm or organization to engage in the business of receiving deposits, subject to certain exceptions.” The Board, however, declined to express a position concerning the applicability of this section because of its policy not to express views as to the meaning of statutes that carry criminal penalties. Nor has the Board expressed its views on the application of any other provision of the banking law to the creation and operation of a bank investment fund. We have no doubt but that the Board’s construction and application of § 32 is both reasonable and rational. The investment fund service authorized by the Comptroller’s regulation and as provided by the First National City Bank is a service available only to customers of the bank. It is held out as a service provided by the bank, and the investment fund bears the bank’s name. The bank has effective control over the activities of the investment fund. Moreover, there is no danger that to characterize the bank and its fund as a single entity will disserve the purpose of Congress. The limitations that the banking laws place on the activities of national banks are at least as great as the limitations placed on the activities of their affiliates. For example, § 32 refers to the “public sale” of stocks or securities while § 21 proscribes the “selling” of stocks or securities. A law review article written by Comptroller Saxon and Deputy Comptroller Miller in 1965 did take the position that the Glass-Steagall Act is inapplicable to bank common trust funds. Saxon & Miller, Common Trust Funds, 53 Geo. L. J. 994 (1965). But this view was predicated on the argument that when Congress in 1936 provided a tax exemption for common trust funds maintained by a bank, now 26 U. S. C. § 584, it contemplated the exemption of common trust funds created for strictly investment purposes, and that consequently Congress must have assumed that the banking laws, which otherwise appear to proscribe such funds, were not applicable. Id., at 1008-1010. Whatever the merits of this argument, it has no bearing on the instant litigation. It is clear that the collective investment funds authorized by Regulation 9 need not qualify for tax exemption under § 584; the First National City Bank Fund does not so qualify. Moreover, the position advanced in the brief filed on behalf of the Comptroller in this litigation is not that the banking laws are inapplicable to bank investment funds, but rather that the creation and operation of such funds are consistent with the banking laws. It is noteworthy that the § 584 exemption is available to common trust funds “maintained by a bank . . . exclusively for the collective investment and reinvestment of moneys contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity as a trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian . . . (Emphasis added.) This language, which makes no reference to contributions by the bank in its capacity as managing agent, is identical to that exempting such common trust funds from the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-3 (c)(3). The Securities and Exchange Commission has taken the position that commingled managing agency accounts do not come within § 80a-3 (c) (3). See Statement of Commissioner Cary, Hearings on Common Trust Funds — Overlapping Responsibility and Conflict in Regulation, before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1963). Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 71 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency (hereafter 1931 Hearings), 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 40 (1931); 1920 Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, quoted id., at 1067, 1068. Senator Glass, commenting on earlier banking legislation, said, “We tried to, and thought at the time we had, removed the system as far as possible from the influence of the stock market.” Id., at 262. Id., at 1052. Report on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, pt. 2, H. R. Doc. No. 70, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 59 (1939). 1931 Hearings 116-117, 1017, 1068. See S. Rep. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 6, 8, 10. Id., at 18; see 1931 Hearings 366; 75 Cong. Rec. 9911 (remarks of Sen. Bulkley). 1931 Hearings 41, 192, 1056; 1920 Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, quoted id., at 1067. 1931 Hearings 20, 237, 1063. See also id., at 1058, where it is said: “Activities of a bank’s security affiliate as a holding or finance company or an investment trust are also fraught with the danger of large losses during a deflation period. Bank affiliates of this kind show a much greater tendency to operate with borrowed funds than do organizations of this type which are independent of banks, the reason being that the identity of control and management which prevails between the bank and its affiliate tends to encourage reliance upon the lending facilities of the former.” See id., at 1064; 75 Cong. Rec. 9912 (remarks of Sen. Bulkley). See 1931 Hearings 87 (remarks of Chairman Glass). See 77 Cong. Rec. 4028 (remarks of Rep. Fish). 1931 Hearings 1064. See 75 Cong. Rec. 9912: “And although such a loss would possibly not result in any substantial impairment of the resources of the banking institution owning that affiliate . . . there can be no doubt that the whole transaction tends to discredit the bank and impair the confidence of its depositors.” (Remarks of Sen. Bulkley.) S. Rep. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 9-10. 1931 Hearings 1006-1029; S. Rep. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 8-9. 75 Cong. Rec. 9884. See also S. Rep. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 8: “The outstanding development in the commercial banking system during the prepanic period was the appearance of excessive security loans, and of overinvestment in securities of all kinds. The effects of this situation in changing the whole character of the banking problem can hardly be overemphasized. National banks were never intended to undertake investment banking business on a large scale, and the whole tenor of legislation and administrative rulings concerning them has been away from recognition of such a growth in the direction of investment banking as legitimate.” In the same vein Representative Steagall said: “Our great banking system was diverted from its original purposes into investment activities .... “The purpose of the regulatory provisions of this bill is to call back to the service of agriculture and commerce and industry the bank credit and the bank service designed by the framers of the Federal Reserve Act.” 77 Cong. Rec. 3835. 75 Cong. Rec. 9912. 1931 Hearings 237; cf. id., at 1064. Id., at 266, 300, 311. 75 Cong. Rec. 9912. S. Res. 71, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., is reprinted in S. Rep. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1. 1931 Hearings 1057. See also id., at 307. See also supra, n. 21. See 26 Fed. Reserve Bull. 393 (1940), quoted supra, at 621.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. SOUTH TEXAS LUMBER CO. No. 384. Argued January 14, 1948. Decided March 29, 1948. Lee A. Jackson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Caudle, Arnold Raum and Carlton Fox. Charles C. MacLean, Jr. argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Arthur A. Ballantine and J. Arthur Platt. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. This case raises a question as to respondent’s liability for the taxable year 1943 under the Excess Profits Tax Act of 1940 as amended. 54 Stat. 975, 26 U. S. C. § 710, et seq. The law was passed to tax abnormally high profits due to large governmental expenditures about to be made from appropriations for national defense. The excess profits tax was a graduated surtax upon a portion of corporate income, and was imposed in addition to the regular income tax. It applied to all corporate profits and gains over and above what Congress deemed to be a fair and normal return for the corporate business taxed. Under the controlling 1943 law the amount of income subject to this excess profits tax is computed by subtracting from the net income subject to regular income tax the amount of earnings Congress deemed to be a taxpayer’s normal and fair return. This deductible amount, called the excess profits credit, was to be computed in one of two ways, whichever resulted in the lesser tax. § 712. The first, not used here, permits a deduction of an amount equal to the company’s average net income for the taxable years 1936 to 1939 inclusive. § 713. The second, used here, permits a deduction of an amount equal to 8 per centum of the taxpayer’s invested capital for the taxable year. § 714. An includable element of the “invested capital” is the “accumulated earnings and profits as of the beginning of such taxable year.” It thus appears that by this method Congress intended, with minor exceptions not here relevant, to impose the excess profits tax on all annual net income in excess of 8% of a corporation’s working capital, including its accumulated profits. The controversy here is over the taxpayer’s claim that in computing its 1943 tax the statute allows it to include in this 8% deduction its “accumulated profits” from certain installment sales, which profits the taxpayer, in accordance with an option conferred upon him, had elected not to report as a part of its taxable income in prior years. Beginning in 1937 and extending over a four-year period, respondent sold parcels of real estate, gave deeds, and took installment notes, which were secured by mortgages and vendors’ liens. It kept its books generally on a calendar year accrual basis of accounting, a basis under which all obligations of a company applicable to a year are listed as expenditures, whether paid that year or not, and all obligations to it incurred by others applicable to the year are set up as income on the same basis. Under 26 U. S. C. § 41 an income taxpayer may report income and expenditures either on an accrual basis or on a cash basis — under which latter method annual net income is measured by the difference between actual cash received and paid out within the taxable year. In any event, the basis used must, in the language of § 41, "clearly reflect the income.” Respondent did not report the value of its land installment notes as income on the accrual basis as it could have done under § 41. Instead, from 1937 up to and including 1943, it has consistently reported its annual income from the installment sales on a third or “installment” basis, expressly authorized for certain types of installment sales by 26 U. S. C. § 44. That section permits a taxpayer to return as taxable income for a given year only “that proportion of the installment payments actually received in that year which the gross profit realized or to be realized when payment is completed, bears to the total contract price.” Thus respondent’s installment income has actually been reported for taxes all along substantially on a modified cash receipts basis, and the taxpayer’s net income, which is subjected both to the normal income tax and to the excess profits tax, has not in any of these years reflected the unpaid balances on the installment notes, or any part of them. On the contrary, these balances were listed on respondent’s tax returns during these years as “Unrealized Profit Installment Sales.” On its 1943 excess profits tax return respondent nevertheless reported as “accumulated earnings and profits” the amount of “Unrealized Profit Installment Sales” shown on its books at the end of 1942, and included this amount in “invested capital.” It thus sought to deduct 8% of its theretofore designated “unrealized profit” in computing its excess profits tax. The Commissioner redetermined the tax for 1943 after eliminating this item from “invested capital.” The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner’s redetermination, 7 T. C. 669, relying on its opinion in Kimbrell’s Home Furnishings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 7 T. C. 339. The Circuit Court of Appeals, with one justice dissenting, reversed on the authority of its decision in Commissioner v. Shenandoah Co., 138 F. 2d 792. The Government’s petition for certiorari alleged that the result reached by the Circuit Court of Appeals was counter to the Commissioner’s regulations and to long-standing tax practices recognized by statutes and judicial opinions, under which practices a taxpayer normally cannot report taxable income on one accounting basis and adjustments of that income on another. The questions thereby raised are of importance in tax administration and we granted certiorari to consider them. A Treasury regulation, set out in part below, applicable to both the normal income tax and the excess profits tax, specifically provides that “a corporation computing income on the installment basis as provided in section 44 shall, with respect to the installment transactions, compute earnings and profits on such basis.” Since respondent computed its taxable income from installment sales on the installment or modified cash receipts basis, but computed its earnings and profits from these same sales on another basis, the accrual, it contends that the regulation is invalid because inconsistent with the governing code provisions. Validity of the regulation is therefore the crucial question. This Court has many times declared that Treasury regulations must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes and that they constitute contemporaneous constructions by those charged with administration of these statutes which should not be overruled except for weighty reasons. See, e. g., Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 375, 378. This regulation is in harmony with the long-established congressional policy that a taxpayer generally cannot compute income taxes by reporting annual income on a cash basis and deductions on an accrual basis. Such a practice has been uniformly held inadmissible because it results in a distorted picture which makes a tax return fail truly to reflect net income. This has been the construction given income, estate, and previous excess profits tax laws by administrative officials, the Board of Tax Appeals, and the courts. The regulation’s reasonableness and consistency with the statutes which impose the excess profits tax on incomes is also supported by prior legislative and administrative history. The present “invested capital” deduction is patterned after a similar provision in § 326 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1057, 1088, 1092. That section imposed a “War-Profits and Excess-Profits Tax.” Invested capital there included “paid-in or earned surplus and undivided profits.” Under that law the administration, the Board of Tax Appeals, and the courts have uniformly held that a taxpayer, having elected to adopt the installment basis of accounting, could not thereafter distort his true excess profits tax income by including uncollected installment obligations in his “invested capital” deduction base. A taxpayer, having chosen to report his taxable income from installment sales on the installment cash receipts plan, thereby spreading its gross earnings and profits from such sales over a number of years and avoiding high tax rates, was not permitted to obtain a further reduction by shifting to an accrual plan and treating uncollected balances on these installment sales as though they had actually been received in the year of the sale. The history of the congressional adoption of the optional installment basis also supports the power of the Commissioner to adopt the regulation here involved. Prior to 1926 the right of a taxpayer to report on the installment plan rested only on Treasury regulations. In 1925, the Board of Tax Appeals held these regulations were without statutory support. Congress promptly, in § 212 (d) of the 1926 Revenue Act, adopted the present statutory authority for an elective installment basis for reporting income, the Senate committee report on the measure designating it as a “third basis, the installment basis.” This new statutory provision was strikingly similar to the Treasury regulations previously held unauthorized by the Board of Tax Appeals. That the Commissioner was particularly intended by Congress to have broad rule-making power under the regulation was manifested by the first words in the new installment basis section which only permitted taxpayers to take advantage of it “Under regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary . . . .” The clause is still contained in § 44 of the Internal Revenue Code. This gives added reasons why interpretations of the Act and regulations under it should not be overruled by the courts unless clearly contrary to the will of Congress. See Burnet v. S. & L. Bldg. Corp., 288 U. S. 406, 415. The installment basis of reporting was enacted, as shown by its history, to relieve taxpayers who adopted it from having to pay an income tax in the year of sale based on the full amount of anticipated profits when in fact they had received in cash only a small portion of the sales price. Another reason was the difficult and time-consuming effort of appraising the uncertain market value of installment obligations. There is no indication in any of the congressional history, however, that by passage of this law Congress contemplated that those taxpayers who elected to adopt this accounting method for their own advantage could by this means obtain a further tax advantage denied all other taxpayers, whereby they could, as to the same taxable transaction, report in part on a cash receipts basis and in part on an accrual basis. We find nothing unreasonable in the regulations here. See Commissioner v. Wheeler, 324 U. S. 542. It is argued that notwithstanding what has been said, Congress by enacting § 501 of the 1940 Second Revenue Act, 54 Stat. 974, 1004, 26 U. S. C. § 115 (l), had provided a definition of “earnings and profits” which includes these unpaid installment obligations and that the regulation here conflicts with § 115 (7), which is applicable alike to both the income and the excess profits taxes. There are at least two reasons why we cannot accept this argument. In the first place, neither § 115 (I) nor any other purports to alter the Commissioner’s power to promulgate reasonable regulations which require taxpayers who adopt the installment basis of accounting to use an accounting method that reflects true income. The hybrid method here urged would not accomplish that result. In the second place, we cannot agree with the respondent’s interpretation of § 115 (0- He argues that “earnings and profits” derived from a sale of property are defined in § 115 (I) considered in the light of §§ 111, 112, and 113; that these sections together define such earnings and profits as all gain “realized” in the year of sale and “recognized” under the law applicable to the year of sale; that all the anticipated profits from these installment sales were “realized” when the sales were made because the installment obligations of the purchasers were received by respondent in the year of sale and they must be assumed to have been worth their face value; that they were “recognized” as taxable by § 111 (c), the law applicable to the year of sale; and that consequently the Commissioner was compelled to accept these lawfully “realized” and “recognized” accumulated profits as “invested capital” for excess profits tax purposes, even though not previously reported as taxable income for either income tax or excess profits tax purposes. Finally respondent contends that § 44 merely conferred upon it a privilege to defer payment of income tax on its tax-“recognized” profits realized from installment sales until the unpaid installment obligations were collected. The congressional reports on § 115 (l) do not provide support for the idea that gains not included in taxable income under the taxpayer’s method of accounting may nevertheless be considered “realized” and “recognized” for computing tax adjustments or deductions so long as they might have entered into such computations under a different method of accounting. Furthermore, neither § 111, § 112, nor § 113 requires a “recognition” of the full face value of installment paper. It is true that § 111 (b) does provide that gain or loss “realized” from the sale of property shall be measured by the “sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received” and § 111 (c) provides that the extent of gain or loss shall be “recognized” as determined “under the provisions of section 112.” But § 111 (d) provides that nothing in § 111 “shall be construed to prevent (in the case of property sold under contract providing for payment in installments) the taxation of that portion of any installment payment representing gain or profit in the year in which such payment is received.” This means that where a taxpayer has validly reported its income from installment sales on the installment basis provided by § 44, that section, not §§ 111, 112, and 113, prescribes the extent to which receipts from such sales are “recognized” as taxable and the year in which such receipts are “recognized” in computing taxable income. Section 44 provides for the return as income “in any taxable year that proportion of the installment payments actually received in that year which the gross profit realized or to be realized when payment is completed, bears to the total contract price.” Unlike § 111, § 44 does not recognize as subject to income tax liability the “market value” of deferred installment obligations. They may never be recognized by a taxpayer on the installment basis for tax purposes under § 44 or any other section, for they may never be paid, or may be paid only in part. The anticipated profits from these deferred obligations are recognized and taxable under § 44 only if the obligations are paid and when they are paid, unless they are sold or transferred before payment. Thus, whatever meaning is given to the words “realized” and “recognized,” the regulation here considered is not in conflict with §§ 115 (l), 111, 112, and 113. The regulation is valid. The respondent can include in its equity invested capital only that portion of its profits from installment payments which it has actually received and on which it has already paid income taxes in the years of receipt. Reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Burton dissent. H. R. Rep. No. 2894, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 1-2. Other adjustments not here material are provided, but the chief deduction or “adjustment” is the one noted above. The straight 8% figure of 1940 was modified in several respects not here material in 1941 and subsequent years. 55 Stat. 699; 56 Stat. 911; 58 Stat. 55. In its 1943 return respondent also reported the amount of such unrealized profits shown on its books as of the end of the two preceding years for purposes of calculating the excess profits credit carryover authorized by § 710 (c). The Kimbrell case was subsequently reversed but not on the contention here urged. 159 F. 2d 608. Section 29.115-3 of Regulations 111: “EaRnings or Profits.- — In determining the amount of earnings or profits (whether of the taxable year, or accumulated since February 28, 1913, or accumulated prior to March 1, 1913) due consideration must be given to the facts, and, while mere bookkeeping entries increasing or decreasing surplus will not be conclusive, the amount of the earnings or profits in any case will be dependent upon the method of accounting properly employed in computing net income. For instance, a corporation keeping its books and filing its income tax returns under sections 41, 42, and 43 on the cash receipts and disbursements basis may not use the accrual basis in determining earnings and profits; a corporation computing income on the installment basis as provided in section 44 shall, with respect to the installment transactions, compute earnings and profits on such basis; . . . .” The meaning of all terms used in the subchapter dealing with the income tax was expressly made applicable to terms used in the excess profits subchapter. §728. Treasury Regulations 112 provided: “. . . In general, the concept of 'accumulated earnings and profits’ for the purpose of the excess profits tax is the same as for the purpose of the income tax.” § 35.718-2. See also H. R. Rep. No. 2894, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 41. This part of the regulation was added as an amendment to Reg. 103, § 19.115-3, now § 29.115-3 of Reg. Ill, after adoption of the 1940 Excess Profits Tax Law. T. D. 5059, July 8, 1941. G. C. M. 2951, VII-I Cum. Bull. 160 (1928); I. T. 3253, 1939-1 Cum. Bull. 178; Consolidated Asphalt Co., 1 B. T. A. 79, 82; Henry Beubel Executor, 1 B. T. A. 676, 678-680; B. B. Todd, Inc., 1 B. T. A. 762, 766; Bank of Hartsville, 1 B. T. A. 920, 921; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 2 B. T. A. 892, 894-895; United States v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 422, 440; Jacob Bros. v. Comm’r, 50 F. 2d 394, 396; Jenkins v. Bitgood, 22 F. Supp. 16,17-18, aff’d, 101 F. 2d 17. Schmoller & Mueller Piano Co. v. United, States, 67 Ct. Cl. 428; John M. Brant Co. v. United States, 40 F. 2d 126; Standard Computing Scale Co. v. United States, 52 F. 2d 1018; Jacob Bros. v. Comm’r, 50 F. 2d 394; Tull & Gibbs v. United States, 48 F. 2d 148; Appeal of Blum’s, Inc., 1 B. T. A. 737, 771; New England Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Comm’r, 9 B. T. A. 334; Green Furniture Co. v. Comm’r, 14 B. T. A. 508; S. Davidson & Bros. v. Comm’r, 21 B. T. A. 638, 644; Federal St. & Pleasant Valley Passenger R. Co. v. Comm’r, 24 B. T. A. 262, 266. Article 117 of Regulations 33 (Revised), promulgated Jan. 2, 1918, and Article 42 of Regulations 45, promulgated April 17,1919. B. B. Todd, Inc., 1 B. T. A. 762; H. B. Graves Co., 1 B. T. A. 859; Hoover-Bond Co., 1 B. T. A. 929; Six Hundred and Fifty West End Avenue Co., 2 B. T. A. 958. S. Rep. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 19, the Senate Finance Committee’s report on Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 9, 23. S. Rep. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 19; Willcuts v. Gradwohl, 58 F. 2d 587, 589-590. Section 115(1) provides: “The gain or loss realized from the sale or other disposition ... of property by a corporation— . . . “(2) for the purpose of the computation of earnings and profits of the coloration for any period beginning after Februarj' 28, 1913, shall be determined by using as the adjusted basis the adjusted basis (under the law applicable to the year in which the sale or other disposition was made) for determining gain. “Gain or loss so realized shall increase or decrease the earnings and profits to, but not beyond, the extent to which such a realized gain or loss was recognized in computing net income under the law applicable to the year in which such sale or disposition was made.” The Conference Committee report on the Second Revenue Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 974, said with reference to § 115 (l): “The provisions in the House and Senate bills, that gain or loss so realized shall increase or decrease the earnings and profits to, but not beyond, the extent recognized in computing net income under the law applicable to the year in which such sale or disposition was made, are retained. As used in this subsection the term ‘recognized’ relates to a realized gain or loss which is recognized pursuant to the provisions of law, for example, see section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code. It does not relate to losses disallowed or not taken into account.” Conf. Rep. No. 3002, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 60.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al., Petitioners v. Vijayakumar THURAISSIGIAM No. 19-161 Supreme Court of the United States. Argued March 2, 2020 Decided June 25, 2020 Deputy Solicitor General Edwin S. Kneedler for the petitioners. Lee Gelernt, New York, NY, for the respondent. Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Morgan L. Ratner, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Erez Reuveni, Joshua S. Press, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for the Petitioners. Cody Wofsy, Stephen B. Kang, Adrienne Harrold, Morgan Russell, Cecillia D. Wang, American Civil Liberties, Union Foundation, San Francisco, CA, Lucas Guttentag, Stanford, CA, David Loy, Sarah Thompson, ACLU Foundation of San, Diego & Imperial Counties, San Diego, CA, Lee Gelernt, Omar C. Jadwat, Jonathan Hafetz, Anand V. Balakrishnan, Celso J. Perez, American Civil Liberties, Union Foundation, New York, NY, David D. Cole, American Civil Liberties, Union Foundation, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. Every year, hundreds of thousands of aliens are apprehended at or near the border attempting to enter this country illegally. Many ask for asylum, claiming that they would be persecuted if returned to their home countries. Some of these claims are valid, and by granting asylum, the United States lives up to its ideals and its treaty obligations. Most asylum claims, however, ultimately fail, and some are fraudulent. In 1996, when Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009-546, it crafted a system for weeding out patently meritless claims and expeditiously removing the aliens making such claims from the country. It was Congress's judgment that detaining all asylum seekers until the full-blown removal process is completed would place an unacceptable burden on our immigration system and that releasing them would present an undue risk that they would fail to appear for removal proceedings. This case concerns the constitutionality of the system Congress devised. Among other things, IIRIRA placed restrictions on the ability of asylum seekers to obtain review under the federal habeas statute, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that these restrictions are unconstitutional. According to the Ninth Circuit, they unconstitutionally suspend the writ of habeas corpus and violate asylum seekers' right to due process. We now review that decision and reverse. Respondent's Suspension Clause argument fails because it would extend the writ of habeas corpus far beyond its scope "when the Constitution was drafted and ratified." Boumediene v. Bush , 553 U.S. 723, 746, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008). Indeed, respondent's use of the writ would have been unrecognizable at that time. Habeas has traditionally been a means to secure release from unlawful detention, but respondent invokes the writ to achieve an entirely different end, namely, to obtain additional administrative review of his asylum claim and ultimately to obtain authorization to stay in this country. Respondent's due process argument fares no better. While aliens who have established connections in this country have due process rights in deportation proceedings, the Court long ago held that Congress is entitled to set the conditions for an alien's lawful entry into this country and that, as a result, an alien at the threshold of initial entry cannot claim any greater rights under the Due Process Clause. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States , 142 U.S. 651, 660, 12 S.Ct. 336, 35 L.Ed. 1146 (1892). Respondent attempted to enter the country illegally and was apprehended just 25 yards from the border. He therefore has no entitlement to procedural rights other than those afforded by statute. In short, under our precedents, neither the Suspension Clause nor the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires any further review of respondent's claims, and IIRIRA's limitations on habeas review are constitutional as applied. I A We begin by briefly outlining the provisions of immigration law that are pertinent to this case. Under those provisions, several classes of aliens are "inadmissible" and therefore "removable." 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1229a(e)(2)(A). These include aliens who lack a valid entry document "at the time of application for admission." § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). An alien who arrives at a "port of entry," i.e. , a place where an alien may lawfully enter, must apply for admission. An alien like respondent who is caught trying to enter at some other spot is treated the same way. §§ 1225(a)(1), (3). If an alien is inadmissible, the alien may be removed. The usual removal process involves an evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge, and at that hearing an alien may attempt to show that he or she should not be removed. Among other things, an alien may apply for asylum on the ground that he or she would be persecuted if returned to his or her home country. § 1229a(b)(4) ; 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c) (2020). If that claim is rejected and the alien is ordered removed, the alien can appeal the removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals and, if that appeal is unsuccessful, the alien is generally entitled to review in a federal court of appeals. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(5), 1252(a). As of the first quarter of this fiscal year, there were 1,066,563 pending removal proceedings. See Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), Adjudication Statistics: Pending Cases (Jan. 2020). The average civil appeal takes approximately one year. During the time when removal is being litigated, the alien will either be detained, at considerable expense, or allowed to reside in this country, with the attendant risk that he or she may not later be found. § 1226(a). Congress addressed these problems by providing more expedited procedures for certain "applicants for admission." For these purposes, "[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival ...)" is deemed "an applicant for admission." § 1225(a)(1). An applicant is subject to expedited removal if, as relevant here, the applicant (1) is inadmissible because he or she lacks a valid entry document; (2) has not "been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility"; and (3) is among those whom the Secretary of Homeland Security has designated for expedited removal. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii)(I)-(II). Once "an immigration officer determines" that a designated applicant "is inadmissible," "the officer [must] order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review." § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Applicants can avoid expedited removal by claiming asylum. If an applicant "indicates either an intention to apply for asylum" or "a fear of persecution," the immigration officer "shall refer the alien for an interview by an asylum officer." §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). The point of this screening interview is to determine whether the applicant has a "credible fear of persecution." § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v). The applicant need not show that he or she is in fact eligible for asylum-a "credible fear" equates to only a "significant possibility" that the alien would be eligible. Ibid. Thus, while eligibility ultimately requires a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of," among other things, "race" or "political opinion," §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(A), all that an alien must show to avoid expedited removal is a "credible fear." If the asylum officer finds an applicant's asserted fear to be credible, the applicant will receive "full consideration" of his asylum claim in a standard removal hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f) ; see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). If the asylum officer finds that the applicant does not have a credible fear, a supervisor will review the asylum officer's determination. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(8). If the supervisor agrees with it, the applicant may appeal to an immigration judge, who can take further evidence and "shall make a de novo determination." §§ 1003.42(c), (d)(1) ; see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III). An alien subject to expedited removal thus has an opportunity at three levels to obtain an asylum hearing, and the applicant will obtain one unless the asylum officer, a supervisor, and an immigration judge all find that the applicant has not asserted a credible fear. Over the last five years, nearly 77% of screenings have resulted in a finding of credible fear. And nearly half the remainder (11% of the total number of screenings) were closed for administrative reasons, including the alien's withdrawal of the claim. As a practical matter, then, the great majority of asylum seekers who fall within the category subject to expedited removal do not receive expedited removal and are instead afforded the same procedural rights as other aliens. Whether an applicant who raises an asylum claim receives full or only expedited review, the applicant is not entitled to immediate release. Applicants "shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed." § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). Applicants who are found to have a credible fear may also be detained pending further consideration of their asylum applications. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) ; see Jennings v. Rodriguez , 583 U. S. ----, ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 830, 836-837, 842, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018). B The IIRIRA provision at issue in this case, § 1252(e)(2), limits the review that an alien in expedited removal may obtain via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. That provision allows habeas review of three matters: first, "whether the petitioner is an alien"; second, "whether the petitioner was ordered removed"; and third, whether the petitioner has already been granted entry as a lawful permanent resident, refugee, or asylee. §§ 1252(e)(2)(A)-(C). If the petitioner has such a status, or if a removal order has not "in fact" been "issued," § 1252(e)(5), the court may order a removal hearing, § 1252(e)(4)(B). A major objective of IIRIRA was to "protec[t] the Executive's discretion" from undue interference by the courts; indeed, "that can fairly be said to be the theme of the legislation." Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. , 525 U.S. 471, 486, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) ( AAADC ). In accordance with that aim, § 1252(e)(5) provides that "[t]here shall be no review of whether the alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal." And "[n]otwithstanding" any other "habeas corpus provision"-including 28 U.S.C. § 2241 -"no court shall have jurisdiction to review" any other "individual determination" or "claim arising from or relating to the implementation or operation of an order of [expedited] removal." § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i). In particular, courts may not review "the determination" that an alien lacks a credible fear of persecution. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii) ; see also §§ 1252(a)(2)(A)(ii), (iv) (other specific limitations). Even without the added step of judicial review, the credible-fear process and abuses of it can increase the burdens currently "overwhelming our immigration system." 84 Fed. Reg. 33841 (2019). The past decade has seen a 1,883% increase in credible-fear claims, and in 2018 alone, there were 99,035 claims. See id. , at 33838 (data for fiscal years 2008 to 2018). The majority have proved to be meritless. Many applicants found to have a credible fear-about 50% over the same 10-year period-did not pursue asylum. See EOIR, Adjudication Statistics: Rates of Asylum Filings in Cases Originating With a Credible Fear Claim (Nov. 2018); see also 84 Fed. Reg. 33841 (noting that many instead abscond). In 2019, a grant of asylum followed a finding of credible fear just 15% of the time. See EOIR, Asylum Decision Rates in Cases Originating With a Credible Fear Claim (Oct. 2019). Fraudulent asylum claims can also be difficult to detect, especially in a screening process that is designed to be expedited and that is currently handling almost 100,000 claims per year. The question presented thus has significant consequences for the immigration system. If courts must review credible-fear claims that in the eyes of immigration officials and an immigration judge do not meet the low bar for such claims, expedited removal would augment the burdens on that system. Once a fear is asserted, the process would no longer be expedited. C Respondent Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam, a Sri Lankan national, crossed the southern border without inspection or an entry document at around 11 p.m. one night in January 2017. App. 38. A Border Patrol agent stopped him within 25 yards of the border, and the Department detained him for expedited removal. Id. , at 37-39, 106; see §§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), and (b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). He claimed a fear of returning to Sri Lanka because a group of men had once abducted and severely beaten him, but he said that he did not know who the men were, why they had assaulted him, or whether Sri Lankan authorities would protect him in the future. Id. , at 80. He also affirmed that he did not fear persecution based on his race, political opinions, or other protected characteristics. Id. , at 76-77; see § 1101(a)(42)(A). The asylum officer credited respondent's account of the assault but determined that he lacked a "credible" fear of persecution, as defined by § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v), because he had offered no evidence that could have made him eligible for asylum (or other removal relief). Id. , at 83, 87, 89; see § 1158(b)(1)(A). The supervising officer agreed and signed the removal order. Id. , at 54, 107. After hearing further testimony from respondent, an Immigration Judge affirmed on de novo review and returned the case to the Department for removal. Id. , at 97. Respondent then filed a federal habeas petition. Asserting for the first time a fear of persecution based on his Tamil ethnicity and political views, id ., at 12-13, he argued that he "should have passed the credible fear stage," id. , at 30. But, he alleged, the immigration officials deprived him of "a meaningful opportunity to establish his claims" and violated credible-fear procedures by failing to probe past his denial of the facts necessary for asylum. Id. , at 27, 32. Allegedly they also failed to apply the "correct standard" to his claims-the "significant possibility" standard-despite its repeated appearance in the records of their decisions. Id. , at 30; see id. , at 53, 84-89, 97. Respondent requested "a writ of habeas corpus, an injunction, or a writ of mandamus directing [the Department] to provide [him] a new opportunity to apply for asylum and other applicable forms of relief." Id. , at 33. His petition made no mention of release from custody. The District Court dismissed the petition, holding that §§ 1252(a)(2) and (e)(2) and clear Ninth Circuit case law foreclosed review of the negative credible-fear determination that resulted in respondent's expedited removal order. 287 F.Supp.3d 1077, 1081 (SD Cal. 2018). The court also rejected respondent's argument "that the jurisdictional limitations of § 1252(e) violate the Suspension Clause," again relying on Circuit precedent. Id ., at 1082-1083. The Ninth Circuit reversed. It found that our Suspension Clause precedent demands "reference to the writ as it stood in 1789." 917 F.3d 1097, 1111 (2019). But without citing any pre-1789 case about the scope of the writ, the court held that § 1252(e)(2) violates the Suspension Clause. See id. , at 1113-1119. The court added that respondent "has procedural due process rights," specifically the right " 'to expedited removal proceedings that conformed to the dictates of due process.' " Id. , at 1111, n. 15 (quoting United States v. Raya-Vaca , 771 F.3d 1195, 1203 (CA9 2014) ). Although the decision applied only to respondent, petitioners across the Circuit have used it to obtain review outside the scope of § 1252(e)(2), and petitioners elsewhere have attempted to follow suit. The Ninth Circuit's decision invalidated the application of an important provision of federal law and conflicted with a decision from another Circuit, see Castro v. United States Dept. of Homeland Security , 835 F.3d 422 (CA3 2016). We granted certiorari, 589 U. S. ----, 140 S.Ct. 427, 205 L.Ed.2d 244 (2019). II A The Suspension Clause provides that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2. In INS v. St. Cyr , 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001), we wrote that the Clause, at a minimum, "protects the writ as it existed in 1789," when the Constitution was adopted. Id ., at 301, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (internal quotation marks omitted). And in this case, respondent agrees that "there is no reason" to consider whether the Clause extends any further. Brief for Respondent 26, n. 12. We therefore proceed on that basis. B This principle dooms respondent's Suspension Clause argument, because neither respondent nor his amici have shown that the writ of habeas corpus was understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution to permit a petitioner to claim the right to enter or remain in a country or to obtain administrative review potentially leading to that result. The writ simply provided a means of contesting the lawfulness of restraint and securing release. In 1768, Blackstone's Commentaries-usually a "satisfactory exposition of the common law of England," Schick v. United States , 195 U.S. 65, 69, 24 S.Ct. 826, 49 L.Ed. 99 (1904) -made this clear. Blackstone wrote that habeas was a means to "remov[e] the injury of unjust and illegal confinement." 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 137 (emphasis deleted). Justice Story described the "common law" writ the same way. See 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1333, p. 206 (1833). Habeas, he explained, "is the appropriate remedy to ascertain ... whether any person is rightfully in confinement or not." Ibid . We have often made the same point. See, e.g. , Preiser v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 475, 484, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) ("It is clear ... from the common-law history of the writ ... that the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody"); Wilkinson v. Dotson , 544 U.S. 74, 79, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005) (similar); Munaf v. Geren , 553 U.S. 674, 693, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 171 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008) (similar). In this case, however, respondent did not ask to be released. Instead, he sought entirely different relief: vacatur of his "removal order" and "an order directing [the Department] to provide him with a new ... opportunity to apply for asylum and other relief from removal." App. 14 (habeas petition). See also id ., at 31 ("a fair procedure to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief"); id ., at 14 ("a new, meaningful opportunity to apply for asylum and other relief from removal"). Such relief might fit an injunction or writ of mandamus-which tellingly, his petition also requested, id ., at 33-but that relief falls outside the scope of the common-law habeas writ. Although the historic role of habeas is to secure release from custody, the Ninth Circuit did not suggest that release, at least in the traditional sense of the term, was required. Instead, what it found to be necessary was a "meaningful opportunity" for review of the procedures used in determining that respondent did not have a credible fear of persecution. 917 F.3d at 1117. Thus, even according to the Ninth Circuit, respondent's petition did not call for traditional habeas relief. Not only did respondent fail to seek release, he does not dispute that confinement during the pendency of expedited asylum review, and even during the additional proceedings he seeks, is lawful. Nor could he. It is not disputed that he was apprehended in the very act of attempting to enter this country; that he is inadmissible because he lacks an entry document, see §§ 1182(a)(7)(A), 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) ; and that, under these circumstances, his case qualifies for the expedited review process, including "[m]andatory detention" during his credible-fear review, §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), (iii)(IV). Moreover, simply releasing him would not provide the right to stay in the country that his petition ultimately seeks. Without a change in status, he would remain subject to arrest, detention, and removal. §§ 1226(a), 1229a(e)(2). While respondent does not claim an entitlement to release, the Government is happy to release him-provided the release occurs in the cabin of a plane bound for Sri Lanka. That would be the equivalent of the habeas relief Justice Story ordered in a case while riding circuit. He issued a writ requiring the release of a foreign sailor who jumped ship in Boston, but he provided for the sailor to be released into the custody of the master of his ship. Ex parte D'Olivera , 7 F.Cas. 853, 854 (No. 3,967) (CC Mass. 1813). Respondent does not want anything like that. His claim is more reminiscent of the one we rejected in Munaf . In that case, American citizens held in U. S. custody in Iraq filed habeas petitions in an effort to block their transfer to Iraqi authorities for criminal prosecution. See 553 U.S. at 692, 128 S.Ct. 2207. Rejecting this use of habeas, we noted that "[h]abeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention" and that what these individuals wanted was not "simple release" but an order requiring them to be brought to this country. Id ., at 693, 697, 128 S.Ct. 2207. Claims so far outside the "core" of habeas may not be pursued through habeas. See, e.g. , Skinner v. Switzer , 562 U.S. 521, 535, n. 13, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011). Like the habeas petitioners in Munaf , respondent does not want "simple release" but, ultimately, the opportunity to remain lawfully in the United States. That he seeks to stay in this country, while the habeas petitioners in Munaf asked to be brought here from Iraq, see post , at 2002 - 2004 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.), is immaterial. In this case as in Munaf , the relief requested falls outside the scope of the writ as it was understood when the Constitution was adopted. See Castro , 835 F.3d at 450-451 (Hardiman, J., concurring dubitante) ("Petitioners here seek to alter their status in the United States in the hope of avoiding release to their homelands. That prayer for relief ... dooms the merits of their Suspension Clause argument" (emphasis deleted)). III Disputing this conclusion, respondent argues that the Suspension Clause guarantees a broader habeas right. To substantiate this claim, he points to three bodies of case law: British and American cases decided prior to or around the time of the adoption of the Constitution, decisions of this Court during the so-called "finality era" (running from the late 19th century to the mid-20th century), and two of our more recent cases. None of these sources support his argument. A Respondent and amici supporting his position have done considerable research into the use of habeas before and around the time of the adoption of the Constitution, but they have not unearthed evidence that habeas was then used to obtain anything like what is sought here, namely, authorization for an alien to remain in a country other than his own or to obtain administrative or judicial review leading to that result. All that their research (and the dissent's) shows is that habeas was used to seek release from detention in a variety of circumstances. In fact, respondent and his amici do not argue that their cases show anything more. See Brief for Respondent 27 (arguing that habeas was "available" at the founding "to test all forms of physical restraint"); Brief for Scholars of the Law of Habeas Corpus as Amici Curiae 11 (the "historical record ... demonstrates that the touchstone for access to the writ" was "whether the petitioner challenges control of his person"). Because respondent seeks to use habeas to obtain something far different from simple release, his cause is not aided by the many release cases that he and his amici have found. Thus, for present purposes, it is immaterial that habeas was used to seek release from confinement that was imposed for, among other things, contempt of court (see Bushell's Case , Vaugh. 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C. P. 1670)), debt (see Hollingshead's Case , 1 Salk. 351, 91 Eng. Rep. 307 (K. B. 1702); Rex v. Nathan , 2 Str. 880, 93 Eng. Rep. 914 (K. B. 1724)), medical malpractice (see Dr. Groenvelt's Case , 1 Raym. Ld. 213, 91 Eng. Rep. 1038 (K. B. 1702)), failing to pay an assessment for sewers (see Hetley v. Boyer , Cro. Jac. 336, 79 Eng. Rep. 287 (K. B. 1613)), failure to lend the King money (see Darnel's Case , 3 How. St. Tr. 1 (K. B. 1627)), carrying an authorized "dagg," i.e. , handgun (see Gardener's Case , Cro. Eliz. 821, 78 Eng. Rep. 1048 (K. B. 1600)), "impressment" into military service or involuntary servitude (see St. Cyr , 533 U.S. at 302, 121 S.Ct. 2271 ), or refusing to pay a colonial tax (see Oldham & Wishnie 496). Nor does it matter that common-law courts sometimes ordered or considered ordering release in circumstances that would be beyond the reach of any habeas statute ever enacted by Congress, such as release from private custody. See, e.g. , Rex v. Delaval , 3 Burr. 1434, 1435-1437, 97 Eng. Rep. 913, 914 (K. B. 1763) (release of young woman from "indentures of apprenticeship"); Rex v. Clarkson , 1 Str. 444, 93 Eng. Rep. 625 (K. B. 1722) (release from boarding school); Lister's Case , 8 Mod. 22, 88 Eng. Rep. 17 (K. B. 1721) (release of wife from estranged husband's restraint). What matters is that all these cases are about release from restraint. Accord, Preiser , 411 U.S. at 484-485, and nn. 3-5, 93 S.Ct. 1827. Respondent and his amici note that habeas petitioners were sometimes released on the condition that they conform to certain requirements. See Brief for Respondent 30; Legal Historians Brief 18. For example, they cite a case in which a man was released on condition that he treat his wife well and support her, and another in which a man was released on condition that he issue an apology. Ibid . But what respondent sought in this case is nothing like that. Respondent does not seek an order releasing him on the condition that he do or refrain from doing something. What he wants-further review of his asylum claim-is not a condition with which he must comply. Equally irrelevant is the practice, discussed in the dissent, of allowing the executive to justify or cure a defect in detention before requiring release. See post , at 2001 - 2002. Respondent does not seek this sort of conditional release either, because the legality of his detention is not in question. Respondent contends that two cases show that habeas could be used to secure the right of a non-citizen to remain in a foreign country, but neither proves his point. His first case, involving a Scot named Murray, is one for which no official report is available for us to review. We could hardly base our decision here on such a decision. His second case, Somerset v. Stewart , Lofft. 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K. B. 1772), is celebrated but does not aid respondent. James Somerset was a slave who was "detain[ed]" on a ship bound for Jamaica, and Lord Mansfield famously ordered his release on the ground that his detention as a slave was unlawful in England. Id ., at 19, 98 Eng. Rep., at 510. This relief, release from custody, fell within the historic core of habeas, and Lord Mansfield did not order anything else. It may well be that a collateral consequence of Somerset's release was that he was allowed to remain in England, but if that is so, it was due not to the writ issued by Lord Mansfield, but to English law regarding entitlement to reside in the country. At the time, England had nothing like modern immigration restrictions. As late as 1816, the word "deportation" apparently "was not to be found in any English dictionary." The Use of the Crown's Power of Deportation Under the Aliens Act, 1793-1826, in J. Dinwiddy, Radicalism and Reform in Britain, 1780-1850, p. 150, n. 4 (1992); see also, e.g. , Craies, The Right of Aliens To Enter British Territory, 6 L. Q. Rev. 27, 35 (1890) ("England was a complete asylum to the foreigner who did not offend against its laws"); Haycraft, Alien Legislation and the Prerogative of the Crown, 13 L. Q. Rev. 165, 180 (1897) ("There do not appear to have been any transactions in Parliament or in the [Crown's] Privy Council directly affecting [deportation] from the time of Elizabeth [I] to that of George III"). For a similar reason, respondent cannot find support in early 19th-century American cases in which deserting foreign sailors used habeas to obtain their release from the custody of American officials. In none of the cases involving deserters that have been called to our attention did the court order anything more than simple release from custody. As noted, Justice Story ordered a sailor's release into the custody of his ship's master. See Ex parte D'Olivera , 7 F.Cas. at 854. Other decisions, while ordering the release of detained foreign deserters because no statute authorized detention, chafed at having to order even release. See Case of the Deserters from the British Frigate L'Africaine , 3 Am. L. J. & Misc. Repertory 132, 135-136 (Md. 1810) (reporting judge's statement "that he never would interfere to prevent" the British consul himself from detaining British deserters); Case of Hippolyte Dumas , 2 Am. L. J. & Misc. Repertory 86, 87 (Pa. 1809) (noting "inconvenience" that U. S. law did not discourage desertion of foreign sailors); Commonwealth v. Holloway , 1 Serg.&Rawle 392, 396 (Pa. 1815) (opinion of Tilghman, C. J.) (same); id ., at 397 (opinion of Yeates, J.) (same). These cases thus do not contemplate the quite different relief that respondent asks us to sanction here. In these cases, as in Somerset , it may be that the released petitioners were able to remain in the United States as a collateral consequence of release, but if so, that was due not to the writs ordering their release, but to U. S. immigration law or the lack thereof. These decisions came at a time when an "open door to the immigrant was the ... federal policy." Harisiades v. Shaughnessy , 342 U.S. 580, 588, n. 15, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) ; see also St. Cyr , 533 U.S. at 305, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (first immigration regulation enacted in 1875). So release may have had the side effect of enabling these individuals to remain in this country, but that is beside the point. The relief that a habeas court may order and the collateral consequences of that relief are two entirely different things. Ordering an individual's release from custody may have the side effect of enabling that person to pursue all sorts of opportunities that the law allows. For example, release may enable a qualified surgeon to operate on a patient; a licensed architect may have the opportunity to design a bridge; and a qualified pilot may be able to fly a passenger jet. But a writ of habeas could not be used to compel an applicant to be afforded those opportunities or as a means to obtain a license as a surgeon, architect, or pilot. Similarly, while the release of an alien may give the alien the opportunity to remain in the country if the immigration laws permit, we have no evidence that the writ as it was known in 1789 could be used to require that aliens be permitted to remain in a country other than their own, or as a means to seek that permission. Respondent's final examples involve international extradition, but these cases are no more pertinent than those already discussed. For one thing, they post-date the founding era. England was not a party to any extradition treaty in 1789, and this country's first extradition treaty was the Jay Treaty of 1794. See 1 J. Moore, Extradition and Interstate Rendition §§ 7, 78, pp. 10, 89 (1891). In any event, extradition cases, similar to the deserter cases, illustrate nothing more than the use of habeas to secure release from custody when not in compliance with the extradition statute and relevant treaties. As noted by a scholar on whose work respondent relies, these cases "examine[d] the lawfulness of magistrates' decisions permitting the executive to detain aliens." Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 961, 1003 (1998). In these cases, as in all the others noted above, habeas was used "simply" to seek release from allegedly unlawful detention. Benson v. McMahon , 127 U.S. 457, 463, 8 S.Ct. 1240, 32 L.Ed. 234 (1888). See also, e.g. , In re Stupp , 23 F.Cas. 296, 303, (No. 13563) (CC SDNY 1875). Despite pages of rhetoric, the dissent is unable to cite a single pre-1789 habeas case in which a court ordered relief that was anything like what respondent seeks here. The dissent instead contends that "the Suspension Clause inquiry does not require a close (much less precise) factual match with historical habeas precedent," post , at 1998, and then discusses cases that are not even close to this one. The dissent reveals the true nature of its argument by suggesting that there are "inherent difficulties [in] a strict originalist approach in the habeas context because of, among other things, the dearth of reasoned habeas decisions at the founding." Ibid . But respondent does not ask us to hold that the Suspension Clause guarantees the writ as it might have evolved since the adoption of the Constitution. On the contrary, as noted at the outset of this discussion, he rests his argument on "the writ as it existed in 1789." Brief for Respondent 26, n. 12. What the dissent merely implies, one concurring opinion states expressly, arguing that the scope of the writ guaranteed by the Suspension Clause "may change 'depending upon the circumstances' " and thus may allow certain aliens to seek relief other than release. Post , at 1989 - 1990 (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Boumediene , 553 U.S. at 779, 128 S.Ct. 2229 ). But that is not respondent's argument, and as a general rule "we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present." United States v. Sineneng-Smith , 590 U. S. ----, ----, 140 S.Ct. 1575, 1579, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). In any event, the concurrence's snippets of quotations from Boumediene are taken entirely out of context. They relate to the question whether the statutory review procedures for Guantanamo detainees seeking release from custody provided an adequate substitute for a habeas petition seeking release . See infra , at 1980 - 1981. They do not suggest that any habeas writ guaranteed by the Suspension Clause permits a petitioner to obtain relief that goes far beyond the "core" of habeas as "a remedy for unlawful executive detention." Munaf , 553 U.S. at 693, 128 S.Ct. 2207. B We now proceed to consider the second body of case law on which respondent relies, decisions of this Court during the "finality era," which takes its name from a feature of the Immigration Act of 1891 making certain immigration decisions "final." Although respondent claims that his argument is supported by "the writ as it existed in 1789," Brief for Respondent 26, n. 12, his argument focuses mainly on this body of case law, which began a century later. These cases, he claims, held that "the Suspension Clause mandates a minimum level of judicial review to ensure that the Executive complies with the law in effectuating removal." Id ., at 11-12. The Ninth Circuit also relied heavily on these cases and interpreted them to "suggest that the Suspension Clause requires review of legal and mixed questions of law and fact related to removal orders." 917 F.3d at 1117. This interpretation of the "finality era" cases is badly mistaken. Those decisions were based not on the Suspension Clause but on the habeas statute and the immigration laws then in force. The habeas statute in effect during this time was broad in scope. It authorized the federal courts to review whether a person was being held in custody in violation of any federal law, including immigration laws. Thus, when aliens claimed that they were detained in violation of immigration statutes, the federal courts considered whether immigration authorities had complied with those laws. This, of course, required that the immigration laws be interpreted, and at the start of the finality era, this Court interpreted the 1891 Act's finality provision to block review of only questions of fact. Accordingly, when writs of habeas corpus were sought by aliens who were detained on the ground that they were not entitled to enter this country, the Court considered whether, given the facts found by the immigration authorities, the detention was consistent with applicable federal law. But the Court exercised that review because it was authorized to do so by statute. The decisions did not hold that this review was required by the Suspension Clause. In this country, the habeas authority of federal courts has been addressed by statute from the very beginning. The Judiciary Act of 1789, § 14, 1 Stat. 82, gave the federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus under specified circumstances, but after the Civil War, Congress enacted a much broader statute. That law, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, provided that "the several courts of the United States ... shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States." Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. The Act was "of the most comprehensive character," bringing "within the habeas corpus jurisdiction of every court and of every judge every possible case of privation of liberty contrary" to federal law. Ex parte McCardle , 6 Wall. 318, 325-326, 18 L.Ed. 816 (1868). This jurisdiction was "impossible to widen." Id ., at 326 ; see Fay v. Noia , 372 U.S. 391, 415, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963) (noting the Act's "expansive language" and "imperative tone"). The 1867 statute, unlike the current federal habeas statute, was not subject to restrictions on the issuance of writs in immigration matters, and in United States v. Jung Ah Lung , 124 U.S. 621, 8 S.Ct. 663, 31 L.Ed. 591 (1888), the Court held that an alien in immigration custody could seek a writ under that statute. Id ., at 626, 8 S.Ct. 663. This provided the statutory basis for the writs sought in the finality era cases. The Immigration Act of 1891, enacted during one of the country's great waves of immigration, required the exclusion of certain categories of aliens and established procedures for determining whether aliens fell within one of those categories. The Act required the exclusion of "idiots, insane persons, paupers or persons likely to become a public charge," persons with infectious diseases, persons with convictions for certain crimes, some individuals whose passage had been paid for by a third party, and certain laborers. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084. Inspection officers were authorized to board arriving vessels and inspect any aliens on board. § 8, id. , at 1085. And, in the provision of central importance here, the Act provided that "[a]ll decisions made by the inspection officers or their assistants touching the right of any alien to land, when adverse to such right, shall be final unless appeal be taken to the superintendent of immigration, whose action shall be subject to review by the Secretary of the Treasury." Ibid . Later immigration Acts, which remained in effect until 1952, contained similar provisions. See Act of 1894, 28 Stat. 390; Immigration Act of 1907, § 25, 34 Stat. 907; Immigration Act of 1917, § 17, 39 Stat. 887. The first of the finality era cases, Nishimura Ekiu v. United States , 142 U.S. 651, 12 S.Ct. 336, 35 L.Ed. 1146 (1892), required the Court to address the effect of the 1891 Act's finality provision in a habeas case. Nishimura Ekiu is the cornerstone of respondent's argument regarding the finality era cases, so the opinion in that case demands close attention. The case involved an alien who was detained upon arrival based on the immigration inspector's finding that she was liable to become a public charge. Seeking to be released, the alien applied to the Circuit Court for a writ of habeas corpus and argued that the 1891 Act, if construed to give immigration authorities the "exclusive authority to determine" her right to enter, would violate her constitutional right to the writ of habeas corpus and her right to due process. Id. , at 656, 12 S.Ct. 336 (statement of the case). The Circuit Court refused to issue the writ, holding that the determination of the inspector of immigration was not subject to review, and the alien then appealed. This Court upheld the denial of the writ. The Court interpreted the 1891 Act to preclude judicial review only with respect to questions of fact. Id ., at 660, 12 S.Ct. 336. And after interpreting the 1891 Act in this way, the Court found that "the act of 1891 is constitutional." Id ., at 664, 12 S.Ct. 336. The Court's narrow interpretation of the 1891 Act's finality provision meant that the federal courts otherwise retained the full authority granted by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 to determine whether an alien was detained in violation of federal law. Turning to that question, the Court held that the only procedural rights of an alien seeking to enter the country are those conferred by statute. "As to such persons," the Court explained, "the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law." Id ., at 660, 12 S.Ct. 336. The Court therefore considered whether the procedures set out in the 1891 Act had been followed, and finding no violation, affirmed the denial of the writ. Id ., at 661-664, 12 S.Ct. 336. What is critical for present purposes is that the Court did not hold that the Suspension Clause imposed any limitations on the authority of Congress to restrict the issuance of writs of habeas corpus in immigration matters. Respondent interprets Nishimura Ekiu differently. See Brief for Respondent 13-15. As he reads the decision, the Court interpreted the 1891 Act to preclude review of all questions related to an alien's entitlement to enter the country. Any other interpretation, he contends, would fly in the face of the statutory terms. But, he maintains, the Court held that this limitation violated the Suspension Clause except with respect to questions of fact, and it was for this reason that the Court considered whether the procedures specified by the 1891 Act were followed. In other words, he reads Nishimura Ekiu as holding that the 1891 Act's finality provision was unconstitutional in most of its applications (i.e. , to all questions other than questions of fact). This interpretation is wrong. The opinion in Nishimura Ekiu states unequivocally that "the act of 1891 is constitutional," id ., at 664, 12 S.Ct. 336, not that it is constitutional only in part. And if there is any ambiguity in the opinion regarding the Court's interpretation of the finality provision, the later decision in Gegiow v. Uhl , 239 U.S. 3, 36 S.Ct. 2, 60 L.Ed. 114 (1915), left no doubt. What Nishimura Ekiu meant, Gegiow explained, was that the immigration authorities' factual findings were conclusive (as Gegiow put it, "[t]he conclusiveness of the decisions of immigration officers ... is conclusiveness upon matters of fact") and therefore, the Court was "not forbidden by the statute to consider" in a habeas proceeding "whether the reasons" for removing an alien "agree with the requirements of the act." 239 U.S. at 9, 36 S.Ct. 2. In light of this interpretation, the Nishimura Ekiu Court had no occasion to decide whether the Suspension Clause would have tolerated a broader limitation, and there is not so much as a hint in the opinion that the Court considered this question. Indeed, the opinion never even mentions the Suspension Clause, and it is utterly implausible that the Court would hold sub silentio that Congress had violated that provision. Holding that an Act of Congress unconstitutionally suspends the writ of habeas corpus is momentous. See Boumediene , 553 U.S. at 773, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (noting "the care Congress has taken throughout our Nation's history" to avoid suspension). The Justices on the Court at the beginning of the finality era had seen historic occasions when the writ was suspended-during the Civil War by President Lincoln and then by Congress, and later during Reconstruction by President Grant. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld , 542 U.S. 507, 563, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing these events). The suspension of habeas during this era played a prominent role in our constitutional history. See Ex parte Merryman , 17 F.Cas. 144, 151-152 (No. 9,487) (CCD Md. 1861) (Taney, C. J.); Ex parte Milligan , 4 Wall. 2, 116, 131, 18 L.Ed. 281 (1866). (Two of the Justices at the beginning of the finality era were on the Court when Ex parte Milligan was decided.) The Justices knew a suspension of the writ when they saw one, and it is impossible to believe that the Nishimura Ekiu Court identified another occasion when Congress had suspended the writ and based its decision on the Suspension Clause without even mentioning that provision. The dissent's interpretation of Nishimura Ekiu is different from respondent's. According to the dissent, Nishimura Ekiu interpreted the 1891 Act as it did based on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. See post , at 2004 - 2005. This reading has no support in the Court's opinion, which never mentions the Suspension Clause or the avoidance doctrine and never explains why the Clause would allow Congress to preclude review of factual findings but nothing more. But even if there were some basis for this interpretation, it would not benefit respondent, and that is undoubtedly why he has not made the argument. IIRIRA unequivocally bars habeas review of respondent's claims, see § 1252(e)(2), and he does not argue that it can be read any other way. The avoidance doctrine "has no application in the absence of ambiguity." Warger v. Shauers , 574 U.S. 40, 50, 135 S.Ct. 521, 190 L.Ed.2d 422 (2014) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). Thus, if Nishimura Ekiu 's interpretation were based on constitutional avoidance, it would still not answer the interpretive question here. When we look to later finality era cases, any suggestion of a Suspension Clause foundation becomes even less plausible. None of those decisions mention the Suspension Clause or even hint that they are based on that provision, and these omissions are telling. On notable occasions during that time, the writ was suspended-in the Philippines in 1906 and Hawaii in 1941. During World War II, the Court held that "enemy aliens" could utilize habeas "unless there was suspension of the writ." In re Yamashita , 327 U.S. 1, 9, 66 S.Ct. 340, 90 L.Ed. 499 (1946). And the Court invoked the Suspension Clause in holding that the Executive lacked authority to intern a Japanese-American citizen. See Ex parte Endo , 323 U.S. 283, 297-299, 65 S.Ct. 208, 89 L.Ed. 243 (1944). If the Justices during that time had thought that the Suspension Clause provided the authority they were exercising in the many cases involving habeas petitions by aliens detained prior to entry, it is hard to believe that this important fact would have escaped mention. Respondent suggests that Nishimura Ekiu cannot have interpreted the 1891 Act's finality provision to apply only to factual questions because the statutory text categorically bars all review. The important question here, however, is what the Court did in Nishimura Ekiu , not whether its interpretation was correct, and in any event, there was a reasonable basis for the Court's interpretation. The determinations that the immigration officials were required to make under the 1891 Act were overwhelmingly factual in nature. The determination in Nishimura's case-that she was likely to become a public charge-seems to have been a pure question of fact, and the other grounds for exclusion under the Act involved questions that were either solely or at least primarily factual in nature. If we were now called upon to determine the meaning of a provision like the finality provision in the 1891 Act, our precedents would provide the basis for an argument in favor of the interpretation that the Nishimura Ekiu Court reached. The presumption in favor of judicial review, see, e.g. , Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr , 589 U. S. ----, ----, 140 S.Ct. 1062, 1069-1070, 206 L.Ed.2d 271 (2020) ; Nasrallah v. Barr , 590 U. S. ----, ---- - ---- ,140 S.Ct. 1683, 1690-1692, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2020), could be invoked. So could the rule that "[i]mplications from statutory text or legislative history are not sufficient to repeal habeas jurisdiction." St. Cyr , 533 U.S. at 299, 121 S.Ct. 2271 ; accord, Ex parte Yerger , 8 Wall. 85, 105, 19 L.Ed. 332 (1869). Thus, respondent's interpretation of the decision in Nishimura Ekiu is wrong, and the same is true of his understanding of the later finality era cases. Rather than relying on the Suspension Clause, those cases simply involved the exercise of the authority conferred by the habeas statute then in effect. This was true of Nishimura Ekiu , Gegiow , and every other finality era case that respondent cites in support of his Suspension Clause argument. See, e.g. , Gonzales v. Williams , 192 U.S. 1, 24 S.Ct. 177, 48 L.Ed. 317 (1904) ; Yee Won v. White , 256 U.S. 399, 41 S.Ct. 504, 65 L.Ed. 1012 (1921) ; Tod v. Waldman , 266 U.S. 113, 45 S.Ct. 85, 69 L.Ed. 195 (1924) ; United States ex rel. Polymeris v. Trudell , 284 U.S. 279, 52 S.Ct. 143, 76 L.Ed. 291 (1932) ; United States ex rel. Johnson v. Shaughnessy , 336 U.S. 806, 69 S.Ct. 921, 93 L.Ed. 1054 (1949) ; United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy , 338 U.S. 537, 70 S.Ct. 309, 94 L.Ed. 317 (1950) ; Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei , 345 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956 (1953) ; United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy , 347 U.S. 260, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681 (1954). Some finality era cases presented pure questions of law, while others involved the application of a legal test to particular facts. At least one involved an alien who had entered illegally. See id. , at 262, 74 S.Ct. 499. But none was based on the Suspension Clause. No majority opinion even mentioned the Suspension Clause. Indeed, any mention of the Constitution was rare-and unhelpful to respondent's arguments here. And in all the cited cases concerning aliens detained at entry, unlike the case now before us, what was sought-and the only relief considered-was release. Indeed, in an early finality era case, the Court took pains to note that it did not "express any opinion" on whether an alien was entitled to enter. Lem Moon Sing v. United States , 158 U.S. 538, 549, 15 S.Ct. 967, 39 L.Ed. 1082 (1895). Like the dissent, respondent makes much of certain statements in Heikkila v. Barber , 345 U.S. 229, 73 S.Ct. 603, 97 L.Ed. 972 (1953), which he interprets to substantiate his interpretation of Nishimura Ekiu and the subsequent entry cases discussed above. But he takes these statements out of context and reads far too much into them. Heikkila was not a habeas case, and the question before the Court was whether a deportation order was reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Court held that the order was not subject to APA review because the Immigration Act of 1917 foreclosed "judicial review"-as opposed to review in habeas. 345 U.S. at 234-235, 73 S.Ct. 603. Nothing in Heikkila suggested that the 1891 Act had been found to be partly unconstitutional, and Heikkila certainly did not address the scope of the writ of habeas corpus in 1789. In sum, the Court exercised habeas jurisdiction in the finality era cases because the habeas statute conferred that authority, not because it was required by the Suspension Clause. As a result, these cases cannot support respondent's argument that the writ of habeas corpus as it was understood when the Constitution was adopted would have allowed him to claim the right to administrative and judicial review while still in custody. C We come, finally, to the more recent cases on which respondent relies. The most recent, Boumediene , is not about immigration at all. It held that suspected foreign terrorists could challenge their detention at the naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. They had been "apprehended on the battlefield in Afghanistan" and elsewhere, not while crossing the border. 553 U.S. at 734, 128 S.Ct. 2229. They sought only to be released from Guantanamo, not to enter this country. See, e.g. , Brief for Petitioner Al Odah et al. in Al Odah v. United States , decided with Boumediene v. Bush , O. T. 2007, No. 061196, p. 39 (arguing that "habeas contemplates but one remedy," "release"). And nothing in the Court's discussion of the Suspension Clause suggested that they could have used habeas as a means of gaining entry. Rather, the Court reaffirmed that release is the habeas remedy though not the "exclusive" result of every writ, given that it is often "appropriate" to allow the executive to cure defects in a detention. 553 U.S. at 779, 128 S.Ct. 2229. Respondent's other recent case is St. Cyr , in which the Court's pertinent holding rejected the argument that certain provisions of IIRIRA and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 that did not refer expressly to habeas should nevertheless be interpreted as stripping the authority conferred by the habeas statute. In refusing to adopt that interpretation, the Court enlisted a quartet of interpretive canons: "the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action," "the longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction," the rule that a "clear indication" of congressional intent is expected when a proposed interpretation would push "the outer limits of Congress' power," and the canon of constitutional avoidance. 533 U.S. at 298-300, 121 S.Ct. 2271. In connection with this final canon, the Court observed: "Because of [the Suspension] Clause, some 'judicial intervention in deportation cases' is unquestionably 'required by the Constitution.' " Id ., at 300, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (quoting Heikkila , 345 U.S. at 235, 73 S.Ct. 603 ). Respondent pounces on this statement, but like the Heikkila statement on which it relies, it does nothing for him. The writ of habeas corpus as it existed at common law provided a vehicle to challenge all manner of detention by government officials, and the Court had held long before that the writ could be invoked by aliens already in the country who were held in custody pending deportation. St. Cyr reaffirmed these propositions, and this statement in St. Cyr does not signify approval of respondent's very different attempted use of the writ, which the Court did not consider. IV In addition to his Suspension Clause argument, respondent contends that IIRIRA violates his right to due process by precluding judicial review of his allegedly flawed credible-fear proceeding. Brief for Respondent 38-45. The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that respondent "had a constitutional right to expedited removal proceedings that conformed to the dictates of due process." 917 F.3d at 1111, n. 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, ibid ., that this holding conflicted with the Third Circuit's decision upholding § 1252(e)(2) on the ground that applicants for admission lack due process rights regarding their applications, see Castro , 835 F.3d at 445-446. Since due process provided an independent ground for the decision below and since respondent urges us to affirm on this ground, it is hard to understand the dissent's argument that the due process issue was not "seriously in dispute below" or that it is somehow improper for us to decide the issue. Post , at 2011 - 2012. Nor is the dissent correct in defending the Ninth Circuit's holding. That holding is contrary to more than a century of precedent. In 1892, the Court wrote that as to "foreigners who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicil or residence within the United States, nor even been admitted into the country pursuant to law," "the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law." Nishimura Ekiu , 142 U.S. at 660, 12 S.Ct. 336. Since then, the Court has often reiterated this important rule. See, e.g. , Knauff , 338 U.S. at 544, 70 S.Ct. 309 ("Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned"); Mezei , 345 U.S. at 212, 73 S.Ct. 625 (same); Landon v. Plasencia , 459 U.S. 21, 32, 103 S.Ct. 321, 74 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982) ("This Court has long held that an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative"). Respondent argues that this rule does not apply to him because he was not taken into custody the instant he attempted to enter the country (as would have been the case had he arrived at a lawful port of entry). Because he succeeded in making it 25 yards into U. S. territory before he was caught, he claims the right to be treated more favorably. The Ninth Circuit agreed with this argument. We reject it. It disregards the reason for our century-old rule regarding the due process rights of an alien seeking initial entry. That rule rests on fundamental propositions: "[T]he power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative," id. , at 32, 103 S.Ct. 321 ; the Constitution gives "the political department of the government" plenary authority to decide which aliens to admit, Nishimura Ekiu , 142 U.S. at 659, 12 S.Ct. 336 ; and a concomitant of that power is the power to set the procedures to be followed in determining whether an alien should be admitted, see Knauff , 338 U.S. at 544, 70 S.Ct. 309. This rule would be meaningless if it became inoperative as soon as an arriving alien set foot on U. S. soil. When an alien arrives at a port of entry-for example, an international airport-the alien is on U. S. soil, but the alien is not considered to have entered the country for the purposes of this rule. On the contrary, aliens who arrive at ports of entry-even those paroled elsewhere in the country for years pending removal-are "treated" for due process purposes "as if stopped at the border." Mezei , 345 U.S. at 215, 73 S.Ct. 625 ; see Leng May Ma v. Barber , 357 U.S. 185, 188-190, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) ; Kaplan v. Tod , 267 U.S. 228, 230-231, 45 S.Ct. 257, 69 L.Ed. 585 (1925). The same must be true of an alien like respondent. As previously noted, an alien who tries to enter the country illegally is treated as an "applicant for admission," § 1225(a)(1), and an alien who is detained shortly after unlawful entry cannot be said to have "effected an entry," Zadvydas v. Davis , 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001). Like an alien detained after arriving at a port of entry, an alien like respondent is "on the threshold." Mezei , 345 U.S. at 212, 73 S.Ct. 625. The rule advocated by respondent and adopted by the Ninth Circuit would undermine the "sovereign prerogative" of governing admission to this country and create a perverse incentive to enter at an unlawful rather than a lawful location. Plasencia , 459 U.S. at 32, 103 S.Ct. 321. For these reasons, an alien in respondent's position has only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute. In respondent's case, Congress provided the right to a "determin[ation]" whether he had "a significant possibility" of "establish[ing] eligibility for asylum," and he was given that right. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), (v). Because the Due Process Clause provides nothing more, it does not require review of that determination or how it was made. As applied here, therefore, § 1252(e)(2) does not violate due process. * * * Because the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that § 1252(e)(2) violates the Suspension Clause and the Due Process Clause, we reverse the judgment and remand the case with directions that the application for habeas corpus be dismissed. It is so ordered . See Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, U. S. Courts of Appeals-Median Time Intervals in Months for Civil and Criminal Appeals Terminated on the Merits (2019) (Table B-4A) (time calculated for non-prisoner appeals from the filing of a notice of appeal to the last opinion or final order). When respondent entered the country, aliens were treated as applicants for admission if they were "encountered within 14 days of entry without inspection and within 100 air miles of any U. S. international land border." 69 Fed. Reg. 48879 (2004). This authority once belonged to the Attorney General, who is still named in the statute. See 6 U.S.C. § 251(2) (transferring authority over "[t]he detention and removal program" to the Department). A grant of asylum enables an alien to enter the country, but even if an applicant qualifies, an actual grant of asylum is discretionary. § 1158(b)(1)(A). The asylum officer also considers an alien's potential eligibility for withholding of removal under § 1231(b)(3) or relief under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30(e)(2)-(3). Respondent's habeas petition alleges that "he can show a significan[t] possibility that he could establish eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims." App. 31-32. But he says in his petition that he left Sri Lanka "to seek asylum in the United States." Id ., at 15. He discusses the criteria only for asylum. Id ., at 21; see also Brief for Respondent 4. And he now alleges that he was improperly "denied asylum." Id ., at 5. Moreover, the gravamen of his petition is that he faces persecution in Sri Lanka "because of " his Tamil ethnicity and political opinions. App. 13. To obtain withholding or CAT relief on that basis, he would need to show "a greater likelihood of persecution or torture at home than is necessary for asylum." Moncrieffe v. Holder , 569 U.S. 184, 187, n. 1, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013). And he would not avoid removal, only removal to Sri Lanka. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) ; 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(f). We therefore read his petition as it is plainly intended: to seek another opportunity to apply for asylum. See GAO, Immigration: Actions Needed To Strengthen USCIS's Oversight and Data Quality of Credible and Reasonable Fear Screenings 13-15, and fig. 2 (GAO-20-250, Feb. 2020). See id. , at 16, n. b. The Department may grant temporary parole "for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) ; see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.5(b), 235.3(b)(2)(iii), and (4)(ii). References to the factual material in this regulation are not endorsements of the regulation itself. And like the immigration officials in this case, we do not question the basis for respondent's asserted fear. See infra , at 1967 - 1968. But we note the Department's view that credible-fear claims can be asserted "in the hope of a lengthy asylum process that will enable [the claimants] to remain in the United States for years ... despite their statutory ineligibility for relief " and that an influx of meritless claims can delay the adjudication of meritorious ones; strain detention capacity and degrade detention conditions; cause the release of many inadmissible aliens into States and localities that must shoulder the resulting costs; divert Department resources from protecting the border; and aggravate "the humanitarian crisis created by human smugglers." 84 Fed. Reg. 33831 ; see also, e.g. , Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, § 130010(a)(3)(C), 108 Stat. 2030 (legislative finding of "a drain on limited resources resulting from the high cost of processing frivolous asylum claims"); Arizona v. United States , 567 U.S. 387, 397-398, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012) ; Homeland Security Advisory Council, Final Emergency Interim Report 1, 7-8 (Apr. 16, 2019); Letter from K. Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland Security, to Members of Congress 1-2 (Mar. 28, 2019); GAO, Asylum: Additional Actions Needed To Assess and Address Fraud Risks 24 (GAO-16-50, Dec. 2015) (GAO Fraud Report); Congressional Budget Office, The Impact of Unauthorized Immigrants on the Budgets of State and Local Governments 8-9 (Dec. 2007); Brief for State of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae 9-12. See, e.g. , GAO Fraud Report 32-33 (discussing Operation Fiction Writer, a criminal investigation of attorneys and application preparers who counseled asylum seekers to lie about religious persecution and forced abortions); Asylum Fraud: Abusing America's Compassion? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 113th Cong., 2d Sess. (2014) (testimony of Louis D. Crocetti, Jr.) (describing study in which 58% of randomly selected asylum applications exhibited indicators of possible fraud and 12% were determined to be fraudulent). See, e.g. , Mnatsakanyan v. United States Dept. of Homeland Security , 2020 WL 1245371, *5 (SD Cal., Mar. 16, 2020) ("Given the identical claims here as in Thuraissigiam , the Court concludes it has jurisdiction over Petitioner's habeas petition under the Suspension Clause"); Kaur v. Barr , 2019 WL 4974425, *3 (D Ariz., Oct. 8, 2019) (granting stay of removal in light of the decision below); Rodrigues v. McAleenan , 435 F.Supp.3d 731, 734 - 735, 738 - 739 (ND Tex., Jan. 22, 2020) (declining to follow the decision below). The original meaning of the Suspension Clause is the subject of controversy. In INS v. St. Cyr , 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001), the majority and dissent debated whether the Clause independently guarantees the availability of the writ or simply restricts the temporary withholding of its operation. Compare id ., at 300, 121 S.Ct. 2271, with id ., at 336-341, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Ex parte Bollman , 4 Cranch 75, 95, 2 L.Ed. 554 (1807). We do not revisit that question. Nor do we consider whether the scope of the writ as it existed in 1789 defines the boundary of the constitutional protection to which the St. Cyr Court referred, since the writ has never encompassed respondent's claims. We also do not reconsider whether the common law allowed the issuance of a writ on behalf of an alien who lacked any allegiance to the country. Compare Boumediene v. Bush , 553 U.S. 723, 746-747, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008) (forming "no certain conclusions"), with Brief for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae 5-13. See also Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1823, 1847 (2009) ; P. Halliday, Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire 204 (2010) (Halliday). In his brief, respondent states that "he requests an entirely ordinary habeas remedy: conditional release pending a lawful adjudication. J. A. 33." Brief for Respondent 29. Citing the same page, the dissent argues that respondent "asked the district court to '[i]ssue a writ of habeas corpus' without further limitation on the kind of relief that might entail." Post , at 1996 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.) (quoting App. 33). However, neither on the cited page nor at any other place in the habeas petition is release, conditional or otherwise, even mentioned. And in any event, as we discuss infra , at 1971 - 1975, the critical point is that what he sought in the habeas petition and still seeks-a writ "directing [the Department] to provide [him] a new opportunity to apply for asylum," App. 33-is not a form of relief that was available in habeas at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Although the Ninth Circuit never mentioned release, its opinion might be read to suggest that gaining a right to remain in this country would constitute a release from the "restraint" of exclusion. See 917 F.3d 1097, 1117 (2019). No evidence has been called to our attention that the writ was understood in 1789 to apply to any comparable form of restraint. Respondent and his amici rely primarily on British cases decided before the adoption of the Constitution. "There is widespread agreement that the common-law writ of habeas corpus was in operation in all thirteen of the British colonies that rebelled in 1776," but "almost no reported decisio[n] from the period." Oldham & Wishnie, The Historical Scope of Habeas Corpus and INS v. St. Cyr , 16 Geo. Immigration L. J. 485, 496 (2002) (Oldham & Wishnie) (internal quotation marks omitted). Respondent's amici also point out that, during the English Civil War, Parliament created a national religion and a "bewildering array of committees" to manage the war. Brief for Legal Historians as Amici Curiae 10 (Legal Historians Brief) (internal quotation marks omitted). They argue that "[h]abeas corpus was readily available to test the legality of their actions." Ibid. But according to their source, the challenged actions were "imprisonment orders," including imprisonment of clergymen who refused to conform. Halliday 163-164. Respondent cites a secondary source, which in turn cites to the National Archives in London. See Brief for Respondent 27 (citing Halliday 236). Whether the founding generation understood habeas relief more broadly than described by Blackstone, Justice Story, and our prior cases, see supra , at 1969, cannot be settled by a single case or even a few obscure and possibly aberrant cases. And in any event, what is said here about Murray's case provides little support for respondent's position. In 1677, we are told, Murray was imprisoned in England so that he could be " 'sent into Scotland' " for a criminal trial, but the King's Bench twice issued a writ of habeas corpus requiring his release. Brief for Respondent 27 (quoting Halliday 236). Putting aside the "delicate" relationship between England and Scotland at the time, Boumediene , 553 U.S. at 749, 128 S.Ct. 2229, issuance of a writ to secure the release of a person held in pretrial custody is far afield from what respondent wants here. This regime lasted until after 1789, when the Aliens Act of 1793 authorized justices of the peace to imprison "without bail or mainprize" (i.e. , bond) any alien found without a passport, who could then be "sen[t] out of th[e] realm." An Act for Regulating Immigration into Great Britain, 33 Geo. III, ch. 4, §§ 11, 29. Amici supporting respondent make an additional argument. They contend that "[i]n eighteenth century practice, the authority of English judges to review habeas petitions was not constrained by past decisions" and that these judges felt free to innovate in order to ensure that justice was done. Legal Historians Brief 5-6. But the role of federal courts under our Constitution is very different from that of those English judges. The English judges "were considered agents of the Crown, designed to assist the King in the exercise of his power." Boumediene , 553 U.S. at 740, 128 S.Ct. 2229. The court with primary habeas jurisdiction, after all, was called the King's Bench, on which the King "was theoretically always present." Halliday & White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 Va. L. Rev. 575, 594, 598, and n. 49 (2008). Habeas was an exercise of the King's prerogative "to have an account ... why the liberty of any of his subjects is restrained." 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1335, p. 207 (1833); accord, Legal Historians Brief 5-7. In our federal courts, by contrast, the scope of habeas has been tightly regulated by statute, from the Judiciary Act of 1789 to the present day, and precedent is as binding in a habeas case as in any other. See, e.g. , Jenkins v. Hutton , 582 U. S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 198 L.Ed.2d 415 (2017) (per curiam ). This concurrence imagines three horrible possibilities that it fears could come to pass unless we interpret the Suspension Clause to protect the right to some undefined category of relief beyond release from custody. See post , at 1989 (opinion of BREYER, J.). But its interpretation is neither necessary nor obviously sufficient to prevent the possibilities it fears. First, if a citizen were detained for deportation, today's opinion would not prevent the citizen from petitioning for release. Second, if respondent's "procedural" claims do not merit habeas review, as the concurrence concludes, post , at 1996 - 1997, it is not clear why habeas should help the concurrence's hypothetical alien whose credible-fear claim was rejected based on forged evidence. Both respondent and this hypothetical alien assert procedural irregularities. Does the availability of habeas review depend on a judge's view of the severity of the irregularity asserted? Finally, there is the hypothetical alien denied asylum on the ground that Judaism is not a religion. Such a decision would of course be ridiculous, but why it would not raise a question of "brute fac[t]" that falls outside the concurrence's interpretation of the Suspension Clause, post , at 1995, is again not clear. Whatever may be said about the concurrence's hypotheticals, it is possible to imagine all sorts of abuses not even remotely related to unauthorized executive detention that could be imposed on people in this country if the Constitution allowed Congress to deprive the courts of any jurisdiction to entertain claims regarding such abuses. If that were to happen, it would no doubt be argued that constitutional provisions other than the Suspension Clause guaranteed judicial review. We have no occasion to consider such arguments here. See Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro , 349 U.S. 48, 51-52, 75 S.Ct. 591, 99 L.Ed. 868 (1955) (interpreting 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163, to provide for review of deportation orders). While the Philippines was a Territory, its government suspended habeas to deal with " 'certain organized bands' " of rebels. Fisher v. Baker , 203 U.S. 174, 179-181, 27 S.Ct. 135, 51 L.Ed. 142 (1906) (quoting resolution). The Governor of Hawaii suspended habeas, with President Roosevelt's approval, after the attack on Pearl Harbor. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku , 327 U.S. 304, 307-308, 324, 66 S.Ct. 606, 90 L.Ed. 688 (1946). In a concurrence in United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams , 194 U.S. 279, 24 S.Ct. 719, 48 L.Ed. 979 (1904), Justice Brewer stated without elaboration and without citing any authority that the Suspension Clause prohibits Congress from "oust[ing] the courts from the duty of inquiry respecting both law and facts" in habeas cases. Id ., at 295, 24 S.Ct. 719. No other Justice joined that opinion. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States , 149 U.S. 698, 713, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 37 L.Ed. 905 (1893), and many other cases, the Court noted that the Constitution gives Congress plenary power to set requirements for admission. The Government notes other distinctions between St. Cyr and this case, including that the alien in St. Cyr raised a pure question of law, while respondent raises at best a mixed question of law and fact. We have no need to consider these distinctions. Although respondent, during his interviews with immigration officials, does not appear to have provided any information tying the assault he suffered at the hands of those who arrived at his home in a van to persecution on the basis of ethnicity or political opinion, his counseled petition offers details about "white va[n]" attacks against Tamils in Sri Lanka. App. 25-26 (internal quotation marks omitted). As now portrayed, his assault resembles those incidents. Department officials and immigration judges may reopen cases or reconsider decisions, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.5(a)(1), (5), and 1003.23(b)(1), and the Executive always has discretion not to remove, see AAADC , 525 U.S. at 483-484, 119 S.Ct. 936.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NORTON, A MINOR, BY CHILES v. MATHEWS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE No. 74-6212. Argued January 13, 1976 Decided June 29, 1976 BlackmuN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 533. G. Christopher Brown argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant. Deputy Solicitor General Jones argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Lee, Harriet S. Shapiro, and William Kanter. Thomas R. Adams filed a brief for John J. Romero, Jr., as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. On the merits, this case raises the same question as to the constitutionality of §§ 202 (d)(3) and 216 (h)(3) (C)(ii) of the Social Security Act, 64 Stat. 484, as amended, and 79 Stat. 410, 42 U. S. C. §§ 402 (d) (3) and 416 (h) (3) (C) (ii), as was presented in Mathews v. Lucas, ante, p. 495. The present litigation, however, also raises certain jurisdictional issues. It now has become apparent that the simultaneous submission of Lucas to the Court, and our decision in that case today, make it unnecessary for us specifically to decide the jurisdictional questions. I Appellant Gregory Norton, Jr., was born out of wedlock in February 1964. Both his father and his mother then were high school students, aged, respectively, 16 and 14, who lived separately at home with their parents. The two never married and, indeed, never lived together. Appellant always has resided with his maternal grandmother and has been cared for by her. When Gregory was born, his father contributed six dollars and some clothing and other habiliments for the baby, but, being so young and unemployed, he never assumed appellant’s actual support. In February 1965 the father entered military service. He was killed in Vietnam on May 19, 1966, at age 19. Before his death, the father apparently took some initial steps (the procurement of a birth certificate and other items) necessary for the processing of a dependent child’s military allotment. The father failed, however, to complete the required procedures before he was killed. In September 1969 appellant’s maternal grandmother filed on his behalf an application for a surviving child’s benefits under § 202 (d)(1) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 402 (d)(1), based on the father’s earnings record. An administrative hearing followed. The Hearing Examiner concluded that appellant was not entitled to benefits as a dependent child because his father, at the time of his death, was neither living with appellant nor contributing to appellant’s support. App. 13-19. The subsequent administrative appeal was no more successful. Id., at 20-21. The present action was then instituted on behalf of appellant against the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. By the complaint, relief was sought alternatively on statutory and constitutional grounds. First, it was asserted that, by his attempt to secure a military allotment for appellant, the father, at the time of his death, in fact was contributing to appellant's support, within the meaning of § 216 (h) (3) (C) (ii) of the Act, and that appellant therefore was a dependent of the father, under §§ 202 (d)(1) and (3) (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), and entitled to benefits. Second, it was asserted that, by creating a presumption of dependency, and consequent qualification for benefits, for legitimate children generally, and for illegitimate children under certain, circumstances, see n. 1, but denying the presumption to appellant and others similarly situated, the Act discriminated against appellant's class, in violation of the guarantee of equal protection implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Appellant’s statutory claim was initially considered and rejected by a single District Judge. Norton v. Richardson, 352 F. Supp. 596 (Md. 1972). In view of the complaint's request for certification of a class pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c)(1), and for classwide injunc-tive relief against the alleged unconstitutional operation of the Act's presumptions of dependency, a three-judge court was convened under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2282 and 2284 (1970 ed. and Supp. IV) to pass upon the constitutional claim. The three-judge court first agreed with, and reaffirmed, the single judge’s rejection of appellant’s statutory claim. Norton v. Weinberger, 364 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 (1973). The court went on to identify the plaintiff class, id., at 1120-1121, but on the merits of the constitutional claim it ruled in favor of the Secretary and granted summary judgment in his favor. Id., at 1121— 1131. Appellant, taking the position that the three-judge court had denied his request for an order enjoining enforcement of provisions of the Act, lodged a direct appeal here pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253. While his jurisdictional statement was pending, Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628 (1974), was decided. This Court thereafter vacated the three-judge court’s judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in the light of Jimenez. Norton v. Weinberger, 418 U. S. 902 (1974). On the remand, the same three-judge court, with one judge now dissenting, adhered to its earlier conclusion in favor of constitutionality. Norton v. Weinberger, 390 F. Supp. 1084 (1975). Appellant has again appealed. We postponed the question of jurisdiction to the hearing of the case on the merits, 422 U. S. 1054 (1975), and, in doing so, cited Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 763 n. 8 (1975), which just then had been decided. Subsequently, we set the case for oral argument with Mathews v. Lucas, ante, p. 495. 423 U. S. 819 (1975). II The question whether the three-judge court was properly convened upon appellant’s demand for injunctive relief is relevant, of course, to our appellate jurisdiction. If the court was not empowered to enjoin the operation of a federal statute, then three judges were not required to hear the case under 28 U. S. C. § 2282, and this Court has no jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. Accordingly, appellant and the Secretary have debated whether the District Court possessed injunctive power under § 205 (g) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. §405 (g), and whether, in the light of § 205 (h), 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h), relief was available under the mandamus statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1361, or under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 II. S. C. § 701 et seg. We think it unnecessary, however, to resolve the details of these difficult and perhaps close jurisdictional arguments. The substantive questions raised on this appeal now have been determined in Mathews v. Lucas, ante, p. 495. This disposition renders the merits in the present case a decided issue and thus one no longer substantial in the jurisdictional sense. Assuming that the three-judge court was correctly convened, and that we have jurisdiction over the appeal, the appropriate disposition, in the light of Mathews v. Lucas, plainly would be to affirm the judgment entered in this case in favor of the Secretary. Assuming, on the other hand, that we lack jurisdiction because the three-judge court was needlessly convened, the appropriate disposition would be to dismiss the appeal. When an appeal to this Court is sought from an erroneously convened three-judge district court, we retain the power “ ‘to make such corrective order as may be appropriate to the enforcement of the limitations’ ” which 28 U. S. C. § 1253 imposes. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 34 (1962), quoting Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 292 U. S. 16, 18 (1934). What we have done recently, and in most such cases where the jurisdictional issue was previously unsettled — and we do not imply that our doing so is statutorily or otherwise compelled — has been to vacate the district court judgment and remand the case for the entry of a fresh decree from which an appeal may be taken to the appropriate court of appeals. Gonzalez v. Employees Credit Union, 419 U. S. 90, 101 (1974), is an example. In the present case, however, the decision in Lucas has rendered the constitutional issues insubstantial and so much so as not even to support the jurisdiction of a three-judge district court to consider their merits on remand. See, e. g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332, 343-345 (1975); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 536-538 (1974). Thus, there is no point in remanding to enable the merits to be considered by a court of appeals. See McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U. S. 21 (1975). It thus is evident that, whichever disposition we undertake, the effect is the same. It follows that there is no need to decide the theoretical question of jurisdiction in this case. In the past, we similarly have reserved difficult questions of our jurisdiction when the case alternatively could be resolved on the merits in favor of the same party. See Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U. S. 676 (1974). The Court has done this even when the original reason for granting certiorari was to resolve the jurisdictional issue. See United States v. Augenblick, 393 U. S. 348, 349-352 (1969). Although such a disposition would not be desirable under all circumstances, we perceive no reason why we may not so proceed in this case where the merits have been rendered plainly insubstantial. Cf. McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U. S., at 32. Making the assumption, then, without deciding, that our jurisdiction in this cause is established, we affirm the judgment in favor of the Secretary on the basis of our decision in Mathews v. Lucas, ante, p. 495. It is so ordered. Section 202 (d) (1) provides survivorship benefits only to a child who was “dependent” upon the deceased insured parent at the time of the parent’s death. A legitimate child, a child entitled under the intestacy laws of the insured parent’s domicile to inherit personal property from the parent, a child whose illegitimacy results from a formal defect in the parents’ purported marriage ceremony, and a child acknowledged in writing by the insured father as his son or daughter or judicially decreed (during the father’s lifetime) to be such, are all deemed under the Act to be dependent upon the parent, unless the child has been adopted by some other individual, and thus are relieved of otherwise proving actual dependency. §§202 (d)(1), 202 (d)(3), 216(e), 216(h)(2), and 216(h)(3) (C)(i), 42 U. S. C. §§402 (d)(1), 402 (d)(3), 416 (e), 416 (h)(2), and 416 (h) (3) (C) (i) (1970 ed. and Supp. IV). Since appellant did not come within any of these categories, he could establish his status as a dependent child under the Act only by showing that his father lived with him or contributed to his support at the time of his death. §§202 (d)(3) and 216 (h) (3) (C) (ii), 42 TJ. S. C. §§402 (d)(3) and 416 (h) (3) (C) (ii). See generally Mathews v. Lucas, ante, p. 495. The definition of the class, however, does not appear to have been formalized in the three-judge court’s judgment. App. 59. In contrast to the situation in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 763 n. 8 (1975), there is no jurisdiction here under 28 U. S. C. § 1252, since the District Court’s decision was in favor of the statute’s constitutionality. Section 205 (g) reads in pertinent part: “Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action .... Such action shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides .... As part of his answer the Secretary shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of are based. The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” Section 205 (h) reads in pertinent part: “The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under [§ 1331 and other specified sections] of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this [subchapter II of the Social Security Act].” See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S., at 756 n. 3. The initiating judge observed that jurisdiction for his court was asserted under the general federal-question provision of 28 U. S. C. § 1331, and under 28 U. S. C. § 1361, vesting the district courts with jurisdiction “in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” Norton v. Richardson, 352 F. Supp. 596, 598 n. 2 (Md. 1972). The Solicitor General contends that a district court has jurisdiction to review a Social Security ruling only under § 205 (g) because § 205 (h) specifically excludes any other source of review of such determinations. He then contends that, for two reasons, there was no jurisdiction here to issue an injunction under § 205 (g). First, § 205 (g) in terms specifies that a district court may enter a judgment only “affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing,” but does not say it may enjoin him, and, moreover, in this statutory structure an injunction is out of place. Second, although the suit was made to sound as a class action, a class action is never appropriate under § 205 (g), and in any case the class was not properly certified, inasmuch as there was no allegation that the members had even filed applications for benefits; thus there is no jurisdiction over the class aspects of the case. Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, is cited. Since only the individual claim remains, even if injunctive power were available under § 205 (g), it would not be appropriately exercised in review of a single claimant’s case. The appellant contends in rebuttal that the “affirming, modifying, or reversing” language in § 205 (g) does not withdraw a district court’s general and inherent equity powers, including the power to enjoin, and that, in any event, jurisdiction remains, and an injunction may be issued, under the other cited statutes. The respective jurisdictional statements for the original appeal and for the present one preserved appellant’s statutory claim along with his constitutional contention. The statutory claim, however, was not pressed in appellant’s brief in the present case, and at oral argument it explicitly was abandoned. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6. In McLucas a single District Judge enjoined the enforcement of Art. 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U. S. C. § 934, without convening a three-judge court. He did so because he considered the constitutional infirmity of the Article to be plain. See Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31 (1962). On direct appeal, under 28 U. S. C. § 1252, the propriety of proceeding without a three-judge court was questioned. We observed that if a three-judge court was originally required under 28 U. S. C. § 2282, we ordinarily were bound to vacate the judgment and remand for the convening of a three-judge court. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 607 (1960); FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 352 U. S. 977 (1957). Concluding, however, that no purpose could be served by deciding whether a three-judge court was required originally, because intervening decisions of this Court sustaining the constitutionality of Art. 134 had rendered the merits issue plainly insubstantial by the time the ease was before us, we vacated the judgment and remanded the case, directing dismissal. 421 U. S., at 32.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO v. DAVIS No. 85-217. Argued February 25, 1986 Decided May 27, 1986 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in Part I of which all other Members joined, in Part II of which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined, and in Part III of which all other Members, except Blackmun, J., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Powell, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 399. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 403. Charles R. Goldburg argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Thomas W. Gleason. Bayless E. Biles argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Council of State Governments et al. by Berma Ruth Solomon, Beate Bloch, Zachary D. Fasman, and Clifton S. Elgarten; and for the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., by Glenn M. Taubman. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The opinion in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959), set forth a general standard for determining when state proceedings or regulations are pre-empted by the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), see 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. II): Subject to exception only in limited circumstances, “[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to §7 or §8 of the Act [29 U. S. C. §157 or §158], the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.” 359 U. S., at 245. This general standard has been applied in a multitude of cases decided since Garmon, and it must be applied again today. Before addressing that question, however, we must consider the very nature of such pre-emption — whether Garmon pre-emption is in the nature of an affirmative defense that must be asserted in the trial court or be considered forever waived or whether it is in the nature of a challenge to a court’s power to adjudicate that may be raised at any time. I Appellee Larry Davis was formerly employed by Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Co. in Mobile, Alabama. At the times relevant to the events that gave rise to this suit, he was a ship superintendent or trainee ship superintendent. The ship superintendents apparently served as the immediate superiors of the longshoremen employed by Ryan-Walsh. They were on salary, however, and their compensation was generally lower than that received by the longshoremen, who worked on an hourly basis. In early 1981, Ben Trione, one of the ship superintendents who worked for Ryan-Walsh, contacted appellant International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA or Union), a union that represents longshoremen and other employees on the waterfront, to discuss the possibility of organizing the superintendents and affiliating with the Union. Although the parties here dispute the content of the conversations that occurred at this stage between Trione and the ILA representatives regarding the ship superintendents and their eligibility for union membership, it is undisputed that a meeting of the superintendents was organized by Trione and attended by Benny Holland, an ILA official from Houston, Texas. At this meeting, several of the superintendents expressed a fear of being discharged for participating in union-related activities. According to Davis’ witnesses, Holland’s response to this was to reassure them that the Union would get them their jobs back with backpay if that happened. According to Holland, however, Holland’s response was that they would be protected in that manner only if they were determined not to be supervisors under the Act and that he did not know whether or not they would be considered supervisors. Holland further testified that he had submitted this issue to the Union’s lawyers and had not received a definitive opinion from them by the time of the meeting. The meeting, according to all witnesses, resulted in a number of the ship superintendents, including Davis, signing pledge cards and a union charter application with the ILA. On the day following the organizational meeting, Ryan-Walsh fired Trione. Trione contacted the ILA, which supplied him with an attorney. The attorney filed an unfair labor practice charge against Ryan-Walsh with the National Labor Relations Board, alleging that Trione was an employee under the Act and that Ryan-Walsh had violated § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(3) of the Act by discharging him for participating in union activities. See 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3). The NLRB’s Regional Director, however, determined that Trione was a supervisor under the Act and declined to issue a complaint. Trione did not, as he had a right to do, appeal this determination to the NLRB General Counsel. See 29 CFR § 102.19 (1985). Shortly thereafter, Davis was also discharged by Ryan-Walsh, apparently for his continued efforts to organize the ship superintendents and to join the Union. In response to his discharge, Davis filed this suit against the ILA in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, alleging fraud and misrepresentation under Ala. Code §6-5-101 (1975). The case proceeded to trial, and a jury entered a verdict in Davis’ favor in the amount of $75,000. Throughout the trial, the Union defended the suit on the merits, raising no issue that the suit was pre-empted by the NLRA. In its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, however, the ILA raised for the first time a claim that the state court lacked jurisdiction over the case because the field had “been preempted by federal law and federal jurisdiction.” App. 96a. The Circuit Court denied the Union’s motion without opinion and entered judgment on the jury’s verdict. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama, the ILA argued that pre-emption was not a waivable defense and that the state fraud and misrepresentation action was pre-empted under Garmon. Although acknowledging that other state courts had adopted the ILA’s position that NLRA preemption was nonwaivable, the Alabama court held that “[i]t is not the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a damage claim for the tort of fraud — even if it arises in the context of a labor-related dispute — that is pre-empted. Rather, it is the state court’s exercise of that power that is subject to preemption.” 470 So. 2d 1215, 1216 (1985). The court’s view was that as a state court of general jurisdiction the Circuit Court had had subject-matter jurisdiction over this ordinary tort claim for damages. As a waivable defense, the pre-emption claim was required under Alabama law to be affirmatively pleaded. Since it was not so pleaded, it was deemed waived. The Alabama Supreme Court, although holding that the ILA’s pre-emption claim had been waived, stated in a footnote that if it had had occasion to reach the merits, it would have found no pre-emption: “The instant facts fall squarely within the ‘peripheral concern’ exception to federal preemption of state jurisdiction of labor-related disputes. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 243-44 (1959). The National Labor Relations Board has already determined that an employer’s supervisors are not protected by the Labor Management Relations Act. Thus, in this case, [Davis] has no remedy before the NLRB, and this dispute, although somewhat labor-related, is, at most, only of ‘peripheral concern’ to the NLRB. See, e. g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U. S. 53 (1966).” Id., at 1216-1217, n. 2 (citations omitted). The Alabama Supreme Court accordingly affirmed the judgment against the Union. The Union appealed to this Court; Davis moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the decision below rested on an adequate and independent state ground because the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision was based on an application of a state procedural rule. The ILA’s submission, however, raised a substantial question whether reliance on the procedural rule rested on an erroneous view of the scope of Garmon pre-emption, a matter of federal law, and hence whether the procedural ground relied on was adequate and independent. We noted probable jurisdiction, 474 U. S. 899 (1985). II A Given the reliance of the Alabama Supreme Court on its procedural rule governing the presentation of affirmative defenses, we first decide whether that rule in this case represents an independent and adequate state ground supporting the judgment below. If it does, our review is at an end, for we have no authority to review state determinations of purely state law. Nor do we review federal issues that can have no effect on the state court’s judgment. See, e. g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562, 566 (1977); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 125-126 (1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207, 210 (1935). The inquiry into the sufficiency of the asserted state ground, however, is one that we undertake ourselves. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1038 (1983); Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765, 773 (1931). In concluding that the Union’s pre-emption claim was procedurally barred, the Alabama Supreme Court first held that because the Mobile County Circuit Court, as a state court of general jurisdiction, had subject-matter jurisdiction over the simple tort claim of misrepresentation, there could be no preemption of that court’s actual jurisdiction. Only the exercise of that jurisdiction could be pre-empted. This explanation has a certain logic to it; but the point is not whether state law gives the state courts jurisdiction over particular controversies but whether jurisdiction provided by state law is itself pre-empted by federal law vesting exclusive jurisdiction over that controversy in another body. It is clearly within Congress’ powers to establish an exclusive federal forum to adjudicate issues of federal law in a particular area that Congress has the authority to regulate under the Constitution. See, e. g., Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U. S. 433 (1940). Whether it has done so in a specific case is the question that must be answered when a party claims that a state court’s jurisdiction is pre-empted. Such a determination of congressional intent and of the boundaries and character of a pre-empting congressional enactment is one of federal law. Pre-emption, the practical manifestation of the Supremacy Clause, is always a federal question. If the Alabama procedural ruling under state law implicates an underlying question of federal law, however, the state law is not an independent and adequate state ground supporting the judgment: “[W]hen resolution of the state procedural law question depends on a federal constitutional ruling, the state-law prong of the court’s holding is not independent of federal law, and our jurisdiction is not precluded. ... In such a case, the federal-law holding is integral to the state court’s disposition of the matter, and our ruling on the issue is in no respect advisory.” Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 75 (1985) (citing Herb v. Pitcairn, supra, at 126; Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers Mutual Canal Co., 243 U. S. 157, 164 (1917)). To determine the sufficiency of the state procedural ground relied upon by the Alabama Supreme Court we must ascertain whether that court correctly resolved the antecedent federal question regarding the nature of Garmon preemption under the NLRA. Specifically, the question is whether Garmon pre-emption is a waivable affirmative defense such that a state court may adjudicate an otherwise pre-empted claim if the Garmon defense is not timely raised or whether Garmon pre-emption is a nonwaivable foreclosure of the state court’s very jurisdiction to adjudicate. B The Court’s opinion in Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U. S. 485, 490-491 (1953), articulated what has come to be the accepted basis for the broadly pre-emptive scope of the NLRA: “Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final administrative order. Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies.... A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law.” Building on this cornerstone, the Garmon Court went on to set out the now well-established scope of NLRA preemption. Given the NLRA’s “complex and interrelated federal scheme of law, remedy, and administration,” 359 U. S., at 243, the Court held that “due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield,” id., at 244, when the activities sought to be regulated by a State are clearly or may fairly be assumed to be within the purview of § 7 or § 8. The Court acknowledged that “[a]t times it has not been clear whether the particular activity regulated by the States was governed by § 7 or § 8 or was, perhaps, outside both these sections.” Ibid. Even in such ambiguous situations, however, the Court concluded that “courts are not primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues. It is essential to the administration of the Act that these determinations be left in the first instance to the National Labor Relations Board.” Id., at 244-245. Thus, the Court held that “[w]hen an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.” Id., at 245. In Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542 (1963), we considered the application of these principles to a situation in which the Georgia courts had awarded relief based on a complaint that contained allegations that made out “at least an arguable violation of §8(b).” Id., at 546. There, we reviewed a claim that “the subject matter of [the] suit was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board,” id., at 543, and held that, even though the state court was authorized to adjudicate the claim as a matter of state law, the state court “clearly exceeded its power” in awarding relief on the complaint. Id., at 548. Specifically, “the state court had no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or to adjudicate this controversy, which lay within the exclusive powers of the National Labor Relations Board.” Id., at 546-547. That our conclusion was in fact jurisdictional was accentuated by our discussion of the procedural context in which the case arose. The state court had awarded a temporary injunction only, and a permanent order had not yet been issued. We rejected, however, the argument that the judgment was not yet final for purposes of our own jurisdiction: “[W]e believe our power to review this case rests upon solid ground. The federal question raised by petitioner in the Georgia court, and here, is whether the Georgia courts had power to proceed with and determine this controversy. The issue ripe for review is not whether a Georgia court has erroneously decided a matter of federal law in a case admittedly within its jurisdiction nor is it the question of whether federal or state law governs a case properly before the Georgia courts. What we do have here is a judgment of the Georgia court finally and erroneously asserting its jurisdiction to deal with a controversy which is beyond its power and instead is within the exclusive domain of the National Labor Relations Board.” Id., at 548 (citations omitted). See also Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U. S. 491, 497-498, n. 5 (1983). Curry made clear that when a state proceeding or regulation is claimed to be pre-empted by the NLRA under Garmon, the issue is a choice-of-forum rather than a choice-of-law question. As such, it is a question whether the State or the Board has jurisdiction over the dispute. If there is pre-emption under Garmon, then state jurisdiction is extinguished. Since Garmon and Curry, we have reiterated many times the general pre-emption standard set forth in Garmon and the jurisdictional nature of Garmon pre-emption; we have also reaffirmed that our decisions describing the nature of Garmon pre-emption and defining its boundaries have rested on a determination that in enacting the NLRA Congress intended for the Board generally to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in this area. See, e. g., Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U. S. 690, 698 (1963); Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U. S. 701, 708 (1963); Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U. S. 301, 309-310 (1964); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53, 60 (1966); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 179 (1967); Motor Coach Em ployees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274, 285-291 (1971); Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U. S. 290, 296-297, 305 (1977); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U. S. 180, 188-190 (1978); Operating Engineers v. Jones, 460 U. S. 669, 676 (1983); Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, supra, at 510-511; Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U. S. 491, 502-503 (1984); Wisconsin Dept. of Industry, Labor and Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U. S. 282, 286 (1986). Davis does not seriously dispute this conclusion — at least as a general matter. He concedes, in fact, that “when a particular issue has been placed by Congress within the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, a state court will have no subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue. In such cases, any judgment issued by the state court will be void ab initio because subject matter jurisdiction is preempted.” Brief for Appellee 13. Davis notes, however, that this Court has acknowledged that Garmon does not preempt “all local regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees, employers, and unions; obviously, much of this is left to the States.” Lockridge, supra, at 289. Specifically, Davis points to Garmon’s own recognition that some controversies that are arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 are not pre-empted: “[D]ue regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal system . . . has required us not to find withdrawal from the States of power to regulate where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act. Or where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.” 359 U. S., at 243-244 (citations omitted). Both before and since Garmon we have identified claims that fall within one or both these articulated exceptions. See, e. g., Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, supra; Farmer v. Carpen ters, supra; Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, supra; Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U. S. 634 (1958); Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617 (1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U. S. 131 (1957); Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U. S. 656 (1954). But these cases serve only as more precise demarcations of the scope of Garmon pre-emption. They have not redefined the nature of that pre-emption in any way. A claim of Garmon preemption is a claim that the state court has no power to adjudicate the subject matter of the case, and when a claim of Garmon pre-emption is raised, it must be considered and resolved by the state court. Consequently, the state procedural rule relied on by the Alabama Supreme Court to support the judgment below was not a sufficient state ground, and the Union was and is entitled to an adjudication of its pre-emption claim on the merits. Ill As the Garmon line of cases directs, the pre-emption inquiry is whether the conduct at issue was arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA. That much is clear. There is also no dispute that if Davis was a supervisor, he was legally fired, the Union misspoke if it represented that there was legal redress for the discharge, and there is no pre-emption. But if Davis was an employee, his discharge for union activities was an unfair practice, the Union was protected in its attempt to interest him in the Union, and it did not err in representing that if he was discharged for joining the Union, there would be a remedy. We should inquire, then, whether Davis was arguably an employee, rather than a supervisor. If he was, the issue was to be initially decided by the NLRB, not the state courts. The precondition for pre-emption, that the conduct be “arguably” protected or prohibited, is not without substance. It is not satisfied by a conclusory assertion of pre-emption and would therefore not be satisfied in this case by a claim, without more, that Davis was an employee rather than a supervisor. If the word “arguably” is to mean anything, it must mean that the party claiming pre-emption is required to demonstrate that his case is one that the Board could legally decide in his favor. That is, a party asserting pre-emption must advance an interpretation of the Act that is not plainly contrary to its language and that has not been “authoritatively rejected” by the courts or the Board. Marine Engineers v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U. S. 173, 184 (1962). The party must then put forth enough evidence to enable the court to find that the Board reasonably could uphold a claim based on such an interpretation. In this case, therefore, because the pre-emption issue turns on Davis’ status, the Union’s claim of pre-emption must be supported by a showing sufficient to permit the Board to find that Davis was an employee, not a supervisor. Our examination of the record leads us to conclude that the Union has not carried its burden in this case. Expecting that the Union would put its best foot forward in this Court, we look first at its submission here that there is an arguable case for pre-emption. The Union’s brief states that its conduct was protected by federal law if Davis was an employee, that in order to find the Union liable the jury must have found that Davis was a supervisor, and that “the state law controversy of whether the Union made a misrepresentation and the federal controversy of whether the superintendents were in fact supervisors are ‘the same in a fundamental respect.’” Brief for Appellant 16 (quoting Operating Engineers v. Jones, 460 U. S., at 682). So far, the argument proceeds in the right direction. As for the critical issue of whether Davis is an employee or a supervisor, the Union asserts only that “[a]bsent a clear determination by the NLRB that the ship superintendents are supervisors rather than employees, superintendents are arguably employees and the state is preempted from applying its law.” Brief for Appellant 13. In making this contention, the ILA relies on our cases indicating that pre-emption can be avoided if an individual’s supervisory status has been determined “‘with unclouded legal significance.’” Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Engineers, 382 U. S. 181, 190 (1965) (quoting Garmon, 359 U. S., at 246). See also Jones, supra, at 680. It does not undertake any examination of Davis’ duties as a ship superintendent. It makes no attempt to show that Davis was more like an employee than a supervisor as those terms are defined in §§2(1) and (11) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §§152(1) and (11). It points to no evidence in the record indicating that Davis was not a supervisor. It does not argue that Davis’ job was different from Trione’s or that the Regional Director was wrong in finding that Trione was a supervisor. Its sole submission is that Davis was arguably an employee because the Board has not decided that he was a supervisor. We cannot agree that Davis’ arguable status as a supervisor is made out by the mere fact that the Board has not finally determined his status. The lack of a Board decision in no way suggests how it would or could decide the case if it had the opportunity to do so. To accept the Union’s submission would be essentially equivalent to allowing a conclusory claim of pre-emption and would effectively eliminate the necessity to make out an arguable case. The better view is that those claiming pre-emption must carry the burden of showing at least an arguable case before the jurisdiction of a state court will be ousted. Moreover, neither Garmon nor Hanna Mining supports the Union’s position. Garmon itself is the source of the arguably protected or prohibited standard for pre-emption. The Court stated, 359 U. S., at 244: “When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of the federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law.” Later the Court said: “When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence” of the Board. Id., at 245. Of course, the Court explained, the Board might decide the case one way or the other, but in the “absence of the Board’s clear determination that an activity is neither protected or prohibited,” id., at 246, it is not for the courts to decide the case. It is apparent from these passages that a court first must decide whether there is an arguable case for pre-emption; if there is, it must defer to the Board, and only if the Board decides that the conduct is not protected or prohibited may the court entertain the litigation. Nothing in Garmon suggests that an arguable case for pre-emption is made out simply because the Board has not decided the general issue one way or the other. Hanna Mining also does nothing for the Union’s submission. The Court there, relying on Garmon, held that there was no pre-emption because the Board or its General Counsel had in fact adversely decided the issues on which the claim of pre-emption rested. Obviously, no inference may be drawn from that decision that a party makes out a case for preemption by merely asserting that the issue involved has not been decided by the Board. The Union’s position is also negated by Interlake S.S. Co., supra, where the Court found pre-emption only after examining the facts and deciding “whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to show that either of [the organizations] was arguably a ‘labor organization’ within the contemplation of §8(b).” Id., at 178. The Court went on to hold that while there was persuasive evidence that the marine engineers were supervisors, the Board had nevertheless effectively decided that the union involved was a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. While agreeing with the principles announced by the Court, Justice Douglas dissented because he had a different view of the facts of the case. Consequently, a party asserting preemption must put forth enough evidence to enable a court to conclude that the activity is arguably subject to the Act. Here, the Union points to no evidence in support of its assertion that Davis was arguably an employee. The Union’s claim of pre-emption in the state courts was also devoid of any factual or legal showing that Davis was arguably not a supervisor but an employee. In this respect, its brief in the Alabama Supreme Court was similar to its brief here, and its post-trial motion for judgment in the trial court contained no more than a conclusory assertion that state jurisdiction was pre-empted. Until that motion, no claim of pre-emption had been made out, but whether Davis was a supervisor or an employee was a relevant inquiry in making out his case. He alleged in his complaint that he was a supervisor. The Union answered that it was without sufficient information to form a belief as to whether or not he was. Moreover, in moving for summary judgment or for directed verdict at the close of Davis’ case and at the close of all the evidence the Union did not assert that Davis was an employee, not a supervisor, let alone point to any evidence to support such a claim. In sum, the Union has not met its burden of showing that the conduct here was arguably subject to the Act. IV We hold that where state law is pre-empted by the NLRA under Garmon and our subsequent cases, the state courts lack the very power to adjudicate the claims that trigger preemption. Thus, the Alabama Supreme Court’s holding that the ILA had waived its pre-emption claim by noncompliance with state procedural rules governing affirmative defenses did not present an independent and adequate state ground supporting the judgment below, and that court erred in declining to address that claim on the merits. On the merits, we reject the ILA’s characterization of our prior cases as holding that the mere lack of a conclusive determination by the Board that an activity is without the purview of the Act renders that activity arguably subject to the Act. Rather, we reaffirm our previously expressed view that the party asserting pre-emption must make an affirmative showing that the activity is arguably subject to the Act and we therefore affirm the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court. So ordered. Under §2(11) of the Act, 61 Stat. 138, a supervisor is defined as follows: “The term ‘supervisor’ means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.” 29 U. S. C. § 152(11). Supervisors as defined in this section are expressly not considered to be employees as defined in § 2(3) of the Act. 29 U. S. C. § 152(3). Only employees as defined in § 2(3), however, are given rights under § 7 of the Act, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 157, which provides: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).” Apparently, however, an insufficient number of cards was obtained, see 29 U. S. C. § 159(a), and no representation petition was filed with the NLRB. Section 8(a) of the Act, 49 Stat. 452, in turn, provides in relevant part: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- 'll) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7. “(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. . . .” 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3). Under the Act, an employer does not commit an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(3) if it fires a supervisor for union-related reasons: An employer “is at liberty to demand absolute loyalty from his supervisory personnel by insisting, on pain of discharge, that they neither participate in, nor retain membership in, a labor union.” Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U. S. 790, 812 (1974). See also Operating Engineers v. Jones, 460 U. S. 669, 671, n. 1 (1983); Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, Inc., 416 U. S. 653, 656-657 (1974). An employer may, however, allow its supervisory employees to join a union. See Florida Power & Light, supra, at 808, 813. Even though supervisors are not covered by the Act, a discharge may constitute a § 8(a)(1) unfair labor practice if it infringes on the § 7 rights of the employer’s nonsupervisory employees. See, e. g., Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 N. L. R. B. 402 (1982), aff’d Automobile Salesmen’s Union Local 1095 v. NLRB, 229 U. S. App. D. C. 105, 711 F. 2d 383 (1983) (summarizing post-1982 standard for finding violations of the Act in disciplinary actions taken against supervisors). In response to Trione’s complaint, the Regional Director stated his conclusions as follows: “As a result of the investigation, it appears that further proceedings on the charge [of a violation under Section 8 of the Act] are not warranted inasmuch as the evidence disclosed that Mr. Trione was employed as a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. For this reason, Section 8(a)(3) would not be applicable to his discharge inasmuch as 'supervisors’ are specifically excluded from the definition of employee under the Act. Nor is there sufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Trione’s discharge violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I am, therefore, refusing to issue a complaint in this matter.” App. 62a-63a. That section provides: “Misrepresentations of a material fact made willfully to deceive, or recklessly without knowledge, and acted on by the opposite party, or if made by mistake and innocently and acted on by the opposite party, constitute legal fraud.” See, e. g., Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Employees Union, Local 16, 69 Cal. 2d 713, 447 P. 2d 325 (1968). In reaching this conclusion, the Alabama Supreme Court noted that Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) requires that affirmative defenses be specifically asserted and concluded that although pre-emption was not specifically listed as an affirmative defense under Rule 8 “it quite obviously falls within the nature of those defenses specifically listed.” 470 So. 2d, at 1216, n. 1. See also Powell v. Phenix Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 434 So. 2d 247 (Ala. 1983) (holding claim of pre-emption of state-law affirmative defenses to be deemed waived if not affirmatively pleaded). Assuming, as we decide infra, that the judgment below did not rest on an independent and adequate state ground and that we therefore have jurisdiction over this case, this is a proper appeal under 28 U. S. C. §1257(2), since the Alabama Supreme Court upheld a state statute, § 6-5-101, as applied, against a claim of federal pre-emption. We note that this conclusion derives from congressional intent as delineated in our prior decisions. Thus, our decision today does not apply to pre-emption claims generally but only to those pre-emption claims that go to the State’s actual adjudicatory or regulatory power as opposed to the State’s substantive laws. The nature of any specific pre-emption claim will depend on congressional intent in enacting the particular pre-empting statute. We have also acknowledged an exception for conduct that is arguably protected under § 7 where the injured party has no means of bringing the dispute before the Board. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U. S. 180 (1978). See also Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274, 325-332 (1971) (White, J., dissenting); Longshoremen v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U. S. 195, 201-202 (1970) (White, J., concurring). Our reasoning and decision here are supported by this Court’s decision in Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U. S. 433 (1940). In that case, the Court faced an issue involving state jurisdiction in a bankruptcy case that was strikingly similar to the issue presented by this case. There, a state court had entered a judgment of foreclosure against the appellants. Although the appellants had a petition pending concurrently in the bankruptcy court, the state courts rejected their challenge that the foreclosure was invalid because of the pending bankruptcy proceedings on the basis of a procedural default. In the face of the appellees’ assertion that the procedural default presented an adequate nonfederal ground for the State’s judgment, however, this Court accepted the appellants’ contention that federal law itself “oust[ed] the jurisdiction of the state court” during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding. The state judgment thus “was not merely erroneous but was beyond [the state court’s] power, void, and subject to collateral attack.” Id., at 438. The Court based this holding on Congress’ exclusive right to regulate bankruptcy, which gave it the power to vest jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings exclusively in one forum and to withdraw that jurisdiction from all other forums, and Congress’ statutory exercise of that right. Given our longstanding interpretation of congressional intent regarding NLRA pre-emption under Garmon, this case is in all relevant respects the same as Kalb. Based on its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce, Congress has created by statute a uniform body of laws governing labor relations and has vested in the National Labor Relations Board the exclusive jurisdiction over administration of those laws. And, although the exclusive nature of this jurisdiction was not explicitly noted by Congress, this Court has held that such exclusivity was intended by Congress. Enactment of such exclusive jurisdiction must, by operation of the Supremacy Clause, pre-empt conflicting state-court jurisdiction. That the entity chosen to administer those laws is administrative rather than judicial, as in Kalb, does not alter the pre-emptive effect of the federal law. Consequently, a procedural default in state court does not protect a state-court judgment from pre-emption. There is no allegation or evidence here that Davis’ discharge, assuming he was a supervisor, was aimed at Ryan-Walsh’s nonsupervisory employees or that it interfered with those employees’ § 7 rights. See n. 4, supra. Whether a particular employee is a supervisor under the Act depends on his or her actual duties, not on his or her title or job classification. See, e. g., Winco Petroleum Co., 241 N. L. R. B. 1118, 101 LRRM 1100 (1979). Although it is not our task sua sponte to search the record for evidence to support the Union’s pre-emption claim, we find nothing in the record to make out even a colorable case for holding that Davis was not a supervisor.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

THOMPSON v. LAWSON, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF THE UNITED STATES BUREAU OF EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION, et al. No. 352. Argued March 9, 1954. Decided April 5, 1954. David Carliner argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Henry H. Glassie. George W. Ericksen argued the cause and filed a brief for the Gulf Florida Terminal Co., Inc. et al., respondents. Lester S. Jayson argued the cause for the Deputy Commissioner, respondent. With him on the brief were Robert L. Stern, then Acting Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General Burger and Samuel D. Slade. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. On June 15, 1951, Otis Thompson died from injuries suffered while loading a ship for his employer. Two women sought a death benefit under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, each claiming to be his “widow.” The Deputy Commissioner denied both claims, that of one woman on the ground that she was not the lawful wife of the decedent, and that of the other because at the time of Otis’ death she was living apart from him not “by reason of his desertion,” 33 U. S. C. § 902 (16). On a review of the latter dismissal, the District Court sustained the Deputy Commissioner’s order, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 205 F. 2d 527. In doing so, that court rejected contrary decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits, Associated Operating Co. v. Lowe, 138 F. 2d 916, Moore Dry Dock Co. v. Pillsbury, 169 F. 2d 988. We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 346 U. S. 921. The Deputy Commissioner made these findings. Otis and Julia Thompson were married in 1921, and lived together as husband and wife until November 1925, when Otis deserted her. They never lived together again, and he never contributed anything to the support of Julia or their two children, nor did she ever endeavor to secure such support. Meanwhile Otis had taken up with one Sallie Williams, and they went through a marriage ceremony in 1929. Julia, in turn, found another mate, one Jimmy Fuller, whom she “married” in 1940. Thereafter she was known as Julia Fuller. She was formally divorced from Fuller in 1949. Shortly before Otis’ death, he asked Julia to “take him back,” but she refused, having no intention of ever again living with him and resuming the relationship of husband and wife. The single, unentangled question before us is whether, on these unchallenged facts, Julia was at the time of Otis’ death in 1951, his statutory “widow,” as that term is described by Congress in the Longshoremen’s Act: “The term ‘widow’ includes only the decedent’s wife living with or dependent for support upon him at the time of his death; or living apart for justifiable cause, or by reason of his desertion at such time,” 33 U. S. C. § 902 (16). We agree with the court below that since she was not at the time of her husband’s death living apart from him “by reason of his desertion,” she was not a “widow” within the scope of this provision. Whatever may have been the situation prior to her “marriage” to Jimmy Euller in 1940, it is clear that after that date she lived as the wife of Jimmy Fuller, held herself out as his wife, and had severed all meaningful relationship with the decedent. We do not reach this conclusion by assessing the marital conduct of the parties. That is an inquiry which may be relevant to legal issues arising under State domestic relations law. Our concern is with the proper interpretation of the Federal Longshoremen’s Act. Congress might have provided in that Act that a woman is entitled to compensation so long as she is still deemed to be the lawful wife of the decedent under State law, as, for example, where a foreign divorce obtained by her is without constitutional validity in the forum State. But Congress did not do so. It defined the requirements which every claimant for compensation must meet. Considering the purpose of this federal legislation and the manner in which Congress has expressed that purpose, the essential requirement is a conjugal nexus between the claimant and the decedent subsisting at the time of the latter’s death, which, for present purposes, means that she must continue to live as the deserted wife of the latter. That nexus is wholly absent here. Julia herself, by her purported remarriage, severed the bond which was the basis of her right to claim a death benefit as Otis’ statutory dependent. The very practical considerations of this Compensation Act should not be subordinated to the empty abstraction that once a wife has been deserted, she always remains a deserted wife, no matter what— the no matter what in this case being the wife’s conscious choice to terminate her prior conjugal relationship by embarking upon another permanent relationship. The judgment is Affirmed. It was not contended before us that in the circumstances of this case the phrase “for justifiable cause” has a different reach than the phrase “by reason of his desertion.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ALABAMA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION et al. v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO. No. 395. Argued February 27-28, 1951. Decided May 21, 1951. By special leave of Court, Merton Roland Nachman, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Alabama, pro hac vice, and Richard T. Rives argued the cause for appellants. With them on the brief was Si Garrett, Attorney General. A. A. Carmichael, then Attorney General, and Wallace L. Johnson, then Assistant Attorney General, were also on a brief with Mr. Rives. Charles Clark argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Marion Rushton, Earl E. Eisenhart, Jr., Sidney S. Alderman and Jos. F. Johnston. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson delivered the opinion of the Court. The Southern Railway Company, appellee, brought this action in the Federal District Court to enjoin the members of the Alabama Public Service Commission and the Attorney General of Alabama, appellants, from enforcing laws of Alabama prohibiting discontinuance of certain railroad passenger service. Appellee’s Alabama intrastate service is governed by a statute prohibiting abandonment of “any portion of its service to the public . . . unless and until there shall first have been filed an application for a permit to abandon service and obtained from the commission a permit allowing such abandonment.” Ala. Code, 1940, tit. 48, i 106. Severe penalties are prescribed for wilful violation of regulatory statutes or orders of the Commission by utilities or their employees. Id. §§ 399, 400, 405. Appellee operates a railroad system throughout the South. This case, however, involves only that Alabama intrastate passenger service furnished by trains Nos. 7 and 8 operated daily between Tuscumbia, Alabama, and Chattanooga, Tennessee, a distance of approximately 145 miles mainly within Alabama. On September 13, 1948, appellee applied to the Alabama Public Service Commission for permission to discontinue trains Nos. 7 and 8, alleging that public use of the service had so declined that revenues fell far short of meeting direct operating expenses. After hearing evidence at Huntsville, Alabama, one of the communities served by the trains, the Commission entered an order on April 3, 1950, denying permission to discontinue on the grounds that there exists a public need for the service and that appellee had not attempted to reduce losses through adoption of more economical operating methods. Instead of pursuing its right of appeal to the state courts, appellee filed a complaint in the United States District Court alleging diversity of citizenship and that requiring continued operation of trains Nos. 7 and 8 at an out-of-pocket loss amounted to a confiscation of its property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Injunctive relief was prayed to protect appellee from irreparable loss, flowing on the one hand from operating losses in complying with Alabama law or, on the other, from severe penalties for discontinuance of service in the face of that law. A three-judge court heard evidence, made its own findings of fact and entered judgment holding the Commission order void and permanently enjoining appellants from taking any steps to enforce either the Commission order or the penalty provisions of the Alabama Code in relation to the discontinuance of trains Nos. 7 and 8. 91 F. Supp. 980 (1950). The case is properly here on appeal, 28 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 1253. Federal jurisdiction in this case is grounded upon diversity of citizenship as well as the allegation of a federal question. Exercise of that jurisdiction does not involve construction of a state statute so ill-defined that a federal court should hold the case pending a definitive construction of that statute in the state courts, e. g., Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941); Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U. S. 321 (1950). We also put to one side those cases in which the constitutionality of a state statute itself is drawn into question, e. g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385 (1948). For in this case appellee attacks a state administrative order issued under a valid regulatory statute designed to assure the provision of adequate intrastate service by utilities operating within Alabama. Appellee takes the position, adopted by the court below, that whenever a plaintiff can show irreparable loss caused by an allegedly invalid state administrative order ripe for judicial review in the state courts the presence of diversity of citizenship or a federal question opens the federal courts to litigation as to the validity of that order, at least so long as no action involving the same subject matter is actually pending in the state courts. But, it by-no means follows from the fact of district court jurisdiction that such jurisdiction must be exercised in this case. As framed by the Court in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 318 (1943), the question before us is: “Assuming that the federal district court had jurisdiction, should it, as a matter of sound equitable discretion, have declined to exercise that jurisdiction here?” In assessing the propriety of equitable relief, a review of the regulatory problem involved in this case is appropriate. Appellee conducts an interstate business over the same tracks and by means of the same trains involved in this case, and such interstate activities are regulated by the Federal Interstate Commerce Commission, 49 U. S. C. §§ 1 et seq. But, it has long been held that this interblending of the interstate and intrastate operations does not deprive the states of their primary authority over intrastate transportation in the absence of congressional action supplementing that authority. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1913). And Congress has since provided: “That nothing in [the Interstate Commerce Act] shall impair or affect the right of a State, in the exercise of its police power, to require just and reasonable freight and passenger service for intrastate business, except insofar as such requirement is inconsistent with any lawful order of the [Interstate Commerce Commission].” 49 U. S. C. § 1 (17) (a). This Court has held that regulation of intrastate railroad service is “primarily the concern of the state.” North Carolina v. United States, 325 U. S. 507, 511 (1945) (rates); Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79 (1939) (discontinuance of local service). State and federal regulatory agencies have expressed concern over the chronic deficit arising out of passenger train operations as a threat to the financial security of the American railroads and have recommended drastic action to minimize the deficit, including the discontinuance of unpatronized and unprofitable service. However, our concern in this case is limited to the propriety of a federal court injunction enjoining enforcement of a state regulatory order. The court below justified the exercise of its jurisdiction with a finding that continued operation of trains Nos. 7 and 8 would result in confiscation of appellee’s property-in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In pursuing the threshold inquiry whether a federal court should exercise jurisdiction in this case, we find it unnecessary to consider issues relating to the merits of appellee’s case, issues which appellants did not see fit to raise in this Court either in their Statement of Jurisdiction or in their briefs. We do note that in passing upon similar contentions in the past, this Court has recognized that review of an order requiring performance of a particular utility service, even at a pecuniary loss, is subject to considerations quite different from those involved when the return on the entire intrastate operations of a utility is drawn into question. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. North Carolina Corporation Commission, 206 U. S. 1, 24—27 (1907). The problems raised by the discontinuance of trains Nos. 7 and 8 cannot be resolved alone by reference to appellee’s loss in their operation but depend more upon the predominantly local factor of public need for the service rendered. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 242 U. S. 603, 608 (1917). The Alabama Commission, after a hearing held in the area served, found a public need for the service. The court below, hearing evidence de novo, found that no public necessity exists in view of the increased use and availability of motor transportation. We do not attempt to resolve these inconsistent findings of fact. We take note, however, of the fact that a federal court has been asked to intervene in resolving the essentially local problem of balancing the loss to the railroad from continued operation of trains Nos. 7 and 8 with the public need for that service in Tuscumbia, Decatur, Huntsville, Scottsboro, and the other Alabama communities directly-affected. Not only has Alabama established its Public Service Commission to pass upon a proposed discontinuance of intrastate transportation service, but it has also provided for appeal from any final order of the Commission to the circuit court of Montgomery County as a matter of right. Ala. Code, 1940, tit. 48, § 79. That court, after a hearing on the record certified by the Commission, is empowered to set aside any Commission order found to be contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence or erroneous as a matter of law, id. § 82, and its decision may be appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court. Id. § 90. Statutory appeal from an order of the Commission is an integral part of the regulatory process under the Alabama Code. Appeals, concentrated in one circuit court, are “supervisory in character.” Avery Freight Lines, Inc. v. White, 245 Ala. 618, 622-623, 18 So. 2d 394, 398 (1944). The Supreme Court of Alabama has held that it will review an order of the Commission as if appealed directly to it, Alabama Public Service Commission v. Nunis, 252 Ala. 30, 34, 39 So. 2d 409, 412 (1949), and that judicial review calls for an independent judgment as to both law and facts when a denial of due process is asserted. Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 253 Ala. 1, 11-12, 42 So. 2d 655, 662 (1949). The fact that review in the Alabama courts is limited to the record taken before the Commission presents no constitutional infirmity. Washington ex rel. Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510 (1912). And, whatever the scope of review of Commission findings when an alleged denial of constitutional rights is in issue, it is now settled that a utility has no right to relitigate factual questions on the ground that constitutional rights are involved. New York v. United States, 331 U. S. 284, 334-336 (1947); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U. S. 570, 576 (1941). Appellee complains of irreparable injury resulting from the Commission order pending judicial review, but has not invoked the protective powers of the Alabama courts to direct the stay or supersedeas of a Commission order pending appeal. Ala. Code, 1940, tit. 48, §§ 81, 84. Appellee has not shown that the Alabama procedure for review of Commission orders is in any way inadequate to preserve for ultimate review in this Court any federal questions arising out of such orders. As adequate state court review of an administrative order based upon predominantly local factors is available to appellee, intervention of a federal court is not necessary for the protection of federal rights. Equitable relief may be granted only when the District Court, in its sound discretion exercised with the “scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the federal courts,” is convinced that the asserted federal right cannot be preserved except by granting the “extraordinary relief of an injunction in the federal courts.” Considering that “[f]ew public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies,” the usual rule of comity must govern the exercise of equitable jurisdiction by the District Court in this case. Whatever rights appellee may have are to be pursued through the state courts. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U. S. 570, 577 (1941); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573, as amended, 311 U. S. 614, 615 (1940). The Johnson Act, 48 Stat. 775 (1934), now 28 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 1342, does not affect the result in this case. That Act deprived federal district courts of jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of certain state administrative orders affecting public utility rates where “A plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” As the order of the Alabama Service Commission involved in this case is not one affecting appellee’s rates, the Johnson Act is not applicable. We have assumed throughout this opinion that the court below had jurisdiction, supra, p. 345, but hold that jurisdiction should not be exercised in this case as a matter of sound equitable discretion. As this Court held in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 297-298 (1943): “This withholding of extraordinary relief by courts having authority to give it is not a denial of the jurisdiction which Congress has conferred on the federal courts .... On the contrary, it is but a recognition . . . that a federal court of equity . . . should stay its hand in the public interest when it reasonably appears that private interests will not suffer. . . . “It is in the public interest that federal courts of equity should exercise their discretionary power to grant or withhold relief so as to avoid needless obstruction of the domestic policy of the states.” For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is Reversed. Upon the filing of an application for permission to discontinue, the statute provides for notification of municipal officials, publication of notice in the area affected by the change in service, and a hearing by the Commission. Ala. Code, 1940, tit. 48, § 107. “The commission, as it deems to the best interest of the public, may grant in part or in whole, or may refuse such applications, . . . .” Id. § 108. Ala. Code, 1940, tit. 48, §§ 79 et seq. Under 28 U. S. C. (Supp. III) §2281, only a district court of three judges may issue an injunction restraining enforcement of “any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes . . . .” The word “statute” comprehends all state legislative enactments, including those expressed through administrative orders. American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582, 591-593 (1946); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U. S. 290, 292 (1923). Appellants contend for the first time in this Court that a suit to restrain state officials from enforcing unconstitutional state laws is, in effect, a suit against the state prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. The contention is not tenable in view of the many cases prior to and following Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which this Court has granted such relief over the same objection. The Alabama statute requiring application for a permit from the Alabama Public Service Commission before discontinuing transportation service was upheld by this Court in St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Alabama Public Service Commission, 279 U. S. 560 (1929). The statute was recently construed and applied by the Alabama Supreme Court in Alabama Public Service Commission v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 253 Ala. 559, 45 So. 2d 449 (1950). Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 504-505 (1947); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 297 (1943); Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U. S. 563, 570 (1939); Canada Malting Co., Ltd. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U. S. 413, 422-423 (1932). Appellee seeks to discontinue only two of several passenger trains serving the same communities. This is a proposed partial discontinuance and not an abandonment over which the Interstate Commerce Commission is given exclusive authority under 49 U. S. C. §§ 1 (18-20). Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153 (1926). The I. C. C. has held that it has no authority under 49 U. S. C. §§ 1 (18-20) to authorize a partial discontinuance as such of intrastate passenger service. Kansas City Southern R. Co., 94 I. C. C. 691 (1925); New York Central R. Co., 254 I. C. C. 745, 765 (1944). See 64th Annual Report, Interstate Commerce Commission (1950) 5-6; 63d Annual Report, Interstate Commerce Commission (1949) 4 — 5; Increased Freight Rates, 194-8, 276 I. C. C. 9, 32-40 (1949); Proceedings, 61st Annual Convention, National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners (1949) 378-382, 410-414. As the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission under 49 U. S. C. § 13 (4) has not been invoked for decision as to whether the continuance of this intrastate service constitutes an undue discrimination against interstate commerce, we cannot, in this proceeding, consider any impact the order of the Alabama Public Service Commission might have on interstate commerce. Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 267 U. S. 493 (1925), and cases cited therein. Compare Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U. S. 196 (1924), where supersedeas was not available to adequately protect federal rights, and Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U. S. 290 (1923), where supersedeas was sought but denied by the state court. Compare such cases as Bacon v. Rutland R. Co., 232 U. S. 134 (1914), where State judicial review procedures plus review in this Court were thought to be inadequate. This inadequacy derived from the rationale that the federal right of a utility to be protected from confiscation of its property depended upon “pure matters of fact” to the extent that a de novo hearing of such facts in a federal court was essential to the protection of constitutional rights. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 211 U. S. 210, 228 (1908). See Lilienthal, The Federal Courts and State Regulation of Public Utilities, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 379,424 (1930). The decisions in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U. S. 570, 576 (1941), and New York v. United States, supra, holding that due process does not require relitigation of factual matters determined by an administrative body, eliminated the premise upon which equitable relief in Bacon rested. Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 525 (1932). See Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176, 185 (1935). Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573, as amended, 311 U. S. 614, 615 (1940). Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 500 (1941). In Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 237 (1943), the Court sustained the exercise of jurisdiction by a federal court in a case involving matters of state law, but only where decision “does not require the federal court to determine or shape state policy governing administrative agencies” and “entails no interference with such agencies or with the state courts.” The absence of a legal remedy in the federal courts does not of itself justify the granting of equitable relief in such cases. Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U. S. 563, 569-570 (1939).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

POTOMAC NEWS CO. v. UNITED STATES. No. 164. Decided October 23, 1967. Stanley M. Dietz for petitioner. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Jerome M. Feit for the United States. Per Curiam. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CONSOLO v. FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION et al. No. 63. Argued December 6-7, 1965. Decided March 22, 1966. Robert N. Kharasch argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were William J. Lippman and Amy Scupi. Richard A. Posner argued the cause for the Federal Maritime Commission and the United States, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Irwin A. Seibel, Milan C. Miskovsky and Walter H. Mayo III. J. Alton Boyer argued the cause for respondent Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S. A. With him on the brief was Odell Kominers. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. We have been asked, in this case, to determine whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to set aside a reparation order of the Federal Maritime Commission which was before it upon the consolidated appeals of the shipper and the carrier, the shipper asking that the award be increased and the carrier asking that it be set aside. In addition, we have been asked to determine whether the Court of Appeals applied the proper standard of review when it set aside the reparation award. We answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative. Accordingly, we reverse. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S. A. (Flota) is a common carrier engaged in carrying bananas from South America to the United States. In July 1955, it entered into an exclusive two-year carrying contract with Panama Ecuador, a banana shipper, and gave Panama Ecuador an option to renew the contract for an additional three years, subject to its meeting the rate offered by any other shipper. This exclusive contract was executed after the Federal Maritime Board, in June 1953, had ruled that Flota’s competitor, Grace Line, was a common carrier of bananas and had violated the Shipping Act, 1916, §§14 Fourth and 16 First, by refusing to allocate its banana shipping space equitably among all qualified shippers. In April 1957, the Board reiterated its view that Grace Line had violated the Shipping Act by signing exclusive carrying contracts and it ordered Grace Line to offer to all qualified shippers, upon a fair basis, shipping space on forward-booking contracts not to exceed two years in length. One month after this ruling Flota rejected a bid by Consolo, a banana shipper competing with Panama Ecuador, for the entire shipping space and honored the option given Panama Ecuador by executing to it a three-year exclusive carrying contract. Shortly thereafter Consolo demanded a “fair and reasonable” amount of the carrying space pursuant to the previous Grace Line decisions of the Board and threatened to file a complaint if its demand were rejected. Flota rejected the demand and itself filed a petition before the Board for declaratory relief exonerating it from liability to Consolo. Consolo followed with a complaint before the Board asking for damages. These proceedings were consolidated and, in June 1959, the Board ruled that Flota’s three-year exclusive contract with Panama Ecuador violated the Shipping Act, §§14 Fourth and 16 First, and it ordered Flota to allocate its space fairly among all qualified banana shippers. Pursuant to § 2 (c) of the Administrative Orders Review Act (64 Stat. 1129, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 1032 (c) (1964 ed.)), Flota petitioned the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to set aside this order. This appeal was stayed, pending determination of the reparations proceeding. In March 1961, the Board ordered Flota to pay Consolo certain reparations for the violation of the Shipping Act. Both Flota and Consolo appealed from this reparation order and each intervened in the appeal of the other, Consolo asking that the reparation award be increased and Flota asking that it be set aside. These appeals were consolidated together with Flota’s appeal to set aside the Board’s finding of a violation of the Shipping Act. The Court of Appeals held that it had jurisdiction to consider these appeals. It affirmed the Board’s finding that Flota had violated the Shipping Act but remanded to the Board the issue of reparations so that it could “consider whether, under all the circumstances, it is inequitable to force Flota to pay reparations . ...” On remand the Federal Maritime Commission concluded that it was not inequitable to require Flota to pay Consolo reparations, although it did reduce the amount of the award. Again, both Flota and Consolo appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, each intervened in the appeal of the other, and the two appeals were consolidated. Again Consolo maintained that the award was too small and Flota argued that it should be set aside in part or in whole. The Court of Appeals reversed and vacated the reparation award, concluding that “[i]n view of the-substantial evidence showing that it would be inequitable to assess damages against Flota in favor of Consolo, . . . the Commission abused the discretion granted it under Section 22 of the Shipping Act [to issue reparation awards] . . . 119 U. S. App. D. C. 345, 352, 342 F. 2d 924, 931. Consolo petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review that decision, which we granted. 381 U. S. 933. I. The first question we have is whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction of the appeals filed by Consolo and Flota. As we read the controlling statutory provisions, it seems clear that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider Consolo’s direct appeal from the Commission’s reparation order granting only part of the relief requested. Section 2 of the Administrative Orders Review Act (5 U. S. C. § 1032 (1964 ed.)) gives the courts of appeals “exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of ... (c) such final orders of the . . . Federal Maritime Board ... as are now subject to judicial review pursuant to the provisions of section 830 of Title 46 . . . .” Section 830 of Title 46 (§ 31 of the Shipping Act, 1916, 39 Stat. 738, as amended), in turn, says that, “except as otherwise provided,” orders of the Federal Maritime Board are reviewable pursuant to the same procedures as are available “in similar suits in regard to orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission Accordingly, if pursuant to provisions in the Interstate Commerce Act a shipper can bring a direct review proceeding to challenge the adequacy of a reparation award issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission, he should be permitted to bring a similar proceeding to challenge the adequacy of a reparation award from the Federal Maritime Commission, subject of course to any special provisions applicable to maritime cases such as the provision in § 2 of the Administrative Orders Review Act that direct review proceedings shall be conducted in the courts of appeals rather than the district courts. The Court has previously held that an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission denying a shipper’s reparation claim is subject to direct review at the instance of the shipper, United States v. Interstate Comm erce Comm’n, 337 U. S. 426, primarily because the adverse order would be wholly unreviewable unless the shipper is permitted to bring an appeal. See Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125. Likewise, in D. L. Piazza Co. v. West Coast Line, Inc., 210 F. 2d 947, cert. denied, 348 U. S. 839, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was of the opinion that the principles of United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n were authority for allowing the shipper to seek direct review of an order of the Federal Maritime Board denying a major part, but not all, of the shipper’s reparation claim. We think Piazza was correct in this respect and we accordingly agree with the court below that it would have jurisdiction to consider Consolo’s appeal. As for Flota’s appeal, much of what we have said in Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., decided today, is pertinent to our consideration here. In that case, where direct review had not been sought by the shipper, we held that the carrier may have review of a reparation order of the Interstate Commerce Commission only in connection with the shipper’s enforcement action under § 16 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act. Section 30 of the Shipping Act, 39 Stat. 737, as amended, provides for a similar action by the shipper to enforce a reparation award by the Maritime Commission and extends certain procedural advantages to the shipper generally comparable to those provided by § 16 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act. He has a wide scope of venue; he is not liable for costs unless they accrue on his own appeal; he is allowed reasonable attorney fees if he ultimately prevails; he is the beneficiary of broad service of process and joinder provisions; and the findings and order of the Commission are given prima facie effect in the enforcement action. These advantages were given to the shipper because he was considered generally to be the weaker party in the controversy and he serves an important role in the enforcement of the Shipping Act. It was to protect advantages similar to these by preventing the carrier from emasculating the enforcement action that we concluded in Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., that the carrier could not seek review of the reparation award except in connection with a shipper’s enforcement action. It is readily apparent, we think, that this holding is applicable to Shipping Act cases when the shipper himself has not sought direct review in the Court of Appeals. Here, however, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals has been invoked by the shipper, who seeks to increase the amount of his damages. In these circumstances, we find nothing in the Shipping Act or the Administrative Orders Review Act that would prevent the Court of Appeals from also considering Flota’s request, either as a consolidated appeal pursuant to § 2 of the Administrative Orders Review Act or as an intervenor’s cross-claim, to have the reparation order set aside or reduced, a result which will not, in our view, substantially impair the procedural advantages intended for a shipper under § 30. Concerning venue, the shipper will still be able to select the forum. Although the venue provisions governing an appeal are somewhat different from those governing an enforcement suit, the shipper still has relatively wide opportunities to find a convenient forum. Section 3 of the Administrative Orders Review Act (64 Stat. 1130, 5 U. S. C. § 1033 (1964 ed.)) enables the petitioner to bring suit in the judicial circuit where he resides, where his principal office is located or in the District of Columbia. By requiring that the carrier’s review proceeding be brought in the court selected by the shipper for his appeal, all the issues in the controversy will be tried in a relatively convenient forum for the shipper. The shipper will not have the benefit in a direct review of those provisions in § 30 that exempt him from his costs and enable him to collect his attorney’s fees if he ultimately prevails. However, the only additional costs and attorney’s fees that the shipper will incur if the carrier is permitted to., challenge the reparation award upon a consolidated appeal or cross-claim are those costs and fees attributable to additional issues not otherwise raised by the shipper’s appeal. To the extent the arguments a carrier may advance to decrease or set aside an award would be asserted in any event as defenses to the shipper’s claim for increased reparations, no additional costs or fees will be incurred beyond those which the shipper would normally assume for his appeal. And, if the shipper prevails against the carrier’s appeal, any additional costs, although not attorney’s fees, as. are incurred may be assessed against the carrier as the losing party under 28 U. S. C. § 1912 (1964 ed.). See also District of Columbia Cir. R. 20 (b). The minimal disadvantages resulting to the shipper from permitting, the carrier to attack the reparation order are more than offset by the desirability of a prompt and efficient determination of the validity of the Commission’s order. Many of the arguments a carrier might make in defense against a shipper’s suit to increase the award could also be advanced to show that the award should be reduced or set aside entirely. And, once the carrier intervenes in the shipper’s appeal, all the parties interested in the complete resolution of the validity of the Commission’s order are before the court. In this situation it would make little sense to require the carrier to break off his argument short of its logical conclusion and relitigate it anew before a district court in an enforcement action. With the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals properly-invoked by the shipper, there is, therefore, every reason to permit the carrier not only to litigate the amount of the reparation order but also to insist upon a determination of the validity of the Commission’s order, both with respect to the carrier’s violation of the Act and with respect to the reparation award itself. If the carrier finally prevails on either of these claims, there would then be no occasion for a separate enforcement suit in the District Court. If the carrier’s claims going to the validity of the order are rejected by the Court of Appeals, the determination of a violation by the carrier would be binding in the subsequent enforcement action by the shipper; nor would there be any basis in the course of a subsequent enforcement action conducted in accordance with § 30 to redetermine whether or not the award itself is supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record. Hence, the shipper will need to litigate the issue of validity only once, and this in the Court of Appeals at the instance of the carrier. Although two proceedings may be required to collect his damages, this is only a necessary incident of the shipper’s decision to bring his appeal in the first place. In short, although a shipper may lose some of the procedural advantages given him by § 30 if he is forced to defend the validity of the Commission’s order in conjunction with his appeal, these losses generally will not be substantial. To the extent that he is disadvantaged, this is the result of a conscious choice he has made. And from the point of view of the enforcement of the Shipping Act, it is certainly less important that the shipper be assisted in his efforts to obtain a greater award than it is to assist him in his efforts to enforce an existing award. The Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining its own jurisdiction to hear Flota’s appeal. II. We turn, then, to the standard of review used by the Court of Appeals when it reversed the Commission’s reparation order. The Court of Appeals rejected the Commission’s finding that it would not be inequitable to award Consolo reparations because it felt this finding “ignores ... the substantial weight of the evidence . . . .” 119 U. S. App. D. C. 345, 347, 342 F. 2d 924, 926. It then concluded that the Commission abused its discretion in ordering reparations because “of the substantial evidence showing that [the reparations] would be inequitable.” Id., at 352, 342 F. 2d, at 931. In effect, the standard of review applied and articulated by the Court of Appeals in this case was that if “substantial evidence” or “the substantial evidence” supports a conclusion contrary to that reached by the Commission, then the Commission must be reversed. This standard is not consistent with that provided by the Administrative Procedure Act. Section 10 (e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (60 Stat. 243, 5 U. S. C. § 1009 (e) (1964 ed.)) gives a reviewing court authority to “set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion . . . [or] (5) unsupported by substantial evidence . . . .” Cf. United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 91 U. S. App. D. C. 178, 183-184, 198 F. 2d 958, 963-964, cert. denied, 344 U. S. 893. We have defined “substantial evidence” as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 197, 229. “[I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.” Labor Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U. S. 292, 300. This is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Labor Board v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 316 U. S. 105, 106; Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F. 2d 18, 21. Congress was very deliberate in adopting this standard of review. It . frees the reviewing courts of the time-consuming and difficult task of weighing the evidence, it gives proper respect to the expertise of the administrative tribunal and it helps promote the uniform application of the statute. These policies are particularly important when a court is asked to review an agency’s fashioning of discretionary relief. In this area agency determinations frequently rest upon a complex and hard-to-review mix of considerations. By giving the agency discretionary power to fashion remedies, Congress places a premium upon agency expertise, and, for the sake of uniformity, it is usually better to minimize the opportunity for reviewing courts to substitute their discretion for that of the agency. These policies would be damaged by the standard of review articulated by the court below. Ordinarily we would be inclined to remand to the ' Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of the standard of review established by the Administrative Procedure Act. Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474; Labor Board v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U. S. 404. However, in view of the fact that this controversy already dates back more than eight years, that it has been before the Court of Appeals twice and that the relevant standard is not hard to apply in this instance, we think this controversy had better terminate now. See O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U. S. 504. Section 22 of the Shipping Act, 1916, provides that “The Board . . . may direct the payment ... of full reparation to the complainant for the injury caused by such violation.” 46 U. S. C. § 821 (1964 ed.). (Emphasis added.) This contemplates that the Commission shall have a certain amount of discretion, but it does not specify what factors are to be considered by the Commission in exercising this discretion. However, we assume that the Commission could validly consider such factors as whether a reparation award would enhance the enforcement of the Act, whether the shipper had suffered compensable injury and whether the award of reparations would be consistent with the previous application of the Act, as well as the factor of culpability of the carrier. Hence, even if the carrier’s conduct were such that it would be inequitable to require it to pay a reparation award, this by itself might not be sufficient to establish that the Commission abused its discretion under the Act. However, we need not rest upon this distinction because we feel that it is clear that there is substantial evidence in the record, considered as a whole, to support the Commission’s findings that it would not be inequitable in this case to require Flota to pay Consolo reparations. The Maritime Board determined, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that Flota had been guilty of “unfairly” or “unjustly” discriminating against Consolo and of giving an “undue unreasonable preference” to Panama Ecuador in violation of § 14 Fourth and § 16 First of the Shipping Act. These findings, which were essential to the determination that Flota had violated the Shipping Act, substantially undercut any equities that Flota might claim. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals considered it inequitable to make Flota pay reparations because Flota might have believed, in view of the unsettled law, that it was not illegal to exclude Consolo. Prior to Flota’s rejection of Consolo’s request for a fair portion of the shipping space, the Federal Maritime Board had decided only two cases relevant to this issue: Consolo v. Grace Line, supra, and Banana Distributors, Inc. v. Grace Line, supra. Both cases held invalid exclusive dealing contracts similar to the one in question here. The Court of Appeals would minimize these two cases as precedents because no order was issued in the first Grace Line decision and the second Grace Line decision was ultimately reversed and remanded by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Nevertheless, at the time Flota entered into the 1957 exclusive contract with Panama Ecuador and at the time it rejected Consolo’s request for a fair share of the shipping space, these decisions were authoritative pronouncements by the agency primarily responsible for administering and interpreting the Shipping Act. And, although the second Grace Line decision was ultimately reversed and remanded, upon reconsideration the Board still found the exclusive contract there in question to be illegal and that decision was ultimately affirmed upon appeal to the Second Circuit. As further evidence of good faith, the Court of Appeals was of the opinion that Flota could reasonably have believed its situation was different from that presented to the Board in the Grace Line cases because of physical differences between its vessels and those owned by Grace Line. However, in its first decision affirming the Board’s finding of a violation the Court of Appeals had affirmed that the record “adequately supported” the Board’s finding that “the differences between Flota’s vessels and Grace’s vessels are not impressive.” 112 U. S. App. D. C. 302, 307, 302 F. 2d 887, 892. We think the Court’s first judgment was the correct one. The record is adequate to establish that Flota took a deliberate, and we think substantial, risk when it gambled that the previous contrary precedent could be distinguished. We agree with the Commission that there is nothing inhering in this situation that would make it inequitable to require Flota to pay reparations. Nor do we feel the record reveals that the reparation award is inequitable because Flota had asked for declaratory relief or because that request was pending before the Board for almost two years. In the first place, Flota did not request declaratory relief until after it had entered into the offending exclusive-dealing contract with Panama Ecuador and until it became clear that Consolo was going to sue anyway. Under these circumstances, the Commission was justifiably skeptical about Flota’s motives in bringing suit. Further, although Flota’s suit was pending for about two years, the record indicates that much of the delay involved in this case was at the request or approval of Flota. At any rate, it has never been the law that a litigant is absolved from liability for that time during which his litigation is pending. Labor Board v. Electric Cleaner Co., 315 U. S. 685; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Sloss-Sheffield Co., 269 U. S. 217. During this time Flota was able to postpone the predictable demise of its discriminatory contract and Consolo continued to suffer injury. Similarly, we do not believe that Flota acquired any “equities” by being caught between the conflicting demands of Consolo and Panama Ecuador. Not only was this a dilemma of Flota’s own making, but in 1958 Flota rejected an opportunity to escape it. At that time Panama Ecuador announced that it was going to cancel the contract unless Flota reduced its rates. Although believing itself under no legal obligation to reduce rates, Flota nevertheless did so in order to perpetuate the illegal exclusive-dealing contract with Panama Ecuador. Finally, there was a provision in Flota’s contract with Panama Ecuador that absolved Flota from liability for refusing to comply with the contract if it was illegal. Although absolution of liability depended upon the contract being declared, in fact, illegal, in light of the previous Grace Line decisions we think this would have' been the more reasonable course of action. Finally we reject the argument that Flota did not benefit from its policy of excluding Consolo and that Consolo lost “only” expected profits. There is evidence in the record that Flota considered its exclusive-dealing contract with Panama Ecuador more profitable than would have been a multiple contract with several shippers. If Flota did not believe there was an advantage in retaining its exclusive contract with Panama Ecuador it is reasonable to think that it would have taken the opportunity given it in 1958 by Panama Ecuador to cancel that contract and offer space equitably to all shippers. Furthermore, we think the court below wrongly minimized the sting of losing expected profits resulting from being unjustly and illegally denied shipping space. Such a loss is real and it is certainly compensable under the Shipping Act. See McLean v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 203 U. S. 38, 48-49; Roberto Hernandez, Inc. v. Arnold Bernstein Schiffahrtsgesellschaft, M. B. H., 116 F. 2d 849, cert. denied, sub nom. Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S. A. v. Roberto Hernandez, Inc., 313 U. S. 582. Without further belaboring this issue, suffice it to say that there is substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole for the Commission to conclude that, “Flota initiated and pursued the unlawful act without good cause and without a satisfactory showing of good faith, and we have been unable, except as noted, to find any equity in its contentions whether viewed separately or together.” This being so, it was clear error on the part of the Court of Appeals to reverse the Commission’s award of reparations. Reversed. Mr. Justice Black took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. “§ 14 Fourth. [No common carrier by water shall] Make any unfair or unjustly discriminatory contract with any shipper based on the volume of freight offered, or unfairly treat or unjustly discriminate against any shipper in the matter of (a) cargo space accommodations or other facilities, due regard being had for the proper loading of the vessel and the available tonnage; (b) the loading and landing of freight in proper condition; or (e) the adjustment and settlement of claims.” 39 Stat. 733, as amended, 46 U. S. C. §812 (1964 ed.). “§ 16 First. [It shall be unlawful for any common carrier by water] To make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, locality, or description of traffic in any respect, whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, locality, or description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever 39 Stat. 734, as amended, 46 U. S. C. §815 (1964 ed.). Philip B. Consolo v. Grace Line Inc., 4 F. M. B. 293 (1953). No order was issued pursuant to this report. Banana Distributors, Inc. v. Grace Line Inc., 5 F. M. B. 278 (1957). This decision predicated liability upon the theory that bananas were “susceptible to common carriage'’ and could be carried by a carrier only under terms of common carriage. This decision was reversed and remanded by the Second Circuit, 263 F. 2d 709. On remand the Board dropped its “susceptibility” theory but nevertheless found Grace Line to be a common carrier under the Shipping Act and held it could not evade the requirements of the Act as to any part of the goods it carried. 5 F. M. B. 615 (1959). This was affirmed by the Second Circuit upon appeal. 280 F. 2d 790, cert. denied, 364 U. S. 933. 5 F. M. B. 633, 641. This order was issued on July 2, 1959. Flota complied by September 1, 1959. 6 F. M. B. 262. 112 U. S. App. D. C. 302, 311, 302 F. 2d 887, 896. The functions and duties of the Federal Maritime Board, so far as relevant to this case, were transferred to the Federal Maritime Commission on August 12, 1961. Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1961, 75 Stat. 840, 46 U. S. C. § 1111, note (1964 ed.). 7 F. M. C. 635. None of the parties challenged, at this time, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to hear these consolidated appeals. “Any person may file with the Federal Maritime Board a sworn complaint setting forth any violation of this chapter by a common carrier by water, or other person subject to this chapter, and asking reparation for the injury, if any, caused thereby. ... If the complaint is not satisfied the Board shall, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, investigate it in such manner and by such means, and make such order as it deems proper. The Board, if the complaint is filed within two years after the cause of action accrued, may direct the payment, on or before a day named, of full reparation to the complainant for the injury caused by such violation.” 39 Stat. 736, as amended, 46 U. S. C. § 821 (1964 ed.). Much of what we said in Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., ante, is relevant to the jurisdictional issue presented by this case. The Senate Report explaining the Shipping Act expressly observed that the enforcement provisions of the Shipping Act were “modeled very closely after the interstate-commerce act . . . .” S. Rep. No. 689, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 13. That report also counsels that “the administration and enforcement provisions of the [interstate commerce] act and the nearly 30 years’ experience of the Interstate Commerce Commission [may] be adapted with slight modifications to the purposes of [the Shipping Act].” Id., p. 12. Unlike the Interstate Commerce Commission situation, there is no possibility here that an enforcement, action can be joined with a direct review proceeding (thereby raising the possibility that the favorable provisions of the enforcement section may become applicable and ensuring that the Commission will be a party), because enforcement suits must be in the district courts and direct reviews can be taken only to the courts of appeals. These same considerations of judicial economy and fairness to all the parties lie behind the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593; Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175; 2 Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 8.07 [5] (2d ed. 1965), and the doctrine that an intervenor of right may assert a cross-claim without independent jurisdictional grounds, 4 Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 24.17 (2d ed. 1963). Of course, in this case the issue of Flota’s violation of the Act was resolved in a previous direct appeal by Flota from the Board’s cease-and-desist order. There is no question of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to consider that appeal. See our discussion of the defenses available to a carrier in an enforcement action at Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., ante, p. 594, n. 6. In its first opinion, remanding the issue of reparations to the Commission, the Court of Appeals said, “But in reviewing the evidence [as opposed to reviewing issues of law], we are confined to a much more restricted standard, as the Administrative Procedure Act, § 1 et seq., 5 U. S. C. A. § 1001 et seq., and a long line of Supreme Court decisions, clearly indicate. See, e. g., Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U. S. 474, 71 S. Ct. 456, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951); United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 315 U. S. 475, 489, 62 S. Ct. 722, 86 L. Ed. 971 (1942). We have examined the appeals from the reparations award with these considerations in mind.” 112 U. S. App. D. C. 302, 309, 302 F. 2d 887, 894. However, in its second opinion, when it reviewed the Commission’s finding that it would not be inequitable to award reparations, the Court of Appeals made no reference to the Administrative Procedure Act. The standard of review articulated and apparently applied in that opinion was inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act. We do not read the opinion below as asserting that the Court of Appeals, in a direct review proceeding, may conduct a de novo review of the equities of a reparation award. We find nothing in the Shipping Act, the Hobbs Act, or the Administrative Procedure Act that would authorize a de novo review in these circumstances, and in the absence of specific statutory authorization, a de novo review is generally not to be presumed. 4 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §29.08 (1958). See United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., Inc., 373 U. S. 709, 715; Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. O’Leary, 288 F. 2d 542, 543-544. Although these two cases were decided before the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act, they are considered authoritative in defining the words “substantial evidence” as used in the Act. 4 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 29.02. The test of substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole had been applied by some reviewing courts even before Congress acted. See Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474, 483, 490. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U. S. 46; Labor Board v. Southland Mfg. Co., 201 F. 2d 244, 246. These same policies are behind the “primary jurisdiction doctrine.” Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U. S. 570, 574-575; United States Navigation Co., Inc. v. Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd., 284 U. S. 474. See generally, Stason, “Substantial Evidence” in Administrative Law, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1026 (1941). See Labor Board v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, Inc., 344 U. S. 344; Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 207-209; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177. See also Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U. S. 218, where considerable deference was given the Federal Security Administrator in the promulgation of rules pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. See Grace Line, Inc. v. Skips A/S Viking Line, 7 F. M. C. 432. See also Johnston Seed Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 358, aff’d 191 F. 2d 228; Boston Wool Trade Assn. v. Director General, 69 I. C. C. 282, 309, where, to avoid an award of reparations that would be inequitable, the I. C. C. and the courts found certain practices by the carriers to be unreasonable only prospectively. See also Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Coal Co. v. Delaware, Lackawanna & W. R. Co., 46 I. C. C. 606, 509. The Senate Report says that the enforcement provisions in the Shipping Act “confer upon the board power to make orders necessary for the enforcement of the act .. . .” S. Rep. No. 689, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 13. (Emphasis added.) Later on, the report says the board shall “make such order as may be proper, including an award of reparation for an injury resulting from the violation.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals said it is “beyond question” that the Board considered and made sufficient findings, supported by the record, that Flota’s exclusive contract with Panama Ecuador was “unjust” and “unreasonable.” It also said that the Board was “entitled to conclude that neither the exclusive contract nor the request for a declaratory order rendered Flota’s discriminatory refusal of space reasonable or just.” 112 U. S. App. D. C. 302, 307-308, 302 F. 2d 887, 892-893. It is important to distinguish this situation from one where a litigant affirmatively relies upon an agency declaration, later reversed, that specifically authorized particular behavior. See Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 284 U. S. 370. Flota’s operating manager in the United States testified that “it is better to deal with one [shipper] than with three.” There is also evidence that Flota had been able to settle Panama Ecuador’s claims for shipment damages on a basis of only “2.4% which is a very low percentage in comparison with the usual 15% deduction which applies to this type of transportation.” Because of its disposition of this case, the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to consider Flota’s objection that counsel for the Commission, who participated in the writing of the Commission’s reparation award upon remand, had violated 5 TJ. S. C. § 1004 (1964 ed.) because he had previously participated as Public Counsel in the trial before the Hearing Examiner on the issue of whether Flota had violated the Shipping Act (although not in the trial on the reparation issue) and had defended the Commission’s finding of violation and award of reparations before the Court of Appeals in the first consolidated appeals. We have examined Flota’s contention in this regard and find it without merit.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

F. W. WOOLWORTH CO. v. TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO No. 80-1745. Argued April 19, 1982 Decided June 29, 1982 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, ante, p. 331. O’CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, post, p. 373. William L. Goldman argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were George W. Beatty, James A. Riedy, Michael D. Bray, and Arnold S. Anderson. Sara E. Bennett, Special Assistant Attorney General of New Mexico, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Denise D. Fort, Assistant Attorney General, and Filmore E. Rose Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Illinois by Tyrone Fahner, Attorney General, Fred H. Montgomery, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Lloyd B. Foster; and for the Multistate Tax Commission et al. by William D. Dexter; Wilson L. Condon, Attorney General of Alaska; J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General of Colorado; Carl R. Ajello, Attorney General of Connecticut; Richard S. Gebelein, Attorney General of Delaware; David H. Leroy, Attorney General of Idaho, and Theodore V. Spangler, Jr., Deputy Attorney General; Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana; Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas; Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland; Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts; Frank K. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan; Warren R. Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota; John Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri; Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska; Gregory H. Smith, Attorney General of New Hampshire; Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General of North Carolina, and M. C. Banks, Deputy Attorney General; Robert O. Welfald, Attorney General of North Dakota, and Albert R. Hausauer, Assistant Attorney General; Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon; and David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General of Utah. John J. Easton, Attorney General of Vermont, and Paul P. Hanlon filed a brief for the State of Vermont as amicus curiae. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The question is whether the Due Process Clause permits New Mexico to tax a portion of dividends that appellant F. W. Woolworth Co. received from foreign subsidiaries that do no business in New Mexico. We also must decide whether New Mexico may include within Woolworth’s apportionable New Mexico income a sum, commonly known as “gross-up,” that Woolworth calculated in order to claim a foreign tax credit on its federal income tax. I Woolworth’s principal place of business and commercial domicile are in New York. It engages in retail business through chains of stores located in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. It sells a wide spectrum of merchandise, including dry goods, hardware, small appliances, confections, packaged goods, and fountain items. In the fiscal year ending January 31, 1977, Woolworth’s gross domestic sales totalled approximately $2.5 billion, with New Mexico sales amounting to approximately $13 million — or about 0.5% of the gross figure. App. 57a. Woolworth owns four foreign subsidiaries of relevance to this suit. Three are wholly owned: F. W. Woolworth GmbH, in Germany; F. W. Woolworth, Ltd., in Canada; and F. W. Woolworth, S. A. de C. V. Mexico. F. W. Woolworth Co., Ltd., is an English corporation of which Woolworth owns 52.7%, with the remainder held and traded publicly. These four corporations also engage in chainstore retailing. Together they paid Woolworth approximately $39.9 million in dividends during the fiscal year in question. New Mexico adopted a version of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act in 1965, N. M. Stat. Ann. §§7-4-1 — 7-4-21 (1981), and joined the Multistate Tax Compact in 1967. § § 7-5-1 — 7-5-7 (1981). See AS ARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, ante, at 311-312; United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U. S. 452 (1978). Consequently the State distinguishes between “business” income, which it apportions between it and other States for tax purposes, and “nonbusiness” income, which it generally allocates to a single State on the basis of commercial domicile. Woolworth reported its dividend income of $39.9 million from its German, Canadian, Mexican, and English subsidiaries as “nonbusiness” income, none of which was to be allocated to New Mexico. Woolworth also treated as “non-business” income a $1.6 million gain from a hedging transaction in British pounds. This transaction was undertaken for the purpose of insuring the payment of the British subsidiary’s dividend against currency fluctuations. See App. 52a-54a. Similarly, Woolworth did not report as New Mexico “business” income $25.5 million of “gross-up” that it never actually received but that the Federal Government (for purposes-of calculating Woolworth’s federal foreign tax credit pursuant to 26 U. S. C. §§78, 901(a), and 902(a)) deemed Woolworth to have received from its foreign subsidiaries. On audit, the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department determined that, under state law, Woolworth should have included in its apportionable New Mexico income the dividends from its four foreign subsidiaries, the foreign exchange gain, and the $25.5 million gross-up figure. These additions increased Woolworth’s apportioned New Mexico income from $84,622 to $401,518. App. 69a. The Department denied Woolworth’s protest, but this decision was reversed on appeal by the New Mexico Court of Appeals. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 95 N. M. 542, 624 P. 2d 51 (1979). As a matter of state law, the Court of Appeals excluded from apportionable New Mexico income Woolworth’s receipt of the dividends at issue. The court stated that “[t]here is no indication that the income from Woolworth’s long-standing investments [in its subsidiaries] was used either in taxpayer’s unitary domestic business or in its business conducted in New Mexico . . . .” Id., at 545, 624 P. 2d, at 54. With respect to the gross-up issue, the Court of Appeals said that the State’s “rigid insistence” on inclusion of this amount “is a refusal to recognize an obviously fictitious income figure, made artificial by the federal reporting requirements for a specific purpose . . . .” Id., at 543-544, 624 P. 2d, at 52-53. The court said that “ ‘[g]ross-up’ in fact represents income to taxpayer’s foreign subsidiaries [that] is paid out in taxes to foreign governments,” id., at 544, 624 P. 2d, at 53, and not income in fact to the parent. The court thus likewise excluded this sum from Woolworth’s apportionable New Mexico income. The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed over one dissent. 95 N. M. 519, 624 P. 2d 28 (1981). On the question whether Woolworth’s receipt of dividends from its subsidiaries constituted apportionable New Mexico income, the court observed that, “[r]egrettably, it needs to be said that the State did a very poor job of inquiring into and developing the facts in this case.” Id., at 524, 624 P. 2d, at 33. The court nonetheless found substantial evidence to support the findings that the subsidiaries’ dividend payments met the State’s statutory test for inclusion in Woolworth’s apportionable New Mexico income. On the constitutional issue, the court identified the “key question” after our decision in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U. S. 425 (1980), as “whether those dividends were income earned in a unitary business.” 95 N. M., at 528, 624 P. 2d, at 37. The court stated: “The [dividend] income [from Woolworth’s subsidiaries] is obviously related to the mutual activities of the parent and its affiliates. The control over the subsidiaries, the interdependence, the history of the relationships, the placing of the [dividend] money in [Woolworth’s] general operating account, all point to functional integration and reveal an underlying unitary business for our purposes here.” Id., at 529, 624 P. 2d, at 38. Respecting the State’s inclusion of Woolworth’s federal gross-up figure as apportionable state income, the court “deem[ed] it unnecessary to delve into all the intricacies of the federal laws and regulations,” but found it sufficient “to say that, since Woolworth decided to use the gross-up option, the income taxes paid by Woolworth’s foreign subsidiaries to foreign governments must be deemed to be received as dividends ----” Id., at 521-522, 624 P. 2d, at 30-31. “Admittedly, the fictitious gross-up, which the state claims is ‘business income’ and which Woolworth deliberately acceded to, does not fit the ordinary definition of ‘income’. . . .” Id., at 522, 624 P. 2d, at 31. Nevertheless, the court noted that there was no claim and no lower court finding that Woolworth did not “obtain an economic benefit from the gross-up procedure here.” Id., at 523, 624 P. 2d, at 32. The court consequently rejected Woolworth’s statutory and constitutional challenges to the State’s inclusion of the federal gross-up figure in Woolworth’s apportionable New Mexico business income. II This case was argued in tandem with ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, ante, p. 307, which also involved dividends and gains from foreign subsidiaries. We have reiterated today in ASARCO that “‘[t]he “linchpin of apportionability” for state income taxation of an interstate enterprise is the “unitary-business principle.”’” Ante, at 319, quoting Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U. S. 207, 223 (1980), in turn quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, supra, at 439. Woolworth owns all the stock of three of its dividend payors and a 52.7% majority interest in the fourth. As a result, Woolworth (at least with respect to the three wholly owned companies) elects all of the subsidiaries’ directors. It potentially has the authority to operate these companies as integrated divisions of a single unitary business. Our decision in ASARCO makes clear, however, that the potential to operate a company as part of a unitary business is not dispositive when, looking at “the ‘underlying economic realities of a unitary business,’” the dividend income from the subsidiaries in fact is “derive[d] from ‘unrelated business activity’ which constitutes a ‘discrete business enterprise.’” Exxon, supra, at 223-224, quoting Mobil, supra, at 441, 442, 439. See ASARCO, ante, at 322-323 (holding that a 52.7%-owned subsidiary is not part of its parent’s unitary business). A The State Supreme Court in important part analyzed this case under a different legal standard. After stating that the existence of a unitary business relationship was the “key question,” the court proceeded to resolve this question largely by emphasizing the potentials of the relationship between Woolworth and its subsidiaries: “The possession of large assets by subsidiaries is a business advantage of great value to the parent; ‘it may give credit which will result in more economical business methods; it may give a standing which shall facilitate purchases; it may enable the corporation to enlarge the field of its activities and in many ways give it business standing and prestige.’ Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 166 .. . (1911).” 95 N. M., at 529, 624 P. 2d, at 38. This reliance on the Flint case was error. Flint upheld a federal excise tax levied on corporate income. The States, of course, are subject to limitations on their taxation powers that do not apply to the Federal Government. As relevant here, “the income attributed to [a] State for tax purposes must be rationally related to ‘values connected with the taxing State.’ Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 390 U. S. 317, 325.” Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267, 273 (1978). The state court’s reasoning would trivialize this due process limitation by holding it satisfied if the income in question “adds to the riches of the corporation . . . .” Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66, 70 (1920). Income, from whatever source, always is a “business advantage” to a corporation. Our cases demand more. In particular, they specify that the proper inquiry looks to “the underlying unity or diversity of business enterprise,” Mobil, supra, at 440, not to whether the nondomiciliary parent derives some economic benefit — as it virtually always will — -from its ownership of stock in another corporation. See ASARCO, ante, at 325-329. B In Mobil we emphasized, as relevant to the right of a State to tax dividends from foreign subsidiaries, the question whether “contributions to income [of the subsidiaries] resulted] from functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale.” 445 U. S., at 438. If such “factors of profitability” arising “from the operation of the business as a whole” exist and evidence the operation of a unitary business, a State can gain a justification for its tax consideration of value that has no other connection with that State. Ibid. We turn now to consider the extent, if any, to which these factors exist in this case. There was little functional integration. Woolworth’s subsidiaries engaged exclusively in the business of retailing — the purchase of wholesale goods for resale to final consumers. This type of business differs significantly from the “highly integrated business” of locating, processing, and marketing a resource (such as petroleum) that we previously have found to constitute a unitary business. Exxon, 447 U. S., at 224. See also id., at 226 (describing “a unitary stream of income, of which the income derived from internal transfers of raw materials from exploration and production to refining is a part”); Mobil, 445 U. S., at 428. Consistent with this distinetion, the evidence in this case is that no phase of any subsidiary’s business was integrated with the parent’s. With respect to “who makes the decision for seeing to the merchandise, [store] site selection, advertising and accounting control,” the undisputed testimony stated that “[e]ach subsidiary performs these functions autonomously and independently of the parent company.” App. 12a. “Each subsidiary has a complete accounting department and a financial staff.” Id,., at 14a. Each had its own outside counsel. App. to Juris. Statement 34a. It further appears that Woolworth engaged in no centralized purchasing, manufacturing, or warehousing of merchandise. The parent had no central personnel training school for its foreign subsidiaries. Ibid. And each subsidiary was responsible for obtaining its own financing from sources other than the parent. In sum, the record is persuasive that Woolworth’s operations were not functionally integrated with its subsidiaries. We now consider the extent to which there was centralization of management or achievement of other economies of scale. It appears that each subsidiary operated as a distinct business enterprise at the level of fulltime management. With one possible exception, none of the subsidiaries' officers during the year in question was a current or former employee of the parent. Ibid. The testimony was that the subsidiaries “figure that their operations are independent, autonomous.” App. 13a. Woolworth did not “rotate personnel or train personnel to operate stores in those countries. There is no exchange of personnel.” Ibid. There was no “training program that is central to transmit the Woolworth idea of merchandising^] such as it may be[,] to the foreign subsidiaries.” Id., at 15a. The subsidiaries “proceed . . . with their own programs, either formal or informal. They develop their own managers and instruct them in their methods of operation.” Ibid. This management decentralization was reflected in the fact that each subsidiary possessed autonomy to determine its own policies respecting its primary activity — retailing. According to the hearing examiner: “Each of the four subsidiaries are responsible for determining the size and location of retail stores, the market conditions in their own territory and the mix of items to be sold. The German subsidiary emphasizes soft goods such as dresses and coats. It sells no food. The English subsidiary operates restaurants in its stores and also operates supermarkets. Each subsidiary attempts to cater to local tastes and needs. The inventory of each subsidiary consists, in large part, of home country produced items. This purchase-at-home practice is consistent with the policy of the taxpayer. A number of inventory items are purchased from the Orient or other places but there is no evidence that the subsidiaries purchase, or are required to purchase, inventory items from any particular source.” App. to Juris. Statement 33a — 34a. Importantly, the Department’s hearing examiner found that Woolworth had “no department or section, as such, devoted to overseeing the foreign subsidiary operations.” Id., at 34a. Neither the parent corporation nor any of the subsidiaries consolidates its tax return with any of the other companies. App. 37a-38a. The tax manager for Woolworth stated that he did not review the subsidiaries’ tax returns or consult with them on decisions affecting taxes. Id., at 14a. There was no “policy of the parent that all of the managers of all the operations get together periodically to discuss the overall Woolworth operations.” Id., at 35a. There were some managerial links. Woolworth maintained one or several common directors with some of the subsidiaries. There also was irregular in-person and “frequent” mail, telephone, and teletype communication between the upper echelons of management of the parent and the subsidiaries. App. to Juris. Statement 34a. Decisions about major financial decisions, such as the amount of dividends to be paid by the subsidiaries and the creation of substantial debt, had to be approved by the parent. Id., at 35a. Woolworth’s published financial statements, such as its annual reports, were prepared on a consolidated basis. Ibid. We conclude, on the basis of undisputed facts, that the four subsidiaries in question are not a part of a unitary business under the principles articulated in Mobil and Exxon, and today reiterated in ASARCO. Except for the type of occasional oversight — with respect to capital structure, major debt, and dividends — that any parent gives to an investment in a subsidiary, there is little or no integration of the business activities or centralization of the management of these five corporations. Woolworth has proved that its situation differs from that in Exxon, where the corporation’s Coordination and Services Management office was found to provide for the asserted unitary business “long-range planning for the company, maximization of overall company operations, development of financial policy and procedures, financing of corporate activities, maintenance of the accounting system, legal advice, public relations, labor relations, purchase and sale of raw crude oil and raw materials, and coordination between the refining and other operating functions ‘so as to obtain an optimum short range operating program.’ ” 447 U. S., at 211. In this case the parent company’s operations are not interrelated with those of its subsidiaries so that one’s “stable” operation is important to the other’s “full utilization” of capacity. Id., at 218. See also id., at 225. The Woolworth parent did not provide “many essential corporate services” for the subsidiaries, and there was no “centralized purchasing office . . . whose obvious purpose was to increase overall corporate profits through bulk purchases and efficient allocation of supplies among retailers.” Id., at 224. And it was not the case that “sales were facilitated through the use of a uniform credit card system, uniform packaging, brand names, and promotional displays, all run from the national headquarters.” Ibid. See also Mobil, 445 U. S., at 428, 435. There is a critical distinction between a retail merchandising business as conducted by Woolworth and the type of multinational business — now so familiar — in which refined, processed, or manufactured products (or parts thereof) may be produced in one or more countries and marketed in various countries, often worldwide. In operations of this character there is a flow of international trade, often an interchange of personnel, and substantial mutual interdependence. The uncontradicted evidence demonstrates that Woolworth’s international retail business is not comparable. There is no flow of international business. Nor is there any integration or unitary operation in the sense in which our cases consistently have used these terms. In Mobil, we recognized: “[A]ll dividend income received by corporations operating in interstate commerce is [not] necessarily taxable in each State where that corporation does business. Where the business activities of the dividend payor have nothing to do with the activities of the recipient in the taxing State, due process considerations might well preclude apportionability, because there would be no underlying unitary business.” Id., at 441-442. This is such a case. Each of the foreign subsidiaries at issue operates a “discrete business enterprise,” Mobil, supra, at 439, with a notable absence of any “umbrella of centralized management and controlled interaction.” Exxon, 447 U. S., at 224. New Mexico, in taxing a portion of dividends received from such enterprises, is attempting to reach “extraterritorial values,” Mobil, supra, at 442, wholly unrelated to the business of the Woolworth stores in New Mexico. As a result, a “showing has been made that income unconnected with the unitary business has been used in the” levy of the New Mexico tax. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501, 509 (1942). We conclude that this tax does not bear the necessary relationship “ ‘to opportunities, benefits, or protection conferred or afforded by the taxing State. See Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444.’” Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Missouri State Tax Comm’n, 390 U. S. 317, 325, n. 5 (1968), quoting Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U. S. 169, 174 (1949). New Mexico’s tax thus fails to meet established due process standards. ► — I W-i We need not be detained by New Mexico’s reaching out to tax “gross-up” amounts that even the Supreme Court of New Mexico recognized as “fictitious.” 95 N. M., at 522, 624 P. 2d, at 31. The gross-up computation is a figure that the Federal Government “deems” Woolworth to have received for purposes of part of Woolworth’s federal foreign tax credit calculation. It “is treated [for this purpose] as a dividend in the same manner as a dividend actually received by the domestic corporation from a foreign corporation.” H. R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., A83 (1962). See also S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 227 (1962). In this case the foreign tax credit arose from the taxation by foreign nations of Woolworth foreign subsidiaries that had no unitary business relationship with New Mexico. New Mexico’s effort to tax this income “deemed received” — with respect to which New Mexico contributed nothing — also must be held to contravene the Due Process Clause. > 1 — \ The judgment of the Supreme Court of New Mexico is reversed. It is so ordered. [For concurring opinion of The Chief Justice, see ante, p. 331.] The English subsidiary operates about 2,000 stores, App. 39a, the Canadian company about 500, id., at 24a, and the Mexican about 12. Id., at 28a. The record does not specify the number of stores the German company owns, but the company may be between the English and Canadian operations in size. “ ‘[B]usiness income’ means income arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or business and includes income from tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, management and disposition of the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer’s regular trade or business operations . . . .” N. M. Stat. Ann. § 7-4-2(A) (1981). “All business income shall be apportioned to this state by multiplying the income by a fraction, the numerator of which is the property factor plus the payroll factor plus the sales factor, and the denominator of which is three.” N. M. Stat. Ann. § 7-4-10 (1981). “The property factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the average value of the taxpayer’s real and tangible personal property owned or rented and used in this state during the tax period and the denominator of which is the average value of all the taxpayer’s real and tangible personal property owned or rented and used during the tax period.” § 7-4-11. “The payroll factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total amount paid in this state during the tax period by the taxpayer for compensation, and the denominator of which is the total compensation paid everywhere during the tax period.” § 7-4-14. “The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total sales of the taxpayer in the state during the tax period, and the denominator of which is the total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the tax period.” § 7-4-16. “ ‘[N]onbusiness income’ means all income other than business income.” N. M. Stat. Ann. § 7-4-2(D) (1981). “Rents and royalties from real or tangible personal property, capital gains, interest, dividends, or patent or copyright royalties, to the extent that they constitute nonbusiness income, shall be allocated as provided in Sections 6 through 9 [7-4-6 to 7-4-9 NMSA 1978] of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act.” N. M. Stat. Ann. § 7-4-5 (1981) (emphasis added). “Interest and dividends are allocable to this state if the taxpayer’s commercial domicile is in this state.” § 74-8. New Mexico defines “commercial domicile” as “the principal place from which the trade or business of the taxpayer is directed or managed.” § 7-4-2(B). “If a domestic corporation chooses to have the benefits of subpart A of part III of subchapter N (relating to foreign tax credit) for any taxable year, an amount equal to the taxes deemed to be paid by such corporation under section 902(a) (relating to credit for corporate stockholder in foreign corporation)... for such taxable year shall be treated for purposes of this title ... as a dividend received by such domestic corporation from the foreign corporation.” 26 U. S. C. § 78 (emphasis added). “If the taxpayer chooses to have the benefits of this subpart, the tax imposed by this chapter shall... be credited with the . . . taxes deemed to have been paid under seetio[n] 902 . . . .” § 901(a). “For purposes of this subpart, a domestic corporation which owns at least 10 percent of the voting stock of a foreign corporation from which it receives dividends in any taxable year shall be deemed to have paid the same proportion of any income . . . taxes paid or deemed to be paid by such foreign corporation to any foreign country . . . on . . . the accumulated profits of such foreign corporation from which such dividends were paid, which the amount of such dividends (determined without regard to section 78) bears to the amount of such accumulated profits in excess of such income . . . taxes (other than those deemed paid).” § 902(a). Woolworth gives this example: “If a foreign subsidiary of a United States parent earns $100, pays foreign tax of $40, and pays a dividend of $30 out of its after-tax profits of $60, the deemed paid foreign tax credit of the parent under section 902(a) is 30/60 x $40, or $20. The parent includes $50 in dividend income (i. e., the actual dividend of $30 plus $20 of ‘gross-up’) and claims a foreign tax credit of $20 against the federal income tax on this income.” Brief for Appellant 6, n. 4. See 26 CFR §§ 1.78-1, 1.902-l(h), (k) (1982); S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 222-228 (1962); H. R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., A79-A84 (1962); 3 B. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts ¶69.2 (1981). Only one witness — Woolworth’s tax manager — appeared before the Department’s hearing examiner. The State introduced as evidence Woolworth’s tax return, a notice of assessment, its worksheets, Woolworth’s protest, and tax regulations. Woolworth introduced a one-page diagram of its corporate structure. See App. B to Brief for Appellee. The testimony given before the examiner and referred to in this opinion is uncontroverted unless otherwise noted. The Department’s decision and order did not mention Woolworth’s foreign exchange gain. See App. to Juris. Statement 30a-38a. The Court of Appeals did not refer to Woolworth’s foreign exchange gain. The New Mexico Supreme Court also ruled that the Court of Appeals had erred in holding that it was reasonable to conclude that Woolworth had simply passed the foreign dividends through its general treasury to its stockholders, without using the dividends for Woolworth’s general corporate purposes. The Supreme Court ruled that the burden of proof was on the taxpayer. Consequently, the court held, the State’s reasonable inference that Woolworth had used the foreign dividends for its own corporate purposes was supportable in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 95 N. M., at 529, 624 P. 2d, at 38. The court further rejected Woolworth’s claim that the apportionment formula should be adjusted if the dividend income were found to be apportionable. Id., at 529-530, 624 P. 2d, at 38-39. The dissenting justice founded his position on “agree[ment] with the analysis of the Court of Appeals.” Id., at 530, 624 P. 2d, at 39. Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion discussed Woolworth’s foreign exchange gain. The tax did not apply to a corporation’s receipt of dividends from other companies subjected to the tax. 220 U. S., at 144-145. The hearing examiner and the New Mexico Supreme Court also thought it significant that Woolworth had commingled its dividends with its general funds and had used them for general corporate operating purposes. See 95 N. M., at 529, 624 P. 2d, at 38; n. 9, supra. This analysis likewise subverts the unitary-business limitation. All dividend income— irrespective of whether it is generated by a “discrete business enterprise,” Mobil, 445 U. S., at 439 — would become part of a unitary business if the test were whether the corporation commingled dividends from other corporations, whether subsidiaries or not. The testimony before the Department’s hearing examiner, see n. 7, supra, focused primarily on the English and German subsidiaries. With respect to the Mexican and Canadian subsidiaries, the evidence was confined to the following: “Q. Now, I would like to[,] without repeating every question if I may[,] ask a summary question concerning the Canadian and the Mexican subsidiaries, we are talking about decisions concerning merchandise mix, site selection, advertising, accounting, training of personnel, and of those items[,] would you say that there is a similarity between the relationship of the U. S. parent to Canada as there is to the German and the English subsidiaries to the extent to which these things are decentralized? “A. Yes, there is a distinct similarity or philosophy involved in the ownership of these companies.” App. 18a. The State did not undertake to controvert the implications of this statement, and neither of the courts below found any difference in the relationships between the parent and each of the four subsidiaries. We thus must assume that the relationship between the parent and the Mexican and Canadian subsidiaries paralleled that between the parent and the English and German subsidiaries in material respects. The New Mexico Supreme Court did state that “[t]here is some flow back and forth of goods” between the parent and the subsidiaries. 95 N. M., at 524, 624 P. 2d, at 33. It cited no evidence in support of this statement. Neither the Department’s hearing examiner nor the Court of Appeals made such a finding. The testimony in the record was that there were not “any inter-company sales of inventory.” App. 13a. The Woolworth witness also stated that, with respect to certain types of goods manufactured by other of the parent’s subsidiaries, he lacked actual knowledge of whether there were intercompany sales. He continued that the idea was “inconceivable to me because of the autonomous operation of the company and the lack of coordination and other facets.” Id., at 43a. Upon further questioning, the witness conceded that he did not “really know where [the English subsidiary’s managers] buy their merchandise.” But he affirmed his knowledge that the English company’s sales to and purchases from the parent were “virtually nil.” Id., at 44a. When questioned whether Woolworth utilized a central buying office for it and its subsidiaries, the witness replied that it did not. Id., at 14a. No other evidence indicated that the parent and the subsidiaries engaged in any joint manufacturing, purchasing, or warehousing functions. Nor did the New Mexico courts find otherwise. Woolworth had no outstanding debts from its English subsidiary, App. to Juris. Statement 35a, and it had not reinvested its dividends in that company. App. 51a. The parent had reinvested dividends in the German company, id., at 52a, but the last additional capital contribution by the parent that the witness could recall, id., at 46a, was a $400,000 transfer made after the German company was demolished during World War II. Id., at 30a. See App. to Juris. Statement 35a. The hearing examiner found that “[i]n the taxable year involved, none of the four subsidiaries’] officers were currently or formerly employees of the parent.” Id., at 34a. Without explanation, he also later stated that “[a]t least one officer of the Canadian subsidiary [was] also an officer of the [parent].” Ibid. One officer from the Mexican subsidiary was a participant in Woolworth’s profit-sharing plan. Woolworth paid the employee’s share of this plan. Ibid. Woolworth had one vice president “who is the liaison man with the smaller foreign subsidiaries,” ibid., such as the Spanish and Mexican subsidiaries. App. 50a. The testimony was that this liaison man “from time to time . . . may have contact with the major subsidiaries . . . .” Ibid. The witness replied that “[t]here hasn’t been that” in response to the questions of whether “all of the managers of all of the operations” ever “get together and talk together about where the company is going or what it is doing or where it should be tomorrow or in ten years from today? Planning for future programs or for future expansion?” Id., at 35a. The managing director of the English subsidiary sat as one of the parent’s 15 directors, and the parent sent one of its officers to participate in meetings of the English board of directors. The state hearing examiner also found that “[a]t least one person who is on the Canadian subsidiary is also on the taxpayer’s board.” .App. to Juris. Statement 34a. Cf. App. 41a (at least three members of the Canadian board of directors also sat on the parent’s board). Although the Department’s hearing examiner did not make findings in this connection, there was testimony that “some of the directors of Woolworth, the taxpayer, sit on the Board of the Mexican subsidiary . . . .” Id., at 29a. “It would be on a rare occasion, once a year,” that the “managing directors” of the foreign subsidiaries would come to New York. Id., at 34a. “It is only sporadically that the parent company is represented at the [English company's] Board meetings.” Id., at 40a. Further, while Woolworth’s chief executive officer and other officers would “on occasion” travel to confer with the subsidiaries’ managers, it was “hard to discern any pattern of regular monthly visits or quarterly visits.” Id., at 35a. “The exchange of information contacts by the subsidiaries is made by the Chief Executive of the company. The Director of Purchases of the parent company does not confer with the Director of Purchasing of the Canadian company or of the German company.” Id., at 37a. The testimony was that “the Canadian financial people have the right to finance their day-to-day operations and I doubt that they would be required ... at the level of a million dollars to seek the permission of the parent company. If there was really substantial borrowings going on, I am sure the Canadians before borrowing . . . would obtain permission of the parent company.” Id., at 26a. More generally, the witness stated that “[n]ormally, I would think that substantial borrowing, an unusual amount, would necessitate the checking with the principal stockholders or the Board of Directors.” Id., at 28a. The English subsidiary was not included in the consolidated statements. App. to Juris. Statement 35a. Cf. Keesling & Warren, The Unitary Concept in the Allocation of Income, 12 Hastings L. J. 42, 52 (1960) (“Central accounting, for instance, may result in some savings, but in most instances the amount is trifling in comparison with the income [involved]. Alone considered, it is too weak a connecting link to bind into one business, what would otherwise, from an operational standpoint, be considered separate businesses”). As noted, there was no centralized tax department and no consolidation of tax returns. In addition to the links set forth in the text, it is plain that the parent and the four subsidiaries all utilize the same general “F. W. Woolworth” corporate name. There is no record information on the significance of the use of this common name. Neither the Department nor the New Mexico Supreme Court gave any weight to use of a common corporate name when sustaining the tax at issue. Cf. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501, 508 (1942). In Mobil, the Court relied upon Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm’n, 266 U. S. 271 (1924): “A British corporation manufactured ale in Great Britain and sold some of it in New York. The corporation objected on due process grounds to New York’s imposition of an apportioned franchise tax on the corporation’s net income. The Court sustained the tax on the strength of its earlier decision in Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, [254 U. S. 113 (1920)], where it had upheld a similar tax as applied to a business operating in several of our States. It ruled that the brewer carried on a unitary business, involving ‘a series of transactions beginning with the manufacture in England and ending in sales in New York and other places’. . . . 266 U. S., at 282.” Mobil, 445 U. S., at 438. There is no comparable “series of transactions” in this case linking the retail merchandise business of Woolworth’s foreign subsidiaries with its business in New Mexico. See Hans Rees’ Sons v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U. S. 123, 133 (1931) (“Undoubtedly, the enterprise of a corporation which manufactures and sells its manufactured product is ordinarily a unitary business, and all the factors in that enterprise are essential to the realization of profits”); Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax Apportionment and the Circumscription of Unitary Business, 21 Nat. Tax J. 487, 496 (1968) (“Manufacturing or purchasing goods in one state and selling in another, and transportation and communication between the states are typical of cases considered unitary”); G. Altman & F. Keesling, Allocation of Income in State Taxation 101-102 (1946). Woolworth challenges only New Mexico’s tax treatment of its dividend and gross-up income. See Juris. Statement i; Brief for Appellant i. We therefore do not consider New Mexico’s tax treatment of other items of Woolworth income. In particular, we do not pass upon the proper treatment of Woolworth’s foreign exchange gain — a matter that was not considered below. See nn. 7-9, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. PHOEBE PUTNEY HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., et al. No. 11-1160. Argued November 26, 2012 Decided February 19, 2013 Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Benjamin J Horwich argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Verrilli, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Hesse, Willard K. Tom, John F Daly, and Imad D. Abyad. Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Edward C. DuMont, Daniel P. Kear-ney, Jr., Alan E. Schoenfeld, and Thomas S. Chambless. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Illinois et al. by Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Jane Elinor Notz, Deputy Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Thomas C. Horne of Arizona, Kamala D. Harris of California, John W. Suthers of Colorado, George Epson of Connecticut, Joseph R. Biden HI of Delaware, David M. Louie of Hawaii, Lawrence W. Wasden of Idaho, Douglas F. Gansler of Maryland, Bill Schuette of Michigan, Lori Swanson of Minnesota, Catherine Cortez Mosto of Nevada, Michael A. Delaney of New Hampshire, Gary K. King of New Mexico, Eric T. Schneiderman of New York, Roy Cooper of North Carolina, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Linda L. Kelly of Pennsylvania, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., of Tennessee, and Darrell V. McGrow, Jr., of West Virginia; for the American Antitrust Institute by Richard M. Brunell and Albert A. Foer, and for Joseph Stubbs et al. by Kermit S. Dorough, Jr. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Hospital Association et al. by Beth Heifetz and Toby G. Singer; for the Georgia Alliance of Community Hospitals, Inc., et al. by John H. Parker, Jr.; and for the Lee Memorial Health System by Ms. Heifetz and Mr. Singer. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Medical Association et al. by Jack R. Bierig; for Economics Professors by Bernard S. Black, pro se; and for the National Federation of Independent Business by Jarod M. Bona and Karen R. Harned. Justice Sotomayok delivered the opinion of the Court. Under this Court’s state-action immunity doctrine, when a local governmental entity acts pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competition, it is exempt from scrutiny under the federal antitrust laws. In this case, we must decide whether a Georgia law that creates special-purpose public entities called hospital authorities and gives those entities general corporate powers, including the power to acquire hospitals, clearly articulates and affirmatively expresses a state policy to permit acquisitions that substantially lessen competition. Because Georgia’s grant of general corporate powers to hospital authorities does not include permission to use those powers anticompetitively, we hold that the clear-articulation test is not satisfied and state-action immunity does not apply. f—4 A In 1941, the State of Georgia amended its Constitution to ■ allow political subdivisions to provide health care services. 1941 Ga. Laws p. 50. The State concurrently enacted the Hospital Authorities Law (Law), id., at 241, Ga. Code Ann. §31-7-70 et seq. (2012), “to provide a mechanism for the operation and maintenance of needed health care facilities in the several counties and municipalities of th[e] state.” §31-7-76(a). “The purpose of the constitutional provision and the statute based thereon was to ... create an organization which could carry out and make more workable the duty which the State owed to its indigent sick.” DeJarnette v. Hospital Auth. of Albany, 195 Ga. 189, 200, 23 S. E. 2d. 716, 723 (1942) (citations omitted). As amended, the Law. authorizes each county and municipality, and certain combinations of counties or municipalities, to create “a public body corporate and politic” called a “hospital authority.” §§ 31-7-72(a), (d). Hospital authorities are governed by five-to nine-member boards that are appointed by the governing body of the county or municipality in their area of operation. § 31-7-72(a). Under the Law, a hospital authority “exercise[s] public and essential governmental functions” and is delegated “all the powers necessary or convenient to carry out and effectuate” the Law’s purposes. §31-7-75. Giving more content to that general delegation, the Law enumerates 27 powers conferred upon hospital authorities, including the power “[t]o acquire by purchase, lease, or otherwise and to operate projects,” § 31-7-75(4), which are defined to include hospitals and other public health facilities, §31-7-71(5); “[t]o construct, reconstruct, improve, alter, and repair projects,” §31-7-75(5); “[t]o lease ... for operation by others any project” provided certain conditions are satisfied, § 31-7-75(7); and “[t]o establish rates and charges for the services and use of the facilities of the authority,” §31-7-75(10). Hospital authorities may not operate or construct any project for profit, and accordingly they must set rates so as only to cover operating expenses and create reasonable reserves. § 31-7-77. B In the same year that the Law was adopted, the city of Albany and Dougherty County established the Hospital Authority of Albany-Dougherty County (Authority) and the Authority promptly acquired Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital (Memorial), which has been in operation in Albany since 1911. In 1990, the Authority restructured its operations by forming two private nonprofit corporations to manage Memorial: Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc. (PPHS), and its subsidiary, Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital, Inc. (PPMH). The Authority leased Memorial to PPMH for $1 per year for 40 years. Under the lease, PPMH has exclusive authority over the operation of Memorial, including the ability to set rates for services. Consistent with §31-7-75(7), PPMH is subject to lease conditions that require provision of care to the indigent sick and limit its rate of return. Memorial is one of two hospitals in Dougherty County. The second, Palmyra Medical Center (Palmyra), was established in Albany in 1971 and is located just two miles from Memorial. At the time suit was brought in this case, Palmyra was operated by a national for-profit hospital network, HCA, Inc. (HCA). Together, Memorial and Palmyra account for 86 percent of the market for acute-care hospital services provided to commercial health care plans and their customers in the six counties surrounding Albany. Memorial accounts for 75 percent of that market on its own. In 2010, PPHS began discussions with HCA about acquiring Palmyra. Following negotiations, PPHS presented the Authority with a plan under which the Authority would purchase Palmyra with PPHS controlled funds and then lease Palmyra to a PPHS subsidiary for $1 per year under the Memorial lease agreement. The Authority unanimously approved the transaction. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) shortly thereafter issued an administrative complaint alleging that the proposed purchase-and-lease transaction would create a virtual monopoly and would substantially reduce competition in the market for acute-care hospital services, in violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, 15 U. S. C. § 45, and § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. § 18. The FTC, along with the State of Georgia, subsequently filed suit against the Authority, HCA, Palmyra, PPHS, PPMH, and the new PPHS subsidiary created to manage Palmyra (collectively respondents), seeking to enjoin the transaction pending administrative proceedings. See 15 U. S. C. §§26, 53(b). The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia denied the request for a preliminary injunction and granted respondents’ motion to dismiss. 793 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (2011). The District Court held that respondents are immune from antitrust liability under the state-action doctrine. See id., at 1366-1381. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 663 F. 3d 1369 (2011). As an initial matter, the court “agree[d] with the [FTC] that, on the facts alleged, the joint operation of Memorial and Palmyra woúld substantially lessen competition or tend to create, if not create, a monopoly.” Id., at 1375. But the court concluded that the transaction was immune from antitrust liability. See id., at 1375-1378. The Court of Appeals explained that as a local governmental entity, the Authority was entitled to state-action immunity if the challenged anticompetitive conduct was a “ ‘foreseeable result’ ” of Georgia’s legislation. Id., at 1375. According to the court, anticompetitive conduct is foreseeable if it could have been “ ‘reasonably anticipated’ ” by the state legislature; it is not necessary, the court reasoned, for an anticompetitive effect to “be ‘one that ordinarily occurs, routinely occurs, or is inherently likely to occur as a result of the empowering legislation.’” Id., at 1375-1376 (quoting FTC v. Hospital Bd. of Directors of Lee Cty., 38 P. 3d 1184, 1188, 1190-1191 (CA11 1994)). Applying that standard, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Law contemplated the anticompetitive conduct challenged by the FTC. The court noted the “impressive breadth” of the powers given to hospital authorities, which include traditional powers of private corporations and a few additional capabilities, such as the power to exercise eminent domain. See 663 F. 3d, at 1376. More specifically, the court reasoned that the Georgia Legislature must have anticipated that the grant of power to hospital authorities to acquire and lease projects would produce anticompetitive effects because “[fjoresee-ably, acquisitions could consolidate ownership of competing hospitals, eliminating competition between them.” Id., at 1377. The Court of Appeals also rejected the FTC’s alternative argument that state-action immunity did not apply because the transaction in substance involved a transfer of control over Palmyra from one private entity to another, with the Authority acting as a mere conduit for the sale to evade antitrust liability. See id., at 1376, n. 12. We granted certiorari on two questions: whether the Georgia Legislature, through the powers it vested in hospital authorities, clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a state policy to displace competition in the market for hospital services; and if so, whether state-action immunity is nonetheless inapplicable as a result of the Authority’s minimal participation in negotiating the terms of the sale of Palmyra and the Authority’s limited supervision of the two hospitals’ operations. See 567 U. S. 933 (2012). Concluding that the answer to the first question is “no,” we reverse without reaching the second question. II In Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), this Court held that because “nothing in the language of the Sherman Act [15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq.] or in its history” suggested that Congress intended to restrict the sovereign capacity of the States to regulate their economies, the Act should not be read to bar States from imposing market restraints “as an act of government.” Id., at 350, 352. Following Parker, we have held that under certain circumstances, immunity from the federal antitrust laws may extend to nonstate actors carrying out the State’s regulatory program. See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U. S. 94, 99-100 (1988); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U. S. 48, 66-57 (1985). But given the fundamental national values of free enterprise and economic competition that are embodied in the federal antitrust laws, “state-action immunity is disfavored, much as are repeals by implication.” FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U. S. 621, 636 (1992). Consistent with this preference, we recognize state-action immunity only when it is clear that the challenged anticompetitive conduct is undertaken pursuant to a regulatory scheme that “is the State’s own.” Id., at 635. Accordingly, “[c]loser analysis is required when the activity at issue is not directly that of” the State itself, but rather “is carried out by others pursuant to state authorization.” Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U. S. 558, 568 (1984). When determining whether the anticompetitive acts of private parties are entitled to immunity, we employ a two-part test, requiring first that “the challenged restraint... be one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy,” and second that “the policy ... be actively supervised by the State.” California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97, 105 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). This case involves allegedly anticompetitive conduct undertaken by a substate governmental entity. Because municipalities and other political subdivisions are not themselves sovereign, state-action immunity under Parker does not apply to them directly. See Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U. S. 365, 370 (1991); Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 411-413 (1978) (plurality opinion). At the same time, however, substate governmental entities do receive immunity from antitrust scrutiny when they act “pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service.” Id., at 413. This rule “preserves to the States their freedom ... to use their municipalities to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhibitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation’s free-market goals.” Id., at 415-416. As with private parties, immunity will only attach to the activities of local governmental entities if they are undertaken pursuant to a “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed” state policy to displace competition. Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 52 (1982). But unlike private parties, such entities are not subject to the “active state supervision requirement” because they have less of an incentive to pursue their own self-interest under the guise of implementing state policies. Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U. S. 34, 46-47 (1985). “[T]o pass the ‘clear articulation’ test,” a state legislature need not “expressly state in a statute or its legislative history that the legislature intends for the delegated action to have anticompetitive effects.” Id., at 43. Rather, we explained in Hallie that state-action immunity applies if the anticompetitive effect was the “foreseeable result” of what the State authorized. Id., at 42. We applied that principle in Omni, where we concluded that the clear-articulation test was satisfied because the suppression of competition in the billboard market was the foreseeable result of a state statute authorizing municipalities to adopt zoning ordinances regulating the construction of buildings and other structures. 499 U. S., at 373. Ill A Applying the clear-articulation test to the Law before us, we conclude that respondents’ claim for state-action immunity fails because there is no evidence the State affirmatively contemplated that hospital authorities would displace competition by consolidating hospital ownership. The acquisition and leasing powers exercised by the Authority in the challenged transaction, which were the principal powers relied upon by the Court of Appeals in finding state-action immunity, see 663 F. 3d, at 1377, mirror general powers routinely conferred by state law upon private corporations. Other powers possessed by hospital authorities that the Court of Appeals characterized as having “impressive breadth,” id., at 1376, also fit this pattern, including the ability to make and execute contracts, § 31-7-75(3), to set rates for services, §31-7-75(10), to sue and be sued, §31-7-75(1), to borrow money, §31-7-75(17), and the residual authority to exercise any or all powers possessed by private corporations, §31-7-75(21). Our case law makes clear that state-law authority to act is insufficient to establish state-action immunity; the substate governmental entity must also show that it has been delegated authority to act or regulate anticompetitively. See Omni, 499 U. S., at 372. In Boulder, we held that Colorado’s Home Rule Amendment allowing municipalities to govern local affairs did not satisfy the clear-articulation test. 455 U. S., at 55-56. There was no doubt in that case that the city had authority as a matter of state law to pass an ordinance imposing a moratorium on a cable provider’s expansion of service. Id,., at 45-46. But we rejected the proposition that “the general grant of power to enact ordinances necessarily implies state authorization to enact specific anticom-petitive ordinances” because such an approach “would wholly eviscerate the concepts of ‘clear articulation and affirmative expression’ that our precedents require.” Id., at 56. We explained that when a State’s position “is one of mere neutrality respecting the municipal actions challenged as anti-competitive,” the State cannot be said to have “‘contemplated’ ” those anticompetitive actions. Id., at 55. The principle articulated in Boulder controls this case. Grants of general corporate power that allow substate governmental entities to participate in a competitive marketplace should be, can be, and typically are used in ways that raise no federal antitrust concerns. As a result, a State that has delegated such general powers “can hardly be said to have ‘contemplated’” that they will be used anticompeti-tively. Ibid. See also 1A P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶225⅜ p. 131 (3d ed. 2006) (hereinafter Areeda & Hovenkamp) (“When a state grants power to an inferior entity, it presumably grants the power to do the thing contemplated, but not to do so anticompetitively”). Thus, while the Law does allow the Authority to acquire hospitals, it does not clearly articulate and affirmatively express a state policy empowering the Authority to make acquisitions of existing hospitals that will substantially lessen competition. B In concluding otherwise, and specifically in reasoning that the Georgia Legislature “must have anticipated” that acquisitions by hospital authorities “would produce anticompeti-tive effects,” 663 F. 3d, at 1377, the Court of Appeals applied the concept of “foreseeability” from our clear-articulation test too loosely. In Hattie, we recognized that it would “embod[y] an unrealistic view of how legislatures work and of how statutes are written” to require state legislatures to explicitly authorize specific anticompetitive effects before state-action immunity could apply. 471 U. S., at 43. “No legislature,” we explained, “can be expected to catalog all of the anticipated effects” of a statute delegating authority to a substate governmental entity. Ibid. Instead, we have approached the clear-articulation inquiry more practically, but without diluting the ultimate requirement that the State must have affirmatively contemplated the displacement of competition such that the challenged anticompetitive effects can be attributed to the “state itself.” Parker, 317 U. S., at 352. Thus, we have concluded that a state policy to displace federal antitrust law was sufficiently expressed where the displacement of competition was the inherent, logical, or ordinary result of the exercise of authority delegated by the state legislature. In that scenario, the State must have foreseen and implicitly endorsed the anticompetitive effects as consistent with its policy goals. For example, in Hattie, Wisconsin statutory law regulating the municipal provision of sewage services expressly permitted cities to limit their service to surrounding unincorporated areas. See 471 U. S., at 41. While unincorporated towns alleged that the city’s exercise of that power constituted an unlawful tying arrangement, an unlawful refusal to deal, and an abuse of monopoly power, we had no trouble concluding that these alleged anticompetitive effects were affirmatively contemplated by the State because it was “clear” that they “logically would result” from the grant of authority. Id., at 42. As described by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the state legislature “ Viewed annexation by the city of a surrounding unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city could require before extending sewer services to the area.’” Id., at 44-45, n. 8 (quoting Hallie v. Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 540-541, 314 N. W. 2d 321, 325 (1982)). Without immunity, federal antitrust law could have undermined that arrangement and taken completely off the table the policy option that the State clearly intended for cities to have. Similarly, in Omni, where the respondents alleged that the city had used its zoning power to protect an incumbent billboard provider against competition, we found that the clear-articulation test was easily satisfied even though the state statutes delegating zoning authority to the city did not explicitly permit the suppression of competition. We explained that “[t]he very purpose of zoning regulation is to displace unfettered business freedom in a manner that regularly has the effect of preventing normal acts of competition” and that a zoning ordinance regulating the size, location, and spacing of billboards “necessarily protects existing billboards against some competition from newcomers.” 499 U. S., at 373. Other cases in which we have found a “clear articulation” of the State’s intent to displace competition without an explicit statement have also involved authorizations to act or regulate in ways that were inherently anticompetitive. By contrast, “simple permission to play in a market” does not “foreseeably entail permission to roughhouse in that market unlawfully.” Kay Elec. Cooperative v. Newkirk, 647 F. 3d 1039, 1043 (CA10 2011). When a State grants some entity general power to act, whether it is a private corporation or a public entity like the Authority, it does so against the backdrop of federal antitrust law. See Ticor Title, 504 U. S., at 632. Of course, both private parties and local governmental entities conceivably may transgress antitrust requirements by exercising their general powers in anti-competitive ways. But a reasonable legislature’s ability to anticipate that (potentially undesirable) possibility falls well short of clearly articulating an affirmative state policy to displace competition with a regulatory alternative. Believing that this case falls within the scope of the foreseeability standard applied in Hallie and Omni, the Court of Appeals stated that “[i]t defies imagination to suppose the [state] legislature could have believed that every geographic market in Georgia was so replete with hospitals that authorizing acquisitions by the authorities could have no serious anticompetitive consequences.” 663 F. 3d, at 1377. Respondents echo this argument, noting that each of Georgia’s 159 counties covers a small geographical area and that most of them are sparsely populated, with nearly three-quarters having fewer than 50,000 residents as of the 2010 Census. Brief for Respondents 46. Even accepting, arguendo, the premise that facts about a market could make the anticompetitive use of general corporate powers “foreseeable,” we reject the Court of Appeals’ and respondents’ conclusion because only a relatively small subset of the conduct permitted as a matter of state law by Ga. Code Ann. §31-7-75(4) has the potential to negatively affect competition. Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ and respondents’ characterization, § 31-7-76(4) is not principally concerned with hospital authorities’ ability to acquire multiple hospitals and consolidate their operations. Section 31-7-75(4) allows authorities to acquire “projects,” which includes not only “hospitals,” but also “health care facilities, dormitories, office buildings, clinics, housing accommodations, nursing homes, rehabilitation centers, extended care facilities, and other public health facilities.” §31-7-71(5). Narrowing our focus to the market for hospital services, the power to acquire hospitals still does not ordinarily produce anticompetitive effects. Section 31-7-75(4) was, after all, the source of power for newly formed hospital authorities to acquire a hospital in the first instance—a transaction that was unlikely to raise any antitrust concerns even in small markets because the transfer of ownership from private to public hands does not increase market concentration. See 1A Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶224e(c), at 126 (“[Substitution of one monopolist for another is not an antitrust violation”). While subsequent acquisitions by authorities have the potential to reduce competition, they will raise federal antitrust concerns only in markets that are large enough to support more than one hospital but sufficiently small that the merger of competitors would lead to a significant increase in market concentration. This is too slender a reed to support the Court of Appeals’ and respondents’ inference. IV A Taking a somewhat different approach than the Court of Appeals, respondents insist that the Law should not be read as a mere authorization for hospital authorities to participate in the hospital-services market and exercise general corporate powers. Rather, they contend that hospital authorities are granted unique powers and responsibilities to fulfill the State’s objective of providing all residents with access to adequate and affordable health and hospital care. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. §31-7-75(22). Respondents argue that in view of hospital authorities’ statutory objective, their specific attributes, and the regulatory context in which they operate, it was foreseeable that authorities facing capacity constraints would decide they could best serve their communities’ needs by acquiring an existing local hospital rather than incur the additional expense and regulatory burden of expanding a facility or constructing a new one. See Brief for Respondents 33-39. In support of this argument, respondents observe that hospital authorities are simultaneously empowered to act in ways private entities cannot while also being subject to significant regulatory constraints. On the power side, as the Court of Appeals noted, 663 F. 3d, at 1376-1377, hospital authorities may acquire through eminent domain property that is “essential to the [authority’s] purposes.” § 31-7-75(12). On the restraint side, hospital authorities are managed by a publicly accountable board, §§31-7-74.1, 31-7-76; they must operate on a nonprofit basis, §31-7-77; and they may only lease a project for others to operate after determining that doing so will promote the community’s public health needs and that the lessee will not receive more than a reasonable rate of return on its investment, §31-7-75(7). Moreover, hospital authorities operate within a broader regulatory context in which Georgia requires any party seeking to establish or significantly expand certain medical facilities, including hospitals, to obtain a certificate of need from state regulators. See §31-6-40 et seq. We have no doubt that Georgia’s hospital authorities differ materially from private corporations that offer hospital services. But nothing in the Law or any other provision of Georgia law clearly articulates a state policy to allow authorities to exercise their general corporate powers, including their acquisition power, without regard to negative effects on competition. The state legislature’s objective of improving access to affordable health care does not logically suggest that the State intended that hospital authorities pursue that end through mergers that create monopolies. Nor do the restrictions imposed on hospital authorities, including the requirement that they operate on a nonprofit basis, reveal such a policy. Particularly in light of our national policy favoring competition, these restrictions should be read to reflect more modest aims. The legislature may have viewed profit generation as incompatible with its goal of providing care for the indigent sick. In addition, the legislature may have believed that some hospital authorities would operate in markets with characteristics of natural monopolies, in which case the legislature could not rely on competition to control prices. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U. S. 579, 595-596 (1976). We recognize that Georgia, particularly through its certificate of need requirement, does limit competition in the market for hospital services in some respects. But regulation of an industry, and even the authorization of discrete forms of anticompetitive conduct pursuant to a regulatory structure, does not establish that the State has affirmatively contemplated other forms of anticompetitive conduct that are only tangentially related. Thus, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), we rejected a state-action defense to price-fixing claims where a state bar adopted a compulsory minimum fee schedule. Although the State heavily regulated the practice of law, we found no evidence that it had adopted a policy to displace price competition among lawyers. Id., at 788-792. And in Cantor, we concluded that a state commission’s regulation of rates for electricity charged by a public utility did not confer state-action immunity for a claim that the utility’s free distribution of light bulbs restrained trade in the light-bulb market. 428 U. S., at 596. In this case, the fact that Georgia imposes limits on entry into the market for medical services, which apply to both hospital authorities and private corporations, does not clearly articulate a policy favoring the consolidation of existing hospitals that are engaged in active competition. Accord, FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F. 2d 1206, 1213, n. 13 (CA11 1991). As to the Authority’s eminent domain power, it was not exercised here and we do not find it relevant to the question whether the State authorized hospital authorities to consolidate market power through potentially anticompetitive acquisitions of existing hospitals. B Finally, respondents contend that to the extent there is any doubt about whether the clear-articulation test is satisfied in this context, federal courts should err on the side of recognizing immunity to avoid improper interference with state policy choices. See Brief for Respondents 43-44. But we do not find the Law ambiguous on the question whether it clearly articulates a policy authorizing anticom-petitive acquisitions; it does not. More fundamentally, respondents’ suggestion is inconsistent with the principle that “state-action immunity is disfavored.” Ticor Title, 504 U. S., at 636. Parker and its progeny are premised on an understanding that respect for the States’ coordinate role in government counsels against reading the federal antitrust laws to restrict the States’ sovereign capacity to regulate their economies and provide services to their citizens. But federalism and state sovereignty are poorly served by a rule of construction that would allow “essential national policies” embodied in the antitrust laws to be displaced by state delegations of authority “intended to achieve more limited ends.” 504 U. S., at 636. As an amici brief filed by 20 States in support of the FTC contends, loose application of the clear-artieulation test would attach significant unintended consequences to States’ frequent delegations of corporate authority to local bodies, effectively requiring States to disclaim any intent to displace competition to avoid inadvertently authorizing anticompeti-tive conduct. Brief for State of Illinois et al. 12-17; see also Surgical Care Center of Hammond, L. C. v. Hospital Serv. Dist. No. 1, 171 F. 3d 231, 236 (CA5 1999) (en banc). We decline to set such a trap for unwary state legislatures. * * * We hold that Georgia has not clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a policy to allow hospital authorities to make acquisitions that substantially lessen competition. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Georgia did not join the notice of appeal filed by the FTC and is no longer a party in the case. In tension with the Court of Appeals’ decision, other Circuits have held in analogous circumstances that substate governmental entities exercising general corporate powers were not entitled to state-action immunity. See Kay Elec. Cooperative v. Newkirk, 647 P. 3d 1039, 1043, 1045-1047 (CA10 2011); First Am. Title Co. v. Devaugh, 480 P. 3d 438, 456-457 (CA6 2007); Surgical Care Center of Hammond, L. C. v. Hospital Serv. Dist. No. 1, 171F. 3d 231, 235-236 (CA5 1999) (en banc); Lancaster Community Hospital v. Antelope Valley Hospital Dist., 940 P. 2d 397, 402-403 (CA9 1991). After issuing'its decision, the Court of Appeals dissolved the temporary injunction that it had granted pending appeal and the transaction closed. The case is not moot, however, because the District Court on remand could enjoin respondents from taking actions that would disturb the status quo and impede a final remedial decree. See Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U. S. 298, 307 (2012) (“A case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F. 3d 1028, 1033-1034 (CADC 2008) (opinion of Brown, J.) (rejecting a mootness argument in a similar posture). An amicus curiae contends that we should recognize and apply a “market participant” exception to state-action immunity because Georgia’s hospital authorities engage in proprietary activities. Brief for National Federation of Independent Business 6-24; see also Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U. S. 365, 374-375, 379 (1991) (leaving open the possibility of a market participant exception). Because this argument was not raised by the parties or passed on by the lower courts, we do not consider it. United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U. S. 56, 60, n. 2 (1981). The Eleventh Circuit has held that while Georgia’s hospital authorities are “unique entities” that lie “somewhere between a local, general-purpose governing body (such as a city or county) and a corporation,” they qualify as “an instrumentality, agency, or ‘political subdivision’ of Georgia for purposes of state action immunity.” Crosby v. Hospital Auth. of Valdosta & Lowndes Cty., 93 F. 3d 1515, 1524-1526 (1996). The FTC has not challenged that characterization of Georgia’s hospital authorities, and we accordingly operate from the assumption that hospital authorities are akin to political subdivisions. Compare Ga. Code Ann. §§ 31-7-75(4), (7) (2012) (authorizing hospital authorities to acquire projects and enter lease agreements) with § 14-2-302 (outlining general powers of private corporations in Georgia, which include the ability to acquire and lease property), § 14-2-1101 (allowing corporate mergers), and §§ 14-2-1201,14-2-1202 (allowing sales of corporate assets to other corporations). See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U. S. 48, 64, 66, and n. 25 (1985) (finding that a state commission’s decision to encourage collective ratemaking by common carriers was entitled to state-action immunity where the legislature had left “[t]he details of the inherently anticompetitive rate-setting process ... to the agency’s discretion”); Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U. S. 34, 42 (1985) (describing New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96 (1978), as a case where there was not an “express intent to displace the antitrust laws” but where the regulatory structure at issue restricting the establishment or relocation of automobile dealerships “inherently displaced unfettered business freedom” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). The Court of Appeals also invoked Ga. Code Ann. §31-7-84, which provides that hospital authorities do not have the power to assess taxes, but allows the applicable governing body in the authority’s area of operation to impose taxes to cover the authority’s expenses. See 663 F. 3d, at 1377. This provision applies in cases in which the county or municipality has entered into a contract with a hospital authority for the use of its facilities. See §§31-7-84(a), 31-7-85. No such contract exists in this case, and respondents have not relied on this provision in briefing or argument before us. Georgia first adopted certificate of need legislation in 1978 in part to comply with a since-repealed federal law conditioning federal funding for a number of health care programs on a State’s enactment of certificate of need laws. See 1978 Ga. Laws p. 941, as amended, Ga. Code Ann. §31-6-40 et seq. (2012); see also National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 2246, repealed by § 701(a), 100 Stat. 3799. Many other States also have certificate of need laws. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Certificate of Need: State Health Laws and Programs, online at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/ con-certificate-of-need-state-laws.aspx (as visited Feb. 15, 2013, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (indicating in “States with CON Programs” table that 35 States retained some type of certificate of need program as of December 2011 while 15 other States had such programs but have repealed them).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?